Community Party Building in Urban China

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Abstract
This paper analyzes the community party building programme in urban China. Community party building represents an effort of the Communist Party of China to transform itself from a “revolutionary party” to a “governing party”. The party building programme involves the expansion of the party’s organizational presence and the various mechanisms to re-organize and integrate party-members. It shows that the CCP is concerned about its organizational erosion at the base level, and is taking measures to remedy the situation. The paper also discusses the relationship between the party organization and local democratic development.

Keywords: Chinese Communist Party, community construction, community party building, grassroots democracy, urban reforms

JEL classification: N35, N95, P36, Z19

1. Introduction
The study of Chinese politics cannot escape from the study of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the party hereafter). Born in 1921 in a divided China, the CCP finally emerged victorious over foreign and domestic rivals in 1949. It re-built the state and reshaped society in accordance to the ideological blueprints of its leaders and the Soviet model. The party created a totalistic system that infused the party, the state, and society, with the party as the centre permeating all aspects of social, economic, and political lives. Over the years, the system was buttressed by the development of a number of totalistic institutions, such as the ubiquitous work units in the cities, the people’s communes in rural areas, the household registration system (hukou 户口 or huji 户籍) that restricted internal migration, the class identification system (shenfen jieji zhidu 身份阶级制度) that classified the “class back-grounds” of citizens, the centralized job allocation and employment planning system that highly restricted social and occupational mobility, the personal dossier
system that kept track of an individual’s misconduct throughout his or her life, the state and collective ownership of means of production that centralized the control of economic resources, and the extensive party networks among the people. The communist party-state was able to achieve a level of centralized political control that was never seen in the pre-CCP rule of the Kuomintang.

Some scholars were doubtful of the sustainability of the monistic and totalistic party-state. Shiping Zheng (1997) argued that there is an inherent structural conflict in such a system because the two principal entities (the party and the state) follow two fundamentally different organizational logics: the party is a perpetually revolutionary-mobilization organization, while the state is by nature a conservative bureaucratic institution. A Chinese scholar described the pre-Deng political structure as “double-track” (shuangguizhi 双轨制) – meaning the parallel party and state apparatuses – which resulted in the confusion of responsibility and accountability and stifled the functioning of legislative initiatives and the rule of law. The consequence of which was the pervasive rule of men (renzhi 人治) (Li, 2000: 172-178). In the eyes of many China watchers, the collapse of the communist totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the near-death experience of the CCP itself in the 1989 students’ movement provided the indication that the CCP’s rule might collapse sooner rather than later in the 1990s. Yet, the CCP was remarkably resilient (Nathan, 2003). It was able to dismantle or reform most of the above-mentioned totalistic institutions in order to pave the way for marketization reforms and economic growth, without shattering the security of its political authority. The party managed to institutionalize succession politics and increase political participation, create or revive several alternative institutions to handle newly emerging challenges in the reform era, and transform itself, using the preferred terms in China today, from a “revolutionary party” to “governing party”.

Thus, compared to the China scholarship in the post-Tiananmen era, the recent scholarship started to pay more attention again to the CCP. Bruce Dickson (2003, 2008) manages to produce the most empirically-sound scholarly work on the patterns and effects of party-business alliance, which points to the remarkable transformation of the party from a proletarian party (at least in ideology and rhetoric) to a party of elite, including commercial elite. David Shambaugh’s (2008) study documents the efforts undertaken by the party to study communist, ex-communist, non-communist parties all over the world to increase the party’s governing capacity. Although the party shows signs of organizational decline and atrophy, the party is also taking pro-active adaptation measures to improve and transform itself in order to stay ahead as the paramount leadership organization in a rapidly changing China. Zheng Yongnian (2010) argues that the CCP is able to reproduce its domination over the state and society by introducing some democratic
elements and limited political participation in the process of reproduction of what is termed as “organizational emperorship”. The pessimistic accounts of the party as a corrupt, irrelevant, incompetent, and disintegrating organization are not without basis of truth, but fail to pay attention to the processes of transformation, revitalization, and re-institutionalization of the party.

This paper is an attempt to examine one particular aspect, at the base-level, of the transformation of the party – community party building in urban China. The concept of community party building (shequ dangjian 社区党建) was being articulated about the same time of the formulation of the community construction (shequ jianshe 社区建设) policy in late 1990s and early 2000s. Community construction aims to re-build and strengthen the grassroots administrative organs in urban China – the street offices and the residents’ committees, in order for them to play a more prominent role in urban governance and management. The reforms of the state-owned enterprises in the 1990s began the transformation of the urban work unit from an all-encompassing institution that handled economic production, ideological education, political mobilization and social welfare, to a more economic-oriented entity. The residents’ committee, which for a long time served as a supplementary institution to organize people outside of the orbit of work units in China’s cities, was now being bolstered and revived. The reinvigoration of the residents’ committees was also accompanied by a vision to transform these grassroots organs into modern functional communities under the community construction policy. Party building in urban communities thus has also become an important component of the community construction policy.

Following this introduction, this paper is divided into four parts. Section 2 will introduce the basic concept of party building in China’s political discourse. Section 3 deals with the organizational mechanisms of urban community party building. In Section 4, I discuss the relationship between urban community party building and community democracy. The last section offers a conclusion.

