FOREWORD

Upon the Second Anniversary of Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong: Essays in Honour of a Pro-Democracy Sociopolitical Movement

28th September 2016 is the second anniversary of the Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. It is also the last anniversary of the said sociopolitical event, which arguably represents a most important milestone in Hong Kong’s post-1997 development, before 1st July 2017 that will mark the 20th anniversary of the “Handover”. It was on 28th September two years ago that pro-democracy protestors occupied the Admiralty (金鐘), Causeway Bay (銅鑼灣), Mong Kok (旺角) and Tsim Sha Tsui 尖沙嘴 areas of Hong Kong in a momentous campaign initially planned out earlier by the “ Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (讓愛與和平佔領中環/和平佔中, OCLP) movement, but launched earlier than scheduled when overtaken by the development of events, metamorphosed into unprecedented scale of demonstrations at multiple locations and was transformed into what was dubbed by the world media as the “Umbrella Movement” when umbrellas, which protestors were using to protect themselves when the police attacked them with tear gas and pepper spray, became a symbol of the occupation campaign. The scale of the protest movement, the zeal and passion of the
participants and the personal sacrifices they were willing to make in pursuing the objective of the campaign and the bravery they showed in facing the formidable machinery of repression wielded by the State and at one stage an ominous prospect of a repeat of the 1989 Beijing massacre, as well as the broad-based support from the wider Hong Kong society, reflected a culmination of almost two decades of grievances against the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)\(^2\) whose one-party dictatorship not only continues to exhibit and strengthen its relentlessness in suppressing dissent in the vast Mainland but also shows an incremental, creeping infiltration of authoritarianism into the Hong Kong society, as reflected most lately by the disappearances of the Causeway Bay Five.

To commemorate the second anniversary of this Occupy Campaign a.k.a. Umbrella Movement (雨傘運動), the present issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* entitled *From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong* represents a collection of specially selected articles focusing on this momentous event, its background of determining factors, theoretical and ideological underpinnings, as well as its implications for the future of the Hong Kong people’s valiant struggle for democracy against the backdrop of the formidable odds, since the 1997 “Handover”, as being under the sovereignty of a gigantic country with an entrenched ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)\(^6\) regime that has no foreseeable intention of allowing for a transition from the present repressive one-party dictatorship to liberal democracy that would respect political freedom and civil liberty, or of relaxing its intolerance for dissent. The obstacles are daunting for the cold reality that the “many freedoms and rule of law Hong Kong people enjoyed were less appealing to a regime

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Figure 1 Mighty Current and Causeway Bay Disappearances

Key:

(1) 14th October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s general manager Lui Por 呂波 logged in for the last time onto the computer of Causeway Bay Books (銅鑼灣書店, owned by Mighty Current since 2014) before his disappearance (and some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen 深圳, Guangdong Province, China, on 15th October).

(2) 15th or 22nd October 2015 – Mighty Current publishing company’s business manager Cheung Chi-ping 張志平 went missing in Dongguan 東莞, Guangdong Province, China.

(3) 17th October 2015 – Gui Minhai 桂民海, co-owner of the Mighty Current publishing company and shareholder of the Causeway Bay Books, went missing while vacationing in Pattaya, Thailand.
(4) 23rd October 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ manager Lam Wing-kei 林榮基 was last seen in Hong Kong before his disappearance and his wife filed a missing persons report with the Hong Kong police on 5th November, but some sources later reported him being arrested in Shenzhen on 24th October. Later upon returning to Hong Kong (“on bail”) in mid-June 2016, Lam confirmed that he was indeed arrested once he crossed into Shenzhen in October 2015, and he suspected that he had already been tailed by mainland agents since two or three years ago. In response to Lam’s revelation, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying 梁振英 emphasised that it was unacceptable and illegal for law enforcement personnel from outside Hong Kong, including from Mainland China, to operate in Hong Kong.

