Governing Enclosure: The Role of Governance in Producing Gated Communities and Guarded Neighborhoods in Malaysia

1. Peter Aning Tedong, 2. Jill L. Grant and 3. Wan Nor Azriyati Wan Abd Aziz

Article first published online: 5 MAR 2015

DOI: 10.1111/1468-2427.12204

© 2014 Urban Research Publications Limited

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research

Volume 39, Issue 1, pages 112–128, January 2015

How to Cite

1. Funding from the Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia (SLAB/SLAI Unit), University of Malaya and Bright Spark UM helped to support this research. The first
author wishes to thank research supervisors Faizah Ahmad and Noor Rosly Hanif for helpful guidance. We would like to thank the anonymous IJURR reviewers for their useful comments on an earlier draft.

Keywords:
- Malaysia;
- gated communities;
- urban space;
- governance;
- security;
- guarded neighborhoods;
- segregation

Abstract

Enclosed residential areas are proliferating in Malaysian cities, in common with many other parts of the world. The production of gated communities and guarded neighborhoods in Malaysia reveals the active role of the state in creating conditions that support enclosure and securitization of space. This article examines the role of governance in producing residential enclaves that reinforce segregation and fragment urban landscapes. Based on a study of gated communities in Malaysia, we argue that governments, corporations and citizen groups collaborate within a complex governance system that (re)produces enclosure. Neoliberal market principles fuse with ethnic politics, cultural predilections and economic imperatives to generate a socially and spatially fragmented urban landscape where security concerns dominate and where citizens culturally, physically and symbolically segregate themselves from others.

Urban Malaysia is experiencing the rapid enclosure of middle- and upper-class residential areas. Enclosed residential enclaves are not a traditional urban form in Malaysia, although the British used fenced compounds and segregated villages during the late-colonial era to control people in regions where they feared the spread of communism (Cheah, 2009; Tajuddin, 2012). The contemporary pattern of enclosure produces two types of residential enclaves in Malaysia (Tedong et al., 2014). In new development projects, private developers are building gated communities surrounded by walls enclosing attractive shared amenities. In older areas of the major cities, residents’ associations organize to create guarded neighborhoods by erecting simple barriers across public roads and hiring security guards to limit outsiders’ access. In this article we examine urban governance mechanisms facilitating urban enclosure in Malaysia to help understand the diverse ways that local cultural and political processes interact with globalizing, modernizing and neoliberalizing forces to produce urban spaces. While neoliberalism may be a necessary condition for enclosure in contemporary metropolitan areas, it is not sufficient to account for variations in the forms enclosures take and the processes generating them: as Glasze et al. (2006: 3) noted, ‘private neighbourhoods are emerging in the cities of the world under different sets of influences in different forms and with different effects’. What first appears to be yet another manifestation of a global phenomenon turns out to equally reflect local dynamics and concerns. Understanding the nature and prevalence of gated residential areas in Malaysia requires insights into the cultural context in which housing is produced and consumed, and the governance processes whereby decisions are made. In Malaysia, governments (federal, state and local authorities), corporations (development companies, management companies and security companies) and citizen groups (safety
associations and residents’ associations) work within a complex governance system to (re)produce enclosed residential areas.

In recent decades, Malaysia has experienced considerable economic growth and modernization (Laquian, 2011). Rapid urbanization ensued as rural residents migrated to take advantage of new opportunities. By encouraging migration of rural Malays to urban areas, the Malaysian government stimulated demand for housing (Sivar and Kasim, 1997; Tan, 2011). Growing industrialization in the context of a laissez-faire economy accelerated the urbanization process (Sivar and Kasim, 1997).

The interaction between private and public actors in (re)producing gated communities and guarded neighborhoods remains under-researched in Malaysia. Case studies such as ours offer useful insights about an area not previously studied in detail and provide opportunities to generalize theoretically (Yin, 2003) about the factors shaping enclosure practices. Based on the findings of a broader study of gated communities and guarded neighborhoods in Malaysia, we consider the role of the state and other key actors in (re)producing enclosure development. We developed these insights from a mixed-methods multi-year study that included surveys of residents, interviews with key actors in government and communities, reviews of documentation and statistics, and field visits assessing enclosed communities. We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 29 respondents purposively sampled from federal, state and local governments, residents’ associations, residents of enclosure developments and residents of open neighborhoods. Subsequently, we surveyed 600 urban residents in Selangor state: using a door-to-door process we contacted residents of enclosed developments and residents of open neighborhoods. We visited a large number of enclosed developments in our fieldwork, but acknowledge the limitations of conducting research in conditions where access is often determined by security guards.

The discussion draws especially on our investigation of gated communities and guarded neighborhoods in Selangor state (surrounding the capital, Kuala Lumpur). Selangor is one of the most developed and urbanized states in Malaysia. Rosly (2011) identified 515 gated communities in Malaysia, mostly located around Kuala Lumpur: in Selangor state she found 407 guarded neighborhoods—the highest concentration in Malaysia. A federal government employee implied that the number could be greater, since ‘the data produced by some local authorities in Selangor does not reflect the actual distribution of guarded neighborhoods and is not up to date’ (interview, 1 November 2012). While the Selangor Housing and Property Board tracks approved guarded neighborhoods, it does not count the many illegal/undocumented guarded neighborhoods in the region.