2. The Concepts of Party Building and Grassroots Party Building

The party occupies a special place in the state-society relations in China. As a system founded on the Leninist principles, the party and the state are in many ways institutionally mingled, with the party clearly on top of the state. On the other hand, many Chinese scholars also argue that the communist party is a “societal” organization, in the sense that it originated from a social movement and it continues to represent and articulate societal/class interests. Society is therefore the “base area” of the party. It provides the necessary “space” for the party to mobilize, organize and consolidate support (Wang, 2003: 228). The “party building” programme goes beyond the mere expansion of party
membership and construction of party organizations within both the state and society. It includes a wide range of self-strengthening measures designed to ensure the party remains capable of leading both the state institutions and societal forces, as well as competent in the performance of the numerous tasks of governance, serving the people, social integration, and mobilization. It also requires party members to be well trained in ideology, organizational skills and organizational discipline. Since the beginning of the reform era, the party building programme demanded the party organizations to be more professional and capable in excelling in administration and planning (Saich, 1986). In other words, ideology (red) and professionalism (expert) are both important elements of the party building programme. The ultimate goal is to construct a well-disciplined, deeply penetrative, organizationally sophisticated, and highly competent mass party, with a committed mission to modernize China (Sun, 1997: 120-125).

As mentioned before, the CCP sees itself as in the midst of transforming itself from a “revolutionary party” to a “governing party”. The party building programme in the reform era therefore has to reflect these changes. Especially for the present Hu-Wen leadership, the “strengthening of governing capacity” is the critical mission of the party in the new century. In the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in 2004, the party approved the “Decision on Strengthening the Building of Governing Capacity of the Party”, a document that reflects the current administration’s approach to governance and party building. The document demands the party to comprehensively improve its ability to guide and manage the socialist market economy, to govern through scientific and democratic method, to promote oversight of power in the decision-making process, to build up the rule of law, to construct a harmonious society, and to elevate the theoretical and ideological training among the cadres (Chen, 2005).

2.1. Grassroots Party Building

There are three main levels in the party’s organizational hierarchy: centre, regional (encompassing provincial, municipal, and county units) and grassroots units. Grassroots party organizations are established in enterprises, villages, schools, urban communities, social organizations, companies of Peoples’ Liberation Army and other local organizations. Depending on the number of party members in a particular grassroots unit, different types of grassroots party organization can be formed. A party branch (dangzhibu 党支部) contains more than 3 but less than 50 party members. A party general branch (dangzongzhi 党总支) has more than 50 but less than 100 party members. If a local unit has more than 100 members, a party base-level committee (dangjiceng weiyuanhui 党基层委员会, or in short dangwei 党
The leadership of the party organization is elected by the party members under its jurisdiction. According to one count, the CCP has about 3.792 million of this kind of grassroots party organizations (Gore, 2011: 54). Sometimes a smaller unit, the party small group (*dangxiao zu* 党小组), may exist, usually formed by only three party members. The party small group however is not an official unit and its work and activities have to be directed and led by a superior party organization (Lu and Ding, 2003: 55-70).

The Chinese Communist Party has always stressed the importance of its grassroots units. It views them not only as effective mechanisms to penetrate and mobilize the sociopolitical energy of the mass, but also as foundational blocks of the party’s organizational edifice. Former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin once warned that weak and ineffective grassroots units would cause the “party’s leadership and government, the party’s entire work, and the socialist state’s political power” to collapse (Jiang, 2003: 168-170). With the current Hu-Wen administration’s emphasis on governing capacity, grassroots party building programmes have been restructured to accommodate this concept as well. For example, the organization department of Fujian provincial party committee highlighted six aspects of the governing capacity of the grassroots party organizations. They include (1) development, (2) serving the masses, (3) competitiveness, (4) execution, (5) management, and (6) control.

“Development” refers primarily to the ability to promote and guide economic development. “Serving the masses” demands the party members to become activists and volunteers. “Competitiveness” is a particularly novel idea, which means that grassroots party members should not be afraid to compete in an electoral setting in order to enhance their own qualities and to consolidate the party’s governing status. “Execution” refers to the strict following and successful implementation of the policies and instructions from superior party leaders. “Management” means that grassroots party organizations have to manage and supervise their own party members well, making sure that they are well qualified and disciplined and able to maintain the “advanced nature” of the party. Finally, “control” demands grassroots party organizations to be a vigilant and effective force in responding to and resolving political and/or natural crisis situations. Grassroots party organizations are thus seen as one of the forces upholding social stability (Zhongong Fujian Shengwei Zuzhibu Ketizu, 2006).

Grassroots party organizations are by nature more proximate to the people and the society. This validates the importance of the party’s “social nature” (*shehui shuxing* 社会属性) in grassroots party building. As mentioned above, there is a theoretical view in China that sees the party as having a dual nature (political and social), which then justifies its active intervention in the society. Thus, while political power in the form of state authority is withdrawing
from the social sphere, political power in the form of the party power continues to expand its influence in the society. As a party that purportedly is committed to “serving the masses”, the “social nature” of the party brings forth some service-oriented elements in grassroots party building – interest mediation and societal attentiveness (shehui guanhuai 社会关怀). Under interest mediation, grassroots party organizations should ensure effective communication between different interests, classes, strata. They should play a leading role in coordinating and mediating disputes and conflicts between social forces. Under societal attentiveness, the party should be attentive to and care about the spiritual lives (thus working on ideological education), political lives (grassroots self-governance and democracy), and daily lives of the people (social-cultural activities and helping the vulnerable groups) (Lin, 2002: 60-62). The idea that grassroots party organizations should be more “socially attentive” illustrates the efforts of the party to become a more pragmatic, welfare-oriented and service-guided organization, while remaining broadly paternalistic.


