Institute of China Studies, 2003-2013
University of Malaya

China: Developmental Model, State-Civil Societal Interplay and Foreign Relations

ICS 10th Anniversary Commemorative Anthology

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Editor
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Institute of China Studies
Introduction
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China Studies and Political Realism: From Domestic Power Interplay to External Power Politics

1. Preamble

Since the official establishment of the Institute of China Studies (ICS) at the University of Malaya on 5th December 2003, forging collaborative ties with the international academic community has always been a top prioritized focus to accomplish the institute’s major objective to be an academic research organization dedicated to the advancement of scholarship on China studies, in particular contemporary China’s political, economic and social development and their implications in the regional and global contexts. Besides establishing international academic visiting positions at the institute, the ICS international seminar series and conferences have served to provide motivated platforms to facilitate informed public policy debates, provide recommendations and conduct academic research on China’s sociopolitical and socioeconomic development and their impacts in the regional and global arena. Especially since 2008, ICS has ensured the organizing of an average of at least two major international conferences at the University of Malaya or in Kuala Lumpur with the participation of academics and researchers from academic institutions and think tanks around the world. Concurrent with that, the ICS Resource Centre was established in January 2009, housing a wide range of statistical data and other research materials pertaining to research in China studies. Besides the rich series of books and working papers published at the institute, the International Journal of China Studies was launched in 2010 as a triannual printed and on-line open access platform focuses on contemporary China and her relations with other countries and regions, in the context of regional and global development, and more specifically, issues related to the political, social and economic development, trade and commerce, foreign relations, regional security and science, medical and technological development. The present volume, China: Developmental Model, State-Civil Societal Interplay and Foreign Relations, represents a tenth anniversary commemorative anthology of selected papers from such publications at the institute over the years. This commemorative volume consists of twenty-five chapters in
eight parts, covering all the major aspects of contemporary China’s political, economic and social development and their implications in the regional and global contexts.

2. China Model in Global Context

Beginning the volume is the first chapter under Part I Chinese Developmental Model in Global and Comparative Perspective, Arif Dirlik and Roxann Prazniak’s “Social Justice, Democracy and the Politics of Development: The People’s Republic of China in Global Perspective”, which provides a critical analysis of the current Chinese developmental and sociopolitical realities in a global context, urging for the need to see China’s problems as the world’s problems, and vice versa, the world’s problems as China’s too. From outsiders’ complicity based on market and related considerations of economic gain to their tacit condoning of political repression stemming from their enthusiasm for the authoritarian “China model” wherein domestic plunder and exploitation could ironically be good for business for transnational corporations, Dirlik and Prazniak provide a scathing evaluation of the phenomenon and root causes of contemporary Chinese political repression in a global context which is of utmost importance in searching for solutions that would go right to the core of the systemic sources far beyond mere surface phenomena. From another angle, Brantly Womack in his paper “Modernization and the Sino-Vietnamese Model”, which analyzes the distinctive model of political development in the contemporary “party-state survivors” of China and Vietnam and the challenges posed to modernization theory by the Sino-Vietnamese experience, talks about the increased local transparency and accountability and articulation of local interests while the Communist Party, being disillusioned with the “socialist transformation” but still firmly in power, places its dogma “on a remote altar while [it] preserves and justifies itself by tending to the pastoral duties relating to the welfare of the flock”.

3. Internal Dissension across the Eras

While from late 2012 to early 2013 the Chinese Communist Party1 had completed its second orderly hand-over of power in more than six decades of its rule over this most populous country in the world, and today, the world’s second largest economic entity, also marking the year 2012 are various other poignant events that have further strained State-civil societal relations in this vast country: the suicide of Zha Weilin, the mysterious death of Li Wangyang, the daring escape of Chen Guangcheng from captivity in Shandong, the intensification of public protests apparently emboldened by the encouraging solution to late 2011’s Siege of Wukan, and the continuing self-immolation
Introduction

of Tibetans since 2009. Among these, most undoubtedly epitomizing the contemporary sociopolitical dilemmas of the People’s Republic of China is the proliferation of public protests mainly related to forced demolition and relocation, industrial pollution and official corruption, and related to this, State response to civil rights-defending *weiquan*维权 activism and its treatment of such activists as part of the wider dissident community, which have also been highlighted in the two chapters in the first section of this volume. The continued unfolding of this systemic crisis has, indeed, to be properly placed in the overall environmental context of the problem of increasingly acute socioeconomic inequality, including its ethnoregional dimension, which in many ways constitute the epitome as well as the root of China’s social ills resulted from her recent decades of continuous, astounding economic *tour de force* while having stagnated are the modernization and democratization of its political structure and sociopolitical power configuration, which has been noted in the above two chapters. The deep-seatedness of such stagnation is conveyed to us in David McMullen’s chapter, “Memorials and Essays: Political Protest in Late Medieval China”, which begins Part II Protest and Dissension from Late Medieval to Communist China. While placing the Tang dynasty tradition of political criticism in its historical context as an aspect of the traditional administrative structure in China, McMullen has shown how besides established channels both for internalized dissent and for independently initiated protest at that time, provisions were developed for the emperor to be aware of dissenting views from the common people, though the paternalistic and largely symbolic nature of such channels should be noted. While pointing out the deep historical and ideological roots of remonstration and the principle of open access to the throne of the Tang period, McMullen also highlights the later developments in State response to political dissent in post-Song China which were often characterized by far harsher imperial dynastic intolerance of dissenting views, along with increasing despotism. From the gruesome suppression of the Donglin movement to the imperial courts’ co-opting the Confucian literati while continuing to monitor and police the intellectual community by codifying the learned tradition, such later developments would not fail to evoke a sense of *déjà vu* for readers of this commemorative anthology.

