Chinese/Taiwanese Nationalism, Cross-Strait Relations and an Inevitable War? – A Review of Dong-ching Day’s Inevitable War?! (2012)

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Abstract
This article reviews Dong-ching Day’s 2012 book Inevitable War?! by scrutinizing a series of central arguments Day makes in the book in the context of the prevailing understanding of cross-Strait relations and international strategic relations. The peculiar characteristics of the present dilemma facing Taiwan as a de facto independent nation-state in the shadow of a mainland China fast rising to be the world’s new superpower and the concomitant pressing issues of nationalism on both sides make various key questions recurrent in the literature now highlighted in the book germane and thought-provoking.

Keywords: Taiwan, China, cross-Strait relations, nationalism, war

JEL classification: F51, F52, F55, F59

Dong-ching Day’s 2012 book 《兩岸終究難免一戰?!》(literally meaning “Cross-Strait war eventually inevitable?!”) by Associate Professor Dong-ching Day 戴東清 from the Department of International and China Studies, Nanhua University, Taiwan, is an unusual piece of work. It is unusual in various aspects. First is the length of time spent on
composing these 148 pages that we now see in print. Writing began in 2006, according to the author in the book’s preface, i.e. six years before the book was finally published. Second is the presently rather unfashionable view expressed in the book – that war could be inevitable – in this era of cosier relationship between the Republic of China (ROC, 中華民國) government under the Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 administration on the island and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, 中华人民共和国) government on the mainland. Third is the consecutive use of a question mark and an exclamation mark in the book’s title. Regarding the first, the author did give various factors to explain the delay in completion. With writing duration spanning both the confrontational period of the Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 administration and the subsequent détente under the Ma presidency, the book admittedly has benefited from a more balanced scope of view of the longer-term progress of cross-Strait relations. While as the author himself observes, during the tumultuous period of cross-Strait relations under the Chen presidency readers at large could probably be more receptive to his view that war would eventually be inevitable between Taiwan and mainland China compared to today’s age of the ECFA, the shadow of war has never left this one of the most dangerous flashpoints of East Asia, once seen as one of the world’s three hottest potential war zones. The two consecutive punctuation marks show a sigh reflecting the helplessness and futility of war if it really erupts with a caveat that even if the risk of a war could be overwhelming the future is not written and it all could very much depend on the choices made by the parties involved.

Day divides his book into six chapters. The first, introductory chapter discusses the background, the past cross-Strait war forecasts and interpretation and preliminary analysis of the possibility for war. Citing Kenneth N. Waltz’s arguments in his book Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis regarding the roles of human behavioural factor, internal national instability and lack of legal constraints in precipitating war, Day emphasizes the critical role of rising nationalism on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, mainland China’s problem of maintaining domestic stability (e.g. that resulted in Deng Xiaoping’s launching of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war) and the conflict between mainland China’s “core
interest” and America’s major interest concerning Taiwan. Adding to Waltz’s three factors, Day raises the possibility of accidental triggering of crisis, citing the assassination of Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in 1914 as pointed out by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in his book Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to Theory and History3 and the earlier-than-expected breaking-out of the Hsin-hai (Xinhai) Revolution (辛亥革命).

