Positioning Southeast Asia in the Globalized World
Proceedings of The 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia
University Of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
Compiled by
Mohammad Raduan Mohd Riffi
Hanafi Hussin
Rodney C. Jubiloado
Lowell S. Bautista
Christine Yun May Yong

Department of Southeast Asian Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
2011
Positioning Southeast Asia in the Globalized World

Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur

6th – 7th December 2011

Compiled by
Mohammad Raduan Mohd Ariff, Hanafi Hussin, Rodney C. Jubilado, Lowell S. Bautista
and Christine Yun May Yong

Conference on Southeast Asia 2011
Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Conference Committee

Vice Chancellor, University of Malaya (Advisor), Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya (advisor), Mohammad Raduan Mohd. Ariff, Hanafi Hussin, Lili Yulyadi Arnakim, Moneaty Azmi, S. Thirunaukkarasu, Mala Rajo Sathian, Hanizah Idris, Rodney S. Jubilado, Francis Dumanig, Lowell S. Bautista, Kim Hyung Jong, Nicolas Weber, Mazlan Majid, Alias Omar, Nor Haliza binti Harun, Jefri, the students of Department of Southeast Asian Studies and the staff of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

In Kuala Lumpur the 4th International Conference was sponsored by the University of Malaya and Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Proceedings of the 4th ICONSEA is sponsored by the Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

The publication was compiled by a group effort with volunteers from the Department of Southeast Asian Studies and its networking on the Southeast Asian Studies

Compiled by

Mohammad Raduan Mohd Ariff, Hanafi Hussin, Rodney C. Jubilado, Lowell S. Bautista and Christine Yun May Yong

Production chief
Hanafi Hussin

Printer
City Reprographic Services, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Printed copies
60
Electric copies
200

© 2011, Copyright by Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia

Conference on Southeast Asia (4th; 2011 Kuala Lumpur)
Proceeding of the 4th Conference on Southeast Asia: Positioning Southeast Asia in the Globalized World / compilers Mohammad Raduan Mohd Ariff … [et.al]
Positioning Southeast Asia studies – Southeast Asia-Congresses. 2. Political-economy-social
Mohammad Raduan Mohd Aris. II. Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction viii

Conference Program ix

**THEME 1**

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA** 1

Celebrification: Audience Segmentation and Behavior through Celebrity Parasocial Interaction

*Dave De Guzman Centeno*

Politicians in the Public Eye: Correlation between Politician Endorsers’ Source Credibility and Publics’ Voting Behavior during the May 2010 National Elections

*Jose Carlo G. De Pano and Eileen Kae A. Relao*

PM Najib and his 100 Days in Office: Identifying the Visibility of Political and Social Affairs News Using Framing Approach

*Yuslinda Mat Yassin and Hasmah Zanuddin*

A Correlation Study Between Government Public Relations and Decentralization with Information Dissemination on Family Planning in the West Java and Banten Provinces

*Hasmah Zanuddin and Aizirman Djusan*

Mekanisme Pemerkasaan Semangat Patriotisme di Malaysia (Mechanism of Patriotism Empowerment in Malaysia)

*Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu, Rahmad Aydil Ali Akhbar and Zubir Zaiyadi*

**THEME 2**

**GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA** 72

Winds of Change in Myanmar? Implications for International Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation

*Anthony Ware*

Contesting Meanings of Democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia: A Comparison

*Rusdi Omar and Abubakar Eby Hara*

Governance of Mining in Palawan, Philippines: Collaborative Governance and Sustainability

*Sol De Villa B. Rama*

**THEME 3**

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA** 117

The Legal Politics of Finance in Indonesia

*Ujang Bahar*
Foreign Aid for Timor Leste’s State-Building Process: A Comparative Study of Australian and Chinese Aid Programs
Laurentina “Mica” Burreto Soares

Taiwanese Investment in Malaysia: Patterns and Issues
Wu Ming Chu

THEME 4
ASEAN ECONOMY COMMUNITY

Making of the ASEAN Community: ASEAN Integration and its Impact on Workers
Qaiser Munir, Fumitaka Furuoka, Beatrice Lim, Roslinah Mahmud and Khairul Hanif Pazim

Cooperation within the ASEAN Plus Three Context: Incidental or Coincidence?
Mohd Hafizzuddin Md Damiri

THEME 5
ASEAN AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Positioning ASEAN in the Globalised World: Organizing the ASEAN Inter-City Football League for Economic and Socio-Cultural Integration
Lim Peng Han

Figuring ASEAN on Equal Development of MDG’s, How Realistic?
Arzad Sectio

THEME 6
SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

ASEAN Double Crisis: ASEAN Community’s Construction Revisited
Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi

THEME 7
ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Positioning Southeast Asia for Globalization via Expansion of Business Entities; Special Reference to Malaysia and Singapore LLPs
Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas

ASEAN: Security Community Building and Regional Security Politics in Malacca Straits
Sartika Soesilowati

Creating Humanitarian Space through ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
Annisa Gita Srikandini
### THEME 8
**SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Safety Issues in Cyberspace: A Critical Analysis on Trends and Challenges in ASEAN region</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mubarak, A.R</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress as a Cause of Depression among Female Prisoner and Its Effect towards Aggressiveness</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Nurul Hazrina Mazlan and Affizal Ahmad</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Study on Childhood Trauma Experiences in Relation to Development of Substance Abuse and Borderline Personality Disorder among Female in Peninsular Malaysia</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Nurul Hazrina Mazlan and Affizal Ahmad</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesaksamaan Gender yang Substantif dalam Kemudahan Tandas Awam di Malaysia (Gender, Substantive Equality and Public Restrooms in Malaysia)</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mawaddah</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usaha Ke Arah Pembangunan Sosial Wanita di Malaysia: Analisis Peranan Pertubuhan Bukan Kerajaan (NGO) Wanita dalam Menengani Isu Perceraian</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Siti Saleha Binti Adnan</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Facebook: Public Sphere of Thai Middle Class during the Transitional Period</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Wimonsiri Hemtanon</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Life of Rural Native Community: An Understanding Using Phenomenological Approach</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Novel Lyndon, Sivapalan, S. and Mohd. Yusof, H</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing of HIV/AIDS and Social Marketing Program: An Analysis of Malaysian Mainstream Newspapers</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tham Jen Sern and Hasmah Zanuddin</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook Motivation: Significant Impact Factors and Users Differences in Indonesian Youth</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reza Safitri and Hasmah Zanuddin</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between Performance Based Pay and Job Satisfaction in Malaysian Private Institutions of Higher Learning (IPTs)</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Azman Ismail, Najmi Mohd Radzi, Zulkifli Yahya and Ali Boerhannoeddin</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-SEA: Exploring the Impact of Electronic Book Publishing in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Teresa Paula De Luna</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Ghosts: An Ontology of Movement and Value in the Life of a Saigon Sales-Girl</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Robbie Peters</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THEME 9
CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Performing Thai and Indigenous Igorot American Folklore and Identities: Ethnic and Cultural Politics Revealed
Jonathan H. X. Lee, Ph.D. And Mark S. Leo, M.A

Malay Shi’ites Pilgrimage in Iran and Iraq: A Cultural Anthropology Outlook
Mohd Faizal Bin Musa

Staging Cosmopolitanism: Perpetual Peace and Conviviality in the Theatre of
Josefina Estrella
Sir Anril Pineda Tiatco

Conceptual Framework in Studying the Visual of Comic Art
Karna Mustaqim, M.A. & Prof. Dr. Muliyadi Mahamood

Iranun Textile Tradition
Juita Jaafar Manap

Language and Nationalism in Malaysia
Paramjit Kaur

The Maintenance of Central Thai Cultural Identity through Hybrid Music Genres
Vicki-Ann Ware

Textiles of the Katang and Mankhong Ethnic Groups of Southern Laos
Linda S McIntosh

Long Take, Longing and Marginalization in Tsai Ming Liang’s
I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone
Fauzi Naeim Mohamed

The Role of Communication Variables in Influencing Job Retention of Filipinos Call Center Agents in Metro Manila and Region 6
Niel Kenneth F. Jamandre

Social Development in ASEAN: Role of Education in Poverty Reduction
The Ngu Wah Lwin (Sueni)

THEME 10
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

The Śailendras Reexamined
Anton O. Zakharov

Pengaruh Barat di Asia Tenggara: Peranannya Terhadap Sejarah dan Peradaban di Asia
(The Western Influence in Southeast Asia: Its Role in the History and Civilization in Asia)
Ahmad Nabil Bin Amir
Pre-Colonial and Colonial Antecedents: Two Narratives Impacting Contemporary Myanmar Politics
Anthony Ware

Dumai, Riau Indonesia: Dari Kampung Nelayan Ke Kota Industri
(Dumai, Riau Indonesia: From a Fishing Village to the Industrial City)
Anastasia Wiwik Swastiwi

Implementasi Kebijakan Pendidikan Berbasis Sumber Potensi Daerah
(Educational Policy Implementation Based On Potential Regional Sources)
Robert Tua Siregar

THEME 11
MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Traffic Limitation Scheme in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
Mohd Hazmi Bin Mohd Rusli

Butuan Involvement in the Maritime Trade of Southeast Asia, Ad.10th-13th Centuries
Mary Jane Louise A. Bolunia

New ASEAN Maritime Core: Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam Cooperation
Mohd Azhari Abdul Karim

Abstracts (Presenters who did not submit their papers)
INTRODUCTION

The 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia (ICONSEA 2011), with its theme *Positioning Southeast Asia in the Globalized World*, took place from 6 – 7 December 2011 at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malay, Kuala Lumpur. This conference brought together academics, practitioners, researchers, students and administrators from various private and public sectors who critically discussed, shared and exchanged their views about the global contemporary issues governing the region of Southeast Asia today.

The objectives of the 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia (ICONSEA 2011) were as follows:

- To create an awareness of the challenges of regional and global contemporary issues facing Southeast Asian countries today
- To promote Southeast Asia as a region with diverse political, economic, cultural and social characteristics
- To present new research findings in the field of Southeast Asian Studies
- To encourage the exchange of ideas and information among researchers involved in researching and teaching Southeast Asian Studies
- To encourage intellectual discourse among researchers, academicians, governments, private sector and NGOs on issues pertaining to Southeast Asia

A total of 150 abstracts were received for this conference, with a total of 136 papers accepted for presentation. Paper presenters came from various countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Myanmar, Brunei, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, China, United Kingdom, America, Australia, Russia etc, reflecting the eclecticism of this conference. These papers were subdivided into 13 panels including *Political Development of Southeast Asia, Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, Economic Development in Southeast Asia, ASEAN Economy Community, International Relations of Southeast Asia, ASEAN and Regional Integration, Security of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Security Communities, Social Development in Southeast Asia, Arts, Literature and Culture in Southeast Asia, Maritime Southeast Asia and Minorities in Southeast Asia*.

The keynote address of ICONSEA 2011 was presented by Dr. Abdul Rashid Moten from the Islamic International University in Kuala Lumpur. 2 panel presentations were also featured during this conference. The first panel, *Textile in Southeast Asia*, examined textiles found in Laos, Sumba and Langkasuka. The second panel, entitled *Malay Muslims and the Conflict in Southern Thailand*, discussed the effects the conflict has had on education, religion and activist organizations in Southern Thailand.

It is hoped that ICONSEA 2011 will continue to be held biannually, in line with its vision to make this conference a platform that will enable Southeast Asian scholars and researchers to share their knowledge to a wider community.

Chairman
ICONSEA 2011
# CONFERENCE PROGRAM

**6th December 2011 (Tuesday)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 08.00 - 09.00 | Registration at Lecture Hall F  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya |
| 09.00 - 10.15 | Welcoming Remarks by Chairman & Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences  
**Keynote**  
Abdul Rashid Moten  
Positioning Southeast Asia in the Globalized World  
Venue: Lecture Hall F, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya |
| 10.15 - 10.30 | Coffee Break |
| 10.30 - 13.00 | Parallel Session 1  
**Parallel 1A, Dean’s Meeting Room 1**  
**MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA**  
**MODERATOR: LOH WEI LING**  
Shiskha Prabawanintygas  
Reconstructing Maritime Boundaries in Southeast Asia  
Mohammad Zaki Ahmad  
Towards Responsible and Sustainable Fisheries Management Practices: The Need for Institutional Framework for the Cooperative Management and Conservation of Shared Fish Stocks in the South China Sea  
Nazery Khalid & Nathalie Fau  
Trends and developments affecting the maritime industry in South East Asia: Issues, challenges and prospects  
Sri Endang Kornita  
The potential of Synergy in Regional Development Policy (Case Pekanbaru and Kampar Regencies)  
Nordin Hussin dan Azmi Fitrisia  
Bagan Siapi-Api and Fishery in South East Asia 1999-2011 |
Parallel 1B, Dean’s Meeting Room 2

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

MODERATOR: HANIZAH IDRIS
(Presentation in Bahasa Malaysia/Indonesia)
Ahmad Nabil Bin Amir
Pengaruh Barat di Asia Tenggara: Peranannya Terhadap Sejarah dan Peradaban di Asia
(The Western Influence in South East Asia: Its Role in the History and Civilization in Asia)

Ahmad Zainudin Bin Husin

Anastasia Wiwik Swastiwi
Dumai, Riau Indonesia: Dari Kampung Nelayan Ke Kota Industri (From A Fishing Village To The Industrial City)

Adlina Ab Halim, Jayum A. Jawan, Sri Rahayu Ismail, Normala Othman, Arnold Puyok & Mohd Hadzrul Masnin
Penerokaan Sumber Biodiversiti & Impaknya Terhadap Pengetahuan Tradisional Masyarakat Peribumi Di Kawasan Pedalaman Sabah (The Biodiversity Conservation and Indigenous Traditional Knowledge of Rural Sabah)

Robert Tua Siregar
Implementasi Kebijakan Pendidikan Berbasis Sumber Potensi Daerah / Educational Policy Implementation Based On Potential Regional Sources

Parallel 1C, DSEAS Meeting Room

ASEAN AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

MODERATOR: SARTIKA SOESILAWATI

Lim Peng Han
ASEAN Economic and Socio-Cultural Integration

Arzad Sectio
Figuring Asean on Equal Development of MDG’s, How Realistic?

Ridwansyah Yusuf Achmad
Promoting the Asean Community Through Student Movements: A Closer Looka at the Asean Student Union

Huong LE THU
ASEAN in the Asia-Europe Meeting: The experience of external socio-cultural cooperation for the internal process of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community building

Mohamed Aslam Ghulam Hasan
China and Japan East Asia Regionalism: Interest and competition

Parallel 1D, JATI 1, DSEAS
CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: SIR ANRIL PINEDA TIATCO

Fauzi Naeim Mohamed
Long Take, Longing and Marginalization in Tsai Ming Liang’s *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone*

Karna Mustaqim, M.A. & Prof. Dr. Muliyadi Mahamood
Conceptual Framework in Studying the Visual of Comic Art

Ariani Ratna Budiati
‘Unyil’ and ‘Upin – Ipin’: From Children’s Story to National Identity and Multicultural

Elan Lazuardi
The Construction of Ideal Women in Indonesian Women-made Films

Parallel 1E, JATI 2, DSEAS

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: RIE NAKAMURA

Robbie Peters
City Of Ghosts: an Ontology of Movement and Value in the Life of a Saigon Sales-Girl

Ali Boerhannoeddin, Azman Ismail, Najmi Mohd Radzi, Zulkifli Yahya
Relationship between Performance Based Pay and Job Satisfaction in Malaysian Private Institutions of Higher Learning (IPTSs)

Mubarak, A.R
Child safety issues in cyberspace: A critical analysis on trends and challenges in ASEAN region

Nurul Hazrina Mazlan & Affizal Ahmad
A Study on Childhood Trauma Experiences in Relation to Development of Substance Abuse and Borderline Personality Disorder among Female in Peninsular Malaysia

13.00 – 14.00 Lunch

14.00 - 16.00 Parallel Session 2

Parallel 2A, Dean’s Meeting Room 1

ASEAN ECONOMY COMMUNITY

MODERATOR: MOHAMED ASLAM GHULAM HASSAN

Mohd Hafizzuddin Md Damiri
Cooperation Within The Asean Plus Three Context: Incidental Or Coincidence?
Qaiser Munir, Fumitaka Furuoka, Beatrice Lim, Roslinah Mahmud & Khairul Hanim Pazim
Making of the ASEAN Community: ASEAN integration and its impact on workers

Hsia-Ping Lan

Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn
ASEAN Economic Integration, Denationalization and the Relocation of Violence

Parallel 2B, Dean’s Meeting Room 2

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: DESIREE SEGURITAN QUINTERO

Francisco Perlas Dumanig, Maya Khemlani David & Ahmed Hilmi Mhd. Noor
Homosexual Men’s Multiple Identities in Online and Face to Face Interactions: Focus on Malaysia

Tham Jen Sern & Hasmah Zanuddin
Framing of HIV/AIDS and Social Marketing Program: An Analysis of Malaysian Mainstream Newspapers

Andreas Totu, Dayu Sansalu, Romzi Ationg, Henry Bating
Who They Are? Youth’s Identity in the Era of Globalization

Nurul Hazrina Mazlan & Affizal Ahmad
Stress as a Cause of Depression among Female Prisoner and Its Effect towards Aggressiveness

Azwar
Social Distance Mobility in Local Communities around Andalas University Campus

Parallel 2C, DSEAS Meeting Room

MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: DAVE DE GUZMAN CENTENO

Siripen Ungsitipoonporn
The virtual Hakka community: A new domain of revitalization

Nicolas Webeer
The Cham Diaspora in Malaysia. An ‘invisible’ community?

Rie Nakamura
Understanding Hiep Hoi Cham: Hoi Giao Vietnam (the Association of Muslim Cham in
Padma Indranila  
Discrimination against Minorities in Southeast Asia

Andika Bin Ab Wahab  
“Malaysian Solution” Does Not Deter Asylum Seekers Aad Refugees Sail to Australia: A Study From Human Security Perspectives

Parallel 2D, JATI 1, DSEAS

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: NAZERY KHALID

Ederson Delos Trino Tápia  
Exploring Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Perspectives From an Integrated and Multi-Level Approach

Anthony Ware  
Winds of Change in Myanmar?Implications for International Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation

Rusdi Omar And Abubakar Eby Hara  
Contesting Meanings of Democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia: a Comparison

Sol De Villa B. Rama  
Governance of Mining in Palawan, Philippines: Collaborative Governance and Sustainability

Parallel 2E, JATI 2, DSEAS

CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: TERESA PAULA DE LUNA

Oscar Tantoco Serquiña, Jr  
The Neon Lights outside One’s Sliding Door: Displacement and Urban Living in Isabelita Orlina Reyes’s Stories from the City

Sir Anril Pineda Tiatco  
Staging Cosmopolitanism: Perpetual Peace and Conviviality in the Theatre of Josefina Estrella

Ruslan Rahman  
Festival Pulau Makasar: Dari Ritual kepada Pariwisata (Pulau Makassar Festival: From Ritual to Tourism)

Juita Jaafar Manap  
Iranun Textile Tradition
16.00 – 16.30 Coffee Break
16.30 – 18.00 Parallel Session 3

**Parallel 3A, Dean’s Meeting Room 1**

**MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**Panel Discussion**

Malay Muslims and the Conflict in Southern Thailand

**MODERATOR: ANTHONY WARE**

**Lili Yulyadi**
Islam, Indonesia and Education Opportunities: Contribution to the Malay Muslims Development in the Southern Thailand

**Bordin Waelateh**
Threats to Education in Southern Thailand

**Mala Rajo Sathian and Rosnun Che Yusof**
Muslim Women Activist Organisations in the Conflict Region of south Thailand

**Parallel 3B, Dean’s Meeting Room 2**

**CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**MODERATOR: JOSE CARLO G. DE PANO**

**Jonathan H. X. Lee. and Mark S. Leo**
Performing Thai and Indigenous Igorot American Folklore and Identities: Ethnic and Cultural Politics Revealed

**Vicki-Ann Ware**
The maintenance of Central Thai cultural identity through hybrid music genres

**Hasmah Zanudin & Arif ZainYusof Ali**
Culture and Innovation: A Survey of the Malaysian Music Industry

**Parallel 3C, DSEAS Meeting Room**

**SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**MODERATOR: SOL DE VILLA B. RAMA**

**Wimonsiri Hemtanon**
Political Facebook: Public sphere of Thai Middle Class during the transitional period

**Reza Safitri, Hasmah Zanuddin**
Facebook Motivation: Significant Impact Factors and Users Differences in Indonesian Youth
Teresa Paula De Luna  
E-SEA: Exploring the Impact of Electronic Book Publishing in Southeast Asia

Parallel 3D, JATI 1, DSEAS

CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Panel on Textile in Southeast Asia

MODERATOR: MCM SANTAMARIA

Linda S Mcintosh  
Textiles of the Katang and Mankhong Ethnic Groups of Southern Laos

Marie Tseng  
Sumba Ikat: New Trends

Zulkifli Mohamad  
Langkasuka Cloths: Limar, Telepuk, Songket and Tenun

Parallel 3E, JATI 2, DSEAS

INTERNATIONAL RELATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: ANNISA GITA SRIKANDINI

Azman Ayob  
Malaysia and Myanmar Relations: Should Malaysia Take Some Extra Miles In Engaging Myanmar?

Zubaidi  
The Role of Religion and NGOs in Strengthening the Relationship Between Indonesia and Malaysia

Mohd Mohiyuddin Bin Mohd Sulaiman  
Muslim Faith in Buddhist State: Burmese Muslim Nationalists’ Contributions in Myanmar Politics 1920 – 1988

18.00-20.00 Welcome Reception
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia

7th December 2011 (Wednesday)

09.00 - 11.00 Parallel Session 4

Parallel 4A, Dean’s Meeting Room 1

CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA /

MODERATOR: RODNEY C. JUBILADO

Mohd Faizal Bin Musa
Malay Shi’ites Pilgrimage in Iran and Iraq: A Cultural Anthropology Outlook

Niel Kenneth F. Jamandre
A Comparative Study of Attrition among Filipino Customer Service Representatives in Manila and the Provinces

The Ngu Wah Lwin (Sueni)
Social Development in Southeast Asia: Role of Education in Poverty Reduction

Novel Lyndon, Sivapalan, S. & Mohd. Yusof, H
Quality of Life of Rural Native Community: An Understanding Using Phenomenological Approach

Parallel 4B, Dean’s Meeting Room 2

ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITIES

MODERATOR: MUBARAK, A.R

Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas
Positioning Southeast Asia for Globalization via expansion of business entities; Special reference to Malaysia and Singapore LLPs

Sartika Soesilowati
ASEAN: Security Community Building and Regional Security Politic in Malacca Straits

Annisa Gita Sri kandini
Creating Humanitarian Space through ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA)

Kim Hyung Jong
ASEAN in East Asia Summit

Parallel 4C, DSEAS Meeting Room

SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

MODERATOR: MOHD MOHIYUDDIN MOHD SULAIMAN

Suryo Wibisono
Building Peace Beyond the Border in South East Asia Nations

Muharrir Kamaruddin, Rosmadi Fauzi & Jamilah Mohammad
Spatial Factor Analysis for Analysing Crime Related Assault in Kuala Lumpur
Apriwan
Energy Issue in Southeast Asia

Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi
Asean Double Crisis: An ASEAN Community’s Construction Revisited

Parallel 4D, JATI 1, DSEAS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
MODERATOR: THIRUNAUKARASU SUBRAMANIAM

Wu Ming Chu
Taiwanese Investment in Malaysia: Patterns and Issues

Pham Tran Thang Long
Securing Urban Farming Through Multiple and Diversified Food Production Activities

Ujang Bahar
The Legal Politics of Finance in Indonesia

Suttiporn Bunmak
From Irregular Migrant Workers to Entrepreneurs: Tom Yum Restaurant Businesses among Patani Malay Entrepreneurs in Malaysia

Parallel 4E, JATI 2, DSEAS
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
MODERATOR: LILI YULYADI ANARKIM

Jose Carlo G. De Pano And Eileen Kae A. Relao
Politicians in the Public Eye: Correlation between Politician Endorsers’ Source Credibility and Publics’ Voting Behavior during the May 2010 National Elections

Dave De Guzman Centeno
Celebritification: Audience Segmentation and Behavior Through Celebrity Parasocial Interaction

Yuslinda Mat Yassin & Hasmah Zanuddin
PM Najib and his 100 Days in Office: Identifying the Visibility of Political and Social Affairs News using Framing Approach

Aizirman Dhusan & Hasmah Zanuddin
A Correlational Study Between Government Public Relations and Decentralization With Information Dissemination On Family Planning In The West Java And Banten Province

11.00 – 11.15 Coffee Break
11.15 – 13.15  Parallel Session 5

Parallel 5A, Dean’s Meeting Room 1

CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: WAYLAND QUINTERO

Hanafi Hussin & MCM Santamaria
Igal Kata-Kata (Narrative Igal): Examining Approaches to the Interpretation of Folk Tales in Sama Traditional Dance Choreography

Peter Jon L. Mendoza
Filipino Illocution: Gravity, Frequency and Architectural Complexity

Caesar Dealwis
The Use of Sarawak Malay Dialect Among Urban Dayak Bidayuh in Kuching

Paramjit Kaur
Language and Nationalism in Malaysia

Parallel 5B, Dean’s Meeting Room 2

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

MODERATOR: NICOLAS WEBER

Rommel A. Curaming
The Making of a ‘Classic’ in Southeast Asian Studies: Another Look at Kahin, Agoncillo and their Books on Revolutions

Anton O. Zakharov
The Śailendras Reexamined

Anthony Ware
Pre-Colonial and Colonial Antecedents: Two Narratives Impacting Contemporary Myanmar Politics

Yambao, Clod Marlan Krister V
Buoyancy of Historical Memory and the Sea Route of Globalization: The Voyage of the Pre-colonial Balangay and the Colonial Galleon Andalucia

Parallel 5C, DSEAS Meeting Room

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: LILI YULYADI ANARKIM

Laurentina “Mica” Barreto Soares
Foreign Aid for State-Building: A Comparative Study of Australian and Chinese Aid Programs in Timor-Leste
Rosilawati Zainol, Syra Lawrence Maidin, Goh Hong Ching, Norzailawati Mohd Noor, Nikmatul Adha Nordin, Tan Wan Hin, Wan Suzita Wan Ibrahim, Muhamad Nur Akramin Sulaiman
Challenges Faced by Nature-Based Tourism Resources in Selangor

John Walsh
Tourism in Thailand and the Post-Authoritarian Development of the Creative Industries

Tracy Peter Samat, Mus Chairil Samani, Dayang Aizza Abang Ahmad, & Jamilah Maliki
Communicating with the World: Uses and Gratification Research on Ethnic Tourism

Parallel 5D, JATI 1, DSEAS

MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: KIM HYUNG JONG

Mary Jane Louise A. Bolunia
Butuan Involvement in the Maritime Trade of Southeast Asia, Ad.10th-13th Centuries

Loh Wei Leng
Straits Port of Penang: Gateway to Indian Ocean Region

Mohd Hazmi Bin Mohd Rusli
The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Traffic Limitation Scheme in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Mohd Azhari Abdul Karim
New ASEAN Maritime Core: Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam Cooperation

Parallel 5E, JATI 2, DSEAS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA/ GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: MALA RAJO SATHIAN

Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu, Rahmad Aydil Ali Akhbar, Zubir Zaiyadi
* Presentation in Bahasa Malaysia
Mekanisme Pemerkasaan Semangat Patriotisme di Malaysia /
(Mechanism of Patriotism Empowerment In Malaysia)

Nang Shining
Does Participatory Governance and The Practice of EGAT’s Corporate Social Responsibility at the Community level in Thailand Ensure Environmental Justice in Cross Border Investments?: A Case Study of The Proposed Hat Gyi Hydropower Project on Salween River, Myanmar/ Burma

Jendrius
From Nagari to Desa and Back to Nagari: Historical Context of Nagari Governance in West Sumatra
Asra Virgianita
Donors and Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Cases of Indonesia, Philippine, and Myanmar

13.15 – 14.15 Lunch

14.15 – 16.15 Parallel Session 6

Parallel 6A, Dean’s Meeting Room 1

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(Presentation in Bahasa Malaysia/Indonesia)

MODERATOR: KU HASNITA KU SAMSU

Mawaddah
Kesaksamaan Gender yang Substantif dalam Kemudahan Tandas Awam di Malaysia
Gender, Substantive Equality and Public Restrooms in Malaysia

Siti Saleha Binti Adnan

Parallel 6B, Dean’s Meeting Room 2

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: HASMAH ZAINUDDIN

Aryo dwiharprayudiis
Student Movements as Creative Minority

Abdullah Sumrahadi
Engineering Cultural Studies as Social Capital for Strengthen Asean Community

Adekunie Daoud Balogun
Dramatic Political Transition in Southeast Asia in the recent time: Issues, Prospects and Challenges

Rohaizan Baharuddin
Democracy in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei: A Tripartite Comparison

Parallel 6C, DSEAS Meeting Room

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: LILI YULYADI ANARKIM
Suharno & Samodra Wibawa
Conflict Resolution in Sampit 2004: Politics of Recognition in a Multicultural Society

Mohamad Latief
Islam and State in Indonesia; A Substantivistic Perspective

Elfitra, Jendrius
Changes in Stratification, Institutions and Lifestyle: Oil Palm Plantation and Social Change in a Rural Community in West Pasaman, Indonesia

Parallel 6D, JATI 1, DSEAS

CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: HANAFI HUSSIN

Tulus Handra Kadir
Human Ordering in Quranic Recitation: The Invention And Standardization Of Murattal Al-Qur`An In West Sumatera

Indrayuda And Tulus Handra Kadir
Cultural Development in the Minangkabau Dance Through the Effect of Social Politics in West Sumatera

Pegah Jahangiri, Mina Hedayat, Dr Sabzali Musa Kahn
The developments of batik in fashion designing in Klang Valley from year 2003 till present

Wong, Lee Lan
The Spread of Love: A case study of charitable activity of Tzu Chi Foundation in Kali Angke, Jakarta

Parallel 6E, JATI 2, DSEAS

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MODERATOR: MOHAMED ASLAM GHULAM HASAN

Jikon Lai
Revisiting the Developmental State the Developmentof Islamic Finance in Malaysia

Rajah Rasiah & Yap Xiao Shan
Can Malaysian Firms Innovate? Benchmarking Against International Technology Leaders

Noni Lela Hayati Ayob, Wan Suzita Wan Ibrahim, Rosilawati Zainol
Rethinking of Tourism Management in Cherating, Pahang

NorShahida, A. & Khairulmaini, O.S.,
Coastal Community Economies in Northern East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia

**Sharif Shofirun Sharif Ali, Rosmadi Fauzi And Jamilah Mohamad**

16.15 – 16.30 Coffee Break

16.30 – 18.30 Roundtable discussion

**Eric C. Thomson, Goh Beng Lan, Rommel Curamig, Lili Yulyadi, MCM Santamaria**
Diversification and Deepening of Southeast Asian Studies

(Lecture Hall F, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya)

18.30 Closing
Certification and appreciation
THEME ONE

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
CELEBRIFICATION: AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION AND BEHAVIOR THROUGH CELEBRITY PARASOCIAL INTERACTION

Dave G. Centeno  
University of the Philippines, Philippines  
davecenteno@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Celebrities, unbound by political constraints, bring new perspectives which expand the range of ideas represented in our national dialogue. “Celebrification”, coined by several writers refers to the infusion and intrusion of the celebrity factor on behavior, and on the perception by an individual of a person, an idea, or a product, as an effect of the ‘parasocial’ interaction with the personalities of popular entertainment media.

This article looks at the voting behavior of individuals as a correlate of Parasocial Interaction (PSI) — a ‘mediated rapport’ or “illusion of intimacy” (Horton & Wohl, 1956) with TV personae. A non-random sample of those who voted during the May 2007 Philippine Senatorial Elections in Metro Manila and Bulacan were surveyed and asked to assess celebrity endorsers of senatorial candidates using the PSI Scale. Results showed that respondents have higher PSI with celebrity endorsers of candidates they voted for.

Demographic variables were also tested as to whether they might be indicators of PSI. The survey tends to suggest that celebrity endorsers who have higher parasociability invoke positive action and behavior (i.e., voting for their candidates). This means that they are also somehow indirect agents of change similar to significant others, when they endorse politicians who are possible leaders of the country, although the findings also show that there are exceptions to this. The paper concludes by turning to Symbolic Interactionism (wherein celebrities are perceived to be ‘significant others’ who may affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors), and notes the advertising implications of ‘celebrification’.

Keywords: Philippine National Elections, Celebrity Endorsers, Parasocial Interaction, Public’s Voting Behavior

BACKGROUND: DEFINING “CELEBRIFICATION”

“Celebrification”, or for others, “celebritification”, is a word coined by several writers to refer to the infusion and intrusion of the celebrity factor on behaviour, and on perception by individual of an object (be it a person, an idea, or a product), as an effect of the popular entertainment media. A few scholarly articles have mentioned this buzzword, implicating the similar connotation in differing contexts. ‘Celebritification’ was attributed to stalking as crime, when one party (usually the spectator) feels a relationship, and sometimes a sense of being wronged by the persona (the one being stalked) and seeks some kind of retribution, or when the stalker, who is often a stranger to the (celebrity) victim, deludedly thinks that there is a romantic bond between them (Wykes, 2007). Rich (2007) identifies a number of trends relating to the quality of politicians emerging in Pacific Asia of which one quality is attributed to the “celebritification” of politics: mixing the element of showbiz.1

The ‘celebritification’ of ordinary people (transforming a relatively unknown individual into a famous one) is posited as an effect of “remarkable transmogrifications in television production, supply, and consumption” which have generated increased visibility and protagonism (or expressions of positive

1 Other qualities mentioned include decline in military figures, the growing role of women, and the struggle against the gangsterization of politics (Rich 2007).
perception). (Hartley, 2008). The celebrification of culture is a phenomenon that has been observed over the last seventy-five years. Celebrities, unbound by political constraints, bring new perspectives which expand the range of ideas represented in our national dialogue. However, a system based on “celebrityhood” risks the glorification of fame and fortune, such that there will be more superficiality and less substance in our society.

West (2007) asserts that:

“The society is now the in the “Age of Celebrity”, where movie stars run for elective office and win. Politicians play fictional characters on television shows. Rock stars raise money for political parties. Musicians, athletes, and artists speak out on issues of hunger, stem cell research, and foreign policy. (Angelina, Mia, and Bono: Celebrities and International Development, 2007).

‘Celebrification’ is also the word suggested by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism to describe a phenomenon seemingly rampant in the Philippine political landscape during elections. In this phenomenon, celebrities help politicians to be more popular; celebrities endorse candidates during election campaigning; and celebrities themselves become politicians wanting to serve the country (PCIJ, 2007). This has happened even before the 2004 national elections and suggests that the phenomenon will only become more and more prominent in Philippine poltics as media plays a bigger role in the Filipino audiences’ everyday life.

Some examples of this phenomenon: the former Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas was elected senator when at that time he was romantically involved with Korina Sanchez, a well-known TV broadcast journalist. They got married in 2009, a year before the May 2010 Presidential Elections where Mar Roxas became a vice-presidentialiable. Celebrification also happened when then President Gloria Arroyo was endorsed by popular talk show host Boy Abunda for the 2004 presidential elections. PCIJ asserts that the most popular among these celebrification instances was when the then unknown candidate Maria Ana Consuelo “Jamby” Madrigal overwhelmingly won seemingly because of the endorsement of actress Judy Ann Santos who joined Madrigal in her campaign rallies (Beronilla, 2007).

Just recently, months before the May 2010 national elections, the Philippine Commission on Elections (Comelec) issued a resolution (Resolution 8758 to implement the ‘Fair Elections Act’ or Republic Act 9006) directing celebrity endorsers of political candidates to either go on leave or resign from their current media undertakings. In response, loud opinions against the said act were heard especially from the media practitioners and celebrities themselves, who asserted that the said resolution violates their free speech rights and rights as citizens to support the candidates they like. The issue was hyped in the news and different networks – both TV and radio. Finally, the Comelec en banc lifted the resolution, saying that celebrity endorsers of political candidates are not required to resign or go on leave but left it to the discretion to the network or the person involved (Business World, Feb 13, 2010). Celebrities are thus seen to play extremely significant roles in this societal event when people have to select whose name they will blacken in the election ballots. These discussions on the concept of ‘celebrification/celebritification’ all describe the influence and power of celebrities across cultures today. However, inquiry into why people have ‘halo’ perceptions of celebrities, and to explain the emergence of the culture of celebrification, is lacking.

This article uses cybernetic and socio-psychological paradigms of the hybridity of mass communication and interpersonal communication to examine the phenomenon of celebrification. Mass media and interpersonal relationships are the communication elements that play vital roles in celebrification, affecting sensitive political affairs and informing the interaction between celebrity endorsers and the voting public; such is the unique effect of mass media on individuals, that it can bear a resemblance to social interaction. The query focuses on the concept of some sort of mediated rapport, or the “illusion of intimacy”, which has been termed parasocial interaction between the TV personae and the viewers.
PARASOCIAL INTERACTION

Mass media and interpersonal communication are generally seen as two entirely different and extreme contexts of communication, but researchers have identified the phenomenon that binds these two contexts together: parasocial Interaction (PSI) is an atypical consequence of television viewing when people process mass-mediated communication in a manner similar to interpersonal interaction; as opposed to the typical consequences of media as for merely knowledge and information (Rubin, 1994; Schiappa, 2005). Years after Horton and Wohl (1956) conceptualized this idea, PSI has been tagged as an imaginary, one-sided friendship and other intimate relationship a viewer has with a mass communication “persona” or character (Houlberg, 1984; Levy 1979; Rubin, Perse, & Powell, 1985; Perse & Rubin, 1990; Sood & Rogers, 2000). Persona are the characters frequently seen on TV such as newscasters, soap opera actors and actresses portraying roles, and all other sorts of personalities on TV. Though the relationship is limited by the vicarious interaction of the persona and the viewer, the latter feels that s/he knows and understands the persona in the same way s/he knows and understands flesh-and-blood friends and intimate fellows; the TV personalities are “like other people in the viewers’ social circle” (Rubin, Perse, & Powell, 1985, p. 189).

Levy (1979) has explored the intricacies of parasocial interaction with TV newscasters in a study. His overall finding strongly suggests that parasocial interaction with news personae is a common feature of the audience experience with television news. The most general indicator of the parasocial relationship is Proposition 1 in Levy’s study—almost like friends one sees everyday. From the focused group transcripts of the study, it is clear that few, if any, viewers confuse the newscasters with their actual friends. But many do relate to the broadcasters as something “special”.

People who watch television news engage in varying degrees of parasocial interaction with the news personae. Those viewers who find the parasocial relationship particularly attractive or gratifying increase their exposure in order to increase their “contact” with the news personae (Levy 1979, p. 7). While it is possible that there is a threshold of exposure beyond which individuals will not increase their viewing in order to increase their parasocial interactions, it is also likely that establishing and maintaining parasocial interaction with the news personae is an important determinant of how much television news some people will watch (Levy, 1979).

Perse and Rubin (1989) examined parasocial interaction in the case of soap opera viewers. Their analysis concluded that similar to social relationships, parasocial relationships with favorite soap opera characters were based, to some extent, on reduction of uncertainty and the ability to predict accurately the feelings and attitudes of the persona. Perse and Rubin’s study highlighted the utility of applying interpersonal frameworks to media contexts. Furthermore, their study implies that construct systems about real people and soap opera characters were linearly related; the link between social and parasocial complexity suggests that viewers are using a significant percentage of their interpersonal constructs when they describe soap opera characters (which is not surprising, given the emphasis of soap opera content on interpersonal relationships). Perse and Rubin’s study indicates that people constitute a construct domain that may be sufficiently permeable to include both interpersonal and television contexts.

Koenig and Lessan (1985) investigated the relationship between television viewers and some television personalities. The survey measured the semantic space between the concepts: self and best friend.

---

2 He used a focus group discussion with two dozen adults living in the greater Albany Country, New York region. The focused group participants were selected from a variety of social backgrounds and all watched television news regularly. Transcripts of each hour-long discussion were analyzed for viewer attitudes toward television news programs and a propositional inventory of 42 uses and gratifications items was prepared from this analysis. Based on the discussion of parasocial interaction, seven propositions were selected as possible indicators of parasocial interaction. The results showed that on the average, more than half (53%) of respondents agreed with the parasocial interaction propositions, with support for the measures ranging from a low of 31% to a high of 80% (Levy, 1979).

3 One hundred five soap opera-viewing college students completed questionnaires constructed from the theories to be tested (i.e. Uncertainty Reduction, Personal Construct). Personal Construct Theory (PCT) illustrated that soap opera viewers may extend the range of their interpersonal construct systems to form impressions of television characters. Uncertainty Reduction Theory (URT) pointed out that reduced uncertainty about characters partially explains the development of parasocial relationships (Perse and Rubin, 1989). Their discussion focuses on implications of these findings for uncertainty reduction theory and personal construct theory.
acquaintance, and favorite television personality. Results of their study revealed that television characters “hold an intermediate position between friend and acquaintance” (1985, p. 264). The authors suggested the term “quasi-friend” as appropriate in describing the relationship between the viewer and a favorite television character.

Other studies have examined how parasocial interaction theory might be used to understand consumers’ participation in online communities. Ballantine and Martin (2005) posit that for online community dependency to occur, an individual must have a pre-existing dependency on (and usage of) the Internet. Dependency on an online community is then predicted to lead to increased parasocial interaction, which then leads to increased usage of that community. The mediating role of parasocial interaction is reinforced by the inclusion of a direct path from online community dependency to online community usage. Moreover, and similar to Kozinets’ (1999) proposition, a direct path flows from Internet usage to the usage of online communities. Finally, online community usage may lead to consumption related behavior (e.g., a non-participative online community user may decide what product to purchase, decide to switch to another brand advocated by active members of an online community, and the like). A feedback loop is also included, indicating that subsequent to some type of consumption-related behavior occurring, an online community member will then return to the community.

MEASURING PARASOCIAL INTERACTION

How can parasocial interaction be measured then? The Parasocial Interaction Scale (PSIS) is a tool constructed by Rubin, Perse, and Powell in 1985, it was later modified by Allen in 1988. PSIS has four psychological constructs which Allen has labeled as the following: (1) perceived similarity or idea coherence where the viewer shares the TV persona’s beliefs and ideas, (2) physical attraction, (3) empathy or passive bonding, (4) empathic action or active bonding which requires overt viewer action to complete. This 20-item PSIS proved to be reliable in this paper’s utilization (Cronbach alpha = .89). It uses a 5-point Likert scale where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral/don’t know, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree.

More researches have been made since the publication of Horton and Wohl’s delineation of PSI. Correlates and non-correlates were identified in various empirical investigations to develop Parasocial Interaction Theory. Levy (1979) has found a positive correlation between age and PSI (r = 24, p<0.01). Older people have higher PSI with TV personae. He also discovered that education could be inversely linked to PSI (r = -52, p<0.01); less educated people have higher PSI with the TV personalities. Amount of time spent watching TV also has a moderate correlation with PSI in Levy’s (1979) research (r = 0.21, p<0.05); the idea is supported by Rubin & McHugh (1987) (r = 0.12, p<0.05). The latter also found out that when the TV persona is perceived to be physically attractive by the viewer, higher PSI could be exhibited by this viewer (r = 0.33, p<0.01). Rubin, Perse, & Powell (1985) concluded that PSI could also be slightly linked with relationship importance (r = 0.16, p<0.01) wherein individuals who say relationships are important to them manifest higher PSI with TV personalities. Finally, Allen (1988) overwhelmingly discovered a very high correlation between ratings of TV newscasters and PSI with the newscasters (r = 0.98, p<0.01). Aside from these findings, Rubin (1983) has also reported correlations between parasocial interaction and dependency on media sources for fulfilling particular social interactions needs (in Gregg, 1971). For some individuals,
parasocial interaction is believed to be a functional alternative to interpersonal relationships (Rosengreen and Windahl, 1972; Rubin and Rubin, 1985; Rubin and McHugh, 1987).

CELEBRITY ENDORSEMENTS

A celebrity endorser is defined by McCracken (1989) as “any individual who enjoys public recognition and who uses this recognition on behalf of a consumer good by appearing with it in an advertisement” (p.34). This public recognition can be due to the frequent appearances of these personalities on TV programs such as soap operas, variety shows, talk shows, and motion pictures, where they are able to project certain images that could impact on viewers, creating parasocial relationships between audience members and these celebrities. Whenever celebrities endorse a product or a service in an advertisement, it can be said that this technique is similar to opinion leadership by significant others. Ohanian (1991) asserts that the explanation for the popularity of celebrity advertising is the advertisers’ belief that messages delivered by well-known personalities achieve a high degree of attention and recall for some consumers. Highly credible sources such as celebrities have been found to produce more positive attitude changes toward the position advocated and to induce more behavioral changes than less credible sources (Craig and McCann, 1978; Woodside and Davenport, 1974).

Advertising professor and practitioner Eleanor Agulto, describes the parallelism between commercial advertisements and political advertisements in an interview with Philippine Journalism Reports (PJR, 2007, in Junio and Laurio, 2007)—she emphasizes that, as compared to a product being endorsed, a candidate is also being sold in a political advertisement. More parallelism indicators are manifested in both types of advertisements: “…most TV (political) ads use the same devices in product advertisements – jingles, slogans, and testimonies, among other things…” (Junio & Laurio, 2007, p.20).

Jay Bautista, executive director of Nielsen Media Research Philippines (NMRP), a TV research agency, says that “selling an unknown candidate (is) like selling a new product” (Bautista, 2007, p.16; in Junio and Laurio, 2007). Brand identity to a political figure, combined with recall and ambassadorship of image, are the concepts considered by Filipino advertising strategists when looking for a celebrity endorser to bring a desirable effect to election campaigns. Parasocial Interaction with the celebrity endorser may be subconsciously involved in how the public would opt to vote for a particular candidate.

