FOREWORD

Dissent Is the Highest Form of Patriotism: Chinese Dissidents and the Legacy of Liu Xiaobo

In his speech delivered in German at the memorial service in Berlin on 13th July 2018 marking the one-year anniversary of Liu Xiaobo’s death, the writer Ian Johnson poignantly compared Liu Xiaobo’s death in 2016 to the execution of T’an Ssu-t’ung in 1898:

In 1898, some of China’s most brilliant minds allied themselves with the Emperor Guangxu, a young ruler who was trying to assert himself by forcing through reforms to open up China’s political, economic, and educational systems. But opponents quickly struck back, deposing the emperor and causing his advisors to flee for their lives.

One, however, stayed put. He was Tan Sitong, a young scholar from a far-off corner of the empire. Tan knew that staying in Beijing meant death, but hoped that his execution might help shock his fellow citizens awake.

(Johnson, 2018)

Johnson went on to ponder:

… the deaths of the two resonate across the 120 years that separate them. Like Tan, Liu [Xiaobo] threw his weight behind a cause that in
its immediate aftermath seemed hopeless – in Liu’s case, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. But with time, history vindicated Tan; the question I wonder is if it will do the same for Liu.

(ibid.)

Just as historian Alan Wood said in his “Preface” to *Limits to autocracy* (1995), “… while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life, I also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, however tenuous, to those who die by the sword”, this special focus issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* dedicated to Liu Xiaobo at the first anniversary of his passing, we believe, could be seen as doing a part in fulfilling such an obligation to contribute to the world some understanding, however modest the effort, of the significance of the life and death of Liu Xiaobo.

As Albert Ho Chun-yen concludes his introductory commentary, “Liu Xiaobo as the Spiritual Rival of Xi Jinping”, in this collection of essays: “Liu Xiaobo’s death does not close the chapter of the democracy movement of the Chinese People but rather left his valuable legacy *Charter 08* which will serve as the light-house providing the direction for the Chinese People in their continued struggle until they are truly liberated from political oppression”, this collection of essays, *Dissent, Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and the Struggle for Democracy: Essays in Honour of Liu Xiaobo*, represents a tribute to a most noble soul, a true lover of his country who cared about democratic rights of the country’s vast population who he hoped one day would be able to fully enjoy political freedom and civil liberties. His deeds and sacrifices truly put to shame those supporters and apologists, not only in China but also among the overseas Chinese, of the present one-party dictatorship that shamelessly resorts to twisting the notions of freedom, democracy and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authoritarian Patriotism</th>
<th>Democratic Patriotism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Belief that one’s country is inherently superior to others.</td>
<td>Belief that a nation’s ideals are worthy of admiration and respect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary allegiance to land, birthright, legal citizenship, and government’s cause.</td>
<td>Primary allegiance to set of principles that underlie democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonquestioning loyalty.</td>
<td>Questioning, critical, deliberative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow leaders reflexively, support them unconditionally.</td>
<td>Care for the people of society based on particular principles (e.g., liberty, justice).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blind to shortcomings and social discord within nation.</td>
<td>Outspoken in condemnation of shortcomings, especially within nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conformist; dissent seen as dangerous and destabilising.</td>
<td>Respectful, even encouraging, of dissent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slogans</strong></td>
<td>My country, right or wrong.</td>
<td>Dissent is patriotic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>America: love it or leave it.</td>
<td>You have the right to NOT remain silent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical</strong></td>
<td>McCarthy Era House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) proceedings, which reinforced the idea that dissenting views are anti-American and unpatriotic.</td>
<td>The fiercely patriotic testimony of Paul Robeson, Pete Seeger, and others before HUAC, admonishing the committee for straying from American principles of democracy and justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contemporary</strong></td>
<td>Equating opposition to the war in Iraq with “hatred” of America or support for terrorism.</td>
<td>Reinforcing American principles of equality, justice, tolerance, and civil liberties, especially during national times of crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

human rights to suppress dissent and criticisms and to perpetuate its power monopoly. Who is the real patriot? “Dissent is patriotic” (see Table 1) is a principle of democratic patriotism as in Westheimer’s formulation, being opposed to authoritarian patriotism’s demanding allegiance to the government’s cause and therefore opposing dissent, and this concept harkens back to the quotation “dissent is the highest form of patriotism”. This is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, though no evidence has been found according to Anna Berkes in her Thomas Jefferson encyclopedia entry of “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism (Quotation)” that found the earliest usage of the phrase, which was used repeatedly during the Vietnam-War era, in a 1961 publication, The use of force in international affairs2: “If what your country is doing seems to you practically and morally wrong, is dissent the highest form of patriotism?”3