Day’s second chapter discusses the interesting issue of the formation of a “Taiwanese identity” and the debate between a school that traces the germination of “Taiwanese nationalism” back to the ceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 and its proper formation triggered by the 228 massacre in 1947 and brutal repression by the Kuomintang 国民黨 4; in other words, a Taiwanese identity was born directly as a counteraction to Japanese colonial rule and the Kuomintang repression which shared similarity in combining political repression and cultural assimilation. Contrary to this view of attributing the birth of a Taiwanese identity to the two “foreign” political administrations, there is another school that traces the formation of this identity only back to the 1895 cession but not to the 228 massacre. Such divergence is in fact rather political, as it all boils down to one’s perspective on whether a so-called “Taiwanese identity” is part and parcel of a wider Chinese identity for in this context recognizing the 228 massacre as a milestone is tantamount to saying that the Taiwanese had finally turned their back on the Han Chinese after the turning point of the 228 massacre. Across the Taiwan Strait, Day notes the rediscovery by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)5 of the usefulness of nationalism in strengthening citizens’ loyalty to the ruling Party and the country in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the demise of communist party rule in most other parts of the world, leading to its embrace both by the intellectuals who have produced countless books and essays in rousing ovation for such nationalism and the wider masses who made books with titles like “China Can Say No” instant best sellers in the country, accompanied by the inexplicable reemergence of Mao-latry – the veneration, the hero worship of the one person in recent Chinese history who caused such unparalleled level of human misery through murderous purges, crime against humanity via mindless
grassroots political persecution, man-made famine through whimsical economic policies that led even to widespread cannibalism.

In contrast to the rising Chinese nationalism in the early 20th Century whose main contents – like those reemerged in the Tiananmen student movement in 1989 – circled around the resentment against government corruption and the aspiration for a clean and able government, today’s new government-promoted nationalism in mainland China is in support of and serving to strengthen the governing legitimacy of the present unelected ruling party and the authority of the present political institution that outlaws any attempt in electoral challenge to the CCP, while abiding by CCP’s rhetoric in emphasizing the importance of political stability rather than political change. In other words, as Day observes, with State and society in a way exist in separation, democracy followed the development of nationalism, leading to the establishment of Asia’s first republic from the ruins of the Manchu monarchy in the early 20th Century. On the contrary, denying a separate existence of society from the political State run in monopoly by today’s catch-all Communist Party, the present wave of State-promoted, mass-inciting nationalism has not only been contributing nothing to democratic reform, but instead has been intensifying bitter xenophobic behaviour in the realm of foreign affairs, especially in the form of hate-filled anti-Japanese and anti-American nationalistic sentiments. Day gives the textbook example of the aftermath of the (allegedly accidental) bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American bombers. Day cites Japanese China expert Miyazaki Masahiro 宮崎正弘 commenting on the extreme anti-American actions by demonstrators in China that amidst such an atmosphere of incited fanatic nationalistic outburst, anyone who are trying to constrain or neutralize the situation would themselves become victims of attack by those around them. As Deng Xiaoping told visiting former US president Richard Nixon just after the June Fourth 1989 Beijing massacre while calls for sanction was brewing, “Please tell President Bush … even if it takes a hundred years, the Chinese people will never beg to have the sanctions lifted. If China would not respect itself, China can’t stand firm and there won’t be national dignity. It’s a very big issue, and any Chinese leader who commits error on this issue
would definitely fall from power. The Chinese people will not forgive him. I’m telling the truth.”

Here goes the war cry of the new nationalists: “Don’t think that Chinese youths will thank America for imposing sanction on China. You can’t separate the individual from the nation. When you hurt the Chinese government, you hurt the Chinese people.”

In the befuddled realm of the CCP State = China = Chinese people cognition, questioning the CCP State’s policy actions is logically equated to insulting the Chinese people and hurting Chinese nationalistic feeling. Nationalism in such context represents a “single-edged venomous sword”, in the opinion of the presently incarcerated Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo.

