Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?

NGEOW CHOW BING

The foreign policy of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, who was elected in 2016, will be closely watched by Beijing and countries in Southeast Asia. Before her inauguration, Tsai stated that her administration would pursue a so-called “New Go South Policy” (xin nanxiang zhengce), i.e. a foreign policy focused on building up ties with countries in Southeast Asia as well as in South Asia. A similar policy was initiated by two former presidents of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. This article provides a framework to analyze the determinants, objectives, policy dimensions and scope of President Tsai’s New Go South Policy. It examines and compares the Go South Policies of previous administrations, together with former President Ma Ying-jeou’s policy towards Southeast Asia. Based on these discussions, a prospective policy analysis of President Tsai’s Go South Policy is provided. It is argued that Tsai’s Go South Policy will help enhance Taiwan’s soft power, increase the island’s presence in Southeast Asia but will not be used to counterbalance China–Taiwan economic integration.

Keywords: Tsai Ing-wen, Go South Policy, Taiwan–ASEAN relations, cross-straits relations, Taiwan foreign policy.

In September 2015, Tsai Ing-wen, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, declared that if she won office a major foreign policy initiative of her administration would be a “New Go South Policy” (New GSP). After her victory

Ngeow Chow Bing is a Senior Lecturer in the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Postal address: Institute of China Studies, Universiti Malaya, Jalan Universiti, 50603, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; email: ngeow.c@um.edu.my.
in the January 2016 presidential election, and inauguration in May, one of Tsai’s first moves was to set up an Office of New Go South Policy which was placed directly under the Presidential Office. This office was headed by James C.F. Huang, a former foreign minister who served from 2006 to 2008 under the administration of the previous DPP President Chen Shui-bian.

In broad terms, the Go South Policy (GSP) refers to initiatives aimed at strengthening relations between Taiwan and countries “south” of Taiwan, especially countries in Southeast Asia. The New GSP, in fact, can also be termed “GSP 3.0”. Two former presidents of Taiwan — Lee Teng-Hui (1998–2000) and Chen Shui-bian (2000–8) — each initiated “GSP 1.0” and “GSP 2.0” respectively, in the 1990s and 2000s. All presidents who initiated a GSP (Lee, Chen, and now, Tsai) are leaders who have deeply suspicious views of Mainland China; indeed, all of them can be considered as “independence-leaning” leaders. The backdrop to these GSPs was the rapid economic development of China and the integration between China and other Asian economies, including Taiwan’s. Hence, although GSP could be couched as an initiative to strengthen Taiwan’s relations with Southeast Asia — and not necessarily tied to Taiwan’s relations with China — in reality it has always been associated as a policy tool to counterbalance China–Taiwan economic integration, along with other strategic benefits, such as enlarging Taiwan’s “international space” and increasing Taiwan’s relevance and leverage in Southeast Asia. Over the past several decades, all Taiwanese presidents, in one way or another, were uncomfortable with Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China, with the exception of President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–16) of the Kuomintang (KMT) party, who was the only Taiwanese leader that did not formally announce a GSP during his term in office. Ma’s government did, however, have a Southeast Asia policy, but it was not meant to counterbalance China–Taiwan economic integration.

Given that GSP is not new, an important objective of this article is to compare and analyze the past cases in order to provide context for President Tsai’s New GSP. Other than being a counterbalance to China–Taiwan economic integration, what other strategic objectives underpin GSP? Did the past GSPs achieve what they set out to achieve? What lessons can the Tsai administration learn from the successes or failures of past GSPs? How did the different historical contexts of previous GSPs affect their performance? Based on what we know about former GSPs, in what areas should Tsai’s government
pay attention to? In what ways does the New GSP signal the general foreign policy approach of the Tsai administration? These are some of the questions that this article seeks to answer. The article utilizes an analytical framework to study the determinants, strategic objectives, policy dimensions and geographical scope of GSP. It then examines and compares the GSPs of Presidents Lee and Chen, together with the Southeast Asia policy of President Ma. This comparison and analysis of past GSPs serves to highlight whether or not they were able to achieve their objectives, and how the relationship between China and Southeast Asia, and between China and Taiwan, also affected their performance. Finally, the article offers a prospective analysis of President Tsai’s New GSP, which may also reflect the general direction of her government’s foreign policy. It takes note that under Tsai, the New GSP pays more attention to people-to-people ties and strives to increase both Taiwan’s economic and cultural presence in Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia’s economic and cultural presence in Taiwan. This could turn out to be a very sensible approach for GSP 3.0 to engage countries in Southeast Asia.

**Analytical Framework**

The GSP does not operate in isolation from the government’s grand diplomatic strategy. As in the case of other democracies, Taiwan’s president plays the most important role in the foreign policy decision-making process. The grand diplomatic strategy is formulated to reflect the president’s worldview (such as whether Taiwan should ultimately be an independent state or reunify with China), approaches to foreign affairs, reading of the state of relations between China and Taiwan, assessing the contemporary alignments of global dynamics, understanding how Taiwan should position itself within such alignments and what kind of foreign policy priorities Taiwan should set. These strategies are often encapsulated in a prescient four-character Chinese phrase that captures their essence. President Lee Teng-hui described his government’s diplomatic strategy as “pragmatic diplomacy” (wushi waijiao); President Chen Shui-bian pursued an “offensive diplomacy” (gongshi waijiao); President Ma called his diplomatic strategy “viable diplomacy” (huolu waijiao); and President Tsai’s government has talked about “steadfast diplomacy” (tashi waijiao), but so far this concept has yet to be articulated in greater detail.
The grand diplomatic strategy, therefore, plays an important role in determining the strategic objectives of GSP. However, Taiwan’s relations with Mainland China is also a very important determinant. As observed by Chen Jie, “Taipei’s Go-South Policy was about China as much as Southeast Asia.” In general, “Go South” is usually juxtaposed with “Go West” (“West” meaning China here). While some Taiwanese scholars in the past had argued that Taiwan’s GSP should be de-linked from the government’s policy towards China, and that GSP and “Go West” could and should be pursued at the same time and presented no policy contradictions, the official rationale for both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian in initiating GSP was, as mentioned earlier, very much about counterbalancing Taiwan–China economic ties.

