The Quarter-Century Legacy of June Fourth: Prospects and Challenges in the Struggle of Post-1989 Dissent and Nonviolent Action in the People’s Republic of China

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Abstract
A quarter of a century has passed since the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and June Fourth crackdown in Beijing. At the 25th anniversary of the tumultuous events of 1989, this paper scrutinizes the prospects and challenges in the struggle of post-1989 Chinese dissent and non-violent action (NVA), both exiled and domestic, in the context of State-civil societal relations, analyses the conflict and reluctant symbiosis across the unfortunate State-society divide, assesses the tribulations and prospects of contemporary Chinese dissent and NVA, and ponders how the struggle of this one fifth of humanity for political rights and civil liberties could be understood in a more global, long-term context, especially in view of the PRC’s momentous global prowess by means of her astounding economic influence and “smart power” outreach, and in particular, her controversial “soft power” leverage.

Keywords: June Fourth, Tiananmen, Chinese Communist Party, authoritarianism, Party-State, dissent, non-violent action, democracy movement, weiquan activism

JEL classification: H11, H12, K49, Z18
Indeed, unless we choose [...] the means to producing a race of free individuals, we have only two alternatives to choose from: either a number of national, militarized totalitarianisms [...] or else one supra-national totalitarianism, called into existence by the social chaos [...] and developing, under the need for efficiency and stability, into the welfare-tyranny of Utopia. You pay your money and takes your choice.

Aldous Huxley, “Foreword” (1946) to Brave New World (1932)

1. Introduction

Presently incarcerated Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dr Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 2 closes the 2002 collection of his works Xiang liangxin shuohuang de minzu [a nation that lies to its conscience] with a passage titled “The Chinese who use 1% of good policies to defend 99% of vicious policies” (“用1%的善政來為99%的惡政辯護的中國人”, see Liu, 2002: 401-402) in which he reiterates his fear for the increasing acceptance by the people of Chinese Communist Party’s warning that Western multi-party liberal democracy will only bring chaos and instability to China. Just how the one-party State’s brutality and callous disregard for human life and dignity that the blood-soaked record of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)3 from the Yan’an 延安 days to the Great Leap Forward (Da Yuejin 大跃进), the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Wuchanjieji Wenhua Da Geming 无产阶级文化大革命), and to the 1989 Beijing 北京 massacre, or on the more individual level inclusive of the treatment of political prisoners like Li Wangyang 李旺阳, could render even remotely possible for the people to accept its simple reassurances to forgo the demand for multi-party political choice and just continue to hope that perennial hope that heaven will bestow them from within the same party an enlightened and benevolent ruler (mingjun xianzhu 明君贤主) is truly beyond imagination. This is despite the fact that the same Party now seems to be slightly less outright brutal while turning into a star performer in economic growth – though it is still arguable whether it is the Party who has the right to claim credit for the economic miracle or the people who had been freed from the Party’s earlier pre-1978 cruel economic constraint who are really
contributing to the economic miracle, just like the overseas Chinese who, being free from ideological constraint, were creating economic miracles all over the world in the earlier days.

“Against ruthlessness, remembering was the only defense”, Salman Rushdie, the 1981 Booker Prize laureate and 1999 Commandeur de l’Ordre des Arts et des Lettres, tells us in *Joseph Anton* (2012). Yet George Orwell paints us a bleaker future in *Nineteen Eighty-four*: “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past”5, or in plainer language, “We, the Party, control all records, and we control all memories […] Whatever the Party holds to be the truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party.”6 So far the world has not yet reached that part of the 21st Century when the “civilizational state” of China would “rule the world” as Martin Jacques’ predicts, but at this juncture of the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen8 天安门 Square demonstrations and the June Fourth massacre it is a right time to reflect upon how long the right to remember could at least be continued to be protected in this harsher and harsher winter of Chinese dissent and nonviolent action (NVA) that seems to be with no thaw in sight, especially in view of the recent death of dissident rights-defence lawyer Cao Shunli 曹顺利 in custody and convictions of the leaders of the New Citizens’ Movement. This paper sets out to explore the vicissitudes of Chinese dissent and NVA, both domestic and exiled, since the 1989 Beijing massacre and gauge the resilience and prospects of such citizens’ struggle against the authoritarian one-party State of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), keeping in mind Nobel Peace Prize nominee Professor Gene Sharp’s four basic requirements for bringing down a dictatorship9: strengthening determination and resistance skills, strengthening independent social groups, creating powerful internal resistance force, and developing wise grand strategic plan for liberation and implement it skillfully. In the process of developing and strengthening these which calls for much patience, some of the last words of Li Wangyang10 could probably give much encouragement in the momentary fight at least for the right to remember – a struggle against mass amnesia enforced by a ruthless self-serving State. “There’s no looking back even if they chop off my head,”
said a blind and frail Li Wangyang, broken in body by 23 years of life spent almost entirely in jail and under repeated beating and torture\textsuperscript{11} in an impassioned, heart-rending video-recorded interview\textsuperscript{12} broadcast in Hong Kong 香港 on 2nd June 2012, before his suspicious “suicide”\textsuperscript{13} in a tightly guarded Beijing hospital ward on 6th June, two days after that year’s 23rd anniversary of the June Fourth massacre.

While the valiant efforts of the Chinese NVA in maintaining its assertiveness and vitality in such harsh political environment, probably best summed up in the homepage motto “I persevere, therefore I am” (Wo cheng gu wo zai 我撑故我在)\textsuperscript{14} of Her Peirong 何培蓉 (“PearlHer”/Zhenzhu 珍珠, the social activist best known as the key player in blind civil rights lawyer Cheng Guangcheng 陈光诚 ’s 2012 dramatic escape from his inhuman house arrest), is truly admirable in the context of citizens’ struggle for political rights and civil liberties, this paper argues that with the country’s “smart power” (including both components of “soft” and “hard” power) perceived to be gaining ground on a global scale in an era of the Beijing Consensus/China Model gaining attractiveness, such a struggle is no longer just a national endeavour but is increasingly taking on a global significance. Even if seeing it as a national struggle, the stake is simply too high for the fate of over 1.3 billion\textsuperscript{15} people – one fifth of humanity.

2. Continuing Crackdown on Dissent

The first half of 2014 was marked by another series of setbacks for China’s crestfallen civil and political rights activism. The death of rights-defence lawyer (weiquan lushi 维权律师) Cao Shunli on 14th March 2014 was believed to be due to a delay of treatment for illness in police custody. Cao, who became a rights-defence lawyer after having been sacked from her post in the Ministry of Labour for exposing corruption in the said ministry, was arrested at Beijing Capital International Airport while she was leaving for Geneva to attend a United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) meeting.\textsuperscript{16} This represents another shocking case of death in custody of China’s civil and political rights activists since the suspicious death of long-imprisoned
and tortured 1989 Beijing demonstration activist Li Wangyang, who had been under continued surveillance since release in May 2011, on 6th June 2012, when he allegedly “committed suicide” under mysterious circumstances in a tightly guarded hospital room. On 11th April 2014 the Beijing Higher People’s Court upheld a lower court’s verdict and sent another rights-defence lawyer Xu Zhiyong 许志永, founder of the Chinese New Citizens’ Movement (Zhongguo Xin Gongmin Yundong 中国新公民运动), on the charge of “gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public space” (which carries a maximum sentence of five years) to four years in prison. The Chinese New Citizens’ Movement is a collection of numerous civil rights activists promoted by the loosely-organized civil rights group “Citizens” which is the successor to the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI, or Gongmeng 公盟 – an organization that advocates the rule of law and greater constitutional protections, established in 2003 by Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao 滕彪, Yu Jiang 余江 and Zhang Xingshui 张水永 from the Peking University Law School and shut down by the government on 17th July 2009). Started in June 2010 by a group of scholars, lawyers, journalists and activists, including Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, Wang Gongquan 王功权, Li Xiongbin 黎雄兵, Li Fangping 李方平, Xu Youyu 徐友渔 and Zhang Shihe 张世和 (Laohumiao 老虎庙), shortly after the proscription of OCI, the New Citizens’ Movement represents a political movement aiming to facilitate China’s peaceful transition towards constitutionalism, as well as a social movement striving to facilitate China’s transition from a “society of servility” to a civil society.

The jailing of Xu Zhiyong came just weeks after another civil rights activist Tan Zuoren 谭作人 completed his 5-year jail term. An environmentalist and civil rights activist who had supported the 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations, Tan drafted the “512 Earthquake Casualty Investigation Report” (512 地震伤亡调查报告) following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake to press for the investigation of the construction quality of the “tofu dreg” schoolhouses that instantly collapsed and killed an astonishing number of students during the quake. He was arrested on 28th March 2009 and subsequently sentenced to five years of imprisonment on the charge of “inciting subversion of
State power” (shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui 冀动颠覆国家政权罪)\(^{17}\). The charge of “inciting subversion of the State” was announced in a 1997 amendment of the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China and has since been leveled against a number of political dissidents and civil rights activists and rights-defence (weiquan 维权) lawyers, including among them Huang Qi 黄琦 who was sentenced in February 2003 to 5 years of imprisonment, with 1-year deprivation of political rights, and again to 3 years of imprisonment in November 2009 for “illegal procession of state secrets” after voicing, together with Tan Zuoren and Guo Quan 郭泉, on the alleged school building construction scandal exposed by the 2008 Sichuan earthquake that resulted in a huge number of student casualties due to the collapse of school buildings\(^{18}\). Other targeted included Wang Xiaoning 王小宁 (arrested for his online publishing and sentenced in September 2003 to 10 years of imprisonment), Gao Zhisheng 高智晟 (sentenced in December 2006 to 3 years of imprisonment, with 1-year deprivation of political rights), Yang Chunlin 杨春林 (sentenced in February 2008 to 5 years of imprisonment, with 2-year deprivation of political rights), Hu Jia 胡佳 (sentenced in April 2008 to 3 and a half years of imprisonment), Guo Quan (arrested in November 2008 and sentenced in October 2009 to 10 years of imprisonment), Liu Xiaobo (arrested in 2008 for organizing the signing of Charter 08 that included an Item 18 “A Federated Republic”\(^{19}\) and sentenced in December 2009 to 11 years of imprisonment, with 2-year deprivation of political rights), and Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February 2010 to 5 years of imprisonment).

2.1. Weiquan Activism as Domestic NVA

In his manifesto published on 29th May 2012 which was quickly censored by the authorities, Xu Zhiyong described the New Citizens’ Movement as at the same time a political, social and cultural movement:

The New Citizens’ Movement is a political movement. China needs to complete a political transformation, establish a free, democratic China with the rule of law. The New Citizens’ Movement is a social movement. The solution to power monopoly, rampant corruption,
wealth disparity, education imbalance, and similar problems does not solely depend on a democratic political system, but also rely on the continuous social reform. The New Citizens’ Movement is a cultural movement. It aims to rid of the tyrannical culture, which is degenerate, depraved, treacherous, and hostile, and build a new nationalist spirit of “freedom, justice, and love.”

It can be observed here a careful attempt, as a rule in China’s weiquan movements, not to be seen as challenging the authority of the Chinese Communist Party in order to avoid shift repression as that experienced by Liu Xiaobo with his Charter 08. Upon the recent arrest and conviction of Xu Zhiyong and other leaders of the New Citizens’ Movement, commenting in a Financial Times report on Xu Zhiyong’s New Citizens’ Movement, veteran artist-civil rights activist Ai Weiwei 艾未未 expressed disdain for such movements’ naivety: “Xu Zhiyong is representative of many young scholars who focused on social issues and sought practical ways to bring about reform. I know many of them and consider them friends. But when they say they have no enemies, I fear they are being unrealistic.”

What Ai criticized as unrealistic is in fact typical of today’s Chinese weiquan activists in carefully restricting their demand for redressing civil grievances to single issues, justifying their actions by appealing to the written laws and constitution, and localizing the targets of the protests to avoid challenging the central CCP government whom they are protesting to rather than against. Such reservations reflect a common consciousness for self-preservation among civil rights activists, especially those who are less known internationally and hence could not expect international pressure to support them in the event of the State’s decision to destroy them. In terms of strategic direction, in contrast with the democracy movements’ looking for long-term systemic, revolutionary change, the weiquan activists are relatively conservative, focusing instead on a particular short- or medium-term goal within the existing sociopolitical framework and aiming just for reform, i.e. planned change of elements within a system rather than the system itself, as shown in the third column of Table 1 in the introductory article²² of this special issue (p. 206). In terms of ideological orientation, in contrast with the democracy
movements’ seeing incompatible interest with the one-party State that they aim to overthrow, the *weiquan* activists see shared interests at least with the more liberal, reformist and moderate faction within the Party-State, hence are looking more for cooperation and synergy of action together with “enlightened” members of the central Party-State, i.e. the more liberal, reformist and moderate faction therein, to *zuozhu* 作主 (enforce justice) for the people against local corruption and abuse of power. *Weiquan* activism’s less revolutionary orientation places it somewhere closer midway on the “reformative-transformative” spectrum in the NVA matrix in Figure 10 in the introductory article of this special issue (p. 234).

### 2.2. “Disturbing Social Order” Charges under Articles 290-293 and the Crackdown on New Citizens’ Movement

After the upholding of Xu Zhiyong’s prison verdict on 11th April 2014, four more New Citizens’ Movement activists – Ding Jiaxi 丁家喜, Zhao Changqing 赵常青, Zhang Baocheng 张宝成 and Li Wei 李蔚 – were respectively sentenced in Beijing to two to three and a half years on 18th April 2014 also on the charge of “gathering a crowd to disrupt public order” or “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” (*xunxin zishi* 寻衅滋事), the usual charge now facing a political activists, civil rights lawyers and worker rights advocates which could mean five years in prison or ten years for multiple offenses, under article 293 of China’s 1997 amended Criminal Law.23 One of the earlier well-known cases is that of Zhao Lianhai 赵连海, the *weiquan* activist who voiced on behalf of parents of children who were victims in the melamine-tainted milk scandal of 2008, who was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment in November 2010 on this charge. The charge was criticized by Dui Hua Foundation (中美对话基金会), the San Francisco-based human rights organization that focuses on detainees in Chinese prisons, in 2011, as a nebulously defined “pocket crime” charge into which “anything can be stuffed”, shortly after a change in the law doubling the possible length of imprisonment or allowing even a 10-year jail sentence upon conviction.24
More recent targets of the law include Guangdong Province lawyer Wang Quanping 王全平 who is under detention since April 2014 under the charge after staging a protest with satirizing slogans on his car regarding Chinese officials’ resistance to public disclosure of their assets, Shenzhen 深圳 labour activist Lin Dong 林东 who is being held since late April on the same charge after attempting to advise workers striking at a Nike and Adidas supplier in Dongguan 东莞, and Pu Zhiqiang 濮志強 (the lawyer who previously represented artist activist Ai Weiwei) who is now being detained under the charge since taken way on 6th May 2014 after a holding a meeting with a group of activists to discuss the June Fourth massacre just weeks before this year’s 25th anniversary of the bloody crackdown. Xu Zhiyong as well as formerly Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚 were charged instead under Article 291 – Xu for “gathering a crowd to disrupt public order” and Chen for “gathering a crowd to disturb traffic order” – which together with Article 293 are part of what more generally referred to as the “disturbing social order” charges under articles 290-293 of the amended Criminal Law.25

2.3. The Judicial System and Its Implication Domestic and Foreign

“Absurd court verdicts will not be able to hinder the trend of human progress; the pall of Communist authoritarianism is destined to disperse; the sunshine of freedom and justice will illuminate every corner of China!”26 yelled a defiant Xu Zhiyong, upon the high court’s upholding on 11th April 2014 of a lower court’s verdict of his imprisonment, Ironically, on 26th May 2014, just as the year’s 25th anniversary of the June Fourth massacre is approaching, the Chinese government published its white paper on the “Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2013” (2013 年中国人权事业的进展) which declares that free speech is prevailing in China. The white paper introduces China’s achievement in human rights from nine perspectives – right to development, to social security, to democracy, to free speech, personal rights, ethnic minority rights, rights of the disabled, environmental rights and China’s international cooperation and interaction in the human rights domain, and proudly emphasizes that “there is no best in human rights matters, only better”. According to the white paper, China is doing her best in
promoting and protecting her citizens’ freedom of expression, and free speech is widespread in the Chinese society and being effectively realized in protecting the people’s ability to supervise the government. Just shortly before this, human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was arrested by Beijing’s police on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” after he attended a family gathering commemorating the 25th anniversary of the June Fourth massacre.

For anyone who still has any illusion about China’s judicial system, the following person accounts would bring one back to reality. WeiQuan lawyer Teng Biao in his article on China’s legal system published in the 19th-25th October 2012 special issue of the New Statesman guest edited by Ai Weiwei (China and its future, published on 18th October 2012 in collaboration with Lisson Gallery, United Kingdom) relates how he was physically carried and thrown out of court for questioning the legal foundation of suppressing Falungong in his defense of a Falungong family, and was kidnapped and tortured by special police in charge of thought surveillance after he joined other lawyers in pushing for democratic elections in the Beijing Lawyers Association. Almost all lawyer associations in China are government-controlled, and Teng says that the thought police who kidnapped and tortured him often said, “Don’t talk to us about law!” which echoes very much a well-known statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Jiang Yu 姜瑜: “Law is not an excuse!” (法律不是挡箭牌 !) (Teng, 2012: 12-13) This seems to have a familiar ring to it, bringing to mind across the globe in the Venezuela activist’s joke cited in William Dobson’s The dictator’s learning curve (2012) that (the late) President Hugo Chávez ruled through the motto “For my friends, everything, for my enemies, the law.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 5) “Today’s dictators understand that in a globalized world the more brutal forms of intimidation – mass arrests, firing squads, and violent crackdowns – are best replaced with more subtle forms of coercion”, notes Dobson, “Rather than forcibly arrest members of a human rights group, today’s most effective despots deploy tax collectors or health inspectors to shut down dissident groups. Laws are written broadly, then used like a scalpel to target the groups the government deems a threat.”
(ibid.) As is now experienced by the New Citizens’ Movement. As was experienced by the movement’s proscribed predecessor, the Open Constitution Initiative/Gongmeng which was outrageously fined RMB1.46 million yuan\(^3\) on 14th July 2009, and declared “illegal” and shut down on 17th July 2009.