Moving from the historical perspective of the preceding chapter to the contemporary era are two chapters respectively by Gregor Benton and Merle Goldman. Benton’s chapter, “Dissent and the Chinese Communists before and since the Post-Mao Reforms”, looks at extra-party dissent under the CCP before and since 1949, from during the Mao era to the post-Mao decades. Distinguishing between opposition and dissent under Communist regimes, Benton argues that at least until the 1980s Chinese communism and the democracy movement never wholly excluded one another. Goldman
in her chapter, “Citizens’ Struggles in China’s Post-Mao Era”, also traces the development of intellectual dissent in modern China, beginning with a look at Mao Zedong’s totalitarian rule before proceeding to the post-Mao authoritarian decades. Goldman’s chapter, moving through the Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administrations, brings into focus the ebb and flow of the plight of dissidents, the uneasy co-existence of pluralistic discourse and openness to foreign ideas and continued tight surveillance and purges and persecution of dissenting intellectuals, including Liu Xiaobo, the key founder of Charter 08. Nevertheless, Goldman notes that while persecution of dissident public intellectuals continues even after the country’s transition from a totalitarian to an authoritarian polity, the rule of the CCP is today admittedly less repressive than during the Mao era, and together with China’s increasing participation in the international community, making it possible for intellectuals to speak out periodically and publicly on political issues, with an impact beyond their immediate intellectual circles.

4. Civil Society and Its Discontents

Beginning Part III State, Civil Society and Sociopolitical Structure in Contemporary China is a chapter on “Governing through Shequ” by Thao Nguyen which highlights that while increasing local autonomy and self-governance (zizhi 自治) seem to be implied by the government’s community-building (shequ jianshe 社区建设), such granting of “autonomy” is subject to the perceived level of human quality (suzhi 素质), pointing to the pertinent issue of acutely increasing socioeconomic stratification in contemporary China which is admittedly the main cause of the currently proliferating street protests², euphemistically called “mass incidents” in official parlance, whose threat to the existing political order can be seen in the case of such a protest that started in September 2011 in a tiny fishing village in China’s Guangdong Province which soon developed virtually into a local rebellion by December which led to the “Siege of Wukan” that both shocked and fascinated the world. Johan Lagerkvist’s chapter, “The Wukan Uprising and Chinese State-Society Relations: Toward ‘Shadow Civil Society’?”, looks into the Wukan incident to reflect on the wider issue of social protest mobilization in the Chinese countryside and the emerging civil society, while pondering the interesting questions related to the uniqueness of the Wukan phenomenon and whether the rather unique and truly remarkable solution to the Wukan crisis does have a symbolic or concrete significance for propelling the progress of democratic politics in China. Despite its unique resolution, the Wukan “uprising” is but one of the myriad cases of “mass incidents” occurring in China at an alarming frequency and intensity which can only be understood by taking into consideration all critical issues underlying contemporary
China’s social transition, such as poverty, inequality and social stratification, and ethnoregional disparities and contradictions, within the overall political milieu where social change is moving apace amidst astounding economic transformation. Ironically, some factors which at first look seem to be system-threatening may instead work for the ruling regime’s advantage. Some see, for instance, social protests in today’s China as constituting one of the major components of social stability, as the protests serve as checks against the leaders’ abuse of power and as mechanisms ensuring the accountability of the government, thereby undergirding rather than undermining the political system in China’s authoritarian polity where multi-party competitive elections do not exist to provide an effective check on the misbehaviour of State authorities, while others consider large-scale mass incidents driven by economic grievances attributable to local officials’ wrongdoing, or the lack of proper regulations or experience in handling problems engendered by the process of socioeconomic transformation, as not regime-threatening because by asking the government to zuozhu (enforce justice), the protests had in fact endorsed the legitimacy of the regime, and as long as the regime had plenty of financial resources to satisfy the protesters’ demands – hence the significance of GDPism as a cornerstone of regime maintenance – it further consolidates its legitimacy. On the other hand, as Gregor Benton notes in Chapter of this anthology, regarding socioeconomic inequalities which form the root cause of most “mass incidents” and the latter’s implications for the prospect of democratization, there are also arguments that the beneficiaries of economic growth are able to find their own individual solutions to their problems and resign themselves to an authoritarian government as a defence against the threat from potentially vengeful losers in the market economy, thereby rendering social polarization inconducive to democratic sentiment among them.