Before the 1990s, the party’s base-level units in the cities were organized mostly in work units, reflecting the Leninist principle of organizing the party on the basis of production and government bodies. The idea was to embed the party in different sectors of the urban society. Through integrating these sectors under the party’s leadership the party would be able to extend its reach into the main structure of the society. Therefore, party’s base units that were established on the basis of residential areas (street offices and residents’ committees) had only a marginal and peripheral role in much of the organizational history of the party in the cities.

3.1. Challenges Facing Community Party Organizations

The reforms of the work units, which permitted state-owned enterprises to undergo bankruptcy, corporate reorganization, merger, and layoffs, have significantly increased the number of party members who are unattached to any party organization – the so-called “pocket party members” (koudai dangyuan 口袋党员) (Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Dangjian Yanjiu Ketizu, 2002: 115). Furthermore, among the vast migrating labour force in the cities there is also a large number of party members who have no contacts with their party organizations. According to the party’s constitution, each and every party member shall have an organizational relationship (zuzhi guanxi 组织关系) attached to a grassroots organization of the party. These party organizations
are responsible for disseminating party directives to the members, organizing “democratic life meetings”, managing and supervising party members, ensuring the strict following of party discipline, and others (Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2007: 28-29, 45-46). Without an organizational relationship with a party’s unit, the “pocket party members” in effect have been cut off from the party’s reach. With increasing number of party members released from work unit reforms and migrated from rural areas, many of them are now residing in urban communities and remain unattached to any party unit. Many of these party members actually “enjoy the freedom of living in anonymity and are glad to be rid of party disciplines and obligations” (Gore, 2011: 62). The party will lose substantial mobilization resources if these organizationally unattached party members remain unorganized.

The established party organizations in the communities, on the other hand, have been showing signs of decline in the reform era. The remarkable socioeconomic transformation and increase of urban wealth took place without significant role played by these grassroots party organizations. Although the grassroots party organizations continued to perform rather well in certain political tasks such as monitoring of dissidents and mobilization in political campaigns, they were less capable in the task of societal integration. The capability, work-style, knowledge, organized activities of the party organizations seemed to be lagging behind the demands of material improvements in the society. The introduction of electoral mechanism to urban communities – the elections of the residents’ committees, also to a certain degree sidelined the importance of the community party organizations. There was an acute sense of “marginalization” of these community party organizations.

In addition, there are many party members whose organizational relationships are attached to the work units outside of their communities (the so-called “on-work” members, the Chinese term is zaizhi dangyuan 在职党员). For these party members, their obligation to participate in party’s organizational activities is fulfilled in their own work units, not in the communities. They are not even required to reveal themselves as party members in the communities. Many of them are indeed uninterested in the work and activities of community construction, while the community party organization also has traditionally no authority over them (Wu and Chen, 2002). According to one estimate, on average only 30 per cent of the party members in urban communities had their organizational relationship attached to the community party organizations, 60 per cent of the party members were the so-called “on-work party members”, and about 10 per cent were “pocket party members” (Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Dangjian Yanjiu Ketizu, 2000: 265). In 2003, the organizational department of Guizhou provincial party committee estimated that only 0.37 per cent of the party members in the
Another issue is the emergence of the so-called “two-new” organizations, referring to private or foreign enterprises and the newly established social organizations (such as NGOs, foundations, charities). Both of which are concentrated in the community residential areas. Many of these organizations have very few or no party members at all. The rapid increase of these organizations without the organizational leadership and participation of the party indicates the irrelevance of the party in the more dynamic sectors in the society. Individual party members in these organizations are also in many instances “pocket party members”.

Finally, there is also the issue of how to integrate and coordinate two types of party organizations in the cities – horizontal party organizations such as community- and street-based party organizations, and vertical, work unit party organizations stationed in the communities. The work unit reforms do not mean that party organizations attached to the work units are dismantled. Contrary, work unit party organizations continue to be important means of political mobilization and organizing, though not as extensive as the pre-reform years. Many work units are bureaucratically ranked higher than the community-level residents’ committees and street offices, and the community party organizations are usually unable to coordinate well with the party organizations of the work units stationed in their communities. Although work unit-based party organizations command huge resources, they have relatively few incentives to assist community party organizations in community construction. On the other hand, street- and community-ranked party organizations are given many responsibilities but without the authority to fully mobilize the necessary resources. This vertical (work units) / horizontal (streets and communities) conflict is indeed common in China’s administrative system – the so-called “tiaoquai chongtu” (vertical-horizontal conflict).

The above discussions thus highlight some of the issues that have emerged. The community party building programme, in a sense, is formulated to tackle these challenges and to maintain the overall political and organizational leadership of the party in society. As early as 1996, the Central Organizational Department of the CCP (zhongyang zuzhibu 中央组织部) issued the document “Opinion on the Strengthening of Party Building Work in Street Offices”, the first major party document stressing the importance of grassroots party organizational work in the cities. The Ministry of Civil Affairs’ 2000 policy document on community construction, “Opinion on Promoting Community Construction Nationwide”, again emphasized the leadership role of the party organization in the process of community construction. Political leaders from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao
have consistently emphasized the strategic importance of community party building, seeing the programme as crucial to the consolidation and strengthening of the organizational foundation of the party (Zhang, 2008). In November 2004, the central Organization Department issued the directive “Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving the Street and Community Party Building Work”. This document serves as the official policy guideline for the community party-building work. Together with the 2000 Ministry of Civil Affairs document on community construction, they specify the basic responsibilities of the party organizations at the grassroots levels. Table 1 summarizes the basic responsibilities laid out in these two documents.