(5) 30th December 2015 – Causeway Bay Books’ shareholder Paul Lee (Lee Bo 李波) went missing in Hong Kong.

that preferred a population obedient to its strictures and a legal system more pliable at the service of Communist Party power”, as Arif Dirlik lays out plainly in his prologue, “The Mouse That Roared: The Democratic Movement in Hong Kong”, and the fact that the Mainland Chinese government now appears to consider its relationship with Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement “as contradiction between enemies”, as Joseph Yu-shek Cheng reminds us in his contribution to the prolegomena, “The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant’s View”. It will be a very difficult period ahead for the pro-democracy forces of Hong Kong, as Cheng foresees, and the struggle between them and the establishment-backed, increasingly powerful and resourceful local pro-Beijing United Front (統戰) is set to bring about further deterioration of the polarisation of Hong Kong society.

For a full understanding of what transpired during those tumultuous 79 days, the campaign’s background and determining factors, the roles of structures and agents on both sides of the State and NVA (nonviolent
action), and the Umbrella Movement’s wider and far-reaching impact on the sociopolitical future of Hong Kong, the ten articles here in this focus issue of CCPS, *From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong*, following the prolegomena, are grouped into two sections, with four articles under the first section, “The Occupation”, followed by six article under the second section, “Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead”.

**The Occupation**

Truth is on the march; nothing can stop it now.

— Émile Zola (1840-1902)

This first section, “The Occupation”, after the prolegomena begins with Steven Chung Fun Hung’s paper, “The Occupy Central Campaign in 2014 Hong Kong”, that first introduces to us the details of the Occupation campaign of 2014, and the triggering factors, in particular the issue of political reform and government’s political reform package involving small circle nomination for Chief Executive election. Also highlighted are the challenges faced by the pro-democracy protestors in facing a combination of State power, pro-establishment mobs and hired thugs presumably from the triads. Such involvement of the triads (also witness the triad-style, almost fatal, cleaver attack on 明報 (*Ming Pao*)’s replaced editor-in-chief Kevin Lau Chun-to 劉進圖 earlier in 2014 with suspected political motive) is particularly intriguing, if we look back at the triads’ involvement at a critical juncture in contemporary China when diverse social forces were galvanized into an almost inconceivable joint action against a ruthless central State: the now legendary “Operation Siskin” or “Operation Yellowbird” (黃雀行動) in the wake of the June Fourth massacre of 1989.
Known as “Secret Passage” at an earlier stage, “Operation Siskin” was a loosely structured Hong Kong-based rescue syndicate hurriedly put together by some key members of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會, “the Alliance”), Hong Kong actors-cum-filmmakers John Shum Kin-fun 岑建勳 and Alan Tang Kwong-wing 鄧光榮 and businessman and triad boss Chan Tat-ching 陳達鈜 (“Brother Six”/ 六哥) in the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Beijing massacre. While the United States and Hong Kong’s British colonial government were undoubtedly involved in the rescue missions to various degrees and the costly and highly dangerous operations were financed mainly by both Hong Kong’s businessmen and her underworld among other benefactors, Operation Siskin owed much to the organizing strengthen and network of the Hong Kong underworld, mainly the smuggling triads, which successfully rescued, by one estimate, more than 300 to 400 wanted student leaders, democracy activists, scholars and writers, mainly from June to the end of 1989, but with sporadic operations lasting till June 1997, just before the “Handover” of Hong Kong to China.⁷ Things have apparently changed much over these years since 1989.