Going back to the issue of rural-to-urban migrant workers (nongmingong 农民工) which constitute the context of Thao Nguyen’s chapter on shequ-building, Kate Hannan’s chapter, “Chinese Migrant Workers: From Labour Surplus to Labour Shortage”, charts the action taken by migrant workers in China’s low-end/labour-intensive manufacturing hubs when the global financial crisis led to a reduction in their employment opportunities, wages and conditions, and proceeds to discuss the migrant worker situation as it stands today. Focusing on three aspects of the migrant labour situation in China – how the migrant labour surplus that came in the wake of Chinese export orders declining following the global financial crisis had eventually turned into a shortage; the present situation where the migrant workers’ relatively more active strategy is bringing about changes in wages as well as State response; the very fact that the migrant workers have been paying all along a disproportionate price for their country’s industrial and urban
development – Hannan argues for a more pro-active approach to promote the interests of migrant workers instead of for Chinese government leaders and officials and a range of other Chinese commentators to be merely paying lip service to publicly recognize the considerable contribution made by these workers who have been “left out of the wealth”. Finally, leaving the urban landscape to move to the country’s equally fast-transforming rural sector, John Donaldson and Forrest Zhang in their chapter, “Whither China’s Agriculture and Rural Sector? Some Thoughts on Changes in Rural China”, introduce a fivefold typology of agribusiness-farmer relations to analyze the growth of agribusiness and the role it has played in the rise of agrarian capitalism in China and the resultant changes to the rural society. Looking at the various forms in which agribusiness companies are transacting with individual agricultural producers, Donaldson and Zhang contend that China’s unique system of land rights has played an important role in shaping agribusiness-farmer interactions and served to provide the individual agricultural producers a source of income and political bargaining power and protected them from being dispossessed of their land by corporate actors.

5. Structure and Agency in Rights-Defending

Further elaborating on the theme of dissent first introduced in Part II are three chapters respectively by Feng Chongyi et al., Chin-fu Hung and Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh under Part IV Chinese Dissidents, Rights Defence and Authoritarianism. In comparison with the earlier victims of State repression in June 1989, whether slain on the Chang’an Avenue, or languished in jail like Li Wangyang (who eventually died under mysterious circumstances), or forced into exile like the many students, academics and labour activists, today’s weiquan (rights-defending) activists on the other hand represent a community who are trying to work within PRC’s politico-legal system to defend the civil rights of the downtrodden masses and victims of official corruption and abuse of power and a mode of development obnoxiously tainted by guan-shang goujie (State-business collusion). At the forefront of this new breed of dissidents are the weiquan lüshi (rights defence lawyers) who top the list of subversive forces highlighted in a recent article in the overseas edition of the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), and who form the focus of Feng Chongyi, Colin Hawes and Gu Ming’s chapter, “Rights Defence Lawyers as Dissidents in Contemporary China”. Against the backdrop of China’s economic, social and political transition, Feng, Hawes and Gu explore the emergence of these “rights defence lawyers”, with emphasis on the politically charged environment for China’s legal profession, how these rights defence lawyers could turn into political dissidents when defending clients whose rights are violated by
the Party-State, and their quest for the rule of law and democratic political reforms through their interaction with the wider *weiquan* activism. Indeed, for the powerless, the dispossessed masses at the lower stratum of society, who have no effective channel to have their grievances redressed by voicing out, these rights defence lawyers emerge to be the main people to whom they could possibly turn for help – who, such as Chen Guangcheng, ironically often become themselves the target of State persecution as they take up cases of victims of State action or of State-business collusion – other than resorting to street protests, or “mass incidents”.

From another perspective, focusing on the advent of the information age, Chin-fu Hung in his chapter, “The Politics of China’s *Wei-Quan* Movement in the Internet Age”, argues that empowerment by the modern information technology could be making some public protests (“mass incidents”) a threat to China’s sociopolitical stability and the rule of the CCP regime, in contrast to the many that are spontaneous, loosely organized, and eventually short-lived. While traditionally the practices and governing logic in China have been lacking in accommodating the needs of civic engagement in public affairs, Hung observes that the Chinese public is awakening to begin defending their protected civil and legal rights especially with the onset of the age of the Internet. Such civil societal activism also represents one of the major foci of Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh’s chapter, “State Coercion and Civil Societal Response: Structure and Agency in the Development of Contemporary Chinese Dissent and Nonviolent Action”, which explores the arduous development and current situation of contemporary Chinese nonviolent action (NVA) movements. Seeing contemporary Chinese NVA not as a multiattribute concept, but a *multiconcept* construct covering a spectrum of civil actions with different ideological and strategic orientations, Yeoh analyzes the Chinese State-civil societal relations with particular emphasis along the pathway of a State domination-NVA assertion nexus with due attention paid to its macro-micro linkages in particular from the interpretive perspective, taking into consideration the problem of structure and agency and taking cognizance of the central role played by individual political actors in giving existence to the system, and the inability for the causal powers of systems and structures to exist without mediation through the Archerian human agency whose causal powers, in turn, are indeducible from or irreducible to the causal powers of society.