Especially in the post-colonial, post-Cold War era, the roar of nationalism tends to become the last refuge for authoritarian regimes against the global march of human rights-, political choice-respecting liberal democracy, a rediscovered ideological instrument to crush any challenge to the ruling party’s political monopoly. Increasingly adept in handling such nationalistic sentiments, observes Day, the CCP State is able to summon them up whenever they should be useful for dealing with foreign relations while avoiding them from turning into a threat to the regime itself. Day gives the examples, among others, of the incidents following respectively the mid-air collision between a United States Navy EP-3E ARIES II signals intelligence aircraft and a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) J-8II interceptor fighter jet near the Chinese island province of Hainan in 2001, and the Chinese actress Zhao Wei’s photo shoot, also in 2001, for a fashion magazine wearing a dress featuring the Japanese “rising sun” military flag. It is within such context that Day raises the concern for a potential clash between mainland Chinese nationalism and the newer Taiwanese nationalism. While Taipei has been reformatting the unfinished Chinese Civil War into an international conflict in order to force Beijing’s hand to reach a certain form of compromise that would pave the way to Taiwan’s political independence and nation-state recognition, similarly the CCP regime will never tolerate Taiwan’s gaining her nation-state status not just because of the righteous question of national sovereignty but more importantly for the regime’s own political survival. While the masses on
the mainland might not really care as much about the issue of Taiwan independence as about their own economic wellbeing, nationalism, probably just next to improving people’s standard of living, is always the trump card in the CCP’s quest to perpetuate its rule. Citing Susan Shirk, Day points out that in the reasoning that CCP is presently the great torchbearer of Chinese nationalism, having proving itself to be the best hope of China to finally be a strong and unified nation, to eventually cleanse itself completely from the shame of the “hundred years of national humiliation” (bainian guozi 百年国耻), the Taiwan issue is no longer simply an issue of territory, but of national pride and dignity. Juxtaposing such outlook among the mainlanders, who increasingly look ever ready to rally around the red flag of the CCP in the event of the outbreak of a cross-Strait war, with the empirical evidence from opinion polls that today’s younger generation in the de facto independent island state is fast diminishing in their identification with China and probably there would be none so identifying themselves in the next generation, Day grimly points towards the looming shadow of a coming war as a most probable outcome of the clash of two nationalisms.

On the premise of such eventual clash of two nationalisms, Day in his third chapter of the book discusses lessons learned from the wars of unification and wars of separation in Chinese history. Recalling the wars of unification in Chinese history including that launched by the Ch’in (Qin) state to take over the other six states during 236-221 B.C., that unified the Three Kingdoms under Chin (Jin) during A.D. 263-280, the North and South Dynasties under Sui during 581-589, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms under Sung (Song) during 962-979, by the Mongol Yuan Dynasty to take over Southern Sung (Song) during 1235-1279, and that by the Manchurian Ch’ing (Qing) Dynasty to take over Southern Ming and Taiwan during 1645-1683, Day asks: Is there reason to predict a war, say around 2020, launched by China to conquer Taiwan? Similarly, recalling the wars of separation in Chinese history including the Battle of Ch’ih-pi (Chibi) in A.D. 207 that established the tripartite existence of the Three Kingdoms which lasted for 73 years, the failed Northern Expedition in 354 during the Eastern Chin (Jin) Dynasty that ended up in the second Three Kingdom period that lasted 16 years,
the Battle of Feishui in 383 that resulted in the Eastern Chin (Jin) and the Former Ch’in (Qin) standing in mutual north-south confrontation for 20 years, the uncontinued war of Liu’s Sung (Song) against the Northern Wei in 430 that resulted in a stalemate that lasted 49 years, the uncontinued Battle of Kao-p’ing (Gaoping) between Later Chou (Zhou) and Northern Han and war waged by Northern Chou (Zhou) against Southern T’ang (Tang) during 954-957 that resulted in a division that lasted 22 years, the failure of the Manchurian Ch’ing (Qing)’s attack on Taiwan in 1664 that resulted in mutual confrontation between Koxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung)’s Ming remnant government on Taiwan and the Ch’ing (Qing) court on the mainland for 19 years, and the failure of the new People’s Republic’s attack on Kinmen in 1949 that left a cross-Strait confrontation till the present, Day asks: Is there reason to predict a failed war effort, say around 2020, by the People’s Republic against Taiwan resulting in a new round of cross-Strait confrontation?