This is a system without judicial independence, in which all important cases have to be directed by the Zhengfawei 政法委 (政法委员会 / Political and Legal Committee of the CCP) which even determines how to convict and sentence, and Party branches are established or Party instructors are appointed into the over 14,000 law firms, according to weiquan lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan 刘晓原 (Liu, 2012: 10). Interestingly, the CCP’s attitude towards the law has also been criticized as having a significant outreach to the despotic regimes in the developing world which find alliance or potential alliance with this biggest dictatorship on the planet a balancing safeguard against Western sanctions over their trampling of human rights, as Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo summarize in the report of their field survey in over 25 countries across the globe on China’s expanding influence among the developing countries that for the overriding political and economic interest of the Party-State, whenever China sees an opportunity, she invariably “chooses to act as an accomplice in these excesses rather than acting as a guardian of the law”, and following from that:

It is not just the fact that China has become the great champion and favourite business partner of the world’s most repressive regimes (Burma, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Cuba), or that its state-owned companies often enjoy carte blanche in their dealings as a result of the dizzying effect of the all-powerful Chinese state. What is just as important is the infiltration and acceptance of Chinese standards and values – which are highly ambiguous when it comes to good business practices or labour, social or environmental issues – throughout Beijing’s sphere of influence [...]

(Cardenal and Araújo, 2011, tr. 2013, 2014: 262)
“Will this new world [anticipated by Martin Jacques] under China’s leadership be a better world? Will it consist of more equal and just societies? Will there be a greater respect for the human rights of the weakest members of society or a fuller awareness of preserving the environment? Will the world be safer and more participative?” – these are the questions Cardenal and Araújo posed for their extensive research project (ibid.: 263). While admitting that a greater temporal perspective is required to provide definitive long-term answers to such research questions and “to determine whether the Chinese model and formula is administering the sickness or the cure”, the authors do not find it optimistic based at the moment on the findings of their impressively extensive research “of the impact which modern-day China is capable of having in places as remote and distant from one another as Russian Siberia and the Congolese province of Katanga in the mining heart of sub-Saharan Africa” (ibid.).

Judging from the trend of the present mode of development and its impact on human rights, social justice and the environment in China, whether one truly believes in the sincerity, political will and capability of the new Xi Jinping 李克强 李克强 administration in cleaning up the mess left by the Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 胡锦涛 decade, the continued upholding of the one-party authoritarian model without judicial independence, which has been rejected as part of the division of powers, in insisting on the political bottom line of “five ‘won’t do’” (wu bu gao 五不搞), and the recent conviction of Xu Zhiyong and others in the New Citizens’ Movement, as well as the continuing crackdown on civil rights lawyers are making it every difficult to question Cardenal and Araújo’s pessimism.

3. Après Nous, le Déluge … Tightening Political Monopoly of a “Degenerative Totalitarian” Polity

In view of the recent crackdown on the New Citizens’ Movement, the continued persecution of pro-democracy activists (including the incarceration of Charter 08 organizer Liu Xiaobo) and civil rights activists and rights defence lawyers, and the followers of the physio-
spiritual Falungong movement and the repressive policy in the ethnic frontier regions, one could not help but feel that it is humanity’s whiff of luck that amidst all these talks of the decline of the West and the advent of a Chinese century, and despite the weaknesses caused by the tussles between consistent, holistic human rights-based foreign policy and realpolitik based on narrower national interests, the leading advanced, dominant powers today in the world still consist of the North Atlantic liberal democracies, not the People’s Republic of China. It would be the harbinger of humanity’s disaster if the world really were to witness the advent of a Chinese century along with a decline of the West, while China remains a repressive one-party authoritarian state maintained through the trampling of her citizens’ civil and political rights as she is today.

3.1. The Rise of China and Decline of the West

The undermining of the trust in North Atlantic liberal democracy by a now dominating authoritarian system that “works better” would lead to the reality that “not only is universal recognition not universally satisfying, but the ability of liberal democratic societies to establish and sustain themselves on a rational basis over the long term is open to some doubt”, as Francis Fukuyama ruminates ominously in *The end of history and the last man* (1992), “Following Aristotle, we might postulate that a society of last men composed entirely of desire and reason would give way to one of bestial first men seeking recognition alone, and vice versa, in an unending oscillation.” (Fukuyama, 1992: 335) At the heart of this is the recognition of the rise of a “non-Western” Asian value and “democracy, Chinese style”, a recognition backed by relativism – relativism not just whose fallacies, as Salman Rushdie warns in *Joseph Anton*, “were at the heart of the invective of the armies of the religious” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 626), but relativism that Fukuyama chillingly foretells would lead to “a future nihilistic war against liberal democracy on the part of those brought up in its bosom”:

Relativism – the doctrine that maintains that all values are merely relative and which attacks all “privileged perspectives” – must
ultimately end up undermining democratic and tolerant values as well. Relativism is not a weapon that can be aimed selectively at the enemies one chooses. It fires indiscriminately, shooting out the legs of not only the “absolutisms,” dogmas, and certainties of the Western tradition, but that tradition’s emphasis on tolerance, diversity, and freedom of thought as well.

(Fukuyama, 1992: 332)

3.2. The “China Model”

To see what the “China Model” is all about, let us take the five points provided by Yu Keping 俞可平, deputy director of CCP’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (中共中央编译局), in his definition of the term, as summarized in Xu (2011: 109-110).

In terms of ownership, China is practicing neither pure public ownership nor thorough privatization, but rather a public economy-led mixed ownership system, according to Yu Keping. In politics, China insists on the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party leadership, is not going for multi-party parliamentary political system and is not going to practice the separation of the three powers (legislative, executive and judicial), and yet China’s is not simple one-party politics, but a unique system of “multi-party cooperation under one-party leadership”. From the ideological perspective, China still insists on Marxism’s leading position in political ideology, but at the same time allows the existence of other streams of thought, within a situation of the co-existence of a single dominant political ideology and pluralistic trends of thought in society. In the domain of military-politics relationship, China has always been practicing the institution of civilian control of the military and not allowing military interference in politics, yet all along been following the principle of putting the gun under the command of the Party (dang zhizhi hui zhi qiang 党指挥枪). In State-society relations, while a relatively independent civil society has already come into existence, China’s civil society is also characterized by being government-led, with most of the civil societal organizations not having the type of autonomy enjoyed by the civil societal organizations in the Western countries. Yu Keping’s five points on the “China Model” basically reflect the Party’s “five
‘won’t do’” (wu bu gao) bottom line which has blocked any meaningful political reform for China: “We won’t do multi-party alternation of governing; we won’t do pluralism in guiding ideology; we won’t do separation of the three powers (legislative, executive, judicial) and bicameralism; we won’t do federalism; we won’t do privatization.”32

3.3. Human Rights or “Humane Authority”?

Yan Xuetong 阎学通, one of China’s most prominent “neocons” (neo-conservatives), or rather “neocomms” (neo-communists), and one of the five candidates from China in the American journal Foreign Policy’s list of the world’s top 100 public intellectuals in 2008, was invited by the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, to give a public lecture entitled “Humane Authority and China’s Sub-Regional Integration” at the university’s Kuala Lumpur main campus on 2nd June 2014. As this was just two days prior to the year’s 25th anniversary of June Fourth, after the public lecture Yan was interviewed by the local television channel NTV7’s reporter who asked him to comment on the issues of June Fourth and China’s human rights situation. Yan explained that there were different types of human rights but the most important thing was that in China, the citizens enjoyed the human right to have a livelihood – “policy that benefits the people is human right” (limin zhengce jiushi renquan 利民政策就是人权). Yan’s meaning is clear: whereas the West talks so much about freedom of speech, of free political choice through multi-party elections, the right to change government by voting – China does not allow all these, but China emphasizes the citizens’ human right to have a livelihood. It is apparent that Yan was just expressing the adamant Party line that the Western notion of human rights should not be made applicable to China which has a completely different set of national conditions (guoqing butong 国情不同).33 Such argument could be seen as for the convenience of legitimizing the continued authoritarian rule of the one-party regime that ruthlessly proscribes freedom of speech and freedom of political choice, but there could also be an ideological basis for it. Causes of social changes can usually be categorized into three groups, viz. the economic, the political and the cultural factors. Economic factors, especially the impacts of industrial
capitalism, form the core of the Marxist approach to social changes. Such Marxist emphasis on economic factors, whether for ideological reasons or for the convenience of power maintenance, still forms the basis of the CCP’s fundamental definition of human rights as the people’s rights to be fed, to be sheltered, to be educated and to be employed. It is upon this ideological foundation that regime-coopted intellectuals could be so confidently singing praises for the Party’s definition of human rights (“with Chinese characteristics”) while providing academic support for the Party’s rule.

What Yan told the reporter about his stance on the human rights issue of China was in fact just a continuation from his view on the universal values like “democracy” and “freedom” he expressed earlier during the public lecture. Yan did not agree with that sort of absolute importance conventionally accorded to concepts like “democracy” and “freedom”. Instead, to Yan, “fairness” would be more important. Again, Yan was just expressing CCP’s stance that the “Western” notions of multi-party competitive electoral democracy and emphasis on individual freedom were not necessary good for China which has her own uniqueness. She could be better ruled by just the unchallenged Communist Party which has rejuvenated itself with the guiding principles of humane authority, yi min wei ben (以民为本) imperative – Hu Jintao’s people-first politics (minben zhangzhi 民本政治) and new Three People’s Principles (新「三民主义」：权为民所用、情为民所系、利为民所谋，i.e. power used for the people, love the people, benefits for the people) and the promotion of a harmonious society (hexie shehui 和谐社会).

3.4. Monopoly over Public Discourse

Whether dealing with existing social inequality or corruption, the CCP State of course has to be the sole discretionary authority for enforcement or public discourse – a point that has been so forcefully demonstrated by the recent crackdown on the New Citizens’ Movement and other civil rights activists (weiquan fenzi 维权份子) whom Yan Xuetong described to the NTV7 reporter as “a bunch of well-to-do people saying that they are defending the rights of the poor people ...” Referring to the 2000-
3000-strong protesters marching in Hong Kong on Sunday (1st June) to commemorate the June Fourth massacre, Yan told the reporter that these were but only 1 per cent of the people. Yan might not be right with the level of discontent among the Hong Kong people, but with China’s very adaptive and inclusionary United Front (tongyi zhanxian/tongzhan 统一战线 / 统战) Work in Hong Kong through the five types of State corporatist measures, including integration, cooptation, collaboration, containment, and denunciation as described by Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam of the University of Hong Kong in their paper “China’s United Front Work in civil society: the case of Hong Kong” (2013), it would really be an increasingly uphill task to safeguard whatever that are left of Hong Kong’s democracy and political freedom from the tightening grip of Beijing. Already, efforts at increasing State monopoly of public discourse is already evident in the dismissal of outspoken newspaper editors and programme hosts and their replacement under pressure from Beijing, a most recent example of which being the case of Ming Pao 明报。Intellectual acceptance of such State attempt at monopolizing public discourse is evident when Yan Xuetong during the public lecture talked about China’s donation of school buses to Macedonia in 2011 which was widely derided by the people in view of the fact that so many of China’s poor school children in the rural areas do not even enjoy proper school building or transport (while some even have to carry their own desks to school). Saying that he could not understand why those people (who criticized the government’s donation of school buses to Macedonia) were so money-minded, Yan quipped: “Beggars have to help beggars too.” Apparently the major problem with such arguments is the befuddlement between the State, an authoritarian one at that, and the civil society, for surely the parents of the poor school children were not the decision-makers on whether or not to donate the school buses. The authoritarian State, controlled by a party which was not elected by the people, was.

Similarly, the strong warnings to the Hong Kong people hardly need to be insinuated in the unprecedented White Paper34 released by the CCP government on 10th June 2014, as stated in item 1 (“The Central Leadership Directly Exercises Jurisdiction over the HKSAR in
According to the Law”) under section II and item 1 (“Fully and Accurately Understanding the Meaning of ‘One Country, Two Systems’”) under section V, again represent an affirmation that it is what Beijing says counts, regardless of what the pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong would like to think:

The NPC Standing Committee has the power of interpretation regarding the Basic Law of the HKSAR, the power of decision on revising the selection methods of the chief executive and the Legislative Council of the HKSAR, the power of supervision over the laws formulated by the legislative organs of the HKSAR, the power of decision on the HKSAR entering a state of emergency, and the power of making new authorization for the HKSAR […] The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the central leadership's authorization. There is no such thing called “residual power.”

Similarly, for the ethnic frontier regions, while official discourses are formulated in such a way as to include the ethnic minorities in the contexts of “national unity” and “development”:

It is only within this overarching framework of national unity that ethnic minorities have been permitted to seek state recognition of their self-defined identity. They are also presented as groups in need of economic development. Believing that economic well-being may ease discontents amongst ethnic groups, Beijing presents itself as a benevolent patron, which unavoidably confines the groups’ developmental choices to the ones formulated by the state. A similar mentality has been exhibited in Beijing’s interaction with the civil society in Hong Kong, with an emphasis on Hong Kong as an economic city and the state as an important source of support and inspiration. While such cultural diversity is built upon hierarchies and formulated from top-down, united front unavoidably alienates and suppresses important aspects of ethnic and native cultures, and
precludes other possibilities of development wanted by the locals from being actualized.

(Lam and Lam, 2013: 322)

3.5. The Chinese “Newspeak”

In *Nineteen Eighty-four* (1949) George Orwell said this about Newspeak, the official language the author created for Oceania, his epitome of totalitarianism:

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, [or English Socialism,] but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought – that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc – should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods.

George Orwell (1949), *Nineteen Eighty-four*, appendix: “The principles of Newspeak”

In the 2011 collection of his works *Wo meiyou diren* 我没有敌人 [I have no enemies], Liu Xiaobo tells us since the 1980s he has rejected the use of phrases like “since the founding of the nation” (*jianguo yilai* 建国以来), “since liberation” (*jiefang yilai* 解放以来) and “new China” (*xin Zhongguo* 新中国) and purportedly replaced them respectively with “after 1949”, “after the Chinese Communist Party took power” and “since China came under the CCP’s rule”. (Liu, 2011: 202-204) The reason is that such “Newspeak” phrases of the PRC have been made popular by repeated indoctrination and have deposited deeply in the masses’ collective memory to endow the CCP with a “heaven’s mandate” for its regime legitimacy.

Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view that the choice of mode of thinking is the choice of way of life implies here that
being used to a style of speech that expresses Party power supremacy and overwhelming gratefulness towards the Party is being used to the reality of messianic autocracy which is in turn being used to a way of life of servitude always in waiting for favours bestowed from above, which then in turn creates fear in the minds of the people for instability, chaos and apocalypse if the savour were to disappear from their lives. *ibid.*: 202) Such is the power of words. Here goes a Party slogan from Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-four*. “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past” (Orwell, 1949, re-pub. 1954: 213) and Newspeak ultimately would be the key to that. To sum up the bleak future, Orwell adds, “We, the Party, control all records, and we control all memories […] reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be the truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party.” *ibid.*: 214) Indeed, it would be impossible to think reality except by thinking through the Newspeak that the Party would eventually rely on for total thought control, and in our case at hand, whether to ensure acceptance of regime legitimacy, to discredit multi-party liberal democracy, to demonize civil rights activists who are disrupting the Party’s benevolent course of action, or to whip up xenophobic patriotism and nationalism to rally the masses around the Party.

Substitute “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” for Orwell’s “Ingsoe, or English Socialism”, Eleanor Roosevelt’s words at the Sorbonne on 28th September 1948 come back to us with a punch under the shadow of the looming Chinese century: “Democracy, freedom, human rights have come to have a definite meaning to the people of the world which we must not allow any nation to so change that they are made synonymous with suppression and dictatorship.” As the Beijing Consensus or the China Model as succinctly explained to us by Yu Keping is gaining converts across a world awestruck by the Chinese success story, suddenly the increasingly forlorn struggle of the Chinese democracy activists and civil rights defenders against the brutal one-
party authoritarianism is no longer a matter of concern for one single country but begins to take on the mantle of an epic struggle of global proportions for the future of human dignity, freedom, political rights and civil liberties.

Xu (2011) indeed analogizes Yu Keping’s expression of the China Model to Orwell’s Newspeak. Intrinsically the Model is just an upgraded version of Chen Yun 陈云’s “birdcage” theory, with the Party and country being the birdcage, and market economy, civil society and value diversity the birds in the cage. Nevertheless, like Orwell’s Newspeak, the apparent contradictions that stand out in Yu’s expression are giving the impression that they no longer constitute China’s worries, but sources of strength (Xu, 2011: 110).

### 3.6. “Democracy”, Chinese Style, and All Is Forgiven

Would Asian values, “democracy, Chinese style” (or rather “democracy”, Chinese style) that CCP is touting be coming gun-blazing with the advent of a Chinese century? Officially, the CCP has never come up with a blueprint for “democracy, Chinese style”. However, there is no lack of PRC’s individual academics who have attempted to introduce their respective visions of this.

As an example, Zhou Zhifa 周志发, an associate research fellow at the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, in his book *Rongcuoxing minzhu: Zhongguo tese minzhu lilun yanjiu* [mistake-tolerant democracy: a theoretical study on democracy with Chinese characteristics] (2013) 38, introduces his theory of “rongcuoxing minzhu” (literally “democracy that tolerates mistakes”):

The core idea [of “mistake-tolerant democracy”) is “entrusting the right of trial and error (shicuoquan 试错权) via elections; protecting political élites’ right of trial and error and obligation to carry out criticism and self-criticism and rectification of errors”. This has nothing to do with whether there is alternate party governance – which means that it is a democratization process suitable even for a “no-party system” or “one-party leadership system”, inclusive of and going beyond the Western model of democratization […] China is a “new-model democratizing country”. After experiencing over 30
years of reform and open-door policy, China has successfully explored and found a path of democratization with Chinese characteristics, i.e. the path of “democratization under one-party leadership”, and not a democratization model of multi-party competition [...] The theory of “mistake-tolerant democracy” is more universally appropriate than liberal democracy as the scientific method of trial and error is universally appropriate [...] “Open self-criticism” is a good practice of the Chinese Communist Party; it also formed the core of Confucius’ thought on ethics.

(Zhou, 2013: 137; my translation)

According to Zhou who labels himself a fighter against Western liberal democracy (ibid., postscript, p. 174), this theory of “democratization under one-party leadership” (ibid.: 138) should be the future system of democracy for the world to replace the Western liberal democracy which has proven not to be universally suitable, to have failed in the developing countries, and to have even been questioned in the Western countries themselves.