We begin our discussion of the roles various agents play in the systems governing and producing enclosure in Malaysia with a brief review of the literature on the governance of space in modernizing urban areas under neoliberal conditions. We then describe the Malaysian context before identifying the roles that key sets of actors play in generating enclosed communities. Ultimately we hope to shed light on the necessary conditions for enclosure and the complex processes that help to explain its growing popularity in Malaysia. By examining a governance system that includes international agents and agendas, governments at three levels, a range of corporations and local citizen action groups, we contribute theoretical insights to current understandings of how gated communities are co-produced in a system of ‘actually existing neoliberalism' (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In the Malaysian context, growing social polarization and a pervasive discourse of fear create
robust conditions within which the governance system enables and encourages physical enclosure of residential areas.

**The governance of space: globalization, neoliberalization and enclosure**

In the 1990s, urban scholars wrote extensively about the widespread appearance of gated communities (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Marcuse, 1997), the privatization of space (McKenzie, 1994) and the influence of fear on urban form and pattern (Davis, 1992; Ellin, 1997). Although much of the early discussion reported on experiences in the United States, by the 2000s gated communities were well documented on most continents and in diverse contexts. Efforts to explain the proliferation of enclosure often focused on the effects of globalization (Marcuse, 1997) or on fears of crime and violence generated by increasing social polarization (Caldeira, 1996; Flusty, 1997, 2004; ; Low, 2001, 2003; ). Grant and Rosen (2009: 575) cautioned, however, that focusing on global factors and processes risked overlooking relevant local conditions necessary to explain particular enclosure practices: ‘Although academics often interpret gated communities in reference to the postulated influence of international politico-philosophical dispositions vaguely generalized as “globalization” and “neoliberalism”, it remains for students of urban practice to demonstrate through empirical analysis that substantial links indeed exist’. The systems producing enclosure vary by location and history, and require explication (Low, 2003; Stoyanov and Frantz, 2006).

The complex relationship between neoliberalism, urban transformation and city governance has received greater attention in recent years (Hackworth, 2007; Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). Many authors (Genis, 2007; Hackworth, 2007; Rosen and Razin, 2009) consider enclosed developments as an emerging form of urban and landscape transformation in the neoliberal city. The neoliberal city reveals new patterns of use and social segregation (Swyngedouw, 1997; Swyngedouw et al., 2002) following the ascendance of free market doctrines among decision makers and other development agents since the 1980s (Keil, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Hackworth, 2007). While there is little doubt that the economic philosophy and political practices of neoliberalism have affected major cities around the globe, neoliberalism is not monolithic in its effects (Keil, 2002). Its practices are historically and geographically contingent (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 383). To understand ‘actually existing neoliberalism' (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349) we must place analysis in particular locations. We can look at the ‘processes that produce spaces, states, and subjects in complex and multiple forms' (Larner, 2003: 511, original emphasis). In doing so, we ‘emphasize the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects insofar as they have been produced within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles' (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349, original emphasis). Analysis of particular examples of urban transformation may reveal that ‘the role of the state now consists in sustaining the social and civic framework upon which markets actually depend' (Goonewardena, 2003: 195). As Peck et al. (2013: 1093) note:

even as it organizes the leading fronts of market-driven regulatory transformation—consistent with its character as a paradigm of restructuring, rather than as a condition or end-state—neoliberalization is never found alone. There is always more going on than neoliberalism; there are always other active sources and forces of regulatory change; there are always countervailing interests, pressures and visions.
Through case studies we can identify interactive processes between the state and other actors that together create conditions allowing particular urban forms to emerge.

How is space governed? Governments at many levels influence the disposition and use of land. The concept of governance implies a broader understanding that coordinating the activities affecting a system may involve many other actors and processes (Jessop, 1998). Within urban contexts, for instance, governance might involve public–private partnerships, industrial agents, trade associations, policy communities and policing agencies. Rhodes (1996) noted that governance is self-organizing and linked to a new public management approach that involved actors beyond government. Studies of the practices of new urban governance have highlighted shifts in the modes of urban regulations and public–private partnerships that have redistributed power between the state and private actors (ibid.; Peters and Pierre, 1998). The interplay between state and private actors is not simple: ‘The state is not a unitary, rational actor but a complex multitude of public actors operating at different levels and in different organizational settings … [The] state is an arena, an institutional context of rules, principles, and procedures that directly or indirectly structure the workings of actors’ (Hysing, 2009: 649). Contemporary governance often transcends the state to give private actors and civil society a greater role in managing urban processes (Swyngedouw, 2005).

Understanding urban processes requires attention to dynamic connections and interrelations among multiple stakeholders. Detailed investigations of enclosure in different local contexts and regions can deepen understandings of how neoliberalism influences the (re)production of enclosure in contemporary urban settings. For example, in Vietnam, Huong and Sajor (2010) observed that the major policy shifts toward housing privatization and micro-governance in condominium development served as mechanisms producing enclave developments. Similarly, in Israel changing urban governance reflecting neoliberal policies associated with the post-welfare state contributed to the emergence of suburban gated neighborhoods (Rosen and Razin, 2009). In Barbados (Clement and Grant, 2012) and parts of Latin America (Caldeira, 2000), the proximity of exclusive enclaves to impoverished neighborhoods has generated consumer expectations about the need for enclosure that authorities facilitate and the market accommodates. In Shanghai ‘the enactment of an aesthetic spatial regime actively constructs and shapes gated communities’ (Pow, 2009: 386), reinforcing neoliberal agendas seeking to create pristine and private middle-class retreats. Over the last two decades, critics of gated communities have often pointed to the role of globalization and neoliberal agendas in driving enclosure (Marcuse, 1997). Yet urban development occurs within a particular local and regional context shaped by cultural practices, expectations and fears (Grant, 2005; Crot, 2006; Rosen and Grant, 2011). Urban spaces inevitably reflect local histories and practices: the guarded neighborhoods of South Africa respond to the legacy of apartheid (Landman, 2006), while the frontier settlements of Israel dot its highly contested landscape (Rosen and Grant, 2011).