Unwillingness on the part of Beijing to take into consideration such inner feeling of the conscientious Mainland China citizens, the socio-psychological makeup of the Hong Kong people as the legacy of long British rule and the Taiwanese who have fought hard and shed blood to gain today’s political freedom and civil liberties thus spells the failure of its “soft power” offensive to win the hearts and minds of the people. Anybody who would refuse to buy the State’s line just to play safe and who would not want to lie to their own conscience and debase their dignity as human as demanded by the Party-State would recognize the plain truth in these lines that Salman Rushdie, the thirteenth on The Times’s 2008 list of the fifty greatest British writers since 1945 and the literary world’s most well-known fugitive from dogmatic terror, reiterates in Joseph Anton, “We have the freedoms we fight for, and we lose those we don’t defend.” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 528) The right to dissent as the highest form of patriotism is something the
conscientious Mainland citizens, the Hong Kongers and the Taiwanese have learned through hard lessons, through blood and sweat, and that marks their democratic patriotism apart from the authoritarian patriotism promoted by the ruling CCP Party-State in Beijing that sees political dissent as highly dangerous and destabilising and persecution of dissidents, even to death in cases such as Cao Shunli, Li Wangyang, Yang Tianshui and Liu Xiaobo, as justifiable in the name of maintaining stability and prosperity.

While early in the germination period of classical Chinese philosophy two and a half millennia ago the founder of contemplative Taoism (道家), Lao Tzu⁴, had already commented, “民不畏死，奈何以死懼之?” [The people do not fear at all to die; / What’s gained therefore by threat’ning them with death?] (Tao Te Ching / 《道德經》, Chapter 74), who would have foreseen the death-defying action of the supposedly docile subjects conditioned by more than 3 decades of personality-shattering brutal political campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the 3 months of June 1989 in Beijing, or the incredible political awareness of the Hong Kong people during the momentous Occupy Campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement of 2014? In both cases, such actions by a long-considered politically docile (in Mainland China) or apathetic (in Hong Kong) people can be seen as a “civil society in self-defense” as described by Professor Ma Ngok (馬嶺) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.⁵ Such action, of course, demands a high level of human dignity and integrity, which the CCP Party-State has been relentless in destroying with both carrots (economic miracle, financial prosperity for conformists) and sticks (brutal persecution of dissidents), that Ian Johnson sees in the personality of Liu Xiaobo:
When the 1989 protests erupted, Liu was abroad but chose to return. After one stint in jail after the Tiananmen protests were bloodily suppressed, he had opportunities to leave China but again chose to stay. And then after a second harsher stint in jail he again decided to remain and keep pushing. He was risking [unlike Tan Sitong] not the immediate arrival of soldiers, but the inevitable and life-threatening imprisonment that befalls all people who challenge state power in China today.

This was not an active decision to die, but a willingness to do so.

(Johnson, 2018)

Confucius once said, “The determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue complete.” (《論語》衛靈公第十五： “子曰：「志士仁人，無求生以害仁，有殺身以成仁。」”) Liu Xiaobo’s self-sacrificing sense of mission and character of unbending human dignity represent the virtue of a true Confucian gentleman. This of course would pose a grave threat to a Party-State which ironically has been shamelessly exploiting the name of Confucius for its United Front work through the “Confucius Institutes”.