6. State and Gendered Space

Continuing the exploration of State-civil societal relations and the situation of dissent in China in Part V *State, Gendered Platform and Social Activism* is Jonathan Benney’s chapter “How to Avoid the Centre: The Strategies of a
Small Feminist Workshop in Rural China” which looks into the possibility of developing activist strategies in China which could “avoid the centre”, other than the activist organizations’ usual strategy of partial appeasement of the Party-State to deal with the spectre of State intervention. Benney analyzes, with the case study of a “women’s workshop” in rural Guangxi, the strategies used by the workshop’s “glocalized” networks of activists to be both offensive and defensive, and to be vocal yet at the same time not to attract immediate official opprobrium. Continuing this discussion of gendered space and social activism in an authoritarian polity, Chin-fu Hung explores in his chapter “The Politics of Electronic Social Capital and Public Sphere in Chinese Lala Community: Implications for Civil Society” the politics of cyber-networks and cyber social bonds in the Chinese lesbian community as well as its wider implications for the Chinese civil society. Hung emphasizes that the Internet has effectively empowered individuals, including the marginalized and once-persecuted homosexual community, and the society as a whole “by diversifying newer sources of alternative/dissenting information and channels for civic association and engagement”, in the repressive, authoritarian China.

7. Spectacles and Central State Nationalism

This anthology continues with Part VI Mega-event, Nationalism on Display, and Role of the Chinese State which further examines the linkages between the external and the internal, first brought up in the earlier chapter by Arif Dirlik and Roxann Prazniak, in understanding Chinese dissent and State-civil societal relations. These constitute the focus of Jeffrey Wasserstrom’s chapter, “Learning from Chinese National and Nationalist Spectacles”, which juxtaposes the two ostensibly contrasting spectacles of the anti-Japanese protests that erupted in mid-2012 and the lavish gala held to open the Beijing Olympic Games on 8th August 2008, while carefully unveiling the role and aim of the Party-State in overseeing and orchestrating such spectacles, the role of the participants, comments of domestic intellectuals and the international responses. Wasserstrom argues against accepting the idea of a single unified Chinese worldview put forward by the Chinese government and occasionally also by foreign commentators. It is indeed also interesting to compare such State-orchestrated, or partly State-orchestrated, spectacles with the large-scale spontaneous gatherings of the masses such as the proliferating “mass incidents” across the Chinese provinces, and the recent, especially 2012’s consecutive gatherings and demonstrations in Hong Kong against the CCP regime’s encroachment into the enclave’s political and civil liberty and its introduction of “brainwashing” curriculum into the Special Administrative Zone’s education institutional framework. The most impressive gathering of all has to be the commemoration gathering upon the 23rd anniversary of June
Fourth that was held in Victoria Park in 2012, attended by the largest number ever of 180,000 people, whose poignant image of over a hundred thousand candles burning in vigil of those slain in the brutal repression two decades ago makes the cover of this commemorative anthology.

Continuing the discussion of State-orchestrated, or partly State-orchestrated, spectacles at work, Brian Bridges looks at international sports events such as the Beijing Olympics of 2008, in his chapter “Beyond the Olympics: Power, Change and Legacy”. Focusing on the expectations, immediate results and potential longer-term legacies of the Beijing Olympics, the chapter pays due attention to their use by the government both for domestic economic and political purposes and as an instrument of foreign relations. While noting the limitation of the success of the Beijing Olympics in extending China’s “soft power” and winning over the hearts and minds of the Western public, Bridges also highlights the complexity of what Jeffrey Wasserstrom calls “transitology” – effectively the transitions away from one-party rule – by observing the lack of the intention on the part of the Chinese leaders, in contrast to the South Korean precedent, to use the sports mega-event to pave the way for democratization, citing the irony in the arrest in early 2011 of Ai Weiwei, one of the key designers of the iconic Bird’s Nest stadium for the Beijing Olympics. Meanwhile, focusing on the other side of the contrasting spectacles that Wasserstrom earlier juxtaposed, Po-chi Chen in his chapter “China’s Cyber Diplomacy in a New Media Age” critically examines the role of cyber public diplomacy as China’s “smart power” strategy in this information age with a case study of the anti-Carrefour incident which incidentally also occurred in 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics to which the incident is partly related, as a nationalistic outburst against the failure of the Beijing Olympic Flame relay in Paris, in addition to the French media’s reaction to the Tibetan unrests.