GSP, henceforth, was not just narrowly an economic-related policy, although during both the Lee and Chen administrations the formal ministerial body in charge of GSP was the economic bureaucracy. As examined later, a number of non-economic diplomatic measures usually were undertaken in conjunction with the GSP’s economic initiatives. Hence, a broader conception of GSP would see it as a focused strategic initiative undertaken by Taiwan towards Southeast Asia, albeit usually with economic policies as points of entry. Taken together, the government’s grand diplomatic strategy and its policy towards China serve as the twin determinants of what strategic objectives a GSP should accomplish.

The formulation of a more detailed policy plan of GSP is meant to fulfil the above objectives. A GSP policy plan generally involves two parts: policy dimensions and geographical scope. In policy dimensions, considerations will be given to whether it is the economic, political, and/or cultural ties between Taiwan and Southeast Asia that need to be upgraded and strengthened. Ideally a GSP will upgrade Taiwan–Southeast Asia ties in all three policy dimensions, but in reality there are always priorities. These priorities will then guide the formulation of more detailed operational plans. Geographical scope refers to the countries that are within the ambit of GSP, and generally they are the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but occasionally a GSP may go beyond ASEAN, or choose to focus on a select group of countries within ASEAN. Figure 1 presents this analytical framework, which will be used to analyze the GSPs of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, and the Southeast Asia policy of Ma Ying-jeou in the next section.
Taiwan’s Go South Policies: A Comparative Analysis

Lee Teng-hui’s GSP

Shortly after taking office in 1988, President Lee Teng-hui announced his administration would pursue “pragmatic diplomacy”. Before Lee assumed power, the previous leaders of Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek (1949–75) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1975–88), had strictly adhered to the “One China” principle in which Taiwan (the Republic of China) broke off diplomatic relations with any country that established diplomatic ties with Mainland China (the People’s Republic of China). This principle resulted in a rapidly dwindling number of countries with diplomatic ties with Taiwan, as well as Taiwan’s exclusion from international bodies that require statehood as
Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?

a precondition for membership. Hence, the rapid shrinking of Taiwan’s “international space” was what Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy” aimed to correct — its goal was to enlarge Taiwan’s “international space”, or, in one scholar’s view, it was designed to provide “diplomacy of visibility”.7 Another interpretation was that “pragmatic diplomacy” did not necessarily seek “visibility” but instead was a strategy to increase substantive, functional cooperative relations with other countries.8 Nevertheless, it was clear that as an overall diplomatic strategy, it called for “(1) the advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties; (2) the development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal relations with Taiwan; and (3) admission or readmission to international organizations and activities vital to the country’s national interests”.9

In the context of “pragmatic diplomacy”, Taiwan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia was aimed at achieving greater politically meaningful objectives. For instance, in 1991, a report issued by a major government-linked think-tank recommended that Taiwan’s policy towards Southeast Asia should use “economic means” to achieve “political ends”, such as inducing Southeast Asian governments to enact laws similar to America’s 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.10 Other political tactics included formal or informal visits by government leaders to Southeast Asian countries, and the upgrading of the hitherto “unofficial” missions in the region (and vice versa) to some kind of “semi-official” status.11

Another important factor that shaped the Lee government’s policy towards Southeast Asia was the increased outflow of Taiwanese investment to Mainland China. Beginning in the early 1990s, Taiwan’s absolute investments in both China and Southeast Asia increased, but Taiwanese investment in China outpaced investment in Southeast Asia, much to the chagrin of Taipei. Lee was not in favour of greater economic exchanges between China and Taiwan, and in 1996 his government introduced the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, which aimed at capping the size of Taiwanese investment in China, but with little effect.12 A major consideration for the formulation of Lee’s GSP was, therefore, to reduce cross-straits economic interactions and to strengthen Taiwan’s economic ties with Southeast Asia.13

In October 1993, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs formulated the “Guidelines on Strengthening Economic Work on Southeast Asian Region” as the principal policy framework for GSP.14 In December 1993, the government submitted a “Policy Statement on Go-South Investment” to the legislature.15 In January 1994, the aforementioned “Guidelines” were implemented for a fixed term.
of three years (1994–96), making this the first phase of GSP under Lee, or GSP 1.1 (see Figure 2). According to the “Guidelines”, the main purpose of GSP 1.1 was to increase Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia. The government was supposed to help Taiwanese companies relocate manufacturing plants from China to Southeast Asia, expand employment opportunities in the host countries, integrate host countries’ and Taiwan’s resources, establish production bases in Southeast Asia in anticipation of the ASEAN free trade area, and improve substantive economic relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia as a means to ensure Taiwan’s status within the regional security architecture. The last point underscored the strategic nature of GSP 1.1, where the geographical scope focused on the more developed maritime countries of ASEAN — the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, plus Vietnam.
Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?

In order to demonstrate the government’s commitment to GSP, it mobilized the government-controlled and KMT-controlled enterprises to invest in Southeast Asian countries. In the 1990s, Taiwan’s economy was relatively advanced and was in a position to offer economic assistance to other countries in the region. Major investment projects under GSP included the Subic Bay Industrial Park in the Philippines (in 1994) and the Medan Industrial Park in Indonesia. In addition, Taiwan was also in a position to share its developmental experiences — the so-called “Taiwan Model” — and in so doing enhance Taiwan’s prestige in the region. In upgrading relations with Southeast Asian countries, it was hoped that bilateral ties between Taiwan and these countries would also witness “creeping officiality...[leading to] partial recognition”, such as the signing of bilateral economic agreements that tacitly recognized Taiwan’s status as a sovereign political entity, and regularized ministerial-level meetings between Taiwanese officials and their Southeast Asian counterparts. Coupled with economic initiatives were a set of highly political policies. In 1994, President Lee and Vice President Lien Chan visited several Southeast Asian countries under the pretext of taking a holiday in the region, and on some of these trips they were able to meet with top government leaders, including Philippine President Fidel Ramos and Indonesian President Suharto.