While the Chinese writer Mo Yan (莫言, meaning “don’t speak”, nom de plume of Guan Moye /管谟业), also vice-chairman of the Communist Party-backed, State-run Chinese Writers’ Association, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature of 2012 was heavily criticised by many Chinese dissident writers and artists for a complete lack of solidarity with and support for other Chinese writers and intellectuals who were punished or detained by the CCP regime for exercising their rights of free expression, it is probably too easy for people not living under the boot of this ruthless authoritarian regime to heap harsh criticisms on those intellectuals who have chosen to censor themselves.
and work with their overlord, as Perry Link concludes his article “Does this writer deserve the Prize?” in *The New York Review of Books* (6th December 2012):

Chinese writers today, whether “inside the system” or not, all must choose how they will relate to their country’s authoritarian government. This inevitably involves calculations, trade-offs, and the playing of cards in various ways. Liu Xiaobo’s choices have been highly unusual. Mo Yan’s responses are more “normal,” closer to the center of a bell curve. It would be wrong for spectators like you and me, who enjoy the comfort of distance, to demand that Mo Yan risk all and be another Liu Xiaobo. But it would be even more wrong to mistake the clear difference between the two.

Mo Yan himself put it bluntly, “A lot of people are now saying about me, ‘Mo Yan is a state writer.’ It’s true, insofar as like the authors Yu Hua [余华] and Su Tong [苏童], I get a salary from the Ministry of Culture, and get my social and health insurance from them too. That’s the reality in China. Overseas, people all have their own insurance, but without a position, I can’t afford to get sick in China.” As Salman Rushdie said in an interview by writer Salil Tripathi (2008: 27), “Defending free speech in absolute terms may take us into a turbulent, hurtful arena. If we say nothing, we will have peace. But it is the peace of suppression, and that’s the choice we have to make.” It is also a choice of safety via ignorance and selective amnesia. Some, like Mo Yan and myriad others, have chosen this peace of suppression, while some rare breed like Liu Xiaobo or Ilham Tohti and other dissidents past and present have made an unusual choice and opted for personal turbulence in defending their rights and dignity as writers, academics, citizens and those of their fellow citizens.
Ian Johnson said: “Like Tan [Sitong], Liu [Xiaobo] knew his responsibility in history.” While “Tan saw China plagued by a cycle of karmic evil that had to be broken”, Liu knew “his role as a public intellectual was to see the future and report back, whatever the costs”, and yes, whatever the costs, as Liu wrote in 1988 (〈論孤獨〉[on solitude]) just before his return to China in 1989 that would change the subsequent path of his life unrevocably:

Their most important, indeed their sole destiny ... is to enunciate thoughts that are ahead of their time. The vision of the intellectual must stretch beyond the range of accepted ideas and concepts of order; he must be adventurous, a lonely forerunner; only after he has moved on far ahead do others discover his worth ... he can discern the portents of disaster at a time of prosperity, and in his self-confidence experience the approaching obliteration.\(^8\)

Patrick Kar-wai Poon, in his article “Liu Xiaobo and ‘Charter 08’ – Freedom of Expression and Cultural Relativism” here that sets out to debunk the CCP regime and its apologists’ use of cultural relativism to try to discredit the universal values of human rights and liberal democracy as being alien to China rightly points out exactly such vision of the intellectual in Liu Xiaobo and others who drafted Charter 08 as they went against the Party-State and its intellectual lackeys and apologists to firmly believe that these values are compatible with Chinese culture and can be incorporated into Chinese culture, and these beliefs “actually are not new in China [with] people in Qing Dynasty like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao and intellectuals and writers during the Nationalist era like Lu Xun and Hu Shi [having] also expressed their aspiration for these universal values.” Of course, as Perry Link said
above, China’s intellectuals today whether “inside the system” or outside “all must choose how they will relate to their country’s authoritarian government” and it would probably not be fair for people who enjoy the comfort and safety of distance to demand that people like Mo Yan risk all and be another Liu Xiaobo. Everyone, facing different circumstances and with different socio-psychological makeup, ultimately has their own line to draw in the sand. It is a very personal choice and Liu Xiaobo knew that, as he said in an interview by the Hong Kong magazine *Emancipation Monthly* (解放月報) in November 1988:

There should be room for my extremism; I certainly don’t demand of others that they be like me ...