From the lists of wars of unification and separation in Chinese history, Day arrives at several deductions. First, both unification and separation require undergoing the trial of war. The way that PRC’s Anti-Secession Law (fan fenlie guojia fa 反分裂国家法)\(^\text{10}\) was written shows that, Day observes, it is difficult for the mainland to achieve unification with Taiwan without resorting to war. On the part of Taiwan, despite the continuous effort of part of the society to pull Taiwan out of China’s historical framework, its possibility of success is never something that Taiwan can alone determine; instead, mainland China’s stance on that is unfortunately of paramount importance and even decisive, unless Taiwan is really prepared to go to war with the mainland. Lastly, Day brings up the human factor as a recurring element in the history of war of unification and separation – strong leaders who could hold dear to a principle to the end vs. those who would go for compromise and trade political sovereignty for economic gains. With this, the author has apparently crossed into the domain of Taiwan’s long-running partisan political fault line. After all, with two thirds of China’s past eras experiencing territorial political unity and one third in division, the pressure of nationalistic “historical responsibility” could be forcing the CCP’s hand to eventually launch an inevitable war of unification, for

_Review of Dong-ching Day’s 《Inevitable War?》_ 185

*IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)*
regime survival, to claim Taiwan.

From the clash of conventional mainland Chinese and emerging Taiwanese nationalism, Day moves on in Chapter 4 to placing the conflict in the wider context of the Sino-US clash of interest – a favourite topic for writers of international relations and strategic studies on which innumerable papers have long been churned out year after year in recent decades. Of particular interest here is that, as Day argues, amidst all the rhetoric of mainland political leaders and scholars emphasizing China’s “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”, the alarming, disproportionate growth in Chinese military expenditure, her self-justified aggressive assertion of sovereignty over almost all of South China Sea, her untiring reiteration of past national humiliation, her exploitation of the society's age-old hatred for Japan and her arrogant refusal to abrogate the possibility of the use of force towards Taiwan to the extent of writing the non-peaceful solution into her Anti-Secession Law definitely do not help to placate her neighbours and the US and dispel their worries of a “China threat”. The centrality of Taiwan in the Sino-US rivalry for Asia-Pacific hegemony, given the undisputed geopolitical strategic importance of the island state for America, has made increasing Taiwanese economic dependence on China a real worry for America, according to Day, citing a Rand Corporation project for the US Defense Department, “Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use”\textsuperscript{11}. The research pointed to the possibility that as the Taiwanese economy is getting increasingly dependent on China, there could be pressure on Taiwan at some point in time to make a reckless move to declare independence to avoid Chinese economic oppression getting out of control as time might not be on Taiwan’s side. Alternatively, being unable to effectively achieve her political objectives via economic means for too long, China might yet resort to military means to force unification with Taiwan, amidst a feeling of defeat from the failure of playing her economic trump card and the concomitant increasing anxiety over Taiwan’s eventually declaring independence – witness the sudden “Sunflower Movement” that is sweeping Taipei through March-April 2014 right at this very moment of writing, led by hundreds of thousands of student protesters enraged by President Ma
Ying-jeou’s “Politburo-esque maneuver”\textsuperscript{12} to enact a trade pact with China to open up the island state’s service industries without fulfilling the promise to allow a clause-by-clause review before implementation. The ultimate source of the protest movement is the increasing wariness felt by Taiwan’s younger generation of, besides and more than the economic impacts of effective merging the two economies though the trade pact, the foreboding sense of China’s incremental political control over Taiwan and the Hongkongization of Taiwan’s hard-won democracy.