While studies have considered the international scope of enclosure (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006), the implications of particular practices (e.g. Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003), the historical origins of enclosure (Bagaeen and Uduku, 2010), and factors producing and shaping enclosure (e.g. Grant and Mittelsteadt, 2004; Pow, 2009), governance conditions influencing enclosure have received little scholarly attention. Although detailed work has described citizen action to enclose space in South Africa (Landman, 2004, 2006; Paasche et al., 2014), wider governance processes producing gated communities—especially self-organized ones—remain under-documented. Addressing
governance practices and processes in Malaysia offers insights into the ways that a range of actors co-produce spatial enclosure to facilitate social separation. The next sections examine the governance and production of enclosure in the Malaysian context.

**Malaysia's experience of neoliberalism**

Until 1957 Malaya (as it was previously known) was a British colony. To support mining and plantation agriculture, the British imported Chinese and Indian labor while encouraging indigenous Malays to grow rice (Tajuddin, 2012). The colonial experience generated an ethnically polarized society (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). By virtue of an economic structure that linked occupation to racial origins, ethnic groups lived apart and had limited social interaction. By the time of independence, ethnic Chinese residents dominated cities such as Kuala Lumpur where many had become successful entrepreneurs and professionals (Tan, 2001; King, 2007). Tamil Indians worked as rural plantation laborers on low wages (Lian, 2002). Malays and other indigenous people relied on agriculture, and felt marginalized in a nation where migrants outnumbered them while a small Malay aristocracy continued to expect deference from their perceived inferiors.

Independence changed the ethnic dynamic, with the constitution privileging Malays. After independence, the income gap between ethnic groups widened as the Chinese business classes prospered; Malays benefited from ethnic quotas on jobs (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Roslan, 2001). Rising tensions followed ethnic and class segregation in urban areas (Goh, 2008). Whereas Malays considered post-independence policy changes to be inadequate in redressing their poor economic status, non-Malays saw them as discriminatory (Shamsul, 2003). Mounting tensions in the years after independence culminated in ethnic riots in May 1969, with many residents of Chinese descent killed (Crouch, 1999: 226). Chinese squatter settlements in the capital region became the focus of government policy to clear and return private land to its owners (Evers, 1984; Johnstone, 1984). Promoting the interests of Malays became a priority.

In 1970 the government announced its New Economy Policy (NEP) to restructure the nation's multi-ethnic society (Gomez, 2003). The NEP directed state efforts to improve the economic situation of ethnic Malays (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Malays enjoyed special rights in housing, education, business and the public service. The government established state trust funds for Malays to expand their ownership of corporate assets, and awarded 61.2% (US $2.5 billion) of privatized assets or companies to Malays (Shamsul, 2003). Rapid urbanization followed restructuring. While Kuala Lumpur had been a largely ethnic-Chinese mining-based entrepôt early in its history (Sendut, 1965), by 1980 it had become more ethnically diverse and was experiencing the challenges of extensive squatter settlement (Bunnell, 2002a). Racial tensions, reflecting economic competition and political rhetoric, were seen as endangering stability (Jomo, 1989). As Malays grew in political power and wealth, they continued to see non-Malays as a threat. At the same time, ethnic Chinese and Indians watched their own rights being eroded (Tan, 2001; Lian, 2002).

The NEP facilitated the rise of a new multi-ethnic middle class in urban areas (Saw and Kesavapany, 2006). Government programs not only bridged the gap in income between Malays and non-Malays, but revealed the determination of the government to enact quasi-neoliberal policies before the era of neoliberalism came to dominate the West. Privatization and affirmative action advanced the status of Malays, along with the self-interest of politicians and elites (Johnstone, 1984; Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Tan, 2008).
Economic growth in Malaysia prior to the 1980s reflected complex structural changes in the transition from agriculture to industrial development (Tajuddin, 2012). In the 1960s and 1970s, Malaysia became the world's largest producer of palm oil (Drabble, 2000) and a net exporter of oil and natural gas (Young et al., 1980). In the 1970s manufacturing played a role in modernizing the Malaysian economy, as its government established many export processing zones (for the electrical and electronics sectors) in which multinational corporations stimulated economic growth (Ariff, 1998).