With the directives from central party and government leaders, the grassroots party building in urban China is now focused on community party building. It is thought that through community party building, the political, ideological, and organizational leadership of the party organizations will once again be securely in place in view of the diversifying and pluralizing urban society in socioeconomic changes. The political, policy, and social functions of the community party organizations are in turn indispensable in maintaining stability, ensuring effective implementation of policies and

Table 1  Formal Responsibility of Community Party Organizations in Two National Documents

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000 Ministry of Civil Affairs Document on Community Construction</th>
<th>2004 CCP Central Organization Department Document on Community Party Building</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) to publicize and implement party’s line, principles and policies and the laws and regulations of the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) to unite and organize party members and ordinary residents in carrying out various tasks of community construction</td>
<td>2) to discuss and decide important matters regarding community construction</td>
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<td>3) to support and ensure rule of law and fulfillment of responsibilities by the community residents’ committee</td>
<td>3) to lead the community residents’ committee and support community self-governance</td>
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<td>4) to strengthen its own organizational construction and ideological political work</td>
<td>4) to maintain close ties with the masses, resolve civil disputes, and maintain social stability</td>
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<td>5) to perform the exemplifying role of the party members in the communities</td>
<td>5) to organize party members and the masses in the work of community construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) to organize party members and the masses in the work of community construction</td>
<td>6) to strengthen its own organizational construction</td>
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directives from higher levels of authority, and providing the platform for building up social capital such as cooperation and participation (Peng, 2007: 74-78). Community party building is infused with community construction. It is asserted that community party organizations are in many ways also social organizations, with their mission to serve and provide welfare to the people. Furthermore, these organizations are endowed with more resources and authority in comparison with other organizations or institutions. The communist traditions of mass line and mass work are said to be able to facilitate the carryout of community construction. Many party members are also community residents who are well aware of the challenges and issues in community construction. Being party members with the supposed “advanced nature”, they can contribute more to the efforts of community construction (Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Dangjian Yanjiu Ketizu, 2000: 157-165; Wang, 2003: 243-249).

3.2. Party Organization at the Street-Office Level

Organizational work of community party building is not confined to the residents’ committee level only. An important part of community party building is to strengthen the authority of the street-level party organization, the immediate superior of the community-level party organization in the organizational hierarchy of the party. As mentioned above, within the administrative hierarchy the community-level occupies the lowest rank. In order to strengthen the authority of the lower-ranked horizontal party organizations, one of the ways is the reorganization of the street-level party organization, instituting a “street party work committee” (jiedao danggongwei 街道党工委) in place of the regular “street party committee” (jiedao dangwei 街道党委).

The “street party work committee” is different from a regular party unit. The “work committee” is a dispatched organ of the district-level party committee, higher-ranked than the street-level. Leaders of the “work committee” are directly appointed from above, not elected from below. Other than the responsibilities specified in the party’s constitution, the “work committee” is also entrusted with specific responsibilities and functions by the district party committee. The term of office for leaders of the “work committee” is also longer than the leaders of a regular party organization (Lu, 1999: 51-52). The composition of the leadership of the “work committee” generally includes some representatives from work unit-based party organizations. For instance, in Shanghai, the leadership of a street party work committee consists of 11 to 13 members; among them are directors of street-level public security bureaus and representatives from the party organizations in government’s functional departments and other work units.6
Through the “work committee” system the vertical and horizontal authorities are connected and integrated. Since the authority of the street party work committee comes from the district party committee, it is empowered to “mobilize the resources and [to] coordinate the related work of the various offices and units” (Takahara and Benewick, 2006: 160) within the street’s jurisdiction, at least those with comparable rank at district level. In such a way, under the overall leadership of the street party work committee, community party organizations could become more forceful when dealing with high-ranked work units stationed within their jurisdictions.

Shanghai has also been pioneering some other more comprehensive reforms at this level. One of the notable measures taken by Shanghai was its decision to define “community” at both the street office and residents’ committee levels (which creates a lot of confusion for outsiders). The “community party work committees” (shequ dangongwei 社区党工委), structured at the street office level, were implemented in several pilot sites in 2005. These work committees are more functionally specialized, with special committees established to deal with administrative organs, the “two-new” organizations, and residential areas (Peng, 2007: 80-82).

Although the establishment of party work committees has achieved some results in integrating vertical and horizontal authority, by no means does the street party work committee has institutionally guaranteed the full cooperation of all work unit-based party organizations. Central, provincial and municipal units are all ranked much higher than the street party work committee. Securing their cooperation can be a quite a struggle. On the other hand, the dispatched organs of district government’s departments at the street level are in theory integrated under the authority of the street party work committee, but it is not as easy as it seems. Each of these organs still has to follow the leadership and command within the vertical bureaucratic channel, under the notion of “dual leadership” (shuangchong lingdao 双重领导). How the “dual leadership” concept operates is still not quite institutionalized and it is not uncommon that the authority of the street party work committee is sidelined. In order to better coordinate and integrate the horizontal party organizations and the vertical party organizations, the 2004 Central Organization Department document suggests establishing some kind of “party building coordination mechanism” which would give the horizontal party organization more powers.