By the end of 1996, it could be argued that GSP 1.1 had achieved a number of important results. Between 1994 and 1996, Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia amounted to US$12.74 billion, greater than Taiwanese investment in China (US$9.83 billion). The official bilateral economic agreements signed in that period exceeded the number of bilateral economic agreements signed between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries in the previous twenty years. “Vacation diplomacy” successfully raised Taiwan’s profile in the region. On 11 November 1996, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that GSP 1.1 would be extended for another three years. However, three weeks later, the same ministry abruptly announced that in order to boost Taiwan’s domestic industrial growth, all government-controlled enterprises had to freeze overseas investment activities. Although this decision did not officially signal the end of GSP 1.1, the move was interpreted as bringing it to an end despite its relative success.

In May 1997, Lee Teng-hui initiated a second Go South Policy, or GSP 1.2, following the onset of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The AFC hit Southeast Asia’s newly-industrializing countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, very hard, while Taiwan (and China)
escaped relatively unscathed. Taipei felt that the AFC presented an important opportunity for Taiwanese businesses to expand into Southeast Asia. In January 1998, Taiwanese Premier Vincent Siew visited the Philippines and Indonesia (and met with Indonesian President Suharto), and announced plans to reinvigorate Taiwan’s economic relations with Southeast Asian countries. This was widely seen as the beginning of the “reboot of GSP”. In February 1998, the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced the “Guidelines on Strengthening Economic Work on Southeast Asian Region, Australia and New Zealand”, formally heralding the second round of GSP (GSP 1.2) under President Lee (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3**  
**Lee Teng-Hui’s GSP 1.2**

- Pragmatic Diplomacy
- “No Haste, Be Patient” Policy

*Strategic Purpose of Go South Policy 1.2*
- Increase Taiwan’s Economic Presence
- Increase Taiwan’s Leverage

*Policy Dimensions: Economics*

*Geographical Scope: ASEAN members, Australia and New Zealand*

Operational Mode

Economic Policies: Finance, Asset Acquisitions
Compared to GSP 1.1, the policy dimensions and ambitions of GSP 1.2 were scaled down significantly, although its geographical scope was enlarged to cover all members of ASEAN plus Australia and New Zealand. Reducing investment in Mainland China was still a major consideration when framing GSP 1.2, even if Taiwanese investment was already falling due to the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits Crisis. As mentioned earlier, the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy was put in place in 1996. The Taiwan Straits Crisis also impacted GSP 1.2 politically in that overtly symbolic presidential visits were left off the agenda. Although some senior leadership visits to Southeast Asia did take place, in this round of GSP economic policies appeared to be the primary focus. The main reason was that Southeast Asian countries would not welcome visits by senior Taiwanese officials in the wake of the tensions generated by the Taiwan Straits Crisis.

Under GSP 1.2, a new holding company called the Southeast Asia Investment Company was created in 1998 through KMT-controlled enterprises, the purpose of which was to conduct mergers and acquisition operations in Southeast Asia. Another major policy move was the financial assistance pledged by the Taiwanese government, which took the form of monetary injections into Taiwan-owned banks in Southeast Asian countries and cooperation between Taiwan’s Central Bank and the Asian Development Bank in providing loans to distressed economies in the region. GSP 1.2 appeared to be a rather cautious policy, with the main objectives being to increase Taiwan’s presence and perhaps leverage in the region.

However, GSP 1.2 failed to gain momentum as Taiwanese enterprises were unenthusiastic about “going out” to Southeast Asia, given the economic, social and political instabilities caused by the AFC, including anti-Chinese riots which took place in Indonesia in May 1998. A Thai scholar commented that Thai–Taiwan economic relations “have not been affected by the Taiwan government’s ‘Southward Policy’...[which] was not very successful...[and] not supported by the Taiwanese private sector”. By 1999–2000, Taiwanese investment in the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam had stagnated. In contrast, Taiwanese investment into China had increased, in spite of the government’s “No Haste, Be Patient” policy. As a result, GSP 1.2 had little substantive meaning and ended up as merely a policy slogan.
President Chen Shui-bian’s GSP

There was both continuity and change between Lee Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s foreign policy. Coming from the “independence-leaning” DPP, Chen did not disagree with the rationale underpinning Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy”. However, he felt that Lee’s foreign policy had not gone far enough. What Chen wanted from the island’s foreign policy was the symbolic, if not formal, recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty, or at least the dignity and identity of Taiwan as a political entity separate from China. In building up the legitimacy of this separate identity from China, Taiwan’s democratic nature was highlighted. Chen’s visits to countries that Taiwan did not have diplomatic relations with — and insisting on being received in a way suggesting that Taiwan was a sovereign political entity — were important and regarded as diplomatic breakthroughs. Another major foreign policy goal was to secure membership of international organizations that require statehood as a prerequisite, including the United Nations (UN). Chen and his supporters labelled the grand diplomatic strategy of his government “offensive diplomacy”, although this term was not widely used during his presidency. Instead, during Chen’s eight years in office, his detractors referred to his provocative diplomacy as “fire-setting diplomacy”.

President Chen began his presidency in 2000, and the immediate focus of his foreign policy was the United States and Japan. However, just two years later, he made a major policy announcement on Southeast Asia. In late July 2002, in a meeting with the Asia Taiwanese Chambers of Commerce, Chen said, “we cannot have too high an expectation of China, especially in economics and trade... the market in Mainland China is neither the sole, nor the safest, nor the final external market of Taiwan... [and hence] we must emphasize investment in Southeast Asia”. Chen’s comments were widely interpreted as heralding GSP 2.0 (see Figure 4).