Alongside the economic transformation in the late 1970s, the Malaysian government enacted new housing policy. Starting with the First Malaysia Plan (Economic Planning Unit, 1965) the state more than doubled public expenditure on low-cost housing (from US $14 million to US $31 million). In the Second and Third Malaysia Plans, public sector involvement in low-cost housing was clear: the state took responsibility because ‘housing for low-income groups [does] not appeal to private developers’ (Economic Planning Unit, 1971: 257). By the time of the Fourth Malaysia Plan in 1981, however, the government had shifted responsibility to the private sector: the plan required at least 30% of all new housing units to be low cost, and 30–40% of units within any development to be reserved for Malays (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1997). State intervention, then, directed private sector developers to build lower-cost units as part of their overall projects: the government controlled price, design and size for low-cost units (Sufian and Ibrahim, 2011). Private developers built small low-cost units, but in some cases had difficulty in selling them; they preferred to build medium- and high-cost units which provided better returns with fewer risks (Tan, 2011). Malpezzi and Mayo (1997: 375) explained that most public low-cost housing in Malaysia has been produced for sale, but in some government programs units were initially leased to tenants, with an option to buy after 10 years. In sum, what might appear to be social housing policy intended to secure public welfare for low earners eventually permitted privatization of housing units produced with public subsidies. Such programs provided ‘public subsidy to both well paid employees and to the building industry’ (Johnstone, 1984: 522). Financial regulations forced banks to provide low-cost financing and tax incentives made real estate development an attractive proposition for local capital, while policies to encourage Malay-owned businesses created strong new players in the market (Johnstone, 1984). At the same time, with insufficient low-cost housing available, informal settlements grew.

The involvement of the private sector in housing markets in Malaysia coincided with the international rise of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism typically implies deregulation, privatization and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision, such as low-cost housing (Harvey, 2005: 3). The influence of neoliberalism in Malaysia was associated with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who ruled from 1981 to 2003. Mahathir initiated practices such as privatization, free market policies and financial liberalization (Saw and Kesavapany, 2006). The country made a transition from a state-dominated developmentalist approach towards a free-market model (Siddiquee, 2007). Liberalization policies under the Fifth Malaysia Plan extended privatization (Economic Planning Unit, 1986). Prevented by virtue of their ethnicity from directly benefitting from privatization of state operations, Chinese entrepreneurs took advantage of opportunities for real estate development as plantations in Selangor were sold off for industrial and residential development (Tan, 2001). Private sector developers completed more than 1.5 million units between 1991 and 2000. From 1981 to 1985, the private sector built 85,630 high-cost housing units, and completed 350,000 units between 1996 and 2000. Since 1985, the private sector has contributed almost 80% of the housing stock in Malaysia.
When the Fifth Malaysia Plan came into effect, the state effectively withdrew from housing development. Instead it turned its attention to altering financial regulations through policies on liberalization, treasury loans and directed credit (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1997). The state's intervention through financial regulations effectively boosted housing production by the private sector in the real estate market: we see this as local evidence of what Smith (2002) called a global strategy of urban restructuring. Park and Lepawsky (2012) suggest that neoliberalization became a dominant feature of 'urban restructuring', but the political economy and racial politics of Malaysia certainly influenced the form restructuring would take.

The transition to a free market in real estate required active involvement from government to give the private sector room to operate within a system previously dominated by the state. Policies privileged neoliberal practices and crony capitalism, whereby powerful interests aligned with the ruling parties benefited from development opportunities (Jomo, 1995). The 1983 Privatization Policy made the private sector responsible for designing, constructing and financing the internal infrastructure, amenities and housing for various income groups (Abdul-Aziz and Kasim, 2011). In 1993 the government introduced the Malaysia Incorporated Policy to improve cooperation and collaboration with the private sector to accelerate economic development. The private sector continued to dominate housing production, contributing nine times the value of public sector development in 2010.

Privatization generated a sense of unstoppable wealth creation that encouraged the Malaysian middle classes to consume high-end goods in order to differentiate themselves from the working classes (Agus, 2002). Changes over the 20-year period after the NEP's launch show that Malays became increasingly involved in business and worked in middle-class jobs; wealth among those of Chinese descent also increased, although more slowly than among Malays (Crouch, 1999). Tamil Indians remained marginalized (Lian, 2002). The NEP'S goal of eliminating the nexus between economic function and race was not achieved, however. Embong (1996) noted that income inequalities and class stratification continued to increase in urban areas during the Seventh Malaysia Plan. Moreover, new forms of spatial and social polarization, such as gated communities, were emerging.

Reduced government intervention in the housing market in the 1970s and 1980s privileged certain class groups. The real estate market satisfied the demand for high-cost housing for affluent people while ignoring the need for low-cost housing. By the late 1980s, Western design models were influencing new suburban developments in Malaysia. Developers building gated communities borrowed practices common in other nations to provide exclusive new options for affluent purchasers. Private amenities located within secure compounds offered a privileged retreat for those with the means to buy homes (Hanif et al., 2012). In a societal context where a repressive state, a docile press and the public culture reinforce fear of others from different ethnic groups or classes (Gomez and Jomo, 1999), enclosed residential compounds offered perceived security and comfort. Not wishing to be left behind in this changing landscape, residents' groups in older middle-class urban areas began organizing to enclose their own neighborhoods.

While in neighboring Singapore the land-scarce state created conditions to encourage enclosure (Pow, 2009), in Malaysia enclosure started from the 'bottom up', without explicit encouragement from government in its early stages. As gated communities became more common, however, the Malaysian government began to regulate land development, enabling new forms of corporate and citizen action that ultimately facilitated urban enclosure. The
proliferation of community-initiated guarded neighborhoods may be understood as a product of processes governing urban space.