I’m pessimistic about mankind in general, but my pessimism does not allow for escape. Even though I might be faced with nothing but a series of tragedies, I will still struggle, still show my opposition. This is why I like Nietzsche and dislike Schopenhauer.9

The road in front for intellectuals and all conscientious citizens who have chosen this path remains torturous. As Joseph Yu-shek Cheng in his article “The Policy Programme and Human Rights Position of the Xi Jinping Administration” in this special focus issue cautions that as the CCP regime to a considerable extent has been able to maintain its performance-based legitimacy through economic growth, a basic social security net covering the entire population and effective governance, and the Xi Jinping administration’s performance on provision of public and social services, combat of corruption and enhancing of China’s international status and influence have been popular among the people, it is unlikely that an Arab Spring kind of situation would emerge in China soon to precipitate political change and inevitable democratisation, and while the civil society is still developing under increasingly difficult
conditions, it is in no position to confront the single-Party regime so soon. Cheng’s prognosis has important implications not only for the dire human rights situation in the densely Han Chinese-population regions of Mainland China but also the post-1997/1999-Handover regions of Hong Kong and Macau as well as its volatile non-Han ethnic frontier regions, which form the foci of several articles in this special focus issue.

Regarding implications of Mainland China CCP regime’s politically repressive policies for these regions, Liu Xiaobo wrote in 2005:

While the separation of Hong Kong and Taiwan from Mainland China during the decline of the Ch’ing Empire represented a product of the era of colonisation filled with humiliation by foreigners, within the overall progress of world civilisation, it also led to these two regions attaining freedom and prosperity [away from the repressive empire on the Mainland] bestowed by modern civilisation. In sharp contrast [...] the [Mainland] Chinese after being freed from the torment by colonial powers, instead of attaining liberation and freedom, have since been subjected to even more comprehensive and more brutal totalitarian subjugation [...] While the Chinese Communist Party’s dictatorial government has undergone an unequivocal great leap in its hi-tech operation, its political system and mode of governance still remain in the medieval era, hitherto having not given up the medieval myth of a greater empire-building. Internally, towards minority nationalities, it denies them freedom of autonomy. Externally, towards Taiwan, it rejects making a promise of not using military force for unification; towards Hong Kong, it resorts to dictatorial coercive means of intervention in Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two System” autonomous governance, resulting in insurmountable barriers to Hong Kong’s political democratisation.10
The dismal outlook of Hong Kong’s political future under the increasing tightening of political space by her Beijing overlord since the 1997 British Handover, especially after the tumultuous Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement, through the unprecedentedly violent “Fishball Revolution” State-civil society conflict, NPCSC’s various “interpretations” of the Basic Law and disqualifying of LegCo members from the pro-democracy camp, harsh sentencing of organisers of civil disobedience, to repeated and bolder and bolder encroachment of Beijing into Hong Kong affairs (including kidnapping of Hong Kong booksellers) that make a mockery of the so-called “One Country, Two Systems” are the subject of enquiry of Benny Yiu-ting Tai’s article “Hong Kong No More: From Semi-democracy to Semi-authoritarianism” and that of Chris Yeung, “Human rights in Hong Kong: One Country looms as Two Systems Fade”, while Łukasz Zamęcki in his paper “Hong Kong Youth Radicalization from the Perspective of Relative Deprivation” looks at the influence of “relative deprivation”, political, economic and cultural, amongst Hong Kong youth on Hong Kong politics. The thesis of Zamęcki’s paper is that the political radicalisation of youth, e.g. more violent protests, the growth of nativist and localist organisations and the flourishing idea of self-determination of Hong Kong, could have resulted from relative deprivation. The case of the other “Special Administrative Region” since the 1999 Portuguese Handover is the subject of enquiry of Jinhyeok Jang’s article “Parliamentary Representation in the Macau Special Administrative Region: A Quantitative Analysis of Roll Call Voting Behavior in the 5th Legislative Assembly, 2013-2017” that assesses the nature of parliamentary representation in Macau (Macao) through an extensive roll call voting analysis for the 5th term Legislative Assembly from 2013 through 2017 and evaluates the relative dominance of politics
in Macau which unlike Hong Kong, employs a single nationwide electoral district, between the pro-Beijing government and pro-democracy opposition legislators.