While some factions of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement today are trying to distance their political struggle from Mainland China’s pro-democracy movement (in the country and in exile) in the name of localism and have become increasingly antagonistic towards the annual Victoria Park commemoration of the June Fourth massacre, a comparison between the 79-day Umbrella Movement (28th September – 15th December) in 2014 Hong Kong and the 50-day Tiananmen Movement (15th April – 3rd June) in 1989 Beijing is inevitable, given the intricately linked demographic and sociopolitical development in both colonial-era Hong Kong and Mainland China and the impact of the
June Fourth massacre in Beijing on the sociopsychological identity transformation (which is increasingly post-1997 bordering on an ethnogenesis) and political consciousness of the Hong Kong people. The next article in this section, “The Mobilization of Memory and Tradition: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Beijing’s 1989 Tiananmen Movement”, by Johan Lagerkvist and Tim Rühlig provides such a comparison between the two movements, highlighting the important role played by the “Tiananmen generation” of political activists in Hong Kong in promoting democracy locally in Hong Kong which they considered as part of the effort in bringing liberal democracy to the whole of China, amidst CCP’s relentless effort to erase the 1989 massacre from the collective memory of the Mainland Chinese citizens. With due attention paid to the rise of localism and the receding influence of the “Tiananmen generation” in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, this thought-provoking paper offers a detailed comparison between the two movements in various aspects such as background, build-up, goals, frames, protest culture, outcomes as well the era-specific goals and external environments.

In pointing out the importance of “mobilization of memory” in pro-democracy movements and the implications of the rise of localism in Hong Kong’s protest culture to the CCP regime, the findings of Lagerkvist and Rühlig’s paper inevitably also lead us to think of the implications of Hong Kong’s emerging rejection of the “mobilization of the Tiananmen memory” to the Hong Kong democracy movement itself. Does Hong Kong really have the capital, resources and leverage to go alone in her quest for genuine democracy? Is a severance of the local movement from the struggle for democracy and political freedom in Mainland China really necessary or even wise? As Lagerkvist and Rühlig point out, mutual exchanges between Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement had illustrated the
importance of interregional linkages between advocates of pro-democracy activism. This is especially significant given the still experimental characteristics of these student-led mass movements, or the “new social movements” referred to in the next paper by Zhongxuan Lin and Shih-Diing Liu, “Occupation as Prefiguration? The Emergence of a New Political Form in the Occupy Central Movement”.

Contemplating the 2014 Occupy Campaign in Hong Kong in its nature as a “laboratories of experience” that manifests the emergence of a form of “prefigurative politics” which is seen to have been deeply rooted in Hong Kong’s political context since the 1997 “Handover”, Lin and Liu bring to our attention a “new way of ‘doing’ politics” that raises deep questions about representation and leadership in protest movements.

Focusing on similar concerns is the fourth paper in this section, “Citizen Camera-witnessing: A Case Study of the Umbrella Movement” by Wai Han Lo, which sees the Umbrella Movement as sharing the common ethos of many other social movements in other regions and countries in recent years in the spirit of “self-actualization” – a new form of “self-help” movement, characterized by the active participation of the young generation, that allows room for individual creativity and diversified action. Lo, however, has the theme of her paper concentrated specifically on one particular aspect of this “self-help” movement in 2014 Hong Kong – citizen camera-witnessing through the use of mobile camera phone as a mode of civic camera-mediated mass self-testimony not only to the State’s brutal repression but also to the beauty of human nature in the movement that through audiovisual, even real-time, sharing via electronic social media and the Worldwide Web, helps to shape the public images of the movement’s participants, engendering sympathy and support for the cause, thus promoting a new form of social mobilization.
Nevertheless, despite the idealism and beauty of such “self-help”
movements, symbolic or even iconic protest actions, as in Rangoon in
1988, Beijing in 1989 and Hong Kong in 2014, while having a
tremendous moral and psychological impact and arousing major national
and international attention, as Professor Gene Sharp\(^8\) reminds us, they
are by themselves “unlikely to bring down a dictatorship, for they
remain largely symbolic and do not alter the power position of the
dictatorship” (Sharp, 2010: 61), or in the case of Hong Kong’s relations
with her Beijing overlord unlikely to bring about Beijing’s agreement
with the Hong Kong people’s aspiration for genuine liberal democracy
that promises full political freedom and civil liberties. Why is this so?