This paper examines the relationship of parasocial interaction with the publics’ voting behavior during the May 2007 Senatorial Elections in the Philippines, based on a study conducted two months after these elections, The research questions are: What can be observed in the PSI of the voting individuals with celebrity endorsers in their voting behavior towards the endorsed candidates? Is there a correlation between the public’s voting behavior towards a celebrity endorsed-candidate and PSI scores of these publics? Does PSI differ across various demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, annual family income, place of origin, and educational attainment) of these voting publics?

METHOD

Respondents
The target information is the publics' PSI with twelve celebrity endorsers, to determine these publics' voting behavior towards the candidates that these celebrities have endorsed during the said elections. Data were obtained from PSIS answers of Filipinos who were able to cast votes in the elections. The study used a purposive nonprobability sampling method. Volunteering-respondents (who answered the survey without any form of incentives) comprised 229 Filipino voters of different demographic backgrounds. The respondents were selected on the basis of specific characteristics, to build up a sample of sufficient size having the desired

---

He further emphasizes,

... If there’s a new product not known to anyone, TV or mass media allows you to introduce the product and make people aware of it. Similar to a political candidate who is not a national figure, mass media allows him to be seen and heard and make the voters aware that he is running. (Junio & Laurio, 2007, p.21).
trait. They are residents and workers at least 18 years of age, 42% are males and 58% are females, from urban Metro Manila (48%) and from San Miguel, Bulacan, a town in a nearby province which can be described as rural (52%); with varying socio-economic status as determined by their annual family income. They also have varying educational attainment which will be discussed later in the results.

Primarily therefore, the respondents came from the areas of Metro Manila and Bulacan. For Metro Manila areas, most of them were associated with two private organizations and one public institution namely, Red Ribbon Bakeshop (RRB) with main office located in Libis, Quezon City; RYCO Inc. located at Makati City; and Ipil Residence Hall, at UP Diliman, Quezon City. On the other hand, Bulacan respondents were from selected areas of the town of San Miguel. There were respondents from selected households of neighboring barangays of Salacot, Buga, and Ilog-Bulo. Lastly, there were a number of respondents from the Bulacan Polytechnic College.

**Instrument**

These voter-respondents were asked to answer firstly, a demographic information sheet asking for their age, gender, annual family income, place of residence, and educational attainment. Afterwards, they were asked to choose a name from a list of candidates whom they voted for. Then they rated the celebrity endorser of that candidate using the Parasocial Interaction Scale (PSIS) which was presented to them in either an English or Filipino questionnaire. The respondents were then asked again to pick another candidate, this time, a candidate who they did not vote for during the elections and give another PSIS rating to the celebrity endorser of the “not voted for” candidate. In cases when there was more than one celebrity who endorsed the candidate, the respondent chose only one celebrity to rate. The list of candidates and celebrity endorsers from which the respondents chose is found in Table 1.

### Table 1: List of Candidate-Celebrity Endorser voter-respondents chose names from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senatorial Candidate</th>
<th>Celebrity Endorser (TV Persona)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Francis Escudero</td>
<td>Susan Roces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manny Villar</td>
<td>Jennylyn Mercado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Pangilinan</td>
<td>Sharon Cuneta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noynoy Aquino</td>
<td>Kris Aquino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgardo Angara</td>
<td>Sarah Geronimo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koko Pimentel</td>
<td>Angel Locsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Recto</td>
<td>Vilma Santos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Defensor</td>
<td>Boy Abunda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic Sotto</td>
<td>Tito Sotto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joey De Leon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variables**

The first variable—voting behavior—was represented by respondents’ checking of two names on the given list of candidates. Each respondent was asked to check one name of a person who s/he voted for (positive

---

8 Both have reliability values (Cronbach alpha = 0.89 and 0.87 respectively).
voting behavior), and in another preceding portion, to check one name who s/he did not vote for (negative voting behavior).

The next variable, Parasocial Interaction (PSI), is consequent to the answer of each respondent to the first variable. Each respondent would determine his/her PSI with the celebrity endorser of the ‘voted for’ candidate, as well as with the celebrity endorser for the ‘not voted for’ candidate. (A list of senatorial candidates was given side-by-side with each candidate’s celebrity endorser.) PSI is determined by the Parasocial Interaction Scale.

**FINDINGS**

**PSI of Celebrity Endorsers and the Voting Behavior of Individuals**

Since the design of the instrument asked for two observations from each respondent, the 229 total sample size reflects 458 total observations (229 PSI scores for positive voting behavior [i.e. vote for the candidate], and 229 for negative voting behavior [i.e. not voting for the candidate]). Shown in Table 2, almost all celebrities have higher PSI scores among the respondents who voted for their endorsed candidates, and conversely, lower PSI among those who did not vote for the candidate, except for Vilma Santos who had an inverse effect – lower PSI to positive voting behavior.

**Table 2: Summary of PSI Mean Scores for each Celebrity and Respondents’ Voting Behavior towards the endorsed Candidate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Celebrity and Endorsed Candidate</th>
<th>Number of PSI observations</th>
<th>PSI MEAN SCORE&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Susan Roces for Chiz Escudero</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennylyn Mercado for Manny Villar</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel Locsin&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; for Manny Villar</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharon Cuneta for Kiko Pangilinan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judy Ann Santos for Kiko Pangilinan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kris Aquino for Noynoy Aquino</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Geronimo for Ed Angara</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel Locsin&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; for Koko Pimentel</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilma Santos for Ralph Recto</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Manzano for Ralph Recto</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boy Abunda for Mike Defensor</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic Sotto for Tito Sotto</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: (a) Angel Locsin has two endorsements taken in this study: one case is for a winning candidate (Manny Villar), another is for a non-winning candidate (Koko Pimentel).

(b) The highest possible score for PSI is 100, lowest is 20.

The PSI associated with positive voting behavior is found to be higher than with negative voting behavior. Susan Roces was rated by 35 respondents who voted for Chiz Escudero, giving her a PSI mean score of 65.66. Her PSI mean score among those who did not vote for Escudero (N=20) is 52.3. Jennylyn Mercado, who endorsed Manny Villar in the 2007 senatorial elections had a PSI score of 73.94 for positive voting behavior and 48.4 PSI for non-voting behavior. Angel Locsin, who also endorsed Manny Villar, acquired PSI scores higher among those who voted for Villar compared to those who did not vote for Villar (65.71 and 60.44 respectively). Sharon Cuneta, who endorsed husband Kiko Pangilinan, gained 67.5 mean PSI for positive voting behavior and 55.8 for negative voting behavior.

Judy Ann Santos’ PSI for voters of Kiko Pangilinan is 72.5, higher than among those who did not vote for Pangilinan (50.67). This is the same with Kris Aquino who endorsed brother Noynoy Aquino, with PSI for positive voting behavior of 74.76, and 57.81 for negative voting behavior. The pattern also applies to endorsers Sarah Geronimo endorsing Ed Angara (80.74 for Angara’s voters, 61.05 for non-voters), Luis Manzano endorsing father-in-law Ralph Recto (62.17 for positive voting behavior, 57.86 for negative voting behavior), Boy Abunda endorsing Mike Defensor (68.38 for Defensor’s voters, and 58.09 for non-voters), Vic Sotto endorsing brother Tito Sotto (79.6 for Sotto’s voters, and 56.0 for non-voters), and Joey de Leon endorsing Tito Sotto as well (73.0 for positive voting behavior, and 55.0 for negative voting behavior).

Angel Locsin’s case is a special concern in this study as she was to be rated by PSI Scale for two endorsements—Villar (a winning candidate) and Pimentel (a non-winning candidate)— to find out if there is any difference in the way she is rated by people who voted and did not vote for Villar and Pimentel. For her endorsement of Pimentel, Angel acquired 42 respondents. Sixteen of them reported positive voting behavior for Pimentel. The average PSI they gave Angel Locsin was 71.38. The other 26 respondents had negative voting behavior for Pimentel. The average PSI score for Angel Locsin among them was 56.81. At this point, it can be also observed that, in the case of positive voting behavior, Angel Locsin has higher PSI among Pimentel voters than among Villar’s voters. However, Angel has lower PSI among Pimentel’s non-voters than Villar’s non-voters. This might be an indicator of the contribution of Angel Locsin’s celebrity endorsement to the winning outcome of Villar and non-winning result of Pimentel’s candidacy.

Vilma Santos endorsed her husband Ralph Recto. A total of 35 respondents rated Vilma. Of these, seven respondents reported to positive voting behavior for Recto. The average PSI score Vilma Santos had among them was 56.14. The other 28 respondents said they have negative voting behavior for Recto. These respondents gave Vilma Santos an average PSI score of 58.32. As compared to other endorsements, Vilma Santos is the only celebrity who got PSI scores marginally higher among those with negative voting behavior than those with positive voting behavior towards Recto. It might suggest that Vilma Santos is not a significant factor in the considerations of the public when choosing Recto, given the relatively low PSI scores she received. Or it can be that, Vilma Santos’ celebrity endorsement has a neutral to negative effect on Recto. Table 2 provides the complete tabulation of PSI mean scores along with the total observations for each case.

With regard to the possible correlation of the two variables – PSI and voting behavior – Point Biserial Correlation reveals a moderate positive correlation between the two variables (r = 0.421, p<0.01). The fair degree of relationship means that the two variables – celebrity PSI and voting behavior – coincide with each other.

---

9 Point Biserial Correlation considers a special combination of variables where one is interval (PSI scores 20-100) and the other is dichotomous – voting behavior – ‘voted for’ (coded as 1) and ‘not voted’ (coded as 0).
Demographic variables and PSI differences
The following are the findings on the differences of PSI across different demographic variables:

Age
The Age demographic variable was divided into three clusters when respondents answered the survey: 18 to 21 (according to SWS in their March 15-18, 2007 survey, less than 9% of the actual voters belongs to this age bracket); 22 to 30 (around 23% of the actual voters were of this age bracket), 31 and above (the rest of the aforementioned SWS percentages of actual voters belonged to this bracket). Of the 229 sample size, 84 respondents are 18 to 21 years old or 36.7% of sample size; 80 respondents belong to the 22-30 years old age group (34.9% of the sample size), and 65 are aged 31 and above (28.40%).

Using Tukey HSD Analysis of Variance, there are three findings: firstly, there is no significant difference on the PSI mean scores between the 18-21 (PSI Mean score = 71.23) and 22-30 (PSI mean score = 72.61) age groups (mean difference=1.38, p<0.802); second, there is no significant difference between PSI mean score given by age groups 18-21 (PSI mean score = 71.23) and 31-above (PSI mean score = 65.89) (mean difference=5.34, p<0.57); and finally, there is a significant difference on the mean scores given by age groups 22-30 (PSI mean score = 72.61) and 31-above (PSI mean score = 65.89)(mean difference=6.72, p<0.01). In other words, only the age groups 22-30 years old respondents and 31-above respondents differ significantly in rating the celebrities with the Parasocial Interaction Scale (PSIS). Young adults have significantly higher PSI than older people.

This finding is in alignment with the SWS survey in March 2007 where it says that younger people of age 44 or less have more scope in political ads (17-18% of the respondents reported that ads were NO HELP to them) than the older people of age 45 and up (23-28% of them said ads were of NO HELP to them).

Gender
A total of 96 male (42%) and 133 female (58%) participated in the survey. SWS (2007) reported that there was actually a balance of percentages between the two genders. The T-test showed that there is a significant difference (p<0.01) between the PSI mean scores given by male (PSI mean score = 65.61) and female (PSI mean score = 73.53) respondents to those celebrity endorsers of candidates they voted for Senator. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference (p<0.974) in the PSI mean scores given by male (PSI mean score = 56.82) and female (PSI mean score = 56.89) to those celebrity endorsers of the candidate whom they did not vote for. Seemingly, females rate higher (PSI=73.53) than males (PSI=65.61) in terms of PSI. This is in the case of those celebrity endorsers of voted candidates only, wherein the difference between male and female PSI is highly significant (mean difference=7.92, p=.000).

The observation of higher PSI scores among females than males might be attributed to the nature of the TV personality to whom males feel closest. As Koenig and Lessan (1985) found out in their study on PSI, male viewers are closest first to newscasters, then to talk show hosts, and to sitcom characters, whereas females did not differentiate among the three types of TV personalities, they all have high PSI. In this study, there was no newscaster who acted as celebrity endorser. Most of the celebrity endorsers are soap opera, talk show, sitcom, and variety show personalities. Another explanation could be that women are the primary viewers of Very High Frequency (VHF) TV, per the statistics released by Business Mirror (2007). Women spend more time watching TV; Rubin and McHugh (1987) termed this as ‘viewing tenure’. Robin and McHugh found that the longer the exposure of a person to TV, the higher PSI s/he may have to a TV personality.

However, SWS reports that there was no computed difference between the two gender in the way their receptivity of ads (SWS, 2007).

Annual Family Income
This demographic information is based on a bracketing scheme identifying a range of annual family income of Filipinos. Initially, a 9-bracket scale was used to determine the respondent’s annual family income (as a
The distribution of respondents according to their estimated annual income were: 37 (16% of total sample) belongs to Bracket 1 (Php 0-45,000); 15 (6.6%) for Bracket 2 (Php45,001-55,000); 25 (10.9%) for Bracket 3 (Php55,001-65,000); 14 (6.1%) for Bracket 4 (Php65,001-80,000); 25 (10.9%) for Bracket 5 (Php80,001-130,000); 13 (5.7%) for Bracket 6 (Php130,001-170,000); 25 (10.9%) for Bracket 7 (Php170,001-210,000); 21 (9.2%) for Bracket 8 (Php210,001-250,000); and 54 (23.6%) belongs to Bracket 9 (Php250,001 and above). The 9-bracket scale was then collapsed into two binary groups: Brackets 1-5 and Brackets 6-9 to signify two extremes of socio-economic status: those who are relatively poor (Brackets 1-5) and those who are relatively rich (Brackets 6-9). In the SWS report, only 7% of actual voters belongs to the dwelling class of ABC, 68% are considered class C, and 26% belonged to D.

The T-test shows that there is no significant difference in the PSI mean scores given by respondents who belong to Bracket 1-5 (PSI mean score = 69.54) and Bracket 6-9 (PSI mean score = 70.87) to those celebrity endorsers of ‘voted’ candidates (p<0.483). On the other hand, there is a significant difference between the PSI scores given by respondents who belong to Bracket 1-5 (PSI mean score = 58.41) and Bracket 6-9 (PSI mean score = 54.42) to those celebrity endorsers of the candidate for whom they did not vote (p<0.05). In other words, those respondents who belong to the lower income have higher PSI than with those who are richer.

This is consistent with the SWS report on voters’ receptivity to ads. There is more receptivity for political ads in lower classes D and E (19-21% said ads were NO HELP) than in middle-to-upper classes ABC (31% NO HELP) (SWS, 2007).

**Place of Residence**

To look at possible implications of PSI, the types of place of residence in this study were classified between rural and urban. There were respondents who resided in Metro Manila (University of the Philippines’ Ipil Residence Hall (a graduate students’ dorm in Quezon City), Ryco Inc. (a distributing firm in Makati), and Red Ribbon Bakeshop (plant in its commissary division in Libis, Quezon City), and respondents from Bulacan (town of San Miguel), a rural area. One hundred nine (109) of the respondents were from Metro Manila (47.6%) and 120 were from Bulacan (52.4%). There were 13% of actual voters who came from Metro Manila, and 43% was from Balanced Luzon (where Bulacan is) (SWS, 2007).

Results of the t-test on the mean scores given by respondents from the two places of residence show that there is a significant difference between the PSI scores given by respondents from Metro Manila (PSI average =66.91) and Bulacan (PSI average =73.21) to those celebrity endorsers of ‘voted’ candidate (mean difference=6.3, p<0.001). There is also a significant difference in the PSI scores given by respondents from Metro Manila (PSI average =54.02) and Bulacan (PSI average =59.45) to those celebrity endorsers of a candidate for whom they did not vote (mean difference=5.43, p<0.013).

Rural and urban people, therefore, (as represented by our respondents) differ in their parasocial interaction with celebrities. The rural respondents apparently feel more “intimacy” with celebrities than the urban respondents. It could be inferred that perhaps people in the metro appreciate celebrities to have lesser influence, and lesser ‘friends-like’ projection. The given zones (Metro Manila and Bulacan) differ in their cultures of distance. It may be that differences in the viewers’ exposure to TV is a factor. Para-proxemics (or distance established between two people when they interact) varies in the two given spheres. In the province, a culture of interconnection encompasses TV personalities whom they can see almost everyday. San Miguel, Bulacan (particularly in the surveyed barangays – Buga, Salacot, and Ilog-Bulo) has a population deriving livelihood primarily from agriculture, where many are farmers and vendors. However, most residents, especially women and children, even those who are able to go to school, are very exposed to TV, perhaps because of lack of other activities.

In terms of the rural and urban dwellers’ receptivity to ads, SWS says in their survey, that those voters who live in the rural areas have more scope for political ads (18% of rural respondents said ads were NO HELP) than those who were in the urban (25% said ads were NO HELP).

---

10 Taken from the University of the Philippines Socialized Tuition Fee Assistance Program as of 2007.
Education
For the educational attainment demographic variable, the gathered data indicating highest educational attainment were nonnormal – the distribution lacks fairly close counts. Hence, the researcher divided the highest educational attainment into two for the statistical significance analysis.

55 respondents (24% of the total sample) are part of the No Formal Schooling – High School Graduate educational attainment cluster. One hundred seventy-four respondents (76% of the total sample) have Some Vocational to Graduate Studies education. Respondents who have No formal schooling up to High School Graduate education gave an average PSI score of 70.00 to celebrity endorsers of a ‘voted’ candidate. Those respondents who have Some Vocational up to Graduate Studies for highest educational attainment had a PSI mean score of 70.26 given to the celebrity endorsers of a ‘voted’ candidate. These two means have no significant difference (p<0.907).

In the count of actual voters, SWS reported that 16% of voters have No/Some Elementary education, 29% are Elementary graduate/Some High School, 42% are High School Grad/some college, and 13% are College graduates.

Meanwhile, respondents who have No formal schooling - High School Graduate highest education had a mean PSI score of 60.31 toward the celebrity endorsers of a ‘not voted’ candidate. And those respondents who have Some Vocational up to Graduate Studies had a mean PSI score of 55.21 toward the celebrity endorsers of a not voted candidate. These two mean scores have a significant difference (p<0.033), unlike the mean scores given to the celebrities that endorsed a voted candidate, for which there was no significant difference between these two groupings. Seemingly, all of the respondents regardless of their educational attainment agree on the PSI given to celebrity endorsers of a voted for candidate. But they differ in the way they interact with celebrity-endorser of not voted candidates.

SWS found out in their 2007 survey that there the scope for political ads does not vary by education (along with gender).

CONCLUSION
This study provides empirical findings on Parasocial Interaction in the context of political advertising and the phenomenon of ‘celebrification’. Parasocial Interaction transforms celebrities (or the TV personae in Horton and Wohl’s [1956] words), into what Symbolic Interactionism suggests are ‘significant others’. Significant others (or ‘orientational others’) are people who have an influence on an individual’s attitudes and behaviors. Parasocial interaction triggers mediated friendship or mediated rapport with the viewing public. When the public sees celebrities as friends, acquaintances, neighbors, or even lovers, symbolic interaction (Popkin, 1991) with such TV personae takes place. Celebrity endorsers may thus assume the roles of significant others who can become influential in the voting decision of the audiences.

There is “celebrification” in Philippine politics. Demographic variables in the survey conducted reveal that different kinds of people maintain varying degrees of PSI with various personae. Respondents classified as young adults (22-30 years old) have higher PSI than older people (contrary to what Levy [1979] found out). Gender also seems to be an indicator of PSI –female respondents have higher PSI than the males (consistent with Koenig and Lessan’s [1985] conclusions). Mass media audiences from the rural areas apparently have higher PSI towards celebrities than urbanites. Education as a demographic factor needs more empirical evidence (since this study lacked normal distribution regarding the education variable).

As supported by SWS March 2007 reports, demographic variables of voters could be influenced ads and apparently by the PSI the voters have with celebrity endorsers. In terms of political advertisement receptivity rate, there is a higher percentage for younger people than the older people, more in scope for ads in lower classes D and E than middle-to-upper classes ABC, and more ad receptivity for people in the rural than those in the urban. There was no varying differences with gender and education. As for this celebrity endorser PSI survey, younger respondents have higher parasocial interaction than the older respondents; lower-income respondents have higher PSI than high-income respondents; and rural-dweller respondents have higher PSI...
than urban respondents. Also, females have higher PSI than males. Educational attainment seemingly does not vary with PSI reports.

The role of celebrity endorsers could be one of the matters that enrich the receptivity of the voters to the advertisements of political candidates. As what Mangahas (2007) illustrated in the SWS press release two months before actual May 2007 elections, “receptivity to political ads definitely matters.. it matters differently to different senatorial candidates”, and it differs as well to different soils – the voters. (PDI, April 2, 2007).

As part of the marketing mix in advertising endeavors, the role of celebrity endorsers and the social interaction they have with the audiences (voters during elections) is a consideration, knowing that the voter’s reception and perception to the communicators and the message in the ads matter after the fact.

REFERENCES


STFAP Bulletin (2007), Office of Student Services and Scholarship, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City


ABSTRACT

Politics has always been a hot issue in Philippine society. People, practically from all walks of life, in one way or another, take part in the formation and stabilization of this particular social institution. Considering its vital role in any social space, this paper examines certain factors that could affect people’s voting behavior, which, in essence, could also influence the election process and outcome.

The primary concept that was tested in this research was source credibility (of selected politician endorsers) and its possible relationship with publics’ voting pattern. The Source Credibility Theory by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953); the Classical Rhetorical Theory as interpreted by reputable communication scholars such as McCroskey (1986), Tompkins (1982), and Covino and Joliffe (1995); and Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model (1963) served as the guiding frameworks of the study.

A total of 217 respondents from different areas in the National Capital Region of the country answered and completed the survey forms. After quantifying the major variables in the study, different statistical treatments were employed to see if there was a significant association between selected politician endorsers’ credibility and publics’ voting behavior.

Since credibility as a theoretical construct is generally composed of three dimensions namely competence, trustworthiness, and goodwill; three findings (one for each dimension) were recorded. Results showed that, at .05 alpha level of significance, there was no significant correlation between the publics’ perceived competence toward the selected politician endorsers and their voting behavior. The same was proven in the cases of the trustworthiness and goodwill dimensions.

The findings generally proved that the credibility of the politicians endorsing other politicians during the May 2010 Philippine elections did not directly affect the voting decisions of the Filipino people. Despite this, it must be noted that other intervening variables like sex, location, age, and other demographics could have partly shaped the aforementioned findings.

Keywords: Politician Endorsers, Credibility, Voting Behavior

INTRODUCTION

Politics has always been one of the major concerns of many Filipino people. Its dynamic and complicated nature has never failed to capture the interest of every member of the Philippine society. Indeed, it would be safe to assume that it really plays a crucial role in national stability and development.

Although mostly tackled in the realm of social sciences, particularly in political science and sociology, the relationship of politics with oral communication is undeniable. This connection is seen in a number of aspects and situations. In fact, several concepts in both fields can prove the association of the two.
One of the many links that can very well establish the connection between politics and oral communication is the concept of credibility. Credibility, also known as ethos in the sphere of communication, is defined as the “attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver” (McCroskey, 1986, p. 62). It is further defined as the “perceived competence and character of a source of communication” (McCroskey, 1986, p. 66). Considering the aforementioned, it could be presupposed that the character and the competence of any source of communication actually affect and shape his/ her total credibility. Taking this assumption in explaining some of the phenomena in the country’s political arena, it could be assumed that politicians’ competence and character which shape their credibility are the very same factors the voting publics consider during the election season.

While establishing and proving the connection between oral communication and politics through ethos, it must be noted that the said association extends to other stages since ethos operates at different levels of communication. Although its functions are said to be mostly exemplified in public communication transactions, it still plays a vital role at the other levels of speech communication, particularly at the levels of interpersonal communication and mediated communication.

When discussing mediated communication, one immediately thinks of TV commercials marketing different products. The functions of ethos in these advertisements are evident in the sense that if the endorser seems and is perceived to be unreliable, it follows that the product he/ she endorses would not be saleable. This fundamental principle of marketing, which may be summarized by the construct known as sponsorship effect, holds true not only in product commercials and endorsements, but in political advertisements as well. The implications and influences of sponsorship effect are of extreme significance to the source of communication as one may be perceived to be more believable if introduced and/ or endorsed by someone who is considered credible and reliable by the members of the audience or by the viewing public (McCroskey, 1986). In the case of political advertisements, the sponsors are the ones endorsing the candidates while the sources are the politicians running for different positions.

Considering the above-mentioned elucidations, it is interesting to see and determine the effects and influences of selected politician-endorsers’ credibility on the publics’ voting behavior as proposed and posited by sponsorship effect. Apart from this, it is equally appealing to gauge the credibility of both the candidates and the selected politicians supporting and endorsing them.

**STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

This study aimed to answer the question:

What is the relationship between the credibility of the selected politician-endorsers and the publics’ voting behavior toward the vice-presidential candidates during the May 2010 Philippine National Elections?

**SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

1. To determine the credibility of the selected politician-endorsers as perceived by the voting publics who cast their votes during the May 2010 National Elections
2. To determine the publics’ voting behavior toward the selected candidates endorsed by the selected politician-endorsers
3. To determine the relationship between the credibility of the selected politician-endorsers and the publics’ voting behavior toward the candidates being endorsed

**HYPOTHESIS**

There is a significant relationship or correlation between the credibility of politician-endorsers and the publics’ voting behavior.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper utilized three approaches to analyze and present the crucial role of credibility in the Philippine political arena, particularly its effects on the publics’ voting behavior— the Source Credibility Theory by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986); the Classical Rhetorical Theory as interpreted by reputable communication scholars such as McCroskey (1986), Tompkins (1982), and Covino and Joliffe (1995); and Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002).

Source Credibility Theory (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986)

The Source Credibility Theory by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986) proposes that listeners or the members of the audience are more likely to be persuaded when they perceive the source of communication as credible. The said theory defines credibility as the communication source’s expertise and trustworthiness as determined by the receiver/s. According to Ohanian (1990), the dimension of trustworthiness is the degree to which the audience attributes confidence in the communication source and accepts the message given by the said source; while expertise is often associated with competence, expertness, qualification, and authoritativeness of the source.

In connection with the assumptions of the two aforesaid theoreticians, other scholars believe that attractiveness is, in fact, another dimension (the third dimension) that determines one’s credibility (Ohanian, 1990). This actually refers to one’s facial and physical attractiveness (Baker, 1977; Caballero & Solomon, 1984; and Patzer, 1983, as cited in Ohanian, 1990).

Basically, the Source Credibility Theory by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986) is divided into three models for it to be applied in a particular communicative act or situation—the factor model, the functional model, and the constructivist model.

The first one—the factor model, from the term itself, involves the factors or dimensions by which the receiver uses to evaluate the source (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986). These dimensions contain the characteristics of the source that the receiver can refer to for judging the source as credible or not.

The second model—the functional model is concerned with the effects or consequences of the source’s credibility on the perceptions of the listeners (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986). This specific approach measures credibility in terms of the degree of satisfaction perceived by the receiver as achieved by the source.

Lastly, the constructivist model delves into what the receiver does with the source’s message (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986). This particular model examines the behavior of the receiver towards the message delivered by the communication source. Specifically, this model looks at how the receiver or the listener accepts, or on the other hand, rejects, the message.

Classical Rhetorical Theory (as interpreted by McCroskey (1986), Tompkins (1982), and Covino & Joliffe (1995))

Two Classifications of Means/Modes of Persuasion

Being one of the earliest rhetorical theories, the Aristotelian Tradition divides the means of persuasion into two different classes—the inartistic and artistic. According to this perspective, the inartistic modes which include things such as contracts and oaths do not properly belong to the realm of rhetoric because the persuader does not create them (Tompkins, 1982). Today, these inartistic modes are referred to as pieces of evidence. Meaning, the orator may use them to build and strengthen an argument but then again, they are not being created by the speaker. On the other hand, the artistic modes are said to be within the scope of rhetoric because the rhetor has control over them. S/he may manipulate and create them depending on the rhetorical situation.
Three Kinds of Artistic Means/Modes of Persuasion
According to the Aristotelian Rhetoric, the artistic modes of persuasion are basically divided and categorized into three kinds: logos or the speaker’s logical appeal, pathos or the speaker’s emotional appeal, and ethos or the speaker’s ethical appeal (Tompkins, 1982).

**Ethos**
Ethos is defined as “the attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver” (McCroskey, 1986, p. 62). Other terms associated with ethos are credibility, prestige, and character. Ethos has three stages: the extrinsic or initial, the intrinsic or transactional or derived, and the terminal (Bulan & de Leon, 2002). It also has three dimensions: competence or authoritativeness, trustworthiness or character, and goodwill or intention (Bulan & de Leon, 2002). Before, only the first two dimensions were considered to be evaluative. However, further contemporary researches, specifically the one conducted by McCroskey and Teven (1999) would prove that goodwill could also be measured and quantified.

**The Three Stages of Ethos**
The initial ethos is the source’s ethos prior to the beginning of the communication transaction. In public speaking situations, this is the speaker’s ethos just before s/he starts to speak or begins to deliver his/ her message (McCroskey, 1986). Background, personal characteristics, appearance, education, reputation, and previous knowledge about the speaker are some of the objectively relevant factors that may affect the speaker’s ethos (McCroskey, 1986 ; Bulan & de Leon, 2002). Another determinant of initial ethos is the so-called sponsorship effect which refers to the process of selecting somebody to introduce a speaker. “The implications of sponsorship effect are important for the source. One may be expected to have substantially higher initial ethos if introduced by a person respected by the audience than one would have without such an introduction” (McCroskey, 1986, p. 69). Aside from sponsorship effect, other factors such as environment or surroundings might also affect one’s initial ethos (McCroskey, 1986).

Next to initial ethos is the derived or transactional ethos. This is the speaker’s ethos during the actual communicative act. The Aristotelian Rhetoric posits that one’s ethos may be modified during the actual communication situation through the speaker’s words and actions which are continually being assessed by the listeners. “This credibility level may heighten or diminish the speaker’s initial ethos” (Bulan & de Leon, 2002, p. 64). The major propositions of the Aristotelian Rhetoric emphasize “the importance of a source’s ‘rhetorical choices’ evidenced by the message. By rhetorical choices, Aristotle meant the things the source chooses to discuss, the arguments used, and the support for the arguments” (McCroskey, 1986, p. 71). Among the other factors that affect the speaker’s derived ethos are the impact of the message (which includes the evidence presented by the rhetor in his speech, organization of the message, the language used, and the over-all impact of the message), the effect of the circumstances, context, and/or situation where the communication takes place, and of course, the delivery of the message (McCroskey, 1986; Bulan & de Leon, 2002).

The third and final stage is the terminal ethos or the speaker’s credibility after the communicative act. This is the level “at which the listener perceives and assesses the speaker upon completion of the communication event; the point of reckoning for the listener as to the worthwhileness of the event” (Bulan & de Leon 2002, p. 64). Many scholars believe that this is the most significant stage of ethos because ...

...like all impressions, this may be lasting or without impact. It may also precede a next communication event with the same speaker and with the same listeners. If the terminal credibility conferred on the speaker was favorable or high, chances are the listeners will be very receptive initially the next time and perhaps throughout.
Otherwise, the opposite would be true. Even if a speaker had low initial ethos, he could still recover and gain high terminal credibility. (Bulan & de Leon, 2002, p. 65)

In effect, terminal ethos could be regarded as the sum total or the product of extrinsic and intrinsic ethos.

**Dimensions of Ethos**

The Aristotelian Rhetoric proposes three general dimensions of ethos. These are the authoritativeness, trustworthiness, and goodwill. Social psychologists Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986) echo the same dimensions but label them as “expertness, trustworthiness, and intention” (McCroskey, 1986, p. 64). Despite this congruence, some scholars believe that the three factors of ethos are competence, trustworthiness, and dynamism. Overtly, the discrepancy lies in the third dimension which refers to “the activity or liveliness of the source” (p. 64). However, close scrutiny of these dimensions would reveal that the third dimension is, in fact, related to goodwill or intention factor. Therefore, a conclusion could be drawn that “goodwill or intention is important but not independent of the other two dimensions of ethos” (p. 64). In spite of this, later studies prove and suggest that goodwill may be measured and calculated separately. Thus, it should be restored to its former status in rhetorical communication theory. Empirical research is reported indicating the existence of the goodwill dimension as part of the structure of the ethos/source credibility construct and a measure of that dimension is provided with evidence for its reliability and validity. (McCroskey & Teven, 1999, p. 90)

**Pathos**

Pathos is most of the time referred to as “the speaker’s use of emotional appeals” (Bulan & de Leon 2002, p. 60). This mode of persuasion, which is further defined by the Aristotelian Tradition as “states of mind that affect judgments” (Covino & Joliffe, 1995, p.71), is usually (especially in literature) “associated with characters who evoke audience’s pity” (p. 71). This being the case, it could be said that a rhetorical act (i.e. a speech) is effective if the rhetor or the speaker is able to stir and influence the emotions of his/her listeners.

**Logos**

Logos could be simply defined as the speaker’s logical appeal or “the method of reasoning and argumentation” s/he employs (Bulan & de Leon, 2002, p. 60). “For Aristotle, proof through logos, or what may be called logical proof, involves the construction of persuasive examples and enthymemes” (Covino & Joliffe, 1995, p. 64). These proofs are necessary in rhetorical communication because they help in strengthening the arguments included in the speech. It must be noted, however, that “the premises of the enthymeme are drawn not from certainties (as with the syllogism), but from the beliefs and presuppositions of the audience” (p. 48).

**Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002)**

Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002) may seem to be quite complex and complicated; but if scrutinized and examined closely, the factors that it considers are common to other communication models as well. The model insists that four major categories suffice to provide an explanation about any communication process. The said are the communicator, the message, the medium, and the receiver (Balon et al., 2002).

The aforesaid model captures the complex and dynamic nature of mediated communication. More than this, it is also considered as one of the most comprehensive communication models since it includes the “perceptions” of both the source and the receiver of the message, and the social context where the
communication transaction transpires. The inclusion of the so-called perceptions of the communicator and the receiver is one of the key strengths of this model. To further illustrate the aforementioned notion, Maletzke (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002) specifically includes in his model the “communicator’s image of the receiver” and the “receiver’s image of the communicator.” This illustration shows the significance of how each perceives the other.

The relationship between the communicator and the receiver, and the message is two-way. Meaning, the source and the receiver affect the quality of the message, while the message itself influences the self-images of the communicators involved in the transaction.

In the model, another vital component—the medium constrains the message. Maletzke (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002) regards the medium as a major player in the communication process. The medium shapes and limits the message. As illustrated in the model, the medium is characterized by prestige and credibility; whereupon it could impose pressure or constraint on the communicator and the receiver as they deliver and receive the message. Consequently, the message transmitted is also partly shaped and influenced. In addition, the receiver’s perception of the medium could actually affect the whole process of communication.

Being a model of mass or mediated communication, Maletzke’s approach (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002) asserts that media content causes pressure or constraint on the communicator or the source of communication. More than this, it also affects the perception of the receiver.

Furthermore, Maletzke’s model (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002) proposes that mass media could be treated as a societal institution with a complex structure surrounded by several influential factors. This approach recognizes and gives importance to other factors that have certain effects on the communicator (who, in this model, is the source) and on the receiver (or the listener). Self-image, personality structure, working team, social environment, organization, and the pressure and constraints caused by the public character of the media content are the factors that influence the main source of communication (Maletzke, 1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002). On the other hand, the following are the factors that influence the receiver: self-image, personality structure, being a member of the audience, and social environment (Maletzke, 1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002).

Synthesis of the Theoretical Framework

The concepts discussed above served as the guiding principles of this paper. Each approach played a crucial part in developing the study’s conceptual-operational framework. Specifically, the first two theories—the Source Credibility Theory (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986) and the Classical Rhetorical Theory (as interpreted by McCroskey (1986), Tompkins (1982), and Covino and Joliffe (1995)) were used in analyzing the complexity of ethos. Moreover, the said were also utilized in understanding the role of credibility in the political arena and its influence in the voting patterns of the publics. On the other hand, the model that was tackled in the previous section of this paper—Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002) was employed to establish the connection between and among the variables being studied in this paper. Particularly, it was used to demonstrate the function of persuasion, credibility to be specific, in mediated communication transactions.

CONCEPTUAL-OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The study’s conceptual-operational framework describes, examines, and exemplifies the function of ethos or credibility, specifically the so-called sponsorship effect (McCroskey, 1986), in mediated communication transactions; and its possible effects on and relationship with the voting behavior/s of the publics.

The framework proposes that mediated communication, in the form of television advertisement, starts with the source of the message. The said communication source acts as the politician-endorser supporting or “advertising” a particular political candidate. In the process, the politician-endorser attempts to persuade the publics to vote for the candidate he/she supports. The way a politician-endorser expresses himself/herself in front of the camera, as proposed by Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model (1963, as cited in Balon et al., 2002),
is influenced by his/her image of the public and other factors which include self-image, personality structure, social environment, his/her membership in an organization, and the pressure and constraints caused by the public character of the advertisement.

The voting publics are the audiences or the receivers of the message. They consume the media message, which, in this case, is the political advertisement. Upon viewing the political advertisement, the voting publics evaluate the credibility of the source of the message. This evaluation leads to ratings which may be categorized as either high or low. In reference to the Source Credibility Theory (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986) and the Classical Rhetorical Theory (as interpreted by McCroskey (1986), Tompkins (1982), and Covino & Joliffe (1995)), if the level of credibility of the politician-endorser is high, the said source is deemed credible; thus, elicits positive voting behavior (for the one being endorsed) from the publics. On the other hand, if the credibility level is low, it implies that the source is not that credible; hence, negative voting behavior (towards the one being endorsed) from the publics follows. The connection between the politician-endorser’s credibility and the attitude of the publics towards the candidate s/he endorses could be explained by and in terms of sponsorship effect (McCroskey, 1986) which deals with the transference of ethos or credibility from the one endorsing to the one being endorsed.

The politician-endorser’s level of credibility is assessed through the degrees of his/her competence or authoritativeness, trustworthiness or character, and goodwill or intention as perceived by the audiences or voting publics.

Aside from the above-mentioned concepts, the study’s framework also considers other factors and intervening variables that could contribute in shaping the voting pattern/s of the publics.

The graphical representation of the study’s conceptual-operational framework (see Figure 1) illustrates the flow of communication in a mediated transaction (in the form of television advertisement) which involves a politician-endorser endorsing a political candidate with the aim of eliciting support or positive voting behavior from the viewing publics. It also situates the specific variables included and tested in this paper.

**Figure 1: Graphical Representation of the Conceptual-Operational Framework**
METHODOLOGY

Respondents
A total of 217 respondents from specific regions of the Philippines (National Capital Region, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Eastern Visayas, and Western Visayas) participated in this research. The ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to 65 years old. Out of 217 respondents, 93 (43%) were males; while 124 (57%) were females. A total of 51 (23%) respondents belonged to Bracket F (PhP 0-80,000), 54 (25%) respondents belonged to Bracket E (PhP 80,001-135,000), 36 (16%) respondents belonged to Bracket D (PhP 135,001-250,000), 21 (10%) respondents belonged to Bracket C (PhP 250,001-500,000), 19 (9%) respondents belonged to Bracket B (PhP 500,001-1,000,000), and 36 (17%) respondents belonged to Bracket A (PhP 1,000,001-above). Most respondents attended and finished college. The table below (Table 1) summarizes the demographics of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/ Place of Residence</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Estimated Annual Family Income</th>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Capital Region</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Male 43%</td>
<td>Bracket A 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No Formal Schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Luzon</td>
<td>26-30 years old</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Female 57%</td>
<td>Bracket B 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary Undergraduate 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Tagalog</td>
<td>31-35 years old</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bracket C 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary Graduate    4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Visayas</td>
<td>36-40 years old</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bracket D 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High School Undergraduate 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Visayas</td>
<td>41-45 years old</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bracket E 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High School Graduate    7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>46-50 years old</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bracket F 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational Course Undergraduate 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51-55 years old</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational Course Graduate 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56-60 years old</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>College Undergraduate   16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61-65 years old</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>College Graduate       31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post Undergraduate      2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post Graduate           16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research Instrument
The first part of the survey questionnaire served to describe the demographic profile of each of the respondents, including age, sex, place of residence, educational attainment, and socio-economic status.
The second part was composed of a closed question asking the respondent of the vice-presidential candidate he/she voted for during the May 2010 National Elections. There was a list of vice-presidential candidates’ names provided by the researcher for the respondent to choose from. This part reflected the positive voting behavior of the respondent. After the respondent had specified the vice-presidential candidate whom he/she voted for, he/she would then indicate the politician-endorser of the said vice-presidential candidate.

The third part was devoted to the main instrument used in this paper—the Source Credibility Measures by McCroskey and Teven (1999). This measurement contains semantic differential type of scales that were developed by employing oblique factor analyses which yielded correlated dimensions that are parallel to those constructs originally theorized by Aristotle (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). It is composed of eighteen pairs (six for each dimension of ethos) of bipolar adjectives that can accurately evaluate the source’s credibility. The alpha reliability of these measures which attests to their internal consistency ranges between .80 and .94.

Since the instrument was developed in the west; and ethos (being the major concept tested in this paper) is known as a function of one’s culture, minor changes were made in the instrument to ensure its compatibility and appropriateness in the Filipino culture. It was translated by an instructor from the University of the Philippines Department of Filipino and Philippine Literature into Filipino to guarantee its reliability in the Philippine setting.

The fourth part was composed of another closed question asking the respondent of the vice-presidential candidate he/she would have least likely voted for. Again, there was a list of vice-presidential candidates’ names provided by the researcher for the respondent to choose from. This part reflected the negative voting behavior of the respondent. After the respondent had specified the vice-presidential candidate whom he/she would have least likely voted, he/she would then indicate the politician-endorser of the said vice-presidential candidate.

The last part of the questionnaire was a list of factors that the voting publics would usually consider in choosing a candidate to vote for. The characteristics included in the list were derived from the results of the pre-test open-response opinion survey questionnaire with an open-ended question. A total of 25 respondents were asked to participate in the pre-test open-response opinion survey questionnaire; and 31 responses or factors were identified to be recurring. These 31 factors were the items placed in the last part of the study’s survey questionnaire; and rated by the actual participants using a five-point Likert scale with the following codes: 5 if the factor was extremely considered by the respondent; 4 if much considered; 3 if neutral; 2 if not much considered; and 1 if the factor was not considered at all.

Data Gathering Procedures
The survey questionnaires were distributed to the purposively chosen respondents. They were given ample time to complete the forms. In the course of administering the survey, the researcher assisted the respondents in answering the questionnaires whenever they encountered technical difficulties. After answering all the questions, the researcher asked them if they had questions or clarifications. After which, the researcher thanked them for participating in the study.

Data Analysis
To determine the credibility of the selected politician-endorser as perceived by the voting publics, each politician-endorser had a score based on the Source Credibility Measures of McCroskey and Teven (1999).

The Source Credibility Measures (McCroskey & Teven, 1999) represent three unique but intercorrelated constructs parallel to those theorized by Aristotle. Thus, these measurements provide three separate total scores (one for each dimension of ethos). To get the total score for each dimension, scores for the items pertaining to that particular dimension were summed up. Score for nine items, as suggested by the developers of the instrument, were inversely computed.

Adapting de Pano’s Ethos’ Scoring System (2008), scores were arbitrarily classified and categorized into three: high, moderate, and low. Scores ranging from 31 to 42 were arbitrarily regarded as high; scores
that were equal to or higher than 18 (18-30) were considered moderate; and scores equal to or lower than 17 (6-17) were classified as low. Since ethos has three dimensions, the researcher only rated each politician-endorser with high level of credibility if all the three dimensions of credibility (competence, trustworthiness, and goodwill), as set by the guidelines formulated by the developers of the instrument, scored high, following the scoring system utilized in this paper.

To determine the voting behavior/s of the publics toward the vice-presidential candidates endorsed by the selected politicians, the researcher directly asked the respondents, through the survey, the vice-presidential candidates whom they voted for last May 2010 National Elections. In this way, the ranking of the vice-presidential candidates, according to votes garnered, was achieved.

The survey questionnaire was also designed to know the ranking of the vice-presidential candidates according to voters’ preferences. Each respondent was asked to rate the vice-presidential candidates: 1-the vice-presidential candidate voted for, 2-the second choice of vice-presidential candidate to have voted for, 3-the third choice of vice-presidential candidate to have voted for, and 4-the least choice of vice-presidential candidate to have voted for.

To determine the relationship between the credibility of the selected politician-endorser and the publics’ voting behavior, Pearson Product Moment Correlation was utilized.

**FINDINGS, ANALYSES, INTERPRETATIONS, AND DISCUSSIONS**

**Objective 1: To determine the credibility of the selected politician-endorser as perceived by the voting publics who cast their votes during the May 2010 National Elections**

As stated earlier, to measure the credibility of the politician-endorser, the researcher utilized de Pano’s Dimensions of Ethos’ Scoring System (2008). It must be noted that the researcher only rated a politician-endorser with high level of credibility if all the three dimensions of ethos or credibility (competence, trustworthiness, and goodwill) had scored high in accordance with the scoring scheme being employed in this study.

The table below (Table 2) summarizes the scoring system used to classify the credibility scores of the selected politician-endorser.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Ethos</th>
<th>McCroskey and Teven’s Source Credibility Measures (1999) Items</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>1, 2, 7, 11, 13, 16</td>
<td>31-42</td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>6-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>4, 6, 10, 12, 14, 17</td>
<td>31-42</td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>6-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill</td>
<td>3, 5, 8, 9, 15, 18</td>
<td>31-42</td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>6-17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the total number of respondents, 81 (37.33%) rated the credibility of Francis Escudero, politician-endorser of vice-presidential candidate Jejomar Binay. Of the said number, 77 (95.06%) voted for Binay (positive voting behavior). The sampled respondents who voted for Binay (positive voting behavior) gave Escudero the following credibility ratings: 35.57 (high) for competence, 34.86 (high) for trustworthiness, and 34.53 (high) for goodwill. Since the three aforementioned mean scores were reportedly high, it could be deduced that Escudero had high level of credibility as perceived by the sampled respondents who voted for Binay. The other four (4.94%) respondents who indicated that Binay was the vice-presidential candidate whom they would have least likely voted for (negative voting behavior) gave Escudero the average credibility scores of 16.75 (low) for competence, 16.25 (low) for trustworthiness, and 19.25 (moderate) for goodwill. Because two of the aforementioned mean scores were relatively low, it could be assumed that Escudero had low level of credibility as perceived by the respondents who stated that they would have least likely voted for Binay (negative voting behavior).