Zhou places his “mistake-tolerant democracy” as part of the greater work of Chinese scholars in constructing theories of “democracy with Chinese characteristics”, including Peng Zongchao 彭宗超’s “heheshi shehuizhuyi minzhu 和合式社会主义民主” (harmonious model of socialist democracy) proposed in 2010 and Lin Shangli 林尚立 and Xiao Cunliang 小存良’s concept of “fuhe minzhu 复合民主” (composite democracy) introduced in 2011 which is based on the two pragmatic paths of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the people as the masters of their own country (ibid.: 136). Interestingly, presaging the later discussion on the Confucius Institutes in this article, Zhou’s exposition of his new “mistake-tolerant democracy” contribution to this stream of attempts at theoretical rationalization of “Chinese-style democracy under the one-party leadership of the CCP” being superior to Western liberal democracy, at least for the “Third World” developing countries that China the rising “Third World” superpower is supposed to lead and be a role model for, was given in 2011 to the academics and students in interaction at République du Cameroun’s Université de Yaoundé II, mainly at its Confucius Institute. Indeed, summing up his
visit to Université de Yaoundé II and its Confucius Institute and his student’s one year there as language teacher “with the additional mission of disseminating ‘mistake-tolerant democracy’” (ibid., postscript, p. 176), Zhou expressed the initial fulfillment of his aspiration: using this indigenously Chinese “mistake-tolerant democracy” theory of democratization under CCP’s one-party leadership (as against Western multi-party liberal democracy), i.e. from the Chinese perspective, to reflect upon the development of African politics; to provide the Confucius Institute’s vocational programme with theoretical backing, i.e. to enable the Confucius Institute to disseminate, on top of its foundation of Chinese language-teaching, a new value system in the form of this new theory of CCP’s one-party-led democracy with Chinese characteristics (as an antithesis of Western multi-party liberal democracy), which would in turn serve to enhance China’s soft power abroad (ibid.: 177):

There is a premise for China’s political institutional reform, i.e. it must insist on following the four cardinal principles, with its core being the insistence on Chinese Communist Party leadership. As “democracy with one-party leadership under socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi yi dang lingdao de minzhu 中国特色社会主义一党的领导的民主) is the intrinsic requirement of the four cardinal principles, the construction of a new theory of democracy in defence of “democracy with one-party leadership under socialism with Chinese characteristics” is presently a theoretical matter of great importance, and forms the backdrop against which this theory of “mistake-tolerant democracy” is proposed. “Mistake-tolerant democracy” is interlinked with Lenin’s and Mao Zedong’s thoughts on Party construction, the gradualist trial-and-error principle of “crossing the river by groping the stones” (mo zhe shituou guo he 摸着石头过河) proposed and promoted by Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, and the “mistake-tolerant mechanism” established by Hu Jintao. Its core is “entrusting the right of trial and error (shicuoquan) via elections; protecting political élites’ right of trial and error and obligation to carry out criticism and self-criticism and rectification of errors”. It has nothing to do with whether there is alternate party governance, which means that other than the two-party
or multi-party competitive democratization model promoted by the Western countries there exists a new model of “no-party system or one-party leadership” democratization model.

(Zhou, 2013: 113; my translation)

Referring to Lenin’s and Mao Zedong 毛泽东’s thoughts, Zhou stressed that the Chinese Communist Party has the obligation to “criticize and self-criticize, and rectify errors”, and hence it also has to have the “right of trial and error”; otherwise, the Party would only have obligations without rights. One could infer that Zhou’s “mistake-tolerant democracy” would include tolerating CCP’s past errors that consume millions of human lives (the Great Leap Forward) and that subject million others of China’s citizens to unspeakable brutality and murder (party purges, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, June Fourth massacre, the continuing persecution of democracy and civil rights activists) as all these could be justified by the Party’s “right of trial and error”, and the same Party that has now been reborn into a creator of economic miracles should have the inalienable right to continue its self-defined natural mandate to be the sole political party to rule while crushing any attempts by its citizens at forming an alternate party that would challenge its political monopoly, and denying the country’s citizens the right to free choice of governing party through multi-party elections. At this point, one cannot help but be reminded of the exiled former “general commander” of 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations Chai Ling 柴玲’s declaration that she had forgiven Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 and Li Peng 李鹏, as well as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), who were held to be responsible for the massacre, following her embrace of the Christian faith in recent years.39

Anyway, according to Zhou’s reasoning (ibid.: 113), China’s human rights situation and priorities are what Western human rights organizations could not understand. This is of course in line with CCP’s adamant argument which we have seen expressed earlier by Professor Yan Xuetong.

International Journal of China Studies 5(2) ● 2014
3.7. The “Right to Harmony” and the “Beijing Consensus”

Moreover, Professor Xu Xianming 徐显明, president of the China University of Political Science and Law (中国政法大学) posited in 2005 the *hexiequan* (和谐权, i.e. “harmony rights”, apparently in line with the official “construction of a harmonious society” policy of the CCP) which according him is to “supersede the earlier three generations of human rights (i.e. rights of freedom, rights of survival and rights of development)”⁴⁰. This new “harmonious society” model is what makes the “Beijing Consensus” so attractive to many developing countries, a magic formula built “on the one hand, the interventionism of an omnipresent state in its economy and society; and, on the other hand, a fierce degree of political control which includes the submission of the state powers – as well as the media – to the one party which holds a monopoly on power without having to be accountable to anyone” with an efficiency which Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo caution in the epilogue of the captivating report of their field survey in over 25 countries concerning China’s expanding influence across the planet that while “grossly described as ‘harmonious’ by the propaganda machine, offers many countries a shortcut to development at a very high price, paid for by the people left behind”, and yet:

This Chinese pragmatism has clearly triumphed in the developing world. In emerging nations which are characterized by civil liberties and the division of power, the local political elites show signs of giving in under the pressure of the excitement caused by China’s arrival. On the other hand, this formula is particularly attractive to despotic regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, whose shady alliances with the biggest dictatorship on the planet help them keep their heads above water.

(Cardenal and Araújo, 2011, tr. 2013, 2014: 262)

This is against a backdrop of rising strength of the decolonized non-Western civilizations and a perceived decline of the West as Samuel Huntington describes in *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (1996):

*LICS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)*
Western values and institutions have appealed to people from other cultures because they were seen as the source of Western power and wealth [...] As Western power declines, the ability of the West to impose Western concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy on other civilizations also declines and so does the attractiveness of those values to other civilizations [...] When non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, they invoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism, democracy, and independence to justify their opposition to Western domination. Now that they are no longer weak but increasingly powerful, they do not hesitate to attack those same values which they previously used to promote their interests.

(Huntington, 1996: 92-93)

Or redefine these “Western” values into something, may it be socialism or democracy or human rights, “with Chinese characteristics”. Here lies the danger that is beyond China, bigger than China.

Domestically, China’s very adaptive and pragmatic brand of State corporatism provides a tested and workable model for the despots or authoritarian regimes among the developing countries – ranging from the more heavy-handed policy of assimilation in the ethnic regions of this largest dictatorship in the world to a more inclusionary version through integration, cooptation, collaboration, containment, and denunciation in the case of the post-Handover Hong Kong, as highlighted by Lam and Lam (2013: 322-323), which include both hard and soft tactic depending on whether the targets are considered as friends, valuable potential cooptees or enemies of Beijing (as depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 10 in the introductory article of this special issue, p. 234), combined with ideological indoctrination from preaching consensus, harmony and patriotism to the reinterpretation of political ideas – a Chinese Orwellian “Newspeak” – to be conducive to cultivating obedience.

3.8. Bonapartism and the New Dictablanda

On the other hand, in its relationship with the civil society or at least some parts of the civil society such as the business classes, with the carrot-and-stick approach to maintain its survival, the once-brutal-
dictatorship-turned-benevolent-*dictablanda* (à la O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986)\(^4\) has managed to preserve the status quo of its own rule as well as the interests of the “other power-holders” by both selling the credit it claimed for the country’s economic miracle (ironically on behalf of the industrious, enterprising and persevering masses whose newly freed entrepreneurial spirit, long-recognized in the communities of their brethren worldwide, resulted from the Party’s repudiation of the Maoist policies, has doubtlessly led to the country’s economic success during the economic reform decades since 1979), as well as extracting the support of these “other power-holders” who are willing to abdicate their opportunity to rule in exchange for other kinds of protection by the ensuing strong State run by the present regime (Stepan, 1985), in a faute de mieux deal much akin to Karl Marx’s description of the Bonapartist regime in “Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon” (1852).

Marx’s classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy rests mainly in the sharing of common interests between the State and the dominant group, which in the case of contemporary China, the ruling CCP regime and the dominant social élite and groups whose inability to overcome the present State’s monopoly of violence to force a regime change has given the Party-State the opportunity to use the leverage gained both to preserve the status quo and to propound its claim as the protector of stability and prosperity in exchange for the acceptance of its legitimacy. This is because even when “a government’s use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that the government’s other services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence” (Tilly, 1985: 172), though it could turn out to be a Faustian bargain that some of these social élite and interest groups might one day live to rue, for as American inventor and statesman Benjamin Franklin warned, “They who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”\(^42\) Meanwhile, Beijing’s United Front Work, as Lam and Lam (2013: 322-323) observe in the case of Hong Kong as in the ethnic frontier regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, with parallel soft and hard tactics mentioned earlier through the expansion of its agents for State corporatism has in a divide-and-rule manner “resulted in further

*LCS* Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)
politicization and polarization of the civil society, and transformed the tension between the state and the local groups into clashes between different local groups”.

4. Smart Power-Backed Assault on the Notion of Liberal Democracy

Yet, on the ideological, conceptual level, lies an even great danger of such smart power-backed crafty befuddlement to aid authoritarianism’s assault on the core values of liberal democracy, as quoted earlier Eleanor Roosevelt’s grave warning while speaking at the Sorbonne in 1948. Here lies the global danger of the advent of a Chinese century with the present political system of CCP’s one-party monopoly intact.

Commenting on Joseph Nye’s arguments on “soft power”, Samuel Huntington ruminated in *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (1996) on what makes a country’s culture and ideology attractive so much so that others will be more willing to follow her leadership:

They become attractive when they are seen as rooted in material success and influence. Soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other people and greatly increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military, and political success. As non-Western societies enhance their economic, military, and political capacity, they increasingly trumpet the virtues of their own values, institutions, and culture.

(Huntington, 1996: 92)

The remarkable growth in China’s military budget in recent years would serve to reflect such a mentality on the part of an emerging superpower (see Table 1 for a comparison of the growth of military expenditure budgets of China, United States of America and Japan in 2013)43.
Table 1 Comparison of Military Expenditure Budget Growth/Decline: China, USA and Japan, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget (US$ billion)</th>
<th>Increase (+)/decrease (−) from previous year (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>118.8</td>
<td>+10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>631.0</td>
<td>−13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>−9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 China’s Key Economic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate (%)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate (%)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (US$ billion)</td>
<td>2,134</td>
<td>2,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (US$ billion)</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>1,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate (RMB yuan equivalent to 1 US dollar)</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>6.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data represent forecast figures.
Source: Liu (2014: 115), Table 3; data from EIU databank.
### Table 3 China’s Economic Achievements by 2012 in Comparison with Selected Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Rank in the World</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>US$2.049 trillion</td>
<td>1st (11.2%)</td>
<td>USA (2): US$1.547 trillion&lt;br&gt;Germany (3): US$1.407 trillion&lt;br&gt;Japan (4): US$0.799 trillion&lt;br&gt;Taiwan (17): US$0.301 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign (inbound) investment</td>
<td>US$121.1 billion</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1st among developing nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External (outbound) investment</td>
<td>US$84.2 billion</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1st among developing nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Liu (2014: 111-112), Table 1; data from EIU databank.
4.1. Nationalism and Patriotism in Service of a Resilient Authoritarian State: Foreign Policy Manifestation since Tiananmen

Liu Xiaobo in Daguo chenlun 大國沉淪 [great nation drowning] (2009) sees the present wave of rising nationalistic daguo jueqi (大國崛起 – the rise of a great nation) sentiments that the CCP is riding on as not simply a result of CCP’s ideological indoctrination but rather rooted in the traditional Great Han-ism and the egocentrism of tianxia 天下 (“under the heaven”) mentality (Liu, 2009: 201-202) which was related to the worldview of “普天之下，莫非王土，率土之濱，莫非王臣” (“all land under the heaven belongs to the Emperor and all people on the land extending to the coast are subjects of the Emperor”, from the classic Tso Chuan 44 左傳 compiled ca. 389 BC). With today’s newly revived pride coming with rising economic and military strength, the CCP has effectively exploited and promoted a new mix of patriotism-induced nationalism to mobilize loyal support for the Party-State. The intelligentsia and masses have responded well – witness the continuing great success of the sedulously crafted films and television series on China’s past great emperors that coated brutality and despotism with beautiful set, scenery and choreography, intoxicating audience with the prime sense of national greatness by pushing the judgment of social justice and the masses’ freedom and dignity into negligible importance (ibid.: 203-204). A good example could be found in the message conveyed by celebrated director Zhang Yimou 張艺谋’s star-studded, national-unity-is-all-that-counts epic film Yingxiong 英雄 (Hero) – in a medley of what Liu calls “beautiful feeling of a flourishing age of prosperity” (shengshi meigan 盛世美感) and “aesthetics of despotism” (baojun meixue 暴君美學), reflecting the great efforts of the members of a subservient intelligentsia to ingratiate themselves with the authorities by extolling the present with analogies from the past and falling in line with the current trend of State-directed public discourse.

If June Fourth was seen to have shown the vulnerability of CCP’s authoritarian power, the post-June Fourth combination of economic miracle – world’s number 2 in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), with strong key economic indicators (see Table 2 and Table 3) – and nationalistic, assertive foreign policy (backed of course by economic

*LICS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)*
strength) has been working really well in rallying support for and lending legitimacy to China’s unelected ruling Communist Party.

Just as class hatred was efficiently employed by Mao Zedong in bringing about the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to obliterate his opponents, climaxing in unspeakable brutality including cannibalism\textsuperscript{45}, maintaining popular hatred towards China’s World War II aggressor, Japan, and backing her “historical” claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea with unabashed assertiveness and new military muscles have combined into a new tool for Chinese Communist Party to re-channel the social discontents outward and project itself as the upholder of national pride and dignity. What looks like a complete reversal of Mao Zedong’s open tactic of using Japanese invasion of China to weaken the Kuomintang 國民黨 (KMT)\textsuperscript{46} in order to enhance the strength of the Red Army (“Patriotism is to let the Japanese occupy more land”)\textsuperscript{47} to the extent of purging leftist intellectuals who advocated strong resistance against Japanese invasion is in close scrutiny perfectly consistent with the CCP’s paramount interest in its quest for political dominance.

4.2. The “Hard” Component of “Smart Power” and Nationalistic Pride as a Tool of Regime Maintenance

Former US State Secretary Henry Kissinger recently warned that with the increasing tension between China and Japan, the phantom of war is again hovering over East Asia. The increasing nationalistic rhetoric by Chinese leaders especially with the rise of the younger leaders like Xi Jinping could be steering the country into a course of direct collision with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new “strong Japan” flambeau which in turn represents the stepping up of provocativeness from the “beautiful Japan” slogan during the same Abe’s earlier 2007 administration. Abe himself has, in his address at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in January 2014, suggested the analogy between the present Sino-Japanese tension and the Anglo-German relations on the eve of the eruption of the First World War (see Table 4)\textsuperscript{48}.

\textit{International Journal of China Studies 5(2) • 2014}
Table 4 Comparison of Anglo-German relations on the Eve of World War I and Sino-Japanese Relations at Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anglo-German relations on the eve of World War I</th>
<th>Sino-Japanese relations at present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall situation</td>
<td>Britain, France and Russia together confronting the rise of Germany in Europe</td>
<td>USA and Japan together confronting the rise of China in East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of conflict</td>
<td>The Balkan Peninsula</td>
<td>Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>German nationalism vs. Slavic nationalism</td>
<td>Chinese rejuvenation vs. a &quot;strong Japan&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>Colonial expansion</td>
<td>Expansion of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military strength</td>
<td>Strengthening British and German naval forces</td>
<td>Strengthening Chinese and Japanese naval forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 China’s Defence Expenditure Budget, 2004-2013

![China's Defence Expenditure Budget, 2004-2013](image-url)
**Figure 2** China’s Defence Expenditure and GDP Growth Rates, 2000-2014

![Graph showing annual growth rates of defence expenditure and GDP from 2000 to 2014.](image)

Note: Defence expenditure growth rate is by comparing current year budget with previous year’s actual expenditure. Source: Tao (2014: 98, 102), Figure 1, Appendix Table 1.

On the other hand, the steep rise in national defence expenditure is also reminiscent of the “arms race” just before the First World War. According to Oxford University professor Margaret MacMillan, in view of China’s increasing her defence expenditure (see Figure 1, Table 5 and Figure 2), a comparison can be made between today’s Sino-American
relations and Anglo-German relations a century ago. In 1900, the strength of the British navy compared to Germany’s gave a ratio of 3.7:1. By 1914, the year when the First World War began, Germany had closed the gap, turning the ratio to just 2.1:1. China increased her defence expenditure by 10.7 per cent from 2012 to 2013’s 740.6 billion yuan (renminbi) or US$139.2 billion.49 According Jane’s Defence Weekly’s latest report, while the Western countries were drastically cutting military spending in recent years, China’s military expenditure has continued to rise and is estimated to reach the range of US$130-$150 billion in 2014 and expected by 2015 to supersede those of Britain, Germany and France combined and by 2024 to surpass the combined total military spending of Europe.50 According to The Military Balance 2014 report released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, on 5th February 2014, China’s defence expenditure could be chasing up to that of the USA by the 2030s if her present economic growth rate could be maintained. The world’s highest absolute defence expenditure growth in 2013 was seen in East Asia, and China’s present defence spending is roughly three times that of India (see Table 5) and higher than the combined figure of the other East Asian countries of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.51

Table 5 Comparison of Military Expenditure of USA, China, Russia, Japan and India, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Expenditure (US$ billion)</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>496.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China*</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *China’s military expenditure of RMB808.23 billion yuan is roughly equal to US$132 billion.
Source: Tao (2014: 99), Table 1.
### Table 6 Comparison of China’s Foreign Policy Strategies Past and Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>2010s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlarging coalition</td>
<td>USA, Japan</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main countries of visit</td>
<td>Non-Communist countries</td>
<td>Central Asia, Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy to disunite</td>
<td>Driving a wedge between Russia and India</td>
<td>Sowing discord between Japan and South Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7 Protests against the Controversial China Passports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protesting countries</th>
<th>Controversial map in China’s new passports</th>
<th>Protest action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (Republic of China)</td>
<td>Printed tourist resort of the Sun Moon Lake (日月潭) in Taiwan</td>
<td>Not accepting Taiwan being a part of the People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>Printed China’s disputed sovereignty claim over territories in West Philippine Sea/South China Sea</td>
<td>Refusing to chop visa on the China passports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Printed China’s disputed sovereignty claim over territories in Biên Đông (East Vietnam Sea)/South China Sea</td>
<td>Issuing visa on a separate sheet of paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Printed China’s disputed sovereignty claim over territories at the India-China border</td>
<td>New visa page totally covering up the controversial passport page</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Liu (2013: 14), Table 4.
Clear changes can be observed in China’s South China Sea policy over the past few decades (see Table 6), from Deng Xiaoping’s “yi lin wei ban, yu lin wei shan” (to be partner of neighbours and do good to neighbours) foreign policy strategy towards the Southeast Asian countries and the suggestion of the principle of “gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa” (to put aside the sovereignty conflicts and concentrate on joint resource development) which were continued to be practiced by Jiang Zemin and then Hu Jintao, to the assertive, unambiguous and non-compromising declaration of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and South China Sea of the Xi Jinping administration (Liu, 2013: 14). Such new territorial assertiveness was even reflected in the inclusion of China’s map comprising the disputed territories in the China passports. This action has provoked severe protests from the countries which are also claimants of the disputed territories (see Table 7), as there have been precedents of the International Court of Justice taking “admission by silence” as recognizing territorial transfer in decisions on territorial disputes (ibid).