The immediate context of Chen’s renewed interest in GSP was again the increased economic integration across the Taiwan Straits. Departing from Lee’s “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, Chen initially wanted to liberalize the strict regulatory controls of cross-strait economic relations, notwithstanding his party’s China-skeptic position. Chen’s cross-strait economic policy was termed “Positively Open-Up, Effective Management”. Although ostensibly more liberal than Lee’s “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, the Chen administration still shared its predecessor’s concerns over increasing Taiwanese investment in
China. The government’s implementation of the “Positively Open-Up, Effective Management” policy also leaned towards “Effective Management” as a way to control cross-straits economic relations. Following on from Chen’s speech, in October 2002 the government formulated an operational plan to strengthen Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia, which served as the basic policy document guiding GSP 2.0. Under GSP 2.0, the geographical scope was focused on the six more developed ASEAN economies — Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Several economic policy initiatives were highlighted. Other than the usual urging of Taiwanese businesses to invest in Southeast Asia, and
the mobilization of government-controlled enterprises in pursuit of that goal, these economic initiatives included the promise that the government would support these businesses (primarily in the form of financing), promotion of agricultural-technical assistance (especially in Indonesia), negotiations for the importation of migrant labour into Taiwan, and more importantly, the attempt to sign FTAs either bilaterally with selected Southeast Asian countries (the chief target being Singapore), or more ambitiously a Taiwan–ASEAN FTA. China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000, and the agreement between China and ASEAN to negotiate an FTA in late November 2000, ignited concern among Taiwan’s political and economic elite that Taiwan would become increasingly marginalized from East Asia’s economic integration. Hence, the attempt to sign FTAs with ASEAN countries was to pre-empt the anticipated economic marginalization of Taiwan.

As in the case of GSP 1.1, economic initiatives were aligned with political policies. At around the time that GSP 2.0 was being mooted, a senior Taiwanese foreign ministry official noted that a strengthened Taiwan–Southeast Asia economic relationship would also fulfil the following objectives: the signing of bilateral FTAs; participation in regional international fora; the establishment of pro-Taiwan groups of parliamentarians in regional legislatures (perhaps modelled on similar pro-Taiwan legislative groups in Japan and the United States); utilizing the influences of Taiwanese businesspersons, and bringing together the region’s pro-Taiwan forces or lobbyists. A Philippine scholar revealed that under Chen’s GSP, in offering economic assistance, Taiwan also lobbied for Philippine support for Taiwan’s bid to join the UN. In addition, the Chen administration also attempted to reenact the successful presidential and vice presidential visits to Southeast Asian countries under the guise of “vacation diplomacy”. However, this time the attempts ended in failure for Taiwan. Vice President Annett Lu’s visit to Indonesia in August 2002, and the subsequent failed attempt by President Chen himself to visit Indonesia, created mistrust and mutual accusations between Taiwan and Indonesia. Not only was there no possibility left for the kind of “vacation diplomacy” undertaken by Lee Teng-hui, but also that Taiwan’s bid to create groups of pro-Taiwan parliamentarians was also unsuccessful.

As shown in Table 1, GSP 2.0 failed to significantly divert Taiwanese investment from China to Southeast Asia. The size of
Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?

Taiwan’s investment in China consistently outweighed the island’s investment in Southeast Asia, except for the year 2008. In fact, there were cases where Taiwanese investors in Southeast Asia, despite answering the call from the government to move from China to Southeast Asia, later moved back to China because it offered a better investment climate. A more sympathetic account, however, is that GSP 2.0 (together with the previous GSPs) successfully strengthened Taiwan’s economic relations with Southeast Asia and reduced its dependence on China, which “would have been greater had such Taiwanese investments not been directed to the ASEAN states.”

The nature of “offensive diplomacy” was also partly responsible for the short-termism imbued in GSP 2.0. By the 2000s, most Southeast Asian countries had already established strong economic and political ties with China, and thus were unlikely to defy the “One-China” policy. Realistically speaking, GSP 2.0 would never have been able to achieve the main foreign policy goals of “offensive diplomacy” — symbolic recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty and identity. Perhaps after Chen realized that, there was no more sustained focus on Southeast Asia in his foreign policy for the rest of his term, and GSP 2.0 eventually lost impetus.

Table 1
Taiwanese Investment in China and Southeast Asia, 2001–8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwanese Investment in China (US$ millions)</th>
<th>Taiwanese Investment in Southeast Asia (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,784.15</td>
<td>2,954.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6,723.06</td>
<td>1,057.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7,698.78</td>
<td>1,415.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6,940.66</td>
<td>1,981.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6,006.95</td>
<td>1,611.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7,642.34</td>
<td>2,132.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9,970.55</td>
<td>4,030.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10,691.39</td>
<td>12,488.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Department of Investment Services, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly (Republic of China: Mainland Affairs Council, 2001–8).
President Ma Ying-jeou’s Policy Towards Southeast Asia

The KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. Ma had campaigned on a platform to create a more productive and less confrontational relationship with Mainland China. Ma’s foreign policy was also premised on pragmatism and flexibility, rather than a strong focus on the symbolic recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Ma called his grand diplomatic strategy “viable diplomacy”, which was to find a “way out” for Taiwan’s constrained international space.

“Viable diplomacy” actually shared many characteristics of Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy”, especially in regard to enhancing and upgrading substantive relations between Taiwan and countries it did not have diplomatic ties with, and securing participation in international organizations. However, a key difference between “viable diplomacy” and “pragmatic diplomacy” was that the former was premised on the concept of “diplomatic truce” with China while the latter was formulated in the context of a confrontational China–Taiwan relationship, and direct competition with China in winning over diplomatic allies. In seeking to obtain substantive relations between Taiwan and countries with which it did not have formal diplomatic ties, Taiwan would not deliberately seek to achieve political and symbolic benefits associated with being a sovereign state, and would also refrain from competing with China in winning over diplomatic allies. Moreover, Taiwan would be pragmatic in seeking ways to join international organizations and would not insist on having the formalities of a sovereign state in joining those organizations. However, Ma’s detractors labelled his “viable diplomacy” as “surrender diplomacy”.