Another politician who endorsed the candidacy of Jejomar Binay was the former president, Joseph Estrada. There were 55 (25.35%) respondents who rated the credibility of Estrada. Of these respondents, 50
(90.91%) voted for Binay (positive voting behavior). The sampled respondents who voted for Binay gave Estrada the following credibility ratings: 36.04 (high) for competence, 35.72 (high) for trustworthiness, and 34.46 (high) for goodwill. Since all the said mean scores were classified as high, it could be presupposed that Estrada had high level of ethos. The other five (90.91%) sampled respondents who indicated that Binay was the vice-presidential candidate whom they would have least likely voted for (negative voting behavior) gave Estrada the average credibility scores of 14.60 (low) for competence, 12.00 (low) for trustworthiness, and 16.20 (low) for goodwill. Because all the three mean scores mentioned were regarded as low, it could be presumed that Estrada had low level of credibility as perceived by the respondents who said that they would have least likely voted for Binay (negative voting behavior).

Richard Gordon endorsed Bayani Fernando, another vice-presidential candidate. There were 129 (59.45%) respondents who rated the credibility of Gordon. Of the said number, only 19 (14.73%) voted for Fernando (positive voting behavior). The sampled respondents who voted for Fernando (positive voting behavior) gave Gordon the following credibility ratings: 36.11 (high) for competence, 34.68 (high) for trustworthiness, and 35.68 (high) for goodwill. Since all the three mentioned mean scores were categorized as high, it could be said that Gordon had high level of credibility for the sampled respondents who voted for Fernando (positive voting behavior). The majority of the respondents (110) (85.27%) who stated that Fernando was the vice-presidential candidate whom they would have least likely voted for (negative voting behavior) gave Gordon the average credibility scores of 14.38 (low) for competence, 14.29 (low) for trustworthiness, and 14.65 (low) for goodwill. Because all the mean scores for the three dimensions of credibility were classified as low, it could be assumed that Gordon had low credibility level for the sampled respondents who said that they would have least likely voted for Fernando (negative voting behavior).

Manuel Villar endorsed Loren Legarda’s candidacy. There were 95 (43.78%) respondents who rated the credibility of Villar. Out of the said number, only 18 (18.95%) voted for Legarda (positive voting behavior). The sampled respondents who voted for Legarda (positive voting behavior) gave Villar the following credibility ratings: 35.72 (high) for competence, 35.00 (high) for trustworthiness, and 35.06 (high) for goodwill. Since all the mean scores for the three dimensions of ethos were categorized as high, it could be supposed that Villar had high level of credibility for the sampled respondents who voted for Legarda (positive voting behavior). The other 77 (81.05%) respondents who indicated that Legarda was the vice-presidential candidate whom they would have least likely voted for (negative voting behavior) gave Villar the average credibility scores of 15.01 (low) for competence, 14.86 (low) for trustworthiness, and 14.58 (low) for goodwill. Because all these mean scores were considered low, it could be assumed that Villar had low credibility level for the sampled respondents who said that they would have least likely voted for Legarda (negative voting behavior).

Finally, Benigno Aquino endorsed his running mate, Manuel Roxas. There were 74 (34.10%) respondents who rated the credibility of Aquino. Out of the said number, 53 (71.62%) voted for Roxas (positive voting behavior). The sampled respondents who voted for Roxas (positive voting behavior) gave Aquino the following credibility ratings: 35.30 (high) for competence, 35.64 (high) for trustworthiness, and 34.85 (high) for goodwill. Since all the three aforesaid mean scores were all high, it could be said that Aquino had high level of credibility for the sampled respondents who voted for Roxas (positive voting behavior). The other 21 (28.38%) respondents who stated that Roxas was the vice-presidential candidate they would have least likely voted for (negative voting behavior) gave Aquino the average credibility scores of 12.52 (low) for competence, 13.67 (low) for trustworthiness, and 14.43 (low) for goodwill. Because all the mean scores for the dimensions of ethos were classified as low, it could be assumed that Aquino had low credibility for the sampled respondents who said that they would have least likely voted for Roxas (negative voting behavior).

The tables (Table 3 and Table 4) summarize and show the findings stated above.
Table 3: Summary of the Credibility Scores of the Selected Politician-Endorsers as Perceived by the Sampled Respondents who Exhibited Positive Voting Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politician-Endorsers</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escudero</td>
<td>35.57</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrada</td>
<td>36.04</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>36.11</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villar</td>
<td>35.72</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquino</td>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of the Credibility Scores of the Selected Politician-Endorsers as Perceived by the Sampled Respondents who Exhibited Negative Voting Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politician-Endorsers</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escudero</td>
<td>16.75</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrada</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villar</td>
<td>15.01</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquino</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the findings shown above, it could be noticed that all the credibility scores were higher among the sampled respondents who exhibited positive voting behavior, and lower among the sampled respondents who displayed negative voting behavior. These findings revealed that the voting publics had higher level of credibility towards the politician-endorsers of the vice-presidential candidates they voted for than for the politician-endorsers of the candidates whom they would have been least likely voted for.

It must be noted that this study included only television advertisements as outlets of political messages; and thus, took a single media type of entertainment television. Evidently, the role and influence of media in the conduct of elections in the Philippines are increasing since it appears that the media, as an institution, serves as the main apparatus in delivering or giving effective campaigns.

The political candidates did not demand for television endorsements from people whose credentials were unknown to the voting publics. The politician-endorsers included in this study were well-known in the political arena of the country. This resulted in formation of positive impressions about the endorsed vice-presidential candidates to lead the country and, more importantly, made these claims valid. Since these endorsers made their assertions appear valid in their advertisements, their credibility was recognized by the voting publics. As defined by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986), credibility would always pertain to one’s expertise (or the ability of the source to make valid assertions) and trustworthiness (or the willingness of the source to make valid assertions).

Furthermore, the politician-endorsers noticeably and distinctly appeared confident on their television advertisements as they endorsed their vice-presidential candidates. This strategy resulted in the positive perceptions of the voting publics (who exhibited positive voting behavior) and clearly showed that they could
trust them as endorsers; and more significantly, the said scheme resulted in making the voting publics feel that they could also be confident with the leadership of the endorsed vice-presidential candidates. Aside from exemplifying confidence, the politician-endorsers were also dressed well and properly while they were endorsing their vice-presidential candidates. This fact might have contributed to their high credibility which, in turn, resulted in positive voting behavior. Ohanian (1990) regarded physical attractiveness as a dimension of credibility. Meaning, it is a factor that influences the level of credibility of a particular communication source. Since the politician-endorsers were quite attractive when they appeared on the television, it could be safely assumed that this factor added to their credibility which, in turn, elicited positive voting behavior from the publics.

The points mentioned above were the very same factors that the other sampled respondents who perceived the politician-endorsers as unreliable used and considered in their assessments. This finding could mean that despite the number of respondents who stated that the politician-endorsers were credible, a portion of the sample, still, was not convinced that they were competent, trustworthy, and caring (a factor of goodwill dimension); hence, the candidates they endorsed were also perceived as such.

The results for this particular objective consistently reflected and exemplified the function of sponsorship effect (McCroskey, 1986) in mediated communication transactions. This connection could be clearly seen as the figures shown above would prove that the respondents assigned higher levels of credibility to the politician-endorsers of the vice-presidential candidates they voted for than to the politician-endorsers of the candidates whom they would have least likely voted for. In this sense, the influence of sponsorship effect (McCroskey, 1986) was evidently observed.

### Objective 2: To determine the publics’ voting behavior toward the selected candidates endorsed by the selected politician-endorsers

The voting behaviors of the sampled respondents were shortly discussed in the previous section of this paper. Escudero was selected by 77 (35.5%) of the total sampled respondents for the politician-endorser of the vice-presidential candidate (Binay) they voted for (since the said vice-presidential candidate had two endorsers). Another politician endorsed Binay during the May 2010 National Elections, the former president of the country and his running mate then, Estrada. The said politician-endorser was selected by 50 (23%) of the respondents for the politician-endorser of the vice-presidential candidate they voted for. Although it could not be generalized because of the number of respondents in this study, and the sampling technique applied, it could be assumed that both endorsers were able to elicit positive responses from the voting publics. Combining the figures mentioned above would attest that both politician-endorsers could have made great influences on the voting behaviors of the publics. All the other politician-endorsers provided their vice-presidential candidates votes not as significant or not as noticeable as the figures the first two were able to give their candidates. To be specific, Gordon provided only 19 (8.8%) votes for his endorsed vice-presidential candidate, Fernando; while Villar elicited 18 (8.3%) votes for his presidential candidate, who, at the same time, was his running mate—Legarda. Finally, Aquino had a share of 53 (24.4%) votes in favor of the vice-presidential candidate he endorsed, and at the very same instance, his running mate—Roxas.

From the previously discussed results, the ranking of the vice-presidential candidates, based on the number of votes they garnered from the sampled respondents, was obtained. Binay reportedly topped the list with a total of 127 (58.5%) votes. He was followed by Roxas with 53 votes (24.4%); then, Fernando with 19 votes (8.8%); and then, at the bottom, Legarda with 18 votes (8.3%). It would be interesting to mention and note that the aforesaid findings were partially consistent with the actual outcome of the May 2010 National Elections. The top two candidates who garnered the most number of votes in this study were the same politicians who ranked first and second during the actual elections.

The table (Table 5) summarizes the findings stated above.
Table 5: Summary of the Votes Garnered by the Vice-Presidential Candidates (Positive Voting Behavior)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vice-Presidential Candidates with Their Politician-Endorsers</th>
<th>Number of Votes N (Total: 217)</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Valid Percents</th>
<th>Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binay-Escudero</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binay-Estrada</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando-Gordon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legarda-Villar</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxas-Aquino</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only nine (4.11%) respondents reported that they would have least likely voted for Binay. Four (1.8%) of these nine respondents selected Escudero for Binay’s politician-endorser; while the remaining five (2.3%) chose the other politician who endorsed Binay—Estrada. A large number of respondents or 110 (50.7%) of the total number of respondents indicated that they would have least likely voted for Fernando; while a sum of 77 (35.5%) respondents said that they would have least likely voted for Legarda. Lastly, 21 (9.7%) indicated that they would have least likely voted for Roxas.

From the results tackled above, Fernando was regarded by the most number of respondents as the vice-presidential candidate whom they would have least likely voted for; while Binay was observed to be the most considered vice-presidential candidate. These findings were consistent, not only with the results discussed in the previous section of this chapter, but more significantly, with the outcome of the actual elections.

The table (Table 6) below summarizes the findings stated above.

Table 6: Summary of the Votes Garnered by the Vice-Presidential Candidates whom the Respondents Would Have Least Likely Voted for (Negative Voting Behavior)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vice-Presidential Candidates with Their Politician-Endorsers</th>
<th>Number of Votes N (Total: 217)</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Valid Percents</th>
<th>Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binay-Escudero</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binay-Estrada</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando-Gordon</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legarda-Villar</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxas-Aquino</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of researchers and political analysts provide explanations as to how voters generally decide. Himmelweit et al. (1985) assert that voters become cynical and uncertain towards parties that have no clear stands during the elections. This seemingly supports the assumption that the way voters perceive parties or political candidates, for that matter, depends on the way they present themselves before the publics.

In the Philippines, there are various political parties and two of these are the Administration and the Opposition. With the country’s usual economic and political state, the public is normally in favor of the Opposition. Indeed, Filipinos always aspire for change and reform. Evidently, Filipino voters abhor those politicians who are members of the Opposition but suddenly unite with the Administration.

Among the vice-presidential candidates included in this paper, Binay, evidently, had the most influential endorsers. Estrada (Binay’s endorser), one of the former presidents of the country, was consistently labelled as the “man of the masses.” The last national elections showed that Estrada was still favored by a significant number of Filipino people. The results attested to the fact that millions of Filipino voters still believed that he was a competent leader. In fact, he ranked second to Aquino (who won the presidency). His
charisma might have positively influenced the voting decisions of the people. According to Gass and Seiter (1999), charisma as a concept could be seen as a factor of credibility. Furthermore, they believe that a person who is perceived to exude high charisma is also perceived as extroverted, composed, and sociable. The said might have resulted in the positive voting behavior of the publics towards Binay who was endorsed by Estrada.

Aside from Estrada, Escudero also endorsed Binay. As mentioned earlier, Filipinos, during the elections (or even before the elections) were looking for politicians or leaders who consistently did not side with the Administration as the said was being perceived as inefficient and corrupt. According to the news, Binay started to top the surveys shortly before the elections, and after Escudero had endorsed him. This fact would lead to a conclusion that Escudero’s endorsement might have created a great impact on Binay’s candidacy. Moreover, Escudero, just like Estrada, was also charismatic; and following the line of argument stated earlier, it could be assumed that his charisma, at least to a certain extent, was able to elicit a favorable response from the voting publics. This, among the many other possible factors, could have partly shaped the positive attitude of the voters towards Binay.

The findings for the second research objective, once again, proved that ethos could play a crucial role in shaping the voting patterns of the Filipino people. Moreover, the gathered data also affirmed the existence of another dimension of ethos which might or might not be unique in the Philippine society—charisma. Evidently, this factor of credibility could have influenced the voting behavior of the publics. Lastly, the findings also confirmed that the implications of sponsorship effect, as carried out by the politician-endorsers, could, at least to a certain extent, affect the attitudes of the voters towards the vice-presidential candidates.

Objective 3: To determine the relationship between the credibility of the selected-politician endorsers and the publics’ voting behavior toward the candidates being endorsed

The last major objective of this research was to determine the relationship between the perceived credibility of the politician-endorsers and publics’ voting behavior. The goal was to see, based on empirical evidence, if the two actually had a significant association.

Since the Source Credibility Measures of McCroskey and Teven (1999) produces three separate total scores (one for each dimension of ethos), the voting behavior of the publics was correlated with each of the three dimensions of ethos (competence, trustworthiness, and goodwill). Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation was used to determine if there was a significant correlation between the publics’ voting behavior and each of the aforementioned credibility factors.

Findings showed that, at .05 alpha level of significance, there was no significant correlation (p-value: .645) between the perceived competence of the sampled respondents toward the selected politician-endorsers and their voting behavior/s. The same was proven in the case of the trustworthiness dimension. It was also seen that, at .05 alpha level of significance, there was no significant correlation (p-value: .297) between the perceived trustworthiness of the sampled respondents toward the selected politician-endorsers and their behavior/s. Finally, the same was observed in the case of the goodwill dimension. It was proven that, at .05 alpha level of significance, there was no significant correlation (p-value: .524) between the perceived goodwill of the sampled respondents toward the selected politician-endorsers and their voting behavior/s. Meaning, the voting behavior/s of the publics and their attitudes towards the vice-presidential candidates did not highly depend on their perceived credibility towards the politicians endorsing the said candidates.

The tables (Table 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3) summarize the findings stated earlier.
Table 7.1: Correlation Coefficients of the Politician-Endorsers’ Competence and the Publics’ Voting Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VB</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1</td>
<td>-.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) * .645</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation -.031</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) * .645</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not statistically significant, p > .05 (2-tailed)

Table 7.2: Correlation Coefficients of the Politician-Endorsers’ Trustworthiness and the Publics’ Voting Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VB</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) * .297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .071</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) * .297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not statistically significant, p > .05 (2-tailed)

Table 7.3: Correlation Coefficients of the Politician-Endorsers’ Goodwill and the Publics’ Voting Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VB</th>
<th>G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) * .524</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .043</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) * .524</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not statistically significant, p > .05 (2-tailed)

To summarize, at .05 alpha level of significance, it could be said that all the components of credibility had no significant correlation with the voting behavior/s of the publics. This finding did not support the hypothesis of the study stating that there was a significant correlation between the perceived credibility of the voting publics towards the selected politician-endorsers and their voting behavior/s.

Although the aforementioned findings were seemingly inconsistent with the findings for the first two objectives which, to a certain extent, were able to make an implicit connection between credibility and voting behavior, it must be noted that other intervening variables might have been the reasons no significant
correlation was observed between credibility and voting behavior. The propositions of the theories and the model utilized in the study namely the Source Credibility Theory by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, as cited in McCroskey, 1986); the Classical Rhetorical Theory as interpreted by McCroskey (1986), Tompkins (1982), and Covino and Joliffe (1995); and Maletzke’s Mass Communication Model by Gerhard Maletzke (1963, as cited in Balon, 2002) argue and imply that there are a number of factors that can affect one’s credibility and voting behavior.

If there was one thing the findings for the third objective proved, it was the fact that the perceived credibility of the respondents toward the selected politician-endorsers of the candidates they have or have not voted for was not the sole or even a major factor that affected their voting behavior. Nevertheless, there was still some sort of connection between the two major variables that were tested in this paper. Hence, the two should not be treated as absolutely independent of each other.

Since the publics’ voting behavior/s had been proven to have minimal dependence on their perceived credibility towards the politician-endorsers of the vice-presidential candidates they have or have not voted for, it was possible that the other intervening variables such as the demographics of the respondents might have affected their voting decisions.

If, for example, sex was the demographic variable that might have affected the voting behavior/s of the respondents, the findings of this study, to a certain extent, would support the assertion of Chiao, Bowman, and Gill (2008) that voters generally perceive male politicians as significantly more competent compared with female politicians; and that voters normally perceive male politicians as significantly more dominant than female politicians. Apparently, in this study, there was only one female vice-presidential candidate included—Legarda. She garnered the lowest number of votes from the sampled respondents, and was also rated to be the second least choice of vice-presidential candidate to have been voted for by the said respondents. A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be drawn from the assumptions of Chiao, Bowman, and Gill (2008). According to them, female candidates still have a difficult time showing that they are credible because some voters still perceive women as less politically powerful than men. In the final analysis, certain issues and abilities are still highly associated with particular sex stereotypes.

If age was the demographic variable which might have influenced the voting behavior/s of the sampled respondents, the findings would support the assertion of Baum (2005) stating that the so-called celebritification greatly influences the voting behavior/s of young voters. This study obtained its largest portion (20%) of respondents from the age group of 19-25 years old. These respondents were still considered members of the youth. Since Escudero, the politician-endorser of Binay, in actuality, was one of the youngest leaders of the country, and could be regarded still as part of the youth, it could be deduced that the respondents who voted for Binay easily and conveniently associated themselves with Escudero resulting in their favorable voting attitudes towards Binay.

If place of residence was the demographic variable which might have shaped the sampled respondents’ voting behavior/s, the findings of this study would support the assumption of Chang (2008) stating that environmental cues, such as objects or places, can, in fact, activate related constructs within voters and influence their voting attitudes. The political advertisements of Binay, for example, showed all his significant projects accomplished in the city of Makati, emphasizing his major contributions to the public schools of the said city. The assumption discussed here could mean that more than the credibility of his politician-endorser/s, there were other factors related to one’s place of residence that could have affected the voting behavior/s of the publics.

Among the other demographic variables that might have influenced the voting behavior/s of the publics were socio-economic status and educational attainment. Since the relationship between the selected politician-endorsers’ credibility and their voting behavior/s was not proven to be significant, it could be assumed that the sampled respondents had considered and taken into account other factors when they were in the process of choosing and voting for their respective vice-presidential candidates; and possibly, these factors were actually the demographic variables discussed above. Although statistical treatments were not employed to establish their probable relationships with the publics’ voting behavior/s, theoretical and conceptual assumptions could, at least to a certain extent, explain the possible connection between the respondents’
demographics and their voting attitudes towards the vice-presidential candidates during the May 2010 National Elections.

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The findings of this study generally suggest and imply that credibility plays a crucial role in many settings, specifically in the political arena. It is regarded as one of the many factors that is highly considered by the voters during elections. More than this, the study also proves the value and functionality of a particular construct mostly associated with the concept of ethos—sponsorship effect—in a political setting through mediated communication transactions. Apart from these, the results explicitly imply that demographic variables could also influence the voting patterns and attitudes of the publics toward political candidates. In the final analysis, this research provides empirical evidence that can prove the importance of certain factors in an important political and social event such as election.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


PM NAJIB AND HIS 100 DAYS IN OFFICE: IDENTIFYING THE VISIBILITY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS NEWS USING FRAMING APPROACH

Yuslinda Mat Yassin and Hasmah Zanuddin
Department of Media Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
yuslinda04@yahoo.com / hasmahmedia@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This study will look up the four main newspapers focuses on the framing of news throughout the reign of Malaysian 6th Prime Minister (PM), Dato Seri Najib Tun Abdul Razak during his 100 days in office. The researchers would like to identify the visibility of political and social affairs news in general especially the expression of the concept One Malaysia (1M) inspired by the PM himself and also how he created a relationship with his foreign partners after sworn in. This study will investigate the PM's images, one to discover and learn how to profoundly and constantly explore the political messages towards the public and foreign leaders. This study will investigate the PM’s strategies in disseminating the policies through the Framing analysis and examined how the policies are presented in each newspaper. For the first 100 days, it is crucial for the PM to portray his visibility as trusted PM not only to the Malaysian people but also to other foreign leaders, so, the usage of News Framing is essential especially in exposing the informational representation of PM according to the value image, which consist of the decision maker’s belief, values, ethics and morals. The researchers will explore the news of PM Najib and his policies reported in the newspaper through framing. Then, a coding scheme is devised, usually in basic terms like frequency (amount of content), information input, types of frames and intensity (power of content).

Keywords: Framing, Social Affairs, Political messages, 1Malaysia, News

INTRODUCTION

Background of Study
Malaysian 6th Prime Minister, YAB Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Hj Abdul Razak, son of the second Prime Minister of Malaysia, YAB Tun Abdul Razak, sworn in as a Prime Minister before Yang di-Pertuan Agong Tuanku Mizan Zainal Abidin at Istana Negara on April 3rd, 2009. Najib takes over from Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who stepped down after leading Malaysia since October 31, 2003.

The involvement of the media during political campaign in Malaysia historically started during the first general election two years after its independence in 1959, whereby the voters have observed the important changes of media usage. With the mass media, it has helped to create the public’s awareness and the importance of elections as well as to report the election process and results. During that period, the politicians used personal contacts such as public rallies and door-to-door campaign as well as heavily usage of traditional newspapers election coverage as a strategy to disseminate their political messages to the intended voters, simply because, in 1950s, Malaysian mass media is yet to develop. The coverage of the media during that period discussed about helping the public to understand about the election process and the importance of political involvement and it was told that, it was more transparent since it was not controlled by any individual or even the political parties. (Tamam, E & Govindasamy, M).

Malaysia practices a parliamentary democracy system whereby executes an elections in order to form a government and to choose its leader. Malaysia has held an election since we achieved independence in 1957. Cited from Tunku Mohar Mokhtar in Rashid Moten, 2008, the elections process in Malaysia is done for
the lower house (Dewan Rakyat or House of Representatives) for its parliament at the period of not more than five years. Malaysia electoral system was taken from the British plurality model with certain modifications in order to adopt the needs of Malaysia’s political ambience. After the Independence in August 31, 1957, Malaysia is under the leadership of six Prime Ministers. These prime ministers have their own way in order to be close with their citizen. They have practiced their personal approach especially during the elections and the means of political communications which, obviously the usage of the media, especially print media (Zahid Hamidi, 2008).

The media in Malaysian political era is be widely used in order to persuade the public and gain their support for the leadership of Najib as well the previous prime ministers. The media is believed to assist political communication between the public and policymakers. And for this study, the policymaker is the sixth prime minister who has new national agenda in order to gain public support. Louw, 2010, claimed that the media has been an important cultural resource during the twentieth century as it is known as a center in creating for impression management and locating social position and status which for example the needs for publicity in order to win the election. Nevertheless, the media is also a tool for positioning people through discourse.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION OF NAJIB

- Highly usage of all print and electronic media
- Each BN party representatives/spokesperson- UMNO EXCO, Youth UMNO EXCO, MIC EXCO, MCA EXCO, etc – Spin Doctors
- Highly usage of social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and blog of 1Malaysia.
- Interpersonal communication with the public and also meeting with his friends of Facebook, Twitter and 1Malaysia Blog comm.
- Walkabouts

NST (April 2010)

MEDIA, FRAMES AND FRAMING

Media also able to act as a propaganda which can generate the origin or source of news to flow towards a filtering process of what the final news would be printed, marginalizing information and allow the government and important private interests to get their message reachable towards their audiences. The politicians disseminate their political messages to win over their potential voters, to disregard their opponents, and search for on how to manage their own visibility through various media techniques. It is known that in the democratic political system, the media is a bridge between a sender of politics and communication, and also as a transmitter of political messages created by journalist. The journalists embrace the accountability of politicians and explicate the political scenarios, while at the same time maximizing the attention from the audiences, to maintain political relationship with their sources, and to compete with their opponents through emphasizing the sensation news or political messages. This technique is also known as framing, would act as cognitively in creating the political debates, influencing the information leveling on the readers, and characterizing to the policy responsibility (Gamson,1992; Iyenger, 1991; Kinder & Kiewit, 1979 in Lee K.T & Hashim, M.S,2009).

Framing acts as an agent for organizing the principles which socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the reality world (Reese, 2001). A frame is like ‘a picture frame, it puts a border around something, distinguishing it from what is around it, distinguishing it from what is around it; it is a center of attraction to certain aspects of an issue, and directs it away from other aspects (Gamson,2004). Framing is about how journalist shape news messages in the realm of reference and depending to some latent concept of meaning and, while the readers who adopts these frames would have similar understanding as the journalists do (McQuail, 2005; Tuchman, 1978, in Gorp V.B, 2007). Framing will also focusing the relationship between public policy issues in the news and how the public perceived
these issues. Framing moves towards what the public talk or think about by examining how they think and talk about issues in the news (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Frames enable the audience to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label the flow of information around them (Goffman, 1974) and to ‘narrow the available political alternatives’ (Tuchman, 1978).

Framing attracts three types of selections comprises of strategic framing by political actors and then media frames as dependent variable and investigate frame building, that is the processes influencing the creation of changes of frames applied by journalists (Bennet 1993, Sheufele,1999, Shoemaker & Reese,1996, Tuchman,1978 in Hanggli & Kriese,2011). Media framing offers interpretive framework that connected the public to assimilate abstract and scattered information into a tangible significance. By changing the insignificant or doubtful events towards perceptible happenings, the media tell people how certain issue is related to their own interests and beliefs. Through these processes, mass media may help people to develop a particular opinion, rather than having unclear or neutral opinions. So, the repetitions of Najib’s political message and showing the positive sides of his political image and also his political entities, it will help to increase the level of confidence of his public.

Thus, a frame in communication or media frame refers to the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker (e.g., politician, a media outlet) uses when relaying information about an issue or event to an audience. Frames also known as a maps or the internal story concepts of the reporters and editors attract for their readers. These plans or frames cognitively serve to structure the public debate, influence readers’ issue information, and the attribution of policy responsibility. For the purpose of this research, the researcher would use media frame to find the political brand identity of Najib.

Issues–specific news frames and generic news frames (de Vreese, 1999) would able to explicate frames to organize an idea (Severin & Tankard, 1992), or ‘to organize the theme (Gamson, 1992), and able to define the problems (Entman, 1993). Issues-specific frames related to specific topics/ news event, while generic frames are broadly applicable to a range of various news topics. Researches explicating issues–specific frames such as, an analysis of the coverage of the U.S. national budget deficits (Jasperson et al,1998), an investigation of US press and television network coverage of two international airline accidents (Entman,1991) in de Vreese et al.,2001. Issue-specific frames in Malaysian news media have portrayed the story of Najib as Malaysia’s sixth Prime Minister not only on the 3rd April, 2009 but throughout the first week after his sworn in as Prime Minister including his childhood life, his late father who also Malaysia’s second Prime Minister. Issues –specific news frames have also reported in the issues and events of electoral processes. For example, the election process in Malaysia in 2008 has been reported and investigated vastly throughout that realm.

In generic news frames, episodic and thematic frames were found as an essential types of political news reporting and effects studies have shown that these frames influence people attributions of responsibility, their policy views (Iyenger,1991), and the strength of their emotional responds (Gross,2001 in Aaroe,2011). An episodic and thematic frame is known as two basic types of frames that appear across is issues, time and space in potential news political news communication (Gross, 2008, Iyenger 1991, de Vreese et al, 2001 & Aaroe, 2011). Thematic frames discusses about political issues and events in broader context and present collective, abstract, and general evidence (Iyenger, 1990 & 1991). While episodic frames describe concrete events and particular cases that clarify the issues (Iyenger, 1991 & Aaroe, 2011) with kind of news frames that has a capacity to transcend issue, time, and space limits. This type of frames is a news frames that place public issues in a broader context by focusing on general conditions or outcomes. On the other hand, the thematic frame places an issue in relation to society, including related background information about societal structure or political context. Thematically framed nation’s crisis stories emphasize the responsibility of government or society in decreasing the problems. Examples include stories emphasizing education policies, political problems, or governmental efforts to help those in needs.

Episodic Frame portrays publics’ issues in terms of concrete instances. Episodic news frame focus on discrete events that involve individual located at specific places and specific time or an approach of a format for
a case study or event-oriented report. It refers to news articles specifically on Najib’s action as Prime Minister at an individual level, treating it as a mere event.

The researchers took Semetko and Valkenburg, five values of news framing, namely, Conflict frames, Human Interest frames, Economic Consequences frames, Responsibility frames and Morality frames in order emphasizes each news frames which they have identified through framing Europe research in 2000 in relations with Political and Social Affairs news frames of Prime Minister Najib.

FRAMING POLITICS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS NEWS OF NAJIB

Dato Seri Najib has been appointed as a prime minister on the 3rd of April 2009. Since his appointment, the news was widely spread not only about his appointment but also the history of him and family regardless through new media or traditional media. The Political news frames were divided into two categories namely Internal and External news political frames. The former category portrayed about Najib political issues inside Malaysia. Usually, this type of news frames, discussed about his role as a Prime Minister such as his appointment as a Malaysian sixth leader, his cabinet line up, his political messages the ministers and deputy minister, his role as a President of a the party - Barisan Nasional for UMNO (for Malay and Bumiputera’s party), MIC (Malaysian Indian party), MCA (the party representing the Malaysian Chinese). As for the External news of political frames, usually the news will explicate the foreign relations between countries. Throughout his first 100 days, there were a few news related to Najib’s foreign relations with other countries, for example during his first appointment as a Prime Minister he has received congratulations wishes and hopes from other foreign countries’ leaders such as Brunei, a phone call from US President Barrack Obama etc. Besides Brunei, Thailand, China and India are among the countries whereby Malaysia is politically related to and there are wide coverage within Najib’s hundred 100 days in office with these foreign leaders. The External news frames also discussed about events of Najib outside Malaysia, for example his visit to India and China.

The Social Affairs frames were reported on the issues related to the Malaysian people needs and wants, for example, issues of a free, vibrant and informed media empowered to report without fear of consequence and holding governments and public officials accountable, the prime minister has called on Malaysians to join him in his journey to break racial barriers in the country, therefore, Malaysia is designed in order to implement this resolution, education matters for the young etc.

Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000 indicated that frames have five values which frequently used such as:

- **Conflict frames** – the conflict frames emerge when there’s a conflict exist among the individuals, groups and institutions. This frame is usually used during election campaign. By framing this news, problems of social complex and political problems could be decreased to soft conflicts. Previous research done by Neuman et al., in 1992 has proved that US media has reported a variety of issues and conflict which have been as a news frame.

- **Human Interest Frame** – focusing on the personal, emotional side of an event, issues or problem. The personalizing of an issue adds the storyline character of news. By using this value it can create closer of the person to the readers, more personalize; creating more dramatize and emotionalize news. This human interest frame will definitely able to capture and hold the public’s attention. With much personalize and emotional frames of Najib, this way will enable the readers to brand him as good or bad leader.

- **Economic Consequences Frame** – with this frames, news will expose the economic consequences an event, problem or issue will be reported for an individual, group, institution, region or country. This frame is often used to make potential economic impact and consequences clearly towards the public. The economic impact of an event has an important news value and it is often suggested that news producers used this frame to make on issue relevant to the public.
- **The Morality Frame** – this news frames is more on matters for religious or moral charge to event, problems or even subject. Because the professional journalistic norm advocates objectivity, journalists often refer indirectly to this morality frame. Journalists have someone ask question, but, through the use of a quote the story which can contain a moral message or specific code of behavior.

- **The Responsibility Frame** – presents an issue or a problem in such a way that the responsibility for causing or even to solve a problem lies with the government, individual or a group.

A study by Iyenger (1991) shows that the American media influence the creation of public opinion on who is responsible for causing or solving the important social problems. For instance on the issue of poverty in the USA, it appears that the public

**METHODOLOGY**

Four mainstream newspapers were content analysed in order to expose the visibility of Economic and Social Affairs frames and its attributes. The medium of study are selected newspapers namely Berita Harian, Utusan Malaysia, The Star and News Strait Times. And type of information categories (Framing, sources and substantive characteristics of the newspaper articles), which are also divided into sub-categories and sub-sub-categories serve as a focus of the study. Therefore, content analysis is the most appropriate method to employ.

Media monitoring of Malaysian print news have been conducted from 3rd April 2009 until 11th July 2009. The framing of Najib news was monitored through Bahasa Malaysia print daily namely Utusan Malaysia and also Berita Harian, and two English-language newspapers, known as The Star and New Straits Times.

ANOVA is used in order to compare the framing attributes and five types of news framing towards single factor analysis of variance which is the newspaper since newspaper is the independent variable with nominal levels. Cross-Tabulation and Phi (or Cramer’s V) were used in order to provide a test of statistical significance and also provide information about the strength of the association between political branding attributes with news framing.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This research was to investigate the type of information input prior to Najib’s news through comparative analysis of frames in four different mainstream newspapers. We studied the topics and action in the news of political and social affairs news frames throughout Najib’s 100 days in office.

**RQ1:** How visible the political and social affairs news in comparison with other news frames?

**RQ2:** How visible is the Internal and External news frames for political news frame?

**RQ3:** To what extent do journalist exposed the categories of Social Affairs (Education/Research, Diversity or Multiracial category, Crime, Healthcare, Sports, Social Legislation, Welfare, Law & Regulations and demography/population) news frames throughout the four newspapers?

**RQ4:** Is there any significant relationship between Political and Social Affairs news frame with five attributes of News Frames (Responsibility, Economic Consequences, Human Interest, Morality and Conflict)

**MEASURES**

In order to locate the visibility of political and social affairs frames, all 100 days news was coded using a detailed information input based from the news action and topics of Najib. The political news frames were divided into Internal and External variables, whereby internal news of political frames meant, any political
news happened inside Malaysia, between Najib and Malaysian government, the public, the party, the opposition and so on. While the External political news frames were defined as news related to Malaysia and other foreign countries relations and news which involved Najib’s event at the foreign countries.

As for Social Affairs frames, this types of news were divided into several categories, such as Education/Research (the education policy which covers both higher learning institute/policies etc and also primary/secondary school/vocational/technique school or syllabus), entertainment (including creative arts, music, movies policies), diversity or multiracial category (religion/race/language situation), Crime (bribery/death/killing), healthcare (health policies/H1N1, SARS etc), Sports, Social Legislation, welfare, Law & Regulations and finally demography/population news frames category.

As for finding the news framing elements, the researcher adopted on the five generic frames by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), and also modified it on certain of its attributes in order to relate it with the scenario of Malaysian political communication context, which originally, they have used it through their study on European politics.

In order to measure on what level of the framing characteristics in Najib as a political actor, the researcher would adopt and modified on certain series of 20 questions based from the five generic frames values. Each explanation was equivalent to measure one of five generic frames, namely, human interest, conflict, morality, attribution or responsibility, and economic consequences. For example, the explanations of the framing attributes would question whether “the story has suggested that Najib or his government would be able to alleviate the problem or issues arises (Responsibility), “the story able to emphasize on how individual or group affected by the issue or problems (Human Interest), “the story mirrored the disagreement between parties/individual/groups/countries” (Conflict), “the story contain moral message” (Morality), or even “the story explain the reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action” (Economic).

MEASUREMENT OF NEWS/MEDIA FRAMES

The measurement of coding system for the media frames, the researcher as said earlier, has adopted and modified the technique used by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) on finding the framing values on their EU political news.

RESULT

The result confirmed significance association between news framing with political branding attributes. The high visibility of PM Najib’s branding attributes were found from news reported in four mainstream newspapers and the news framing elements managed to enhance the visibility of his images, personality, policies and also as a party leader.
The table above portrayed the total news about Prime Minister Najib found within 100 days from all newspapers. 641 counts of news were identified which spread across 4 different newspapers, that are, in descending order, Utusan Malaysia (253), New Straits Times Press (NSTP) (165), The Star (117) and Berita Harian (106). Majority of the news were in April (231), followed by June (214), July (117) and May (79).

Table 2: Frequencies of Political and Social Affairs News Items within Four Different Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Berita Harian</th>
<th>NSTP</th>
<th>The Star</th>
<th>Utusan Malaysia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>133</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the frequencies of political and social affairs news items within the four newspapers, it was found that political news items were found mostly in Utusan Malaysia (170), followed by NSTP (133), Berita Harian (78) and The Star (73). While, social affairs news items were mostly detected also in Utusan Malaysia (83), followed by The Star (44), NSTP (32) and Berita Harian (28).
Table 3: Strength of Association between Political and Social Frames within Four Different Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Phi</td>
<td>.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cross tabulation conducted proved that there is no significant relationship between framing values and different newspapers ($p = .003$), as the value of Cramer’s V (14) = .146, $p > .001$.

Table 4: Cross Tabulation between Political with its Sub Frames (Internal or External)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table portrayed the cross tabulation between political with its sub frames (internal or external). Based on the findings, it can be identified that internal sub frame (349) is more than the external (105).

Table 5: Cross Tabulation between Social Frames with Sub Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education / Research</th>
<th>Multiracial Category</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Health care</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Social Legislation</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Law and Regulations</th>
<th>Demography / Population</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows that he was prominent in social legislation and multiracial/diversity which carries more than 50 percent of total percentages of social frames. This was, a portrayal of fair and just in his domestic social policy through his 1Malaysia concept in order to promote unity and eliminate racial barrier.
Table 6: Visibility of Framing Values of Najib’s in Different Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing Values</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berita Harian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Consequences</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Interest</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cross-Tabulation between Framing Values and Different Newspapers

Based on the above table, a cross-tabulation analysis was conducted between framing values and different newspapers. Considering only the most frequent appearance in newspapers, the analysis found that Utusan Malaysia holds the most apparent counts of framing values, namely responsibility 15.3%(98), human interest 12% (77), conflict 7.3% (47) and morality 4.4% (28). Berita Harian was the only other newspaper that holds the economic consequences framing value at 0.8% (5) counts.

Table 7: Strength of Association between Framing Values and Different Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Phi .233  .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’s V  .134  .001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table represented a significant relationship between framing values and different newspapers ($p = .001$). The strength of association recorded has an effect size of low to medium (Cohen, 1988) where the value of Cramer’s V (23) = .134, $p < .001$.

Table 8: Association between Framing Values and Framing Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing Values</th>
<th>Framing Items</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Najib / Government to alleviate the problem</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government responsible for the issue</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Story suggest solution</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual / group / people responsibility for the problem</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News to require urgent action</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia
Political Development in Southeast Asia

Table 8 showed the frequency of framing items for each of the framing values. From the table, it is clear that under the responsibility value, item of ‘Najib / Government to alleviate the problem’ has the most frequent occurrences (147). For the human interest frame, ‘human example / face on issue’ (59) has the majority number while for conflict, ‘disagreement between parties / group / countries / individual’ (68) occurred the most. Meanwhile, for morality, ‘moral message’ (23) appeared as majority and lastly, for economics, ‘economic consequence to proceed or not action’ and ‘cost / degree of expense’ (5) shared the most amount.

Table 9: Cross Tabulation of each News Frames of Political and Social Affairs Frames in Framing Value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Economic Consequences</th>
<th>Human Interest</th>
<th>Morality</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Visibility of News Framing Attributes of PM Najib and its statement (adopted and modified from Semetko and Valkenburg (2000))
Table 10: Strength of Association between each News Frames of Political and Social Affairs with Framing Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Approx. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal by Nominal</td>
<td>Phi</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer's V</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a significant relationship (Table 10) between news frames of political and social with framing values \((p = .000)\). The strength of association recorded has an effect size of low to medium (Cohen, 1988) where the value of Cramer’s V \((21) = .206, p < .001\).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The passing baton of previous PM Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to Dato’ Seri Najib Tun Abdul Razak has created a situation whereby Malaysian politics landscape has been attacked by political tsunami and the current government has lost five states to the opposition party lead by Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and its coalition of PAS and DAP. This scenario has given a sign to the current government that there are more voices need to be heard and they seems not to do their work by providing good service to the voters and fulfilling the election promises.

The leadership under Najib’s realm is in jeopardy as he need to develop new energetic political team who can be trusted and can win over the lost voters and maintain the current voters, not only that Najib has to without hesitation and no time to be wasted to rebrand his political entities regardless his government image, his own image which has been badly portrayed and scrutinized, his party image and also BN coalition image. In his early appointment as PM, he has made huge transformation to the country by instilling his “1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now” concept in order to unite the Malaysian at any level and race, and at the same time, to improve the relationship between the people and government so that the public is well guided and will not be manipulated by the political tricks.

The visibility of Political and Social Affairs news frames in comparison with other news frames in four mainstream newspapers was studied during Najib’s 100 days in office as a Prime Minister from 3\(^{rd}\) April 2009 until 11\(^{th}\) July 2009.

- **Conflict frames** – Patterson (1993) in Semetkio & Valkenburg, 2000, found out that the conflict frame also covers discussion in the news between political elites often reduces complex substantive political debate to overly simplistic conflict. Within one year in office, Najib has faced a few bi-elections and news has reported so many kinds of issues and solutions were given by newspapers in order to win the votes of the people in each constituency. The visibility of political conflict frames from the external views can be found such as conflict of Thailand during the ASEAN Summit on 11\(^{th}\) April 2009 and Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak said it was an unexpected ending and that the Thai government had decided to put off the summit due to security reasons. Conflict news about Malaysia and North Korea; stated that Malaysian is involved with North Korea Nuclear activity and denied by the Prime Minister Najib and when he was asked about a report by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, which cited an unnamed sources as saying that United States envoy Philip Goldberg's visit to Malaysia recently was meant to find ways to stop a payment from a bank in Malaysia to North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il.

As for Social Affairs news frames such as conflict between the opposition and Najib’s policy which is regarding the 1Malaysia Concept, and Najib said, unlike a Malaysian Malaysia proposed by opposition,1Malaysia did not deviate from the basic ideas and spirit of Federal Constitution, but, more towards the means of every race to respects each other and understands unique differences.
• **Human Interest Frame** – And since this paper is about framing of Najib, obviously it has this category whereby all of the four newspapers especially during the first week of his appointment as PM, have reported about Najib personal information, his life history, his passion towards the nation, pictures of him during and after the sworn in, he went down to see his citizen and sat with him and drinking tea with the customers in the restaurant during his walkabouts etc. All four newspapers have reported the history of Najib for example during his childhood life, his relationship with the people, historical review about him and his father who was Malaysia’s second Prime Minister and so on. As for external thoughts, Datuk Seri Najib Razak came in for praise from American global peace advocate and civil rights activist Rev Jesse Jackson Sr for ensuring a smooth transfer of power, from King of Brunei whereby, Sultan of Brunei Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah has expressed hope that good relations with Malaysia will continue under new Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak's administration (NST, 11th April, 2009). And the prime minister has his personal thoughts of Malaysia-China relations because to him it has special personal significance since his father made a bold and farsighted decision 35 year ago that China with feeling of anxiety with the Chinese government.

As for Social Affairs frames, it covered the story regarding how Najib promised that the 1Malaysia concept will not compromise the right of the Malays and aborigines’ including those in Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia). During the celebration of his 100days in office which is on 11th of July 2009, he has held a public gathering at Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC), and has also announced 11 people friendly measures, among others are, discount for users of toll roads, eradication of hardcore urban poverty, ownership of public housing by low-income earners, and reduction in the license renewal fee for hawkers.

• **Economic Consequences Frame** – from the findings, it is proved that, the Economic Consequences Frame did not fall to any of political news frames or social affairs frames, but it was more Economic News Frames Input and news action.

• **The Morality Frame** – the social affairs frames covered issues such as religion matters, whereby the headline said Respect other religions and races, Muslim urged’ as Najib said Islam was brought to the world as a universal religion and to him it was important for Muslims to closely look into the teachings as these observed the religious requirements during Ramadan (fasting month) and to overcome race barriers issues when Najib called Malaysia to accept that diversity is a source of strength, not part of the problem. As for political news frames, for example, how Najib tried to instill his political messages of unity through 1Malaysian concept to East Malaysia, which is Sabah and Sarawak or the Borneo part of Malaysia and how he used politically that the 1Malaysia concept should not be misused by anyone to make extreme or unreasonable demands on the government.

• **The Responsibility Frame** – If we look at individual level under Social Affairs news frame, Najib has expressed his first policy for the nation, hours after sworn in, which is 1M, as a continuation of the country’s nation building, despite of racial and cultural differences, the people should share a passion for a better future by aiming for an opportunity, respect and extended friendship. Najib using 1M has pledged the Malaysians to join him in his journey to break racial barriers in the country in order to build the nation (Paridah Samad 2009). As for government responsibility, news frame could be found as new policy has been made under the leadership of Najib. Under the party of UMNO who is also under the power of Najib, as a group would have contributed its corporate social responsibility to those in needs especially during the flood has been widely reported by all of four newspapers. For example Program UMNO Juara Rakyat on January 2010.