Given China’s increasing military aggressiveness in the South China Sea against Vietnam and the Philippines, which is getting worse during the first half of 2014 (backed by her “historical” claim to over 80 per cent of the Sea which is flying in the face of the international law of the sea) and with that infamous nine-dash-line boundary (see Figure 3) – though not created but inherited by the PRC from the pre-1949 Republic of China (ROC) – not only demarcating a wide area of ownership directly overlapping with the ASEAN claimants’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in accord with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) but in fact extending to the doorsteps of neighbouring countries, it is truly not easy for her neighbours to accept without doubt her repeating claim of a “peaceful rise” or even “peaceful development”.

Take the case of Malaysia or Indonesia which unlike Vietnam and the Philippines has tended to play down their maritime disputes with China. On 26th January 2014 a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) flotilla comprising three ships – an amphibious landing craft and two
Figure 3 China’s Official Nine-Dash-Line Map of South China Sea


destroyers – patrolled the James Shoal which is just about eighty kilometers off the Malaysian state of Sarawak on the Borneo island. While in this area which Beijing counts as the southernmost part of its territory, the soldiers on board the Chinese ships conducted an oath-taking ceremony vowing to safeguard the sovereignty and maritime interests of China. This is the second time in two years Chinese warships have appeared at James Shoal to declare China’s sovereignty. Even Indonesia which has been distinctive among the maritime ASEAN countries for her non-involvement in the South China Sea disputes with China seems to be getting tougher, with talks of taking more assertive
legal and military actions, against China’s inclusion of Indonesia’s energy resource-rich Natuna islands within the former’s notorious nine-dash-line claim area.56

Back by economic strength, China’s present foreign policy strategies under the Xi Jinping administration seem to hark back to the Maoist era. The over-generalization of the concept of liyi zhi bang 禮儀之邦 (“land of ceremony and propriety”) by those who see China from the perspective of “Cultural China” (Wenhua Zhongguo 文化中國) into the implication that China has always been a gentlemanly country promoting peace and respect towards others is simply a myth. From ancient time to the modern era, the imperial courts’ unending wars of conquest of “barbarian” (manyi 萬夷) lands and frontier regions, the wars between fiefdoms, the palace struggles, and the post-World War II civil war and Mao’s bloodcurdling purges and political campaigns altogether make a millennia-long record of mass murders, genocides, massacres, unimaginable tortures and all forms of extreme human cruelty.

Indeed, here in this East Asian landmass, the blood-soaked history of the CCP since the bloody purges of the so-called “AB” (“anti-Bolshevik”) League of the 1930s in the Chinese Soviet regions that claimed the lives of more than a hundred thousand people had continued throughout its reign (Gao, 1999; Hu, 2012) – the inhuman violence that typically accompanied the rise of the Communist Party to power whether in the former Soviet Union or China. For instance, according to a Party History Publishing House (中共党史出版社) publication, by the end of the 1950-1953 “Movement to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries” (镇压反革命运动), over 2.4 million “bandits” were liquidated, 1.27 million “counterrevolutionaries” were incarcerated, 230 thousand brought under surveillance and 710 thousand killed (Bai, 2006, repr. 2008: 494). However, placing these in the proper perspective, they are but minor incidents throughout the millennia-long blood-soaked history of the Chinese dynasties – may they be through State brutality, suppression of peasant revolts, pacification of the frontiers, conquests for the imperial realm, or even palace purges. So much for a “land of ceremony and propriety”.

LICS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)
In terms of regional foreign relations, somehow contrary to what Professor Yan Xuetong described as “zunxun wangdao” (遵循王道, i.e. following the way of a (benevolent) king) in his 2nd June 2014 public lecture57 referred to earlier, a prominent Vietnamese academic at a seminar organized by the same institute once summed up China’s behaviour in foreign policy as “da guo bu ren 大國不仁” (“heartlessness of a huge country”). “How could one use a simple term of ‘ren’ (仁, “benevolence”) in the Confucian tradition to cover up the blood-soaked history of the internal strife of China?” asks Dr Liu Xiaobo in Xiang liangxin shuohuang de minzu 向良心說謊的民族 [a nation that lies to its conscience] (2002), “Even the history of the very term ‘ren’ (仁) is also a history of ‘chiren’ (吃人, man-eating [lijiao 禮教 58]) that Lu Xun ( 魯迅) referred to.” (Liu, 2002: 117).

Hence, under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand the Southeast Asian countries’ wariness with regard to China’s apparent hegemonic intentions over the South China Sea waters which are at their doorsteps. In response to Professor Robert Beckman and Professor Clive Schofield’s recent suggestion that China should depict the outer limit of her EEZ claims from the islands over which it claims sovereignty so as to create an area of overlapping claims in the middle of the South China Sea where the claimant States could move towards joint development pending a final agreement on maritime boundaries, Professor Raul Pedrozo (Captain, USN, Ret.) assigned to the International Law Department at the US Naval War College in an article posted in February 2014 presented several reasons against the proposal which he said “will allow Beijing to further advance its salami-slicing strategy in the South China Sea at the expense of the other claimants.”59 First of all, he challenged China’s claim to the South China Sea islands other than the Pratas Island based on the fact that the Paracels and Spratlys were both French territories until the Japanese invasion during the Second World War; thereafter the island groups were returned to France after the Second World War and then acquired by South Vietnam after the Franco-Indochina War and inherited by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Most importantly, Pedrozo doubted that China would ever live up to her obligations under UNCLOS. This is
apparent from China’s non-compliance with her commitments under the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DOC) despite her signing up to it, as well illustrated by the incidents of Viking II ramming and Binh Minh 02 cable-cutting, and of Reed Bank and Scarborough Shoal; the establishment of Sansha 三沙 City; the implementation of the Hainan maritime security and new fisheries regulations; the recent naval patrols to the James Shoal, and the most recent ship ramming in May 2014 provoked by China’s building an oil rig in the area of dispute which led to lethal anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam. Both for real geostrategic considerations and to feed the rising tide of domestic nationalism, upholding dubious historical claims of sovereignty would have to take precedence over international law, while each of these acts “designed to alter the status quo through unlawful intimidation” is bringing China one step closer to achieving de facto total control over the South China Sea in complete defiance of the outcries from her Southeast Asian neighbours – all the more so when, as Ernie Bower, a Southeast Asia specialist at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, put it, “the Chinese are drawing the conclusion that these guys are not ready for prime time.”

4.3. The Dangerous Trap of Nationalism in the Struggle for Democracy

Hence, one of the most significant development of the post-Tiananmen CCP was its rediscovery of the usefulness of nationalism in strengthening citizens’ loyalty to the ruling Party and the country in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the demise of Communist Party rule in most other parts of the world, leading to its embrace both by the intellectuals who have produced countless books and essays in rousing ovation for such nationalism and the wider masses who made books with titles like “China can say ‘No’” instant best-sellers in the country. Such a phenomenon is accompanied by the inexplicable reemergence of Mao-latrie – the veneration, the hero-worship of the one person in recent Chinese history who caused such unparalleled level of human misery with crimes against humanity through murderous purges and blood-curdling political persecution, and man-made famine through
whimsical economic policies that led even to widespread cannibalism.

In contrast to the rising Chinese nationalism in the early 20th Century whose main contents – like those reemerged in the Tiananmen student movement in 1989 – circled around the resentment against government corruption and the aspiration for a clean and able government, today’s new government-promoted nationalism in China is in support of and serving to strengthen the governing legitimacy of the present unelected ruling party and the authority of the present political institution that outlaws any attempt in electoral challenge to the CCP, while abiding by CCP’s rhetoric in emphasizing the importance of political stability rather than political change. Whereas in the early days of the modern era, as Day (2012: 37) observes, with the Chinese State and society still in a way exist in separation, democracy followed the development of nationalism, leading to the establishment of Asia’s first republic from the ruins of the Manchu monarchy in the early 20th Century, denying a separate existence of society from the political State run in monopoly by today’s increasingly catch-all Communist Party, the present wave of State-promoted, mass-inciting nationalism has not only been contributing nothing to democratic reform, but instead has been intensifying bitter xenophobic behaviour in the realm of foreign affairs, especially in the form of hate-filled anti-Japanese and anti-American nationalistic sentiments. “The survival of democracy depends on the ability of large numbers of people to make realistic choices in the light of adequate information”, Aldous Leonard Huxley tells us in *Brave new world revisited* (1959), “A dictatorship, on the other hand, maintains itself by censoring or distorting the facts, and by appealing, not to reason, not to enlightened self-interest, but to passion and prejudice, to the powerful ‘hidden forces’, as Hitler called them, present in the unconscious depths of every human mind.”63 Day gives the textbook example of the aftermath of the (allegedly accidental) bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American bombers, and cites Japanese China expert Miyazaki Masahiro 宮崎正弘 commenting on the extreme anti-American actions by demonstrators in China that amidst such an atmosphere of incited fanatic nationalistic outburst, anyone who are trying to constrain or neutralize the situation would themselves become
victims of attack by those around them (Day, 2012: 38).

As Deng Xiaoping told visiting former US president Richard Nixon just after the June Fourth 1989 Beijing massacre while calls for sanction was brewing, “Please tell President Bush … even if it takes a hundred years, the Chinese people will never beg to have the sanctions lifted. If China would not respect itself, China can’t stand firm and there won’t be national dignity. It’s a very big issue, and any Chinese leader who commits error on this issue would definitely fall from power. The Chinese people will not forgive him. I’m telling the truth.” Here goes the war cry of the new nationalists: “Don’t think that Chinese youths will thank America for imposing sanction on China. You can’t separate the individual from the nation. When you hurt the Chinese government, you hurt the Chinese people.” In the befuddled realm of the CCP State = China = Chinese people cognition, questioning the CCP State’s policy actions is logically equated to insulting the Chinese people and hurting Chinese nationalistic feeling. Nationalism in such context represents a “single-edged venomous sword”, in the opinion of Liu Xiaobo expressed in Dan ren du jian: Zhongguo minzuzhuyi pipan 戰人獨立：中國民族主義批判 [single-edged venomous sword: a critique of Chinese nationalism] (2006).

Especially in the post-colonial, post-Cold War era, the roar of nationalism tends to become the last refuge for authoritarian regimes against the global march of human rights-, political choice-respecting liberal democracy, a rediscovered ideological instrument to crush any challenge to the ruling party’s political monopoly (Liu, 2006, “Introduction”, p. i). Increasingly adept in handling such nationalistic sentiments, observes Day (2012: 39-41), the CCP State is able to summon them up whenever they should be useful for dealing with foreign relations while avoiding them from turning into a threat to the regime itself. Day gives the examples, among others, of the mass nationalistic paroxysms of rage following respectively the mid-air collision between a United States Navy EP-3E ARIES II signals intelligence aircraft and a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) J-8III interceptor fighter jet near the Chinese island province of Hainan in 2001, and the Chinese actress Zhao Wei 赵薇’s photo shoot, also in

LICS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)
2001, for a fashion magazine wearing a dress featuring the Japanese "rising sun" military flag, culminating in her being splashed with human waste while performing on stage at the end of the year. Such outbursts represent the manifestations of the frightening nationalistic sentiments whipped up by the State to project the image that the CCP is presently the great torchbearer of Chinese nationalism, having proving itself to be the best hope of China to finally be a strong and unified nation, to eventually cleanse itself completely from the shame of the "hundred years of national humiliation" (bainian guochi 百年国耻) – that painful experience of China’s humiliation at the hands of the Western powers and Japan up to the Second World War – which is still crying out loud for redemption (while Mao’s “patriotism is to let the Japanese occupy more land” directive during the Japanese invasion could best be forgotten).

Such image spinning is undoubtedly highly effective among a whole generation of business leaders and intelligentsia both within China and amidst the overseas Chinese communities to whom Beijing’s stance that the benefits of stability under one-party rule far outweigh the risky endeavour of democratization and decentralization and that the human rights of the 1.3 billion-strong populace to be free from starvation and to be sheltered far outweigh the Western notion of freedom of speech and freedom of political choice would find resonance, and a generation to whom a China that could stand tall among the community of nations, a China that is fast becoming a superpower, and a world that stoops to a rising economic, military and “Cultural China” (Wenhua Zhongguo) are all that count in bestowing pride on one’s Chinese ethnicity, whilst probably little else matters. Nevertheless, how far the Party-State could continue to exploit this antediluvian cycle of what William Callahan (2010) termed “pessoptimism” of national humiliation and national glory to rally the people – both Chinese citizens and Chinese Overseas – around the five-star red flag and garner support for the legitimacy of CCP’s enforced political monopoly and suppression of political dissent in the name of hexie 和谐 (harmony), especially among the Internet-savvy post-90 generation who are further removed from the memory of the “hundred years of national humiliation” seems to be increasingly
doubtful. Herein might lie the hope that the trap of xenophobic nationalism may not turn out to be the catch-22 of Chinese NVA as long as the latter remains clear of its ultimate raison d’être – the struggle for political rights and civil liberties in China as part of humanity’s world-wide struggle for freedom and democracy, for breaking away from the shackles of authoritarianism and obscurantism.

5. Resiliency of a “Degenerative Totalitarian” Regime

Such flexing of military muscles, in combination with economic strength, has so far served well in rallying support for the performance-, not electorally, based legitimacy of the one-party State. This smart power-backed assault on the notion of liberal democracy is epitomized here by Zhou Zhifa’s declaration (2013: 113-114) that China is already a new-model democratizing country, and she has created and ushered in a new path of democratization, i.e. “democratization with one-party leadership under socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which has provided a new democratization model for human race’s democratic political civilization. Hence, according to Zhou, (refuting Fukuyama’s thesis) history is not ending with liberal democracy, as China’s over 60 years of development not only represents the rise of prosperity and national strength, but also the rise of human civilization. China’s political institutional reform is not just simply a transformation from one system to another, but is purported to bring to perfection the socialist democratic system through democratization with one-party leadership, a contribution to human civilization with cosmic importance.

China’s practice and theory have shown that “democracy with one-party leadership under socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been explored and practiced for over 90 years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. The institution of the National People’s Congress (人民代表大会制), the system of multi-party cooperation and political negotiation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, “democratic centralism” (minzhu jizhong zhi 民主集中制) and the Communist Party’s work style of criticism and self-criticism together represent the role model of democracy under one-
party leadership, which has transcended the scope of what liberal
democracy could explain [...] Liberal democracy is not universal; it is
merely a special manifestation of Western civilization.
(Zhou, 2013: 113; my translation)

Such a “perfect” system, much superior to Western liberal democracy
and which by Zhou’s criteria represents an unprecedented contribution to
human civilization and a model of mankind’s political future, was
succinctly and confidently described by Chen Xiqing 陈喜庆, deputy
head of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China ( 中共中央统战部), at a press
conference in which he unreservedly declared that China’s “multi-party”
system was already perfect, hence there was no need to establish new
political parties.67 The CCP, according to Chen, has been absorbing the
workers, peasants, soldiers as well as members of the intelligentsia as
party members, while the eight existing “democratic parties” (minzhu
dangpai 民主党派) are focusing mainly on recruiting people from the
middle and upper social strata, including those in the fields of
technology, culture and sports, as their party members. In China’s so-
called “multi-party cooperation” (duodang hezuo 多党合作) system,
these “democratic parties” are neither “non-ruling parties” (zaiyedang 在
野党) nor “opposition parties” (fangduidang 反对党), but “participating
parties” (canzhengdang 参政党). Besides that, according to Chen, there
are also “party-less” (wu dangpai 无党派) people in the system,
comprising those who are not members of these nine political parties.

Despite such smokescreen of rhetoric, basically what we are
witnessing is the resiliency of what Hsu Szu-chien 徐斯倫 called
“degenerative totalitarian polity” (t’ui-hua chi-ch’üan cheng-t’i 退化極
權政體) since mid-1990s which while having lost the original
totalitarian regime’s ideology, power of political mobilization and
monopoly over the economy, still not only continues with but
tenaciously maintains the absolute monopoly of the “Party” over
political power and State machinery and control over media of
propaganda and social organizations (Hsu, 2003: 168). The major
characteristic of such a degenerative totalitarian regime is, according to
Hsu, just like many authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes, by
sourcing its legitimacy from economic development, and with the unchallengeable national power inherited from its totalitarian past is now playing the role of a developmental State to drive economic development, while at the same time continuing to prohibit political pluralism, freedom of political association and the existence of independent mass media.

Moreover, a degenerative totalitarian regime does not need to worry about justification for long-term survival that used to plague authoritarian regimes from the perspective of the ultimate value legitimacy, for not only that the degenerative totalitarian regime has inherited totalitarianism’s self-justification of political monopoly, it is also carrying forward and strengthening the reign of terror and State machinery of repression that it inherited from its totalitarian past (ibid.: 168-169). Such an ingenious combination of the capability for national development and that for repression has served to continue a mode of governance which is justifying repression (in the name of weiwen 维稳, i.e. “maintaining stability”) with economic development, observes Hsu, as long as the benefits of development surpass the costs of repression, as development (which has replaced ideology and social reconstruction in its totalitarian past) is now main aim of this degenerative totalitarian regime as the key to the paramount raison d’être of maintaining the status quo of monopolistic political governance. Unlike under an authoritarian government, even limited pluralism and self-organization of societal interests to any meaningful extent are absolutely prohibited lest they jeopardize this degenerative totalitarian regime’s absolute monopoly of all political power (ibid.: 169).