Alongside “viable diplomacy” was the policy of cooperation with China, especially on economic matters. Ma liberalized the regulations contained in both the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy and the “Positively Opening Up, Effective Management” policy on capping the size of Taiwanese investment in China, approved the three direct links (postal, transportation and trade) between the two sides and signed more than twenty economic and technical agreements with China, the most important of which was the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA). ECFA was effectively an FTA, the signing of which would ease the concerns of the commercial elite in Taiwan that the country was increasingly being marginalized from East Asia’s economic integration.
Unlike Lee and Chen, there was an absence of a specific GSP under Ma’s government (see Figure 5). While “viable diplomacy” aimed to contribute to regional peace and stability, Ma’s policy objectives vis-à-vis Southeast Asia remained largely confined to improving economic relations and, to the extent that it was feasible, more people-to-people linkages, especially in the field of educational exchanges. During Ma’s tenure, Southeast Asian students in Taiwan steadily increased. In 2008, the year Ma assumed office, the total number of ASEAN students in Taiwan was 11,959. In 2015, that number had risen to 26,756.43
Ironically, however, due to improved cross-straits relations under Ma, economic interactions between Taiwan and Southeast Asia that require a certain level of official nature became possible. One key example was the successful signing of the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP), which was effectively an FTA between Taiwan and Singapore. The signing of FTAs has always been seen by China as something that can only be done by a sovereign political entity, and in the past China had been opposed to other countries signing trade agreements with Taiwan. Nevertheless, ASTEP was signed in 2013 without protest from Beijing, perhaps because the ECFA had been signed between China and Taiwan, and that ASTEP was signed by Singapore’s representative in Taipei and Taiwan’s representative in Singapore instead of between ministerial-level officials. However, ASTEP ended up being the one and only breakthrough in Southeast Asia. To be sure, Ma’s government pushed for similar agreements with other Southeast Asian countries, but without success.

As shown in Table 2, Taiwanese investment in China during the Ma years grew substantially. While Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia also increased, it was on a much lower scale. Nevertheless, on average, the annual size of Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia during the Ma years was still greater than it had been during the Chen administration, despite the absence of an official GSP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwanese Investment in China (US$ million)</th>
<th>Taiwanese Investment in Southeast Asia (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>2,096.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14,620</td>
<td>2,394.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14,380</td>
<td>2,279.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12,790</td>
<td>5,852.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>9,190</td>
<td>1,467.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12,080</td>
<td>2,651.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>10,970</td>
<td>2,051.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?

Comparison of the Go South Policies/Southeast Asia Policy of the Three Presidents

The GSPs of Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-bian, together with the Southeast Asia policy of Ma Ying-Jeou, were all introduced to enhance Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations, although the actual strategic outcomes differed. As shown in Table 3, GSP 1.1 and Ma’s Southeast Asia policy were more successful than GSP 1.2 and GSP 2.0. GSP 1.1 and Ma’s Southeast Asia policy resulted in improving Taiwan–Southeast Asia ties, while GSP 1.2 and GSP 2.0 were short-lived and quickly abandoned. However, in evaluating the effectiveness of these policies, an analysis of two other sets of relationships in the strategic triangle between Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia is also required: China–Taiwan relations and China–Southeast Asia relations.

Both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were presidents with antagonistic views towards China, and they both pursued policies towards China that can be considered as confrontational. As can be seen in Table 3, the actual outcome of GSP 1.1 and GSP 2.0 differed radically. GSP 1.1 did increase substantially Taiwan’s economic presence in Southeast Asia (albeit without being able to significantly divert Taiwan’s capital outflow to China) and “vacation diplomacy” was successfully conducted. A similar attempt to re-enact “vacation diplomacy” under GSP 2.0 ended disastrously for Taiwan. In the case of Lee, it is important to note that in the 1990s China was not as powerful and influential as it is today, and Taiwan could still claim to have more economic presence and influence in Southeast Asia compared to China. China–Southeast Asia relations were also just beginning to develop. Singapore and Indonesia had just established diplomatic relations with China in 1990, while Vietnam was only just beginning to normalize relations with China after more than a decade of hostility. Lee’s GSP (especially GSP 1.1, and not the short-lived GSP 1.2) could be pursued as Taiwan — being the main investing country in Southeast Asia in the 1980s — still commanded significant leverage when compared to China. Politically, however, Lee may have hit the buffers with his “vacation diplomacy”. Even though China–Southeast Asia relations were still in their infancy — a situation which then allowed Taiwan to have some room to maneuver — it became clear to Southeast Asian countries that by the middle of the 1990s, and especially after the AFC, that China was going to be the paramount power in Asia. As a result, they all adhered to the “One-China” policy in an even stricter fashion from the mid-1990s onwards.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual Outcome</th>
<th>Taiwan’s Policy towards China</th>
<th>China’s Strengths Compared to Taiwan’s</th>
<th>Southeast Asian Attitudes towards China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee Teng-hui’s GSP 1.1 and GSP 1.2</td>
<td>GSP 1.1 relatively successful in balancing Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia and China but is not sustainable. “Vacation diplomacy” not repeated. GSP 1.2 quickly fizzled out as Taiwan’s private sector was unenthusiastic.</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>China is rising but Taiwan could still keep balance</td>
<td>Growing political-economic ties between China and Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Shui-bian’s GSP 2.0</td>
<td>Declining Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>Increasing imbalance tilted in China’s favour</td>
<td>The beginning of the “Golden Era” between China and Southeast Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou’s Southeast Asia Policy</td>
<td>Stable and improving Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations</td>
<td>Cordial</td>
<td>Overwhelming China power</td>
<td>Deferential to China but increasingly fearful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Any gains accruing from GSP 1.1, however, should be qualified in the sense that it was not sustainable. To a large extent, because Taiwan had become more democratic, the government of the day was not able to impose strict control on the flows of private capital to China. GSP 1.1 and 1.2 were launched at a time when China was quickly opening up to the world, and as a result, Taiwanese investors were easily lured by China’s vast market, efficient infrastructure, similar language and culture, educated workforce, tax-incentive policies and many other opportunities and benefits when compared to Southeast Asia. In other words, Taiwanese investment into China was a perfectly natural market phenomenon. To the extent that the GSPs of Lee Teng-hui were aimed at diverting investment from China, they were going against market realities and were thus bound to fail.