8. Ethnoterritoriality and Peripheral Nationalism

Indeed, the incident of a Tibetan rights activist attempting to seize the Olympic torch from the torchbearer and the flame being extinguished four times when the Beijing Olympic Flame arrived in Paris on 7th April 2008 which the French media described as “a slap to the face of China”, as Chen recounts, have vividly illustrated the critical ethnoterritorial problem the oppressive, authoritarian State is facing in its volatile frontier regions. Such ethnoregional problem, which is increasingly turning violent in recent years, represents a highly complex issue as highlighted by Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh in Part VII Frontier China, Ethnoregionalism and Peripheral Nationalism. In his chapter “Frontier China: Ethnoregional Disparity, Ethnoterritoriality and Peripheral Nationalism”, Yeoh analyzes the involuted nexus between the challenges
posed by central-peripheral conflicts, ethnoterritorial aspirations, income and wealth inequalities and interregional economic disparity exacerbated by the country’s “retreat from equality” over the recent decades. While proceeding to ponder the pitfalls and prospects of further decentralization and contemplate the feasibility of the road beyond fiscal federalism, Yeoh cautions that ethnoregionalization of poverty may add to decentralization, especially in the absence of a federal process, the threat of centrifugal tendencies especially if decentralization leads to a politics of cutthroat competition instead of a decentralized politics of accommodation and the resultant provincial protectionism intensifies local particularism and peripheral nationalism, hence precipitating secessionistic ethnogenesis or reethnicization. Adding to these is the problem of environmental and cultural destruction in the ethnic frontier areas to which Gary Sigley turns our attention in his chapter, “Cultural Heritage Tourism and the Ancient Tea Horse Road of Southwest China”, which reviews the environmental and cultural destruction brought about by China’s modernization and examines the possible role tourism may play in the cultural heritage preservation of the particular case of Chama Gudao 茶馬古道 – the “Ancient Tea Horse Road” which represents a cultural route of enormous significance to the many different ethnic communities in southwest China. Rather than the standard form of mass commercial tourism which itself could be contributing to such environmental and cultural destruction – the latter process often being a by-product of modernization which in ethnic minority areas the locals tend to refer to as hanhua 漢化 (“becoming Han”) – Sigley argues for a model that involves more culturally sensitive forms of community-based sustainable tourism, by targeting the four major participants in the production and consumption of tourism, i.e. the government, tourism operators and developers, local communities and tourists.

In fact, the distribution of China’s poor being characterized by the “four concentrations”: (1) concentration in the mountainous areas, (2) concentration in the western region, (3) concentration in environmentally fragile areas, and (4) concentration in ethnic minority areas, hence reflecting a composite phenomenon made up of rural poverty, geographical poverty, ethnic poverty and frontier poverty, has undoubtedly been playing an important role in recent years’ ethnic riots in the country’s frontier regions. Indeed, in this regard, the issue of Uyghur urban unemployment amidst Han influx is pointed out in David O’Brien’s chapter, “The Mountains Are High and the Emperor Is Far Away: An Examination of Ethnic Violence in Xinjiang”, which focuses on the devastating outbreak of violence in Xinjiang in July 2009, the role of the hard-line party secretary Wang Lequan and the central State’s strategy and policy towards this restive ethnic region. While worsening interethnic relations especially in view of the surging Han influx and the relative economic backwardness of the local ethnic communities and environmental
degradation" especially in the form of receding grassland due to mining and overgrazing have been blamed for the escalating ethnic regional disturbances, both O’Brien and Yeoh, nevertheless, emphasize the overall political structure and State policy towards dissent as the major contributing factors for the increasing volatility of the ethnic regions, as manifest in recent years’ troubles in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. In this regard, O’Brien has focused on the widening gap between the central State’s official policy for the ethnic regions and on ethnic minorities and what is actually happening on the ground – a gap similarly emphasized by Yeoh in the form of the inability of a regime to face the unfolding political realities while continuing to recycle the shopworn Leninist conspiracy theories that blame mass protests primarily on the Party’s foreign and domestic enemies, especially the foreign forces hostile to socialism bending on fostering a process of “peaceful evolution”, as highlighted by Womack earlier in his chapter, exemplified in recent years by the high-profile Charter 08 in China in 2008 and 2006’s “Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy for Vietnam”.

9. Apprehension, Hedging and Realpolitik

This commemorative anthology ends with Part VIII The Rise of China in Regional and Global Context that begins with Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall Duggan’s chapter “Expectations and Adaptation: China’s Foreign Policies in a Changing Global Environment” which sees in the Chinese government’s current foreign policies an adaptation of the conception of her historical role of “leading developing country” to that of a “responsible caretaker” in international affairs and notes the difficulties faced by even such a technocratic one-party elite with a little need for assuring domestic support and legitimacy to define her new global role of an emerging world power, and Carlyle Thayer’s chapter “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea” that examines the factors behind Chinese assertiveness in the disputed maritime region, the responses by the ASEAN claimant states and the impact on bilateral relations. These are followed by two chapters from the perspectives of China’s two East Asian neighbours, South Korea and Japan. Sukhee Han in his chapter, “The Rise of China, Power Transition and South Korea’s Soft Hedging” analyzes “dual bandwagoning” as fundamental to South Korea’s “soft hedging” in which South Korea maintains economic interdependency and cooperative relations with the rising China while at the same time expanding diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States of America, or in other words, soft hedges against China with the blessings of the US, given her economic dependence on China and the latter’s diplomatic influence over North Korea, as well as her traditional alliance with the US, her long-time ally. Such a strategy, Han contends, has gained
particular cogency in the light of recent developments concerning nuclear weapons in North Korea. While deviating from other types of hedging carried out by the other regional states – such as reciprocal hedging, twin hedging and dual hedging – South Korea’s policy of soft hedging under the then new Lee Myung-bak 이명박 李明博 administration since 2008 is particularly tailored to maintain her faithfulness to the trusted strategic alliance with the US strained during the anti-American, pro-Chinese and North Korea-friendly presidency of the late Roh Moo-hyun 노무현 / 卢武铉, and through increasing economic interdependence and societal interactions with China, coincides with the latter’s interest of maintaining her one-party regime legitimacy through economic performance. On the part of the US, according to Han, the effort to curtail China’s potentially revisionist inclinations by weaving her into the international community and integrating her with the global economy indeed concurs with South Korea’s policy of soft hedging. From another perspective but also within the regional context of East Asia, Kazuyuki Katayama in his chapter, “Development of Japan-China Relations since 1972”, describes three periods of Japan-China relations of a “heiwa yuko 平和友好” (peace and friendship) era, a “seirei keinetsu 政冷经热” (politically cold, economically hot) era, and an era of “senryaku teki gokei kankei 戦略的互恵関係” (mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests) since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. The fact is that almost seven decades after the end of World War II, shadow of the past still lingers to haunt the bilateral relations between these two East Asian powers. Prominent examples include issues from the complex entwinement of historical legacy and national honour and dignity like the visits by the former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi 小泉純一郎, widely considered as official, to the Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja 靖国神社) to territorial disputes such as that related to the Senkaku Islands to military concerns such as the June 2009 incident around the atoll of Okinotorishima 沖ノ鳥島. Problems as such notwithstanding, Katayama argues the importance of managing bilateral relations based on common interests, new thinking on sensitive issues, frank communication networks, a new, wider Asian and global framework, and the need to address to public diplomacy whose core targets include the young generation.