In Beijing, a “party building coordination committee” is established at the street level with its branches extended to the residents’ committee level. The “coordination committee” is an attempt to create a system of “integrated horizontal-vertical party networks, with the horizontal party organizations in charge” (tiaokuai jiehe, yikuai weizhu 条块结合, 以块为主). According to one survey, at the end of 2002 all street offices in Beijing had established
some kind of “coordination committees”. A total of 3,084 work unit party organizations have joined the coordination committees, among which are 451 central-level work unit party organizations (Beijing Chengshi Shequ Dangjian Ketizu, 2003). Similar mechanisms also operate in Shanghai and Tianjin, with different titles such as “community party building joint conference” or “community party building research society” (Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Dangjian Yanjiu Ketizu, 2000: 252; Ketizu, 2005; Gu and Gu, 2006: 209-216).

3.3. Party Organization at the Residents’ Committee Level

As mentioned above, one of the main challenges of community party building is simply to establish an organizational footing in the communities. The goal is to have at least one formal party organization (branch, general branch, or committee) for every community residents’ committee. Thus, any community with more than 3 “pocket party members” should establish a formal party presence. The organizational relationship of the retired, laid-off, and migrating party members should be transferred to the community party organization. Fresh college graduates with party membership also should have their organizational relationship with the party established in the communities before they find employment and transfer their organizational relationship to another unit. Formal organizational presence of the party in the community thus allows it to fulfill the leadership role and permeate into the daily lives of community residents. As of 2004, 93 per cent of the community residents’ committees in China had community party organizations (Zhan, 2005: 4). “On-work” party members are also asked to participate in the party’s activities in the communities. They are to become full-time “24-hour” party members (fulfilling party’s duties during work and at home) rather than the “8-hour” party members (fulfilling party’s duties during work hours in work units only) (Li, 2008: 26).

Establishing a formal organizational presence is only the first step. Although community party organization is defined as the leadership core in the organizational system of a residential community, in reality how relevant it is to urban residential life depends on the ability of the party organizations to lead, to relate to the people, and to deal with other community organizations and institutions. The relationship between the residents’ committee and community party organization will be dealt with in a later section. Here, I shall discuss several other aspects of party organizational activities at the residents’ committee level. As mentioned before, the “social nature” of the party justifies its active role in the society. Many community party organizations indeed strive to become some sort of social work organizations, with strong service and welfare elements. Interestingly, these party organizations attempt
to describe and delineate themselves as part of the “voluntary sector”. Here, the term “party members-volunteers” (shequ dangyuan zhiyuanzhe 社区党员志愿者) suggests that community party building aims to foster permeation of the party into the voluntary sector. In contrast to ordinary residents, party members are said to have more activist and voluntary spirits that can contribute to public-spirited activities. Some empirical studies in China contend that among the volunteers in several Shanghai localities, majority of them were party members (Liu and Xu, 2001). Furthermore, party members shall become leaders and organizers of the voluntary organizations and activities in urban residential areas. They are to direct and monitor these activities so as to ensure that they will not become politicized and pose a threat to the party’s authority (as in the case of Falungong, which started off as exercise activities in urban communities) (Pan, 2000).

3.4. Party Organization below the Community Level

Below the community level, party’s organizational penetration is to be extended to blocks and buildings – the so-called “loudong dangjian 楼栋党建” (also referred to as louyu dangjian 楼宇党建 or louzu dangjian 楼组党建). Party members of a community who are scattered in different residential blocks and buildings within the community are organized into party branches or cells in their respective blocks and buildings. This will create an organizational network with the community party organization as the centre and the smaller units as its tentacles extending to each block and building. Many of the activists and leaders of residents’ small groups are party members, and sometimes residents’ small groups coincide with the smaller party branches and cells. These party members in the most basic units play the leading role in mobilizing their neighbours to participate in various community activities, doing ideological work, as well as being the eyes and ears of the party. In a district in Shanghai, party cells are required to ensure that there are “no illegal activities …, no security-threatening incidents, no superstitious activities” in their buildings and blocks (Zhonggong Shanghaishi Jiading Quwei Zuzhibu, 2007: 11-12). On the other hand, these smaller units are also the most basic units of the party to “serve the people”. They pay visit to sick neighbours, mediate family and neighbourhood disputes, and organize some cultural activities and exercises for the old and retired people (Wu, 2006).

Between blocks/buildings and the whole community, sometimes an intermediate level – the section (pian 片), is also delineated to facilitate party building. Section party building (zuzhi jian zai pian shang 组织建在片上) is meant to bring party organizations or small groups that are too scattered into a more unified command and management (Li 2008).
3.5. Party Organization in “Two-New” Organizations

Organizational penetration also extends to the so-called “two-new” organizations. Party building work in these organizations in a minimum sense would involve organizing the party members working in these organizations (no matter how few they are) into formal branches and cells (Lu and Ding, 2003: 744). Apart from organizational penetration, community party building aims to co-opt and recruit the social elite emerging in the private economy and social organizations. One effective way to extend party building in these organizations is again through block party building, in this case establishing party organizations in commercial buildings (Ou, 2005). For example, whereas a private enterprise might have only one or two party members, a commercial building with several enterprises might have enough party members to establish an organizational presence. Block party building is reportedly a successful strategy of grassroots party building. Due to the efforts of block party building, in Shanghai as of 2008, there were 12,941 party organizations established in the “two-new” organizations, a 320 per cent growth over 5 years, and that more than 205,000 party members now had party organizational relationship attached to the “two-new” party organizations.7