Mohit and Abdulla (2011) argued that feelings of insecurity contributed to the move towards enclosure. The discourse of fear around crime linked to particular ethnic communities, such as Indians (Bunnell et al., 2010) and illegal migrants (Kassim, 1997), had accelerated by the 2000s. Some studies suggested that the desire to enhance safety and security (Xavier, 2008) and concerns related to fear of crime (Sakip et al., 2013) motivated middle-income groups in Selangor to create enclosed developments. Hanif et al. (2012) acknowledged the role of secondary factors such as enhanced property values, desire for exclusive living and privacy. Given the generally low crime rates in Malaysia, however, it appears that fear outweighs risk; Tedong et al. (2014) argue that marking class differences may be a significant though unacknowledged trigger for enclosure.

The move to enclosure must also be understood in terms of wider urban developments in western Malaysia. Over several decades Kuala Lumpur has become a large and diverse city within an economically powerful region. In the 1990s Prime Minister Mahathir announced plans for urban redevelopment in Kuala Lumpur, along with the construction of new towns and cities, a Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) creating a ‘world class' city with high-tech infrastructure (Bunnell, 2002b; King, 2007). From its inception in 1997, Putrajaya (the new administrative capital for 300,000 civil servants) sprang up very rapidly. Whereas Kuala Lumpur is an eclectic mix both in terms of form and people, Putrajaya was designed as a Malay-Muslim city, featuring Middle Eastern-style Islamic architecture (King, 2008). In a political landscape where conservative Islam grew in influence and pervasiveness during the period from 1970 to the 2000s, ethnic and religious minorities became more fearful for their own cultural traditions, legal rights and physical safety (Jomo, 1988; Yeoh, 2011). Particularly vulnerable groups, such as Tamils living on plantation lands in areas targeted for new development, found themselves evicted and relocated into low-cost high-rise housing on the fringe of urban areas (Lian, 2002). Although described as a strategy for social equity and harmony, government development policies instead enhanced and spatialized class, ethnic and religious segregation in Malaysia.

Gated and guarded areas in Selangor do not exist in a vacuum. They are produced within a context of contested authority between the federal government and the state, as the national government seeks to promote its agenda through redevelopment on lands within the state (Bunnell, 2002c). As the nation-state creates urban spaces uniquely marked as Malay and Muslim, the upper and middle classes in urban and suburban areas of the capital region also want to strengthen their safety and visible security (Goold et al., 2010; Hanif et al., 2012) while separating themselves from others. Gating does not signal the state's surrender of its monopoly on policing space, but supports and reflects residents' perceptions that open and diverse urban landscapes fail to offer the level of neighborhood security people expect. The next section considers the activities of various state and non-state actors in producing key conditions that govern the proliferation of enclosure in Selangor.

Governing enclosure in Malaysia

Malaysia operates with three levels of government: federal, state/territorial and local. Each plays a part in the regulation of urban development. The federal government owns all Malaysian land. Under the National Land Code 1965, land is normally let on long-term leases (for 33, 66 or 99 years). Once a lease expires, land and buildings revert to the state. The
owner may then apply for renewal, subject to a hefty fee which may equate to the original lease purchase price (Singh, 2002). The federal government prepares five-year plans that set housing and land development policies, and creates laws and guidelines to govern ownership and use of land. Through funding programs it influences options for the private sector and civil actors. Although the federal government has jurisdiction over education, health and security, state governments control land matters including housing (Shuid, 2008: 2). State and territorial governments create guidelines for urban development. State authorities manage approval processes including land conversion for housing, and building and structure plans; many government agencies, at both federal and local level, also play a role in approvals (Tan, 2011: 64). Local authorities develop and administer plans and process development permits under the Town and Country Planning Act 1976.

Non-state actors in the development process include a range of companies that may develop land, build homes, manage condominiums or provide security services. Various citizen groups—such as neighborhood watch groups, safety organizations and residents’ associations—also participate in governing urban space. We briefly describe each of these categories in turn.

**Federal government**

Prior to the 1980s, the federal government played a major role in producing affordable rental housing and low-cost housing for purchase. In the 1980s it rolled that policy back to provide greater room for the private sector in housing production. It also revised laws to facilitate new ownership forms that ultimately privatized larger segments of the urban landscape. In 1985, the government introduced the Strata Title Act to regulate high-rise condominium buildings. Most condominiums were constructed as walled developments, with gates permitted during the approval process. As enclosures became increasingly popular in Malaysia, the government amended the Strata Title Act in 2007 to allow gated communities of detached homes or ‘landed’ property (Fernandez, 2007). The Building and Common Property Act 2007 addressed land-related problems around gated and guarded developments (Mohammad et al., 2009: 72). Thus a suite of legislation supports gated communities.

After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, enclosed developments became increasingly common in Malaysia, and resident-initiated guarded neighborhoods began to appear. In 2010 the federal government’s Department of Town and Country Planning released its gated communities and guarded neighborhoods guidelines. By this point the government appeared to have ‘rolled back’ from the idea that it could provide effective public services such as neighborhood policing; it was explicitly enabling private companies and residents’ associations to self-regulate in enclosing public areas within privatized residential developments. Gated communities guidelines prepared by the federal government in 2010 sought to keep projects small: guidelines restricted enclosures to urban areas and stipulated 10 hectares as the maximum area for gated developments.