The three factors of instrumental activities, bargaining power and
ideology, according to Vaughan and Archer (1971), represent necessary
(though might not be sufficient) conditions of success for assertive
groups. On the other hand, facing these assertive groups is institutional
domination whose success also depends upon the existence of three
necessary conditions, namely monopoly, constraint and again, ideology.
Juxtaposing Vaughan and Archer’s two constructs gives the composite
schema as shown in Figure 2. Monopoly is used here in the Weberian
sense of the word, referring to CCP’s monopoly of political power. The
corresponding feature on the side of democracy movement or civil rights
activism comprises instrumental activities defined as the sum of actions
to devalue the political monopoly of the authoritarian ruling party on
which domination is based. However, for the dissidents, instrumental
activities are not enough, whether for successful civil rights assertion or
striving for political liberalization. Bargaining power, according to
Vaughan and Archer, is as necessary as “an alternative to the use of
violence and yet implies a degree of organization which would make
revolt effective if reform were denied” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 27).
However, its two components of numerical strength and organization are
Figure 2 Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Conflict

Source: Yeoh (2014: 222), Figure 5. Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32).

crucial to its effective use and success – the two elements which the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and particularly the “prefigurative politics” referred to by Lin and Liu or the “self-help” movement described by Lo are presently lacking.

This brings us to the next section of this focus issue, “Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead”.

Democracy, Identity and the Road Ahead

DESMARIS [Henceforth!]

– Motto of the Cliffords (1310-1676), Gatehouse, Skipton Castle, North Yorkshire

Sze Chi Chan and King Fai Chan in their paper, “The Unfinished Experimentation of Political Parties in Hong Kong – Reflections from Theoretical and Experiential Perspectives”, pick up where we just left
off in the last section by pointing out that the first challenge which civil activists in Hong Kong’s post-“Handover” budding civil society is facing, in responding to the grand new environment ushered in by the Sino-British Agreement in 1997, was whether to transform the pressure groups, such as those comprised of community workers, unionists and student activists who practiced mainly a “protest-advocacy” model in political bargaining which may work just fine in colonial Hong Kong, into political parties in a parliamentary democracy in the new political milieu of PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

According to Chan and Chan, citing the idea of activist-scholar Yeung Sum 楊森, the new instrument of a political party – which we are now witnessing as a new political option being weighed by the post-Umbrella Movement veteran student leaders and activists from the movement – unlike pressure group politics that advocates only the interest and well-being of specific groups, “demands political groups to embrace a wider horizon and bear a more inclusive vision” which will also serve to strengthen bargaining power and widen support base in challenging the establishment to bring about genuine democratic reform. In this case, support base in terms of numerical strength refers not only to members directly within the pro-democracy movement or directly active in the movement in some capacity, but also the “third parties” or members of the “the general public” that the movement would need to win over as “allies” or at least “friendly neutrals”, as shown in Figure 3.

Winning over uncommitted third parties is absolutely important for any chances of success in nonviolent action (NVA) assertion of the movement, in a process referred to by Irwin and Faison (1978) as a “political jujitsu” in which shifts of attitude are important as well as shifts of behaviour “because both sides adjust their actions according to how they gauge their support”. Above the “third parties” in Figure 3 are “opponents” who, from the perspective of the
Figure 3 Process of NVA Assertion vis-à-vis Party-State

Source: Yeoh (2014: 234), Figure 10. Schema based on Irwin and Faison (1978).

NVA proponents, represent potential converts especially among State-coopted intellectuals, emerging middle class, disgruntled working class but also moderates and reformers in the ruling echelons and bureaucracy, and from the point of view of the Party-State, the ultimate sovereign of the SAR, the dejected and demoralized leaders and members of the NVA movements who feel lost fighting an unequal battle with no success in sight and who are at the edge of losing conviction in their movements that they feel are increasingly becoming irrelevant facing the continuously growing strength of the Party-State and its proxy in the SAR.