Chen’s GSP 2.0 was also a failure. First, 2000 was the year China joined the WTO, and this exposed China to another round of liberalizing reforms that eventually propelled the country to become the largest global trading power. As a result, Taiwanese private enterprises further poured their investments into China. GSP 2.0 was therefore destined to fail so long as it was linked with the mission to divert Taiwanese investment from China.

Second, Chen’s administration coincided with the beginning of the so-called “Golden Decade” (an official Chinese rhetorical term) between China and Southeast Asia. Golden Decade roughly refers to the first decade of the twenty-first century, in which relations between China and Southeast Asia substantially improved, underpinned by a series of cooperative agreements and partnerships, including the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (2002), the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002), the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security (2002), China’s accession to the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (2003), the ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership (2003) and the Year of Friendship and Cooperation between ASEAN and China (2006). In this context, it would be more prudent for Chen to pursue a GSP with limited political goals and focus instead on consolidating Taiwan’s economic ties with Southeast Asia. However, in reality, the nature of Chen’s “offensive diplomacy” was such that it resulted in a GSP with an overt political mission, thus alienating many Southeast Asian countries in the process. In the end, to use Lowell Dittmer’s characterization of a type of strategic triangle, a “stable marriage” developed between...
China and Southeast Asia while Taiwan was almost reduced to “pariah” status.46

Ma Ying-jeou’s determination to reverse Chen’s diplomatic losses saw him pursuing a cordial policy towards China which avoided initiating a GSP to counterbalance cross-strait economic integration. The Ma government’s Southeast Asia policy mostly focused on economic and cultural matters which, in turn, were appreciated by Southeast Asian governments. In a way, Ma attempted to create a love triangle between China, Southeast Asia and Taiwan. As Samuel Ku, a Taiwan-based scholar, noted, Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations under Ma improved because China–Taiwan relations also improved.47 The meeting between President Ma and President Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015 illustrated that from a political perspective, cross-strait relations had also become more stable and positive under Ma.

That said, China’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries began to experience difficulties because of rising tensions in the South China Sea in the late 2000s. China’s assertive behaviour towards the Southeast Asian claimants such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and even Indonesia, from 2012 onwards seriously undermined China’s reputation and credibility as a positive force for stability in the region. Singapore — which is not a party to the dispute but has a major stake in stability in the South China Sea — was also concerned by China’s assertive behaviour in the maritime domain. While economically China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries remained robust, strategically China–Southeast Asia relations suffered an erosion of mutual trust that had been built up during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s relationship with Southeast Asia remained stable and productive, but this could not be compared with the substantive improvements in China-Taiwan relations. Hence, the love triangle during the Ma years was an imbalanced one and tilted instead towards a “marriage” between China and Taiwan.

President Tsai Ing-wen’s GSP

Drawing on the above discussion, we can offer some prospective analysis of GSP 3.0 under President Tsai. It is interesting to note that Tsai had declared GSP 3.0 even before a clear diplomatic strategy had been officially formulated. Tsai’s government has announced the concept of “steadfast diplomacy”, although it has not been officially articulated in any clear and detailed way. What is clear, however,
is that Taiwan’s relations with China have cooled considerably due to the DPP’s pro-independence leanings and also because Tsai has refused to recognize the so-called “1992 Consensus” as the basis for cross-straits relations. Nevertheless, Tsai has also been quite cautious and restrained in her China policy by, for example, not explicitly linking the New GSP to cross-straits relations. In answering critics of her New GSP — that this would be a repeat of the “failed” GSPs under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian — Tsai’s government has emphasized that GSP 3.0 will be an independent policy detached from the island’s policy towards Mainland China; thus, any attempt to strengthen Taiwan’s economic ties with Southeast Asia would not come at the expense of Taiwan’s economic relations with China.

In the second half of 2016, Tsai’s government began firming up some policy details of GSP 3.0. In August 2016, Tsai convened an economic meeting and approved the “New Go South Policy Guidelines”. The document sets out the short, middle and long term goals of GSP 3.0, defines the operating principles for policy action, and outlines the governmental apparatus set up to support GSP 3.0. Among the long-term goals is that Taiwan and countries under the GSP should form a “common consciousness of economic community”. The government also pledges that GSP 3.0 will be a long-term commitment with the emphasis not just on trade and economic linkages but also people-to-people ties. In September 2016, the Executive Yuan (the executive branch of the government of Taiwan) came up with a Plan of Action to Implement the New GSP. This Plan of Action outlines the four main directions of the New GSP: economic and trade integration; people-to-people exchanges; sharing of resources and talents (among government agencies and between the public and private sectors); and regional connections (between Taiwan and South and Southeast Asia). The document also points out that the core idea of the New GSP is “long-term commitment, multi-faced interaction, and mutual benefit”. In October 2016, the President of the Executive Yuan (Taiwan’s Premier) Lin Chuan convened a meeting with nineteen governmental ministries and agencies to discuss further the mapping out of policy actions based on the Plan of Action document. The main outcome from the meeting was the Work Plan of the New GSP, a document approved by the Executive Yuan in December 2016. The Work Plan elucidates in greater detail the policy action plans in accordance with the four policy directions laid out in the earlier Plan of Action document.
Based on the above documents, it can be seen that there are several features of GSP 3.0 as shown in Figure 6. First, the geographical coverage includes South Asia. Other than India, Taiwan’s relations with the countries in South Asia have been minimal at best. GSP 3.0 would elevate the status of South Asia in Taiwan’s overall foreign policy considerations, which includes, in particular, the strengthening of Taiwan–India ties in a substantive way. Courting a better relationship with India is strategically significant as India is a “peer rival” to China, a role none of the Southeast Asian countries
Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?

can assume. However, it would be assuming too much at this point to suggest that Taiwan–India ties can evolve into a partnership at the strategic level. Hence, the crux of GSP 3.0 will still be focused on Southeast Asia.