3.6. Issues in Community Party Building

On the organizational front, the community party building thus aims to consolidate and entrench the party’s organizational foundation in urban communities, and if successful, the party may also be able to re-establish its ubiquitous presence in urban society. Whether these efforts are able to accomplish the intended goals, however, is still not yet certain. Weaknesses of the community party building are frankly acknowledged in China. Many party organizations are still far from having the different aspects of “governing capacity” emphasized by the present leadership. One Chinese analyst highlighted several main problems of community party building, including overconcentration on the quantitative aspect (expansion of party members, formation of party organizations and increase of party activities), while neglecting and paying inadequate attention to qualitative side, such as the actual political and organizational performance and capabilities of these party organizations (Liu, 2008). Actual participation by party members was not as active and passionate as assumed, while the organizational activities were impractical and irrelevant. General social indifference toward party organizations and their activities was still prevalent. Some party organizations became hollow once key leaders moved to other places. The lack of cohesiveness among newly established party organizations was not unusual: while some party organizations were being established, others were failing
and disintegrating. Another study based on a survey of 8 communities in the city of Taiyuan shows that the community party organizations did well in the areas of propaganda, ideological education, dissemination of central directives, while performance in the area of social service was rather unsatisfactory. In other words, the community party building had not been successful to turn the party organization from a political-revolutionary organization to a more pragmatic and service-oriented organization. The same survey also shows that the integration of community party members, “on-work” party members and “pocket party members was rather poor, with close to 50 per cent of the “on-work” party members and “pocket party members” reporting no or weak relationship with the community party organization (Wang, 2004). Several reports on the progress of community party building in different provinces and cities show that the results have not been satisfactory, with problems such as organizational integration, low morale of party members, underinvestment of resources, low quality of party workers persisting (Chen, 2008; Sun, 2005; Wu, 2005; Jiangshusheng Dang de Jianshe Xuehui and Taizhoushi Dang de Jianshe Xuehui, 2007). A foreign observer of China’s party building programme has also questioned the wisdom and viability of maintaining such a huge party organization in the era of market economy, which inevitably erodes the authority and purpose of these party organizations. In such a view, the party building programme is futile (Gore, 2011).

Notwithstanding the mixed results of community party building programme, the role of the party organization as the “core leadership” in community governance is without doubt. How party organization might affect community democratic development and vice versa will be discussed in the next section.

4. Community Democracy and Community Party Organization

The policy of community construction encourages the development of community self-governance and community democracy through the elections of the residents’ committees. However, the community party organization, as a component in a Leninist organization, is bound to follow instructions from above. Thus, conflicts between the residents’ committee and community party organizations are possible and real. Which organization is the “boss”? Is it the residents’ committee, which is popularly elected (no matter how flawed the electoral procedure is), or the community party organization, which is not popularly elected but privileged to perform the leadership role?

Unsurprisingly, the mainstream view in China does not see such incompatibility. Instead, the leadership of the party organization is deemed to be indispensable in the development of grassroots democracy. Although the party organization is the “core leadership” in communities, it does not directly
interfere with the decision making process. Its main job is to ensure that the decisions made and carried out by the residents’ committee do not contradict the overall national policies and laws. Furthermore, the leadership of the party is also necessary so that anti-government and destabilizing forces in the society would not have a chance to seize on the opening up of democratic space to create political and social instability. Some analysts suggest that without the supportive role played by the party organization, community democratic development would not have proceeded in a smooth and orderly fashion (Gu, 2001). Democratization has to be orderly, and community party organizations are the “stabilizing forces” in the process of democratic development (Xie and Pu, 2007, Hu, 2007).

In a residents’ committee election, a party leader typically serves as the leader of the election committee in charge of election organizing. The party organizations thus has various means to manipulate an electoral process, such as disqualifying candidates who challenge the party’s choice, directing residents to vote for a particular candidate, or even stuffing ballot boxes. Even if the party organization refrains from such blatant electoral interference, that fact that it has the support of the street office authorities, commands greater resources such as monopoly in policy discourses and networks of activists and party members, indicates that there is much influence and control that can be exercised by the community party organization in residents’ committee elections (Zheng, 2005). On the other hand, the party organization is also instrumental in the mobilization of residents to participate in residents’ committee elections. A survey on Shanghai residents shows that party members are generally more active and willing to contribute to community construction than non-party members (Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Dangjian Yanjiu Ketizu, 2000: 166; see also Takahara and Benewick, 2006: 169). The party members in this sense are playing the “exemplary role” (xianfeng juese 先锋角色) in electoral participation and mobilization.

Whether democracy should accommodate the party, or whether the party should accommodate democracy, is a tough question in community democratic development. So far, there are two main approaches to resolving the problem: (1) infusing the leadership of the community party organization with the residents’ committee, and (2) reforming the community party organization to make it more democratically accountable to non-party members.