Politically, the news frames portrayed how the Prime Minister and his relationship with the foreign leaders, for example with China, USA, Thailand, India and others within his first 100 days in office. Through
external news frames such as Najib said the China government has allocated a huge fund specifically for investment in Malaysia as a reflection of the excellent economic and social ties between the two nations. Internal frames issues such as Datuk Seri Najib Razak's swearing-in as the sixth Prime Minister in historic given who his father was, but he is very much his own man and is realistic about the economic and political challenges ahead and issues within the party whereby, Najib advised Barisan Nasional component party members not to be too obsessed with political posts.

This study is to understand the political and social affairs news frames and how it was portrayed in order to make in more visible and impactful towards the people especially in order to gain trust form the voters and future voters. Malaysian is known as having a restricted media environment, whereby government regulations and economic pressures towards the press are highly notable especially with the economic and political elite have influencing the news every day, Smeltzer and Lepawsky, 2009. Prime Minister Najib and his media entourage have been working hard in order to make himself positively visible through the media. With these four newspapers which have the government control, it is useful especially for Najib to use the media as ‘prized possessions’ (Louw 2010) especially Najib is seeking to influence the public. The media images could also bring forward the values of the political communicators. As Najib is the prominence value of the news, with the help of media images it can embrace the summary manners, such as credibility or trustworthy, responsibility, confidence etc, Fredin et al (1996). Fredin et al also noted that media images identify a set of schemata that refers to the news media and the coverage of political news. These media images are significantly associated with the political news which can act as mediation between the media use and outcomes of the news such as attitude change, evaluations, and knowledge of issues (McLeod et al.1986; Graber, 1988; in Fredin et al 1996).

REFERENCES

A CORRELATION STUDY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DECENTRALIZATION WITH INFORMATION DISSEMINATION ON FAMILY PLANNING IN THE WEST JAVA AND BANTEN PROVINCES

Hasmah Zanuddin and Aizirman Djusan
Department of Media Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
aizirman@depkominfo.go.id / emyana_ruth@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The study aims to figure out the correlation between centralized and decentralized governmental system and the role of government public relations toward information dissemination on family planning program. A survey is conducted to clearly scrutinize the condition of family planning implementation before and after the effectuation of Law No. 22 Year 1999 on Local Government. The launching of the Regulation initiated the legality of the establishment of autonomous local governments. Some studies show the differences of information dissemination performance following the changes of governmental system in which the government public relation activities involved. Family planning program is one of policy which has been affected by the decentralization. The random sampling procedure covers 1,390 respondents of family planning acceptors population in West Java and Banten province. To assure a non-homogeneity of respondent, the shared attribute is applied namely to all respondents shall have experienced both centralized and decentralized government system. Varied background of respondents such as educational, occupation, ethnic, age, and the preference of family planning method were considered. Multivariate analysis was applied to test the correlations among the factors. Focus group discussions among the government authorities were used to strengthen the hypotheses on government policy.

Keywords: Decentralization, Government Public Relations, Information Dissemination, Family Planning Program

BACKGROUND

Multidimensional crisis which happened in late 1990s was not only significantly influencing economy, but also gave effect to Indonesia’s government management mechanism system. Unimaginable political phenomenon becomes reality when Indonesia entered Reformation Era. One of the examples of this phenomenon is the closed list proportional general election system (only choosing the party’s logo) which now replaced by direct general election refers to open list of candidates. Besides giving effect to democracy establishment that encourage civic engagement like in the general election, reformation era also followed by government institutions transformation which marked by the liquidation of several government institutions, such as Ministry of Information and Ministry of Social Affairs.

Meanwhile, in the central stage, the revitalization and optimization of government roles is increased, while in regional stage several new autonomy regions are formed as the implementation of Regional Government Law No. 22/1999 which was enhanced with No. 32/2004 Law. Regional autonomy is autonomous region capability to manage and handle local people needs on own initiatives based on law and regulation. Autonomous linguistically means stand by yourself or with your own government, whereas region is an area owned by the government. Thus the notion of autonomous region by term is “the power invested in an area/region to manage an maintain local area/region and people needs (article 1 paragraph 5 of No.32/2004 Law). Until December 2008, recorded 215 new autonomous areas formed which consist of 7 provinces, 173
regencies, and 35 new cities. Therefore the total number reached 524 autonomous areas which consist of 33 provinces, 398 regencies and 93 cities.

Since the enactment of No. 20/1999 Law about Regional Government, the relationship between Central and Regional Government seemed a bit distant. For example, when Central Government were planning to import rice to reassure rice availability in the regions, several regions were saying no to that policy because they considered the rice supply was still enough in their area. Recent cases that just happened were the regions rejection to fuel price increase and the Direct Cash Assistance (BLT).

With the above background, the study is formulated as follows:

1. Is there any significant relation between Government Public Relations (GPR) and Decentralization to the Dissemination of Information concerning Family Planning (KB)?

2. Is there any significant difference between Government Public Relations (GPR), Government System and Dissemination of Information on Family Planning (KB) before and after the implementation of regional autonomy?

LIMITATION

This study focuses its research on public information concerning Family Planning (KB) Program instituted in Indonesia, not included other public information. Government Public Relations (GPR) concept observed herein will be limited to the government officials responsible for the dissemination of information with regard to Family Planning (KB). The information dissemination term refers to a process of well-planned and measurable information spreading set forth into the workplans of institutions responsible for Government Public Relations (GPR).

LITERATURE SUMMARY

Government Public Relations

The history of public relation’s process of maturation can be traced in books and essays about the history of public relations (e.g., Vasquez & Taylor, 2001) whereby Public Relations (PR) develops from one-way manipulative communication to the ideal of dialogic and symmetric communication.

Limited literatures provide abstract, construct, and theories about PR. PR scholars thus outline the ethical and technological maturation process within PR communication. Yet we must question whether the developmental stages presented in these perceptions inevitable result from historical data or whether other perceptions of PR history can be detected. Scholarly literature shows that alternative perceptions of PR history do exist: Olasky (1984, 1987), for example, criticizes the picture of a historic evolution. He does not detect understanding and democratic discursive processes but rather sees more resourceful persuasive forms of control techniques, which do not serve capitalist interests but are intended to prevent market economic and individual interests from evolving freely: In Olasky’s view, therefore, Ivy Lee is not a “champion of democratic ideals, he is just the opposite, a master controller and propagandist” (Pearson, 1990, p. 35).

Miller (2000) criticizes the dominance of corporate PR historiography which places the origins of PR in the era of industrialization. Her approach relates social and cultural history to PR in order to obtain an alternative and more detailed view of PR history. Brown (2003) criticizes the fact that the established PR historiography places the beginning of dialogic PR-communication in the second half of the twentieth century. Citing the example of the apostle St. Paul, Brown wants to show that the so-called modern symmetrical PR techniques can be traced back to ancient times. Thus it can be seen that a number of scholarly interpretations of historical facts in public relations offer a perception of history that differs from established conceptions. However, we might ask why these interpretations do not receive as much prominence as the historiography of Bernays, Cutlip and others.
Communication takes place in every aspect of government in the daily life, including the city, county, state, and national levels. Indonesian government communication exists to serve the information needs and to help citizens make informed decisions. One of the roles of government public relation is as the communication bridge of particular programs between organization and society and it also a critical key for image building (Kadir, 2009).

Public relation studies have increasingly growing. In early 1988, most public relations research was casual and informal, rather than scientific and precise and done by individuals trained in public relations rather than by individual strained as researchers (Lindenmann, 1988). In 1994, the International Public Relations Association (IPRA) survey to international public relations practitioners confirmed wide recognition of the importance of research for evaluation and measurement. Yet, the application of evaluation research remains low in public relations even in the early 20s century. Whereas there is a strong argument that the whole theoretical basis of public relations needs to be questioned and reviewed with further pure or basic research. At an applied level, public relations academics and practitioners need to greatly expand efforts in both formative (strategic) and evaluative research; research which is much more than monitoring press clippings. For public relation evaluation studies, some theoretical models are available, one of macro models proposed by Macnamara breaks public relation activity into three stages: inputs, outputs, and outcomes.

Another proposition that is commonly use in public relation study can be reviewed from evolution public relation types (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). Grunig and Hunt present the direction of communication (one-way vs two-way) and the balance of intended effects (asymmetrical vs symmetrical) as two dimensions of public relations practices. And these two dimensions of PR Practices, in turn, result in four models of PR practices – press agentry/publicity, public information, two-way asymmetrical PR, and two-way symmetrical PR practices.

Briefly public relations can be interpreted as: (a) something that is owned by someone, (b) its function is to increase public relation through activity or specific policy, (c) to be major milestone in democratic society (Center and Jackson, 2003). Other notion emphasize public relations is a communication management between organization and its public. Achievement of optimal result is certain profit form (Grunig, 1992). Wilson and Ogden explain public relation as organization efforts to build and maintain profit reciprocity relation in order to communicate and work together with public which will ensure long term success (Wilson and Ogden, 2003). Public relations can also be defined as management, through communication, perception and strategic relation between organization and its internal and external stakeholders. If the opinions above are integrated, public relations basically link with communication management between organization and its internal and external stakeholders.

Another tool in public relation research is the Hutton framework which is an improvement for previous Grunig-Hunt “four models” typology. The framework classifies practices in public relation into three main dimensions: initiative, interest, and image (Hutton, 1999). The three-dimensional cube provides a framework by which various public relations practices can be analyzed in either formative or evaluation research. With this framework, it appears to be six relatively distinct orientations of public relations practices: persuasion, advocacy, public information, cause-related public relations, image/reputation management, and relationship management (Hutton, 1999).

Decentralization
Regional Government management in Indonesia has leaped far from centralization to decentralization, as an effect of No. 22/1999 Law about Regional Government. But unfortunately, the confinement of this law was not based on government sincere political will, but only as a respond to suppress demand from several areas in Indonesia who wanted to separate from Indonesia.

The indication that government planned to retract this decentralization (recentralization) is visible from government’s unserious behavior in solving problems that happen in decentralization management, for instance the coordination inter regional government, which caused relation disharmony between Regency/City Government with Province Government. Regency/City Government walk itself and no more listens to province, because it do not feels as governor subordinate. This condition is left by Central
Government; even it was used as reasons to show that decentralization management has failed. So that the eagerness to revise this law get enough reasons. No. 22/1999 Law had been revised, even it can be said it got changed with No. 32/2004 Law. If it is seen from the spirit, as if No. 32/2004 Law is lead to strengthen regional autonomy, which is by revising Regional Leader election management, from originally it was chosen by the Regional legislative, then it is elected directly by the people. However, if it is conducted in depth research, then the spirit to retract decentralization and regional autonomy will be found. Firstly, in this law the term Regional Government authority can no longer be found, instead it is changed into Regional Government affairs, because authority connoted politically with sovereignty. While, the term affairs only connoted to administrative aspect. Secondly, hierarchical government control pattern from village to the central is getting stronger. Although it is meant to ease coordination and monitoring, yet this thing restrict Regional Government power in government management. Thirdly, several government regulations as implementation of No. 32/2004 Law, shows more that there have been a turning point in decentralization. Let’s say (1) Government Regulation No. 38/2007 about Affairs Division between Government, Province Government, and Regency/City Government and (2) Government Regulation No. 41/2007 about Regional Organization Devices. By the implementation of those rules, it marked the foundation of centralistic government reinstallation, which was tried to be craked through No. 22/1999 Law. The phenomenon in decentralization management is the reason why re-map is needed in decentralization run after No. 32/2004 Law.

In the discourse of government and development in Indonesia, between decentralization, local democracy and village development are the three main issues that are not linked significantly to improve village people human well being. Several facts can be we show. First, village development is not more than village infrastructure development which is believed will open easiness in economic transaction between village and city. In the past time, this development project narrowly was interpreted as government kindness to the people and also was worked on to achieve short term political purposes that were to double people’s loyalty (not legitimacy) to the ruling power and also buy village people’s voice to vote for certain party. It was an open secret that villages who win Golkar absolutely will get development project from the government, in other hand if Golkar fails in certain villages then the streets will not be repaired.

Theoretically, democracy and decentralization often imagined as condition that is needed for village development effectiveness. Decentralization and democracy will make state apparatus more open and accountable, therefore more responsive to local needs and aspirations (Crock and Sverisson, 2001). However, decentralization -democracy and poverty reduction relation are not fully clear. Studies collection, start with World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/1, titled Attacking Poverty, concludes there are not any consistent relation between pro-poorness and democracy. Far more it was written: the allegation that there is common relation or relation that can be forecasted between government decentralization and policy development that is more ‘pro-poor’ or poverty reduction outcome clearly missed out convincing evidence. They who propose decentralization in this field, at least, should get more careful (Crook and Sverisson, 2001: 52). Another research by the National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and UNDP (2008) indicates that ‘economic growth of the new autonomous regions has fluctuated compared to their parent regions, and the new regions have not been able to close the gap with their parent region. The regional budgets in the new regions play a less effective role in encouraging economic activity. Meanwhile, the performance of public service in the new regions are considered low, due to the lack of effective of funds, low utilization of services, and lack of personnel skilled in public service provision’.

Decentralization is a concept that has multiple interpretations. In management and politic discipline, decentralization is meant as power and authority transfer from higher level government to lower level, or from national to sub national level (Collins and Green, 1994; Mills, 1994). Decentralization type can be classified into four, that are: 1) delegation, which transfer authority to lower level management, 2) de-concentration is transfer authority to lower level administrative, 3) devolution is transfer authority to lower political level, 4) whereas, privatization is a condition where obligation and authority is transferred from public area to private ownership (Rondinelli, 1983). Classification above got a lot opposition, especially regarding whether devolution and privatization can be categorized as part of decentralization (Collins and Green, 1994).
As shown before, hundreds of new autonomous areas have been formed in Indonesia’s territory after the implementation of No.22/1999 Law about Regional Government which then enhanced to No.32/2004 Law. Regional autonomy is autonomous region competence to manage and maintain local people needs under own initiative based on people’s aspiration in accordance to legislation. Linguistically autonomy means stand-alone or self-government. Meanwhile region is a territory or government environment. Therefore, Regional Autonomy by term is an “authority/power on certain area/region which is managed and maintained for people in that area/region (article 1 paragraph 5 No.32/2004 Law).

Principally, regional autonomy itself is a concept of autonomy decentralization. In Indonesia’s case, authority decentralization also changes regional government mechanism management. Regional division is one of the real examples in this context in which the local governments now play more important functions in local and regional development (Matsui, 2005). Thus, the implementation of regional autonomy will heavily rely on its leadership and policy, as stated by (Firman, 2003), ‘The progress of decentralization policy implementation in Indonesia in nearly 10 years (1999-2008) has been uneven in character, in which some provinces, districts, and municipalities have been able to develop impressively under the reform, but some others not, and even negatively, depending upon the quality of leadership of the local elites’. The success or failure in applying regional autonomy will affect other sector. (Firman, 2009) said ‘Indonesia’s decentralization policy reform involves a shift in several government functions, responsibilities and tasks from the central to the local government domain. Decentralization gives opportunities for responsive local governance, but…under the new policy there is a general tendency for local authorities and local leaders to improve the region according to their own socioeconomic and political interests’.

In the implementation of family planning within decentralization era, it is important to make sure that responsibilities at central, provincial, and district levels are clear in practice, and that financial and human resources are sufficient and adequate at the local level. Commitment of local authorities to support and invest in family planning is crucial. It is also important to improve local logistics management and delivery systems for contraceptives, ensuring continuity of supplies. The practice in some developing countries indicates that decentralization in and of itself does not always improve the efficiency, equity and effectiveness of the health sector. Instead, it can exacerbate inequities, weaken local commitment to priority health issues and decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery by disrupting the referral chain (Lakshminarayan, 2003). Some regional management are susceptible to particularly serious threat to accessibility and delivery of reproductive health services, such as family planning program which somehow is controversial against local pressures or religion background, and emergency obstetric care which requires a functioning and effective health system. In early practice in Philippines, the non-health factors such as political leadership as well as other reforms that interact with decentralization have affected health sector. The research has proven the effect of decentralization toward accessibility, affordability, and quality of health services, including for reproductive health. It is suggested six aspects that should be examine regarding decentralization, which are: delivery of services, financing of services, institutional capacity, health personnel, quality of care, and local representation (Lakshminarayan, 2003).

Information Dissemination
The dissemination process is a public information delivery process from a source to receiver in a context. Public information encompasses information products that a government agency chooses to impart on its own or is otherwise required to release (Hemon & McClure, 1987). Information dissemination involves a proactive distribution of information products and otherwise making them (as well as information services) available to the public. The government, as well, improves communication with the public so that needed information is easily identified and retrieved.

There are several key factors in information dissemination process which based on source and receiver. Those factors are internally and externally (Duggan and Banwell, 2005). It can be indicated that in information delivery process there are two main actors, information provider (source) and information recipient (receiver). Internal factor that influence information dissemination effectiveness from provider point of view are effectiveness measurement, changes in behavior, changes in attitude, budget, and evaluation.
While, the external factors are cultural obstacles, social economy factors, knowledge enrichment, information based research. Whereas, internal factors that influence information recipients are perceptual relevance of an information, interaction with information, and someone’s influence in information formulation. Whereas, the external factors are: understanding the need for new knowledge, discovery types of information, awareness of information sources, and the desire for changes as a result of new information.

Some studies about information dissemination relate it to communication approach. Information Processing Model assumes that changes in knowledge will automatically lead to changes in attitudes, which will automatically lead to changes in behaviour (Flay, 1981). Theory of Cognitive Dissonance stated that attitudes could be changed if they were juxtaposed with a dissonant attitude but, importantly, dissonance theory held that receivers accepted only messages that were consonant with their attitudes and actively resisted messages that were dissonant (Festinger, 1950). Grunig’s Situational Theory of communication holds that the relationship between knowledge (awareness), attitudes and behaviour is contingent on a number of situational factors. Grunig lists four key situational factors: (1) the level of problem recognition; (2) the level of constraint recognition (does the person see the issue or problem as within their control or ability to do something); (3) the presence of a referent criterion (prior experience or prior knowledge); and (4) level of involvement.

For managing government information resources, public access as a concept should consider factors of accessibility, availability, and acceptability (Hernon, 1998). Accessibility refers to the extent to which government information is accurately identified bibliographically in reference works and to which information is publicly known. It also requires the resolution of economic, political, social, and technological barriers encountered in gaining access to information. Accessibility declines if the public cannot obtain a copy; information is contained in a format requiring the use of special tools; information can be located but not obtained within an acceptable time frame; information is priced higher than individuals can afford (and are willing) to pay; and government agencies lose, misplace, or do not make information available. Accessibility includes understanding or cognitive access; for instance, the person needs sufficient expertise to understand the information. It may not, however, always be the responsibility of the government to provide the requisite level of explanation and education when a person lacks that understanding.

Availability refers to what information exists and what the government will release, either voluntarily or by legal recourse. It refers to physical access and document delivery, and to issues such as whether the information can be obtained in a convenient and user friendly format, in a language understandable to the customer, and in a time frame whereby the information is relevant and timely, and has utility. Along with the development of information technology, the government agencies are encouraged to use it to improve service delivery performance to the public; continued the downsizing of the federal workforce and the transference of programs and services to state and local government. Information technology (IT) usage has been a greater way to make public information more accessible.

Acceptability relates to credibility, user preferences, expectations, and even sales potential. It might also include issues related to misinformation and disinformation, and the extent to which WWW sites have not been hacked and basic information changed—even temporarily.

**METHODOLOGY**

In order to get public perception to the following three variables: Government Public Relations (GPR), Decentralization and Information Dissemination, a survey with structured questionnaires has been carried out to respondents registered as KB acceptors before the implementation of regional autonomy (before 1999) in West Java and Banten provinces. The preference of these two provinces as the location of this study is in view of efficiency and effectiveness factors due to their proximity with the national capital of Indonesia. The sampling is conducted with Multi Stage Cluster Sampling method, to take respondent in West Java which has 17 districts and 9 cities, and in Banten which has 4 districts and 4 cities. The latter is a newly established province as a result of West Java subdivision. From this sampling method, the research objects of 736 respondents from 13 cities/districts of West Java province plus 4 cities/districts of Banten province are
selected randomly. The areas, from which the samples are taken, have represented various conditions of cities and districts, ranging from developed, under-developed to newly established areas of subdivision.

These three variables are thereafter operated into some measurement dimensions. GPR variable will be further elucidated with some factors: Roles and Existence; Communication; and Media. Decentralization variable is constructed with the following dimensions: Decentralization Instruments; and Decentralization Aspects to Family Planning (KB) Program. For Information Dissemination, this variable consists of dimensions: Accessibility, Availability and Acceptability. Dimensions constructing these variables are further broken down into some indicators. Public perception to all variables adopted for this study is measured in Likert’s scale.

By quantitative approach, the collected data will be processed and analyzed using multivariate analysis in case of latent variables, covering descriptive analysis, paired t-test, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Second Order and Multiple Linear Regression. Data distribution is first tested for its normality assumption prior to analysis using $\chi^2$ (Chi square) based on data skewness and curtosis. Path analysis produces modeling to respond hypothesis that has been tested with model significance test (overall and partial) and testing of classical assumption of simple linear regression model.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Characteristics of Respondents

Data on the characteristics of respondents includes Sex, Education, Number of Years as Family Planning Acceptors (KB), Type of KB Taken, and Contraception Method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Characteristics of Respondents by Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research result, 2011*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Characteristics of Respondents by Education Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneducated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School (SMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School (SMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strata 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strata 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strata 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research result, 2011*
Table 3: Characteristics of Respondents by Number of Years as Acceptors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Num. Years of Acceptors</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974 - 1979</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 -1984</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 - 1989</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 1994</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 - 1999</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>82.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>736</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research result, 2011

Table 4: Characteristics of Respondents by Type of KB Taken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of KB</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-sponsored</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>49.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Initiative</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>50.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>736</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research result, 2011

Table 5: Characteristics of Respondents by Contraception Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contraception Method</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injection</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>32.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pill</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>18.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implant</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUD</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>31.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasectomi/Tubectomi</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>736</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research result, 2011

Based on the above respondents’ characteristics, some findings are simply detected. First, in terms of respondents’ gender, data shows that female respondents much outnumbered than male KB participants. It is consistent with national data on KB participants across the country, in which female participants of KB program are still dominating. This fact should cause concern since KB can and should be able to attract male acceptors. BKKBN (National Coordinating Body for Family Planning Program) as a special organization responsible for KB program in Indonesia continues their attempts to increase the number of contraception users among male population.

Another assessed characteristic of respondents concerns education. It is evident that respondents involved in this study in majority have low education degrees (SMP/SMA). This condition has affected the responses forwarded by the respondents, and the results of study.

Another factor affecting the results of study relates to respondent selection scheme, i.e. based on the number of years as KB acceptors. All respondents selected for this study have been participating in Family Planning (KB) program since 1999. It suits the target of research objects, i.e. KB acceptors who have been registered as KB program participants prior to the implementation of regional autonomy. It aims to give
opportunity for the respondents to compare KB-related issues during two different governance systems, i.e. centralized and decentralized.

Furthermore, from the characteristic of types of KB preferred by respondents, survey revealed that proportional balance of respondents participating in government-sponsored KB programs, which is totally free, and those of self-initiative participants. This reality indicates that the research is relatively representative in terms of respondent composition by types of KB programs. Indeed, the main proponent of KB program in Indonesia is not Government only. Private parties have expressed their serious concerns on KB program. More self-initiative KB participants indicate that KB has now turned into a need, and accessible in self-help manner.

**COMPARISON OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION TO RESEARCH VARIABLES PRE AND POST REGIONAL AUTONOMY**

To assess the discrepancy of public perception on Government PR, Decentralization and Information Dissemination before and after 1999, paired t-test statistics have been used. The results are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$t_{count}$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>$t_{table}$</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government PR ($X_1$)</td>
<td>-17.793</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>2.246</td>
<td>Reject Hypothesis Nil ($H_0$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research tabulation, 2011*

Since it evidently indicated that the test results in value of $t_{count}$ (-8.328) is greater than $t_{table}$ (2.246), $H_0$ is therefore rejected. Thus, one can simply arrive at conclusion concerning significant discrepancy between average public perceptions to Goverment PR ($X_1$) variable before and after the introduction of regional autonomy. Negative mark (-) in score $t_{count}$, shows an increase, implying the increase of public perception to $X_1$ after regional autonomy introduced in comparison with pre-regional autonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$t_{count}$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>$t_{table}$</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization ($X_2$)</td>
<td>-8.328</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>2.246</td>
<td>Reject Hypothesis Nil ($H_0$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research tabulation, 2011*

A significant discrepancy is also detected from average public perception to Decentralization ($X_2$) variable between pre and post regional autonomy introduction. Public perception to decentralized government system ($X_2$) is to increase if compared with centralized system (before 1999) in Family Planning (KB) Program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$t_{count}$</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>$t_{table}$</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Dissemination ($Y$)</td>
<td>-20.290</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>2.246</td>
<td>Reject Hypothesis Nil ($H_0$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research tabulation, 2011*

Likewise in case of $Y$ variable, the conclusion shows significant discrepancy of average public perception to Information Dissemination ($Y$) variable, where it is detected an increased public perception against this Information Dissemination ($Y$) variable following the implementation of regional autonomy if compared with pre-regional autonomy conditions.
DOMINANT FACTORS ANALYSIS IN RESEARCH VARIABLES

Table 9: Score of Standardized Loading Dimensions to Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government PR</td>
<td>Roles and Existence</td>
<td>0.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>0.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>0.890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research tabulation, 2011

Out of three dimensions defining Government PR (X1) variable assessed for this study, Media dimension records the highest score. It means that Media dimension has the most dominant influence in Government PR if compared with the other two variables. Meanwhile, for Roles and Existence dimension of Government PR variable it is identified that public perception is highly dominated for the indicator of “The roles of KB officials (State Hospitals, Puskesmas, BKKBN Agents, etc.) is significantly important”. With regard to Communication dimension, indicator of “Pro-active KB agents in encouraging people to participate in KB program” records the highest score. Correlated with the previous theory, it is identified that Government PR in KB affairs is more focussed on “persuasion” type PR practices. In Media dimension, KB program indicator reveals the importance of socializing this birth control program via internet/website. It has been regarded as the most dominant factor.

Table 10: Scores of Standardized Loading Dimensions to Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>Decentralization Instruments</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralization Aspects to KB Program</td>
<td>0.580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research tabulation, 2011

It is clear that the dimension of Decentralization Instruments is more dominant in defining Decentralization variable (X2). To assess decentralization dimension, the indicator of “Government authority delegation” has unarguably the highest score. For the assessment of dimension of Decentralization Aspects to KB program, the”Government (central/regional) indicator has well-cut targets to pursue” becomes a dominant factor.

Table 11: Score of Standardized Loading Dimensions to Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Dissemination</td>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptability</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research tabulation, 2011

Out of three dimensions defining Information Dissemination (Y) variable, Availability dimension has the most dominant influence to Information Dissemination. For Accessibility dimension, the dominant construction factor is indicator saying “After receiving information concerning KB, my knowledge on family planning increases.” Meanwhile for Availability dimension, the dominant factor is that of indicator “Obtaining information on KB from the Government” (in this case, hospitals/puskesmas/KB extension agents, etc.). As to Acceptability dimension, the dominant factor relates to indicator saying “Information on KB is important so that public will fully understand the positive and negative impacts of KB program.”
IMPACTS ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TO DEPENDENT VARIABLE

To assess the significance of two independent variables to dependent variable, double linear regression will be applied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12: The Results of Simple Regression Equation Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goverment PR (X1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization (X2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research tabulation, 2011*

Linear equation between two variables of Government PR (X1) and Decentralization (X2) to variable of Information Dissemination (Y) concerning Family Planning Program is as follows:

\[
\hat{Y} = 3.192 + 0.69X_1 + 0.352X_2
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13: The Results of Multiple Linear Regression Variants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goverment PR (X1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization (X2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Research tabulation, 2011*

Based on the above equation it can be concluded that the most significant variable to Information Dissemination (Y) is Government Public Relation (X1) variable, compared with Decentralization (X2) variable with regard to Family Planning Program. Based on the above analysis results, it can be concluded that these two independent variables in this study, i.e. Government PR and Decentralization have positive impact to independent variable of Information Dissemination. However, Government PR factor has stronger influence to Information Dissemination than Decentralization factor. The relation of these variables is applied in Family Planning (KB) program.

CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE

To identify the relation of variables in partial manner, Pearson correlation was adopted. From the above table, the value of Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.866 with score \( t_{\text{count}} (46.920) \), which is higher than \( t_{\text{table}} (2.246) \). It means there is a significant correlation between Government PR (X1) dan Information Dissemination (Y) concerning Family Planning (KB) program, in which the value of correlation coefficient reaches 0.866. Thus, the better Government PR is the better Information Dissemination concerning Family Planning (KB) program. Meanwhile, determination coefficient of 75.00% shows that variation in Information Dissemination concerning Family Planning (KB) program can be explained by Government PR variable with category “strong influence”, and the remaining of 25.00% is subject to other factors than Government PR variable.
Table 14: The Correlation of Government PR (X₁) and Information Dissemination (Y) concerning Family Planning (KB) Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient of Pearson Correlation r_XY</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test Results</th>
<th>Determination Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r_{count}</td>
<td>r_{table}</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>46.920</td>
<td>2.246</td>
<td>Ho reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research tabulation, 2011

Table 15: The Correlation of Decentralization (X₂) and Information Dissemination on Family Planning (KB) Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient r_XY</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test Result</th>
<th>Determination Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r_{count}</td>
<td>r_{table}</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>28.271</td>
<td>2.246</td>
<td>Ho rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research tabulation, 2011

Based on the foregoing table, the value of Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.722 with the value of t_{count} (28.271) higher than the value of t_{table} (2.246). It implies that significant relationship between Decentralization (X₂) and Information Dissemination (Y) on Family Planning (KB) Program as indicated with the value of correlation coefficient reaching 0.722. Thus, the better Decentralization is the better Information Dissemination on Family Planning (KB) Program. Meanwhile, determination coefficient of 52.13% indicates that variations in Information Dissemination on Family Planning (KB) Program can be explained by Decentralization variable with category “strong influence”, with the remaining of 48.87% affected by other factors out of Decentralization Variable.

DISCUSSION

Research finding indicating that Government PR positively affected information dissemination is as predicted. The role of Public Relation in Information Dissemination is regarded as very important factor by the public. With the existence of this Public Relation, information can reach the target audience. This is also true in case of Family Planning (KB) Program. The better Function of Public Relation, the more effective Communication, and the more Various Media used, will result in the better information reach the public. It is detectable from open Access of public to such information, the Availability of extensive information, and high Acceptability of public to the information.

The function of Government PR in Family Planning is considered improving by public though considerably reduced number of KB agents happened after the implementation of regional autonomy. Within BKKBN, the reform had actually started in 2004, where around 50% of agents were transferred to other government institutions. Family Planning (KB) program was neglected. However, owing to the importance of public relations in Family Planning (KB) in practice the delivery of KB extension service is not solely dependent on government officials (Government PR). The function of public relations is developing and has been taken over by some other officials than Government KB agents. They included midwives, village officers, village cadres, etc. They indirectly perform public relation function in Family Planning (KB) during their day-to-day activities. This phenomenon has been one of answers to the findings of this study. While in terms of quantity, KB agents sustain reduction following regional autonomy, has no influence to Information
Dissemination of KB to the public. The stagnant existence of BKKBN as a special organization responsible for KB program in Indonesia ceased and then revived in 2009.

Another factor influencing positive relationship between Government PR variable and Information Dissemination in KB is that of higher awareness of public to participate in this program due to changing demands and era. This awareness leads to self-initiation in looking for and accessing KB-related information. The sources of information on KB are no longer from KB agents only, instead from varying information media. This condition is completely different from the era when information and communication was still limited and KB program was just newly socialized. GPR became the main source of spreading information about KB. Unfortunately, this public awareness of needs on KB program has yet to be assessed in the study.

Public gives good assessment to the communication technique adopted by KB agents, particularly to their pro-active stance in persuading people to participate in KB Program. Likewise, the use of media for Government PR is getting more optimum after 1999 if compared with previous time. A wide variety of media has been used to get across information about KB to the public. This media variation is following information technology and communication advancement, from which diverse media can be utilized as public relations functions, either printed media, digital media or new media. Many authors (see, for example Cutlip, Center and Broom, 2000; Guth and Marsh, 2003; Lattimore et al., 2004; Newsom, Turk and Kruckeberg, 2004; Wilson, 2001) have emphasized the use of a variety of channels to increase effectiveness of public relations programs and the use of appropriate channels for different audiences (Xavier et al., 2005). Today, media that has been assessed as the most effective channel in conveying KB program is utterly television. However, public has greater expectation on KB program socialization via internet/website.

For another variable, Decentralization (X2), generally respondents in Banten and West Java Provinces admit successful implementation of regional autonomy in their provinces. It is obvious from the devolved decentralization instruments such as region subdivision, financial management, inter-institution coordination, or institutional coordination. These conditions may be found differently in other provinces in Indonesia as the implementation of regional autonomy is considerably depend on the leadership and policies within respective region (Firman, 2003). Success or failure in regional development process will unarguably bring impacts to other sectors.

Similarly in KB affairs, decentralization has generated impacts to the implementation of KB program itself. As noted above, since the implementation of regional autonomy, the organizational structure of BKKBN changed. This birth control program has been delegated to each region under coordination of provincial and regional BKKBN. Hence, positive relationship between Decentralization and Information Dissemination as found herein is indeed unexpected. However, as previously pointed out by Pratikno (2008), it is said that 'local-government proliferation could potentially result in positive impacts for local and regional development'. Likewise, some theories support this claim saying that 'Decentralization and democracy will make state apparatus more open and accountable, therefore more responsive to local needs and aspirations' (Crock and Sverisson, 2001). The finding of this study is very likely possible, i.e. regional autonomy has produced positive impact to information dissemination, especially with regard to KB program in West Java province and Banten province. Nevertheless, further research to policy and priority of those regions in KB affairs is still needed to strengthen the study finding. A Focus Group Discussion (FGD) between local officials in the capacity of regional autonomy manager and KB agents as Government PR will undoubtedly enrich this research.

FURTHER RESEARCH

Research specifically focusing on Government PR is limited. Meanwhile, this study focuses merely on Government PR for Family Planning (KB) sector, which is popularly known as KB agents. Research on Government PR for other sectors yet widely open. In addition, some other factors than the assessed ones are yet assessed regarding the relation of Government PR and Information Dissemination such as public awareness and the needs on KB program, as well as the existence of non-government public relations.
Research on the relation of decentralization and information dissemination can be investigated in other provinces since every autonomous region may have different policy on certain issue.

REFERENCES


Breton, Albert, An Introduction to Decentralization Failure.


Kadir, R (2009). Humas Pemerintah dan Pencitraan; Studi tentang Peran Humas dalam Pencitraan Malang sebagai Kota pendidikan

Keefer, Philip E, Ambar Narayan and Tara Vishwanath, Decentralization in Pakistan: Are Local Politicians Likely to be More Accountable?, (May, 2005)


Mantra, B. I.; & Kasto, (1992) Penentuan Sampel, Metode Penelitian Survei, ed. Masri Sangarimun dan Sofian Effendi, Jakarta: LP3ES, p. 120.


Meguid, Bonnie M. *Bringing Government Back to the People? The Impact of Political Decentralization on Voter Engagement in Western Europe*


Moorthy, K. Sridhar, *Strategic Decentralization in Channels*


Wawancara dengan Direktur Pemaduan Kebijakan dan Program Badan Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN) Pusat, Ambar Rahayu (BKKBN Online 29 Juni 2009)

Wawancara dengan Kepala BKKBN Pusat Sugiri Syarief (103,4 Radio FM Jakarta 19 April 2009)


MECHANISM OF PATRIOTISM EMPOWERMENT IN MALAYSIA

Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu, Rahmad Aydil Ali Akhbar and Zubir Zaiyadi
Jabatan Pengajian Kenegaraan dan Ketamadunan, Fakulti Ekologi Manusia
Universiti Putra Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
hasnita@putra.upm.edu.my

ABSTRACT

Patriotism is a term which is relevant throughout the ages. Each country needs people with the spirit of patriotism to ensure the survival of the country. Without this spirit, the country's sovereignty will be undermined and eventually destroyed. Recognising the importance of this spirit of the country, various efforts have been made by the government and other parties to strengthen patriotism in young Malaysians. Therefore, this paper will be discussing the mechanisms that can empower the patriotism of the people. This includes career and education-patriotism oriented, the campaigns undertaken by the government, private sector and the role of media and art industry contributions and through law enforcement.

Keyword: Patriotism, empowerment, government, role of media, Malaysia

PENDAHULUAN

pada 31 Ogos 1957. Sementara itu, pada era pascamerdeka pula, semangat patriotisme pula lebih kepada mengekalkan kemerdekaan, menyumbang kepada kemajuan negara dalam semua aspek seperti ekonomi, politik, pendidikan dan sosial. Hakikatnya, untuk mengekalkan kemerdekaan bukanlah satu perkara yang mudah kerana ia memerlukan penglibatan dan komitmen yang yang berpaksikan kepada semangat patriotisme yang jitu daripada semua pihak termasuk rakyat dan pemerintah. Sehubungan itu, semangat patriotisme ini perlu disuburkan dalam jiwa warga negara dari semasa ke semasa melalui mekanisme-mekanisme yang bersesuaian seperti mana yang akan dibincangkan dalam penulisan ini.

**DEFINISI PATRIOTISME**


**MEKANISME PATRIOTISME**

(a) **Pendidikan Berteraskan Patriotisme**

Pepatah Melayu pernah berkata “Melentur buluh biarlah dari rebung” merujuk kepada jika hendak mendidik anak-anak biarlah dari seawal usia. Ibu bapa memainkan peranan penting dalam membentuk jati anak-anak untuk menjadi warganegara yang patriotik dan ini dilihat sebagai pendidikan yang tidak formal. Justeru pendekatan yang lebih sistematik dan berdisiplin bagi menggarap semangat patriotisme haruslah diterap dari bangku sekolah lagi, di

Oleh itu langkah kerajaan untuk menjadikan subjek sejarah sebagai subjek wajib lulus untuk mendapatkan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) adalah tindakan yang wajar sebagai langkah asas pendidikan ke arah semangat patriotisme dan cintakan negara. Dengan mewajibkan subjek Sejarah, pelajar akan memberi tumpuan penuh terhadap subjek tersebut dan secara tidak langsung pelajar akan lebih memahami dan menghayati sejarah negara dan langkah itu dapat memberi peluang kepada calon yang gagal mata pelajaran sejarah memperbaiki keputusan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM). Bagi mengukuhkan subjek Sejarah ini Menteri Pelajaran, YAB Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin telah menegaskan, format peperiksaan dan penaksiran ke atas pelajaran itu juga akan dibentuk semula untuk lebih memotivasi pelajar dan arah mempelajari dan menghayati sejarah terutama mengenai tanah air (Utusan Online: 17 Disember 2010). Usaha kerajaan ini turut mendapat perhatian daripada ramai ahli akademik seperti Prof. Madya Dr. Shakila Yacob (2010) yang menyatakan bahawa tujuan ataupun objektif pengajaran dan pembelajaran Sejarah bukan hanya untuk mendalami pengetahuan generasi muda mengenai latar belakang dan profil negara malah untuk memupuk semangat patriotisme dan menyemarakan lagi sikap bertolak-ansur, toleransi, saling hormat-menghormati diantara kaum dan agama serta bahasa dan budaya. Oleh itu subjek sejarah harus dilaksanakan tanpa gagal bukan sahaja di peringkat sekolah menengah tetapi harus bermula daripada peringkat sekolah rendah hingga ke peringkat pengajian tinggi sama ada awam atau swasta. Malah usaha ini terus diiringi dengan subjek-subjek lain yang berpaksikan patriotisme antara contohnya Cajian Tempatan, Tamadun Islam dan Tamadun Asia (TITAS), Kenegaraan Malaysia, dan Hubungan Etnik. Hal ini juga tidak hanya tertumpu pada pembelajaran dalam bilik kuliah sahaja tetapi juga dijalankan dalam program-program luar bilik kuliah seperti menyertai pasukan Pengakap, Pasukan Latihan Pegawai Simpanan (PALAPES), Pandu Puteri dan pelbagai lagi persatuan dan NGO yang berobjektifkan patriotisme.

Ironinya pendidikan berteraskan patriotisme bukan sahaja melalui pendidikan sejarah sahaja malah nilai-nilai patriotisme mampu dipupuk melalui sastera, penulisan dan kebudayaan. Usaha penganjuran Pesta Sukan dan Kebudayaan Belia Malaysia oleh Kementerian Belia dan Sukan melalui Majlis Belia Malaysia dan Majlis Belia Pulau Pinang yang berlangsung pada Disember 2010 lalu di Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) telah memberi ruang kepada pelajar sekolah (Berita Harian Online: 12 Disember 2010) dan generasi muda menzahirkan serta menerapkan semangat patriotisme melalui bakat kebudayaan, sastera dan sukan.

(b) Kempen Patriotisme oleh Kerajaan, Media dan Industri Seni Hiburan

Teori Penetapan Agenda1 merupakan salah satu strategi yang digunakan oleh media untuk mempengaruhi masyarakat. Justeru dapat dilihat autori yang dimiliki oleh kerajaan dan pihak media untuk menetapkan rancangan ataupun kempen bertemakan patriotisme bagi menyempai semangat patriotisme serta mempengaruhi masyarakat untuk mencintai negara. Media tidak sahaja memulakan dan mengakhiri operasi siaran dengan lagu Negaraku, tetapi harus menyelitikkan segmen-segmen patriotik semasa beroperasi seperti menyiarkan filem-filem seperti Hati Malaya, Sarjan Hasan, Lefitenan Adnan, Bukit Kepong serta banyak lagi dan tidak memberi keutamaan penuh kepada filem-filem sinetron dari Indonesia, Korea atau Latin yang jauh daripada identiti sebenar Malaysia.

Usaha ini perlu diperkasakan lagi dengan sokongan kerajaan melalui filem-filem pendek, cereka, buah bicara dan animasi terbitan Jabatan Filem Negara yang tidak hanya bersifat bermusim contoh hanya pada bulan kemerdekaan negara tetapi haruslah sepanjang tahun. Malah dituruti dengan kempen-kempen kemasyarakat yang diselit dengan sentimen patriotisme seperti mengembalikan semula kempen atau program Rakan Muda. Begitu juga dengan pihak swasta boleh mengambil inisiatif dengan menyelitikkan elemen-elemen patriotisme sebagai contoh penyertaan pameran dan demonstrasi oleh polis dan tentera dalam program Jom Heboh anjuran Media Prima Berhad melalui TV3 yang sememangnya menjadi tumpuan utama pengunjung seluruh negara. Secara tidak langsung elemen-elemen patriotisme akan terdedah kepada masyarakat dan suasana mesra rakyat akan terjalin antara kedua-duanya. Tambah lagi, usaha pihak swasta seperti Petronas tampak lebih konsistan terhadap nilai-nilai patriotisme apabila kerap menerbitkan iklan-iklan syarikatnya yang bertema patriotisme khususnya ketika menjelang sambutan kemerdekaan negara setiap tahun2. Usaha yang sama juga ada dilakukan oleh syarikat-syarikat lain seperti Telekom Malaysia (TM), Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) dan lain-lain syarikat berkaitan negara (GLC) dan seharusnya kempen-kempen patriotisme ini terus dicontoh oleh pihak-pihak swasta yang lain sebagai tanda terima kasih kepada negara dan bagi membina lagi semangat patriotisme rakyat.


---

1 Teori ini dikemukakan oleh Shaw dan McCombs dengan menyatakan kuasa autori yang dimiliki oleh pihak media ataupun kerajaan yang menguasai media akan menentukan maklumat yang hendra disampaikan kepada audiens.
2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1-DyHVD6l&feature=related
3 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Yxt7XSJX6U&feature=related
4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SD9heMOWhQ&NR=1

66
oleh pihak kerajaan, pihak swasta, NGO mahupun individu itu sendiri dengan memberi keutamaan yang tinggi kepada negara dan mengatasi kepentingan peribadi dalam apa jua hal dan bidang. Sebagai contoh, hal ini amat bertepatan dengan sikap rakyat Jepun yang dilihat amat patriotik seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Dr. Mohd Ridhuan Tee Abdullah (2010) di dalam penulisan blog beliau. Dalam segenap perkara mereka akan menjaga disiplin dan maruah bangsa. Hal ini bererti jika mereka gagal mendisiplinkan diri serta menjaga maruah bangsa bermakna mereka telah mencemarkan nama baik negara Jepun dan ini adalah cara mereka melahirkan dan menzahirkan semangat patriotism.

Selain itu kemen-kemen bertema patriotisme, pendekatan berbentuk usaha sama kerajaan dan media massa perlu diperhebat dengan menggalakkan penggiat seni menghasilkan filem dan drama yang lebih bersifat patriotik dan beridentitik budaya Malaysia. Usaha akan lebih memberangsangkkan dengan suntikan dana daripada kerajaan sebagai motivasi kepada penggiat seni. Sebagai contoh drama bersiri Beret Hijau telah memperlihatkan kerjasama antara Angkatan Tentera Malaysia dan penggiat seni. Tambah lagi penerbit drama berkenaan telah mendapat suntikan semangat dan motivasi apabila Y. B. Khairy Jamaludin (ahli politik) telah menawarkan diri untuk berlakon bersama-sama dalam beberapa siri drama tersebut. Selain itu, industri seni perfilman juga boleh mencontohi idea-idea daripada filem-filem negara luar seperti India, China dan Thailand yang sering kali menggambarkan budaya tempatan mereka walaupun filem tersebut dalam genre seram, percintaan, komedi,aksi dan pelbagai lagi seperti filem Mudhalvan, Once Upon Time in China dan Ong Bak. Oleh itu, penggiat seni juga wajar menggambarkan hasil-hasil karya yang mencerminkan semangat patriotisme, kecintaan terhadap negara dan elemen kebudayaan tempatan. Justeru, pujian juga harus diberikan kepada Dato’ Yusuf Haslam sebagai penggiat seni yang terus mengekalkan momentum menerbitkan filem Gerak Khas dan Roda-Roda Kota Raya yang menceritakan kerjaya polis sebagai pemangkin semangat patriotisme dan cintakan negara. Drama ini telah diterbitkan sejak lebih sepuluh tahun lalu dan delegasi ini diteruskan oleh anak beliau selaku pelakon dan pengarah muda, Syamsul Yusuf.