5.1. Weiwen and the Feign Era of Peace and Prosperity

Nevertheless, if we take China as a whole in 2012, the country’s weiwen allocation had actually amounted to 7.017 hundred billion yuan (which the government defined as “public security” expenditures), as compared to 6.703 hundred billion yuan for national defense.68 Professor Sun Liping 孙立平 of Tsinghua University (清华大学)’s Faculty of Social Sciences in a 2011 report69 comments on the sharp increase in the very high weiwen expenditure which in some places has reached a spare-no-
expense, regardless-of-cost proportion. Part of these expenses actually do not make economic sense, according to Yu Jianrong 于建嵘, director of the Center for the Study of Social Issues at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as, e.g., ten thousand yuan spent on blocking a shangfang 上访 petitioner (who shangfang, i.e. “travels up”, to the capital for petitioning) could have been better spent on helping to solve the petitioner’s problems. In an article later deleted from Gongshiwang 70, Chinese scholar Cai Shenkun 蔡慎坤 questions whether a yearly spending of hundreds of billions of yuan on a million-strong Chinese police force (or probably above ten million if inclusive of local non-police or para-police public security teams) within an environment devoid of judicial independence is leading to out-of-control, self-justified weiwen-induced corruption.

Here is a stability brutally maintained by coercion through spare-no-cost clamping down on social protests and persecution and surveillance of civil rights activists in order to project an image of hexie shehui (the government slogan of a “harmonious society”) – a feign flourishing age of peace and prosperity that Xu Zhiyuan referred to in Weizhuang de shengshi 假装的盛世 [feign flourishing age of prosperity] (2012) while a repressed, muzzled society just cruises on and plays along in an auto-pilot mode with the formidable system that nobody could challenge – a society that as Xu observed in his earlier book Jiquan de youhuo 極權的誘惑 (The totalitarian temptation, 2011) is increasingly submerging itself into what German-American political theorist Hannah Arendt called the “banality of evil”. Xu made this comment from his observing the group of youth sitting close by while he and dissident author Yu Jie 余杰 were having a meal in a restaurant in Beijing (Xu, 2011: 253). These seven or eight people’s involvement has nothing to do with loyalty to the country, party or ideology; it is just a job, a day’s pay. In the case of Cheng Guangcheng before his dramatic escape to the US embassy in Beijing, the number of local thugs who were paid to enforce a watertight round-the-clock surveillance of his residence where he upon ending his jail term was put under long-term inhuman house arrest in Linyi 临沂, Shandong Province 71, came up to at least a hundred – a structure that Chen himself with a dry sense of humour referred to as the
“Chen Guangcheng Economic Zone”, though probably some local villagers were under duress and threat to themselves and their families to be paid to guard Chen. 72 Weiquan activists who were coming to visit him to render help were repeatedly beaten up by local thugs who were guarding his house. To the admirers of the “China Model”, is this exactly the type of stability they are so in love of – the feign era of peace and prosperity they are so worried that would be destroyed in the advent of liberal democracy incomparable to the tidiness and single-minded efficiency of one-party authoritarianism?

5.2. Weiwen, War on the Internet, and the Media Battlefront

In a recent 9th meeting of the secretaries of the Security Councils of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (上海合作组织 / Шанхайская организация сотрудничества) held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 17th April 2014, China called upon SCO’s member countries (6 members including China, Russia, and the former Soviet Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) to strengthen control over the Internet and the management of non-governmental organizations in order to ward off “colour revolutions” (street protests that Russian military officers view as a “new US and European approach to warfare that focuses on creating destabilizing revolutions in other states as a means of serving their security interests at low cost and with minimal casualties” 73 which had overthrown autocratic leaders of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan over the past decade. 74 Such call has raised fear that these SCO member countries led by China are going to join hands in strengthening control over domestic dissidents and stepping up suppression of voices of dissent.

Interestingly, while Mr Ai Weiwei the dissident artist says that the Internet represents an effective technology to terminate authoritarian regimes and the best gift heaven has ever bestowed upon China 75, President Xi Jinping the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party has virtually declared war on the Internet which he says represents a greatest peril that could lead to the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party and the doom of the nation 76. Recently, when announcing on-line
the publication of the “Human Rights and Democracy Report 2013” on its official weibo 微博 (China’s Internet weblog) on 11th April 2014, the British embassy in China had to break up the two characters of the Chinese term for human rights, 人权 (renquan), into three characters 人 木 亥, and use ‘MZ’ to represent 民主 (minzhu), the Chinese term for democracy, in order to circumvent the Chinese government’s Internet censorship of “sensitive words”.77 In order to more effectively enforce Internet censorship against information from outside China critical of CCP’s policy, the Chinese government has asked Fang Binxing 方滨兴, president of the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (北京邮电大学), to organize the development of the “Great Firewall of China”78 (国家防火墙 / 防火长城) to filter unchecked information from outside China to make it impossible for China’s netizens to visit foreign websites which are critical of the CCP and PRC and to Google search for “sensitive” terms (Cheng, 2012: 7-8). Readers’ comments are also monitored to check for “sensitive” words like “democracy”, “freedom”, “multi-party system”, etc., and round-the-clock manual checks are conducted to detect comments with anti-government nuances and related IP addresses are investigated (ibid.). Netizens who post anti-government opinions are often arrested and jailed.

Indeed, in trying to control the power of the pen by drawing blood with their swords, the Chinese authorities’ official policy towards dissent has long been chillingly Orwellian, as already related in Poole (2006: 203) almost a decade ago: “In June 2005, users of Microsoft’s newly launched Chinese weblog service were banned from using words and phrases such as ‘democracy’ or ‘democratic movement’: attempts to type these terms invoked an error message that read: ‘This item contains forbidden speech.’” The attempt by the Chinese government in 2009 to enforce the compulsory installation of a “lūba 绿坝” (Green Dam)79 Internet filtering software was widely interpreted to be yet another similar assault on dissent in cyberspace.80 The list of forbidden words on the Internet has been growing, covering terms that could be even merely remotely related to dissent, including the now and then ludicrously prohibited moli 茉莉 [jasmine], pangzi 胖子 [fatty – nickname of Ai Weiwei], etc.81 Super-sensitive terms like liu-si 六四 [June Fourth] and
related words of course have long been banned, but users of social media like weibo have been heightening their creativity in inventing homophones to circumvent the censorship, or with such truly indigenous phrases like wuyue sanshiwu ri 五月三十五日 [35th May].

Nevertheless, in an interesting incessant battle of wits, the round-the-clock censors have also not been lax in tracking such creativity to block any new suspicious terms created. Just ahead of this year’s 25th anniversary of the June Fourth massacre, adding to the existing blockade of popular foreign social media websites of Facebook, Twitter and Google’s YouTube, the CCP regime went further and blocked all Google services, including search, image, Gmail, maps, translation, either HTTP or HTTPS, as well as all versions of Google countries, including Google Hong Kong, Google.com, etc.

This is of course an important component of the nation-wide blockade of information, war on investigative journalism and enforced mass amnesia. During this year’s candlelight vigil at Victoria Park on the night of 4th June, video tributes were played in honour of those arrested in recent weeks in the mainland for trying to commemorate the anniversary. Among them was outspoken 70-year-old journalist Gao Yu 高瑜 who has been arrested several times before, and jailed for having “published state secrets”. She will face years of imprisonment if convicted of the charge of “leaking state secrets to a foreign news site” she is now accused of. Over two months after her arrest, Gao – who disappeared on 24th April 2014 and officially confirmed in May of being arrested – was still not allowed to meet her defence lawyer Zhang Sizhi 张思之, thus raising suspicion that she had been badly beaten up and injured according to information received by US-based human rights activist Wen Yunchao 温云超 (Bei Feng 北风 ) from unnamed sources, according to an Apple Daily (蘋果日報, Hong Kong) report on 24th June 2014. “They arrest journalists, and then arrest journalists who try to bring light to those arrested,” said rights-defence lawyer Teng Biao, presently a visiting scholar at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who revealed that he was warned firmly by China’s State security forces not to attend the Victoria Park commemoration but came despite of the warning. “The ruling Communist Party had elevated its notorious
‘stability maintenance’ to a political cleansing with its spate of arrests and detentions,” added Teng who roared his defiance with an oft-repeated slogan following a triad-style savage knife attack on Ming Pao’s former editor-in-chief Kevin Lau Chun-to 劉進圖 earlier this year: “BUT YOU CAN’T KILL US ALL!” In addition to its stance supporting greater democratic reforms in Hong Kong and against Hong Kong government policies such as the Moral and National Education (MNE, 德育及國民教育) school curriculum proposal which the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has accused as being a brainwashing political action – whose teaching material “China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual” refers to the Chinese Communist Party as an “advanced, selfless and united ruling group” (進步、無私與團結的執政集團) while denouncing the multi-party system of the United States, the liberal newspaper under Lau’s leadership has continued in the last few years with its investigative reporting that has increasingly been seen by Beijing as a pain in the neck, including the investigation into the death of Li Wangyang, and participated in investigative work with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) that looked into the offshore assets of China’s leaders and their relatives and reporting on the stories. The stabbing of Lau in the morning of 26th February 2014 occurred barely a month after his abrupt replacement as editor-in-chief in January.

A historian once said, “[…] while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life, I also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, however tenuous, to those who die by the sword.” (Wood, 1995: xiii) Indeed, from Gao Yu to Kevin Lau, from the mainland to Hong Kong, in the fight for freedom of expression, the fight against obscurantism and authoritarianism in the face of a ruthless State machinery of repression, these valiant guardians of the people’s right to know are, notwithstanding the State’s relentless efforts to silent them, being transforming into the Archedian “metareflexives” constantly driven by the force of their sociopolitical ideals and cultural concerns – for some, shaped by their personal encounter and tragedy at the hands of a ruthless regime, and for others, by the day-to-day grotesque injustices perpetrated by the actions of a racketeer State – and an almost religious
devotion to the embodiment, pursuance and actualization of such ideals and concerns (Archer, 2003; see also page 227 of the introductory article of this special issue for the concept of a “racketeer State”).

6. From Extraterritorial Action to the Confucius Institutes: Nature and Effectiveness of China’s “Soft Power”

Talking about the Russian situation, William Dobson (2012)’s source noted that unlike the former Soviet citizens who had few legal protections, for today’s Russian citizens the Russian constitution “guarantees the same set of freedoms and rights as any Western constitution [but] actually only one right is really observed – the right to travel abroad, to leave.” The effect of this is that “many people who might have opposed the regime simply left”, notes Dobson – “while the dictatorship of the Soviet system required closed borders, the authoritarianism of Putin’s Russia aims to sustain itself with open borders and passports.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 7) Exiling political activists who are too well-known in the West to be too damaging for the authoritarian State in continuing to persecute them has always been a good option. Earlier example of Chinese dissidents so exiled during the post-Mao era included Wang Dan 王丹 and Wei Jingsheng 魏京生 through the usual procedure of giving them a severe jail sentence and then granting them medical parole, or in the case of the late Fang Lizhi 方励之 who sought refuge in the US embassy during the June 1989 crackdown and was allowed later to leave for America. Similarly, Chen Guangcheng also sought refuge in the US embassy after his escape from house arrest with the help of Her Peirong and other weiquan activists and was later allowed to leave for America. There are rumours at the moment that negotiation has been going on regarding possible similar solution for Liu Xiaobo which Liu allegedly rejected. In an interview by the Sunday Telegraph (UK) published on 18th May 2014 as the 25th anniversary of the Beijing massacre was approaching, retired businessman and former triad boss Chan Tat-ching 陳達錦 (“Brother Six”/ 六哥), mastermind of the legendary Operation Siskin that successfully spirited hundreds of dissidents in danger out of China in the
wake of the June Fourth massacre of 1989, recalled how he went personally to Beijing in the 1990s to negotiate for the release of two of his operatives involved in the Operation Siskin who were arrested by the Chinese police and sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment, after the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (the Alliance / 香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 / 支聯會) failed to rescue them within half a year as Chan requested them to do. Interestingly, as the plucky mastermind of the Operation Siskin related to Sunday Telegraph in the recent interview, at that time he told the Chinese authorities that they should in fact thank him for bringing out of China those people who gave them such headache, and in response, the Chinese authorities told him that they would release his people if he stopped the Siskin rescue operation.\textsuperscript{89}

Nevertheless, even though being safe from State persecution beyond China’s shores, to coordinate a resistance movement through influencing China’s students overseas and expatriates is not a simple task given CCP’s tight surveillance of the country’s citizens sojourning overseas through covert operation network and allegedly an extension of the country’s so-called “soft power”.

6.1. United Front Work and Extraterritorial Action

Recently Australian media reported that the Chinese government had set up large covert informant networks inside Australia's leading universities to put the Chinese academic staff and students under surveillance in order to protect Beijing’s “core interests”.

According to an article by John Garnaut, the Asia Pacific editor for Fairfax Media, published in The Sidney Morning Herald, China is establishing an extensive secret network of informants in Australia’s major universities, including the University of Sidney and the University of Melbourne which have over 90,000 students from China, who now have the opportunity to be exposed to ideas and activities which are prohibited in China.\textsuperscript{90} The Chinese government is allegedly using the China student associations in Australia for collecting intelligence and promoting political activities, according to the article, with function in parallel to the other intelligence networks operated by the Chinese
diplomatic mission. Among the lecturers and Chinese-born students interviewed “who have suffered repercussions because of comments they made in Australian classrooms which were reported through Chinese intelligence channels”91, the article highlighted the case of a Chinese senior lecturer at a high-ranking Australian university who was interrogated four times by the Chinese intelligence agency regarding his comments made at a seminar about democracy at the University of New South Wales. The article also gave another case of a Chinese student in Australia who met with the Dalai Lama, leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Chinese intelligence got to know about this through its informant network, according to the report, and the student’s parents back in China were subsequently asked by security officials to restrain their child’s behaviour.

According to a former Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin 陈用林 who has defected to Australia, the Chinese government is also using students to infiltrate dissident organizations, especially those related to Tibet and Falungong 法轮功. The Chinese Consulate-General in Sidney vehemently denied all these allegations. Chen Yonglin, the former First Secretary of the Chinese Consulate-General in Sidney who defected in 2005 for Australian political asylum, stated that his main job during the four years and two months at the Consulate-General was to keep watch on the dissidents. He also pointed out that Chinese spies in Australia, who numbered over a thousand, were involved in kidnapping targeted dissidents back to China.93 This reminds us of Voltaire’s words and experience as related in Joseph Anton: “Voltaire had once said that it was a good idea for a writer to live near an international frontier so that, if he angered powerful men, he could skip across the border and be safe”, and indeed “Voltaire himself left France for England after he gave offense to an aristocrat, the Chevalier de Rohan, and remained in exile for seven years.” (Rushdie, 2012: 15) Alas, as the author of Joseph Anton, the fugitive writer who was the thirteenth on The Times’s 2008 list of the fifty greatest British writers since 1945 proceeded to remind us from his own bitter experience: “But to live in a different country from one’s persecutors was no longer to be safe. Now there was extraterritorial action. In other words, they came after you.” (ibid.: 15-16) The recent
Australian media report just acts to confirm the well-known fact that China’s nationals overseas are under close surveillance for detection of any activities which could be considered as anti-CCP.

A blatant example of such extraterritorial attack on dissent is reflected in the exiled blind Chinese civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng’s accusation that he was being forced to leave New York University for “as early as last August and September, the Chinese Communists had already begun to apply great, unrelenting pressure on New York University, so much so that after we [i.e. Chen and his wife and son] had been in the United States just three to four months, NYU was already starting to discuss our departure with us.”94 Despite N.Y.U.’s denial of the allegation and its law school’s claim that the fellowship as that given to Chen was always to be for one year, it is probably difficult not to link that turn of events to the then newly opened New York University Shanghai (NYU Shanghai), the first university jointly operated by China and the U.S., and part of a major initiative the NYU law school calls its Global Network University.95 This brings to mind an episode related by Tiananmen student leader Dr Wang Dan96, whose name tops China’s Most Wanted list for the 21 Tiananmen Square Protest leaders and who was arrested and imprisoned in 1989 immediately after the massacre and arrested and jailed again in 1995 for his continued political activism and released and exiled to the United States in 1998, in his latest memoir Cong Liu-si dao liuwang 從六四到流亡 [from June Fourth to exile] (2012)97 in which there were objections from some quarters among the academics during the approval process for him to teach at Taiwan’s National Cheng Kung University in 2011 presumably for fear of adverse effect on the university’s academic collaboration with China, leading him to caution about the inclination of “Hongkongization” in Taiwan (in the form of “not to make the Mainland unhappy” kind of self-constraint taking root) and its impact on Taiwan’s political development (Wang, 2012: 395-396). This is definitely not alarmist talk – just witness the sudden “Sunflower Movement” that was sweeping Taipei through March-April 2014, led by hundreds of thousands of student protesters enraged by President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九’s “Politburo-esque maneuver”98 to enact a trade pact with China to
open up the island state’s service industries without fulfilling the promise to allow a clause-by-clause review before implementation. The ultimate source of the protest movement is the increasing wariness felt by Taiwan’s younger generation of, besides and more than the economic impacts of effective merging the two economies though the trade pact, the foreboding sense of China’s incremental political control over Taiwan and the “Hongkongization” of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy.

Paralleled to such covert operations to put dissidents overseas under tight Chinese surveillance is the escalating influence the Chinese government is exerting on free academic enquiry overseas, leading to self-censorship of academics critical about China’s human rights violations and brutal repression of dissent. To be able to engage in free academic enquiry, and to live the life of an intellectual with dignity, “one had to make the presumption of freedom. And a further presumption: that one’s work would be treated as having been created with integrity.” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 117) It is precisely such presumptions on the part of the world’s academia that has been increasingly eaten away in the relentless drive of extraterritorial academic cooptation through huge deployment of funding, propaganda and manpower in the name of academic and educational exchange to move academics to shy away from speaking openly about human rights violations in China proper and in the frontier regions under CCP’s military occupation, CCP’s political authoritarianism and suppression of civil liberties and political rights; in short, anything deemed by Beijing as “sensitive subjects”.

6.2. Confucius Institutes: Cultural Schools or “Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics”?

Bloomberg reported in November 2011 that when Hanban 汉办, formally named the Office of Chinese Language Council International, a government-affiliated group under the Chinese education ministry, which has spent at least US$500 million since 2004 establishing 350 Confucius Institutes worldwide, offered Stanford University US$4 million to host a Confucius Institute on Chinese Language and Culture and endow a professorship with a caveat that the professor was not supposed to discuss delicate issues such as Tibet, “Stanford refused,
citing academic freedom, and Chinese officials backed down”. Nevertheless, the university then “plans to use the money for a professorship in classical Chinese poetry, far removed from the Tibet dispute.”99 On the other hand, the same Bloomberg report cited that when the University of Chicago created a Confucius Institute in 2009-2010, “more than 170 faculty members signed a petition objecting to it as an ‘academically and politically ambiguous initiative’ established without the faculty Senate’s consent.” The Columbia Daily Spectator reported such unease at Columbia University – one of the 20-odd U.S. colleges that opened Confucius Institutes in 2009 and 2010100 – citing Professor Robert Barnett, the director of the Modern Tibet Studies Program, that “There is this strange silence about Tibet and other sensitive issues when it comes to Columbia, academics, and talks of China [...] The silences are a worry because they could be self-censoring.”101 This is even more troubling in view of the fact that the Chinese government “shut down the Modern Tibetan Studies Program’s study abroad program in Tibet in 2006, and several Columbia faculty members have been denied visas to China – including [Professor Andrew] Nathan, ever since the publication of his 2001 book [The Tiananmen papers] which included leaked Chinese government documents”102, the latter reflected a tactic the CCP regime is increasingly using to silent critics abroad103 as well as to quash reporting on sensitive issues104. Whether the tactic really works would of course depend on whether the foreign scholar or the foreign news agency involved would choose to acquiesce and self-censor for the sake of a visa.