On the other hand, Day also points out the prevalent argument by mainland scholars that eventual unification is of paramount importance for China for the fact that territorial unity represents the road to prosperity while disunity tends to lead to disaster and agony. Day argues that such thinking is the result of Chinese traditional mainstream thought of grand unity and sovereignty. While the worries for a possible domino effect affecting China’s frontier regions may not be unfounded, Day contends that the real disaster and agony stem not from separation – as in the “velvet divorce” of the Czech Republic and Slovakia – but from the unwillingness of the stronger side to let go of the weaker leading to the use of devastating military campaign to halt the latter’s move towards independence, as in the case of Russia and Chechnya, or formerly Indonesia and Timor-Leste and Serbia and Kosovo, when the maintenance of social stability and welfare and protection of human rights as the fundamental value of national existence give way to vehement sovereign sentiment and ultra-nationalistic ideology. Anyway, it all boils down to a matter of policy priority. China’s leaders, from Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping have been vehemently against adopting Western liberal democracy for China, both for the fear that the Communist Party will lose its political dominance or China might disintegrate like the former Soviet Union.

The possibility of China’s disintegration is indeed not just a figment of the nightmare of CCP’s leaders, but a favourite prognostication among Western and Japanese scholars too. For instance, Ian Cook and Geoffrey Murray gave a scenario in which “the erosion of sovereignty via such combined pressures as globalization, new regionalism (based partly on newly emerging elite groups) and ethnic dissent, would lead to

\textit{IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)}
China fragmenting”, in a scenario wherein “[r]ich regions like Guangdong and Fujian might attempt to break away from the centre to form a South China state with Hong Kong and Taiwan in order to maintain their economic prosperity, while poor regions would become poorer with the possibility of social unrest and even civil war.”

Cook and Murray added to this scenario the possible secession of Tibet and Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan), resulting in the China proper shrinking to a rump centred on the Huang He 黃河 (Yellow River) and Yangzi Jiang (Chang Jiang) 扬子江 / 长江 deltas (Cook and Murray, 2001: 93).

Farfetched it might seem to be, such “China deconstructs” nightmare scenario does underline the long-term worries of China’s rulers over the impacts of decentralization since Dengist reforms began. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 serves further as a premonition of the bad days to come. After all, China is the world’s only former empire that has not disintegrated as have, all in the 20th century, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, the Western maritime empires, and the Russia empire (later, the Soviet Union). The only ethnic region that managed to break away from China is Outer Mongolia that formed the independent Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, with Russian support, though not recognized by China until 1946.

Unity has been the greatest concern of the generation that holds dear to the conviction that China’s shameful defeat at the hands of Western and Japanese colonizers would never be allowed to be repeated, and that, though not often explicitly stated, high degree of regional autonomy especially in the non-Han regions like Tibet and Xinjiang could be the prelude to separatism and pave the way to China’s disintegration, as the cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have amply attested to. When the former Taiwanese (Republic of China) president Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 came up with his theory of “China in seven blocks” (中國七塊論), he was widely vilified not only in mainland China, but also among the Chinese community leaders overseas.

Lee’s idea was proposed in a book《台灣的主張》 (“Taiwan’s Viewpoint”) he published in May 1999 towards the end of his presidency. Lee wrote that the ideal situation is when China is finally
able to throw off the yoke of Great Sinism (大中華主義) and allow comprehensive autonomy for regions with diverse cultures and differing degrees of development. Lee believed that competition among these seven regions for progress and prosperity would auger well for a more stable Asia. The proposed regions include Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan), Mongolia (Inner Mongolia), the Northeast – as stated in Lee’s book – and two more regions understood to be Jiangbei (north of the Yangzi River) and Jiangnan (south of the Yangzi River).

Lee’s proposal instantly caused uproars both in China and among the overseas Chinese communities. His detractors wasted no time to show their disgust at his audacity to so explicitly propose the splitting up of China. He was crowned with the unenviable title of a stooge of the Western and Japanese anti-China forces. The fact that Lee said before twenty-two years old he had considered himself a Japanese and the media published his photograph wearing a kimono did not help, given the painful memory both in China and in the overseas Chinese communities of the unspeakable inhumanity the Japanese military committed against the Chinese populace during its 1937-1945 invasion and occupation of China and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, those who came to Lee’s defense stressed that Lee, as the first popularly elected president of the first human rights-respecting liberal democracy in the five millennia of Chinese history and the first native Taiwanese Chinese to become Taiwan’s head of state – “who successfully guided the Taiwanese people into full democracy through an election-led, gradual and peaceful process that some international observers have praised as a ‘quiet revolution’”18 – was not proposing China’s disintegration, but administrative decentralization through conferring regional autonomy for economic development.