4.1. Infusing the Leadership of the Community Party Organization with the Residents’ Committee

There are strong suggestions to infuse community party organizations and residents’ committees. This is achieved through two methods: (1) the secretary of the community party organization being also the chairperson
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of the residents’ committee, a practice known as “yijiantiao 一肩挑” (one shoulder carrying [all responsibilities]); and (2) members of the leadership committee of the community party organization are concurrently holding positions in the residents’ committee, a practice known as “jiaocha renzhi 交叉任职” (cross-holding of office positions). Infusing both organizations is the approach favoured by the national leadership. The 2004 Central Organization Department document encourages cross-holding of positions between community party leaders and officers of the residents’ committee, and that community party secretary should also become the chair of the residents’ committee through elections.

In early 2006, the Ministry of Civil Affairs also issued a directive on residents’ committee elections that encourages cross-holding of office positions. In this document, it suggests that party members who are interested to run for positions in the party’s leadership should first get elected as officers of the residents’ committee before being nominated as candidates in party elections. Those who are unable to get elected in the residents’ committee elections should not be nominated in party elections, especially if it is the position of the party secretary. As for party members who are already officers of the residents’ committee, they should run for leadership positions of the party in party elections (the document is collected in Zhan, 2006: 183-189). Both yijiantiao and jiaocha renzhi are meant to achieve “structural integration” in which residents’ committee officers overwhelmingly are also party members (Wang, 2003: 173).

As of 2004, 89 per cent of the chairs of the residents’ committee throughout the country were party members (Zhan, 2005: 5). This statistic, however, does not tell us whether these party members were also party secretaries or not. Table 2 provides some of the data on yijiantiao and jiaocha renzhi in selected provinces and cities in the years 2003-2007. From the table we can see that the infusion approach was indeed quite successful. About half of the residents’ committee members were party members. While in Beijing 42 per cent of the chairs of the residents’ committees were party secretaries, other provinces and cities reported more than half of their residents’ committee chairs also concurrently served as party secretaries, with the city of Nanjing reporting a 90 per cent rate of yijiantiao.

Theoretically speaking, infusing the two bodies could lead to greater democratic accountability of the party organizations. Under this approach, the party secretary and other party leaders have to stand before the test of public opinion in residents’ committee elections. As the above-mentioned 2006 Ministry of Civil Affairs directive spells out, those who have failed the test of residents’ committee elections should not be allowed to contest in party elections. The party indeed would have to accommodate democracy. From a practical perspective, incorporating the two bodies also strengthens
the residents’ committee. The infusion approach reduces the possibilities of conflict between the party organization and the residents’ committee (Gu and Gu, 2006: 230-242). Party members in the residents’ committee could use their resources and connections in the party to help the work of the residents’ committee. However, infusing the two bodies could also lead to the subordination of the residents’ committee by the party organization. The high percentage of yijiantiao raised the suspicion that this is the unwritten required “quota”. In fact, in 2003 the organizational department of Shanghai party committee issued an instruction that required that at least 50 per cent of the winners in residents’ committee elections should be party members (Zheng, 2005: 98). One would not be surprised to learn if the party organizations dominated and manipulated the election process to achieve this quota. There are critics of this approach as well from a different perspective. “Structural integration” blurs the line between the community party organization and the residents’ committee. One of the unintended consequences might actually be weakening of the community party organization, since now it would have to involve itself in the detailed daily community administrative affairs. The authority of the party organization thus would now have to depend on the performance and effectiveness of the residents’ committee. In turn, it would have limited time and energy to strengthen its own organizational and integration work (Kojima and Kokubun, 2004: 230-232).

### Table 2 Percentages of Jiaocha Renzhi and Yijiantiao

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Cross-holding of positions (Jiaocha renzhi)</th>
<th>Chair of the Residents’ Committee as Secretary of the Community Party Organization (Yijiantiao)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Above 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingdao</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provinces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Above 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. Party’s Democratic Reforms

To reduce the “democratic deficit” of the party organizations, a number of cities have also experimented with some institutional innovations to make the community party organizations more democratically accountable to the people. I will discuss two of them: (1) the reforms of party’s elections; and (2) the increased supervision of party’s leaders.

4.2.1. Party’s electoral reforms

Broadly speaking, most of the leaders at the various levels of party hierarchy, from the centre down to the community and village level, are supposed to be “elected”, but in practice party’s elections are nothing more than a formality process to confirm the selection already made through the Nomenclature system. In the community, the street-level party officials would nominate the candidates for community party’s elections, and the party members basically just confirmed the selection.

A reform known as gongtui zhixuan 公推直选 (public nomination and direct election) has been introduced in some cities to democratize the electoral process. Gongtui zhixuan originated from the elections of party chiefs in rural villages, in which it aims to bolster participation by party members and the public, and to increase competition between candidates. There are different models of gongtui zhixuan, but all of them, as the name gongtui zhixuan suggests, involves ending the overt monopolization of nomination by party officials and allowing for direct election by party members.¹⁰ As of 2008, 296 community party organizations in Shanghai were reported to have carried out gongtui zhixuan reforms.¹¹ Other cities that were reported to have experimented with gongtui zhixuan include Beijing, Shenzhen, Ningbo, Nanjing, Dalian, Chengdu, etc. These reforms in party’s elections allow non-party residents to have a say in the election process.