Selective enforcement of laws reflects the priorities of decision makers and their willingness to facilitate enclosure. For instance, laws such as the Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974 and the Road Transport Act 1987 specify that public streets must be kept open for access. Another guideline—the Private Agency Circular (1) 2006 (drafted before demand for security guards grew so exponentially)—specified that only Malaysians and Nepalese veterans could work as security guards. Our field surveys in 2012 found that immigrants from Southeast and South Asia—especially Indonesia and Bangladesh—commonly worked as guards.
Our interviews with local authority staff and other stakeholders suggested that government guidelines responded to the increasing trend towards enclosure. The guidelines allowed local authorities to approve enclosure of public spaces (streets, parks, etc.) by giving residents' associations 2-year renewable planning approval to erect barriers. A federal government representative explained: ‘The guidelines become a backbone to monitor and regulate these developments, especially guarded neighborhood schemes' (interview, 1 November 2012). Another government regulator expressed discomfort with federal policy: ‘The guidelines are only tools for local authorities to regulate these communities … We do not support or legalize them' (interview, 23 October 2012).

The government of Malaysia actively promotes public safety (and arguably encourages fear) through a range of incentives and funding programs. For instance, in recent years it has provided uniforms for community safety volunteers, funding to support neighborhood watch activities and grants to residents' associations. In the 2013 Malaysian Budget, the federal government allocated US $56 million to the private sector and local communities in order to ensure neighborhood safety (Ministry of Finance, 2013). The tax system allows developers to deduct the costs of installing safety measures (such as gates), thus securing private benefits through public incentives (ibid.). Such incentives roll out opportunities for private corporations, associations and actors to securitize space.

State/territorial government

State and local governments in Malaysia are politically and economically subordinate to the federal government (Nooi, 2008). Political relationships between Selangor state and the federal government are often antagonistic—an opposition party has controlled the state government since 2008. Even before then, however, state officials sometimes challenged, ignored or contravened federal policies.

State-level authorities govern decisions on land development projects (Omar, 2001). In 2007, the Housing and Property Board of Selangor introduced guidelines to govern closure of public roads (a practice not officially permitted by the federal government). Selangor's guidelines for considering residents' requests are stricter than those set by the federal government, but the 12 local authorities within the state may choose which guidelines to use. One local authority employee explained: ‘There are several guidelines produced by federal and state authorities. For example, 51% support from residents is required by federal authorities to establish a guarded neighborhood, while at least 80% concern from residents is required by the state level … We at the local authority level will adopt both of the guidelines but favor the state guideline’ (interview, 29 October 2012). While the state of Selangor sets standards that may make achieving local consensus for enclosure more difficult, it has limited scope to reduce demand for enclosure or to slow its spread.

Local governments

Planners working for local authorities deal with applications for enclosure from residents, and evaluate requests for local barricades. The limited funding available to local governments means that departments describe themselves as short-staffed and unable to police urban space in order to ensure compliance with policies. Local authority staff members dealing with applications generally approved enclosures. They perceived that gated communities save government the costs of building some public amenities. Moreover, in the case of guarded neighborhoods, residents' association members become the ‘eyes and ears' of local officials,
thus helping local authorities to optimize manpower. A local authority employee explained that:

I believe enclosure developments help local authorities in terms of urban management: landscaping, blocking drainage, and [dealing with] uncollected garbage. A residents' association will inform us if there are any issues within their communities … I would say that the role of the residents' association at the neighborhood level indirectly helps us in urban management, especially on the issue of safety and security (interview, 25 October 2012).

Our interview data indicated that all local authorities in Selangor were aware of the existence of enclosures but only some recognized the scale of illegal erection of barricades (Figure 1). A few local authority employees criticized enclosures, while others appreciated such action. One individual explained: ‘We organize best neighborhood awards every year … to appreciate the role of residents' associations in managing their neighborhood area … Last year [2011] the winner was the guarded neighborhood development from Bandar Sri Damansara’ (interview, 23 October 2012)

Figure 1. Illegal street barricade erected in older neighborhood (photo by Peter Aning Tedong)

Those interviewed agreed that, given the demand from residents, they faced pressure to approve enclosure applications. Political intervention also complicates the development process in Malaysia. One local authority employee explained: ‘We received an application to close public roads … [that] was supported and recommended by a politician in the area’ (interview, 5 November 2012). Recently, one opposition party member told a reporter: ‘I believe [enclosure development] has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. It should be allowed if there are no objections’ (Foo, 2013). Bassoli (2010: 487) noted that contemporary politics in Malaysia reflects a ‘shift from national to local levels [that] has been driven primarily by a new collaborative attitude that has arisen among politicians and been strongly supported by political institutions' Supporting residents' requests for enclosure suits political interests.

Corporations

Several types of company play a role in governing the production of enclosure. Many have grown in influence and power over recent decades, with increasing privatization in the economy and the rise of real estate capital. Development companies took advantage of opportunities to dominate the housing market as the government withdrew from it during the 1980s. Convincing the federal government to limit requirements for low-cost housing as a mandatory component of the mix has left development companies able to focus on the higher end of the market. While initially they promoted gated communities as innovative, over time they have made enclosure a standard feature of new suburban residential design. relatively small- scale condominium development projects are well suited to being enclosed, so as to render shared amenities private (Department of Town and Country Planning of Malaysia, 2010).
Once gated community projects are occupied, then management companies play a role. Condominium development and enclosure generates a niche for companies to manage shared amenities, provide maintenance services and hire guards (Azimuddin, 2007; Fernandez, 2007). Security companies have become a growth industry as they provide guards to management companies running gated communities and residents' associations operating guarded neighborhoods.