Such tactics are crucial for if “the assertive group has limited members willing to engage in concerted action and a low degree of internal organisation, while the dominant group has a strong and highly organized portion of its membership engaged in applying constraints, domination is likely to prove stable” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 28). However, such variations in relative numerical and organizational...
strength on the two sides could only account for their relative degrees of success in this process of “political jujitsu”, as Vaughan and Archer caution, for a parameter inevitably influencing this power interplay that has to be taken into account is “the alliances either group can form in order to acquire wider support for either domination or assertion” (ibid.), i.e. not only the active and passive opponents but also the “neutrals”, the uncommitted third parties, to win over as portrayed in Figure 3. In striving to arouse doubts and conflicts among their opponents, for instance, agents of repression could induce cracks in activists’ solidarity and causes the activism to be stymied by appearing moderate and conciliatory to certain more “agreeable” factions in order that they would abandon their goals. This represents an important component of the United Front work. Internal cracks are more prone to occur under a situation where the NVA movement is relatively weak in bargaining power as well as instrumental activities, as portrayed in Figure 4.

From a broader perspective, subtle or overt forms of suppression as illustrated above could come in different forms, but what Gene Sharp identifies as four mechanisms of change produced by NVA in their opponents could similarly be mechanisms through which the Party-State, besides outright violent suppression, could break its opponents in the NVA movements, namely, conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (Sharp, 2010: 35-37), tactics long recognised to be employed by Beijing’s United Front work in Hong Kong, or as Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam (2013) describe, “the soft tactics of integration, cooptation and collaboration, as well as the hard tactics of containment and denunciation” that all seek to “ultimately consolidate China’s hegemony in the local society” (Lam and Lam, 2013: 306). The danger that lies herein is multifaceted, as pointed out in three other articles in this section – “Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: Comparative Analysis of Their Developments
Figure 4 State Domination and NVA Assertion


after the Umbrella Movement” by Benson Wai-Kwok Wong and Sanho Chung, “Post-Umbrella Movement: Localism and Radicalness of the Hong Kong Student Movement” by Che-po Chan, and “Migrants and Democratization: The Political Economy of Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong” by Stan Hok-Wui Wong, Ngok Ma and Wai-man Lam.

While Wong and Chung’s paper reflects the concern over the difficult situations faced respectively by the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism in the post-Umbrella Movement era – for HKFS including loss of creditability and wave of members’ withdrawal, and for Scholarism mainly a manpower sustainability and leadership

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succession problem, Wong, Ma and Lam’s empirical study using the Asian Barometer survey data raises the disturbing issue of immigrants from Mainland China post-Handover — who are seen as, by self-selection, “politically more conservative, more content with the status quo, and less supportive of progressive political change (i.e. fast democratization) than the native population in Hong Kong” — being reliable supporters of the pro-Beijing coalition in the elections in Hong Kong, thus representing a barrier to democratisation in Hong Kong.

Chan, on the other hand, highlights the rise of radical localism that stems from the frustration felt by Hong Kong’s younger generation over the failure of the Umbrella Movement, and as a strong reaction to Mainland China’s interference in Hong Kong affairs and the Hong Kong government’s compliance to such an interference, leading to further polarisation of the Hong Kong society and fractionalisation among the pro-democracy forces, exemplified for example by the rising radical localist perspective of denying Hong Kong people’s “Chinese” identity and of the overriding focus on distancing Hong Kong from China and escaping Beijing’s political control, which has led to even the questioning of the nature of Hong Kong’s annual commemoration of the 1989 Beijing massacre, including the slogan of “rehabilitation of June Fourth” (pingfan liu-si 平反六四) used by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China. The last point here, about the “pingfan liu-si” slogan, nevertheless, reflects a divergence in strategic approach and ideological orientation not solely related to this recent rise of radical localism in the post-Umbrella Movement era in Hong Kong but also even among the pro-democracy activists and June Fourth survivors over the conventional use of the term “pingfan 平反” (i.e. to rehabilitate or to redress a mishandled case) in the demand “to pingfan June Fourth”. The concern is understandable as the demand for the CCP regime “to pingfan June Fourth” is rightly, as argued by those

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opposing the use of the term, tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of the CCP regime who is merely asked to rehabilitate the 1989 protests as a patriotic movement, to release those remained jailed for the protests and to apologize to and compensate those injured during the brutal crackdown or persecuted thereafter and families of those who were slain on the Chang’an Avenue and elsewhere in Beijing in June 1989, and to allow the long-exiled former protesters to return home. Hence, while no one doubts the political defiance shown by China’s (mainly exiled) democracy movement, the current debate over the continued use of the word “pingfan” could probably reflect the internal dilemma concerning the determination and the ultimate aim of China’s and Hong Kong’s democracy movements and their leadership, as well as throw light upon the current disarray of these movements.