The most common practice of gongtui zhixuan is to allow nomination of candidates by ordinary party members (jointly or self-nomination) and non-party residents’ representatives. Street party officials then decide from the preliminary nominees who would become the formal candidates. Party members will then directly elect the secretary and other leadership positions. In some instances, nominees were not necessarily restricted only to those party members whose organizational relationship is attached to the community. In order to encourage the participation of work unit party members stationed in communities, they are sometimes nominated to run for elections of community party organizations.¹²

In a district in the city of Sanmenxia in Henan province, a similar model called “santui zhixuan 三推直选” (three nominations and direct election) allows community party members, non-party residents’ representatives,
and representatives from work units and businesses to nominate the candidates.\textsuperscript{13} In a Shenzhen district, the “\textit{santui yiping yixuan}” \textsuperscript{11} (three nominations, one evaluation, and direct election) model allows for organizational nomination, joint nomination by party members, and self-nomination. The participation of non-party residents is in the stage of “democratic evaluation” meeting of the preliminary nominees, in which these nominees are evaluated by the party members and non-party residents’ representatives, before the street party officials determine the final list of formal candidates.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{4.2.2. Increased supervision}

Another set of reform measures are intended to increase democratic supervision of the party leadership by party members and ordinary residents. One example is the “community party oversight council” (\textit{shequ dangwu jiantu weiyuanhui} 社区党务监督委员会) established in a community in the city of Chengdu. The oversight council is elected separately from the leadership committee by the party members. Party leaders and their family members are not allowed to sit on the oversight council. The duties of the council include preventing power abuses and corruption by party leaders, ensuring the integrity of the procedure of party elections, and implementing the system of “disclosing party’s affairs” (\textit{dangwu gongkai} 党务公开). The oversight council has the right to sit on the meetings held by the leadership committee, to read every party document, to question members of the leadership committee, and to recommend impeachment of particular party leaders (Jin, 2007).

In designing the system of oversight council, there was a strong emphasis on “oversight by a different body” (\textit{yiti jiandu} 异体监督). The oversight council is still a party organ, but it is clear to the district officials who designed this system that to effectively supervise the party leaders, there has to be an institution independent from the control of these leaders. Although it would be premature to argue that “check and balance” and “separation of powers” are taking hold within the CCP, the idea of “supervision by a different body” is nevertheless something novel. The party always has an internal regulation and corruption investigation mechanism – the “disciplinary inspection committee”. The disciplinary inspection committee, however, is controlled by the party committee at the same level of the party hierarchy (Lu, 1999: 174-199). In investigating power abuses and corruption occurring at the same level, the disciplinary inspection committee is not very effective. In comparison to the disciplinary inspection committee, the design of the oversight council and the idea of “supervision by a different body” represent a progressive step toward a more democratically supervised party organization.
Will the party eventually accommodate the rise of community democracy? Or will community democratic development remain in the firm control of the party? Such is not an easy answer. The party is not unaware of its “democratic deficit”, judging by the party’s electoral and supervision reforms discussed above. It clearly recognizes the need to increase participation and contestation in order to have a claim in democratic legitimacy. But an optimistic picture of a democratically reforming community party organization still has to be balanced by the fact that no matter how many tests of popular scrutiny the party leaders go through, their ultimate boss is the higher-level party organization, under the party doctrine of “democratic centralism”. A community party secretary that rides on popular support against the bosses at the street-level could be perceived to be destabilizing to the regime and violating party’s discipline. So far the evidence supports the argument that the party has tentatively in some aspects accommodated democracy, but whether this is sustainable in the long run remains to be seen.

5. Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party is in the middle of a transformative process. True, much of its Leninist characteristics have not been abandoned, as demonstrated by the occasional suppression and mobilization campaigns. But concomitantly, the party is trying to restructure, reshape, and redefine itself as a party that is able to take on monumental tasks of governance and development in the process of modernization and in the environment of globalization. The “three represents” theory, ridiculed for its theoretical obscurity by outside observers and dissidents, actually serves important strategic purpose for the party to modernize itself, to become a capable “governing” party of the whole people. The class and social bases of the party are enlarged to cover all major strata of society, while the ideological orientation becomes forever pragmatic and eclectic. The party, in this sense, exhibits certain features of what is called the “catch-all” party in Western party systems.

Of course, the CCP is still different from a political party in a democratic political system. The CCP dominates the state and society and does not tolerate organized opposition. The party claims to represent and articulate the interests of all elements of the society, but does not tolerate these interests to form the basis of political pluralism. Instead, the party aims to co-opt, integrate, and monitor these interests. In this sense, community construction and community party building are the efforts of the party to engage with the society and to bring these social forces under the firm control of the party. However, the interaction between party and society also forces the party to undergo changes in order for it to remain relevant and legitimate. The
analysis of the construction of party organization in urban communities and the relationship between the party organization and community democratic development presented in this paper thus offers an angle for us to examine the complexity of the party’s transformation.

Notes
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1. Therefore, throughout this paper I will use the generic term “community party organization” rather than the more specific “community party committee”, “community party general branch” or “community party branch”.


3. They are called pocket party members because they keep their party certificates in their own pockets, i.e. no organizational attachment.

4. According to one estimate, as of the end of 2007, only 4.1 per cent of the employees of “non-public” enterprises were party members, only 8 per cent of these enterprises had organized party presence. Cited from Wu, 2008: 65.


7. Hong Meifen, “‘Liangxin’ Zuzhi Dangyuan 5 Nian Zeng Liangbeiduo” [Party members of “two-new” organizations growing more than double], *Jiefang Ribao* 解放日报, 26th June 2008.

8. This pattern is confirmed in the two residents’ committees in Shanghai that I interviewed. Both residents’ committees had 50 per cent party members.

9. This point was made to me by a residents’ committee chair I interviewed in Shanghai in November 2007.


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