A currently under-documented player in the production of enclosure in Malaysia is the media. As is true in many countries, crime sells advertising. Crime in residential areas gains headline coverage in Malaysia, adding to residents' fears and demands for enclosure. The media may thus play a part in inducing what Kenna and Dunn (2009: 808) see as a moral panic that reflects fear of disorder and lack of control. In Malaysia, middle-class residents often link these fears to disadvantaged populations such as Indians (Bunnell et al., 2010), illegal immigrants (Kassim, 1997) or recent rural–urban migrants (Bunnell, 2002a).

Citizen associations

Citizen action to promote neighborhood safety has a key role in enclosure of established areas. By the early 1980s, residents' associations were becoming significant players in urban issues. Encouraged by funding programs from government, citizens organized neighborhood watch and safety associations to patrol areas to enhance security. Residents' associations play an important and growing role in neighborhood safety in Malaysia: for instance, the number of associations registered under the Societies Act increased by 12% from 2008 to 2009 (Misnan, 2010). Studies of such associations have argued that they help create safe and harmonious communities in Malaysia's enclosure developments (Karim and Rashid, 2010).

Since the early 2000s, residents' associations have increasingly organized to raise funds to erect barriers and hire guards. Some secured official approvals for enclosure, but others self-organized to take control of public spaces without requesting permission. Few repercussions ensue for illegal enclosures.

Associations collect fees from residents willing to pay, but they have no mechanism to enforce compliance. As one residents' association leader interviewed said: ‘We don't force them to pay the maintenance fee … I hope someday they will realize the importance of the guarded neighborhood concept, since crime incidents are happening every day in residential areas …

We need to take extra safety and security measures' (interview, 4 November 2012). Those interviewed believed residents' associations played a vital role in protecting neighborhood safety and security. Indeed, the system has become a cost-effective way for government to address—and to reinforce—concerns regarding security in diverse urban contexts. With the growth in guarded neighborhoods, Malaysia now has more private security guards than police officers (Surin, 2009). Paradoxically, enclosure has generated plenty of (low-paying) jobs for disadvantaged ethnic groups and immigrant laborers, the very people who arouse urban fears among some Malaysians.

Conclusion: conceptualizing the conditions for enclosure

Is the proliferation of enclosed communities in Malaysia an example of globalization and neoliberalism in practice? Although international influences and philosophical shifts certainly
played their part in bringing enclosure to a nation where physical bounding was not traditionally common, we have also shown some of the ways in which particular cultural and political processes and circumstances in Malaysia generated unique conditions that intensified the production of social and spatial fragmentation. The national government's initiatives on privatization, deregulation and decentralization facilitated processes of social differentiation already being made concrete in space. As Aalbers (2013: 1083) has argued, 'actually existing neoliberalism is flexible enough to influence policy in other ways than through the mantra of free markets'. This case study of Selangor state reveals some of the ways that various players and institutions interact in governance processes that (re)produce enclosure (see Figure 2). The governance system at work in Malaysia includes international capital and political ideology, framing a neoliberal agenda within which governments, corporations and citizen associations co-produce the economic, social and political conditions to stimulate and legitimize enclosure.

Figure 2. Framework showing how actors, companies and governments participate in Malaysia's governance process (re)producing enclosure

Case study research may not allow us to generalize in respect of other places, but it warrants hypotheses about relationships and engenders useful questions for further research. Based on a study of Malaysian enclosure, and in the context of the literature on gated communities, what conditions seem necessary for enclosure? As Marcuse (1997) noted, social polarization (wherein some groups are succeeding or privileged while others are struggling) is commonplace alongside enclosure. The Malaysian case suggests that fear of others, aligned with strong in-group identity and differential power, may increase the likelihood that residents will seek spatial enclosure where the state permits it. Colonial socio-spatial ethnic divisions, which left Malays economically disadvantaged and Malaysian society racially segregated, structured political responses to urbanization. After independence, government policies for affirmative action and laws that offered Malays prerogatives and privatized resources left ethnic groups feeling vulnerable. In the wake of modernization, globalization and Islamization in Malaysia, new forms of class and religious inequality have emerged: concentrations of Malay-Muslims in new cities, suburban areas of affluence and older middle-class neighborhoods looking for strategies to protect residents' wellbeing. With its robust economy, Malaysia draws international migrants in search of opportunity: these are simultaneously viewed as a potential threat and as low-wage labor to man the hundreds of entry barricades being erected.