Second, GSP 3.0 will continue to highlight the economic linkages between Taiwan and Southeast Asia. On the one hand, the higher labour costs and the difficult-but-necessary economic structural transformation that is going on in China — a transition away from traditional investment-fuelled growth to more consumption-based growth — will increasingly make China a less attractive place for Taiwanese investors. In short, the economic consideration of GSP may for the first time be aligned with market realities and hence become much more enticing to the private sector in Taiwan. In this sense, GSP 3.0 emulates its predecessors in urging greater Taiwanese investment into Southeast Asia. On the other hand, what is new about GSP 3.0 is that it will no longer solely emphasize unilateral Taiwanese business expansion into Southeast Asia but also encourage Southeast Asian businesses to invest in Taiwan. Other than investment, GSP 3.0 highlights reciprocal tourist visits, perhaps in anticipation of the likely decrease in Mainland Chinese tourists in the coming years due to the cooling of cross-strait relations since Tsai was elected. The “two-way street” henceforth encourages a “mutual increase of presence” between Southeast Asia and Taiwan.

Third, increased Taiwan–Southeast Asia economic ties will be reinforced by negotiating new or updating existing bilateral investment treaties, together with the initiation of bilateral dialogues. Eventually, it is hoped that a track 1.5 annual “Taiwan–ASEAN Dialogue” will be realized. This is perhaps the most political aspect of GSP 3.0.

Fourth, GSP 3.0 would also for the first time significantly accentuate the strengthening of people-to-people ties. Tsai’s government has referred to GSP 3.0 as a “people-based GSP” (yiren wei hexin de nanxiang zhengce). The idea of emphasizing people-to-people relations was also mooted under the Southeast Asia policy of Ma Ying-jeou, but it was not a priority. Under GSP 3.0, there are more concrete policy plans in cultivating people-to-people ties between Taiwan and Southeast Asia, especially in the field of education. The Work Plan document mentioned earlier specifies that more scholarships will be offered for students from South and Southeast Asian countries to study in Taiwan. Other policy plans include training more experts on South and Southeast Asia in Taiwan and encouraging Taiwanese students to study in South
and Southeast Asia. While the traditional linkage with the “overseas Chinese” communities in Southeast Asia will not be severed, the focus of these new people-to-people and educational initiatives seem to pay more attention to the non-Chinese people of South and Southeast Asia.

Fifth, Taiwan will leverage on its achievements in science and technology, culture, education, agriculture and public healthcare to promote the country’s cooperation in these functional areas with countries in South and Southeast Asia, and, in the process, help promote Taiwan’s soft power as well as Taiwan’s “brand”.

Finally, perhaps learning from the lessons of the short-termism of GSP 2.0, Tsai’s government has stressed that GSP 3.0 will be “long-term” in nature; that is, Taiwan’s commitment to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries will not waver even if Southeast Asian countries were unlikely to support the cause of “Taiwan independence”. It is important to note that with an Office of New Go South Policy as the main planning unit under the Presidential Office, and the Office of Trade Negotiations of the Executive Yuan as the main coordinating body for GSP 3.0, Tsai’s government has elevated the political status of, and signalled the long-term commitment of the government to, GSP 3.0. Contrast this with the past short-term GSPs, which were usually situated lower under a ministerial level economic bureaucracy.

Based on the above analysis, one might also infer the general foreign policy direction of Tsai’s government. The focus on people suggests that a significant element of Tsai’s “steadfast diplomacy” comprises the projection of Taiwanese soft power. Chen Shui-bian also emphasized Taiwan’s soft power in his “offensive diplomacy”, but that soft power was heavily predicated upon Taiwan’s democracy and freedom, which resonated well in developed democracies but less so in Southeast Asia where authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian politics still prevail. Tsai’s soft power strategy will not de-emphasize Taiwan’s democratic achievements, but rather focus more on the achievements of Taiwanese people in culture, education, business, science and technology, and how these achievements can serve as the basis for Taiwan to offer concrete and cooperative benefits to the people of other countries. Perhaps learning from the bitter lesson of Chen’s overly aggressive “offensive diplomacy”, which alienated some countries from Taiwan, Tsai’s strategy would, and should, opt for this “softer” approach in asserting Taiwanese identity through people-centric initiatives.
If this inference is correct, and together with a cautious but not confrontational policy towards China, the strategic objectives of GSP 3.0 are quite different from the previous GSPs in the sense that the China factor is not as prominent as before. The operational plans of GSP 3.0 aimed to create a situation where there will be an increase of Taiwan's cultural and economic presence in Southeast Asia, and more importantly, an increase of Southeast Asia's cultural and economic presence in Taiwan (a situation of “mutual increase of presence”). To be sure, Southeast Asia today already has a significant economic and cultural presence in Taiwan, in the form of migrant labour (mostly Thais, Filipinos and Vietnamese) and ethnic Chinese students from Southeast Asia pursuant to the so-called "qiaosheng" policy which gives preferential treatment to ethnic Chinese students of foreign countries studying at Taiwanese universities. Thus GSP 3.0 aims not only to increase, but also to diversify Southeast Asia's presence in Taiwan, by drawing in not only labour and capital, and also non-ethnic Chinese students from Southeast Asia.

A more connected Taiwan with increased Southeast Asian presence will create greater leverage for Taiwan to avert a hostile situation in cross-strait relations. Southeast Asian countries will also have a greater stake in cross-strait stability, and are therefore more likely to complicate China’s calculation of an armed conflict with Taiwan given the higher diplomatic costs associated with such a scenario. If GSP 3.0 could bring about this strategic outcome, it would have served its purpose well. As for China–Southeast Asia relations, there have been ongoing tensions between the two sides over the South China Sea. However, Taiwan is unlikely to gain much from these tensions, given that Taiwan and China share the same basis of the U-shaped (or “nine-dash line”) claim in the South China Sea. More importantly, most ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea, despite having a more difficult relationship with China, prefer not to “rock the boat” and create more difficulties in their relations with China by bringing in the Taiwan factor. Henceforth, in essence, GSP 3.0 is well-advised not to repeat the missteps of the failed GSP 2.0.