Finally, moving from State-level relations to the impact of a rising China on the ethnic Chinese overseas, Juliette Koning and Andreas Susanto in their chapter “Apprehension, Admiration and Ambiguity: Chinese Indonesians Talking about Business Opportunities in China”, focusing on the largest member of ASEAN, explore the impact of the increasing global importance of China on the sociocultural and economic orientation of Indonesians of Chinese descent. The case of the Indonesian Chinese is unique, according to Koning and Susanto, for being Chinese or being a Chinese entrepreneur in
this vast country has for decades been an issue, and “Chinese” as an ethnic identity was in fact not allowed between 1965 and 1998. While the lifting of various restrictive laws on Chineseness in the late 1990s after more than 32 years led to the creation of new space in Indonesia for being Chinese, Koning and Susanto’s study found inter- and intra-generational differences among Indonesian Chinese today as to how the contemporary rise of China is perceived as far as questions of identity and business opportunities are concerned, reflecting a mélange of apprehension, admiration and ambiguity.

10. Postscript and Acknowledgements

This book thus represents an important collection of research articles published over the years at the Institute of China Studies by prominent international scholars providing critical insights into a whole range of the most crucial aspects of the contemporary sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformation that China is currently experiencing. It is highly opportune, we believe at this tenth anniversary (2003-2013) of the inception of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya and on the eve of the fortieth anniversary (1974-2014) of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Malaysia, to put together into one volume all these highly critical writings at this juncture of great changes in the Asian giant’s continued odyssey of development, modernization and reform, wherein at stake, as evidence increasingly shows, is not only the wellbeing of the country’s population of one fifth of humanity but also that of the international community in this era of globalized commercial linkages and politico-socioeconomic nexus of an increasingly borderless world.

Before ending this introduction, the editor and the Institute of China Studies would like to thank all the authors who have contributed these great papers to this commemorative volume as well as the anonymous reviewers who have given invaluable assistance in providing critical comments on the earlier version of these papers. As with ICS’s past publications over these years, again I wish to thank the institute’s administrative officer Miss Susie Ling Yieng Ping 林燕萍, administrative assistants Miss Geeta Gengatharan and Miss Nazirah Hamzah, and general assistant Mr Sallehuddin Ismail for the crucial administrative arrangements in making the publication of this tenth anniversary commemorative anthology possible. I am also grateful to Miss Si-Ning Yeoh 楊思寧, editorial assistant of the International Journal of China Studies, for her assistance in proof-reading and technical help in cover and appendix plate design, and Mr Md Arphan Ali, editorial assistant of the China-ASEAN Perspective Forum, for a second proof-reading. I would also like to express my gratitude to IJCS’s former editorial assistant Mr Lionel Wei-Li Liong 梁偉立 for his crucial help, from proof-reading to technical
help in cover design, in the preparation of the past ICS publications that form the sources of this commemorative anthology, and to Mr Ivan Foo Ah Hiang 符亚强 for his excellent typesetting of this present volume, a high level of excellence that he has always maintained over all these years with ICS’s publications. As with all the past ICS publications, the responsibility for any errors and inadequacies, whether in general or copy editing, that remain in this commemorative anthology is of course fully mine.

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Notes
1. CCP, or more officially, the “Communist Party of China” (CPC).
Introduction


6. The threat of the advent of the Internet to the standard official “black box” approach (the routine and standard procedure of covering up and news blackout) is apparent, as the Internet itself has become a target of government suppression. In the well-known Weng’an incident of 2008, for instance, the government had moved swiftly to impose si feng 四封 (“four blockades”), i.e. feng wang 封网 (blocking the Internet), feng cheng 封城 (blocking the town), feng tongxin 封通
**Appendix Figure I** China: Incidents of Public Protest (*Qunti Shijian*)

![Graph showing the number of incidents of public protest from 1993 to 2005. The number of cases increases from 8700 in 1993 to 87000 in 2005.]