(c) Profesion dan Kerjaya Berorientasikan Patriotisme

Walau bagaimanapun, jika golongan muda tidak berminat untuk menyertai tentera atau polis, mereka mempunyai profesion altenatif lain untuk menzahirkan semangat patriotisme seperti menganggotai Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat, Jabatan Pertahanan Awam, Pasukan Askar Wataniah dan Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia (RELA). Selain itu, kerajaan juga telah memperkenalkan modul baharu dalam kursus Diploma Pengurusan Awam yang akan diikuti oleh pegawai-pegawai muda Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik (PTD) bagi individu yang berminat memohon jawatan Pegawai Tadbir dan Diplomatik, Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam. Modul yang diperkenalkan dalam kursus ini akan menekankan latihan yang berkaitan elemen patriotisme, ketahanan psikologi,
(d) Penguatkuasaan dan Perlaksanaan Undang-Undang


Selain itu amalan berorientasikan kenegaraan yang selalu diamalkan dalam majlis-majlis rasmi kerajaan harus diperluas atau diserap ke dalam majlis-majlis rasmi sejarah dan majlis-majlis anjuran pihak swasta. Sebagai contoh nyanyi lagu Negaraku wajib diadakan dan diadakan di dalam setiap majlis-majlis rasmi dan sejarah kerajaan tetapi berkesinambungan terus kepada majlis-majlis anjuran pihak swasta. Oleh itu unsur-unsur patriotisme tidak hanya dilihat apabila berurusan dengan kerajaan tetapi akan terus terasa momentumnya ke semua sektor-sektor lain dalam negara.

Sehubungan itu juga, langkah kerajaan yang mewajibkan golongan remaja menyertai Program Latihan Khidmat Negara amat bijak bagi membendung mereka daripada hilang semangat patriotisme di samping mengekalkan gejala yang melanda golongan tersebut kini. Program ini telah menjadi lebih efektif dengan penguatkuasaan Akta Latihan Khidmat Negara yang akan dikenakan kepada remaja dan ibu bapa (atau penjaga yang bersubahat tidak menghantar anaknya kepada program tersebut setelah mendapat surat arahan berbunyi demikian) adalah salah satu bentuk penguatkuasaan undang-undang bagi membentuk semangat patriotisme.

Selain itu kerajaan juga harus bertindak tegas kepada individu yang gagal mematuhi prinsip Rukun Negara dan mempertikai perkara-perkara yang telah termaktub dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia yang menjadi elemen penting kepada semangat patriotisme. Sebagai contoh isu Namewee yang jelas melakukan penderhakaan kepada negara dengan menggebu-gebu lagu Negaraku, mengguris perasaan umat Islam dan orang Melayu melalui video klip ciptaannya di internet. Oleh itu undang-undang seperti buang negeri atau perlucutan taraf warganegara harus dilaksanakan agar setiap warganegara dapat memahami betapa pentingnya rasa cinta kepada negara. Tambahkan pula fenomena dunia globalisasi yang mampu mendatangkan anasir-anasir buruk dalam bentuk penjajahan mmland khususnya pemikiran dan jati diri generasi muda dan tidak lagi bersifat penjajahan ketenteraan seperti dahulu pada zaman kolonial.

(e) Elemen Lain Manifestasi Patriotisme

Selain daripada contoh-contoh yang telah diterangkan sebelum ini terdapat juga mekanisme lain yang mampu membentuk semangat patriotisme. Seperti sentiasa mengamalkan slogan "Majulah sukan untuk negara" telah


(1) Mana orang yang tidak menghadiri dirinya bagi latihan khidmat negara seperti yang dikehendaki supaya dibuat olehnya menurut kuasa pemberitaan yang dikeluarkan oleh Majlis di bawah sub seksyen 17(2) melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan boleh didenda tidak melebihi tiga ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi enam bulan atau kedua-duanya.

(2) Apa-apa dapat bersalah di bawah sub seksyen 1 berkenaan dengan mana-mana orang tidaklah melepaskannya daripada tanggungkuan untuk menjalani latihan khidmat negara.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gyiBvtJ5Z4


Begitu juga dalam budaya perlancongan di mana industri ini mempunyai tarikan tersendiri dalam menyemai patriotisme yang lebih konkrit. Hal ini boleh diukur jika promosi yang diubah oleh kerajaan dan agensi perlancongan serta kecenderungan pelancong (khususnya pelancong tempatan) untuk melawat tempat-tempat bersejarah yang menjadi alternatif kepada tempat-tempat perlancongan lain yang sememangnya popular dengan flora dan faunanya. Tempat-tempat bersejarah ini kaya dengan peristiwa-peristiwa yang boleh dijadikan sumber mengenai peristiwa penting untuk mengurangkan darjah sikap berpura-pura dalam kalangan masyarakat jika ia dianggap penting untuk meningkatkan nilai kemasyarakatan\(^1\).

\[^8\] Datuk Lee Chong Wei (Badminton) dan Datuk Nicol Ann David (Skuasy)
\[^9\] Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif Unit Inovasi Khas Pejabat Perdana Menteri.
Justeru, semangat patriotisme amat penting bagi setiap warganegara Malaysia bukan sahaja sekadar perasaan cinta kepada negara dan sanggup berkorban tetapi amat berhubung kait dengan hubungan harmoni antara kaum di Malaysia.

KESIMPULAN

Secara keseluruhannya, mekanisme-mekanisme yang dibincangkan di atas mampu menjadi wadah untuk memperkasa semangat patriotisme generasi muda yang menjadi pelapis kepada kepimpinan negara pada masa hadapan. Sungguhpun begitu mekanisme-mekanisme tersebut bukanlah hanya disasarkan kepada generasi muda semata-mata tetapi juga kepada seluruh lapisan masyarakat termasuklah golongan pasca belia.

Mekanisme patriotisme adalah terdiri daripada strategi pendidikan berteraskan patriotisme, kempen serta peranan kerajaan, media massa dan industri seni hiburan untuk menggarap semangat patriotisme masyarakat, kelebihan profesi yang bersifat patriotik, penguatkuasaan undang-undang dan elemen-elemen lain seperti semangat kesukanan dengan slogan “Majulah sukan untuk negara”, pembudayaan patriotisme dalam kehidupan, menyemai budaya inovasi dalam masyarakat serta berganding bahu bersama-sama untuk menjayakan Gagasan 1Malaysia.

Namun begitu usaha-usaha untuk memantapkan semangat patriotisme ini tidak harus dipikul oleh satu-satu organisasi semata-mata tetapi memerlukan koordinasi, komitmen dan kerjasama penuh semua pihak bagi menjana nilai-nilai patriotisme dalam diri setiap warganegara Malaysia.

BIBLIOGRAFI


THEME TWO

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
WINDS OF CHANGE IN MYANMAR? IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN POVERTY ALLEVIATION

Anthony Ware
School of International and Political Studies
Deakin University, Australia
anthony ware@deakin.edu.au

ABSTRACT

We are witnessing the beginnings of what could well be significant change in Myanmar. Elections in November 2010 were quickly followed by the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, then by the resignation of Senior-General Than Shwe, dissolution of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the opening of parliament, and the inauguration of Thein Sein as President on 30th March 2011. Thein Sein's inauguration speech called for national reconciliation and an end to corruption, promised a more market-oriented economy, and vowed to create employment opportunities. He also pledged to develop the health and education sectors in cooperation with international organisations, and to alleviate poverty. While some fear this may only be rhetoric, a growing number of indications suggest that major political and economic reform may indeed be getting underway.

This paper traces these recent developments and the possibility of significantly improved international development cooperation in Myanmar, particularly as it affects the prospects of poverty alleviation efforts and cooperation with Western INGO and multilateral agencies. It analyses the implications of this reform on international development assistance and cooperation from the perspectives of humanitarians need, international relations theory, development theory, and political philosophy.

Keywords: Myanmar, Politics, Reform, Poverty Alleviation

I think it would be fair to say that winds of change are clearly blowing through Burma. The extent of it is still unclear, but everyone who's gone there recognizes that there are changes.

Kurt Campbell (2011), US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
October 2011, Yangon

It appears increasingly clear that we are witnessing the beginning of significant change in Myanmar. It has now been just over a year since the elections and release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and over seven months since the dissolution of the State Peace and Development Council and inauguration of President Thein Sein. As the world has watched anxiously, a bold reform agenda has been announced, and several concrete steps taken. While some fear this reform may not be genuine or sustainable, a growing number of indications suggest that the new government may in fact be instituting real reform.

This paper explores the possibility of significant improvement in international cooperation and partnership with the Myanmar government in extreme poverty alleviation as a result of this ongoing reform. It does so by tracing the major political developments of the past year, examining any increases in the opportunities current international development programs as a result of the reform to date, and then analyses the implications reform should have on international policy, drawing from the perspectives of development studies, international relations theory and contemporary political philosophy. This analysis notes the view of development practitioners inside Myanmar that the greatest obstacles to greater poverty alleviation efforts by Western-based INGO and multilateral agencies stem from the restrictions applied by the international...
community, and draws the conclusion that a repositioning of international policy to expand the humanitarian space is overdue, including at least some select direct development cooperation and partnership with the government. The next step towards improved international cooperation in poverty alleviation in Myanmar lies with the international community.

WINDS OF CHANGE

Myanmar went to the polls for the first time in two decades on 7th November 2011, in elections widely criticised at the time as being neither free nor fair (e.g. ICG 2011a; Farrelly 2010; Zarni 2011). The greatest concern was that they were fundamentally flawed, given the 2008 constitution virtually guarantees continued effective control to the military plus the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party, allocating 25 percent of seats to military appointees while most of the democratic opposition banned from running for office because they had a prior conviction, even if they had been as a prisoner of conscience.

Expectations of major reform were, therefore, not high, even when Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest 6 days later. The new parliament convened in January without much fanfare. At the end of March 2011, Senior-General Than Shwe dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the junta resigned, allowing the formal opening parliament and the inauguration of President Thein Sein. The international community was still largely sceptical about change, and resignation of the former junta was widely held to be little more than cosmetic (e.g. Farrelly 2010; Wai Moe 2011; Zarni 2011); General Thein Sein had been Prime Minister in the old regime, and simply removed his uniform to become the civilian President in what Holliday (2011a:10) termed a “military dominated ersatz democracy.” Fears were that no substantive change would be forthcoming.

Critics, however, have been pleasantly surprised. This transition has proven, however, to be a real change of personnel in effective control over the country and significant policy change does appear to be occurring as a result (ICG 2011b).

Thein Sein’s presidential inauguration speech, on 30th November 2011, called for sweeping political and economic reform, including things like: national reconciliation, an end to corruption, a market-oriented economy, foreign investment, development of the health and education sectors, and work to alleviate poverty in cooperation with international and local organisations (NLM 2011a). Many initially labelled this as mere rhetoric (e.g. Kinnock 2011; Zarni 2011). Certainly, in the same address Thein Sein also declared that Myanmar needs to continue to build a strong, modern military to prevent bullying by other nations, and his oath to office involved pledging to uphold the Three Main National Causes of "non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty", the mantra used by the former regime to justify the 1988 coup and the dominant role of the military over the past two decades (Minye Kaungbon 1994). Together with the dominance of the military and regime-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) in parliament, this is troubling. Nonetheless, there are a growing number of encouraging indications that President Thein Sein is in fact moving to institute much of this agenda as real reform.

Rapid and significant change has taken place in Myanmar in recent months … Since taking up office less than six months ago, President Thein Sein has moved quickly to begin implementing his ambitious reform agenda. A series of important economic, political and human rights reforms are being made … The president has reached out to government critics, including Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic minorities.

(ICG 2011b:14-15)

This past year has seen many changes. For example, Thein Sein moved quickly to appoint a number of well-respected non-military advisors, on political, economic and social affairs. One of these is U Myint, long-time economic advisor to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, now Chief of the Economic Advisory Unit. U Myint has long championed the needs of the rural poor, and moved quickly to hold a Rural Poverty
Alleviation Workshop in May, with a raft of recommendations apparently gaining Presidential approval. These include: acknowledging the extent of poverty, preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), land and tax reform, pro-poor macroeconomic policies, and improving government transparency and accountability whilst tackling corruption and the vested interests of elites (U Myint 2011). This was followed by a broader, National Workshop on Reforms for National Economic Development in August, with a number of reforms proposed by non-military participants being adopted into policy (NLM 2011b).

Surprising many, there has been a level of democratic debate inside the new parliament, with quite lively discussions on issues like political prisoners, taxation, mobile phone costs and registration of NGOs (Horsey 2011), all published in the New Light of Myanmar. The fact that relevant ministers have been required to answer questions is significant, and there have been some improvements as a result. Likewise, censorship of foreign news websites (Hseng 2011a) and car importation restrictions were relaxed in September (Irrawaddy 2011a)—the latter breaking the monopoly held by the top generals and their cronies. Market-rate money changers have been legalised (Hseng 2011b), and the President has met directly with Suu Kyi, who came away from the meeting optimistically saying, “We have reached a point where there is an opportunity for change” (Irrawaddy 2011b). Most surprisingly, at the end of September the government bowed to civil society activism and suspended the controversial Myitsone Dam project, a move welcomed by Suu Kyi but provoking the ire of the Chinese, who have invested much of the US$3.6 billion into the project (Hseng 2011c; Ba Kaung 2011). The government has legalised the registration of trade unions, and is preparing legislation legalising street protests under strict condition of silence and non-violence.

Even more significant is the formation of a Myanmar National Human Rights Commission in September. This was followed by the release of 6,359 prisoners (including some 220 of the estimated 1,000 political prisoners), in part a response to the first report by the new Commission. Upon the release of political prisoners, the UN Special Reporter on Human Rights in Myanmar declared that this is “a key moment in Myanmar’s history”, and a real opportunity to deepen the commitment to democracy (Quintana 2011). At the same time, he expressed concern that “gross and systematic violations of human rights” still exist in Myanmar, and that the new government’s express commitments to other human rights have largely not yet materialised as concrete action.

Nonetheless, any one of these changes would have been unimaginable a year ago. While it is likely that a key motivation behind these reforms has been to gain the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014, which they requested and were awarded at the ASEAN meetings in Bali in November 2011, they still justify raised expectations. The demands of ASEAN chairmanship and the desire for the removal of international sanctions place continuing pressure on the government to maintain reform. Significant political and economic reform over the coming years is now quite plausible, even likely.

Former ILO representative to Myanmar, Richard Horsey, argued in June 2011 that,

What we are witnessing now is more-or-less what we should expect to see if we are in the early stages of evolution away from authoritarian rule. This does not mean that is what is happening, but that we should not jump to the opposite conclusion.

(Horsey 2011)

Vested interests and the inertia of post-colonial sensitivities suggest that change is only likely to be able to proceed incrementally. Certainly, to this point reform remains too recent and superficial to have made much tangible difference to the daily lives of most of the population, apart from a clear air of expectation amongst the people, and changed attitudes by some officials. Reform remains fragile, and potentially able to be wound back easily and with minimal notice (ICG 2011b).

Recent US official comment reflects this tension. The US State Department’s Special Representative for Burma, Derek Mitchell, commented recently on the sense of expectation that “something is happening” in Myanmar (Mitchell 2011), and the State Department recently called the new government “reformist” and “open-minded” (State Dept 2011). However, a key demand remains the release of all political prisoners, and
without that the US Congress renewed sanctions for another year in September 2011. The Senate Committee Chairman commented that,

Over the last year the Burmese regime has “severely restricted and frequently violated freedoms of assembly, expression, association, movement and religion.” And in furthering its hold over Burmese society, the regime has committed crimes of murder, abduction, rape, torture, recruitment of child soldiers and forced labor – all with impunity. In recent months, however, we have seen some encouraging steps … But it is far too soon to think that the walk to freedom has succeeded. (Baucus 2011)

US President Obama announced in November 2011 that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will shortly visit Myanmar, further adding to the credibility of reform.

ASEAN has taken quite a different position, giving far greater international credibility to these reforms, as highlighted by Myanmar being offered ASEAN chairmanship for 2014. The announcement on 18th November 2011, the day after ASEAN chairmanship was announced, by Aung San Suu Kyi that the National League for Democracy will re-enter the political process is likewise highly significant. The NLD will accept the olive branch extended by the new government and re-register as a political party, contesting upcoming by-elections. This re-positioning effectively ends their boycott of the political process and previous demand for the 1990 election results to be honoured. It strongly implies confidence in the possibility of achieving incremental change within the existing system, and some confidence of fair and just outcomes over time.

The legitimacy this confers upon the President and Parliament, and Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the incremental reform process, are significant markers for the international community. Major political and economic reform therefore does indeed appear to be getting underway. The only remaining obstacle for a major reassessment of international policy towards Myanmar is therefore the continued detention of an estimated 800 prisoners of conscience. If these reforms continue and are genuinely domesticated, this would bring significant change to the political landscape within Myanmar. Continued reform does prompt, however, the need for immediate reappraisal of international policies regarding international development cooperation.

Reform to date has been more about policy announcement than tangible change. The impact of reform on the operation and projects of INGOs in Myanmar has therefore been minimal. However, based on recent history international responses that engage constructively with this reform, while demanding accountability and continued change, will be crucial for continued momentum. It is crucial, however, that accountability and pressure must be maintained in ways that minimise sensitivities rather than provoke fears of foreign interference, loss of sovereignty or of disunity and disorder. Increased development cooperation, particularly focussed around rural poverty alleviation, and with the health and education sectors, therefore appears to offer great potential for such constructive engagement.

REFORM IMPLICATIONS FOR ONGOING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Under the SPDC, Myanmar was a difficult context for Western and multilateral agencies to operate within. Negotiating the suspicions of the Myanmar government and the deep reservations held by international donors and governments created a very complex environment for development, complicated further by the very significant humanitarian need they sought to address with very limited resources and mandates. On the one hand, development organisations have faced restrictions from a government slow to negotiate the MOUs, equally slow to issue visas, and then restrictive about the locations and sectors organisations may work within, and slow to issue travel permits for foreign personnel to visit project sites. These are serious access restrictions which the European Commission (EC 2007) suggested threatened the whole humanitarian space in Myanmar. On the other hand, Western governments, international donors, organisational boards and the international community as a whole also restricted the humanitarian space, directly and indirectly, to put
pressure on the regime. One anonymous in-country representative of a major bilateral donor pointed out that
the greatest consideration for Western governments, which tempers humanitarian assistance to the people of
Myanmar, is that aid must “not keep the regime in power one day longer than would otherwise be the case.”

Preliminary analysis of personal interviews with a large number of development professionals
working in Myanmar in 2009 were presented at ICONSEA 2009, and found that, in contrasting these two sets
restrictions on international poverty alleviation programs, international development staff working inside the
country widely believe the greatest restriction came from the international community through sanctions, low
levels of funding, and mandate restrictions (Ware 2009). These, they suggest, restrict the humanitarian space
more so than difficulties working with the Myanmar government. This contention has significant
implications.

Prioritisation of Western political concerns over humanitarian concerns significantly restricted
international development funding. For example, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), in 2008,
shortly before Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar received the least ODA of any of the UN’s least developed
countries, at just five percent of the average assistance given on a per capita basis. This restriction in
development assistance appears highly disproportional, especially when contrasted with assistance given to
other least developed countries with “similarly repressive governments”, who receive substantially more aid:
Laos 22 times more, Sudan 19 times more; and Zimbabwe 7 times more on a per capita basis (ICG 2008:15).

Table 1: GDP and ODA indicators for Myanmar and reference Least Developed Countries
(Source: UNDP 2007, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP US$)</th>
<th>ODA per capita (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>29,663</td>
<td>40,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8,677</td>
<td>8,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3,843</td>
<td>3,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>3,071</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2,727</td>
<td>1,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>2,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td><strong>1,027</strong></td>
<td><strong>904</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>2,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>3,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While ODA to Myanmar more than doubled in response to Cyclone Nargis, reaching US$10.80 per
capita in 2008 (UNDP 2010), this was a temporary, emergency-response increase. The return to previous
levels has been partially off-set by small increases from a number of donor governments, but ODA to
Myanmar still remains particularly low in comparison to other least developed countries, rising modestly to
US$5 per capita in 2010 (Buncombe 2011). This time of increased activity has created, however, an improved
environment of development cooperation within Myanmar (Sadandar 2010).

Restricted aid has become one dimension of the international coercive pressure designed to compel a
belligerent regime into adopting democratic and human rights reform. The unintended adverse humanitarian
impact of such highly restricted aid has been widely observed. (See, for example, Badgley 2004; Hadar 1998;
donor concerns that increasing humanitarian aid may send the wrong signals, inadvertently prolonging authoritarian rule and stymying political change (Source 1 2009). The absence of the It also reflects donor concerns that the macro-economic context has not had the preconditions for growth, particularly issues like rule of law, administrative capacity, and policy weakness such as a lack of property rights (Moore 2009). Thus donors have implicitly questioned Myanmar's absorptive capacity and the probability of fungability.

The ongoing domestic political reform is rapidly addressing many of these concerns. This could prompt international policy change that could greatly expand the opportunity for international development cooperation. The next section therefore analyses the implications of this reform on international development assistance and cooperation from the perspectives of humanitarians need, international relations theory, development theory, and political philosophy.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

Humanitarian Assistance
The major reason for continuation of international restrictions on the humanitarian space are concerns that human rights abuses, excessive military expenditure and the suppression of democracy continue, and are not yet sufficiently dealt with. This next section will examine the current reforms from the perspectives of international relations theory, development theory, and contemporary political philosophy.

The argument in favour of sanctions, from a humanitarian perspective, relies on the idea that the formal and informal economy are largely independent of each other, that the poor primarily derive their incomes from the informal sector, and that the informal sector is not dependent on foreign investment or markets (Burma Campaign 2004; Asia Society 2010). It therefore argues that sanctions targeted at the formal economy with minimal impact on the vast majority of Myanmar's people. Oehlers (2004) argues that these structural and institutional characteristics of the Burmese economy make sanctions an effective device against the military regime, without causing harm to the poor:

It may reasonably be presumed the negative consequences arising from sanctions will have greatest impact on the military and its closest associates. Far from the blunt and indiscriminate tool it is often accused of being, in the case of Burma at least, sanctions appear to be surprisingly well targeted and capable of exerting considerable pressure on the military regime.
(Oehlers 2004:43)

It is significant to note that Oehlers recognises this is a presumption. Certainly, the majority of the poor are primarily connected to the informal economy, and it is domestic policy not economic sanctions which are the greatest immediate cause of the economic difficulty faced by most of the poor. However, the level of poverty and the depth of multidimensional deprivation means that even a marginal impact on the poor will have a significant effect on their wellbeing, and this assessment ignores the fact that many poor do also connect with the formal economy. World Vision, for example, found that the May 2003 US sanctions had the largest impact on factory workers in the textile industry (James 2004). US and European sanctions have “significantly hampered growth in export sectors such as agriculture, fishery, and garments, as well as tourism, which are a crucial source of jobs and income for millions of impoverished families” (Pedersen 2010:116). Taylor (2004) argues that sanctions have created an economic malaise that has deepened the poverty of most people in the country, whilst weakening the prospects of sustainable democratisation and making resolution of the fundamental issues more difficult through postponement and polarisation.

As Moore (2011) suggests, the crucial questions are: “How do we make the welfare of the people our main priority? And, would an increase in international assistance lend too much legitimacy to the regime?”
International Relations Theory: Sanctions as Socialisation to International Norms

Risse & Sikkink (1999) offer an international relations theory of the role of sanctions in socialising norm-violating states to international norms which fits closely with the Western response to Myanmar. They illustrate their model with a discussion of socialisation to human rights norms.

According to their model, socialisation pressure is triggered when a particularly flagrant violation of an international norm activates a transnational advocacy network that succeeds in putting the norm-violating state on the international agenda. Such a transnational advocacy network, they suggest, will typically attempt to shame the norm-violating state by labelling it as a 'pariah' state which does not belong to the community of civilised nations, then begin documenting and publicising human rights violations. Such transnational advocacy network began to coalesce in Myanmar after the brutal crackdown on demonstrations in 1988, and the arrest of Suu Kyi in 1989. It was solidified when the NLD won the 1990 elections but power was not transferred.

According to Risse & Sikkink, the initial reaction of most norm-violating states to such overt confrontation is to refuse to accept the applicability of international human rights norms and challenge international jurisdiction. In response, transnational advocacy networks almost always advocate material pressure, from targeting the key interests of regime officials to making aid conditional on human rights performance. Regimes vary greatly in their vulnerability to this sort of pressure, based largely on the strength of their desire to maintain good standing with the states applying the pressure. Such a response fits closely with Risse & Sikkink's model well with the political pressure against Myanmar.

It is ironic that as the regime seeks once more to disengage from the rest of the world that the world considers disengagement in the form of sanctions as a weapon for change in Burma. (Perry 2007:175)

Increased pressure from the transnational advocacy network is aimed at enlarging the space for domestic civil and political groups, amplifying their demands in the international arena. This can result in a backlash and further repression against activists. Where further repression occurs, Risse & Sikkink suggest, transnational advocacy will increasingly call for donor countries to make foreign aid contingent on human rights, exactly as happened in Myanmar. After Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995 but defied a travel ban, provoking confrontation, advocacy stepped up pressure. By 1997 aid budgets were slashed, and the US Congress and the European Union (EU) implemented economic sanctions. The impact of the initial 1998 crackdown and the abortive election of 1990 on aid flows to Myanmar, and then the further impact of the 1997 bans by the US and EU, were immediate and dramatic, as shown clearly in Error! Reference source not found..
Returning to Risse & Sikkink’s model, their most important contribution is the observation that, as international pressures escalate, the first steps towards institutionalising international norms into domestic practice are usually only intended as cosmetic tactical concessions to pacify criticism, rather than steps to institute real reform. However, by changing their discursive practice they unintentionally open greater space for the domestic opposition and begin the change process. The first aim of transnational socialisation pressure should therefore be to force the target regime to offer concessions which may initially only be tactical, rather than sincere reforms.

Many argue that sanctions lack coercive force, not being universally adopted (e.g. Holliday 2005; Pedersen 2008; Steinberg 2010; Taylor 2004; Thant Myint-U 2009; Thant Myint-U in McDermid 2009). The significant contribution of Risse & Sikkink is recognition that the role of sanctions should not be coercion, but socialisation, and that the indicators of success should initially be tactical concessions and incremental change, not radical reform.

Klotz (1996) elaborates this distinction between coercion and socialisation, arguing that coercion relies on threatening state survival. Since sanctions are generally incapable of inflicting that high a cost on the target state, sanctions are almost always an ineffective instrument of coercion. Socialisation, on the other hand, seeks to promote the desire for acceptance within the international community. Sanctions, he argues, can sometimes do this well. What is essential is not that pressure be applied comprehensively, but that it is both targeted against key interests and that it quickly adjusts in response to even tactical concessions.

Applying Risse & Sikkink’s model, it is hard to see how poverty alleviation interventions constitute key regime interests. Aid given to UN agencies and INGOs, that bypasses government officials to deliver assistance directly to the extremely should ever have been included within such socialisation pressure. This aside, decades of international pressure has now resulted in major concessions, which may have began as only tactical measures to deflect pressure, but now do constitute real reform. Risse & Sikkink’s model therefore insists that socialisation pressure must re-adjust quickly in response to the ongoing reforms in the country. Expansion of humanitarian space through increased development assistance and wider mandates that facilitate development cooperation with the new-government would seem to be the minimum appropriate response to current reform.
**Development Theory: Competing Political and Apolitical Approaches**

Switching to analyse this issue through development theory rather than international relations, the same debate emerges. Underlying this analysis is an alteration between contrasting political and apolitical approaches to international development, encapsulated in the difference between an MDG-motivated approach and a Rights Based Approach (RBA) to development (Nelson 2007).

The MDGs mobilize the classic development sector tools … The MDGs are a careful restatement of poverty-related development challenges, in language that avoids reference to rights … The RBA rests … on internationally recognized human rights standards and principles, to which governments and donors are obliged to adhere … Rights-based approaches … tie development to the rhetorical and legal power of internationally recognized human rights. (Nelson 2007)

It is this clash of understandings of the nature and resolution of poverty that lies at the heart of the disagreement between international development approaches to Myanmar, accentuated by the highly strained and politicised context.

The RBA has been termed “empowerment through external pressure” (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall 2004). It seeks “to analyse inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress” (OHCHR 2006:15). When applied, it enables people to recognise their rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, works to build their capacity to claim these rights, and works with the state, as the primary duty-bearer, to strengthen state capacity to respond and be accountable in fulfilling these human rights (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall 2004). The RBA uses recourse to international law to guarantee “a protected space where the elite cannot monopolize development processes, policies and programmes” (OHCHR 2006), and as such is explicitly political, putting politics at the heart of development (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall 2004).

By contrast, the MDG-approach insists on political neutrality, with a focus on poverty alleviation on a needs basis, targeting assistance to the most poor and vulnerable. Nelson observes that the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs were deliberately constituted in apolitical terms. An expectation that humanitarian poverty alleviation be apolitical is likewise brought out by many others. For example the Brazilian ambassador to the UN noted to the General Assembly in 1991,

Humanitarian activities … must by definition be disassociated from all shades of political consideration. They are, by definition, neutral and impartial…. the secret of effectiveness in the humanitarian field is that even when nations disagree on everything else, even when they clash, they can still agree that … suffering must be relieved. (cited in Minear & Weiss 1993:24)

Baulch (2006) argues donors should allocate aid based on the level of poverty and the ability to make an impact “in accordance with the priorities set out by the MDGs”, rather than on political considerations. Alesina & Dollar (2000) express similar concern that too often aid is not given in response “to the variables that make aid effective in reducing poverty … [but] is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients.”

While some argue the two approaches are entirely consistent (ACFID 2009; OHCHR 2006; UNDP 2003:29), others recognise only a “limited convergence between the two agendas” (Alston 2005:761). To Nelson (2007), the inherent conflict is between the key agents mobilised and policy recommendations espoused by the two approaches. The MDGs were couched in strictly humanitarian terms that seek to make developing country governments, donors, UN agencies and INGOs mutually accountable, with a focus on international cooperation to address the issues created by poverty, and without any inherent reference to cause or blame. The RBA, by contrast, focuses on national governments as primary duty-bearers, seeks to empower
populations to make substantive claims against these governments, and is couched in international legal terms. The MDGs want the best equipped actor to address specific poverty needs, drawing on best practice international development to meet the most severe needs as a priority, and call for international cooperation and partnership. The RBA seeks to reform systemic causes of poverty by demanding change of political power structures.

Given political power structures are undergoing reform in Myanmar, even an RBA-approach should now be considering adjustments and development cooperation in areas the new government has shown willingness to address. “Poverty has emerged as the most acutely felt constraint on human rights for the majority of people across the country” (Pedersen 2009:2), while “aid has, arguably, emerged as our best tool for promoting better governance and human rights in Burma” (Pedersen 2009:1).

Policies restricting cooperation with the regime in areas of reform that international advocacy has been demanding for years only endangers the efficacy of reform.

However, Duffield (2008) argues that the way in which international development agencies create space to operate in Myanmar is through constant reassurances to all sides that they are adhering strictly to humanitarian principles of apolitical assistance for those in extreme need. This finding is strongly borne out by these fieldwork responses, where deviation from apolitical neutrality could threaten the operating space granted by the Myanmar government. With neutrality, however, aid agencies are confident they could deliver substantially more aid to effectively alleviate more of the suffering they see. They thus argue the greatest restriction on the humanitarian space is caused by the international community, and therefore that humanitarian funding (and mandates) should be significantly increased. The on-going reform only strengthens their case.

Political Philosophy: The Demands of Global Justice

Holliday (2011a) observes that since the end of the Cold War a new idea of humanitarianism has emerged that denies the old principles of impartiality, apoliticality and neutrality, and is instead ambitious to engage politically to redress the root causes of injustice.

In a post-Cold-War era of humanitarian engagement driven by generic notions of global justice, [Myanmar] has for years looked to be a prime candidate for political reform, and the main task facing the rest of the world has long seemed crystal clear: helping to make it happen. (Holliday 2011a:2)

Holliday therefore explores theories of contemporary political philosophy and global justice in relation to Myanmar, concluding that “a prima facie case for external engagement with Myanmar is readily made” based on the obligations of our shared humanity (Holliday 2011a:145). However, he finds it far less clear exactly how such engagement should be undertaken and what issues specifically it needs to address.

To analyse any such foreign intervention, Holliday (2011a) proposes a typology of possible interventions by various actors, suggesting they may involve expressive or aggressive pressure, and consensual or belligerent engagement, by either state or civil actors. These possibilities are summarised in Error! Reference source not found..
Figure 2: Holliday’s (2011a) proposed typology of engagement options for external actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors</th>
<th>Civil Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expressive Pressure</td>
<td>diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive Pressure</td>
<td>sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensual Engagement</td>
<td>bilateral assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belligerent Engagement</td>
<td>military intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 1988, Western state and civil actors have primarily responded to the Myanmar regime with a range of both expressive and aggressive pressure (diplomacy, advocacy, sanctions and boycotts), with restricted consensual engagement through limited bilateral assistance and INGO engagement. Asian regional neighbours, on the other hand, have primarily acted through consensual corporate engagement, and (in some cases) bilateral assistance and limited expressive diplomatic pressure.

Holliday argues that in determining an appropriate response to the global justice demands of contemporary political philosophy, insiders must play a leading role and the dismissal of the views of regional neighbours such as China, India and ASEAN, is “worrying”; their voice should be an essential moral and practical precondition for external engagement with Myanmar” (Holliday 2011a:142).

The conclusion of his extensive analysis of the demands of contemporary political philosophy and global justice is a call for increased expressive pressure (diplomacy and advocacy), a readjustment and evaluation of the extensive repertoire of aggressive pressures applied by Western powers against Myanmar (sanctions and boycotts), and an increase in consensual engagement by the West, in terms of both bilateral assistance and INGO engagements. He expresses great concern at the imbalance in which so little Western consensual engagement has been attempted. He advocates a major increase in effort be given to such intervention, “led from the grassroots through civic action, undertaken … by UN agencies and INGOs … a recasting of major power engagement” (Holliday 2011a:172). Evidence from INGOs and UN agencies in Myanmar makes it clear that despite serious restrictions applied by the Myanmar government, there is considerable scope for increased bilateral assistance and INGO consensual engagement to be effective.

First Steps of Repositioning

A wealth of scholarly research has thus arisen to suggest that humanitarian aid to Myanmar should be significantly expanded in response to the current reforms within Myanmar, and that international development assistance should be recommenced. From a sanctions perspective, the range of tactical concessions made by the regime requires a repositioned response, and humanitarian assistance offers the best option to do that in a manner that supports reform without otherwise strengthening the regime. From a humanitarian perspective, whether one ascribes to an apolitical or politically active humanitarianism, development theory and contemporary political philosophy both call for increased intervention in the form of assistance delivered via the UN and INGOs to help alleviate the impacts of poverty.

The opportunity now exists, therefore, to acknowledge and encourage domestic political reform by increasing assistance to the poor and vulnerable, in a way that reduces conflict in the international political relationships and builds international development cooperation.

It would be a massive wasted opportunity if the West failed to engage with this new government, to assess their willingness to take the country in a different direction, and to convince them that improved relations are possible if they do so. (TNI 2010:10)
Such repositioning has commenced. The Obama administration has responded by increasing humanitarian aid to Myanmar and adding additional diplomatic ‘practical engagement’ to the pressure of economic sanctions (Steinberg 2010). This has the full endorsement of the NLD, and has involved a doubling in humanitarian funding from US$17 million in 2009 to US$37 million in 2010 and 2011 (USAID 2011). This is positive first step towards the major increase and “recasting of major power engagement” Holliday (2011a:172) and others call for. Capacity building of the technical skills of civil servants, particularly in ministries involved in poverty reduction, health and education Is also appropriate (Asia Society 2010).

Australia and the UK have likewise responded to reform by announcing increases in humanitarian funding. In February 2010, in anticipation of the 2010 elections, Australia announced an increase in aid from A$30 million in 2009/10 to $50 million in 2012/13 (Smith 2010). The UK followed suit in February 2011, announcing the largest increase, from £32 million in 2010/11 to £185 million in 2014/15 (Buncombe 2011). Australia has also already announced a broadening of the mandate according to which the aid budget can be allocated, indicating that aid projects must begin engaging lower-level officials (Moore 2011).

At some stage into the future, Burma will have a civilian Government, which will face great challenges. At some stage into the future, the regional and international community will be asked to help in the rebuilding of Burma’s economic and social structures. Australia’s view therefore is that the international community must help prepare Burma for the future. Burma’s capacity cannot be allowed to completely atrophy to the ultimate disadvantage and cost of its people. The international community needs to start the rebuilding now.


Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD position on aid has always been nuanced enough to reject aid for the government while supporting strictly humanitarian aid (ICG 2002). The NLD has never opposed humanitarian aid (Suu Kyi 2010).

These moves constitute solid first-steps towards the major increase and “recasting of major power engagement” (2011a:172) the current reforms call for, whether considered from the perspective of development professionals working within the country, or from development studies, international relations theory or political philosophy.

REFERENCES


Ware, Anthony. 2009. ‘Facilitating Community Development Projects Within Myanmar: Preliminary Results of International NGO Interviews’, paper presented to *Third International Conference on Southeast Asia (ICONSEA 2009)*: University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

CONTESTING MEANINGS OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA: A COMPARISON

Rusdi Omar and Abubakar Eby Hara
College of Law, Government and International Studies (COLGIS)
Universiti Utara Malaysia, Kedah
rusdi.omar@adelaide.edu.au / ebyhara@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

It is often argued that liberal democracy (hereafter democracy) will solve many if not all political problems in non-democratic states. By adopting democracy, many governments will value and respect their citizens, overcome corruption, create good governance and even improve economic development better than do many other types of government. However, this paper argues that the contribution of democracy on the above matters is not as straightforward as being assumed. There are mixed results of the expansion of democracy in the cases of some Asian countries. In some cases, the adoption of liberal democracy has created problems of social order and security. Neither does it make people participation in controlling the government effective. This, however, is not to deny the fact that democracy has given opportunity to people to empower themselves against tyrannical and authoritarian government. Rather it is to state that the relation between liberal democracy and the above issues is problematic at least in two grounds. First, in its original place in the Western states, liberal democracy has been criticized based on greater human values as having failed to fulfill its promises. Secondly, as imported form of government in the Third World countries, liberal democracy have been interpreted and given meanings different from those in its main goals and principles. By referring to Indonesia and Malaysia cases, this paper attempts to elaborate the contesting meanings of democracy circulating among societal groups and elites and suggests the importance to implement deliberative democracy which can give opportunity for people to debates the meanings of democracy. The deliberative process may open a better fulfilment of people aspirations and needs.

Keywords: Democracy, Good Government, Political Deliberation, People and Participation

This paper attempts to see how the spreads of liberal democracy take place and were interpreted in Asia particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. It is commonly argued that liberal democracy (hereafter democracy) will solve many if not all political and economic problems in the non-democratic states. By adopting democracy, many governments will value and respect their citizens, overcome corruption, create good governance and even improve economic development better than do many other types of government. However, this paper argues that the contribution of democracy on the above matters is not as straightforward as being assumed. There are mixed results of the expansion of democracy in the cases of some Asian countries. In some cases, the adoption of liberal democracy has created problems of social order and security. Neither does it make people participation in controlling the government effective. This, however, is not to deny the fact that democracy has given opportunity to people to empower themselves against tyrannical and authoritarian government. Rather it is to state that the relation between liberal democracy and the above issues is problematic at least in two grounds. First, in its original place in the Western states, liberal democracy has been criticized based on greater human values as having failed to fulfill its promises. Secondly, as imported form of government in the Third World countries, liberal democracy have been interpreted and given meanings different from those in its main goals and principles. By referring to Indonesia and Malaysia cases, this paper attempts to elaborate the contesting meanings of democracy circulating among societal groups and elites and suggests the importance to implement deliberative democracy which can give opportunity for people to debates the meanings of democracy. The deliberative process may open a better fulfillment of people aspirations and needs.
The wave of liberal democracy (hereafter democracy) once again takes place in the world. This time, the wave goes to the Middle East authoritarian regimes such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. All of these regimes have been felt down or in the process of breaking down. The fall of the authoritarian regimes may have different reasons but it has one thing in common that democracy will bring hope to solve many problems faced by the old regimes. Democracy is hoped to solve economic problems faced by young generation in many of these countries. It is also hoped to solve problems of freedom which was severely limited and problems of cronyism and corruption circulating among elites.

However, as the experiences in some countries have shown, the road to democracy was not as smooth as expected. Countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are among the early examples within which such expectation was not easily materialized. Problems expected to be overcome such as corruption, equality, participation, economic development, bad governance inherited from the old orders were not easily overcome. In some cases such as corruption and good governance if not remain the same, is becoming worse. This is not to deny the fact that some realizations of the hopes have also taken places. Relatively wide and genuine political participations, for example, have taken place particularly in Thailand and Indonesia.

Given this situation, this paper attempts to see why this rising expectation happens by specific reference to Indonesia and Malaysia case. We contend that there have been tendency to understand democracy as one for all solution to problems faced by countries experiencing leadership and economic crisis in the above mentioned democratizing countries. People in these countries particularly the young generation have been socialized internally and externally with the promises of the ideal of liberal democracy in such a way that they have to replace altogether the previous system with the new one called democracy. This widely-shared view is problematic in some grounds. First liberal democracy grew in the Western liberal society and was aimed initially to solve problems in liberal society not in the so-called non-liberal society. Secondly, as consequence of this, democracy has been interpreted and given many meanings once it spread over to non-liberal societies in Asia and Africa.

By referring to Malaysia and Indonesia cases, this paper attempts to see how the spreads of liberal democracy take place and were interpreted in both countries. Democracy as initially introduced by their colonial masters was not working as designed. Indonesia keeps changing their political system and interpreted the meaning of democracy in many ways. Malaysia is consistent with the parliamentary democracy; however it adjusted that system to fit the needs of local condition. It should be stated that countries experience quick changes to democracy such as Indonesia faces many problems of democratization while countries experience evolution to democracy such as Malaysia may manage the process of democratization in more peaceful and orderly manners.

This paper is divided into four sections. First it discusses the definition of democracy as a starting point of discussion. Secondly, it shows that liberal democracy is based on Western experience completed and spread over in its nearly complete form to the world since 20th century. Thirdly, it elaborates how once spread to the new states, democracy has been interpreted and given many meanings. Democracy has become a catch-for-all word that can solve many problems. Fourthly, it attempts to implement the interpreted meanings of democracy in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia.

DEMOCRACY AS A VALUE AND A SYSTEM

Before elaborating this paper further, as a starting point we need to discuss meanings and main principles of democracy as a value and as a system.

As a value, as David Held (1994: 41) argues the concept of democracy has been privileged in Western political life because ‘it offers - in theory at least - a form of politics and life in which there are fair and just ways of negotiating values and value disputes’ (Held 1994: 41). Such a form offers ways to resolve and relate different values through a political dialogue. In this sense, it is preferable as a form of government because of its ‘intrinsic fairness’ and its ‘overall good consequences’ for a society (Copp et.al 1993: 4). Democracy, according to Held, is a key word that can ‘legitimately frame and delimit’ the competing ideologies and interests in a state (Held 1994: 41-42).
In the Western liberal countries, the spirit of the above ideas generally necessitates the presence of two main criteria (Ganesan 1995: 301-303). The first criterion is equality. It is important in a democratic country that citizens have an equal opportunity to participate in the appointment of public officials, principally via general elections. The second criterion is that ‘ultimate political power is vested with the people of a state’. It is the right of citizens to choose a government which can administer the country and pursue their interest. The legitimacy of government, in this case, depends on citizen agreement (Ganesan 1995: 301-303).

To effect the materialization of this spirit of democracy, the state has traditionally advocated providing a number of ‘para-political institutions’, practices and structures which can guarantee and preserve individual rights and equality. There has been a conventional assumption that the roles of the ‘para-political institutions’ have to cover what is defined as a minimalist definition of democracy. Based on the standards in the liberal democracy model, such institutions should provide and guarantee competition, political participation, respect for human rights - particularly civil and political liberties (Diamond et al 1988: xvi; Sorensen 1993: 13; Uhlin 1995: 134), and civilian control over the military (which is especially relevant in the Indonesian case) (Karl 1990: 2) as basic conditions for a democratic system.

In line with this David Beetham (1994: 55) argues that democracy is a form of decision-making about the rules and policies of collective where people can participate and have control and the most democratic government is the one in which all members of society have equal rights to participate effectively in decision-making directly. This is also the implementation the principle of public control and equality. Democracy according to Beetham should be conceptualized as located at one end of the spectrum, while at the other end is a power system where people are completely excluded from decision-making process.

To elaborate briefly, control and competition in this perspective should be meaningful in so far as individuals and organized groups can compete freely with each other for political office. Political participation in the selection of leaders and policies should include all adults. Basic civil and political liberties must include freedom of expression, freedom to form and join organizations, and freedom of the press. Finally, civilian control over the military, in this perspective should, at least, be able to restrict military intervention in politics (Uhlin 1995: 134).

In terms of the above definition, democratization, defined as process, means: ‘the extension of competition, participation and human rights to an increasing number of institutions, issues and people that were not previously governed by these democratic principles as well as the process whereby civilians take control over the military or at least restrict the military’s willingness and capacity to intervene in politics.’ (Sorensen 1993: 13)

The elements of democracy outlined above, particularly competition, participation, protection of human rights, and civilian control over the military, which can engender political dialogue, can be found in many ideologies and values. These ideologies and values may contribute their forms of democracy.

In the West, as Giovanni Sartori (1995: 102-103) has highlighted, the above ideas and standards of democracy are formulated in liberal democratic constitutions and systems. The standards are important because they protect people from the abuse of power by a government. The desirability of democracy lies in its rule of law, or in Sartori’s words, in its ‘harm-avoidance rule’, which can protect people from being imprisoned, tortured and killed because their values are different from those of their government (Sartori 1995: 103).