Conclusion
Taiwan is clearly a vibrant democracy with significant economic and cultural capital that can benefit the people of Southeast Asia. The call for a New GSP should theoretically elicit enthusiastic
responses from Southeast Asian countries, but this has not been the case, perhaps because there is the memory of the past failures of GSPs. The fact that GSP has always been associated with a “green” or independence-leaning president may also raise concerns that GSP is merely a derivative of Taiwan’s policy towards China rather than a policy on its own right. After reviewing in this article the past achievements and failures of Taiwan’s GSPs (and President Ma’s Southeast Asia policy) and the lessons they offer, and pointing to what challenges and opportunities that GSP 3.0 under Tsai will likely encounter, it can be argued that GSP 3.0 is meant to strive for “mutual increase of presence” between Southeast Asia and Taiwan economically and culturally while staying clear of provocative political policies. On the whole, this seems like a good strategy for Taiwan to engage Southeast Asia, and so if implemented well enough, GSP 3.0 may achieve far more than what its predecessors did.

NOTES

The research for this article received partial support from UMRG 022B-15HNE.

1 Alternatively translated as Southbound Policy, Southward Policy or South-Oriented Policy.

2 Lee Teng-hui was not quite “independence-leaning” during the early years of his presidency and actually promulgated the Guidelines for National Unification. But throughout his presidency he strongly resisted greater integration with Mainland China. After he left office he became a staunch advocate of Taiwanese independence.

3 General works on the foreign policy of Taiwan include Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002); Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2007); Shih Cheng-feng, ed., Taiwan waijiao zhanlue [Diplomatic Strategy of Taiwan] (New Taipei, Taiwan: Lee Denghui minzhu xuexiao, 2013).

4 It is important to note that traditionally the most important focus of Taiwan’s foreign policy remains the United States and, to a lesser degree, Japan, which are the two countries that can provide the greatest security assistance in case of an armed conflict with China.

5 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, op. cit., p. 112.


7 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, op. cit., p. 9.

Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?


10 The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires Taiwan to be treated *de facto* as a state by the United States government, and authorizes the United States to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan.


13 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, op. cit., p. 112.

14 Wang Junfeng, *Lengzhanhou Taiwan diqu yu Dongmeng geguo guanxi yanjiu* [A Study of Taiwan’s Relations with ASEAN Countries in the Post-Cold War Era] (Beijing, China: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2014), p. 43.

15 Ibid., p. 43.


18 Medan Industrial Park was actually set up earlier, in 1988, but received a major investment boost from Taiwan between 1994 and 1996.

19 See Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, op. cit., pp. 120–21.

20 Ibid., p. 22.


22 Wang, *Lengzhanhou Taiwan diqu yu Dongmeng geguo guanxi yanjiu*, op. cit., p. 43.
23 Ibid., p. 42.
24 Ibid., p. 43.
25 Ibid., p. 45.
33 Ibid., pp. 157–65.
35 Edgardo E. Dagdag, “China–Taiwan (Cross-Strait) Relations and the Philippines”, in *Ensuring Interests: Dynamics of China-Taiwan Relations and Southeast Asia*, op. cit., p. 236.
36 Vice President Lu boarded a Jakarta-bounded plane without informing the Indonesian authorities. Upon arrival, and knowing her status as the Vice President, the immigration officials refused to let her exit the airport in Jakarta and directed her to board a flight to Bali. Lu, however, insisted she must visit Jakarta and the Taiwan government chartered a flight from Bali to Jakarta. The Indonesian government relented but directed the flight not to arrive at the main airport of Jakarta but a small private airport, and later that day Lu met some ex-Indonesian officials. See Yan and Huang, *Minjindang duiwai zhengce yanjiu*, op. cit., p. 121–23.
37 President Chen attempted to re-enact “vacation diplomacy” by planning to visit Bali in December 2002. Indonesia refused but Chen still insisted on going anyway. This led to an Indonesian minister saying that the plane carrying Chen would not be allowed to land in Bali. Finally, Chen relented. Afterwards, Indonesia sent some officials to Taiwan to smooth things over, but Taiwan portrayed this event as Indonesia sending officials to Taiwan to apologize, which further angered the Indonesians. See Ibid., pp. 125–28.
38 *Economic Integration and the Investment Climates in ASEAN Countries: Perspectives from Taiwan Investors* (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 15.
Taiwan’s Go South Policy: Déjà vu All Over Again?


40 See the interpretation by a Chinese scholar in Chen Kongli, Zouxiang heping fazhan de liangan guanxi [Cross-Strait Relations Walking Towards Peaceful Development] (Beijing, China: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010), p. 68.

41 Chang and Chen, Taiwan zhuquan yu gongshi waijiao, op. cit., p. 13.


43 Data obtained from the website of the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, available at <http://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/7q/relfile/8053/1b0e60cd-3526-4657-a93f-14f704faach.pdf>.


48 The “1992 Consensus” refers to the consensus supposedly reached in 1992 between both sides to recognize that there is only One China but allows for different interpretations of what that means. China insists that recognizing this consensus is the basis for cross-strait relations to develop. Ma’s government agreed with the Chinese view and upheld the 1992 Consensus.

49 “Taiwan zhuanxiang Domeng bushi fangqi dalu” [Taiwan is Not Abandoning Mainland in Turning to ASEAN], Sinchew Daily, 28 May 2016.


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.


54 Ibid.


Jiang Yili, “Nanya guojia yu Taiwan de guanxi” [Relations between South Asian Countries and Taiwan], in Zhongguo duiwai guanxi zhong de Taiwan wenti [The Taiwan Issue in China’s Foreign Relations], edited by Lu Xiaoheng (Taipei, Taiwan: Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2003), pp. 167–80. For a general survey of cultural and economic relations between Taiwan and India, see Johnny Chi-Chen Chiang, “Asian Regional Economic Integration and Taiwan–India Economic Relations”, in Taiwan Today, edited by Anita Sharma and Screemati Chakrabarti (New Delhi, India: Anthem Press, 2007), pp. 94–110; and Deng-ker Lee, “A Study of the Cultural and Educational Exchanges between Taiwan and India, 1995–2006”, in Taiwan Today, op. cit. pp. 130–39.