**Appendix Figure II** China: Numbers of People Involved in Public Protests (*Qunti Shijian*)

![Bar chart showing the number of people involved in public protests from 1994 to 2005. The number of people increases from 87000 in 1994 to 4000000 in 2005.]
Appendix Figure III China: Participants of Public Protests (*Qunti Shijian*)

Note: Among “Workers”, one-third are workers of SOEs. “Others” includes a small number of ex-servicemen, teachers, students, cadres etc.

Appendix Figure IV China: Identity Circles

Appendix Table I China: Official Social Stratification, 1880s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literati and officialdom (<em>Shi 士</em>)</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (<em>Nong 农</em>)</td>
<td>56,000,000</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and commerce (<em>Gong shang 工商</em>)</td>
<td>12,500,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70,000,000*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Total population around 350-400 million.
**Appendix Figure V** China: Social Stratification in Late Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty

5% – members of the royal household, ministers and officials, other members of the officialdom, landlords, big businessmen, candidates of imperial civil examinations

95% – peasants, craftsmen and artisans, small businessmen

**Appendix Figure VI** China: Social Stratification, 1959-1979

Cadres (10 million in 1959)

Workers of State-owned enterprises (35 million in 1959)

Peasants (200 million in 1959)
Appendix Figure VII China: Social Stratification, Present

Upper class: about 100 million (7.7% of total population of 1.3 billion), including a still not well-defined but emerging “middle class”

Bourgeois class: more than 10 million private enterprise owners

Cadres: 40 million cadres + more than 25 million quasi-cadres

Urban workers: 29 million urban State-owned enterprise workers + 160 million non-SOE workers

Nongmingong (rural-to-urban migrant labour): more than 200 million

Peasants: more than 300 million

Appendix Figure VIII China: Resurgence of Bourgeois Class since 1989

Year


Million people

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Appendix Figure IX China: Channels of Social Mobility and Barriers before Economic Reform (Intragenerational Mobility)

Notes: Arrows represent the directions of mobility, percentages are rates of mobility.
Appendix Figure X China: Present Structure of Social Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 Major Socioeconomic Classes</th>
<th>10 Major Social Strata</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper: top-leadership cadres, managers of large enterprises, high-level professionals and bosses of large private enterprises</td>
<td>State and social administrative stratum (with organizational resources), 2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-upper: middle- and lower-leadership cadre, middle-echelon administrators of large enterprises, managers of medium- and small-scale enterprises, middle-echelon professional skilled personnel and bosses of medium-scale enterprises</td>
<td>Managerial stratum (with cultural or organizational resources), 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-middle: lower professional skilled personnel, bosses and officers of small-scale enterprises, bosses and officers of individually-owned small-scale enterprises, individually-owned businesses, middle- and high-level mechanics/machinists, and large-scale agribusiness</td>
<td>Private enterprise owner stratum (with economic resources), 1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-lower: individual labourer, commercial- and service-sector personnel, workers and peasants</td>
<td>Professional skilled stratum (with cultural resources), 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower: workers and peasants in poverty and without certainty for a job, and people in vagrancy, unemployment and semi-unemployment</td>
<td>Officer stratum (with small amount of cultural or organizational resources), 7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individually-owned business &amp; industry stratum (with small amount of economic resources), 7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial- and service-sector personnel stratum (with very small amount of cultural, organizational and economic resources), 11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worker stratum (with very small amount of cultural, organizational and economic resources), 17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural labourer stratum (with very small amount of cultural, organizational and economic resources), 42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban and rural vagrant, unemployed and semi-unemployed stratum (basically without cultural, organizational and economic resources), 4.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper administrators, 9.4%</th>
<th>Ullar administrators, 17.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower administrators, 57.9%</td>
<td>Middle &amp; upper unit administrators, 15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper managers, 12.6%</td>
<td>Middle managers, 41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower managers, 46.0%</td>
<td>Large enterprise owners, 0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium enterprise owners, 27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small enterprise owners, 71.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional personnel in science, education, culture and health, 69.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional personnel in engineering and technology, 22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional personnel in business, commerce and service, 8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party &amp; government department officers, 62.4%</td>
<td>Enterprise officers, 37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small employer of business &amp; industry, 22.0%</td>
<td>Self-employed business &amp; industry, 78.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary-level supervisors of business &amp; service, 4.4%</td>
<td>Relatively white-collar personnel of business &amp; service, 17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar personnel of business &amp; service, 78.6%</td>
<td>Primary-level supervisors of secondary industry, 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers of secondary industry, 33.5%</td>
<td>Unskilled workers of secondary industry, 63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized farmers, 12.6%</td>
<td>Part-time farmers, 25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary farmers, 62.4%</td>
<td>Youth waiting for job, 22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuegeng personnel, 35.3%</td>
<td>Other unemployed, 38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-employed personnel, 3.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Arrow indicates that the whole or a part of a social stratum concerned can be included in one of the five major social classes.
## Appendix Table II State’s v. Society’s Version of the Case of Li Shufen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What the people believed</th>
<th>Government’s version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cause of death</td>
<td>Li Shufen was brutally raped and murdered</td>
<td>Li Shufen jumped into the river herself and drowned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background of Wang Jiao, Chen Guangquan and Liu Yanchao who were present at Li Shufen’s death</td>
<td>Kinship relations with party secretary Wang of the county, or related to Jiang, head of the provincial public security department</td>
<td>Parents of all three were peasants in the village, not relatives of the party secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How were Li Shufen’s family members beaten up?</td>
<td>Li Shufen’s uncle, grandfather and grandmother were beaten up, lying with critical injuries in the hospital; her aunt was locked up at the police station, with her hair cut off; her uncle was beaten up by public security (police) and injured during argument</td>
<td>Li Shufen’s grandfather, grandmother and aunt were not beaten up, neither were they locked up at the police station; her uncle was not beaten up by the police – he was in fact beaten up by somebody in front of an insurance company and the case was being investigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who recovered Li Shufen’s body from the river?</td>
<td>Li Xiuzhong 李秀忠, her uncle</td>
<td>Fire brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopsy on 25th June 2008</td>
<td>Public security and armed police had come to take the body away for autopsy but were disallowed by the people; public security finally took away Li Shufen’s internal organs, hence Li’s body in the coffin was without internal organs</td>
<td>Li Shufen’s family members agreed to drowning as the cause of death but refused to let the body be buried; they were asking the public security department to order Wang Jiao, Liu Yanchao and Chen Guangquan to pay a compensation of 500,000 yuan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Figure XI Vicious Cycles of China’s Ethnic Minority Areas