In a quite different regional setting, out there in China’s volatile ethnic frontier region of Xinjiang, Beijing is often seen to be in a “Catch 22” no-win situation due to the dilemma that granting greater autonomy will probably not be responded with much appreciation as a result of long-term mistrust and hatred generated by decades of CCP brutal misrule but rather more demands for political and ethnic autonomy or even independence, in “a terrible paradox the Chinese have created for themselves” (Starr, 2004) where there is no guarantee that raising the Uyghurs’ level of education and socioeconomic status will take the edge off the desire of the Uyghurs to seek independence (Ji Ping, 1990: 200). To further understanding of Beijing’s authoritarian reach in this region under this condition, Roy Anthony Rogers in his article “The Radicalisation of Xinjiang: Its Roots and Impact on Human Rights” analyses the human rights conditions in Xinjiang, as well as the internal and external factors that have influenced Beijing’s policies on the human rights conditions in the region, and looks into the policy changes and the factors that have caused these changes. Ultimately, whether it be Hong Kong, Macau, Xinjiang, Tibet or Taiwan, as Liu Xiaobo said,

One of the important principles underlying the post-WWII modern civilisation is the self-determination of a region’s inhabitants. Under this principle, the achievement of any unification to resolve conflict is not determined by military coercion by a powerful party, but by the voluntary choice of the minority groups [...] If unification could imply coercion and subjugation, there might as well be no unification.11

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal 4(2) • 2018
In the case of Xinjiang, it also cannot be denied that the religious dimension has always been tricky for the Beijing overlord. From Cultural Revolution era’s humiliation of Uyghurs’ Islamic faith to the recent The Wall Street Journal’s report on accusations by Uyghurs who had been in Xinjiang’s massive “re-education” camps of being forced to denounce their religious faith, being forbidden from all their religious practices and being brainwashed to extol the CCP regime and Xi Jinping. Nevertheless, Xinjiang’s Uyghurs are not the only target of CCP’s religious persecution, as Beatrice Leung points out in her article “Xi Jinping’s Religious Freedom Policy vs Human Rights”. While CCP’s degree of suppression on religious freedom has fluctuated according to the political climate, being unpredictable but according to the wish of the political leaders, according to Leung, under the Xi Jinping administration religious security has been uplifted to the level of national security, with religion asked to serve the needs of the Party and to be managed with even stricter rules and regulations, in a rigid policy line that virtually exerts a degree of religious control that harkens back to the Mao Zedong era aiming at the immediate extinction of religions, in which human rights including religious rights have to give in to the fulfilment of Xi Jinping’s so-called “China Dream”.

Are Xi Jinping’s oft-repeated expression of admiration for Mao, combination of his grandeur “Belt and Road Initiative” and “China Dream” with intensification of brutal suppression of dissent with his “rule by law”, the massive re-education camps that have emerged and are expanding in Xinjiang and CCP regime’s embrace of big data to plan for a nationwide watertight surveillance scheme and social credit system of rewards for social conformists and punishments for “social misfits” as analysed in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh’s postscript “Brave New World Meets Nineteen Eighty-four in a New Golden Age: On the Passing of Liu Xiaobo, Advent of Big Data, and Resurgence of China as World Power”