Lee’s proposal might have had its origin in an earlier book 《和平七雄論》 (“A Theory of the Peaceful Seven Powers”) by Wang Wen-shan19. Wang advocated breaking up China into seven parts – not seven regions, but seven independent countries. Wang’s rationale is that a China with 1.3 billion people could never become a democratic country. The best way to avoid the resurrection of the ancient Chinese empire was to let China disintegrate into several smaller Chinas peacefully,
voluntarily and rationally, stated Wang. It has been said that Lee was deeply impressed by Wang’s book and recommended it to many people including his officials in charge of cross-Strait relations. He also showed the book to the Japanese writer Fukada Yusuke 深田佑介 during the latter’s visit to Taiwan and suggested a Japanese translation. Fukada brought it back to Japan and got a Japanese version out in 1997 called, more provocatively, “Seven Chinas”, published by the Bungeishunju 文藝春秋. This was not the first time the breaking up of China was suggested in Japan in recent years. Taking France as having the optimal country size, Japan’s China expert Nakashima Mineo 中嶋幸雄 had earlier suggested dismantling China into twelve blocks, viz. Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, eastern China, southern China, western China, northern China and central China. Another Japanese China expert Miyazaki Masahiro 宮崎正弘 whom Day cited with regard to Chinese citizens’ anti-American nationalistic outburst, as noted earlier in this review article, also asserted in 1995 that the post-Deng China would split into 16 small states forming a federal system.

The nightmarish scenario of China’s disintegration and the most likely prospect of losing Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, probably also Qinghai and Ningxia, and of course Taiwan, and having China shrunk by half alone is enough for the Communist Party leaders to convince many, not least among the overseas Chinese community leaders, to shun the idea of democratization and regional political autonomy. The death of the Soviet Union hangs like the sword of Damocles to remind people that “[… when] Mikhail Gorbachev launched his radical political reform and initiated the process of political democratization in the former Soviet Union, scholars in the West argued that Gorbachev must be ‘right’ and China’s Deng Xiaoping must be ‘wrong.’ […] However, when Gorbachev’s reforms eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping was proven ‘right.’”20 The prevalence of such views that have fed into the collective fear somehow serves well in justifying the stance of China’s current regime despite the value-loaded nature of judging right and wrong in this case. Soviet Union’s disintegration is definitely wrong in the context of the preference for stability and
territorial unity, but this is highly judgmental. Firstly, as pointed out earlier, that a “nation” divided is destined to herald misery for the people might not be borne out by modern empirical evidence – the outstanding record of economic prosperity, political stability and human welfare of the many successor states of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, the Kalmar Union (the Danish empire) and, of course, the success of Taiwan. To be fair, to generalize such successes could be as empirically unsound as to be consumed by the combination of ethno-national pride and the morbid fear of losing territorial domination, but sometimes, as the proverb goes, the best things might just come in small parcels. E.F. Schumacher in his now classic *Small Is Beautiful* (1973) proposed the idea of “smallness within bigness” – a form of decentralization whereby for a large organization to work it must behave like a related group of small organizations.21 “Man is small, and, therefore, small is beautiful”, Schumacher might just have a point. Secondly, the aspiration for a unified nation under the Han Chinese domination from the point of view of the Han Chinese should be indisputable, but whether this is true from the perspective of other non-Han Chinese people – “Chinese” as defined as “China’s citizens” – especially those who are ethnoterritorial should, to be fair, be properly seen from these ethnic minorities’ point of view, taking seriously into consideration their civil liberties and political rights as well as the right of ethnic self-determination.