In mid-June 2014 the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), a 47,000-member association which was founded in 1915 to guard academic freedom, accused the Confucius Institutes which “function as an arm of the Chinese state” of flouting basic rules of academic freedom and integrity, and called for the agreements between Confucius Institutes and close to 100 universities in the United States to be either cancelled or renegotiated to ensure that the value of free speech would be safeguarded. Otherwise, in its strong-worded statement, the authoritative AAUP urged universities in the United States to “cease
their involvement” with the Confucius Institutes as most “agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims and practices of the government of China”, while the academic activities “are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China”.\textsuperscript{105} “Specifically,” said the AAUP statement, “North American universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.”\textsuperscript{106}

Similarly, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) has earlier urged all Canadian universities to sever all ties with the Confucius Institutes as these on-campus institutions were playing “too close a role in the development of university curricula” and bringing about a “fundamental violation of academic freedom”. “Simply put,” said CAUT executive director James Turk in a 17th December 2013 statement, “Confucius Institutes are owned and operated by an authoritarian government and beholden to its politics.”\textsuperscript{107} The University of Manitoba had earlier declined offers for a Confucius Institute “because of worries about the potential whitewashing of controversial subjects such as Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre”, and another Canadian university, McMaster University, announced plans in February 2013 to “shut down its Confucius Institute due to concerns, raised in an Ontario Human Rights tribunal case, that the school required instructors to swear not to be members of Falun Gong”.\textsuperscript{108}

In a testimony paper aptly titled “Confucius Institutes: Trojan horses with Chinese characteristics” presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives on 28th March 2012, American social scientist Steven Westley Mosher representing the Population Research Institute pointed out that the Confucius Institutes’ “seemingly benign purpose leaves out a number of purposes both salient and sinister, namely, sanitizing China’s image abroad, enhancing its ‘soft power’ globally, and creating a new generation of China watchers who [are] well-disposed towards the Communist dictatorship.” At the outset of his
testimony, Mosher – who in 1979 was the first American social scientist to visit mainland China and the first research student from the United States to conduct anthropological research in post-Cultural Revolution rural China, and whose expulsion from Stanford University’s Ph.D. programme in the mid-1980s became a cause célèbre in the academic world – gave his personal “experience in how the Chinese Party-State deals with its overseas academic critics”:

Following my expose of human rights abuses in China’s one-child policy in the early eighties, the PRC, acting through the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, put tremendous pressure on my university, Stanford University, to deny me the Ph.D. Beijing went so far as to threaten to abrogate its scholarly exchange program with the U.S. unless I was, in its words, “severely punished” for speaking out. In other words, I know from personal experience how ruthless the CCP can be when it comes to pursuing its own interests and how sycophantic, not to say craven, some academic administrators can be.

Even for those who are disposed to see in this a person with an axe to grind, it would not be easy to dismiss the facts that Mosher, currently the president of the Population Research Institute, presented:

While the Confucius Institutes are sometimes compared to France’s Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, this is misleading. Unlike the latter, Confucius Institutes are neither independent from their government, nor are [sic] do they occupy their own premises. Instead, they are located within established universities and colleges around the world, and are directed and funded by the so-called Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), located in Beijing, which answers in turn to the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China and, chiefly, to the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, the Chairman of the Confucius Institute is none other than Liu Yandong, who served as the head of the United Front Work Department from 2002 to 2007.

On the United Front Work Department, as well as the “democratic parties” (minzhu dangpai) referred to earlier in this paper, Mosher went on to explain:
The purpose of the United Front Work Department, it should be noted, is subversion, cooption and control. During the Communist revolution, it subverted and coopted a number of other political parties, such as the Chinese Socialist Party, into serving the interests of the Communist Party. After the establishment of the PRC, it continued to control these parties, which were allowed to exist on sufferance, albeit as hollow shells, to create the illusion of “democracy” in China. That it has \textit{de facto} control over the Hanban suggests, more strongly than anything else, what one of the chief purposes of the Confucius Institutes are, namely, to subvert, coopt, and ultimately control Western academic discourse on matters pertaining to China.

In their paper “China’s united front work in civil society: The case of Hong Kong” (2013), Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam of the University of Hong Kong pointed out that

To strengthen its rule, China has actively promoted patriotism in the form of “China can say no” and rejection of foreign intervention. In addition, it has attempted to develop a set of standards different from the West, so that it would not be evaluated on the same ground as in liberal democracies. Series of attempts have been made to deny the relevance of certain Western concepts, notably human rights and democracy.

(Lam and Lam, 2013: 304)

Such concern over educational institutions serving willingly as vehicles for State-guided propaganda of a regime paranoiacally suspicious of free critical inquiry beyond its control could indeed be grave in view of their potential influence on the outlook and orientation of the human agency. Herein also lies the danger of the current fashionable glorification of the “Beijing Consensus” (à la Joshua Cooper Ramo, 2004) or a “China Model” – whose onslaught has seen the effective discrediting of the Chinese democracy movement, in-exile or domestic – which represents not solely a domestic tragedy of this huge nation of 1.3 billion people who constitute one fifth of humanity. On the contrary, governments of developing countries around the world which are tired of the West
criticizing and censuring them for their despotism, cronyism and corruption increasingly see China “as a new and unquestionable paradigm of efficiency”, and as Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araújo add in the epilogue of the report of their field survey in over 25 countries concerning China’s expanding influence in the world:

As if that were not enough, this new world leadership is being run by an emerging country – one of their own – which is also prepared to lend money, make investments and reinforce political ties without imposing any conditions or asking any awkward questions. Therefore democracy, the albeit imperfect system which has brought more prosperity, well-being, justice, liberty and equality to human life than any other idea conceived by Man, now finds itself having to compete with the ‘Beijing Consensus’, as the Chinese model has been labeled.

(Cardenal and Araújo, 2011, tr. 2013, 2014: 262)

The increasing influence and acceptance of the so-called “Beijing Consensus” or “China Model” is tantamount to a subliminal universal acceptance of an authoritarian, repressive political model of development where economic advancement takes unquestionable precedence over liberal democracy, free political choice, free speech and human dignity (see Professor Yan Xuetong’s “policy that benefits the people is human right” argument referred to earlier in this paper). The also currently fashionable so-called “soft power” (à la Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 1990, 2004) projection of China includes such politico-cultural outposts like these over 360 Confucius Institutes and over 500 Confucius classrooms worldwide, but language teaching and learning is never purely about language, for it inevitably embodies the inculcation of not only cultural values but subliminal political brainwashing through textbooks (including what is omitted in them) and “cultural immersion programmes”, as Steven Mosher’s testimony reminded us: “It is naïve to think that teachers trained in the PRC will limit themselves to teaching language and cultural programs, while avoiding such controversial subjects as China’s military buildup, its abysmal human rights record, and its distain for democracy. Such subjects invariably come up in the classroom, and Beijing’s trained cadre of ‘language teachers’ will know
exactly how to allay the concerns of their young and impressionable
charges.” Remember, as mentioned earlier in this paper, how the
teaching material “China Model National Conditions Teaching Manual”
for Hong Kong’s school curriculum Moral and National Education
proposal unabashedly refers to the Chinese Communist Party as an
“advanced, selfless and united ruling group” ( 進步、無私與團結的執政集團 ) while denouncing the multi-party system of the United States.

6.3. Yu Ying-shih’s Take on Confucius Institutes

Yu Ying-shih 余英時 is an Emeritus Professor of East Asian Studies and
History at Princeton University who has taught at three Ivy League
universities (Princeton, Harvard, and Yale) and the University of
Michigan and had been the president of New Asia College, Hong Kong,
and vice-chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He was
named on 15th November 2006 the third recipient of the John W. Kluge
Prize for lifetime achievement in the study of humanity. Professor Yu
has always advocated, in the face of the conventional generalization on
Confucianism, that liberal Confucian values unshackled by imperial
ideology of the dynasties are not incompatible with democracy. He had
been a vocal critic of the authoritarian Taiwanese government on the
Kaohsiung/Formosa Incident (高雄/美麗島事件, 1979) and provided
strong, vocal and concrete support for China’s democracy movement
following the 1989 Beijing massacre. The Princeton China Initiative ( 普
林斯頓中國學社 ), fruit of Yu and his wife’s indefatigable efforts,
became an unforgettable post station and asylum for many exiled
intellectuals and student leader following the Beijing massacre. As
revealed in an interview, the 19-year-old son of Yu’s female cousin was
killed near the Chang’an Jie-long 安街 (literally “Street of Eternal
Peace”), the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned
across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into
the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during
that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989.

On 22nd March 2012, Yu Ying-shih was interviewed at Princeton by
writer Bei Ming 北明, programme host of Radio Free Asia, for his
opinions on the Confucius Institutes.10 Regarding why a regime which
has not been known to be attaching primary importance to humanistic culture or education (witness the first thirty years’ political campaigns and strengthening of Marxist-Leninst-Maoist hybrid ideology during the CCP’s six-decade reign and the second thirty years’ rugged materialism under economic reform) is now backing the global dissemination of the Chinese language with national strength, Yu saw the motivation as twofold. The first is for commercial convenience especially in the initial stage of the Confucius Institute initiative, since the ancient Chinese teacher and philosopher Confucius 孔子 is well-known to the outside world and the name of Marxist-Leninism was getting inconvenient, and hence exploiting the name of Confucius would create an illusion that the CCP has changed and is now identifying with something quintessentially Chinese. The deception is reflected in the fact that Confucian studies organizations like the International Confucian Association (国际儒学联合会/国际儒联) etc. are all civil or semi-civil organizations and no CCP leaders even including Wen Jiabao who had tried so hard to cultivate for himself the image of a traditional humanistic Chinese patriarch had ever dared to openly praise Confucius or promote Confucianism, and that a colossal statue of Confucius which appeared in January 2011 on Tiananmen Square was removed in hardly three months after intense backlash from inside the CCP. Hence, exploiting the name of Confucius to popularize the Chinese (Mandarin) language has nothing to do with ideology.

Besides the economic, commercial reason, there is also a political dimension of the Confucius Institute initiative – that of the United Front Work. While there have even been accusations from Western governments and scholars alleging Confucius Institutes being involved in espionage, the more apparent victim of the Confucius Institutes is academic freedom, according to Yu. Huge fundings have been used for political purposes, as foreign universities including those in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, etc. are being “bought up” as the Confucius Institutes make inroads into these higher education institutions. Such fundings have been used to, through unwritten conditions, dissuade the beneficiary universities from employing or inviting academics who are considered “anti-PRC”. This has led to an
atmosphere of intimidation preventing academics from voicing anti-CCP opinions, especially among those who are yet to receive long-term tenure.

While considering the political motive of Confucius Institutes to have already overtaken the commercial, Yu did not agree with certain worries on the part of some Western, Indian and Japanese media circles that along with Chinese language teaching, certain ideology, presumably Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, is being imparted. Yu felt that this is totally impossible as there should be absolutely no such intention on the part of the Chinese authorities as even the CCP government itself no longer believes in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and hardly ever brought it up. The only concrete thing the CCP government now believes in is its absolute political power – the Chinese Communist Party’s continued unchallenged one-party rule (yidang zhuanzheng — 党专政) — that is intricately linked to huge pecuniary interests of the élites from the party leaders’ families to the PLA. This is the bottom line that cannot be abandoned. This is what China wants countries all over the world to accept: CCP’s yidang zhuanzheng is Chinese democracy, or “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics”; and CCP’s yidang zhuanzheng is closely related to Chinese traditions, to Confucius. What is intrinsically the most attractive part of Confucius for the CCP when it is promoting the name of the sage? It has to be Confucius’ teaching of not to defy one’s superiors and start a rebellion — that emphasis on reverence and obedience based on the feudal social order of human relationship and filial piety. On the contrary, the Confucian insistence on the critique of political power and the contingent nature of political mandate, as well as the emphasis on the voice of the people in governance and the importance of public discourse and individual responsibility for social action have to be conveniently ignored or given a warped reinterpretation. What the CCP has been selectively promoting is the era-specific imperial dynasty-serving decadent feudalistic component of Confucianism — the same kind of ancient holy laws being promoted by religious fundamentalists as heavenly mandated and hence infallible. These constituted the “Confucian shop” (Kongjiadian 孔家店) that the May Fourth Movement (Wu-si Yundong 五四運動, 1919) had aimed to
destroy. “The CCP is reopening the Kongjiadian because its Majiadian 马家店 (‘Marxist shop’) has failed miserably,” quipped Yu.

In terms of management, unlike the British Council, the Goethe-Institut or formerly the United States Information Agency, the currently over 360 Confucius Institutes and over 500 Confucius classrooms are aggressively infiltrating universities all over the world and directly represent China’s United Front Work backed by huge funding to make political inroads into the core of the foreign, especially Western, universities in an effort to alter the international, Western in particular, views on the CCP regime. Funding from the CCP regime through the Confucius Institutes is increasingly controlling the direction of Western research on contemporary China. As such external fundings mean a lot to cash-trapped universities, especially State universities, in times of economic recession and education budget cuts, they work to create campus environments more and more untenable for academics with anti-CCP regime viewpoints and lead to the muzzling of the harsh critics of the PRC who are now in fear of not getting long-term tenures due to their open criticism of the CCP regime. In other words, the United Front Work through the Confucius Institutes is implanting a perception that the CCP’s one-party rule is most suitable for China. The CCP is not asking anybody to accept the Marxist-Leninist ideology which it is not even mentioning, observed Yu, but there is only one main thing one has to accept: there is only the rule of the Communist Party of China, and that is the only true order of things, right and proper, perfectly justified, and this is in line with Chinese historical traditions and perfectly in conformity with the teachings of Confucianism. The June 1989 Beijing massacre might not be right, but the CCP through its “soft power” is asking everyone to accept that the bloody crackdown was inevitable for the good of China.

On the other hand, Yu is critical of the view from some quarters that regardless of the ulterior motive of the CCP’s exploitation of the name of Confucius, it would always be a positive development for China to promote the name of Confucius at the expense of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead, to Yu, by exploiting the name of Confucius, the CCP is giving Confucianism a “kiss of death” – the same negative impact as
bestowed by its warped, shameless reinterpretation to justify its own absolute political control upon a list of terms ranging from “People’s” to “democracy” to “human rights”. In other words, the CCP’s brazen usurpation of the name of Confucius for the Party’s own rebirth could lead to the destruction of Confucianism and the second death of Confucius. What the May Fourth Movement wanted to destroy in 1919 was neither Confucianism nor the name of Confucius, for whom the reformist leaders like Hu Shih 胡适 and Ch’en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 had great respect, but the repressive Confucian “religion” (Kongjiao 孔教), also derisively dubbed Confucian “shop” (Kongjiadian) – the use of Confucius’ name as a political instrument of the ruling class for the absolute subjugation of the masses through the indoctrination of unquestioning obedience, of the “three cardinal guides and five constant virtues”112 of the era-specific, dogmatic, repressive “Confucian” ethical code of mingjiao 名教 (or lijiao 禮教) under the disguise of the quintessential Confucianism (rujiao 儒教). The Confucius Institute initiative represents the CCP’s reopening of the Kongjiadian, not to be taken by deception to be considered as efforts to revitalize Confucianism.

In summary, Yu reminds us that the Confucius Institutes have nothing to do with education or culture. They have never been aimed to promote education or culture, not even any ideology. Hence they also have nothing to do with ideology. On the contrary, they have everything to do with economic interest, with the political United Front Work of the CCP. The Confucius Institutes do not constitute, though widely mistaken to be, a cultural phenomenon, but political behaviour, pure and simple. Confucius Institutes are the old “Confucian shops” (Kongjiadian) with a new name. The CCP has managed to set up hundreds of such outlets overseas, and they are selling well.

6.4. Subliminal Universal Acceptance of Political Authoritarianism as Effectiveness of Soft Power

Similar concern, as that surrounding the Confucius Institutes, over the subliminal universal acceptance of political authoritarianism can be seen in the 2009 Nobel Literature Prize laureate Herta Mueller’s description

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as a “catastrophe” the 2012 award of the same Prize to Mo Yan 莫言, vice-chairman of the Communist Party-backed, State-run Chinese Writers’ Association, whom she criticized as “celebrating censorship”. It made a mockery of the Nobel spirit indeed that this is the same Mo Yan who in 2011 joined a group of authors to transcribe by hand a 1942 speech by Mao Zedong on how art should serve Communism – a speech that began decades of government control over Chinese writers and artists. Some might see the award of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Mo Yan as reflecting a triumph of CCP’s effort in developing its soft power in the world, besides being an act of appeasement on the part of the Nobel committee and Sweden to mend relationship with the PRC after the confrontation resulted from the earlier award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo in 2010 and subsequent diplomatic and economic retaliation from the PRC (including “denying visas to Norwegian dignitaries and delaying shipments of Norwegian salmon for so long that the fish rotted before they could clear customs”114), hence vindicating the latter’s openly stated strategy to enhance culture as part of the soft power of China, a “factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength” – as described by former president Hu Jintao in a 2007 speech to the national congress of the CCP – a strategy probable best reflected by the Confucius Institutes.115

However, in the latest ranking of countries by soft power according to the British magazine Monocle, it seems that China, not being ranked among the top 20, would still have some way to go. According to this latest investigation by Monocle on soft power based on government standard, diplomatic facilities, cultural exports, educational capability, business environment, etc., topping the list in 2012 is the United Kingdom, followed by the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, Japan, Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and South Korea.116

That the recent claim of China’s increasing “soft power” is much overhyped can also be seen in the 2013 Country Ratings Poll of 25 countries and the European Union conducted by GlobeScan, an international polling firm, and the Programme on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland for the BBC’s World Service which shows global views of China’s influence having deteriorated
sharply to reach their lowest level since the poll began in 2005, with positive views falling eight points to 42 per cent and negative views rising eight points to 39 per cent. Perceptions of China are seen plunging markedly not only within the EU, expectedly worst in Japan (with only 5 per cent holding positive views against 64 per cent holding negative views), but also in China’s regional neighbours which are not her traditional enemies, e.g., Australia (swinging around dramatically from the previous survey’s 61 per cent positive and 29 per cent negative to this latest survey’s 36 per cent positive and 55 per cent negative).\(^{117}\) Admitting that “the rating had put China in an ‘embarrassing’ position, compared to the nation’s rising economic power and the national image it sought to project”, sighed Professor Qiao Mu 乔木 of the Beijing Foreign Studies University (北京外国语大学), “It seems China is getting rich fast but its influence ranking is dropping dramatically [...] China is drawing more attention globally, for its increasing foreign aid and participation in international affairs, but now it turns out that the values and the political system China holds are not accepted by the world.”\(^{118}\)

The above observations on the Confucius Institute phenomenon inevitably lead us to question: is the 1989 Beijing massacre just an overhyped local hiccup in the long torturous process of a developing nation’s modernization (albeit that of a huge nation comprising one fifth of humanity) and the hitherto forlorn struggle to end one-party authoritarianism in China just a local effort to bring about true political change in an East Asian state, or should the 1989 massacre in reality be seen to have implications much wider than that observed on a local national level and the struggle of this one fifth of humanity to be free from one-party authoritarianism be understood in a more global, long-term context, as pondered earlier in this paper? And if so, what role have the two tracks of Chinese NVA, the democracy movement and the *weiquan* activism, been so far playing in this larger-than-national struggle against authoritarianism, and is the seemingly forlorn struggle truly desponent?
7. Concluding Remarks

Putting aside the argument whether the CCP should really be credited so much for China’s economic miracle in the recent decades, or rather the credit should be in the most part due to Chinese citizens’ entrepreneurial spirit freed from the Maoist yoke since the late 1980s, it is an undeniable fact, even from the perspective of the most ardent detractors of the CCP regime, that the social changes the recent decades of astounding economic transformation had wrought upon China is reaping apart and reconstituting the social fabric of the vast nation. Against this backdrop, the following are several concluding remarks pertinent to the preceding analyses in the paper in conjunctive reading with the introductory article of this special issue.