THE CONTEXT AND THE SPREAD OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Until the 17th century, liberal democracy was still associated with a bevy of citizens in places of meeting or council. Only in the early 19th century came the idea of the rights of citizens to participate in determining the collective will through the medium of elected representatives. The theory of representative democracy fundamentally changed the thinking of democracy. The debates about the number of people who should be involved in democracy were resolved. Representative democracy was considered as the solution for it offered a responsible and appropriate government and most likely the stable one for nation states.
At this time liberal democracy managed to establish a cluster of rules, agencies and institutions that allow participation of a broad majority of citizens in choosing their representatives. The representatives can make political decisions that affect the whole community. The cluster includes, among other, elected government and a fair and free election in which the voices of every citizen have the same weight. The citizens also have the right to vote regardless of race, religion, class, sex and other discriminations. They have freedom to gain information and freedom of expression to all public issues, the right of all adults to oppose the government and compete for a position, and the autonomy of society - the right to form independent groups including social movements, interest groups and political parties.

Many of these principles of democracy are a reflection of the liberalism, and it is also difficult to separate democracy and liberalism. The integral relationship of liberalism and democracy is, as said by Beetham (1994: 56-57), reflected in five relations that are summarized below: first, liberalism provides the basis for freedom of expression and freedom to form groups and other political rights as part of the rights of individuals in the form of constitutional protection and special legislation. But not all individual rights are democratic rights, but without any guarantee of rights for all citizens to gather, to get access to information, to influence others, and to vote, democracy becomes meaningless. The democratic rights in other words are the rights of individuals necessary to ensure public control over decision-making process on an ongoing basis and these rights require protection, especially when the implementations of those rights involve the views and actions unpopular for government and society at large.

The second contribution of liberalism according to Beetham (1994: 56) was the separation of powers between executive, legislative and judicative, of which its absence could mean the idea of the 'rule of law' and all things related to the rule of law can become an illusion. Legal rules cover protection of individual rights, guarantees of due process of law, subordination of the state officials to the laws and the possibility of lawsuits against maladministration and abuse of power.

The third contribution is also related to the institutionalization of people representatives council elected based on geographical positions through an open competition. The council has the power to approve all taxes and regulations as well as to control the executive. Representative system is considered more effective than direct democracy because it is more effective to fulfill the general control and political equality given the conditions of complex modern territorial state.

Then a fourth aspect of liberalism that sustains the principles of liberal democracy is a limited role of the state and the separation between the public and private. Private sphere includes autonomous civil society, market, the ownership of wealth, family, personal relationships and individual consciousness. This is based on the consideration that democracy cannot work if there is no autonomous area of citizens separated from the state or if there is no pluralism in the center of power or if the state is doing too many social duties or if all the social relations become politicized (Beetham 1994: 56-57).

The fifth aspect of linkage between liberalism and democracy is the existence of an epistemological premise that there is no final truth about what is good for society, and the truth is not the domain of revelation or special knowledge (Beetham 1994: 56-57). The only criterion for public goods is what is chosen by people organized independently not by experts who had prophetic revelation about the foundation of higher knowledge. This anti-paternalism democracy is a direct descendant of the anti-paternalism principles of liberalism.

So in general it can be concluded that liberalism emphasizes individual rights, and in the context of a liberal society, people are given the freedom to think in a free exchange of ideas. System of government should be transparent and all citizens are protected. It is clear that the followers of liberalism supports the system of liberal democracy as the rights of individual liberty secured and guaranteed equality before the law and they have the same opportunity to succeed in this system.

In a liberal society, the state is the referee for the conflicting interests of individuals in economic competition and free exchange. Free elections and free markets are both important based on the basic assumption that collective goods can be expressed adequately in life only if the individuals interact through a competitive exchange with minimal state intervention. But behind the role of the 'minimal state' in which its authority and power should be strictly limited, there is still a strong commitment to the need for state intervention in certain fields: namely to regulate the behavior of dissidents and to reshape social relations.
and institutions in the event of failure in laissez-faire competition, where the greatest happiness of the people is not achieved.

Presumably there is a kind of mutual benefit or symbiotic mutualism between liberalism and democracy. According Linandtud (2004), liberalists sustain democracy through an emphasis on the individual rights, on the control over government and on the fairness of the election. While liberal democracy supports liberalism since in a liberal democratic system, state should be accountable to the public (which means giving place to the individual to have freedom of opinion and speech). But the question of who is actually considered as legitimate participants, whether only citizens of one country or any other individuals and what their roles in the political system are still debated and not resolved. The answer seems to be submitted to the thinkers of oppressed groups and feminists who argue for a truly universal suffrage. Although the struggle to gain civil rights and right to vote for blacks and women succeed, the aspirations of equal political participation and equal human development still unmet.

Based on the above elaboration, we may conclude that liberal approach to democracy measure the successful implementation of democracy from how the democratic system is able to protect and meet the interests of liberal society. Progress or political development is measured, for example, in relation to the level of individual freedom and other political rights of individuals. State intervention is seen not only to restrict the rights of people but not conducive to the development of creativity and competition for people. State should have very minimal role in the maintenance of freedom and individual rights.

It should be noted here, that the above principles of liberal democracy that developed in Western liberal societies can not necessarily be applied directly in the newly independent societies in Asia and Africa. Especially aspects that can become issues are the role of leaders, the paternalistic culture and the strong religious culture in these countries. These aspects have an influence on the relationship between civil society and the state. This relationship has different characters from that in Western countries. Likewise, private and public boundaries continue to experience redefinition and remain unresolved in many new countries to date.

IMPLEMENTATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN ASIA

Using the above understanding of democracy, we can see that there would be several problems with the implementation liberal views of democracy in the third world. The understanding of liberal perspective on democracy in the third world is sometimes incomplete, because it often does not take into account cultural complexity, composition of ethnic groups, and religions and economic needs in a society that affect how people view the role of leaders and the state (Parekh 1992; Bell 2006). This relates to the contexts of the community which have different cultures from that in non-Western societies or the often called illiberal societies (Bell et.al 1995).

Explanation of liberal perspectives that depart from the level of freedom and how political party and government must function in a rational way are often misleading. Such an explanation measures progress of democracy according to a standard that is often dangerous because if the standard such as full freedom is used, it could bring one country to the brink of conflicts and divisions. When freedom is given fully, a country previously considered as a model for democracy such as Sri Lanka and Lebanon can also be trapped in a bloody conflict in the long run. This is not to mention previous authoritarian countries such as Iraq within which the introduction of democracy brings not only confusions but bloody conflicts almost every day. Because of that, how democracy should apply must be understood from how people themselves understand and debate democracy in their political context.

New countries in Asia have different understandings, experiences and even different philosophies of power, politics and democracy. According to Daniel Bell (2006: 8-9), the liberal democratic state grew from the Western experiences while countries in East Asia has its own experience and philosophy. Furthermore, in the context of these countries, liberal concepts such as human rights, democracy and capitalism, has been modified substantially when entering into an East Asian community (Daniel Bell 2006: 9). In understanding the concept of individual, for example, the understandings of individuals in countries such as China and India differ from those in Western countries. According to Parekh (1994: 57), the role of
The concept of caste is very important in determining the position of individuals in India. Similarly, individuals in many other Asian countries such as China and Southeast Asia are more dependent on family and community than those in the West. In liberal concept, property rights belong fully to individuals, but in Islam, not all individual private properties belong to him/her. There is right of the poor in that property.

The concepts of power, rights, liabilities, equity, ownership, freedom, equality, loyalty, power and authority in the liberal societies are often interpreted differently in the Third World and affect the perception of the role of government. The view of power in China/Asia departs from the trust while in the West it departs from distrust (Helgesen and Li Xing 1998: 106-7). Paternalistic system is easier to develop in such a situation, because the people often trust uncritically the leaders they like. Assessment to leadership capacity is often done not because of the ability and capacity but because of the religious and cultural quality of leaders who possessed it. The tradition of opposition is also not growing strong in these countries.

It should be clarified that some of these conceptions are often manipulated by the government in this new states for the sake of maintaining their authoritarian regime. Some Southeast Asian leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir, Suharto and Thaksin Sinawatra also managed to take advantage of this cultural situation to strengthen their power and legitimacy. They give clear arguments that cultural characters of their political system are different from those in the Western liberal states, which they often call Western individualist system. These leaders formulate and define Asian values which, among others, depart from the primacy of the importance of harmony in life and virtues of family and community rather than individualism as the value of maintaining the stability and even improvement in some Asian countries. But regardless of manipulation for the benefit of those in power, this does not eliminate the differences in the cultural and social context of the application of democracy.

Restrictions on freedom in these countries are also justified by showing the conditions of society which are vulnerable because of communalism and ethnic conflicts in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in the Suharto era. In these three countries, the government felt it was important to regulate the media and issues that can be discussed openly. Communities are also often reminded of the importance of stability and development with reference to the example of the chaos prevailing in some newly independent countries in Asia and Africa.

Some intellectuals in these countries emphasized the importance of a strong government in the sense that it is able to maintain security and to run the development programs. The intelligentsia in Singapore often called a Singaporean school, for example, wrote that what Singapore needed were not democracy but the government that can work. In Malaysia, the government's roles in development have stronger justification after the riots in May 1969. The government became patron especially for the societies. The intellectuals in Indonesia during the New Order regime gave legitimacy to the New Order by emphasizing national stability and economic development. They have featured the New Order as a regime full of hope and peace while the Old Order was pictured as an order of chaos that have to be abandoned because it implemented all the evils such as too much politics, competition and instability, and no development.

But not all these regimes are fully successful. During their development, communities change, demands change and the ability of any state to please and meet the needs of the community also reduced. In some countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the authoritarian regimes are so long in power that the cost to maintain political stability became increasingly higher than before. The cost in particular was to maintain the cohesiveness of regime and the patronage network that supported the system. Corruption, nepotism and collusion were increasingly prominent in these countries that bring to the demands for changes within the community.

We can see phenomenon such as the complexity of the economic development, the safety and welfare of the people and the complexity of the state and civil society relations in the above discussed states and in Asia in general. These countries must secure three important issues, to borrow a concept Benhabib (1996), namely legitimacy, economic welfare and a real understanding of collective identity. These three are inter-related problems; lack one of these will lead to instability and problems in society. These new countries inherited economic backwardness and crisis inter-ethnic relations from their colonial master.
such condition, economic prosperity and collective identity becomes very important part that must be met if the regimes of democracy to gain legitimacy. The countries being successful with the democratic system are usually able to maintain a certain balance levels of these three aspects. However, what often happens is the emphasis on one at the expense of the others.

When they were not able to control the society and lost their political and ideological hegemony, protests would be increasingly stronger. Regimes under Marcos in the Philippines, Ne Win in Burma, Indonesia's Suharto and the military government in Thailand before Thaksin fell as many people demanded changes in society. Except for Burma who fell back into the hands of the military, calls for changes into a more democratic system of government happen in these Southeast Asia states. People demand for political reform that allows more fair elections and support political institutions and rule of laws that respect civil rights and democratic political process.

The democratizing process in these regimes is, however, not stable and smooth. Although there is a more fair election and there is freedom of speech, and freedom to form political party, political processes and behavior of politicians remains the same as when they were still with the authoritarian regimes. Patronage system is still very strong in the community so that the party was built through the characterizations of one person. In the political process, although the level of ‘money politics’ from one State to another State is different, it is always used to maintain loyalty. In both the legislative and various executive levels, the circulation of money politics is very high. The candidates are not expected to prepare a program for a great campaign, but a lot of money to strengthen the network of patronage to secure his/her positions.

Except for Singapore, the above political practices are so common in Asian countries. Regrettably, these political practices had removed the reformist groups that could bring politics with good programs and progress from political processes. Exclusion of reformist groups can be seen in Indonesia and the Philippine politics. In Indonesia, the reformists had only two choices, eliminated or adjust to the nature of the old politics of patronage as in the Suharto era. In the Philippines, these politicians are referred to as trapo or traditional politicians who continued control the political scene. They are wealthy families with big names such as Marcos, Ramos, Arroyo, Aquino and many others. Although the people took to the streets several times in what is called people power, but the real change of power was spinning and only occurred among members of these big and rich families.

CONTESTING MEANINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA

The above does not mean that the system of liberal democracy could not be applied in the third world. We argue that the implementation is not complete and hard to be completed because the communities discussed in these new states have their own experiences and understandings of democracy and thus develop their own understanding of the meanings and practices of democracy. There have always been negotiations between civil society and the state with regards to certain issues in the development of democracy. Many of the policies and laws limiting freedom of speech and media in semi-democratic regimes such as in Malaysia and Singapore are becoming increasingly unpopular in the eyes of society so that one day it is not impossible that they will be reviewed or revoked.

Moreover, the understanding and application of democracy in, for example, Indonesia and Malaysia should not only concern on the electoral democracy including campaigns, political turn out, freedom and other election-related activities such as monitoring the election that generally become the focus of Western political observers in viewing the progress of democracy (see, for example activities conducted by Freedom House and Polity IV Project). Democracy in these countries should also relate to the usefulness of democracy itself namely whether it provides benefits to the welfare, to the improvement of community life and to the formation of a clean government.

When people of Indonesia and Malaysia are said to have no liberal background such as in the liberal society in the West, this does not necessarily mean that the community want to be restricted and controlled and that they want to depend on the state. Society still longed for freedom but they also want the
state to have a greater responsibility for the progresses in society. In Malaysia and Indonesia, Muslim groups that support the implementation of Islamic law wanted a greater state role in religion. In Malaysia, Islam became the official religion of the country so that the state rather than the community is responsible to the implementation of Islamic teachings. In Indonesia, at the lower level, the same thing happened. Governments regulate religious education and have religious courts for Muslims. In Indonesia, the government is also facing strong demands for more religious rules into public rules (Hara 2010; Zein 2001).

In such a context, democracy debated and implemented in these countries differed significantly from that comprehended in the West. Democracy is not mainly discussed in term of freedom and system of government, but also understood as the spirit behind it which for example inspired the struggle for freedom and independence. There are at least four essential meanings of democracy that can be made in both countries. Certainly this is not mutually exclusive categories.

First, the introduction of the idea of democracy has provided inspiration for national leaders and fighters to fight for freedom and justice for their countries. The ideas of freedom and human rights originating from Western colonial countries influenced the independent movements and the fledging post-independent governments. In this context, democracy often means independence and equality of nations in international relations. When the countries became independent, democratic forms of government whether authoritarian or democratic was another matter, what matters was the independent for the people from colonialism. They then may adapt authoritarian models of governance including military and communist governments, especially in countries which achieved independence through revolution.

Nevertheless they keep fighting for freedom and equal rights in international politics, denounced Western imperialism and colonialism. Democracy means collective freedom as a nation to par with other nations. The leaders of Third World states believed that independence presented them with the opportunity to realize human dignity as free people. In terms of its moral ends, this belief is congruent with concepts of democracy (Macpherson 1966: 36). For leaders of some Third World countries, concepts of democracy have similar moral ends. As C. B. Macpherson (1966: 37) argues, the ultimate goals in Third World concepts of democracy are ‘to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society. They (concepts of democracy) differ in their views as to what conditions are needed, and as to how they must move to achieve those conditions’.

In light of Macpherson’s argument, it is, therefore, in terms of process to realize moral ends of democracy that many countries have different approaches. In Western liberal democratic experiences, to realize the moral ends of democracy was to liberalize the state. A liberal democratic system was essential to meet the demands from a society which had liberalized many aspects of its cultural, social, and economic life, within a liberal-capitalist economic system (Macpherson 1966: 5-11). However, in the non-Western state, the way to achieve the moral ends of democracy which can increase human dignity may be different from that in the West.

Second, democracy is often added with adjectives such as Pancasila democracy, Asian democracy, Confucianism democracy, Islamic democracy or other religious democracy (Hatta 1992; Hindley 1971; Sukarno 1970; Fukuyama 1995). Meaning of such a deployment usually occurs because liberal democracy does not fix with local cultures and conditions. As mechanisms of government, democracy is actually something foreign to these countries. Indeed, many thinkers from these countries try hard to adjust the values of their traditions and religions with democracy and they found parts of local values and religions are compatible with democracy. But no matter how much compatibilities existed between the two, those local values had no direct connections with the workings of government. The values were not formulated and implemented in institutions. If anything it is the values circulated among the people and remained so until the entry of modern ideas about democracy.

In communities that prioritize community and togetherness, the legal and formal democracy is often separated from society. Thoughts on democracy based on rational programs are only one example of

\[^{1}C. \text{B. Macpherson argues that there are three concepts of democracy. The first one is the liberal democracy model applied in the West, the second one incorporates modern communist concepts and the final one is neither liberal nor communist but represented by 'newly independent underdeveloped countries', see C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, the Massey Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 36; Thanks to Khoo Bo Teik, a political scientist from the Malaysia University of Science, who draws my attention to this Macpherson’s book.}\]
rational political ideals hardly applied in such political community. Political relations within society are determined more by the nature of togetherness or unity rather than rational political and economic interests. Loyalty is determined by the feelings of like or dislike and patron-client affiliations to the religious leaders, groups, ethnicity and region. The orientation of the political parties also leads to political loyalty to leaders rather than loyalty to rational programs.

Thirdly, democracy is often understood as a deliberation and consensus. In a conflict resolution, political actors in both countries tend to make a consensus rather than to have open conflicts in solving their differences. They will seek the most acceptable solution to avoid discontent that may create conflicts. They also tend to make the broadest possible coalition that can accommodate different groups in society, including those which have different ideologies. Sukarno in Indonesia for example, made a large coalition that combines elements of nationalism, religion and communism (Nasakom) (Sukarno 1970).

In its development, consensual politics has become a major feature of the political behavior of governments in the region. Formal oppositions often do not grow and develop strongly because there is a tendency to form a coalition that includes all main political power. This tendency can prevent the emergence of an opposition with a solid ideology. If anything, the opposition is restricted to a minimum, their role continues to be subtracted, and their leaders are frequently jailed using oppressive political Laws. The ruling party always wants to strengthen and broaden its coalition base by co-opting various groups in society. The ruling coalition party will feel more secure if its coalition becomes bigger despite there have been distinction of ideologies and orientation in it. The term strange bedfellow seems not a big problem in the coalition. Strict coalition based only on a certain ethnic group and an ideology is often weak and can bring the country to the brink of division and conflict in the long run such as in Sri Lanka and Lebanon

Fourth, democracy is viewed more as a tool rather than a goal or more precisely democracy is always associated with other objectives that are relevant to people's lives such as economic progress and the efforts to create clean governance. Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of media are important things in democracy but this often became less significant when associated with more urgent needs such as economic recovery (Kausikan 1997; Mahbubani 1995).

Democracy will be meaningless if the people remain poor and corruption is everywhere. The people generally do not bother with explanations that democracy has no correlation with economic growth and clean government. They demanded conditions better than the conditions during the previous authoritarian regime. If this does not become reality, they do not hesitate to say that the authoritarian system is better. Unlike the common view of democracy in the West, that democracy is a goal that must be fought primarily in countries that have not been democratic, for countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, democracy was not a goal but is often simplified as a tool of legitimacy for any other purposes. Political leaders such as Mahathir and Suharto said this often implicitly or explicitly.

In Malaysia, an important aspect of democracy such as freedom is not seen as very important because of the plurality within its community. Freedom must be limited because if it is given, it may be used to raise sensitive issues of communalism that can trigger hostility. The government wants to ensure that there are controls on freedom through various laws, especially the Internal Security Act (ISA). Another reason often mentioned is the necessity of peace and stability that allows economic development. The leaders of Malaysia, like Mahathir, often remind people that unrest and severe political conflict may affect the development process as happens in other third world states.

But the perception of the ISA is constantly changing. In recent years it is increasingly rare that ISA is used to capture oppositions. The latest use of ISA was to capture the creator of the blog in the internet and a prominent dissident, but the arrests received widespread protest that raised questions about whether the ISA is still necessary. Community resistance to the use of the ISA with that case was even stronger. It is not so surprising to hear the recent news that the current PM intend to rebuke ISA and replace it with another law.

Indonesia entered a critical period in the life of democracy after the honeymoon or the euphoria of democracy ended. People used to give great hope for democracy as a Panacea for the life of a bawdy scarred nation. For example they hoped that with the return to democracy and the overthrowing of the
authoritarian Suharto regime, everything including economic development and the eradication of poverty would happen. They also expected the eradication of rampant corruption in every level of society.

But over the last 10 years after the fall of Suharto, the above promises are not only unfulfilled but also more difficult to materialize in compare to that during the Suharto’s time. Corruption is getting worse to a large extent expanding to almost all political elites and government levels (Hadiz 2003). Economic growth and the tackling of poverty had not been met. Many leaders, including vice president Budiono disappointed with such a circumstance. According to him, initially democracy promises pure people participation but now it becomes problems not solutions.

The explanation above is not intended to show that countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia reject liberal democracy totally. The aspiration to implement democracy and the adoption of its principle has become part of life for people in both countries. This paper attempts to show the dynamics within the community itself in understanding democracy. The application of democracy should not be the same as the existing models available in Western states, as the place of original place of democracy because of the different socio-cultural context described above.

The spirit and idea of democracy has grown and live in society in both countries. If we follow the definition of Betham (1994: 44)) on democracy, then the core democratic system is the voice and interests of the people. He said democracy was a form of decision-making about the rules and policies of collective where people have the control over the government and their policies and the most democratic government is where all members of society have equal rights to participate effectively in decision-making.

In both countries, the core and the spirit of democracy in the above sense remains alive. The problems and the distinctions between Malaysia and Indonesia are only in terms of its application. In Malaysia, although there are restraints on freedom, sensitivity and responsiveness of the government to the interests of the people can be said to be greater than in Indonesia. Although the ruling parties monopolize and control the media and various social and political networks, there is no guarantee they will win easily in the general elections if they had not succeeded in convincing the people their eligibility in running the government and parliament (Crouch 1993).

In Indonesia, the new democratic system was reintroduced after being under the authoritarian Suharto regime for nearly 30 years. Suharto’s New Order system according to the leaders of reform did not allow the participation of the people in politics and it is why one of the demands for reform is to provide extensive opportunities for popular participation in politics. Over ten years after the reform, citizen participation is indeed more pure and free. Communities are free to choose their leaders and representative in parliaments in relatively fair general elections. They can also protest the government without fear of arrest and the civil society is also evolving. However, the participation is still less meaningful because the government and political actors are not responsive to the will of the people. Politicians and elites in government and bureaucracy are elected through a democratic process such as general elections but once they acquire power, they tend to form a kind of elite class of its own and consolidate their interests as a group of elite rather than serving the interests of the common people.

CONCLUSION

This paper attempts to explain the spread of liberal democracy and the promises it brings. Although it develop and grow in Western cultures in particular in liberal western society, it has been spread over to the world and accepted as the main standard for arranging good political life. It inspires movements against authoritarian and tyrannical government in many Third World states. As shown by the wave of democracy in the Middle East, it creates a kind of rising expectation that many if not all problems in authoritarian states can be solved by having a democratic political system. However, in its implementation the above promises and expectation were not easily fulfilled. Many new democratizing regimes face problems with economic development, stability and good governance. In some areas such as the eradication of corruption, factionalism and political stability, the situation often gets worse than that during the authoritarian time.

By specific reference to Indonesia and Malaysia case, this paper argues that the approach to democracy needs to be more sensitive to cultural, social and political situation of the countries discussed. In
these two countries democracy has been modified and understood at least in four main meanings. First, it has been seen as part to promote their dignity as new nation state. Secondly, these two countries also often discuss democracy within their cultural context such as Asian cultures, Confucianism and Islam. They then put some adjective to democracy such as Asian Democracy and Pancasila democracy. The debate within cultural context often leads to the redefinition of the relations between the state and society or between the public and private sphere. Thirdly, in both countries, democracy means efforts to build consensus. Ruling parties in both countries always attempts to build a grand coalition. This often discourages the growth of opposition. In Malaysia, formal opposition can grow but their rights are limited. Indonesia on the other hand does not have effective formal opposition to government. Fourthly, democracy in both countries is often seen as tool or means for other ends such as economic development, political stability and good and clean governance.

Debate about democracy is the debate about the future destiny of both nations. As a value, democracy has given space for people to discuss, define and redefine the needs for their countries. They keep discussing the best way to represent people voices and aspirations as the core of democracy principle. In this process they keep redefining the meanings of freedom, general elections, role of leaders and other political issues that may fulfill the need of majority of population.

REFERENCES


GOVERNANCE OF MINING IN PALAWAN, PHILIPPINES: COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY

Sol de villa B. Rama
College of Business and Public Administration
Western Philippines University, Palawan
eya4girls@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The study was conducted from September 15, 2009 to December 5, 2009 in two large mining projects located in Southern Palawan, namely: Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Project in Barangay Rio Tuba, Bataraza, Palawan, and Berong Nickel Mining Project in Barangay Berong, Quezon, Palawan.

The study underscored the present collaborative governance landscape of mining governance in Palawan and its impact on the socio-economic and ecological conditions of mining communities by the presence of sustainability indicators. The study used the case study method using surveys, FGDs, in-depth analysis, and ground truthing.

Results revealed that collaborative governance in mining is still a rhetoric, and theoretical among stakeholders. The Multipartite Monitoring Teams (MMTs) as an approach to multistakeholdership have failed to initiate collaborative governance in mining. Mining operations did not improved the economic life of most of the stakeholders, but have improved social services- education, health, and infrastructure projects in communities. The stakeholders have diverse views and opinions about mining, but believed that mining has both positive and negative impacts on their lives and the environment, and most of them seemed to incline toward negative perceptions about mining.

The key indicators of sustainability and non-sustainability of mining on socio-economic, collaboration, and ecological condition of the community, the Decommissioning Plan, and the economic performance of nickel in the world market, provided an analysis for factors of uncertainties of mining industry. These uncertainties were used as a logical framework for scenarios of mining industry in Palawan. These scenarios were termed as Utopian, Economic Priority, Civic Priority, and Dystopian which reflect the possible futures of mining industry in Palawan.

Collaborative governance of mining could be effectively functional under certain conditions. Hence, a Model for Collaborative Governance anchored on effective dialogues was developed and designed based mainly on the Utopian Scenario and premised that collaboration reduces the risks of dispute and implementation failure in the policy cycle of environmental governance such as mining governance.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance, Collaboration, Sustainability Indicators, Socio-Economic, Ecological

INTRODUCTION

Collaboration and socio-economic and community sustainability issues in mining industry have become a major concern, not only in the Philippines but globally. Actions by local communities and pressure groups have crystallized into recognizable threats to development of mineral projects. In some instances, projects are being delayed or totally abandoned because of opposition by communities where the projects are located.
Although the mineral industry has proved adept at quickly designing and integrating engineering and management models into its operations that promote sound environmental practices and satisfy, to the extent that is possible, increasing environmental awareness, there are new issues under debate. Two of these issues include: 1) a greater number of stakeholders are involved in all phases of the development process along with their various demands, and 2) the call for the socio-economic and ecological dimensions of mining activities as being inherent in the concept of sustainable development.

MEANINGS, CONCEPTS OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS

Collaborative governance as a strategy to enhance mining operations implies not only sharing resources but also powers and authority primarily by the state and other stakeholders such as local government units, non-government organizations, the indigenous peoples’ organizations, and the private sector. The question, however, remains to be: “Is collaborative governance good for the environment?” Practitioners and academics frequently ask this question because collaboration has increasingly supplemented or supplanted other forms of governance, such as centralized planning and command-and-control regulation. Collaboration is one of several forms of new governance elbowing its way into the environmental policymaking process. Hence, debates continue whether collaboration improves the environment and the socio-economic situation of the communities inside the program over alternative governance systems. The debate, however, is largely rhetorical and theoretical, because there is little empirical evidence to suggest whether collaboration has a positive or negative impact on the environment.

Most researches on collaborative environmental governance focus on processes (e.g. consensus, public participation, and mediation). Some research also address outputs (e.g. plans and projects) and social outcomes (e.g. trust and social capital). Very little research addresses environmental and socio-economic outcomes. Much is known about how collaborative processes vary (Koontz, et. al 2004; Sabatier, et. al 2005). Emerging research also suggests how collaborative outputs vary (Wilkinson 2007; U.S. IECR 2007; U.S. GAO 2008) and how collaborative outputs differ from non-collaborative outputs (Leach 2007). Research also indicates that collaboration on environmental problems tends to increase social capital among participants (Sabatier, et. al 2005; U.S. IECR 2007), though little is known about the effect of collaboration on non-participants. One recent study, for example, suggests that increased social capital among collaborative participants may come at the expense of reduced social capital in other venues (Lubbell 2007). In sum, we know much about what collaborative governance is and what collaborative partners do, but we know very little about the impact of collaborative governance on environmental and socio-economic conditions of the stakeholders.

This paper reviews the state of knowledge and practice on collaborative governance and its impact on the socio-economic, and ecological performance of two mining operations as perceived by the people and major stakeholders of the host mining communities through in-depth analysis and observation and ground-truthing of mining activities and outcomes of mining in the host communities.

MINING POLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Republic Act 7942, or the “Act Instituting a New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization, and Conservation” (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) declares it a policy that “all mineral resources in public and private lands within the territory and exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Philippines are owned by the state. It shall be the responsibility of the state to promote their rational exploration, development, utilization, and conservation through the combined efforts of government and the private sector in order to enhance national growth in a way that effectively safeguards the environment and protect the rights of affected communities.” This law was a realization of the time and effort invested by the government, private mining sector, and concerned entities to put together a practical and modern mining law designed to meet the needs of a well-endowed mineral producing country. It has aptly addressed the conditions sought by foreign investors such as security of tenure, ability to expatriate profits, majority
equity ownership, and guaranteed right to mine. Its governing principles, under its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40), provide strict adherence to the principle of “sustainable development”. Sustainable development provides that the use of mineral wealth shall be pro-people and pro-environment in sustaining wealth creation and improving the quality of life. It is considered in the industry today as one of the most socially and environmentally-sensitive legislations in its class. It has specific provisions that take into consideration the engagement of all entities which has a stake on mining, referred to as MSPs.

PALAWAN PROVINCE AND ITS MINING RESOURCE

The mineral resource of the province is located mainly at the southern part and Puerto Princesa. To date, the city of Puerto Princesa has declared a moratorium in mineral development in its area of jurisdiction.

Mining, though still restricted in the province, is gaining ground due to the economic policy of the national government. However, commercial mining in Palawan began during the 1950s. Some of the notable mining companies in the following decade were the Palawan Quicksilver Mines Inc., which extracted liquid mercury from cinnabar ore in Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City; Nin Bay Mining Co.; Republic Glass Corporation; and Vulcan Industrial and Mining Exploration which mined the high-grade silica deposit in Roxas, Palawan.

The mining boom in the 1970s paved the way for the opening of various mines particularly in the southern part of Palawan which was rich in chromite. It was in the middle of the decade when the Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation (RTNMC) in Rio Tuba, Bataraza, Palawan began its nickel production. RTNMC, the mining company that survived the mining depression of the 1990s and early 2000, is the largest and oldest operating mine in Palawan.

As of February 20, 2008, the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) received 160 mining applications and approved 12 permits. But as of June 2008, there have been only two small scale mining permitees operating in Taytay, Palawan that are both in chromite production, and two large mining companies operating: RTNMC in Bataraza, Palawan, and Berong Nickel Corporation (BNC) in Berong, Quezon, Palawan.

JUSTIFICATION

The mining industry in the Philippines has developed a conducive environment through the implementation of the Revitalized Mining Act of 1995. The industry is considered as the economic strategy of the Arroyo administration to alleviate the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the marginalized members of the Filipino society, specifically those located in rural communities.

To effect reasonable and desired changes, helpful guides and insights should be readily available from studies of various areas affecting the industry. The existing literatures or studies on mining in the Philippines showed that much attention has been directed to the adverse environmental impacts and other technical studies, such as results of exploration studies. The governance aspects, and the socio-economic impacts, as well as sustainable development issues are often overlooked, which explains the scarcity of related literature or studies that could be helpful in addressing issues on governance, ecological and socio-economic impacts, and sustainability indicators on mining projects. Hence, this study of collaborative governance and community sustainability indicators of mining projects.

INVESTIGATION SCOPE

Figures 1, and 2 show the research sites to identify the landscape of collaborative governance and sustainable development indicators of socio-economic and ecological conditions of mining communities.
Figure 1: Map of Palawan showing the location of the research sites
(Source: PCSD Office, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan October 2010)

Figure 2: Map of Bataraza, Palawan showing the location of Bgy. Rio Tuba and RTNMC
(Source: PCSD Office, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, October 2010)
BRIEF PROFILE OF BERONG NICKEL MINING PROJECT

Berong Nickel Mining Project is operated and managed by the Berong Nickel Corporation (BNC) whose focus is solely on nickel laterite in the Philippines. It is located at Barangay Berong at the northwestern part of the municipality (see Figure 3-Map of Quezon, Palawan, p. 89). Initial activities are centered at developing a direct-shipping laterite operation at Bgy. Berong, Quezon, Palawan where the ore will be sold FOB (free-on-board) Philippines to nickel smelters.

The Toledo Mining Corporation has an economic 56.1% interest in BNC. Berong, Moorson, Long Point, and Ulugan deposits (collectively referred to as the Berong deposit) all in Palawan have a combined pre-JORC (Joint Ore Reserves Committee) resource of approximately 2.75 million tonnes of nickel ore at around 1.3% nickel (Ni). The company also has interests in an additional laterite property, the Celestial, which has pre-JORC resource approximately 75 million tonnes and around 1.25% nickel. Both Berong and Celestial deposits total a combined pre-JORC resource of some 350 million tonnes at 1.3% Ni.

Berong is believed to be the world’s fourth largest nickel laterite resource company. Together, Berong, Ipilan, and Ulugan represent world class projects with a combined resource of some 345 million tonnes at 1.3% nickel and an estimated total nickel content of more than 4.6% million tons. The deposits offer the potential to recover both limonite and saprolite ore.

The company has entered into a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA No. 235-2007-IVB) with the Philippine government covering the 288-hectare Berong Nickel Mining Project. The current Direct Shipping Operation falls under the MPSA and the Associated Special Mines Permit. The key highlights of the Philippine government’s initiatives within which the company has jurisdictionary operates are as follows:

1. Temporary Exploration Permit (TEP) granted on the 15th November 2005 which commenced the test pitting, drilling, sampling, GPR, and topographical survey;
2. Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) granted on the 14th June 2006;
3. Priority Project Status granted on October 2006;
4. Special Mines Permit granted on November 2000;
5. Trial metallurgical shipment commenced on January 2000;
6. Extension on Mining Permit granted on the 5th of June 2007;
7. Berong MPSA (commercial) granted in November 2007; and
8. Berong-Tree cutting permit was granted in January 2008.

BRIEF PROFILE OF RIO TUBA NICKEL MINING PROJECT

The Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Project is one of the pioneering large scale mining projects in Palawan which has been in operation since 1975. It is located at the southern part of the province specifically in Bgy. Rio Tuba, Bataraza, Palawan. It mines nickel ore from laterite, a red-colored soil rich in iron and clay, originally formed from the deep weathering of bedrock in tropical and subtropical regions. There are two types of ore being mined by the project: an upper layer of limonite which typically has lower nickel and higher iron content, and an underlying layer of saprolite, which typically has higher nickel and lower iron content. All mining operations of the project are conducted above ground using bench mining techniques. The project supplies various types and grades of saprolite and limonite to customers located in Japan, China and the Philippines. Deliveries are made by barge to the customers’ vessels offshore near the mining areas. It also supplies all of the limonite required for the operation of the Coral Bay HPAL (High Pressure Acid Leaching) facility located adjacent to Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Project. The annual production rate of the project is placed at 10,000 MT for nickel and 7,050 MT cobalt, with an estimated potential mine life of 20 years.

The Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Project is currently owned by the Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation (RTNMC), a subsidiary of Nickel Asia Corporation (NAC).
OBJECTIVES

1. Identify most relevant local sustainable indicators, out of collaborative governance, ecological, social, economic, based from public perception realms.
2. Develop criteria or model to create sustainable collaboration in mining communities with communication/dialogues as a tool.
3. To determine the future of mining industry and surrounding communities based from identified sustainable indicators of collaboration, ecological, and socio-economic aspects.
4. Recommend criteria and governance ideas from mining and environmental management, to considering the three fundamental variables: ecological certainty, social and economical viability, and institutional sustainability.

RESEARCH METHOD

The study primarily uses the case study method in understanding the extent of collaborative governance implementation and practice in mining projects as reflected by socio-economic, ecological sustainability indicators. The research design generates comprehensive and relevant information on how mining plans and programs are formulated and implemented in order to achieve sustainability in terms of collaborative governance and its socio-economic, and ecological impact/outcomes to the host communities. The information also enables the study to have an in-depth analysis on views and perceptions of the mining stakeholders in achieving sustainable development in terms of policy, process, policy outputs/outcomes complementation.

Review and analyses of government agencies’ documents was an important data collection scheme, anchored to the analyses are key informant interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, and ground truthing to validate data from stakeholders- government agencies, NGOs, community people including IPs, and local officials. Since the research study is highly qualitative in nature, it adopted descriptive statistics using averages as measure of central tendency, specifically means, to analyze and summarize the data. It also used the Likert scale method to measure the attitudes of respondents towards mining.

Economic performance or the high volatility of international market price of nickel, and a sustainable indicator of civic capacity of mining communities as drivers of change of mining industry are the bases for the scenario framework analysis.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Collaborative governance leading to socio-economic and ecological sustainability is the main focus of this study as contextualized in the mining industry of Palawan. This new governance concept highlights the sharing of resources and powers by multi-stakeholders with the end goal of bringing better services to the community without endangering the environment. Communities of Bgy. Rio Tuba in the Municipality of Bataraza and Bgy. Berong in the Municipality of Quezon are host to mining companies Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation (RTNMC) and Berong Nickel Corporation (BNC) respectively. Respondents from these two communities share how these mining companies respond to their concerns and offer other insights as to how other organizations collaborate with mining companies. Analysis of key results of the study revealed that collaborative governance in the form of Multipartite Monitoring Team (MMT) of the community is effective in bringing economic change but only limited to the targets stipulated pro forma in the Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942). Other forms of governance such as formal and non-formal dialogues emerge to bring services to the community as initiated by mining companies themselves but limited to the mining companies’ interests and targets. As local officials “ride on” or become beneficiaries of mining companies, they jeopardize their oversight function and integrity thus failing to assume or explore alternative methods in delivering basic services to the people. In this context, collaborative governance may have resulted in an economic betterment but only superficial as these benefits are good during the active
The operation of mining. When a mining company declares “maintenance status,” all of these benefits are severed and could not be sustained collaboratively because preparation for this unforeseen circumstance is beyond the MMT's mandate.

The residents of mining host communities in Palawan are generally poor in terms of family income, are in their middle ages, and are literate. Majority are engaged in farming and other related jobs. Almost all of them have other sources of income in order to augment family needs and expenses. They are also members of community organizations such as the Parents-Teachers Association, farmers association, tribal association, church organizations, and other organizations that have relation in their present work and community activities. Their primary civic participation is limited to community and school activities such as the “gulpi-man” or “bayanihan,” and medical missions. The barangay captains, chieftains, schoolteachers, and the mining companies are considered active sponsors of civic activities in the community.

The respondents have diverse views as far as mining is concerned. However, majority believe that mining activities have adverse effects on the environment, but also believe that mining would bring development and other benefits to the community as reflected in the Socio-economic Sustainability Indicators. Mining has created job opportunities, provided revenues for the government (fees, rentals, excise tax, etc.), established business opportunities, and realized livelihood projects. In spite of these indicators, the respondents from Rio Tuba Mining Corporation (RTNMC) and Berong Nickel Corporation (BNC) generally regard them as FAIR.

Collaborative governance (CG) offers substantial opportunities for mining stakeholders to interact and address common concerns as reflected in the CG Sustainability Indicators. Although other studies point to CG as a shared problem solving mechanism, the study indicates that proactive opportunities can be achieved through CG. Hence, problems need not be present for CG to be activated. Rather, a formal collaboration such as the MMT enhanced with formal and informal dialogues and community mobilization has been observed to be necessary to achieve the intended goals or outputs of collaboration such as the EPEP, SDMP, and the Decommissioning Plan.

In terms of the respondents’ participation in planning activities related to mining, a great majority confirm that they have never been involved and never been informed of mining operations and related activities. They claim that only the barangay captains, barangay officials, and the chieftains are ones invited to such planning activities. They also claimed that mining companies failed to respond to their concerns to the environment and never been transparent of their operations.

In spite of the perception of the community that they are not consulted in planning stage of mining activities, it appears that local leaders have been consulted by the mining companies and actively engage the community through informal dialogues as observed in the community’s participation and acceptability of mining by the community. Considering that there are no incidents of rallies or indignations against the operation of mining, the community feels to be only involved in activities that require huge manpower such as tree planting.

The stakeholders are aware that the mining companies have external linkages with other industries at the provincial, regional, national and even international locations. This external linkages is either inherent to their operations, or is a need for the company to exist.

In terms of employment, trainings, and skills development, the two companies provides opportunities for their employees as well as to non-employees, either in-service, or outside the companies. The trainings and skills development is a way for employees to keep abreast of latest technologies or state-of-the-art of their present work.

The significant community projects or programs that the two companies have provided to the host communities are on the aspect of health such as free hospitalization and medical assistance; education through the maintenance of a school, provision of scholarship, special school for the indigenous peoples called Indigenous Learning System; and infrastructure projects such as water system, livelihood projects, and social services. These projects are implemented under the companies’ SDMP. The SDMPs are policy compliance and serve as a guidepost for their socio-economic responsibility in the host communities. These services are made possible through formal dialogues between the mining companies and NGOs such as
academic institutions and GK Foundation. These instances indicate that collaborative governance is possible and not be exclusive to one formal CG mechanism such as the MMT.

The mining companies have a continuing rehabilitation program by planting exotic and endemic trees in the mined-out areas. They also establish research and development projects (R & D) in support of their rehabilitation program. The R & D projects are focused on growth performance and adaptability studies of different tree varieties.

The mining companies’ operations are periodically monitored and evaluated by the MMT including ecological concerns. Mitigating measures to monitor the quality of air, water, noise, siltation, and reforestation and reforestation projects should be within the DENR standards as stipulated in the EPEP. The two companies have so far been effective in implementing their EPEP as shown by the result samplings done by the MMT in the area for the past several years. This was further justified by zero-incidence in major hazards in the environment during the period. In fact, RTNMC, for this matter, has received several commendations and awards for its environmental performance given by DENR and other award-giving bodies in the country.

Respondents have identified mining operation within standards such as enhanced forest cover, air and water quality standards, continuous tree planting activities, and continuous rehabilitation of mined-out areas as Ecological Sustainability Indicators.

Collaborative governance in mining in the province of Palawan does not go far from the old system of command-and-control type of governance. This means that policy and decision-making rests primarily at Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Mines (DENR) particularly the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). Although the scope and function of the MMT is in itself a form of CG mechanism, the DENR (based in Manila) still issues mining permits without consultation with LGUs and the concerned communities. In essence, CG at the national level is still a baseless rhetoric. This realization pave the way for the proposition of a Model for Collaborative Governance in Mining as a general recommendation of this study.

SCENARIO ANALYSIS

Figure 3 showed that at one extreme, collaboration and civic capacity become more open, holistic, and inclusive with increased trust and respect for differences. Self-interest would be tempered by willingness to give and take and find workable solutions to problems. There would be an understanding of mutual interdependence across social, economic and environmental factors.

At the other extreme, values could become more divided and rigid, leading to conflict and distrust. Narrow perspectives and self-interest could hamper dialogue and efforts to resolve disagreements. The community would be compartmentalized and segmented, moral and ethical positions could become fixed and closed creating divisiveness, distrust and acrimony in decision-making.

In terms of economic growth under which mining will operate in the future, it could experience extended periods of strong prices, growth and productivity supporting the economic viability of the industry. On the other hand, the mining industry could experience extended periods of downturn with weak prices, low growth, and limited improvements in productivity.
As shown by the framework, the two key variables - economic growth and collaborative and civic capacity provided different scenarios for each quadrant. Thus, as shown in Figure 6, each quadrant serves as basis for defining a different scenario.

SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS

**Utopia - The Best Scenario (high economic growth with high collaboration and civic capacity)**

The scenario here reflects a strong economic condition and a high level of trust and respect characterizing overall collaboration and civic capacity. For the most part, this same trust and respect are found between the two cases mining projects and communities. Vision and change are guided through collaborative activity involving the communities of interest interacting in a constructive way with high confidence in the future. Within the mining industry and regulatory agencies, strong leadership recognizes the need for drastic change in social and environmental performance, community engagement, and open communications. Cooperation is strong and would likely create new opportunities such as emergence of common language terminology that all stakeholders can understand. This is vital in bridging differences, ensuring shared understanding while reducing frustration and mistrust.

Accompanying the improved economics and collaboration and civic capacity is a new generation of senior executives in the corporation and a new genre of public leaders sensitive to evolving social values and experienced in the operational and corporate challenges of modern mining. They recognize the need to engage stakeholders in planning and decision-making, raise environmental and social performance, and improve the reputation of the industry in the province. They understand the need to promote best practices...
in operations, expand stakeholder engagement and embrace sustainable development principles in practical ways.

In this environment, reflecting a major commitment to local capacity building, as much as the rehabilitation and restoration work is contracted to local communities. With this, a new sense of trust and legitimacy begins to emerge among indigenous people, non-government organizations, and local communities. Evidence of broad acceptance of the key principles of sustainable development emerges and is reflected not only in general policy statements, but also in specific programs of actions.

**Civic Priority Scenario (low economic growth, with high collaboration and civic capacity)**
The scenario is reflective of a difficult economic condition which serves to drive innovation, at the same time, respectful collaboration and civic capacity further facilitate change. Economic and social pressures initially push the mining companies to the limits of survival. Low demand undermines economic growth and real prices decline. At the same time, public environmental and social concerns remain high and NGOs are influential in raising their concerns. Declining earnings may lead to closure of the mining companies and devastation to the host communities. This raises concerns by governments in supporting these communities suffering job losses and in dealing with abandoned mines. Bankrupt mining companies are unable to undertake proper closure and post-closure procedures. The government is forced to step in and deal with abandoned sites itself. The overall dynamics create an atmosphere of uncertainty and discourage new investment in technological capital.