Whether it be the rise of radical localism vs the pan-Chinese approach of the “Tiananmen generation” of pro-democracy activists or the political orientation of Mainland Chinese immigrants vis-à-vis that of native Hong Kongers, the problem at hand ultimately boils down to the issue of identity, which forms the specific focus of the other two papers that respectively begins and ends this section – “Booing the National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities through the Mirror of Sport” by Brian Bridges and “The Rise of Civic Nationalism: Shifting Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan” by Justin P. Kwan. With sport being seen as a means to express or reflect nationalism or for the government to advance “patriotic” agenda, Bridges examines the rise of “localism” in Hong Kong especially as a post-Occupy phenomenon by looking at recent sporting fixtures, while at the same time tracing the issue back to the pre-Occupy era, using case studies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2009 East Asian Games.

As Nicolae Gheorghe (1991) notes, it has been a widely observed phenomenon that while government responds to challenges from ethnic
community organizations that seek to influence public policy, “within an inverted and complementary paradigm [...] ethnic communities take shape as response to stimuli which induce a process of ethnogenesis” (Gheorghe, 1991: 842-843). Such an inverted paradigm, as shown in the lower flow line in Figure 5, wherein State policy has induced reethnicisation and polarisation among ethnic minorities or even ethnogenesis in places like Spain’s Andalucía or some other imagined communities, as described by Benedict Anderson (1983, 1991) who defines a nation as a community socially constructed and ultimately imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. As Anderson observes, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible [...] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson, 1991: 6-7).

The sovereignty of a nation-state is imagined, according to Anderson, because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the
divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm, giving rise to the national
dreams of freedom whose gage and emblem were the sovereign state.
Similarly, other historicist (in contrast to the primordialists) like Ernest
Gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) also posit that nations and
nationalism are products of modernity and have been created as means
to political and economic ends, and the nation, assuming the nineteenth-
century conceptual entity of a nation-state, is the product of nationalism
– but not vice versa – through the unification of various peoples into a
common society or community.

This is exactly what is occurring in China’s ethnic frontier regions
of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia where the CCP central State’s
repressive, uncompromising and inflexible political paradigm verging on
internal colonisation, coupled with massive Han 漢 demographic and
economic invasion leading to resource exploitation and local cultural
and environmental destruction, is pushing local resentment, reethnicisation and polarisation to an extreme of desperation (as
reflected in the horrifying Tibetan self-immolations) or to a boiling point
(as manifested in the regional unrests and Xinjiang-based cross-province
terror attacks). Are we observing a similar phenomenon of ethnogenesis,
or reethnicisation of the local people, with a distinctive southern lingnan
嶺南 ethnocultural identity in contrast to the northern “Mandarin” ( 官
話 ) culture, unfolding in Hong Kong, especially in the post-Occupy era
as a reaction against increasing northern interference, domination and
oppression emanated from the authoritarian political centre in Beijing?
Or maybe not only in Hong Kong, as Kwan’s comparison between the
Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in
Taiwan shows, in terms of national identity patterns and formation, and
how the rise of civic nationalism is furthering the nation-building project
in these two polities which has led to increasingly widening identity gap
between them and Mainland China.

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Finally, closing this August/September 2016 focus issue of CCPS is a book review article on Joseph Yu-shek Cheng’s 2013 edited monograph, *The second Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR: Evaluating the Tsang years 2005-2012*.

**Postscript**

We have it in our power to begin the world over again.