7.1. The Predominant Role of Economic Condition and Prospect

Economic condition and prospect apparently played a large part in the failure of the 1989 student movement to ignite a nation-wide, society-pervasive uprising that would have even crossed the urban-rural divide. While it was a night of “min bu wei si, naihe yi si ju zhi?” (民不畏死，奈何以死惧之？[“the people have no fear of death, why threaten them with it?”]) against the State’s instrument of carnage in Beijing on 3rd-4th June 1989, such manifestation of incredible valour was constrained to Beijing and there was in general no significant uprising elsewhere in support of the civil disobedience in Beijing, except for sporadic demonstrations in some cities in protest of the government’s bloody crackdown in Beijing which were either brutally put down (as in Chengdu 成都 where at least 300 people were killed, according to Amnesty International) or more peacefully dispersed (e.g. in Shanghai 上海 where university students also took to the streets at the time of the Tiananmen demonstrations, Xi’an 西安, Wuhan 武汉 and Nanjing 南京).

Of course, this is not to say that there was no hidden sympathy even in the rural areas for the Beijing demonstrators and victims of the crackdown; otherwise the student leaders’ and wanted activists’ escape through the secret network under Operation Siskin to southern China and
then to Hong Kong would not have been possible. However, other than these, the lack of similar level of uprising outside Beijing should be noted. For China in 1989 was not an economic basket case but a nation in the fervency of reform – and full of hope. Just coming out from the Maoist barbaric cannibalistic horror (which was the one last horror – though probably one of the worst – in the torturous history that China had to endure from imperial time to the republican era), Deng Xiaoping’s China while suffering from corruption, inequalities and urban hardship (even in these aspects it was not intolerable for the majority of the masses who would probably be willing to give Deng’s reforms a shot at whatever cost) is still a place that was full of hope. The same sentiments still prevail today. After having gone through hell, a softer form of purgatory would taste like sweet heaven. As Professor Gerald Chan of the University of Auckland observes in the closing remarks of a recent article, “China can now afford to dream dreams, whereas in the recent past it has a lot of nightmares.” (Chan, 2013: 13)

7.2. The Incredible Extent of Mass Acceptance of Authoritarianism in Exchange for Material Progress

Therefore, it could be said that one of the most negative legacies of June Fourth is that economic progress and miracles (and concomitant technological and military strength and pride) can be created by maintaining an authoritarian grip on political power, by suppressing free political choice and bypassing the messy democratic processes which, after all, could be argued as hugely inefficient for many developing countries that gravely lack the prerequisites for their correct execution. Hence, as we have seen earlier, the Beijing Consensus, the China Model (and the glamorous, spot-on 2008 Games of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing, in comparison with, say, 2010’s XIX Commonwealth Games in Delhi that came two years later) looks so attractive to many developing countries’ dictatorships and flawed democracies. And to a great many Chinese citizens too, who are willing to be convinced by the government that the murderous crackdown in 1989 was for the good of the country, or as expressed in the blood-chilling words, attributed to Deng Xiaoping, that it was worth killing 20 wan 万 (i.e. 200 thousand) people to ensure
China’s 20 years of stability – and prosperity. While resentment at the level of corruption and public office abuse and injustice could be draining support from the CCP, this should not be exaggerated. The damage this has done to the CCP as often emphasized by the exiled democracy activists and the Falungong movement could just be whimsical. The level of corruption and public office abuse, for a people who had suffered enough through the imperial time, warlord period, early republican era, and the Maoist excesses, seems tolerable, amidst unprecedented affluence, not only in the urban areas, but also in the rural townships. As illustrated in Figure 4, situation remains on the left-hand side of the point of intersection between actual social injustice and the tolerance threshold of it, i.e. with the former still well below the potential level which the people at large would no longer be able to tolerate.

Anti-corruption drives, whether during the Jiang Zemin era, or with the renewed zeal under the Xi Jinping administration, albeit often criticized as lacking in its thoroughness amidst corruption accusations aimed at the top leaders’ families themselves, have seemed to be well appreciated by the people at large within the overall environment of economic efficiency and increasing national pride. It is within such atmosphere that the former, now exiled, leaders of the 1989 mass movement are forgotten, and calls for justice by victims of public office abuse and government-business collusion, and by the persecuted civil rights activists and rights defence lawyers are met with general apathy from those who are not directly victimized. Dominant group nationalism, whether its imaginary nemesis be Japan the World War II aggressor and Nanjing massacre perpetrator, America the “hegemonic” imperialist, or the “splitists” in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, never fails to rally the Han 漢 / 汉 Chinese majority and even the overseas Chinese to defend the ruling Chinese Communist Party against political dissidents who are often seen as doing the rejuvenated nation a disservice by trying to destabilize the rule of the Party that has turned China from the “Sick Man of Asia” into the world’s coming modern superpower.
As the CCP’s authoritarian grip on China is growing stronger, PRC’s international economic, military and diplomatic clout continue to rise, and civil societal protests against CCP’s “democracy, Chinese style”, whether from China’s exiled democracy movement or domestic weiquan activism, continue to wane or to be crushed into oblivion, a myth seems to be increasingly taking hold: the struggle for a free society
in China with political rights and civil liberties of all citizens fully protected from State ruthlessness and with multi-party representative democracy firmly established looks increasingly forlorn, as the PRC’s growing strength is ensuring the CCP’s one-party authoritarianism very long-term staying power. There is a bon mot that some ascribe to the ancient Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu\textsuperscript{119} 孫子, some to Confucius and some say is a Japanese proverb: “If you sit by the river long enough, you will see the body of your enemy float by.”\textsuperscript{120} It is true that the year 2013’s Gini coefficient of 0.473 announced by the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China in January 2014 which was the lowest in the past ten years has been suspected of underestimation by many scholars and experts outside China\textsuperscript{121}, while a recent April 2014 report from the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research gives China’s Gini today at around 0.55\textsuperscript{122}, compared to 0.45 in the United States. Yet, ironically, despite such growing socioeconomic inequality, in the current environment of a PRC growing fast to be a world superpower with continued strengthening of her economy and the well recognized, truly remarkable success of her poverty reduction efforts, the acute power asymmetry – as depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 6 in the introductory article of this special issue (p. 203 and p. 225) – between the increasingly formidable Party-State and the political dissidents who seem to look set to continue their descent into oblivion and irrelevance is making the body that could float by less and less likely to be that of the authoritarian regime. Despite the subjective hopes and aspirations that persist in the dreams of the advocates of democracy and social justice, there is no fortunate cosmic alignment apparent to spell an imminent death of this one-party authoritarian regime which, as ruthless and repugnant as it is, is increasingly adept and innovative along Dobson’s “learning curve” in its catch-all Bonapartist cooptation of societal interests – a benevolent dictablanda\textsuperscript{123} ever willing to expand societal freedom, as long as doing so would not jeopardize its political monopoly and the concomitant private interests of the ruling elites, in a social contract that the civil society is dictated to accept – in the foreseeable decades.
7.3. Revolutionary Changes Still Could Come Unawares

Although just like the other authoritarian regimes, the CCP is using a variety of methods to protect and continue its one-party rule, including severe news surveillance and censorship and tight control of the social media (including the blocking of popular foreign social media websites of Facebook, Twitter and Google’s YouTube), as William Dobson, author of *The dictator’s learning curve* (2012) reminds us, revolutionary changes could still pop up when you are least aware of it.\(^{124}\)

In 1949, Kuomintang (KMT) leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 retreated with a significant amount of gold and approximately 2 million Nationalist refugees to the small island of Taiwan where he established a hard-line authoritarian regime, shortly following the 228 Massacre of 1947 (二二八大屠殺). The White Terror (白色恐怖) to which Taiwan was consigned after the massacre was one of the longest martial law periods in world history, as tens of thousands of Taiwanese were imprisoned and executed under the grim eye of the Taiwan Garrison Command secret police body. Who in that era could have predicted the day would come when four decades later President Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 (son of Chiang Kai-shek) and Taiwan’s ensuing leaders\(^{125}\) would successfully facilitate a bloodless and relatively peaceful democratic transition by imposition for their nation and turn the de facto independent island state into one of the most vibrant democracies in the world and a best-case paragon of civil liberties and political rights-respecting free society? Similarly, who could have predicted even in the 1980s that Mikhail Gorbachev’s *perestroika* would eventually bring about the downfall of Communist Party totalitarianism in Russia, the rest of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Russian-dominated Soviet Union, hence liberating the many long-tortured subordinate nationalities from the “prison of nations”. This is of course from the point of view of those who are unwilling to be blinded by the central State dominant nationalism, and who are ready to admit that, despite being lamented by the Russians, this represents a liberation well cherished from the perspective of the non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union, who have long languished under Leninist-Stalinist totalitarianism, not to mention particularly the horrors
of the Stalin years, ever since the days their quest for national self-determination was hijacked by the Bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{126}

7.4. Ripples in Time …

There is an interesting description of the Tiananmen Square, the centre of the 1989 demonstrations and the ultimate target of the brutal crackdown after the massacres elsewhere in Beijing of valiant citizens who went to streets to block the advancing tanks and armoured vehicles of the PLA, in \textit{Chinese Whispers} (2013) by Ben Chu, the economics editor of \textit{The Independent}:

To stand at the north end of Tiananmen Square in Beijing is to straddle the historical fault line that separates two Chinas. To the north is the opulent and vermilion-walled Forbidden City, the enormous palace complex constructed by the Ming emperors in the fifteenth century. To the south lies the almost equally vast concrete expanse of Tiananmen Square, one of the largest public spaces in the world, commissioned by Mao Zedong. The architecture comes from two profoundly different eras, one imperial, the other Communist, and yet the sensation for the individual as he gazes north, and then south, is rather similar. The scale of both the square and the palace is intimidating. Both, in their own ways, project a cold and ruthless power. Both plant a feeling of insignificance into the soul of the individual. On this spot the Wittfogel proposition, that Chinese political history is one long and seamless story of autocracy, feels plausible.

(Chu, 2013: 82-83)

Chu is referring to the historian Karl Wittfogel who identified a connection between ancient “hydraulic empires” and modern China’s (and Russia’s) bureaucratic totalitarianism, and saw Mao’s CCP, despite all its modern trappings, as merely the latest imperial dynasty to rule China through the same technique he termed “oriental despotism”\textsuperscript{127} as practiced by the former emperors. Chu notes that Wittfogel, himself a refugee from Nazi Germany, was following a long dismal tradition which can be traced back to the Enlightenment political philosopher
Montesquieu and the Victorians and had hence projected a perpetual nightmare (Chu, 2013: 231).

It is true that symbolic protest actions as in Rangoon in 1988 and Beijing in 1989, while having a tremendous moral and psychological impact and arousing major national and international attention, as Gene Sharp reminds us, are by themselves “unlikely to bring down a dictatorship, for they remain largely symbolic and do not alter the power position of the dictatorship” (Sharp, 2010: 61). Yet despite all the dismal projections and series of heart-rending disappointment, probably it would be mildly encouraging to note that a key element in this causation is the perspective of time frame. “The air does not cease to have weight, although we no longer feel that weight”, says Émile Durkheim (1895). Under brutal repression, simmering ripple effects take time to break through the surface to eventuation through an often slow, meandering process of fermentation or even metamorphosis while brewing social forces bringing along subliminal emergent changes (as depicted in Figure 4 in the introductory article of this special issue, p. 215) continue to threaten to subvert the stability of well laid-out projectable changes envisaged by the ruling regime; hence patience is called for. While there might not be enough ripples to momentarily change the tide of events for a country as huge as China and a ruling party as entrenched as CCP, one may recall the theoretical example given by the “butterfly effect” of the late American mathematician and meteorologist Professor Edward Norton Lorenz, who was professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a pioneer of the chaos theory, in which the formation of a hurricane is being contingent on whether or not a butterfly somewhere far away had flapped its wings a couple of weeks earlier. The recent positive developments in democratic reform in Burma came more than two decades after the “8888” (8th August 1988) Rangoon massacre. The painful memory of the June 1989 Beijing massacre was but just 25 years old. The brutal reign of the Soviet Communists lasted just seven decades, compared to its predecessor, the three-century long Romanov dynasty. The rule of the CCP has just been over six decades, a speck in the millennia-long history of Chinese dynasties, mostly each lasting a few centuries. To judge the success and
failure of social action, a right perspective on time is pertinent, as the literary world’s most well-known fugitive from dogmatic terror illustrates on the resiliency of art: “The poet Ovid was exiled by Caesar Augustus to a little hellhole on the Black Sea called Tornis. He spent the rest of his days begging to be allowed to return to Rome, but permission was never granted. So Ovid’s life was blighted; but the poetry of Ovid outlasted the Roman Empire. The poet Mandelstam died in one of Stalin’s labor camps, but the poetry of Mandelstam outlived the Soviet Union. The poet Lorca was killed by the Falangist thugs of Spain’s Generalissimo Franco, but the poetry of Lorca outlived Franco’s tyrannical regime.”

The same for today’s exiled dissidents and those physically stay back in China but intellectually exiled from the land where citizens are compelled to trade political freedom and civil liberties for lucre and security. The struggle for political freedom, civil liberties and social justice may continue to seem forlorn in the short term, but the last page of the seemingly Sisyphean endeavour will forever remain unwritten, so long as commitment and conviction remain steadfast for these social actors who would not allow an authoritarian regime “to draw lines in the sand and order them not to cross.”

Notes

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2. Leading intellectual dissident activist from the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and hunger strikes to Charter 08 – for which he was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment – Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 but was unable to receive it as he was serving his 11-year sentence. He received his Ph.D. from the Beijing Normal University in 1988 with his thesis “Shenmei yu ren de ziyou 审美与人的自由” [aesthetics and human freedom].
3. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中国共产党).
8. Tiananmen 天安门, i.e. Tian’an Gate (gate of heavenly peace).
10. A glass factory worker who was first arrested in 1983 for organizing the Mutual Aid Association of Shaoyang Workers (邵阳市工人互助会) under the influence of the Beijing Spring (Xidan 西单 Democracy Wall) and Poland’s Solidarność, and who during the tumultuous months of 1989 organized and chaired the independent workers’ union of Shaoyang city (邵阳市工自联) and led workers’ demonstrations in support of the students’ protests in Beijing, Li Wangyang was arrested on 9th June 1989 immediately after the Beijing massacre and jailed for 13 years for “anti-revolutionary propaganda and instigation” and released on 8th June 2000 blind and deaf and in extremely poor health, after enduring long years of beating and torture in jail, but was soon jailed again in 2001 for 10 years for “subverting government institution” and under continued surveillance upon release in May 2011.
11. The torture of Li Wangyang included the use of the inhuman undersized handcuffs and pincers and repeated solitary confinement (sometimes for as long as three months) in the dark, hot, smelly and lice-, fly- and mosquito-infested “coffin cabin” of just 2 metres x 1 metre x 1.6 metres and being long shackled with rusty fetters weighing over 50 kilogrammes that caused terrible festering and ulceration from ankles to haunches, according to the Hong Kong-based 中国人权民运信息中心 (ODN, 14th June 2012). (东方日报 / Oriental Daily News / ODN is a Malaysian daily in Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.)


13. Such doubts include the fact that the death scene photographs show that Li’s legs did not leave the floor and his hand was on the window frame, the white bandage strip around Li’s neck was not tightened and the loop was too small to fit his head, Li’s face showed no distortion and there was no trace of struggle as often with hanging, where the white bandage had come from as the bed sheet and blanket were not torn, how a blind and deaf person who could hardly walk without help managed to tie the strip on the window frame and on his neck to successfully commit suicide and how he did manage to commit suicide under the watchful eyes of as many as nine guards that night, whether it was the purpose of the hospital to let Li’s family see him having hanged himself the reason that it had chosen to notify the family first instead of taking him down urgently to resuscitate him, and whether the police was trying to hide something by urgently wrenching his body away from his family. (ODN, 4th June 2012, 7th June 2012, 8th June 2012, 9th June 2012, 10th June 2012; 11th June 2012; 13th June 2012; Bajiu Yi dai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012; “关于要求严肃调查李旺阳死亡真相的紧急呼吁 / Urgent appeal for credible investigation into the truth of Li Wangyang’s death”, initiated by journalist and human rights activist Bei Feng 北风 (Wen Yun chao 温云超), then Peking University’s economics professor Xia Yeliang 夏业良 and scholar of historic documentation (US) Wu Renhua 吴仁华, 6th June 2012 <http://www.peachhall.com/news/gb/china/2012/06/201206070601.shtml>)


15. In this paper, following the US (rather than British) convention, billion = 1000,000,000 and trillion = 1000,000,000,000.