As time passes, the determination to change grows. Innovative practices are initiated. Dialogue is opened with local communities and a variety of NGOs and other interest groups. New managers with new attitudes attempt to bridge the gap of distrust. There is transformation in thinking and recognition for a need to change in behavior and performance - to resolve the issues of the past, build open relationships, and create conditions for reducing social, environmental, and economic costs while sharing benefits. In time, these developments create new coalitions. Mining companies are able to approach government for support as more credible and responsible organizations. With a more flexible approach to mining and community development, IPs are more actively and often directly involved in mine development and add support to the industry in dealing with government. Government would likely provide incentives like tax credits for implementation of closure and post-closure plans, R & D and training programs, income support programs for the host communities and infrastructure projects to assist in diversification of mining communities.

**Economic Priority (high economic growth, with low collaboration and civic capacity).**
In this scenario, economic growth raises prices and creates financial prosperity for the mining industry. Financial prosperity of the companies rises, and there is a new sense of confidence. There is increase in public credibility and financial support. Stakeholders are vigilant and are against the expansion of new mines. There is a growing state of mistrust on government. Mining companies are performing well financially and are increasingly efficient in producing needed nickels, but is frustrated in its efforts to expand existing mines and develop new ones because the NGOs and advocacy groups are very active and are against the idea. Mining companies “buy” local supports which is an unhealthy measure because it will create divides. Such approach is extremely divisive and destructive. This situation of decline in the face of financial prosperity persists for some time, but it is not sustainable.

**Dystopia - The Worst Scenario (low economic growth with low collaboration and civic capacity).**
Low economic growth creates insufficient demands for nickel and other minerals. Investor interest in mining shares continues to languish and mining share values remain depressed. Funding for, and participation in joint research efforts with governments is de-emphasized. Leadership is dominated with “old school” thinking that does not tend to support new ideas. The antagonism and mistrust that existed between companies and environmentalists deepen and the demand on funds from programs to restore abandoned mine sites skyrockets above revenues from existing mine operations. The mining companies respond by hunkering down and becoming even more closed and inward-looking. The only dialogue between the industry and the public, community organizations, and NGOs happens through the media as
accusations and charges of poor practices become increasingly common. Mines close temporarily to avoid the costs associated with permanent closure. Adverse economic impacts are widespread and highly public.

This scenario envisions the best scenario of the host communities after mines’ life. In comparison with the other mining projects in the country, the RTNMC and BNC did not receive any major criticism in terms of pollution and damages to life and the environment.

With a highly financed and well planned SDMP of both companies, which would stretch out until year 2034 in the case of RTNMC, and year 2017 for BNC, there is considerably enough time to strengthen and improve the collaborative governance in host communities in order to impact socio-economic upliftment for the individual families and the host communities in general. Stakeholders would realize that building confidence is essential for a revitalized and responsible mining.

Corollary to this, however, would be the realization that the lack of reliable information is a stumbling block to effective dialogue and mutual trust. During the MRFC Meeting of RTNMC and Coral Bay Nickel Mining Corporation (CBNC) on October 2008, the MRFC Chair, RD De Jesus emphasized the importance of inviting representatives from the municipality of Bataraza and from the barangays during the development planning of the companies’ SDMP. He further emphasized that their involvement would help in synchronizing with the development plans of the municipality and the impact barangays. At this point, it can be gleaned that the MRFC has recognized the importance of participation and collaboration in development planning and implementation as far as the mining governance is concerned.

Each company has a well-developed 5-Year Decommissioning Plan which would be implemented before the mine ceases to operate. The presence of a good road network, complete facilities and infrastructure projects, continuous and progressive rehabilitation of mined-out areas, the mine sites would likely be best suited for an economic zone. Moreover, Bataraza is a gateway in the southern part of the province to Malaysia, and the provinces of Sulu, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi of Mindanao.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON INSTITUTIONALIZING COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN MINING

Collaborative governance of mining in Palawan was seen only through the creation of a Multipartite Monitoring Teams (MMTs) as prescribed by RA 7942 whose responsibility is periodic monitoring of mining activities- extraction, environmental enhancement program and social development programs’ implementation. Through the MMTs, intergovernmental and stakeholders’ collaboration is very limited and periodic. The true essence of collaborative governance as espoused by theorists were not found in actual practice in mining projects.

No exceedances or habitat fragmentation; speed soil erosion and transportation; water source reservoir depletion; mercurial and cyanide water contamination were found based on reports and documents analysis. Validations were made in river banks. Mined areas were found to be in good speed of reforestation of various forest tree species.

Very limited confidence in institutional transparency and bureaucratic matters, neither in economic performing. However, the mining companies showed good performance in delivery of social services such as education, housing, water system, electricity, livelihood, service roads and bridges. Sustainability indicators were identified in two mining communities: collaborative governance: harmonious relationship of mining stakeholders, compliant of proper implementation of mining and environmental laws, increased participation of community in decision-making process, there is a sense of community ownership of development projects, harmonious relationship of mining stakeholders, transparency of the company in its operation in some aspects, strong linkages by the company, at barangay and municipal governments, Community Assistance Program, zero violation of mining and environmental laws, absence of severe protest or opposition to mining, regular assembly meetings, regular public consultations especially in gaining approval of projects to the community, rights of host communities are respected and recognized, maintained balance social relationship by and with the company and the host community, local labor and skills recognized and given priority, mutual understanding of stakeholders role in mining operation, strong linkages with other NGOs, GOs, NGOs, and Pos in the community; socio-economic: provided jobs to IPs,
new businesses are opened, high standard of living of those at the middle level of management of the mining companies, secured employment, various privileges are enjoyed by the communities, economic and job security, good peace and order situation which enhanced economic activities, health and safety of the community is secured, improvement of infrastructure support services, increased literacy rate, mortality and morbidity incidence decreased, increased tax revenue collection, improved health facilities, improved school facilities, and availability of livelihood financial assistance; ecological: reforestation (open to the community), Community monitoring system, progressive nursery development, enhanced/increased forest cover, air and water quality within standard, ecological balance maintained, absence of mercurial and cyanide water contamination, Minimal exceeding habitat fragmentation, low soil erosion and transportation, no water source reservoir depletion, reforestation (open to the community), activities within the standards set by the regulatory agency, rehabilitation of mined areas, converting it to other sustainable project and other land use suited to the environment, enhanced forest cover, continuous tree planting activities, air and water quality maintained within standard, siltation measures installed, ecological balance maintained; no exceedances of mercurial and cyanide water contamination, and no water source reservoir depletion.

Collaboration for environmental governance is a multi-faceted concept and practice. It rests on the reality that the benefits of environmental governance are non-exclusionary, and therefore the responsibility to manage common property resources – such as the environment - should be undertaken by various sectors, not just by the government. As a common pool resource and a public good, however, the government has the primary responsibility to safeguard these resources and to ensure the genuine participation among sectors in the management of these resources. This is especially important among those that rely on such resources for their livelihood.

At the heart of effective governance is people’s participation that reflects the sense of ownership, and to some extent, the sustainability of efforts. In many cases, stakeholders who have much to gain in resource management are often those who neither have the power nor the influence to make decisions. This can be a factor of several socio-economic and political environment within which participation happens.

For instance, the economic condition of communities and partners determine, to a large extent, their capacity to participate. In cases where communities are economically better off, they would be able to devote more time to participate in civic activities such as environmental management.

In looking at collaboration therefore, one must be conscious of the broader framework within which it operates. In many cases, the process of collaboration in environmental governance is much more difficult than any forms of collaboration as the benefits of environmental governance may only become tangible in the long run. Considering the number of stakeholders and their intricacies, environmental governance is so broad and complex that no single approach can resolve issues. The stakes and risks are high and transcend borders, political divisions, and cultural beliefs.

Several factors come into play that determine the effectiveness of collaboration on environmental management and sustainable development as exposed by the study. These include:

- Broader policy framework that supports the process of collaboration, and legitimizes the protection of resources either through a legislation and/or a national policy;
- A set of clear action plan and strategy that provides direction with which to concretize legislation or national policy;
- Institutional arrangement that would facilitate collaboration, a set of clear roles and responsibilities among various actors, in the case of environmental management, an inter-agency, multisectoral arrangement would be necessary, coupled with scientific and technical support which might be coming from the academe or research institutions;
- An effective information and public awareness that provides accurate and timely information between and among partners, including the results of the collaboration;
- Capacity development that continually improves the process of partnership by strengthening individual and institutional capacity to participate, or improve the condition within which participation happens; and
• Public-private partnership that allows the involvement of the private sector, especially in cases where they exploit the resources themselves.

In examining these, it is important to provide the context with which collaboration and environmental governance, specifically on mining, is crucial, hence a model for effective collaborative governance in mining is being recommended by the study as shown in Figure 4.

**TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN MINING**

The study has provided an opportunity to understand the importance of the need for policy reforms and governance measures in the successful implementation of the mineral industry in the province of Palawan.

The implementation of multi-stakeholdership as a form of collaboration and stakeholders participation in monitoring the activities of mining as introduced by the Revitalized Mining Act of 1995 is a great challenge in the mineral industry. The policy reform is envisioned to be responsible in bringing down to reality and action the true essence of responsible and sustainable development in the mining host communities through increased pluralism, participation, and collaboration of the mining stakeholders.

However, this multi-stakeholdership as represented in the study by the MMTs as a form of collaboration in monitoring the EPEP and SDMP of the mining companies in the province of Palawan has not gone far enough to bring to the ground the true essence of engagement among the stakeholders. It failed to serve as a tool in bringing stakeholders together for a clear objectives and outcomes beyond what the laws provide. It is a mere compliance to the law but never metamorphosed as a convenor of genuine collaboration and engagement among stakeholders of mining.

The study suggests a collaborative process model for mining governance towards attaining the best scenario in the mining host communities as its contribution to present-day governance perspective, based from the findings.

Gray (2005) defines collaboration as: “(1) the pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources (such as information, money, labor, etc.), (2) by two or more stakeholders, (3) to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.”

An underpinning concept of collaboration is the domain, which can be thought of as the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organizations) that become joined by a common problem of interest. The study revealed that there are four major actors in mining in Palawan, namely: the government organizations/agencies such as the DENR-MGB, PCSD, and the LGUs; the NGOs such as the Haribon Palawan; the IPs such as the Tagbanuas and Pa'wan of Bataraza and Quezon, Palawan; and the Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation and Berong Nickel Corporation as the mining companies.

**THE MODEL FOR COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN MINING**

This Collaborative Governance Model proposes that by improving the quality of the decision-making process, collaboration reduces the risks of dispute and implementation failure in the policy circle. Attempts at collaborative problem solving may involve several repetitions of this cycle and the length of time devoted to each phase will vary from case to case.

In the model, **CONTEXT** is the expanded Utopian (best) Scenario wherein the host communities would reach and experience a strong economic condition and a high level of trust and respect among stakeholders of mining. For the key players to gain legitimacy and support, super-ordinate goals must reflect the desires and aspirations of the collaborating organizations, be feasible, and also must be deemed worthwhile by society at large. In practice, the establishment of long-term goals and actions is unlikely to be straightforward due to different understandings, values, attitudes, and aspirations among the collaborating organizations in the policy arena. Structures and procedures must be created or strengthened (for those existing structures), or totally removed (non-functional structures) to guide subsequent collective action. Failure to develop adequate structural arrangements for the inter-organizational environment has
major implications, since the stakeholders or collaborators will not be able to move forward in the desired direction.

**Scope, directions, and Outcomes:** Watson (2004) argues that collaboration should not be viewed as an end in itself, “By working through the first three steps of collaboration, organizations should be able to develop joint policies, programs and projects (outputs) designed to produce outcomes, which are consistent with established long-term goals and desired end. Failure to generate outputs or to achieve positive outcomes is likely to undermine the commitment of participants to the collaborative arrangement.”

The *civic community* in the framework represents the basic human dimensions that relate to the success or failure of collaborative processes. The literature suggests six aspects of civic community: human capital, social capital, trust, political efficacy, collective action beliefs and legitimacy. Among them, trust was identified as the most important for collaborative action to succeed. Collaborative processes that give members a sense of fair treatment can create a considerable trust and a new social and human capital. With respect to *legitimacy*, Lubell, et.al (2007) argue that it must be understood as a twofold normative requirement, expressed by procedural criteria (based on fundamental value of autonomy and hold that those bound by mining policy must have a voice in formulating it) and substantive criteria (based on fundamental values of welfare and justice and hold that mining policy outcomes must improve the conditions of life for mining stakeholders and the costs and benefits must be distributed fairly).

To illustrate the model, there are eight main components as shown in figure 4.

![Figure 4: Model for Collaborative Governance in Mining](image-url)
and venues, the civic culture, the legal system, the existing mining policy or laws, and the performance of the mining companies. The context is highly influenced by the process structure: the GOs, NGOs, MCs, IPs, host communities, civic community, and by legitimacy. The background of the process structure is hinged on a strong and productive collaborative process or continuous dialogues by and among the stakeholders.

Continuous dialogues compromise the foremost collaborative governance mechanisms proposed by the study and reflected throughout the model. Apparently, stakeholders are not involved in the planning of mining activities. Mining companies call for community assemblies only when they require support either for their operation or expansion. There is no regularity in the information drive or interfacing with the community and stakeholders. In reference to the framework of the study particularly in the collaborative governance process, continuous dialogues could either be formal and informal thus blurring the line as to the specific form of dialogue. It could be a quarterly Town Hall Assembly in which stakeholders will report to the people their sector’s achievements and plans. Mining companies could also take advantage of organizations or affiliations for practicality to which most community members belong such as the Parent-Teacher Associations, tribal association, and religious organizations.

For instance, members of the mining company’s Community Relations Office may communicate with the imam or priest to set aside a portion of their time of worship for announcement purposes or distribute newsletters to the members of these organizations. Collateral activities such as medical missions, sports, and tribal festivals can also be a means of informing or consulting the public.

Figures derived from these reportorial activities could serve as benchmarks for planning and monitoring purposes. The bottom line is that proactive efforts must be exerted in reaching out to the public instead of just working in the confines of their EPEP and SDMP.

According to the framework, building collaborative governance for mining in Palawan should begin by understanding the scope, directions, and outcomes of mining at the perspective of each collaborative actors, a perception or awareness that a new approach to reach the best scenario (high economy, high civic capacity) of the context is necessary. This step establishes the basis for compatibility and complementarity of the stakeholders by closely examining the objectives, motivations, scope of participation, and characteristics of each. It will also draw the level of accountability and responsibility of each stakeholder. Literature suggests that actors must understand not only the values, goals, and constraints of the actor itself, but also the values, goals, and constraints of the other actors. If this perception is shared by the actors, then a participative or collaborative process will start. If the perception is easily shared with the broader public, the initiative will gain legitimacy. Once the scope of each institutional structure is established, the next step is to set the direction and perceived outcomes of each actor, and finding the common ones to all actors which would serve as the overall direction of the collaborative effort.

A collaborative effort needs to have a direction, an overall goal that is shared by all the participants or the stakeholders of mining. For example, the GOs, such as the DENR-MGB, PCSD, LGUs, and NCIP would set their directions and outcomes based on their mandates and regulatory frameworks-RAs 7942, 7611, 7160, and 8371, respectively. The LGUs should extend extra effort to find complementarity of directions with the MCs’ EPEP, SDMP, and Decommissioning Plans by institutionalizing the Municipal Planning and Development Councils (MPDCs). On the other hand, the IPs will revolve around its right of Free Prior and Informed Consent, the Mining Companies will set its direction within its mandate of institutionalizing the EPEP, SDMP, and the Decommissioning Plans, while the host communities will continue to set directions towards attaining a high economy and civic community, as the best scenario envisioned to reach by the collaborative effort.

The civic community, which represents the basic human dimensions related to the success or failure of collaborative processes (Lubell, et.al 2005), is influenced by the collaboration structure. Both structure and civic community influence the context and are influenced by it and also feedback to the structure. The results indicate the process effectiveness. The results are outputs and outcomes aligned with previously defined goals. They may change the context and bring new stakeholders to the table. Results, therefore, are necessary for collaboration survival.
REFERENCES


Agency Documents


__________n. d.a.Meeting the Challenges: Mining the Community and the Environment.


__________n.d.a.CAR Mining Companies, Cordillera Administrative Region, 1950-Present.


Philippine Laws

Republic Act No. 7942 or the Mining Act of 1995 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
Republic Act No. 7160 or the 1991 Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations

Republic Act 7611 or the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) of Palawan and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
THEME THREE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE LEGAL POLITICS OF FINANCE IN INDONESIA

Ujang Bahar
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Padjadjaran University, Bandung, Indonesia
Ujang_Bahar@yahoo.co.id

ABSTRACT

The legal politics of state finance as reflected in APBN (National Budget) is intended to implement development in order to realize people prosperity as mandated in paragraph IV of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia.

In practice, Indonesia embraces a deficit model, that is, a model that allows national expenditures/outlays that are more than national income. The deficits are covered by any of three options, namely, privatization of state owned corporations (BUMNs), foreign loans, and Issuance of State Obligation/Promissory Note (SUN). In the era of current government (reformation era), the government prefers the last option.

Obligation is really a contractual agreement (verbintenis), or a written evidence of a loan/promissory note that is tradable, or an evidence of being co-investor in a loan issued by either Government or private corporation, at a floating or fixed interest rate that can produce a gain or incurs a loss for the issuer (government).

Therefore, there occurs a shift in the function of APBN from being a political instrument of prospering people to be an instrument of government’s business. From year to year, the number of state obligations the government issued has been steadily larger in value that of course increases the burden of APBN. Based on the data from Ministry of Finance, total state promissory notes per December 2010 was Rp 1,676 trillion (US$ 186.43 trillion?), consisting of promissory notes of US$ 118.39 trillion?? and loan of US$ 68.04 trillion?. From the numbers, Rp 674.91 trillion is tradable. In 2011, Government intends to add SUN by Rp 200 trillion. Therefore, Government should be careful in managing it so that Indonesia would not fall into bankruptcy.

Keywords: People Prosperity, Legal Politics of Finance, Budget Deficit, State Obligation

INTRODUCTION

From before until present days, the government has been having willingness and commitment to exercise a development. Because Republic of Indonesia holds a welfare state concept based by the law, as it is promulgated within the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, namely, to move public welfare forward, to develop nation’s mind and to take participation for world order on independence, never-lasting peace and social justice basis.1

The Article 1 (1) of the 1945 Constitution in relation with Article 1 (3) of the 1945 Constitution, it is said that Republic of Indonesia is a state of law; within performance of state administration in all aspects must be, therefore, based on the law, it is not only based on absolute power. In a State of law, a country provides legal position as the basis for State power and its power performance in all respects must also be based on the law.2

Syachran Basah stated that, “Indonesia as a State of law is a welfare country founded on the Philosophy of Pancasila, both as State foundation or sources from all legal sources with rejection of

---

1 See the Preamble of the Constitution of 1945.
absolutism in its all aspects. Furthermore, it is also said that “Within a State of law concept with Philosophy of Pancasila, legal and people sovereignty pillars that express a harmonically integral relationships based by a constructive monoduality principle. That such integralistic relationship becomes the primary authority sources for formation of regulations. The sovereignty pillar of law contains understanding that supreme powers are laid down in the law, otherwise peoples sovereignty contains understanding that such sovereignty is executed by peoples in accordance with the constitution”.

The sovereignty state of law or it is often called as the material state of law or welfare state is a state where its government is not only responsible for peoples order and peaceful maintenance, but it is responsible for peoples welfare and there is no one of peoples life aspect is separated from governmental intervention (from the cradle to the grave). Therefore, relations between state and law results in State dependence on the law in one hand and it also generates the law dependence on the State in another hand. Thus, importance of law in the State development would actually be realized through two primary aspects:

“In the beginning step, the law will arrange State life and lay down judicial basis for national development planning and implementation, among of them is economic development. Its succeeding step is the law creation and its enforcement. A low creates some possible conditions for implementing of development and to assure its outcomes”.

The welfare state doctrine is a concrete formation from transfer of Staatsonthouding principle which expect that State and governmental roles are actively engaged within peoples economic and social life as the primary step to create public welfare in addition to keep orders and security.

The emergence of the welfare State doctrine is a further development from a State doctrine which lay down its functions only as the order keeper. In this law State concept as it is also called as the formal State of law, the role of State is very limited. The government is not permitted to intervene within citizenship affairs, both in social and economic aspects. The state involvement in regulating of order and security or peoples social and economic aspects are not separated from State’s function. There are many authors or experts whom define a State function, they are Adam Smith, Friedman, and L.A. Geelhoed. According to Adam Smith, a State function includes to maintain security and order in respect with authority limits established by such State itself, collectivity (security and order), justice enforcement and public infrastructural development.

Adam Smith argued in accordance with natural freedom system, the holder of power has only three basic obligations:

1. The holder of power has liability to protect community from violence and invasion acts created by others independent community.
2. The holder of power has liability to protect each community members from unjust and oppressive treatment executed by other members in community.
3. The holder of power has liability to provide for public medium and infrastructures as if they could not be provided, developed, or maintained by community themselves.

According to Friedman, a State function consist of provider, regulator, entrepreneur, and empire functions. A state established by its peoples is based on social treaty and provided with by peoples to act for protection of peoples interest whom had formerly engaged in social treaty, it does only not have authority, but

---

3 Syachran Basah, State Science, Citra Bakti, Bandung, 1992, p. 3.
5 R. Ibrahim, Prospect State-Owned Enterprises and the Public Interest, Citra Aditya Bakti, Bandung, 1997, p. 10
7 Machfud MD, Democracy And The Constitution In Indonesia, Rineka Cipta, Jakarta, 2000, p. 29
10 Guntur Hamzah, p. 293
it has also liability to participate in creating of balance and harmony in justice achievement for executing treaty party interests. In that modern welfare State concept has been, however, appeared some criticism in it, especially relating to appearance of juridification quantity symptoms, namely, to speed up some legislation growth. In addition, there is ideas emergence about how far the State envolvement in regulating of community life is. There are two opinions. The first opinion is that government must limit its engagement in regulating of community life. Its basic reason is that, whatever the powers held by State and having governmental bodies, it will not capable to govern all matters. Furthermore, a community will basically be happy as if the government itself limits its intervention by providing a larger autonomy for peoples in developing their creativity for themselves progress and welfare. The second opinion stated that government must have ability as large to regulate community life aspects as possible, because it is only with this way regularity, order, security, and progress could be reached and maintained.

All of the State activities in governing people life and make them more welfare are reflected in the National Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN). However, it is commonly said with term the “National Budget”. The National Budget is a translation from the “Budget” This budgetary terminology was firstly used in relation with state in the eighteenth century England’s Low Council as outcomes from The Glorious Revolution (1688). The Number 1 Act of 2004 about the State Treasury determines a limitation of the National Revenue and Expenditure Budget and it is furthermore called as the National Budget is a state administration yearly financial plan approved by the House of Representative.

Furthermore, in order to understand what it is a budget and its function, thus it must be reminded again about definition of budget stated by some experts or authors. Firstly, M. Subagio argues that “Budget is a required plan for financing all activities, and it is also true for demanded costs in exercising of administration activity accompanied by amount of revenue estimation that could be collected and used to finance such expenditures.” Second, Arifin P. Soeria Atmadja stated that a “National Budget means total expenditure estimation or calculation that would be expended by the State.”

Furthermore, if the APBN is seen from its function aspect, thus we will meet with a definition that, such APBN always reflects a Staatsrechtelijke function. What is meant with the Staatsrechtelijke functie is concluded by the reaview committee of the Dutch Treasury Act chaired by Prof. Dr. D. Simons as followings:

“Elk begrotingshoofdstuk wordt afzonderlijke wet vastgesteld. De wetsontwerpen zijn voor de regeering middel tot de verkrijging van de autorisatie van de volksvertegen woording om uit gave tot bepaalde te doen, daardoor soms ook om maatregelen te treffen welke uitgaven en nemen. De keuze van de afwezen van belangen, het besiisen hoeveel geld menvoor verschillende activiteiten wel bestede wordt door de regering verricht bij het indienen van dewetsontwerpen. De saten Generaal verrichten de keuze functie door amendering en aanvaarding of verwerping van deze ontwerpen. Het varlenen van autoritatie is het primaire doel van de begrooting.”

In the New Order Government (The President Soeharto era), the practiced National Budget by government was well known by balanced and dynamic budget terminology. Where its revenue side equals with its expenditure side and it continuously increase in quantity aspect from year to year. However, such budget is actually a deficit budget because its expenditure side is larger than revenue side. Its Deficit is funded or closed through foreign loan.

The government’s financial (budgetary) politic in the new order era was started with the First Five Years Development (Pelita I) Plan in 1 April 1969, and up to present time, it is utilized foreign loan and grant

---

11 Gunther Teubner, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, W. De G. Berlin, 1986, p. 4
12 Bohari, the State Budget Law, Rajagrafindo Persada, Jakarta, 1995, p. 13
16 The budget deficit is a budget policy that allows pegelan / state expenditures greater than revenues within certain limits set by law.
fund for financing of productive development projects and they have not fully capable be funded from the
government saving. The roles of such foreign loans and grants have importance as one of financing sources in
covering of budgetary deficit, especially for development fund sources.

Since the reform era was, however, started with the 1997 monetary crisis, the Government itself
began to understand dependence on the foreign loans and grant may cause Indonesia to be trapped in the
lengthening crisis. In addition to difficulties in obtaining of loan sources, its long procedures, and its
requirements are often related with political issues, thus Indonesia may freely not operate to implement its
active foreign political roles as a sovereign State. The Republic of Indonesia is always under pressure of the
donor institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Hence in the reform era was,
consequently, the Government took a policy to cover budgetary deficit from Privatization of the BUMN
(State-owned corporations) and State Bond issuing, or it is usually called as the Letter of State Bond (SUN).
Further attention is closely paid on the State Bond. Meanwhile, Foreign Loan is only a complementary one.17

Based on the description above, there are two problems discussed in this paper are:

1. How is the Role of State Bond in National Budget (APBN)?
2. What’s the role is not contrary to Legal politic of finance referred to in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution?

OVERVIEW OF STATE BONDS (GOVERNMENT BONS)

A state in doing its activities, both in administration operation or perform diplomatic relation with other
countries, it must hold a sovereign State status. Consequently, all of its actions could be recognized and
legally accountable. The Article 1 (1) of the 1945 Constitution proclaims that State of Indonesia is a unity
State with republic formation. Such provision in addition to emphasize form of State, it also implies an
emerging implication with unity State and republic administration formats. According to Jimly Ashhiddigie,
this definition illustrates that Indonesia’s founding fathers deeply emphasized the importance of unity State
conception as a truly definition of the State of Indonesia (True Nature of State of Indonesia).18

The emergence of the State of Indonesia doctrine is the succeeding development from doctrine of
State which lay only down its function as an order keeper. In this State of law concept, it is also known with
formal legal State, where role of the State is very limited. The government is prohibited to intervene in
citizenship affairs, both in social and economic issues.19 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja argues that, “As a state
which is perceiving changes or taking a development process toward prosperity for its ideal
realizations, so role of the law in development would be to assure such changes would regularly take places. Both such
changes and order constitute a developing community’s twin destinations, so that, the law itself becomes
unavoidable medium in the development process.20 Consequently, the law holds very important role for such
development process or not at all. Next Mochtar Kusumaatmadja stated that:

The law is a means of renewal of society based on the assumption that the regularity or orderliness
in business development or reform it is a desirable or even viewed (absolutely) necessary. Another
assumption contained in the conception of law as a means of development is that the law in the
sense of rules or laws can indeed serve as a tool (regulator) or a means of channeling the direction
of development in terms of human activity towards desired by the construction or renewal. Both
these functions were expected to do by law in addition to the traditional functions that guarantee the
certainty of the order.21

18 Jimly Ashhiddigie, Indonesia Kontitusi And Constitutionalism In my Home, Study Center HTN, FHUI, Jakarta, 2002, p. 92
19 Machfud MD, Op Cit, p. 29.
21 Ibid, p. 88

121
As was stated in advance, efforts to achieve a just and prosperous society as a form of state welfare adopted by Indonesia, is reflected in practice the implementation of the State Budget. Until now, Indonesia adopts deficit. The deficit is covered by various means, among other things that are popular and are suitable (Suitable) with the present era is by way of issuance of State Bonds ([Government Bonds]).

The word “Obligation” was actually came from Dutch “Obligatie” or “Verplichting” or “Obligaat” that means an unleaveable obligation, or letter of State/Local/Company obligation with fixed interest rate to its holder.\(^2\) Therefore, obligation is a bonding agreement (verbintenis), or a loan written evidence as a letter of tradeable debt recognition, or evidence of participation as an Investor in a specific loan issued by the Government or private organization. Emmy Pangaribuan Sumanjuntak provide its definition as following “a letter of debt with duration is more than one year and specific interest rate would be paid by related organization to raise fund from community for company financing or by the government for its national budgetary requirement”.\(^2\) In addition, there is another wider term about obligation, Bond. A bond or debt definition can be found in Black’s Law Dictionary:

Bond is a certificate or evidence of a debt which the issuing company or governmental body promises to pay the bond holder a specified amount of interest for a specified length of time, and to repay the loan on the expiration date. In every case, a bond represent debt – its holder is creditor of the corporation and non a part owner as is the shareholder. Commonly, bonds are secured by a mortgage. A written obligation, made by owner of real property, to repay loan under specific term, usually accompanied by a mortgage placed on land as security. A deed whereby the obligor-obligees himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, to pay a certain sum of money to another at a day appointed.\(^2\)

Government Bond is similar with instrument or another securities that could be traded off in the securities exchange. Those securities traded in the securities exchange are generally differed into two types, namely, securities as ownership evidence (stock) and securities as debt evidence (bond). A bond is a form of debt recognition from organization or company. The bond itself contains a bonding agreement/contract for two parties between lender and borrower. A bond issuer wins a loan from bond holder with certain predetermined specifications, both concerning to debt expiration date, paid interest rate, sum of repayment and other additional specifications.\(^2\) Therefore, a bond treaty is a standard agreement. Because it is a debt securities, so its payment must be considered as a liability and consequently it must formerly be paid attention if compared with another securities.\(^2\) Meanwhile, Dyah Ratih Sulistyastuti argued that bond is a fixed income securities issued in relation with debt treaty on which it provides a routine income.\(^2\) Bond has a specific characteristic as another securities with fixed income characteristic, such as (1) securities that own legal forces, (2) have a specific periodic time or expiration date, (3) produce a periodical fixed income, and (4) have a specific nominal values. A bond nominal value is called par value, stated value, face value, or denomination value. Issuing of the bond as a securities with fixed income create its issuer liability to pay a specific percentages on specific period. The amount of paid percentages on specific period is based on its nominal value. Payment on amount of value that is based on its face value is generally called as coupon payment. This coupon payment is usually performed on annual or semi-annual basis, however it may also be paid on quarterly base depending on agreement, it may even be paid on monthly basis.

\(^{25}\) Mariam Darusbadrulzaman, the Bank Credit Agreement, Aditya Bakti, Bandung, 1993, p. 35. Standard agreement is an agreement whose contents have been prepared in advance. (Standard form of obligatie). Its contents are not discussed again with the applicant or purchaser. To the buyer only offered the choice whether to accept the clause set out in the form or not. For example a nominal amount, interest rate, and janagka time.
\(^{27}\) Dyah Ruth Sulistyastuti, Stocks And Bonds Tiori Summary and Problem Answer, Publisher Universits Atmajaya, Jogyakarta, 2002, p. 51-52
Determining of the coupon rate is always established on existing commercial interest rate. After such bond arrived on its maturity date, bond holder will receive its face value and one time of coupon payment. Based on its issuer, bond can be divided into:

1. Central Government Bonds (Government Bonds)
2. Local Government Bonds (Bonds Municipal) consisting of General Obligation Bonds and Revenue Bonds. General obligation bonds are municipal bonds whose source type of cash flow from tax revenues. While Revenue bonds are types of municipal bonds that pay coupons and principal of the projects financed.
3. Bonds Owned Enterprises (State Owned Company Bonds)
4. Private Corporate Bond (Corporate Bonds).

Definition of the Government Bond in according to Coyle is: “........negotiable long-term debt securities, issued by a government to raise a capital”.\(^{29}\) Meanwhile, according to Mikesell, “The bond is representing that debt is a long-term promise by the borrower (bond issuer) to the lender (bondholder) to pay the bond’s face amount (or par value) at a defined maturity date”.\(^ {30}\) Meanwhile, in the Number 24 Act of 2004 about the Government Bond, it is said that Government Bond is a security in form of the letter of debt recognition in rupiah currency or foreign currency in which its coupon and face value payment is guaranteed by Republic of Indonesia, in accordance with its effective period.

As other bond cases, the government bond according to its type of coupon can be devided into:

1. **Fixed Rate Bonds**, it is a bond with fixed coupon since it was issued up to its maturity date.
2. **Floating Rate Bond**, it is a bond with interest rate following the commercial interest rate.
3. **Mixed Rate Bond**, it is a bond with fixed coupon rate for a specific period, for example, one to three years and its interest rate will follow commercial interest rate after third year.

In addition to contrasting from its type of coupun, the Government Bond is also made difference as tradeable and non-tradeable bonds. After passing from its issuing process, the Government Bond is tradeable in primary, secondary, tertiary market (over counter market) or fourth market. A non-tradeable government bond is a bond as expression from governmental debt recognition to the Central Bank (Bank of Indonesia) in Recapitulation Bond shape (Letter of State Debt). For example, bridging fund replacement in the Bank of Indonesia’s Liquidity Aid (BLBI) that is granted to commercial banks in covering their liquidity problems when they are faced with the 1998-1999 monetary crisis.

**THE LEGAL POLITIC OF FINANCE (BUDGETARY) ON THE GOVERNMENT BOND IN INDONESIA**

As the sovereign country founded by the law, and perform the State administration laid down by constitution, thus Republic of Indonesia within its State financial management, especially its National Budget is yearly established by the Act. The National Budget reflects activities to be carried out by State for one year period forward.

The National Budget actually holds a very important role and function for the state survival. Consequently, it is established by the Act. Indeed, its Act has a specific character because it is only effective for one year budgetary period. As it is meant in the Article 23 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, the National Budget as an expression from state financial management is yearly established by the Act and openly implemented and have fully responsibility for people’s prosperity. It is different from other acts where their

---


effective period is more than one year and may indeed up to tens of year or decades. Provisions in this Article 23 (1) contains the House of Representative’s *begroeting* rights. The way to develop a National Budget is a measure for the State Governmental character. In the fascism country, its budget is only determined by the Government. However, this national budget is established by the law in a democratic or people’s sovereignty country, it means by the House of Representative approval.31

The legal foundation for bond issuing can’t be met within the Civil Code, however, because this obligation or bond is a human conduct with its civil character, therefore we can indirectly use its legal foundation on the Article 1233 of Civil Code where it is said that every contract is made in accordance with approval and regulations, too. Furthermore, in the Article 1234 of the same code, it is said that each contract is to provide for anything, to do something, or not to do anything. From those two articles could be found a conduct element for bond issuing and it is then bought by other party, meaning as approval to provide for and do something that results in a contract. In one hand, it will create a liability (debtor) and hold a right (creditor) on other hand. In the following step, if is looked for legal foundation for bond (securities) issuing can be applied Article 1756 where it is stated that an occurred Debt as consequence from borrowing of money consists only a sum of money stated in such approval. If it is, before its repayment, took place increasing or decreasing prices or changes about currency validity, thus such borrowed money repayment must be made in currency in repayment time, where it is calculated according to currently effective prices. In bond cases, issuer holds position as debtor on amount of money stated in such bond. For government bond case, its legal basis is the Number 24 Act of 2002 About Letter of Government Bond Juncto with the Number 83/KMK.01/2003 Decree of Financial Minister of March 4th in 2003 About Government Bond auction in the initial public offering, and this decree has been modified with Number 36/PMK.06/2006 Decree of Financial Minister in which it is assigned Bank of Indonesia (Central Bank) as its executor. This assignment is followed up by Bank of Indonesia with issue of the Number 5/4/PBI/2003 Bank of Indonesia Regulation on March 21st in 2003 about Issue, Trade and Purchase as well as Administration of the Government Bond.

As it has also been understood that, money utilization objectives from Government Bond trading is to finance development and to cover former National Budget deficit as consequence from monetary crisis that in turn reduces economic growth and high unemployment rate.

This condition encourages the government to exercise its function as stabilizer, namely, to keep maintenance of high employment opportunity rate, appropriate stability and economic growth level by considering its all consequences on trade and balance of payment.32 Instruments for used policy for stabilizing consists two types, they are *monetary instrument* and *fiscal instrument*.33 These two instrumental interaction is very important. The monetary instrument pays more attention on importance of total money limitation circuled by Bank of Indonesia (Central Bank) and it is fitted with economic demand, both for short-time stability interest or long-term economic growth. Meanwhile, the fiscal instrument focuses on the National Budget aspect. The government expenditure addition in National Budget will be expansive in character with increasing demand in governmental sector. Furthermore, this circumstance develop on private sector. This Government expenditure could be fulfilled by taking a loan (deficit in budget). As this policy is accompanied by relax monetary policy, this deficit financing effect will create a larger expantionary impact, because this deficit may be covered by loan addition. However, if it is made a strict money circulation, thus loan addition will rise interest rate up, so it also tends to slow down market transaction.

Loan can be divided into two types, namely, external and internal loans.34 An external loan is a governmental borrowing from abroad. In 1980s, there are many country whom perceive economic difficulties after they raised a substantial loan from abroad. Those countries are forced to make more exports than their imports for producing a trading surplus with aims to repay their external loan, namely, to pay interest and instalments on former loans. Meanwhile, internal loan obtained by country from their community. There are arguments said that such internal loan does not result in burdens, because we borrow for our interest.

31 See Explanation of Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution.
33 Ibid, p. 13
34 P.A. Samuelson & W.D. Nordhaus, op cit, p. 359.
The choice in selecting of those external and internal loans have some specific considerations. Nonperformance in repayment of external loan becomes primary considerations in determining such choices to select domestic loan. Consequently, there are many developing countries remove their foreign to domestic loans in 1990s. Nearly all developing countries divides their loans into domestic loan, so this loan portion has nearly reached 70% from total committed loan. Another reason is that minimal cost and risk on economy as primary reason in loan selection that would be committed one. Furthermore, it is recognized that domestic loan could be executed by new money printing by central bank or increases loan commitment from domestic banking systems. The cost for making a loan could be thereby eliminated or even no cost at all, however it can actually result in a macroeconomic risk. An excessive financing through money printing can totally also improve excessive demand that will in turn increase inflation rate. A domestic loan from banking world and other private sectors imply a good-developed banking intermediate system. The domestic loan can reside inflationary pressure or risks from foreign borrowing crisis.

However, a highly active domestic loan (Government Bond) can also result in a crowding out effect in private sectors because a reduction in investment on private sectors and consequently resists economic growth rate.

THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT LOAN TRANSACTION AS SOURCES FOR GOVERNMENT FINANCING

Emission and Trading Procedures
A bond issues and trade is in principle similar with signing of credit agreement, because both bond issues and credit agreement has a corresponding objective as a medium for rapid fund raising to finance an investment or expansion needed for development projects. The essence of bond is a letter of loan recognition to its owner or bond holder issued by the borrowing party. The bond issuing party states or admits that related party has a loan to bond holder, and said his or her capability for repayment of all total face values and interests as it is enclosed in such letter of bond recognition.

For having rights to do emission (government bond issuing and trading) in securities exchange market, it must be passed through some standardized procedures, namely, issuing of bond must firstly based on the Presidential Degree as chief of executive. In the following step, the potential issuer (Ministry of Financial Affairs) submits a letter of intent to the Securities Exchange Supervisory Agency – Financial Institutes (BAPEPAM-LK) about its intent to issue and trade such bond through securities exchange market. If the BAPEPAM provides an approval for this emission plan, the Ministry of Financial Affairs then immediately assigns some supportive institutes and profession in the securities exchange market, such as underwriter, trustee, guarantor, certified public account, and law firm. The assignment of these supportive institutes and professions could make by direct assignment or offerings. A direct assignment would be implemented if such issuer has already had a close employment relationship and depthly recognized reputation and ability of these supportive institutes or professions. Meanwhile, offering method is usually performed by asking those offering participants proposes their offerings, and issuer then selects and determine its choice on institutes and professions providing their best and cheapest returns. Furthermore, such supportive institutes and professions that has been assigned to start their job in accordance with a specific agreement (for example, Guaranting of Emission agreement, trusting agreement, coverage agreement) that would govern individual duty and responsibility in relation with the Government Bond issuing plan. Among those supportive institutes and professions must coordinatively work each other in supporting of the bond issuing and trading execution, however they are individually responsible for their respective assignment field. Activities for bond paper printing, prospectus production, preparing of financial statement and other technical activities take place in this step.

---

After passing through this step, further step is then the underwriter duty to submit a statement for registration of bond emission to the BAPEPAM-LK enclosed by some supportive documents such as Prospectus Design, Agreement Certificate between Underwriter and Issuer and others. After reviewing and examining those documents by the BAPEPAM-LK and stated meets terms and conditions, the BAPEPAM-LK furthermore perform a final hearing with all related supportive institutes and professions in planning of bond issues. From this final hearing outcomes, the BAPEPAM-LK in behalf of the Minister of Financial Affairs produce letter of emission license. After that time, related bond is ready for trading in the initial offering market.

The initial offering market or primary market is an activities for the Government Bond offering and trading in its first introduction. Or the new Government Bond trading is issued by the government. The offered price in this initial offering market is its nominal price. Meanwhile, its potential buyers and buyers are not limited. Every individual, Indonesian citizens or foreigners, Indonesian legal entity or foreign legal entity, and wherever their domiciles in Indonesia or abroad are, naturally, not become problems because all transaction in the securities exchange market would be conducted by computerized system in accordance with the technological advance. Such sophisticated technological utilization results in transactions in minutes counting and it is therefore perceived its contribution for improvement human prosperity, development and civilization.

The Government Bond trading mechanism in its initial offering market is as following: Firstly, the government bond is offered by the Underwriter in collaboration with Selling Agent. They disseminate prospectus, serve ordering, distribute ordering form, perform allocation and returning of ordering money to ordering parties or potential buyers if those ordered bond is sufficient large or fits with transferred fund. The succeeding step is that ordering parties or potential investors return ordering form back after filling to Underwriter or Selling Agency directly in places where they firstly got those forms. Furthermore, underwriter or Selling Agent whom receive such orders will return them again to ordering parties, and copy of ordering form which had been signed as evidence or invoice for related bond orders. However, such invoice is not an assurance that such orders would be fulfilled. The following step is that Issuer (Ministry of Financial Affairs) in cooperation with the Underwriter will make bond allocation. In there are excessive orders, thus it is usually decided to make even distribution by reducing of the ordering portions coming from related parties whom make more one orders. Parties whom propose more than one order would be assumed as one order. In order that even distribution may be reached, thus ordering parties in small quantity must be provided a priority treatment. However, this will not apply for the ORI 001 Retail Government Bond where from total indicative offered ORI as large Rp. 2 trillions has occurred an oversubscribe to become nearly Rp. 4 trillions. The government remains to accept all orders. After information was obtained about bond allocation, thus potential investors must immediately make their payment by cash, or check or clearing account, or other mediums, both in rupiah or foreign currency pursuant to enclosed specifications in prospectus. Such payment must be made through the Underwriter or Selling Agent with transfer of order evidence. When such payment occurred, ordering parties directly receive their letter of bond in accordance with its total purchase and coupon for interest. If money for bond purchase has been delivered in ordering time and allocation does not meet plafond, thus money returning must mutually performed with bond delivery. For the Republic of Indonesia Bond, its selling money in settlement time within its initial offering market sold by Underwriter would be transferred to the Government Account in Bank of Indonesia in behalf of Minister of Financial Affairs cq. Its General Director of Trustee, and credited as Governmental Revenue for financing its expenditure in the National Budget.

In the following step, trading for Letter of Government Bond would be executed through secondary market after their listing made by Underwriter with payment of listing fee at Securities Exchange Market.

The secondary market is a place for bond trading conducted by after initial offering market was closed.\textsuperscript{41} Transaction system in the secondary market is firstly conducted by call system. Throughout this system, brokers are contesting to raise their hands up while calling their offered exchange rates. Securities exchange market’s officer see and record those exchange rates and they also record codes of those brokers individually. A transaction takes place when an agreement is reached concerning on offered rates and then bought. This system has been lefted behind because it is assumed not efficient anymore.

Starting in year 1980 to 1995, The Indonesian Securities Market made a continuous trading system into effective. In this system, brokers write exchange rate down for trusteeship they received in each available Slip Order, and they deliver forward it to market officers. That related officer will then write down in accepted exchange rate and broker’s code in blackboard. If transaction truly occurs, thus trading is continued again and it will continuously take place like this.

Since 1995, the Jakarta Securities Market has introduced a securities trading system by a computerized operating mechanism called as the JATS (Jakarta Automated Trading System). In this system, it has been included system for transaction settlement, centred depository system and broker accounting system. These three system are supported by supervision system, membership system, recording system and data and statistic processing system where they all are processed through a computer system. However, this system has some disadvantages because it is very susceptible to insider trading occurrence (dissemination of information without rights in relation with insider information). For this reason, sanctions for actors must be made in harmony with sanctions established in the Bill about Electronic Information and Transaction (EIT).\textsuperscript{42}

The trading transaction for Government Bond in secondary market is a transaction with investment and speculative character, investors in addition to making their investment, there are also available some certain parties make use this Securities Market as gambling business with Capital Gain expectation (a rise in security nominal value).