– Thomas Paine (1776), *Common sense*,

Appendix to the Third Edition

This August/September 2016 focus issue of *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* thus represents both a written testimony and an in-depth case study. It is a written testimony, in an age when forced mass amnesia and persecution of memory have become effective tools of ruthless authoritarian governments to perpetuate their rule, to a valiant movement by the Hong Kong people that began on 28 September and lasted for 79 days in the autumn of 2014 to hold their destiny in their own hands. “… while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life,” says University of Washington historian Alan Wood in his preface to *Limits to autocracy* (1995)\(^1\), “I also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, however tenuous, to those who die by the sword.” Even though Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement of 2014 did not end that tragically in a massacre as Beijing’s Tiananmen Movement did 25 years earlier, if the intensification of PRC’s repression of dissent in the past year both in the domestic and global context (witness the kidnapping of Gui Minhai from Pattaya) could be a sign of what is to come for China under continued uncompromising political monopoly of the increasing authoritarian post-reform-era CCP party-State capacity,
even a further liberalized authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democрадура)\(^{12}\) seems to be increasingly fading from the horizon. Thus the challenge that Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement is facing is indeed daunting. It is in this climate that the present issue of *CCPS* with its specific focus on the Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement comes in timely, for this momentous event that represents a most important milestone in Hong Kong’s road of sociopolitical transformation and that is set to have far-reaching effect on Hong Kong’s future – which will be dealt with in great detail in the ten articles following Dirlik and Cheng’s prolegomena – stands out to be “so monumental, so symbolic, so glorious, and speak so eloquently to our highest ideals that they transcend the immediacy of the news”, in the words that were originally a description of that other, similar, movement just under three decades ago, “History demands that [it] be preserved.”\(^{13}\)

Besides bearing testimony, this focus issue of *CCPS* is also a valuable case-study analysis of a movement participated by between 1.2 to 2 million people – which was the largest pro-democracy protest in the territory since 28th May 1989 when about a quarter of the Hong Kong people took to the streets in a show of support for the 50-day pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square that ended tragically shortly later on that fateful night of 3rd-4th June when a beleaguered regime finally responded with a massacre to reclaim the capital from the unarmed peaceful protesters – from various perspectives including sources and determining factors, structure and organisation, theoretical and ideological underpinnings, achievements and failures, as well as its aftermath and impact on the future.

Before ending this foreword, we would like to thank all the contributing authors of the articles in this focus issue, and the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this August/September 2016 *CCPS* focus issue.
of From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong possible. We are deeply grateful to Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, Arif Dirlik and Brian Bridges for their great support in the organizing of this volume; without their help the publication of this worthy issue on Hong Kong’s Occupy Campaign / Umbrella Movement would not have been possible. Finally, we are also grateful to our proof-readers, Mr Goh Chun Wei & Mr Dylan Hii Yong Jie for their crucial assistance in checking the final galley proofs and CRCs, and to Miss Wu Chien-yi for the journal’s website construction and maintenance. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

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Notes

1. The transliteration being from the older names 望角，芒角．

2. People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国) consists of 31 provincial-level administrative units including sheng (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘肃, Guangdong 广东, Guizhou 贵州, Hainan 海南, Hebei 河北, Heilongjiang 黑龙江, Henan 河南, Hubei 湖北, Hunan 湖南, Jiangsu 江苏, Jiangxi 江西, Jilin 吉林, Liaoning 辽宁, Qinghai 青海, Shaanxi 陕西, Shandong 山东, Shanxi 山

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西, Sichuan 四川, Yunnan 雲南 and Zhejiang 浙江), zizhiqu 自治區 (i.e. “autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi 广西 of the Zhuang 壮, Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia 內蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia 宁夏 of the Hui 回, Xizang/Tibet 西藏 of the Tibetans and Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and zhixiashi 直轄市 (i.e. municipalities directly ruled by the central government – Beijing 北京, Chongqing 重慶, Shanghai 上海 and Tianjin 天津). After the “Handover” (or “huigui 回歸” from the perspective of the PRC, i.e. “return” [to the motherland]), the British colony of Hong Kong and Portuguese colony of Macau officially became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (香港特別行政區) and Macao Special Administrative Region (Região Administrativa Especial de Macau, 澳門特別行政區) of the People’s Republic of China respectively in 1997 and 1999. The now vibrantly free and democratic island state of Taiwan – officially still “Province of Taiwan, Republic of China” (中華民國臺灣省) – remains a sovereign country of her own, since the conclusion in 1949 of the Chinese Civil War, outside the control of Mainland China’s ruthlessly authoritarian Chinese Communist Party regime.