19. Charter 08’s suggestion of a Federal Republic of China – which was seen by the CCP as inciting splittism – was not new, though such schemes suggested in the past did vary in arrangement details. These included a prominent confederation proposal of a *Chunghua Lienpang Kunghekuo* 中华联邦共和国 ("Federal Republic of China"), a “Third Republic” – the first republic being the *Chunghua Minkuo* 中华民国 (Republic of China) and the second, *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo* 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of China) – proposed by Yan Jiaqi 殷家其 (1992) encompassing the “loose republics” of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang (in an arrangement like that of the European Union) and “close republics” consisting of the rest of present-day China (in an arrangement akin to that of the United States). Yan obviously had in mind some sort of coexistence of federal and confederal systems within a single country.
21. “Xu Zhiyong, the quiet lawyer holding beijing to account: the campaigner’s demands that officials obey the law have been met with fury” (by Tom Mitchell), *The Financial Times*, 24th January 2014. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d9a136da-838d-11e3-86c9-00144feab7de.html#axzz31aLuJJFj>


29. The *New Statesman* is a British left-leaning political magazine founded in 1913. This issue guest-edited by Ai Weiwei represents the first time the *New Statesman* has produced a translated issue (*ibid.*).


31. A yuan 元 of reminbi 人民币 is equivalent to about US$0.161.


39. ODN, 5th June 2012.

40. “Let the hexie spirit transcend the confrontational spirit of the three generations of conventional human rights, to cultivate and produce a new generation of human rights – the hexie rights (rights of harmony). Hexie rights will become the foundation stone and key element of the building of the hexie shijie (harmonious world)” (“以和谐精神超越传统三代人权的对抗精神, 将化育出新 一代人权 —— 和谐权。和谐权将成为和谐世界建设的基石和要素。” See “法学专家徐显明提出第四代人权 ‘ 和谐权 ’” [legal expert Xu Xianming proposes the fourth-generation human rights “the rights to harmony”], 中国新闻网 / 腾讯网, 22nd November 2006 <http://news.qq.com/a/20061122/002038.htm>.)

41. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter opine that a transition from authoritarian rule could produce a democracy, but it could also terminate with a liberalized authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 9, cited in Diamond, 2002: 24). While shadows of the remnants of her ghostly past still linger to haunt the one-party State, there are already telling signs that the continuing transformation from a dictadura (dictatorship) into a dictablanda leading further to a highly restrictive democradura in the near future is the most possible direction the CCP regime is heading to and indeed planning to head to, given the fact that the Western, “bourgeois liberal” democracy (democracia) has already been ruled out of the cards, or at least not until mid-2000s. In fact, following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the Central Party School, China’s authoritarian one-party political system will and should remain unchanged until at least 2037 (Zhou, Wang and Wang (eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46, see Bo, 2009: 10-11). This is in line with what Deng Xiaoping stated in 1987, that direct general elections could only be held after half a century had passed in the 2000s, and at the moment the country had to make do with indirect elections above the county level and direct elections only at county and below county level, given the colossal population and inadequate level of cultural quality of the people (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 19-20, cited from 《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [selected works of Deng Xiaoping, volume 3], Beijing: Renmin
Chubanshe 人民出版社 1993 年版，第 220～221 页).
42. First written by Benjamin Franklin for the Pennsylvania Assembly in its
*Reply to the Governor* (11th November 1755), with several paraphrased
variants including: “Those who surrender freedom for security will not
have, nor do they deserve, either one.” “Any society that would give up a
little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both.” “He
who sacrifices freedom for security deserves neither.” etc.
43. *ODN*, 7th February 2014.
44. Or Zuo Zhuan.
45. A continuation of such brutality climax in the death of Li Wangyang,
which except for some street protests in Hong Kong, was largely met with
apathy in China as well as the most parts of the Chinese émigrés.
46. Or officially the “Kuomintang of China” (中國國民黨).
47. See, e.g., Zhong Bo 鍾波’s “毛泽东：让日本多占地才爱国” [Mao
Zedong: patriotism is to let the Japanese occupy more land]
<http://m.secretchina.com/node/408171> and “日本侵华给毛泽东带来的
好处” [how Mao Zedong benefitted from the Japanese invasion of China]
<http://m.secretchina.com/node/407891>.
50. *ODN*, 7th February 2014. According to The New York Times, the Jane’s
Defence Weekly figures are much higher than China’s government figures
because the former Chinese military’s research and development (R&D)
spending and pension, etc. which are excluded by the latter. Also, China
does not include in her military spending many items which are potentially
military in nature, e.g., space programme and rocket programme. China
officially announced in March 2014 a 12.2 per cent rise in military
spending to 808.23 billion yuan (US$131.57 billion) for 2014, without
giving a breakdown of how that amount would be spent. (“A nervous
region eyes robust Chinese response to missing Malaysian plane”
com/news/nation-world/sns-rt-us-malaysia-airlines-china-response-
analysis-20140313,0,2758820.story?page=1>)
52. South China Sea / Biển Đông (East Vietnam Sea) / West Philippine Sea.
53. The Pinnacle Islands – a group of uninhabited islands currently controlled
by Japan who calls them the Senkaku Islands 尖閣諸島, a part of
Okinawa prefecture 沖繩県, but claimed by both the ROC and the PRC as
the Diaoyutai Islands 釣魚台列嶼 / 魚台群岛, part of the Taiwan
province. The largest island of the group is the Uotsuri Jima 魚釣島 / Diaoyu Dao 釣魚島。There are other similar military concerns, such as the June 2009 incident around the atoll of Okinotori-shima 沖ノ鳥島。Such thorny issues, together with the sensitive and complex entwining of historical legacy and national honour and dignity such as that surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja 靖國神社), serve well to illustrate how, almost seven decades after the end of World War II, shadow of the past still lingers to haunt the bilateral relations between these two East Asian powers.

54. “From Taiwan’s perspective, the ROC Government was the first in the twentieth century to claim sovereignty over the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands, basing its claim on discovery and continuous patronage of these islands dating back to the first century. When the Spratly Islands were ‘retroceded’ to the ROC in 1946, the Kwangtung provincial Government was given jurisdiction over them. In 1947, the ROC Ministry of the Interior’s subsequent proposal to the central Government to ‘temporarily transfer jurisdiction of the islands to the ROC Navy’ was approved. In addition, an official map titled as ‘Map of the Location of the South China Sea Islands’ was released that showed the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands within the 11-dotted U-shaped lines.” (Sun, 2011: 3-4) See also Ts’ai (2014: 35). The nine-dash line (jiù duān xiàn 九段线) or U-shaped line (U形線) is called dượ́ng lưỡọ̄ bò (牛舌線), i.e. “cow-tongue line”, by the Vietnamese.


56. ODN, 31st May 2014.

57. See “‘中國外交遵循王道’—— 間學道：現時成果未達理想” [“China’s diplomacy follows the way of a (benevolent) king” – Yan Xuetong: with less than ideal outcomes at the present], 星洲日報 (Sin Chew Daily), 5th June 2014 <http://news.sinchew.com.my/node/369299?tid=1>.
58. The era-specific, dogmatic, repressive “Confucian” ethical code of mingjiao 名教 used to be upheld in feudal China under the disguise of the quintessential Confucianism (rujiao 儒教).


60. Ibid.


67. ODN, 1st July 2011.

68. According to a 30th April 2012 Reuters report (see Hai Tao, 2012); see also report in ODN, 17th November 2012.

LCS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)
69. “Yi liyi biaoda zhiduhua shixian shehui de changzhijiu’an 以利益表达制度化实现社会的长治久安” [realizing society’s long-term governance and stability by institutionalization of interest expression], cited in “Gonggong anquan zhangdan 公共安全账单” [bill of public security], Caijing 财经 [finance and economics], 9th May 2011.

70. Cai Shenkun 蔡慎坤, “Zhongguo teshe weiwen fuchu le duoda daijia 中国特色维稳付出了多大代价?” [what is the price of stability maintenance with special Chinese characteristics?], Gongshiwang 共识网, 10th May 2012.

71. Provincial-level administrative units in the People's Republic of China refer to the country’s 31 sheng 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘肃, Guangdong 广东, Guizhou 贵州, Hainan 海南, Hebei 河北, Heilongjiang 黑龙江, Henan 河南, Hubei 湖北, Hunan 湖南, Jiangsu 江苏, Jiangxi 江西, Jilin 吉林, Liaoning 辽宁, Qinghai 青海, Shaanxi 陕西, Shandong 山东, Shanxi 山西, Sichuan 四川, Yunnan 云南 and Zhejiang 浙江), zizhiqu 自治区 (i.e. “autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi 广西 of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia 内蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia 宁夏 of the Hui, Xizang/Tibet 西藏 of the Tibetans and Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and zhixiashi 直辖市 (i.e. municipalities directly ruled by the central government – Beijing 北京, Chongqing 重庆, Shanghai 上海 and Tianjin 天津).

72. ODN, 1st May 2012.


74. ODN, 19th April 2014.

75. ODN, 9th November 2010.

76. “据报， 习近平在全国宣传部长会议，公开呼吁中共全党「严防西方意识形态的影响渗透」，更将互联网列为「亡党亡国」大患，多次掀起「清网」行动。” (ODN, 29th April 2014)

77. ODN, 12th April 2014.

78. The colloquial term for the Ministry of Public Security’s censorship and surveillance project officially called the “Golden Shield Project” (金盾工程).

79. Dubbed “lūba 滤霸” [filtering bully], this software was originally scheduled for compulsory installation by 1st July 2009 on all personal

International Journal of China Studies 5(2) • 2014
computers entering the Chinese market. The attempt was later temporarily postponed following domestic and international outcry, and finally declared on 13th August to be abandoned except for those computers for public access in schools, cybercafés and other public places. (ODN, 10th June 2009, 15th August 2009)

80. ODN, 2nd July 2009.

81. ODN, 24th June 2011.

82. “微博镇压六四言论 剁諺音詞破封鎖” [weibo suppresses June Fourth expression; create homophones to break through the blockade], Ming Pao 明報 (Hong Kong), 6th June 2010. <http://www.aboluowang.com/2010/06 06/168645.html#sthash.v4G4htSi.dpbd>


84. ODN, 25th May 2014.


86. Ibid.

87. ODN, 14th February 2014, 28th February 2014, 1st March 2014.

88. Such rumours, while highly convincing, were as usual unconfirmed, just like the alleged negotiations conducted in recent years by the State with the Mothers of Tiananmen on terms of compensation for death of their children in the 1989 massacre.

89. ODN, 20th May 2014.

90. ODN, 23rd April 2014.


92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.


95. Ibid.

96. Wang Dan 王丹 received his Ph.D. in 2008 from Harvard University with his thesis “A Comparative Study of State Violence in Mainland China and Taiwan in the 1950s”.

LCS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)

98. “Ma seems to have forgotten he’s running a democracy, not a Communist Party precinct”, commented William Pesek in “Is China losing Taiwan?”, *Bloomberg View*, 1st April 2014 <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/20140331/ischinalosingtaiwan>.


100. Ibid.

101. “China-funded institute tests Columbia’s commitment to academic integrity” (by Melissa von Mayrhoaser), *Columbia Daily Spectator*, 11th November 2011.

102. Ibid.

103. Like Andrew Nathan and Perry Link, the two U.S. professors who co-edited *The Tiananmen Papers* (2001), who were denied visas to enter China, Professor Elliot Sperling from Indiana University was the latest in the list of academics to be denied entry to China – a tactic the CCP regime increasingly uses “as punishment against scholars, journalists and others who write or speak in ways that Chinese officials deem politically offensive” (“China denies entry to an American scholar who spoke up for a Uighur colleague” (by Edward Wong), *The New York Times*, 7th July 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/world/asia/us-scholar-who-supported-uighur-colleague-is-denied-entry-to-china.html?_r=1>). Sperling, who vocally supported Ilham Tohti (the moderate ethnic Uighur economics professor who has been held incommunicado since 15 January 2014 when police officers escorted him from his apartment on the campus of Minzu University of China (中央民族大学), and was charged by the Chinese authorities in February 2014 with separatism), was forcibly expelled from China when arrived at the airport in Beijing on 5th July 2014 and his valid one-year tourist visa was cancelled on spot. (On Ilham Tohti’s arrest, see also “China accuses Uighur intellectual of separatism for his advocacy work” (by Andrew Jacobs), *The New York Times*, 25th January 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/world/asia/china.html?_r=1>.) Gardner Bovingdon, Sperling’s colleague at Indiana University, was also met with the same fate earlier when he was expelled on arrival in
Beijing in May 2013 with a valid visa (though he has already been put on a Chinese visa blacklist together with 12 other scholars after they jointly contributed to a 2004 anthology on Xinjiang) (“China denies entry to an American scholar who spoke up for a Uighur colleague”, *The New York Times*, 7th July 2014).

104. For two years running, new resident visas have been denied to *The New York Times* and *Bloomberg News* which published stories in 2012 on the hidden wealth of CCP leaders’ families, and recently two longtime resident journalists, Paul Mooney of Reuters and Melissa Chan of Al Jazeera English, were forced them to leave Beijing when their visas were denied. (“China accuses Uighur intellectual of separatism for his advocacy work” (by Andrew Jacobs), *The New York Times*, 25th January 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/world/asia/china.html?_r=1>.)


106. Ibid.


108. Ibid.

109. Chang’an Avenue/Chang’an Jie 长安街 (literally “Street of Eternal Peace”) was the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989. Massacre along Chang’an Avenue/Boulevard (with heaviest casualty on the night of 3th-4th June 1989 but as a whole lasted from about 10 p.m. of 3rd June to the midnight of 5th June) mainly occurred along the route of PLA advance at the Wanshou Lu 万寿路 junction, Muxidi 木樨地 intersection, Fuxingmen 复兴门 (Fuxing, i.e., “revival”, Gate) outside Yanjing Hotel (燕京饭店) and Minzu Hotel (民族饭店), and Xidan Bei Dajie 西单北大街 (Xidan North Street) junction along West Chang’an Avenue at Xinhua 新华门 (Xinhua, i.e. “new China”, Gate) and Nan Chang Jie 南长街 junction onto Tiananmen Square (天安门广场) from the western side and from the eastern side of the Chang’an Avenue near Hongmiao 红庙 to Jianguomen 建国门 (Jianguo,
i.e. “nation founding/building”, Gate), along East Chang’an Avenue near Beijing Hotel (北京饭店) and Nanchizhi Dajie 南池子大街 (South Chizi Street) junction onto Tiananmen Square (Yazhou Zhoukan 亚洲週刊 (1989), Chingt’ientungti te ipai jih 驚天動地的一百日 [a hundred days that shook heaven and earth]. Hong Kong, p. 80). In addition, massacre also occurred along Qianmen Dajie 前门大街 (Qianmen, i.e. “front gate”, Street – PLA’s southern approach to Tiananmen that night), at Chongwenmen 崇文门 (Chongwen, i.e. “culture/civilization revering”, Gate), between Jianguomen and Chaoyangmen 朝阳门 (Chaoyang, i.e. “sun facing”, Gate), the approach to the university district and around Peking University (北京大学), Yiheyuan 颐和园 (Summer Palace imperial garden) and Tsinghua University (清华大学) (ibid.). Outside Beijing, similar massacre at that time mainly occurred in Chengdu 成都, the capital city of Sichuan Province.

110. 「孔子學院及其影響 —— 專訪余英時」 [Confucius Institutes: A special interview of Yu Ying-shih],《縱覽中國》[China overview], 8th April 2012.

111. Or K’ung Tzu / Kong Zi.

112. San gang wu chang 三綱五常 as specified in the feudal ethical code: the three cardinal guides of “ruler guiding subject, father guiding son, and husband guiding wife”, and the five constant virtues of “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity”.

113. ODN, 26th November 2012. “Mo Yan”, literally meaning “do not speak”, is the pen name of writer Guan Moye 管谟业.


116. ODN, 20th November 2012


118. Ibid.

119. Or Sun Zi.
120. “If you sit by the river for long enough, the body of your enemy will float by”, as cited in Joseph Anton (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 532).

121. The Gini coefficient of 0.473 for year 2013, announced by the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China in January 2014 (see “国家统计局局长马建堂就2013年全年国民经济运行情况答记者问”, 中华人民共和国国家统计局 (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China), 20th January 2014 <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgztjdt/201401/t20140120_502414.html>), which is the lowest in the past ten years also represents a continuous decline over the past five years since 2009. The figure was suspected of underestimation by many scholars and experts outside China after its announcement (Sun, 2014: 12).

122. Which makes income inequality in today’s China “among the highest in the world, especially in comparison to countries with comparable or higher standards of living”, according to sociologist Yu Xie 谢宇, the University of Michigan researcher who published the article “Income Inequality in Today’s China” (co-authored with graduate student Xiang Zhou 周翔 in April 2014 online in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, with their main analyses based on data from the China Family Panel Studies, a large-scale survey project conducted by Peking University’s Institute of Social Science Survey (“Income inequality now greater in China than in US”, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 28th April 2014 <http://home.isr.umich.edu/releases/income-inequality-now-greater-china-us/>; Michigan News (University of Michigan), 28th April 2014 <http://www.ns.umich.edu/new/releases/22156-income-inequality-now-greater-in-china-than-in-us>; “中国收入不平衡比美国严重”, Michigan News (University of Michigan), 29th April 2014 <http://www.ns.umich.edu/new/chinese-translations/22165-2014-04-29-20-27-50>). China’s Gini coefficient was 0.30 in 1980. Family income Gini in China was 0.61 in 2010, according to a December 2012 report by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (西南财经大学) in Chengdu (Sun, 2014: 12).

123. See O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

125. In particular, President Lee Teng-hui 李登輝, the first popularly elected president of the first human rights-respecting liberal democracy in the five millennia of Chinese history and the first native Taiwanese Chinese to become Taiwan’s head of state – “who successfully guided the Taiwanese people into full democracy through an election-led, gradual and peaceful process that some international observers have praised as a ‘quiet revolution’” (Mashiro Wakabayashi, “Taiwan de zhuzhang (Taiwan’s viewpoint), by Lee Teng-hui” (book review), China Perspectives, n°25, September-October 1999 <http://www.cefc.com.hk/uk/pa/articles/art_ligne.php?num_art_ligne=2509>, quote from page 91).

126. “According to history, the Empire of the czars was a ‘prison of the peoples’ and Lenin opened it. But history is never quite that simple. At the start of the twentieth century the empire was already showing signs of weakness; all its subject peoples were beginning to resent its domination and looking for ways to escape from it. Lenin’s genius lies in having grasped the breadth of these desires for emancipation, and in having understood that by utilizing those desires – which had nothing to do with the working class – he could assure the victory of the workers in his own country.” (Carrière d’Encausse, 1979: 13)


130. Ibid.

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*LCS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)*


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LICS Vol. 5 No. 2 (June/August 2014)


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International Journal of China Studies 5(2) ● 2014