Natural environment

- harsh natural conditions
- diminishing green
- soil erosion
- desertification
- declining land quality
- rapid increase in clearing and deforestation
- poverty and backwardness
- drought
- frequent natural calamities
- declining production

Economic environment

- little investment for development
- transport backwardness
- ineffective communication and information
- backwardness in merchandise economy
- economically weak
- little cumulative capital for initiation
- low productivity
- low average income
- lack of self capability
- inadequately attraction for investment
Appendix Table III “Mass Incidents” in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang: Comparison and Contrast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inner Mongolia, 11th May 2011</th>
<th>Xinjiang, 5th July 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trigger</td>
<td>Rights-defending herdsman killed by coal truck</td>
<td>Uighur workers killed by Han Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>Herdsman’s livelihood in great difficulty and poverty blamed on mining activity on their grassland</td>
<td>Poor development in Uighur areas leading to acute poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way of protest</td>
<td>Peaceful demonstrations</td>
<td>Violent Uighur backlash killing Han Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slogan of protest</td>
<td>“Remembrance of the killed! Stop mining!”</td>
<td>“Blood for blood! Han Chinese get the hell out of Xinjiang!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Mongolian students and herdsmen</td>
<td>Uighur youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State response</td>
<td>Suppression with army and riot police; making arrests before situation worsened</td>
<td>Suppression with army and riot police; making arrests after conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

信 (blocking mails) and feng jizhe 封记者 (blocking reporters). In this incident of 2008 that shocked the nation, after the suspicious death of a beautiful young schoolgirl Li Shufen 李树芬, discovered at 1 a.m. of 22nd June 2008 drowned at the Daan Bridge 大堰桥 of the Ximen River 西门河, the standard official “black box” approach, as in so many other cases throughout the country, had served to accentuate the people’s distrust of the government and fed further the rumour mill and pushed the situation to the boiling point, leading to tens of thousands of people walking the streets of Weng’an, Guizhou Province, on 28th June 2008, attacking police and burning law enforcement vehicles and government offices. For the extent of people’s distrust of the government in the case of Weng’an incident, see Appendix Table II (source: Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, “Stratification, Social Action and Morphogenesis: Structures and Agents in Contemporary China’s Social Transformation”, International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2011, pp. 407-504 / original data source: Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刊, Vol. 22, Issue 27, 13th July 2008, p. 26). The rumours about Li’s missing organs, while being perceived as part of the suspected cover-up by the authorities, could be seen as an extension of the long-running allegation of illegal organ harvest from executed prisoners by the State apparatus and the grisly rumours of such harvest from imprisoned Falungong 法轮功 followers.

7. Regarding the natural environmental vicious cycle together with that of the economic environment, see Appendix Figure XI (source: Wu Yingmei 吴映梅, Xibu Shaoshu Minzu Juyuqu Jingji Fazhan ji Jizhi Yanjiu 西部少数民族聚居
区经济发展及机制研究 [A study of economic development and system in the ethnic minority areas of western China], Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 2006, and discussion in Yeoh, 2011, *op. cit.*.

8. For a comparison of the characteristics of the recent “mass incidents” in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, see Appendix Table III (source: *ODN*, 29th May 2011, and discussion in Yeoh, 2011, *op. cit.*).

9. Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

10. The Pinnacle Islands – a group of uninhabited islands currently controlled by Japan who calls them the Senkaku Islands 尖閣諸島, a part of Okinawa prefecture 沖縄県, but claimed by both the governments of the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China as the Diaoyutai Islands 釣魚台列嶼/钓鱼台群岛, part of the Taiwan province. The largest island of the group is the Uotsuri Jima 魚釣島/Diaoyu Dao 釣魚島.