CCPS Vol. 4 No. 2 (July/August 2018)
foreboding of China’s reattaining its global glory enjoyed during the Yung-le or K’ang-Ch’ien eras of prosperity of the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties? As the Yung-le and K’ang-Ch’ien eras of prosperity in fact represent not only times of China’s zenith in international stature and economic development but also peaks in China’s domestic brutal political oppression, is Xi’s “China Dream” also reverting China back to a Maoist totalitarian era, albeit this time sugar-coated with economic prosperity, military pride, and more mesmerising nationalistic fervour? It is thus enlightening for us to take a glimpse at China’s only remaining old-style totalitarian neighbor in East Asia and in many ways her client state of North Korea, as explored in Soyoung Kwon’s article “Post-Communist Transition Revisited: The North Korean Regime in a Comparative Authoritarian Perspective”, that is arguably still resiliently totalitarian, a living protest against William Dobson general observation that today’s authoritarian dictators, as in China, “understand that in a globalized world the more brutal forms of intimidation – mass arrests, firing squads, and violent crackdowns – are best replaced with more subtle forms of coercion” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 5) like deploying tax collectors or health inspectors to shut down dissident groups or using broadly written laws to send dissidents into life-threatening imprisonment from which they would come out later physically and psychologically broken or not come out alive at all.

Before ending this foreword, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in this issue and the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this July/August 2018 CCPS focus issue of Dissent, Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and the Struggle for Democracy: Essays in Honour of Liu Xiaobo possible. We are deeply grateful to Joseph Yu-shek Cheng for his great support in the organising of this volume, without whose help the publication of this worthy issue on the
legacy of the late Liu Xiaobo at the first anniversary of his passing would not have been possible. Two of the articles in this collection (on Macau and North Korea) represent revised version of the authors’ papers originally presented at the 2017 Sizihwan International Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies, “Challenges to Local Politics in the Asia-Pacific Region”, at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan, 30 November - 2 December 2017, duly revised by incorporating critical peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers. To the authors, “감사합니다” (kamsa hamnida), for allowing us to include their revised papers in this journal issue. We are also grateful to Miss Wu Chien-yi (吴千宜) for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*, PhD
Editor
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal
Department Head and Associate Professor
Department of Administrative Studies and Politics
Faculty of Economics and Administration
University of Malaya
Malaysia

Notes
1. T’an Ssu-t’ung (譚嗣同), executed in 1898 at the age of 33, occupies a place of tremendous importance in contemporary China’s history as his execution symbolised the political failure of an autocratic regime to reform its governance from within itself, to modernise the country and to
democratise the polity, and turned the intelligentsia to seek violent and hostile means, through revolution, to overthrow the ancien régime.


4. Laocius (Lao Tzu, 老子, c. 571-471 BC) was a 6th-Century BC contemporary of Confucius (K’ung Tzu, 孔子, 551-479 BC), though some modern historians consider him to have lived during the Warring States period of the 4th Century BC.

5. See: Richard Bush (2016). Hong Kong in the shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan (Chapter 4, “Hong Kong’s liberal oligarchy”).


8. For this translation, see Johnson (2018).


Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 4(2) ♦ 2018

* Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (楊國慶), with a Ph.D. on ethnopolitics in socioeconomic development from the University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (1998), is an Associate Professor of the Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He is the founder and editor of the Scopus-indexed triannual academic journal Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS) jointly published by the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies of Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-sen University (台灣國立中山大學) and the University of Malaya’s Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, was the department head of the Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, from 1st August 2016 to 31st July 2018, the director of the Institute of China Studies (ICS), University of Malaya, from 13th March 2008 to 1st January 2014, the founder and editor of the institute’s then SJR top-tier Scopus-indexed triannual academic journal, International Journal of China Studies (IJCS, Vol. 1, 2010 – Vol. 5, 2014), and is currently also a member of the international editorial committee of several journals in Asia and Latin America. Among his latest publications in recent years are “Malaysia: Perception of contemporary China and its economic, political and societal determinants” (article, The Pacific Review, 2018, cs), “China-Malaysia trade, investment, and cooperation in the contexts of China-ASEAN integration and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road construction” (article, The Chinese Economy, 2018, cs), “Environmental policy in Malaysia with reference to Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy” (book chapter, Wenzao University Press, 2018),

CCPS Vol. 4 No. 2 (July/August 2018)
Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, and Suntory Foundation / University of Tokyo international research grant project “Beyond ‘China threat theory’: Dialogue with China experts on the rise of China” (2014-2015, Malaysian component). <Website: http://emileyeo5.wix.com/emileyeoh; email: emileyeo@gmail.com, yeohkk @um.edu.my>

References