The new regime of social polarization has integrated ethnic groups in cities such as Kuala Lumpur, but produced a class-inflected landscape where residents of bungalow neighborhoods now want to separate themselves from districts of apartment buildings, and the purchasers of attractive new condominiums want privacy in which to enjoy their privileged spaces. Those with the ability to do so wish to reduce the risk of contact with those they fear. Like the grassroots activism that may produce temporary tent cities or guerilla gardening in Western nations, residents in comfortable Malaysian neighborhoods engage in a kind of do-it-yourself urbanism to fashion places they wish to inhabit: 'neoliberal reterritorialization takes place at the level of the local and involves decentralization, privatization and individualization' (Iveson, 2013: 828). 'Rather than merely forming the context for political and economic activities by state or capitalist agents, the city gives rise to forms of grassroots
activism that reflexively map and imagine the city in the process of acting to change it' (Goh and Bunnell, 2013: 827). Neoliberal practices certainly influence decisions to erect neighborhood barricades in Selangor state, but the complex racial history, religious politics, class dynamics and political ambitions of Malaysia regulate the pace and extent of the phenomenon. In developing theory about the ways in which enclosure is produced, we might argue that the nature and extent of social differentiation, and the way that social polarization is articulated in national politics, affects the dominance of enclosure as an urban development practice.

Market mechanisms seeking to take advantage of opportunities and differentiate products generated gated communities as a development form. Where consumer desires for privacy, exclusivity or special amenities coincide with growing affluence and compliant government, then developers find enclosure an attractive option. In contexts like Malaysia—where enclosure becomes so dominant in the marketing of suburban land—we are likely to find the real estate industry responding to cultural and political conditions. In this region, enclosure is not one among many market options but is rapidly becoming the virtual standard. Moreover, the imperative for enclosure has spread from corporations exploiting market opportunities to citizen groups acting locally to promote neighborhood safety and order. Fear becomes the cultural justification for fragmenting space in the city and placing security guards on residential streets. Fortified urban spaces in Malaysia represent physical manifestations of the growing discourse of insecurity, often deeply intertwined with fear of disadvantaged others (especially immigrants). Thus we might argue that spatial products such as enclosure reveal the nature of contemporary urban cultural values, especially status marking and insecurity.

The collaboration of the state is a necessary condition for enabling widespread enclosure of the kind seen in the area around Kuala Lumpur. In Malaysia various levels of government play both active and passive roles in enclosure. The federal government produced laws, guidelines and funding incentives that together facilitated the development of segregated and enclosed residential areas, and encouraged residents to consider occupying them. State- and territorial-level officials participated in a land regulation process that turned a blind eye to the closure of public streets, the alienation of public spaces and the securitization of space. Local authorities reviewed and approved applications for enclosure while overlooking many instances of illegal street barricades. In interviews, we found an assumption at all levels of government that residents would and should accept increasing responsibility for their own safety and security. The merits attributed to citizen action (alongside fear of others and the perceived failure of the state to ensure security) provided legitimacy to residents' associations acting to enclose their districts. Thus we see in Selangor state the conditions in which a complex governance system of state actors (at all levels), market players and citizen groups collaborate in co-producing enclosure.

1. 1

Ethnically segregated occupational classifications persisted long after the end of colonialism.

2. 2

Residents' associations are proliferating. Prime Minister Najib Razak reported that 4,025 were registered under the Registry of Societies Malaysia (Najib, 2012)
3. While neighborhood action to enclose space is not common in many countries, it has been reported in South Africa (Landman, 2006) and the United States (Blakely and Snyder, 1997).

References


Direct Link:
  o Abstract
  o PDF(245K)
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 476

  o CrossRef
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 14


Direct Link:
  o Abstract
  o PDF(290K)
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 31

• Bunnell, T., S. Nagarajan and A. Willford (2010) From the margins to centre stage: ‘Indian' demonstration effects in Malaysia's political landscape. Urban Studies 47.6, 1257–78.
  o CrossRef
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 7

  o CrossRef
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 77


  o CrossRef


  o CrossRef.
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 30


  o CrossRef.
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 30

  o CrossRef.

  o CrossRef.

  o CrossRef.
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 39
  - CrossRef
  - Web of Science® Times Cited: 7


  - CrossRef
  - Web of Science® Times Cited: 6


Direct Link:
  - Abstract
  - Full Article (HTML)
  - PDF(133K)
  - References
  - Web of Science® Times Cited: 11


Direct Link:
  - Abstract
  - Full Article (HTML)
  - PDF(624K)
  - References
  - Web of Science® Times Cited: 3


Direct Link:
  - Abstract
  - PDF(150K)
  - Web of Science® Times Cited: 149

Direct Link:

- Abstract
- PDF(1907K)
- References
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 3

  - CrossRef
  - CrossRef
  - CrossRef

Direct Link:

- Abstract
- PDF(210K)
  - Web of Science® Times Cited: 74


Direct Link:

- Abstract
- Full Article (HTML)
- PDF(2028K)
- References
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 25

  - CrossRef
  o CrossRef
  o CrossRef
  o CrossRef, o Web of Science® Times Cited: 253
  o Web of Science® Times Cited: 98
  o CrossRef, o Web of Science® Times Cited: 29
  o CrossRef, o Web of Science® Times Cited: 40

Direct Link:

- Abstract
- Full Article (HTML)
- PDF
- References
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 8


Direct Link:

- Abstract
- PDF
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 1009

  - CrossRef

Direct Link:

- Abstract
- Full Article (HTML)
- PDF
- References
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 20

Direct Link:

- Abstract
- Full Article (HTML)
- PDF (1109K)
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 669


Direct Link:

- Abstract
- Full Article (HTML)
- PDF (633K)
- References
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 3


- CrossRef
- Web of Science® Times Cited: 9


- Web of Science® Times Cited: 4