3. See Yeoh (2016: 43, Figure 2), with adjustment in item 4 based on latest confirmed information.


5. Ibid.

6. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).

7. See “黃雀行動背後港人捨命救危內情” [inside story of how Hong Kong people risked their lives to embark on rescuing those in danger behind the Operation Siskin] by Jiang Xun 江迅, originally published in Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刊 [Asia week], Issue 23, 14th June 2009; reproduced in

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8. Multiple-time Nobel Peace Prize nominee, Gene Sharp is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/nobel-peaceidINDEE81Q0HL20120227>

9. Or more correctly transliterated, “jūjutsu”. Jūjutsu 柔術 is a Japanese martial art of close combat, using no weapon or only a short weapon, for defeating an armed and armored opponent by manipulating the opponent’s force against himself rather than directly opposing it with one’s own force. Jūjutsu, which dates back to the 17th century, is an ancestor of Aikidō 合気道 which was developed in the late 1920s, as referred to by Stephen Zunes (2009) when he says, “As with the martial art of aikido, nonviolent opposition movements can engage the force of the state’s repression and use it to effectively disarm the force directed against them.”

10. Chang’an Avenue/Chang’an Jie 長安街 (literally “Street of Eternal Peace”) was the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989. Massacre along Chang’an Avenue/Boulevard (with heaviest casualty on the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 but as a whole lasted
from about 10 p.m. of 3rd June to the midnight of 5th June) mainly occurred along the route of PLA advance at the Wanshou Lu 萬壽路 junction, Muxidi 木樨地 intersection, Fuxingmen 復興門 (Fuxing, i.e. “revival”, Gate) outside Yanjing Hotel (燕京飯店) and Minzu Hotel (民族飯店), and Xidan Bei Dajie 西單北大街 (Xidan North Street) junction along West Chang’an Avenue at Xinhua门 新華門 (Xinhua, i.e. “new China”, Gate) and Nan Chang Jie 南長街 junction onto Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場) from the western side and from the eastern side of the Chang’an Avenue near Hongmiao 紅廟 to Jianguomen 建國門 (Jianguo, i.e. “nation founding/building”, Gate), along East Chang’an Avenue near Beijing Hotel (北京飯店) and Nanchizi Dajie 南池子大街 (South Chizi Street) junction onto Tiananmen Square (《驚天動地的一百日》, Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刊 (1989), p. 80). In addition, massacre also occurred along Qianmen Dajie 前門大街 (Qianmen, i.e. “front gate”, Street – PLA’s southern approach to Tiananmen that night), at Chongwenmen 崇文門 (Chongwen, i.e. “culture/civilization revering”, Gate), between Jianguomen and Chaoyangmen 朝陽門 (Chaoyang, i.e. “sun facing”, Gate), the approach to the university district and around Peking University (北京大學), Yiheyuan 春和園 (Summer Palace imperial garden) and Tsinghua University (清華大學) (ibid.). Outside Beijing, similar massacre at that time mainly occurred in Chengdu 成都, capital city of Sichuan Province. While the official death toll stood at four hundred and forty-three, 223 of whom were soldiers and police officers, plus 5,000 soldiers and police officers and 2,000 civilians wounded in the crackdown, exiled dissidents estimated the number of civilians, workers and students killed in the Beijing crackdown during the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 to be from 2,000 to 3,000, while Soviet sources in 1989 put the number massacred in Beijing as 3,000, as cited by Mikhail Gorbachev at a politburo meeting in 1989 (ODN, 19th August 2011).


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