Finally, Day asks, since during the three decades of open-door policy and reform which brought mainland China astonishing economic achievements Taiwan was in fact not a part of the People’s Republic of China and her absence in the PRC did not affect in any way the rise of mainland China, there is absolutely no reason to believe that Taiwan’s continued absence in the PRC would constitute a hindrance in any way to the continuing rise of mainland China into a world power. So why is this inexorability of making Taiwan a part of the PRC? – a *sine qua non* for achieving a world superpower status? If Taiwan is simply a military-strategic pawn in Sino-US rivalry, would the Finlandization of Taiwan, as suggested by Bruce Gilley22, following increasing cross-Strait economic and trade relations truly help, Day asks, to reduce Sino-US tension? What would US’s other allies in the Asia-Pacific think if US
were to so easily surrender Taiwan to the PRC?

Day concludes his book with the final two chapters discussing about his core argument of the possible inevitability of a cross-Strait war. The severe inadequacy of political trust causes difficulties in any meaningful progress in truly ending mutual enmity and building in turn military mutual trust, making the rather pragmatic calls of former PRC president Hu Jintao 胡锦涛’s 31st December 2008 “Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu 告台湾同胞书” (“Letter to Our Compatriots in Taiwan”) hollow and futile. With no progress in sight in ending cross-Strait enmity and the state of war since 1949, with PRC’s eventual true or erroneous understanding that Taiwan is forever only willing to go for economic but never political integration with the mainland and with China’s ultimate objective of persuading Taiwan for unification forever remains in vain, one of the three alternative conditions for resorting to non-peaceful means in the Anti-Secession Law, “a complete disappearance of the possibility of peaceful unification”, would assert itself. In such a situation, war is not just an alarmist talk – here Day strikes home with the basic message of his book – whether from the perspective of international power rivalry, the mainland regime’s domestic pressures or the mainland leaders’ power contests and consolidation, even if the Taiwanese government were to hold dear to its present “three no’s” policy: “no unification; no independence; no use of force.”23. All in all, the fact is that: the first two on the part of Taiwan do not guarantee the third by the mainland regime, if the PRC eventually makes good on a jilted lover’s “marry me or I’ll kill you” pledge.

Notes

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1. 戴秉清 (Dong-ching Day), 《兩岸終究難免一戰?!》(Inevitable War?!), Taipei: 秀威資訊科技股份有限公司 (Showwe Information Co., Ltd), 2012, 148 pp. + vi.
4.  Or officially the “Kuomintang of China” (中國國民黨).
5.  Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中國共產黨).


15. Cook and Murray (op. cit.: 93).

16. The Uyghurs in fact established, with Russian help, a short-lived East Turkestan Republic in 1944, but it collapsed after the 1949 Communist victory in China’s civil war, and the region was reincorporated into China as the Xinjiang Uyghur Zizhiqu (“autonomous region”) in 1955. Like the de facto independent Taiwan since 1949, with the collapse of the Ch’ing (Qing) Dynasty that led to the repatriation of the imperial troops from the region, Tibet (today China’s Xizang Zizhiqu) was in every respect virtually on her own from 1911 to 1950.

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19. “Wang Wen-shan” 王文山 was the pen-name of Wang Shih-jung 王世榮, a former associate professor at Taiwan’s Chinese Culture University 中國文化大學. The Chinese version of his book 《和平七雄論》 was published in December 1996.


23. President Ma Ying-jeou proclaimed the “three no’s” policy – no negotiations for unification; no pursuit of de jure independence; no use of force by either side of the Taiwan Strait – in outlining his planned approach to cross-Strait relations prior to the 22nd March 2008’s Taiwan presidential election, seemingly as antitheses to the PRC’s long-standing “three no’s” – no Taiwan independence; no “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”; and no Taiwan membership in organizations where statehood is required.