The bond supply and sales in generally, and government bond in particularly, beside it can be performed in domestic, it can also transactioned in abroad. For example, in New York Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange or London Stock Exchange. Bond offered in abroad has actually two primary goals, firstly, to facilitate ways for getting of intended currency denomination and to create a short transactional distance between investors and issuer. For example, the Government of Indonesia issues Government Bond in Yen denomination about Yen 1 trillion. Therefore, to facilitate Yen acquisition, such bond is sold out by Tokyo Stock Exchange. Therefore, potential Japanese investors can directly obtain it and he or she is not necessary come to Jakarta. The Government of Indonesia can collect Yen currency in short period to cover its National Budget for development finance.

Overseas bond offering essentially be divided into two tranches offer Dual and Multi jurisdictional offer. Dual tranche offer is a bond offering in addition be performed in domestic market, it is also executed in one foreign market. Meanwhile, a multi jurisdictional offer is a bond offering in domestic market and it is also offered in some foreign market. Some constraints faced by the Government (Issuer) to make such foreign offering is its substantial expense imposed to hold supportive professional fees that would work in realizing that transaction. Additionally, every countries have different offering mechanisms and legal provisions so that, in attempt to understand offering terms and procedures in abroad, issuer must ask for existing supportive professional assistance in respective countries.

Although bonds have in generally long-term period, but Debtor remains to bear liability for interest (coupon) payment that would quarterly or monthly be executed. For private company, interest (coupon) payment period may be not problematic and it can pay on time. However, the Government which don’t perform any trading or revenue from such bond could not be used to finance commercial projects, it also rely on Government income; consequently, the Government must make appropriate calculation about whether Governmental expenditure posts are sufficiently to pay its Government Bond coupon in National Budget. Therefore, the role of bond within National Budget has moved from formerly to cover budgetary deficit, but it simultaneously become financing sources. In order such Government Bond would not become National


\textsuperscript{42} Ahmad M. Ramlili, Ibid, p. 99.
Budget burdens in the future, thus before its issuing must be considered ability to pay interest and other liabilities in accurate ways. In this framework, an appropriate strategy in Government Bond management becomes very important things in order that government remains capable to pay all its liabilities.

**Government Bond Development in National Budget**

The concept of Government Bond in actually appeared from monetary crisis faced by Indonesia in 1997-1998 which result in the fall of Soeharto administration as New Order regim and a very dangerous damages in national banking system. Consequently, it must be implemented a restrucrization, because total capital in all banking system on July 1997 only amounted to Rp. 43.50 trillions, in October 1998 it reduced to minus Rp. 28.55 trillions. In only two months later, banking capital perceived free fall amount Rp. 70.01 trillions or in minus position as Rp. 98.54 trillions in December 1998. This condition continuously took place until to the end of February 1998, minus Rp. 198 trillions, even to late March 1999 reached minus Rp. 244.6 trillions. Among commercial banks, it was in fact that governmental banking systems perceived largest loss. BNI perceive loss amount to Rp. 46.22 trillions, BRI experience a loss as Rp. 26.55 trillions, and BTN, Rp. 10.63 trillions. Nevertheless, this condition may not continuously be permitted to occur. The banking world must immediately saved from Systemic Insolvency.

No matter how much will this cost, the government has a true commitment to do restrucrization by Government Bond issue, because the Government assumes that restrucrization in banking world is a key for structurization in other sectors that must also performed for recovery from such crisis. The government commitment to improve banking world system is written down in the Mutual Decree among Minister of Financial Affairs and Bank of Indonesia Governor in Number 53/KMK.017/1999 and Number 31/12/Keputusan /GBIO on February 8th 1999 about Commercial Bank Recapitalization. Recapitalization means that addition in banking capital for reaching of predetermined Capital Adequacy Ratio, namely, eight percents pursuant to Bank of International Settlement (BIS). Meanwhile, it is only determined four percents in recapitalization policy.

Capital addition to the banking world is implemented in government bond shape and not fresh fund likes in BLBI. Revenue from government bond by banking world is recorded in book as capital. Therefore, government bond injection in certain amount would make a positive CAR. Further step is to separate banks in various categories in accordance with output of due diligence calculation on their capital adequacy ratio (CAR) basis. Such classification is the A category Bank for health banking system because its CAR above four percents. There are 62 banks in this category. The B category includes banking system with CAR between four percents to minus 25 percents. There are 66 banks in this category. If banking owners don’t inject their capital to improve their CAR, so these banks would be taken over by the government (Bank Take Over/BTO) for recapitalization. In the C category includes banks with CAR under negative 25 percents and they are stated as the Frozen Operating Bank (BTO). There are 38 banks in this category and they were finally liquidified on March 23rd 1999. Based on the due diligence on March 31st 1999, it was estimated fund for banking recapitalization reaches Rp. 351 trillions, national private commercial banks amount to Rp. 25.55 trillions, regional development banks as 1.23 trillions, the 1998 take over banks amount to 80.47 trillions, the 1999 take over banks as 12.11 trillions. This total will continuously increase up to reach Rp. 432.72 trillions. The banking restrucrization costs that include guarantying programs, BLBI, Credit Programs, and recapitalization that formerly was bridged by Bank of Indonesia (Central Bank) must be compensated by the government. This compensation has automatically moved problems from monetary to fiscal policy domains. Fund compensation by this government is not in cash; however it is channelled through the Government Bond issuing mechanism, and it was conducted step by step from May 1998 to December 2000.

Since issue of the government bond for financing of banking restrucrization, total cumulative governmental debt perceived a dramatical increase. In 1997, government beared on foreign debt equals US$
53.864 billions and it had no domestic debt until that time. However, post crisis period in 2001, total foreign
loan has reached figures equals to US$ 74.917 billions and domestic loan equals to US$ 72 billions.

In the late of year 2010, total Republic of Indonesia debt perceived an increase up to Rp. 85.89
trillions compared with Rp. 1,596.66 trillions in 2009. However, it perceives in percentages reduction on PDB
from 28 percents in 2009 to 26 percents in 2010. Additionally, total Republic of Indonesia debt until to late
2010 was recorded to reach Rp. 1,676.15 trillions. In US dollar denomination, total government debt until late
2010 reached US$ 186.42 billions. It increased US$ 17.2 billions compared with the late 2009 that equals to
169.22 billions.\(^{47}\) That debts consists of loan amount to US 68.04 billions and securities equals to US$ 118.39
billion. With utilization of the Republic of Indonesia’s gross domestic product equals to Rp. 6,253.79
trillions, thus its debt ratio is 26.8\(^{\%}\).\(^{48}\)

The latest data on June 2011 obtained by author showed that those debt nominal value continuously
increase to Rp. 1,723.9 trillions. If it is compared with US dollar denomination, total governmental debt up to
2011 has reached US$ 200.52 billions consisting of loan about US$ 69.51 billions and security (bond) equals
to US$ 132.01 billions. Therefore, even if the Republic of Indonesia’s gross domestic product equals to Rp.
6,422.9 trillions for comparison, so that ratio of Indonesia debt on June 2011 is recorded as 26\(^{\%}\) on gross
domestic product (GDP).\(^{49}\) It is a very dangerous quantity. Imaging, until to June the Government spent
useless money to pay interest for debt equals to Rp. 48.7 trillions for debt’s interest payment only. It is said by
Minister of Financial Affairs, Agus Martowardojo, in a meeting with House of Representative’s Budgetary
Committee performed on July 4\(^{50}\) 2011 at House of Representative Building.

This substantial total debt increasing is caused by combination of past policy errors and monetary
crisis, it is not resulted from new financing commitment.\(^{51}\) The government burdens through National Budget
mechanism is automatically very heavy. These burdens consists of burden on bond’s interest and burden for
repayment of bond value if they have reached expiration date. Interest expenses that would be imposed by
National Budget may annually reach Rp. 80 trillions. This burden does not include foreign debt’s principal
settlement and its interest, and burden for repayment of bond principal if it has expired in specif year. This
condition is of course highly impose and it could be disgussed to move the National Budget’s macoroeconomic
function \((de~macro~economische~functie)\) as a policy instrument in determining of the national expenditure
level \((nasionale~bestedigingen)\) from the National Budget.\(^{52}\) In other words, the heavy National Budget’s
burden as consequence from policy of the government bond issue may suspiciously eliminate such National
Budget function as national development stimuli.

The Management Strategy for Debt Government Bonds
As a result from crisis that attack Indonesia in 1997, Indonesia enters into a new era in facing with fiscal risk
coming from two sources. \(\text{Firstly,}\) it is related with substantial total Government’s debt portfolio. \(\text{Second,}\) it is
related with Governmental programs that require for funding supports from the Government where its
quantity may suddenly rise up. The government’s debt repayment (interest and settlement) is projected to
succeed 40 percents from total Governmental revenue in near future years.

More importantly, bond repayment will face with a very serious risk. This case is largely caused by
more than half \(50\%)\) from the Government’s debt portfolio is foreign loan in foreign currency. And a large
portion of the Government’s domestic debt (government bond) uses a fluctuative interest rate following
domestic interest rate and inflationary level. Therefore, an increase in domestic interest rate, devaluation of
rupiah exchange rate, and inflation will significantly increase debt repayment costs.\(^{53}\)

With debt composition in domestic and foreign currency in \(50\%:50\%)\) ratio, thus it can be drawn a
conclusion that Governmental debt portfolio is very susceptible toward various risks, such as a significant

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
\(^{50}\) Ibid.
\(^{52}\) Prof. Simons, quoted from W. Riawan Tjandra, State Finance Law, PT. Scholastic Widia Facility, Jakarta, 2006,p. 8.
debt cost/burden addition in National Budget, both in refinancing risk as consequence from unbalanced expiration date structures or market risk resulted from changes in interest and exchange rates. Those risk must continuously be managed in well manner for fiscal risk avoidance, for example, through application of the best practices in government debt management in accordance with internationally prevailing standards. Additionally, even such government bond will averagely expire in 2005-2009. If these condition are not well managed, they will result in fiscal crisis and inability of government to fulfil its debt liability. Its further impact will cause international confidential erosion on Indonesia.

For anticipating this possibility is, therefore, the National Budget’s fiscal policy must always be directed to keep and maintain macroeconomic stability as well as to encourage economic growth level. A good government bond management has, in generally, purposes to:

1. Assure for covering of financing gap and fiscal sustainability resistance in accordance with macroeconomic condition and low costs.
2. Increase a prudential principles in debt management, especially for risk minimalization, both market and refinancing risks.
3. Develop various efforts in order that planned loans could be implemented with respect to schedules and estimated costs.

The selected debt management strategy is firstly to make efforts in government debt reduction by eliminating of debt stock reduction that will immediately reach its expiration date. This Government Bond reduction could be executed by cash by back, debt switching, or utilization of the debt swap facility.

The cash by back is a policy selected by government with repurchasing in cash of the Government Bond before its expiration date. This repurchased government bond is obligation which perceive a reduction in its value (undervalue) in the marketplace, the government in this condition may obtain gains because it pays price under face values when they were issued formerly. In addition, its other gains is that government will not necessary pay their yield (interest). This cash by back policy is also called as passive strategy.

Meanwhile, the second strategy is to make a debt switching for old obligation with a new one. This strategy is an active strategy in government bond management. According to Rahmany:

Debt switching is meant as policy for extending of government bond’s average expiration portfolio by exchange of bond (bond swap) that would immediately expire with a new obligation that have a more extending expiration date, therefore it can be a more fitted structures with the Indonesian stock exchange market capability in the future by considering of the Surplus primary balance that may be created by government in the future.

The debt switching itself will provide impact for extending maturity date for a specific bond. This extending expiration date will also rearrange structures of state bond maturity date so they will not accumulate in a specific period. This maturity date arrangement is called as reprofil ing.

This extending maturity date presence will automatically avoid refinancing risk for expired government bond. A government bond that would refinanced due to maturity date can be cancelled for a moment. This cancellation will provide a breadth for budget because there are available fund in budget for use in other needs with more effective benefit. This budgetary breadth may be resulted due to reduce fiscal pressure. A fiscal pressure is a reduction in discretion (breadth in determination) of the government within its expenditure budgetary compilation, because there are expenditure posts as government liability and commitment, thus expenditure for projects and development programs for fiscal stimuli will reduce, too.

---

54 Sovereign Debt Management Strategy, ibid, p. 3.
56 A. Fuad Rahmany, ibid, p. 375.
An expired public debt could actually be repaid by issuing a new government bond for refinancing of those expired one. However, a refinancing on substantial debt can also result in a crowding out effect, i.e., a condition in which private sectors will not obtain opportunity for owing because a substantial existing fund has been absorbed by the government. Consequently, a debt switching presence has also avoiding such crowding-out effect. A public bond repayment with utilization of new bond will add total outstanding money. This case may increase inflation rate. The presence of bond exchange does indeed not repay expired debt. However, this policy has at least reduced occurrence of inflationary risk due to increasing in total outstanding money.

The succeeding impact from this government bond’s maturity date replacement can also be expected to decrease total new bond addition by issuing of government bond. With the presence of reduction in outstanding money, thus debt to GDP ratio will perceive a reduction, too. If this reduction may be maintained from year to year will of course create a fiscal sustainability resistance. Basri makes sense that a fiscal sustainability resistance as a condition where the government will not perceive a financial difficulty in financing its expenditure budget in limited period. This debt switching policy will certainly not generate a fiscal sustainability. This condition is urgently affected by other governmental policies and other macroeconomic condition.

The third stock of bond reducing strategy is the debt swap. This policy is a facility provided by donor institutes to debtors with specific requirements, especially from the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. Indonesia can of course utilize this facility by considering risk and cost reductions and its financial condition.

The following government bond management strategy is a simplification of government bond portfolio. To facilitate risk management, so such government debt management must be executed in comprehensive way to simplify variety of typical debt instruments in the structure of government bond (debt) portfolio, so that its management may more effectively implemented.

The furthermore strategy is an issue or procurement of government debt in rupiah. This case may be applied to reduce risks on exchange rate fluctuation which in turn cause an increase in national budget burden as if there is a devaluation in rupiah currency. To overcome this possibility, thus new bond procuring policy must be made a priority in rupiah currency and made some efforts to reduce loan in foreign currency in phased and planned ways. In addition, it must also be considered utilization of value protective instruments available in marketplace, such as the currency swap.

Additionally, strategy in government debt management that could be utilized to add National Budget liquidity is through reduction of refinancing risk in foreign loan portfolio, and it can be performed by load scheduling facility provided by creditor for soft and semi-commercial loans by remaining to consider risk factors and saving in government bond expenses.

Furthermore, another strategy is an increasing in portion of government debt with fixed interest rate. Total fixed rate government bond and variable rate government bond must be made in balanced proportion, 50% to 50% ratio. This strategy can assist to give certainty for government in calculating of total interest expenses that would become burdens in a specific budgetary year. In addition, for such government bond or debt, trading of variable rate bond can assist market liquidity because it can facilitate a benchmark yield curve in the secondary market for government bond. The risk of interest rate can also be reduced by utilizing of the existing interest rate swap facility in financial market.

**CLOSING REMARK**

Based on descriptions formerly stated, it can be drawn conclusions as followings:

1. The Government of Indonesia holds deficit budget in its national budget management. This deficit is covered through State-Owned Company Privatization, Foreign Loan and Issue of Government Bond. The Government Bond holds a primary role for coverage of this budgetary deficit, because policy on Foreign Loan in according to mandate provided by Number 7 Presidential Rule of 2005 about 2004-
2009 National Medium-term Development Plan is directed to reduce stock of foreign loan. Meanwhile, the State-owned company privatization still face with various constraints and very limited one.

2. The Government Bond and National Budget roles does not oppose with intent promulgated in the Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution because the government bond as a security may be traded in Stock Exchange market, both in domestic or foreign will invite gain or loss on the National Budget. These gain or loss can decrease or increase burdens in state financing activity. The Government Bond activity indirectly becomes a Governmental business medium. Consequently, a strategic guidelines in government bond management must truly implemented as good as possible. If the government bond increase, thus it also increase possibilities for government or state perceives National Budget crisis.

3. It is important to emphasize that governmental assurance will not implement default policy on government bond must not only be regulated in Acts, and debt switching policy (debt exchange that would expired with a new debt in accompanying with its stimuli will place a heavier burdens, for example, a higher interest rate), however it may be made in actual tradeable/sold governmental asset as if the government breaks itself promise. This instance is assumed capable to reduce governmental appetites to remain continuously add burdens of government bond or debt in obligation shape.

4. In considering that total government bond has reached a very apprehension point, it is time currently to switch deficit budgetary policy toward a new model dynamic balanced budgetary policy where governmental expenditure maximally equals with collected revenue (income). If the government bond issuing policy can not operate as it is expected, thus it may also be worried that Indonesia will perceive a monetary crisis again such cases in Greece and some other European countries.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**Books**


Ahmad M. Ramli, Cyber Law & Intellectual Property Law System In Indonesia, the second mold, Refika Aditama, Bandung, 2006.


Bagir Manan, Welcoming Dawn regional autonomy, the Center for Legal Studies Ull, Yogyakarta, 2001.

Bohari, the State Budget Law, Rajagrafindo, Jakarta, 1995.


Dyah Ruth Sulistyastuti, Stocks and Bonds Summary Tiori and FAQs, Publisher Atmajaya University, Jogjakarta, 2002.


Jimly Asshidigie, and Constitutionalism Indonesia Kontitusi In my Home, Study Center HTN, FHUI, 2002.


Machfud MD, Democracy and the Constitution In Indonesia, Rineka Cipta, Jakarta, 2000.

Mariam Darusbadrulzaman, the Bank Credit Agreement, AdityaBakti, Bandung, 1993.

R. Ibrahim, Prospect State Owned Enterprise and the Public Interest, Citra Adytia Bakti, Bandung, 1997.
Sudarsan Brixi, Dealing With Contingent Liabilities In Indonesia and Thailand, the Government at Risk Continental Liabilities and Fiscal Risk, Hana Polackova Editor, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.

**Dissertation, Seminars, Papers, Magazines, Newspapers,**

Adiningsih, Restruktirisasi Banking, Tempo, March 1, 1999.
Investor Daily, October 9, 2006.

**Regulation**
Joint Decree of the Minister of Finance and Governor of Bank Indonesia. 53/KMK, and No. 017/199 931/12/Kep/GBI February 8, 1999.
Bond Information Memorandum of the Republic of Indonesia, 001 in Euro Series., Dated July 17, 2006.
FOREIGN AID FOR TIMOR-LESTE’S STATE-BUILDING PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN AND CHINESE AID PROGRAMS

Laurentina “Mica” Barreto Soares
International Development Studies
Ohio University, USA
barreto_mica@hotmail.com / lb521509@ohio.edu

ABSTRACT

Since 2002, Timor-Leste has been in the process of state-building. Most of the foreign aid to the country has been for the purpose of state-building projects, the result however is a mixed record. Considerable criticisms have pointed towards donors’ lack of concern regarding the state-building needs of the recipient country, as too much focus has been placed on their national interest. In recent years, Australian and Chinese aid has come under criticism. Critics have argued that important issues like poverty reduction and social and economic development have become secondary to both countries’ national interests. This study explores the two countries’ long-term goals in Timor-Leste by comparing and contrasting their aid programs to state-building initiatives from 2002-2011. It found that the two countries have differences in their aid programs as well as share commonalities in terms of their approach and national interest. It was argued that both countries’ aid has been used as currency for buying time, political influence, and the hearts and minds of the Timorese for the purpose their long term goals. Foreign aid serves as a soft power instrument for maintaining and gaining the two countries’ geopolitical and geostrategic interests and future influence, as well as for achieving economic opportunities in the region. It recommended that the government of Timor-Leste needs to play a ‘smart diplomacy’ card, continue to be friendly, and open to all countries, while maintaining balanced relations between Australia and China and at the same time strengthen its coordination role at home by taking a more active and effective leadership role in the management of the international assistance for the purpose the country’s state-building needs.

Keywords: Foreign Aid, State-Building, Aid Program, National Interest, Soft Power

INTRODUCTION

This paper was built upon my M.A. thesis with Ohio University (August 2011) in which I examined the effectiveness of foreign aid for state-building process of Timor-Leste through a comparative case study of Australian and Chinese aid programs from 2002-2011. I explored these two donors’ long-term goals in Timor-Leste by comparing and contrasting the purposes and activities of their foreign aid for various aspects of the country’s state-building processes. The primary lines of my inquiry were whether these two donors show any differences or similarities in terms of why they have given aid to Timor-Leste, how they have coordinated with other donors and the recipient government, and where and how such aid has been directed and criticism towards their aid programs.

In 1999, the state-building works started in Timor-Leste. Following a popular referendum in August, the international community, under the leadership of the United Nations (UN), stepped in with an influx of foreign aid to build a new Timor-Leste. In the first two and a half years of its transition from the UN’s control to independence (October 1999- May 2002), the state of Timor-Leste depended entirely on foreign aid of one kind or another. Bilateral and multilateral aid, as well as support from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), created the impetus behind the transition (Federer, 2005; Sakabe, 2008). These groups
continue to play a role in the post-independence period. In almost twelve years of the international community’s intervention, despite different modes of organizing the data, the most reported figure revealed that the international community contributed more than USD 5.2 billion (La’o Hamutuk, 2009; Neves, 2011) toward Timor-Leste’s nation-building and state-building initiatives. In 2009 alone, foreign aid to Timor-Leste accounted for about 0.05% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the same year (OECD, 2010). Today, more than 20 bilateral and 16 multilateral agencies are providing foreign aid and operating in the country (Ministry of Finance, 2010).

Australia and China have been two important donors to this between 1975–1999). The two countries stand out from all other donors in terms of the impact they have had through the visibility of their aid projects and the amount of aid they channeled into Timor-Leste. Geographically closer and a dominant power in the sub-region of the Asia Pacific (Rumley, 1999), Australia has been the number one donor to Timor-Leste, in both bilateral and multilateral terms. In contrast, China is not a traditional donor and the amount of its aid allocation for Timor-Leste is relatively small, yet its donations have been on the rise in recent years. Moreover, most of China’s foreign assistance comes through bilateral arrangements (Horta, 2007; Ministry of Finance, 2009).

Despite these apparent differences, both Australia and China have come under criticism in recent years, as they have competed for the role as the primary guardian of Timor-Leste. Serious concerns have been raised about the fact that the two donors’ aid is driven by their respective national interests and long-term goals rather than by the state-building needs of the recipient country (Storey, 2009; Curtain, 2009; Rosser, 2008; Anderson, 2007; Scanteam, 2007; Horta, 2007; Rumley, 1999). Critics have argued that issues like effective institutional building, poverty reduction, economic and social development, which are critical to the state-building process of Timor-Leste, have become secondary to their national interests in their respective foreign aid programs (Horta, 2011; Aid Watch, 2009). Not only do the two countries have competing interests for regional dominance, but they also seek access to the region’s natural resources, notably the oil and gas of Timor-Leste, while actively paving the road and supporting the long-term business opportunities of their nationals (Tow & Rigby, 2011; Horta, 2011; Dorling, 2011; La’o Hamutuk, 2007; Rumley, 1999). These issues have all been raised as important motivations for the continued interest in Timor-Leste by these two countries.

AUSTRALIAN AND CHINESE FOREIGN AID TO TIMOR-LESTE

This section will trace the two countries’ aid statistics, aid programs and management. Australia’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Timor-Leste started in the 1980s during Indonesian period (AusAID, 2011). For the last five years Australia has been the biggest ODA provider among bilateral donors to Timor-Leste, bypassing Japan in 2005, and the United States in the early years of the Timor-Leste independence. Timor-Leste is among the top-ten recipients of Australia’s bilateral foreign aid in the Asia Pacific Region—it ranked eight before Cambodia and Bangladesh in 2008 and ranked fifth in 2005 (OECD, 2010). Australia’s top-three recipients are Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Between 2008 and 2009, Timor-Leste received 5% out of its total disbursement of USD1,413 million. From 2002 - 2010 Australia’s ODA disbursement to Timor-Leste totaled USD 500.857.3 million (OECD, 2010).

China’s foreign aid disbursement to Timor-Leste development did not start until 2000, thus it was considered as an “emerging” along with South Korea, Brazil, and Thailand. China’s prior support to Timor-Leste was demonstrated through diplomatic and political solidarity consistently voting against Indonesian’s occupation over Timor-Leste at the United Nations. According to the Timor-Leste government’s available data, China’s total aid to Timor-Leste over the last ten years was USD 50.528.608 million (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Its highest contribution occurred during 2005, it was about USD 9.2 million.

Australian’s ODA so far has been heavily centered on social infrastructure and services. It accounted for more than 80% of its ODA. Its social infrastructure programs mainly cover education, health services, government and civil society, conflict, peace and security, water supply and sanitation, social services, and population or the reproductive health sectors (AusAID, 2009; OECD, 2010). Among the social infrastructure
programs, the government and civil society (mostly government) and the conflict, peace and security programs have received more attention when compared to other sectors. Other areas where Australia has been involved are agricultural production and humanitarian relief. The later activities included in the areas of agriculture, fishing, small industry and multi-sector cross cutting issues such as environmental protection. This sector received about 6% of its total ODA.

China’s foreign aid flow has been arranged around projects. According to the Ministry of Finance’s report, China’s aid programs were allocated to three main areas: physical infrastructure, technical cooperation, which included health (Chinese doctors), scholarships for Timorese students, and training and agricultural development. Since 2002, China has provided training to more than five hundred Timorese civil servants in different technical skill areas including: administration, tourism, construction, and technology (Personal interview--Chinese-Dili Embassy, 2010). In addition, China sent its medical doctors to Timor-Leste to work in hospitals---about 12 Chinese doctors have worked in the country for the last five years.

China’s physical infrastructure development includes high profile government offices did not occur until in 2006. Prior to that, Chinese involvement was in the area of technical cooperation for issues such as trainings of government officials in different office skills and agriculture development, mainly in distribution of agricultural tools and seeds. However, its biggest contribution so far has not been in the area of infrastructure. As China’s statistics suggest its total contribution for physical infrastructure development was about USD 13.1 million out of its total foreign aid since 2000, while its contribution for combined social infrastructure was about USD 29.8 million. China’s focus on physical infrastructure may occur more in the future, but that has not been the case for the last ten years.

As the aid programs suggest, although the two countries have contrasting figures in their aid volume, both Australia and China are involved in the same programs, which are social infrastructure development. The difference is Australia’s social infrastructure programs are broader than that of China’s aid programs. For example Australia has been also involved in areas including strengthening civil society organizations, gender and women’ empowerment, and youth and children, but China has not involved in these areas. China’s assistance has been largely concentrated in Dili, the capital, while Australia’s aid programs have been delivered not only in Dili, but also in the surrounding districts for programs such as water and sanitation and youth development. The apparent contrast between the two donors in their aid programs is regarding major physical infrastructure. Australia has not been involved in physical infrastructure development the way China has. China may likely to do more in the future. Since 2006 China has been involved in building a number of principal public institutions, which are the Office of President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of Defense, 100 houses for the Timor-Leste Defense Forces and primary schools.

On the management front, both Australia’s and China’s cooperation with Timor-Leste is arranged through government to government framework. Besides bilateral cooperation, Australia also involved in multilateral cooperation by providing assistance through the United Nations agencies and the World Bank as well as some local Timorese and Australia-based non-governmental organizations. China’s involvement in multilateral cooperation is relatively small compared to Australia. Australia’s development assistance is generally managed by its aid agency, AusAID office. China does not have a funding agency like Australia and most western donors do. In Timor-Leste, Australia’s aid is managed by the AusAID-Dili office, which is attached to the Australian embassy. China’s aid is managed through its embassy in Dili with a representative from the Ministry of Commerce. China’s cooperation with the government of Timor-Leste is established under the name of Economic and Technical Cooperation. It coordinates through the ministerial level and involves Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Australia’s cooperation with Timor-Leste is established through a Bilateral Cooperation Agreement that is also at the ministerial level and it is based on sectoral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Currently Australia has about five bilateral cooperation agreements with the government of Timor-Leste in areas that include defense and security and governance and public service especially for human resources development cooperation.

Australia’s bilateral assistance is largely executed and implemented by Australian management consulting firms. Currently the biggest implementing agency of AusAID is a company called GRM
International based in Brisbane Australia. This consulting firm is involved in implementing a project called Public Sector Capacity Development Project (PSCDP). It focuses on governance and public administration through recruitment and management of international technical advisers and places them across government ministries. The government’s role in the process of bringing in these advisors is very limited; and the project coordinators are responsible for the decision-making. The large amount of aid is for the payment of salaries to the international experts. This form of aid generates criticism by the recipient government and the people of Timor-Leste because it is seen as “boomerang aid” that helps the donor country by providing jobs to its citizens rather than jobs for the recipient country.

China shares similar approach. Almost all of its assistance has been managed and executed by China’s state-owned consulting firms. The government plays almost no role in determining who is involved in implementing the Chinese’s aid program. China brought its own skilled-workers to work in the construction companies with limited involvement of low-skilled Timorese workers. Thus China too creates an “aid boomerang” effect in Timor-Leste. The Timorese government seems to have no problem with this arrangement—the government’s view is that China’s contributions so far have been generous. In an interview with a senior government official from the Ministry of Infrastructure said: “I think we don’t have to worry about it, let it be…they (China) were the ones who wanted to offer their help to us …it is gratuity so just let it be...we don’t have to worry about it.”

China’s aid management is exclusively between the two governments (Timor-Leste and China). China did not work closely with other donors in Timor-Leste. Many donors criticized China for having exclusivity and rigidity in its aid management. China hardly attended regular informal donors meetings or meetings that were hosted by the Timorese government and the World Bank. In a colloquial message by Chinese representative in Dili passing through a government official from the Ministry of Finance said: “…If you want to find us, go to project sites, we do not come to the meetings because we are busy working in the field.”(Personal interview: Dili, July 2010). China also did not provide regular reports about its foreign aid activities to the government’s Office of Aid Effectiveness. The Government’s archive on Chinese aid statistics is based only on the source stated in the cooperation agreement at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, the government of Timor-Leste seems to be more comfortable with the way China manages its aid because it is less bureaucratic compared to most western donors, including that of Australia’s aid management. But the Timorese government does acknowledge the transparency process of most western donors’ aid management. China’s fast-track approach with no-strings-attached however, has won the hearts and minds of not only the Timorese government but also many ordinary Timorese.

AUSTRALIAN AND CHINESE AID GOALS AND POLICIES

Australian government stated five main reasons for providing aid to Timor-Leste: 1) to reduce Timor-Leste’s poverty; 2) Australia’s aid making difference in the lives of the Timorese people; 3) Australia’s national interest; 4) Australia’s aid programs and finally, Australia’s – Timor-Leste country strategy (AusAID, 2010). The statement was further reinstated by the AusAID Dili Minister-Counselor, Ali Gillies, during the donors’ meeting in 2010 in Dili that Australia’s support is not only for ‘altruistic’ purposes, but it is also very much for Australia’s ‘national interest’ to see that Timor-Leste becomes a ‘strong and prosperous’ nation (AusAID & Gillies, 2010). Chinastated that its foreign assistance is part of the Chinese government’s international duty to assist others and to build friendships among developing countries including Timor-Leste. Both donors stated they are keen to continue providing assistance and will play important roles in Timor-Leste’s future development.

From the outset it shows that Australia desires to have close engagement in Timor-Leste’s social, economic, and political developments. On the social and political sides, they are closely linked with security and stability. Regarding this, Australia considers Timor-Leste’s geographical proximity, combined with the fragile and instable security situation due to frequent conflicts every two years from 1999 to 2008, that it might repeat the event in 1975 and 1999 with Timorese refugees’ making an exodus to Australia (La’o Hamutuk, 2010). Additionally, Australia is also concerned about the possibility of terrorism and drugs-
smuggling activities due to weak border management. In short, security threats become paramount for Australia’s support while trying to foster democratic governance and reducing poverty for MDGs purposes. China’s public reasons for support sound like a philanthropic act and a moral obligation as world community member.

According to the empirical research on the ground and early literature demonstrate that both countries’ reasons for providing assistance to Timor-Leste went beyond their stated goals and policies. While recognizing some of the above public reasons, the findings from empirical studies are inclined to associate the assistance with the long-term interests of the two countries, that their aid is used to gain their long-term goals. The finding could be summarized into three main motives: geopolitical, geostrategic and economic interest. These outcomes further strengthen the argument of previous literature. For example as suggested by Horta (2011) regarding China and the USA’s soft power behind their foreign aid programs. These three motives are closely interrelated and reflect both countries’ medium and long terms interest in Timor-Leste and specifically in the Southeast Asia region.

On the geopolitical and geostrategic fronts, Australia and China’s reasons for providing assistance to Timor-Leste are seen as driven by their foreign policy, which is their desire to have hegemonic power in Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste’s geographical proximity to Australia and its being surrounded by the other Southeast Asian nations where China now has greater influence in the economic, social and cultural spheres of those countries fits well into these two categories. China’s assistance is seen as an attempt to gain a strategic foothold in Timor-Leste, which is part of its wider Asia-Pacific ‘soft power’ push. In an interview with a Timorese senior diplomat, the incumbent stated both China and Australia desire to have geostrategic and geopolitical leverage in Timor-Leste and other Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto (former Indonesian president). However, they will have more political leverage with Timor-Leste compared to with Indonesia as a well-established country. Australia’s position over Timor-Leste since World War II has not really changed given Timor-Leste became a buffer zone for the security to ensure the security of Australia (Personal interview: Dili, July, 2010). In an interview with an Australian scholar, the author argues:

“…Australia always likes to have some control over the approaches to Australia from a sea boat in areas of drug smuggling or terrorism or illegal migration. China’s one-China Policy…Timor-Leste has always been taking a one-China Policy…all the Timorese government you know, and the CNRT who fought during the struggle, they have always taken one-China Policy, they never gave any room for Taiwan to exercise any diplomacy” (Personal interview: Dili, July 2010).

Australia’s claim of Timor-Leste as geographically more proximate is without doubt, making Timor-Leste strategically important in shaping its foreign policy in the region. As Seddelmeyer (2009) states, Australia’s foreign policy and regional relations are very much shaped by its geographical factors and it has existed since the British Empire in the 18th century (p. 10). It becomes more salient at the end of the World War II after Australia repositioned and reorganized its foreign policy to become a middle power in the region. Australia has claimed for years that it cannot let another country take over the lead of Timor-Leste since it is adjacent to its border.

Furthermore, recently the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) proposed in its study that the Australian Defense Forces continue its station in Timor-Leste for some time and advised the Australian government not to compete with China in Timor-Leste. The Institute confidently proposed: “Timor Defense Forces would need assistance until 2020…Australia shouldn’t directly compete with China for Timor-Leste’s affections…instead, the Timorese may need to be reminded, in more beguiling ways, of where Timor-Leste’s true and most reliable friendships lies” (ASPI, 2011). This move was seen as Australia’s attempt to gain attention, make Timor-Leste dependent on Australia’s defense forces, and to discourage Timor-Leste’s defense forces from being influenced by China and other countries.

Australia considers Timor-Leste not only because of its natural border but also because Australia believes it saved Timor-Leste from the catastrophe during the 1999 post referendum violence with pro-Jakarta
militias. On this ground, Ishizuka (2004) challenges this notion by pointing out that the change of Australia’s position from “a pro-Indonesia to a pro-UN policy did not imply a pro-East Timor…(but) economic influences were significant…for the Australian government the Timor Sea is an opportunity that must be pursued with all available strength” (p.283). Furthermore, Australia sees Timor-Leste as its ‘little brown brother’ in its backyard in the Asia Pacific region. Australia is inclined to treat Timor-Leste like another Solomon Island or Papua New Guinea where Australia predominantly exercises its political power over the region’s national interest. Contrary to Australia, China, as Cotton and Ravenhill (2001) conclude in their study, does not want an independent Timor-Leste to become ‘too dependent’ on its neighbor Australia, and to ensure that Timor-Leste continues to recognize China with a one-China policy, so it does not fall for Taiwan’s ‘dollar diplomacy’ (p.122). Under these circumstances, Timor-Leste is used as a “battle ground” for Australia’s political influence and China’s soft power approach to Timor-Leste.

On the other hand there was also an argument about the competing interests between Australia and China that are driven by Timor-Leste as well. One informant from Timor-Leste argues that Timor-Leste used China’s support or China’s engagement to send a message to Australia because lately, Timor-Leste’s relationship with Australia is quite tense—especially regarding oil and gas issues. The Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s proposed the idea for a refugee-processing center to be built in Timor-Leste, which was half-backed, and only exacerbated the situation because almost all Timorese including the Parliament and the government rejected the proposal.

On the economic front, Timor-Leste’s natural resources, such as oil and gas, have become the main reason for both countries’ assistance in Timor-Leste. However, there are different stands, especially on Australia’s side. Another Australian scholar argues that Australia’s interests are represented by private commercial companies, while China’s interests are represented by the state:

“Timor-Leste is one place where China has already expressed an interest in resource development, among many others. Oil and gas are important resources for all countries and China has explicitly linked its assistance to gaining further access to those resources. Australia’s aid program is not linked, however, to the private commercial activities of companies that are based here (Timor-Leste)” (Personal interview: Dili, July 2010).

The above argument was countered by an Australian expatriate—saying that although publicly Australia’s interest in oil and gas in Timor-Leste are represented by its private companies, those private companies pay taxes to the government and since foreign aid to Timor-Leste comes from taxes it is not totally a separate interest. Another Australian scholar revealed his knowledge about Australia’s position on oil and gas during a personal interview that some Australian government officials think that they should give aid to Timor-Leste from Timor-Leste’s natural resources because Timor-Leste is considered incapable of spending their money (Personal interview: Dili, July 2010). The earlier literature states that Australia has had an interest in Timor-Leste’s oil since the Portuguese era. Rumley (1999) argues that during the Indonesia period, relations between Australia and Indonesia had been greatly influenced by the prospect of large oil reserves in the Timor Sea. The Australian government signed a treaty with the Indonesian government for the sharing of natural resources in the Timor Sea. As for China, its other economic interest links with future market opportunity in Timor-Leste—to be able to use the country as a market for its third class goods or third world quality products—first class quality products go to Australia and second class product go to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

Australia and China may not have competing economic interests among them in Timor-Leste because Timor-Leste is not Australia and China’s real market. Both Australia and China are partners in economic relations. Rumley (1999) argues, “China is increasingly market oriented and thus regional and global interdependence and its development imperative combine to create immense opportunities for Australia to help guarantee food and resource security and to provide technical adviser and service expertise of various kinds” (p.131). According to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs’ report in 2009, China is Australia’s second-largest trading partner after Japan (Australian Government-Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(2009). Furthermore, Ang (2010) states that Australia’s economic boom in the 1990s was because of China’s high demand for Australia’s natural resources (largely coal and iron)—Australia benefited tremendously from China’s call for natural resources (p. 127). However, it does not mean Australia has zero interest in economic opportunity in Timor-Leste. From Australia’s point of view, it is in their interest to see that Timor-Leste becomes a prosperous country because if Timor-Leste is prosperous, demand for the Australia’s goods will increase, and Australia could expand its market. Moreover, Australia also wants to make sure that any government in Timor-Leste is friendly to Australia.

The above empirical studies and previous literature imply that regardless of what is written in the statements about their noble reasons, both China’s and Australia’s actions on the ground speak boldly about their interests in the region. I would argue that both countries have used their aid as a type of currency or soft power for buying time, political influence and to gain the minds and hearts of the people of Timor-Leste in order for both countries to maintain and achieve their long term geopolitical, geostrategic goals and economic interests. Even though neither country has direct links to the current aid activities and management on the ground, in the broader scope, both countries’ foreign aid can indirectly influence their competing interests. As Davis (2006) argues, Australia’s development assistance has influenced its foreign policy since World War II and it continues to be “politically and conceptually dominated by” its national interests (p.29). This argument may agree with the informants who think that, regardless of whether Timor-Leste has oil or not, Australia will intervene in Timor-Leste. Australia’s market-oriented development cooperation opens up opportunities for its private companies to quest for oil and gas in the Timor Sea. At the time of writing, the Timor-Leste government and the Australia’s Woodside oil company continue to be in dispute over the best means for the Greater Sunrise oil production. The long-debated issue centers on the building of natural gas pipelines for oil and gas processing— the Timor-Leste government is eager to bring the pipeline to Timor-Leste, while the company is keen to build one of the world’s first floating pipeline to Darwin, Australia.

For the last nine and a half years, Australia has shown an increased interest in security and has become stronger with the emergence of China in Timor-Leste. Australia’s choice to prioritize social infrastructure could be used to influence and shape Timor-Leste’s political culture, which will threaten Timor-Leste’s political sovereignty. China’s emphasis in visibility is not only in Timor-Leste but also in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. China’s ‘no string attached’ approach to foreign aid disbursement could be seen as buying time for its future economic opportunity. Today, in Timor-Leste, a large number of Chinese immigrants, known as “new comers”, are involved in economic activities throughout the territories. Some observers view this massive influx of Chinese small businessmen as a potential trigger that could ignite future conflicts between the locals and the new immigrants as they compete for economic opportunities. In the capital of Dili, Chinese businessmen dominate the operation of gas stations on every corner. Chinese companies were awarded several major projects by the Timorese government, including heavy oil power plant construction. In January 2011, representatives of China’s state-Exim-Bank paid a visit to Timor-Leste to start negotiating a ‘soft loan’ for Timor-Leste’s infrastructure development (Horta, 2011).

**CRITICISMS OF AUSTRALIAN AND CHINESE AID PROGRAMS**

Both Australia and China’s aid program have come under criticism in recent years. On the national interest end, China’s presence in Timor-Leste has generated some discomfort among the Dili-based traditional donors. In Moises Nairm’s words, China’s presence is considered “toxic” towards the established donors. Actually Cuba too—the two nations were seen as favorite donors of both the Mari Alkatiri government and the current Gusmão government. Cuba was a favorite because the Alkatiri government agreed to Cuba’s offer of 700 seats for Timorese students to study medicine in Cuba. In 2007, the Norwegian Cooperation in Timor-Leste conducted a review and an independent consultant called Scanteam carried out the work. They noted sentiments among some Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors over these two non-DAC donors’ offer (p.54). Some DAC donors have drawn conclusions from the angle of ‘global strategic competition for resources and influence’, which China is the great subject of this framework, given Timor-Leste’s natural resources and geo-strategic position.
Sentiments about China’s presence and its assistance have obvious impacts especially when the previous government negotiated a deal that was followed up by the current government in 2010 to purchase two navy-patrol boats for the Timor-Leste Defense Force. The act prompted some donor countries’ concern, principally Australia and the USA, that Timor-Leste has taken sides with China and abandoned its “big brother”, and even more so when Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão regards China as Timor-Leste’s “true friend.” Speaking on the occasion of laying the construction work on the soon to be opened Chinese-built Office of the Ministry of Security and Defense, Prime Minister Gusmão was quoted as saying:

“We are firmly committed to incrementing bilateral cooperation in the military area with friendly countries that provide us with uninterested support…our Chinese brothers and sisters are clearly part of this group…there is nothing that would prevent us from requesting and accepting, their help, nor would it be legitimate for anyone to seek constraints to our options” (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 2010).

In reaction to the Prime Minister Gusmão’s speech, at least two senior representatives among prominent traditional donors in Dili immediately contacted a senior government official about the Prime Minister’s move—details about conversation were not revealed for courtesy purposes, but said to be in relation to the Prime Minister’s speech (Personal interview: Dili, July, 2010). Among Australia’s observers, an unnamed Australia’s senior diplomatic analyst was quoted by the Australian, a newspaper: “China’s foray into what has been traditionally regarded as “Australia’s sphere of interest” had set alarm bells ringing in Canberra” (The Australian, 2010, para, 3). In addition, Hugh White, a former deputy secretary in the Defense Department and who is now head of the Strategic Defense Studies Centre at ANU added: "It is contrary to a very deep intuitive sense we have of our strategic interests. And I don't doubt for a moment Australia will be very nervous about this” (ibid. para, 5). In a slightly different and indirect tone highlighting the procurement process, a senior diplomat of one of the traditional donors in Dili stated in the interview:

“I don’t see this is a major problem…the decision of where to purchase this equipment like the patrol boats it is the ultimate decision of the government of Timor-Leste…but we suspect that is also has political elements involved here and Timor-Leste’s involvement here has the opportunity to assert itself as an independent sovereignty vis-à-vis because they have cooperation with Australia and they make decisions to purchase boats from somewhere else and that is entirely within their right…the question and criticism (is) about the transparency in the process…it was not an open tender process and no justification but again in terms of the general criticism and the purchasing principle, those are legitimate criticisms” (Personal interview: Dili, July 2010).

This growing concern of Australia and some other DAC donors about China’s presence and ways of approach have deepened the discontent on the Timor-Leste side, especially about Australia’s treatment of Timor-Leste. Australia is always seen as meddling or interfering in Timor-Leste’s internal affairs. Timor-Leste became suspicious of Australia’s intentions behind its gestures, including its foreign aid assistance. Some view that Australia and China have used Timor-Leste as a proxy battleground for the two countries’ competing interests in the region.

On the other hand, China has been quiet and continued to work and provide assistance to Timor-Leste. It has not reacted publically to the criticism from other donors. China’s attitude may best be framed as silent diplomacy. China’s growing confidence in Timor-Leste perhaps was boosted with the recent declaration by Timor-Leste’s President to a Portuguese news Agency, Lusa, and then reported by the Macau Hub news agency that Timor-Leste will in turn keep China as its trading partner: “…I don’t think there are many options for East Timor in terms of demands (needs) other than China…I see China as one of the few countries in the region or in the world from where East Timor can attract some investment” (Macauhub, 2011). This move sent a message about who will be Timor-Leste’s close partner but it has yet to be seen in the future.
On the programs side-- Australia’s aid program has been criticized for being spread too thin across the country, which resulted in some areas receiving more aid and some less aid. In a joint press conference between Timor-Leste’s President Jose Ramos-Horta and Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, President Jose Ramos-Horta was quoted as saying:

“In the past Australian aid money was all over the place (scattered), in 20 to 30 different areas of support. So I don't want to sound ungrateful or anything like that...but sometimes countries are generous, no doubt about it, but with their own strategies in addressing these views of world poverty” (The Australian, 2010, para, 3-4).

President Horta’s criticism was acknowledged by Foreign Minister Rudd as “right” about the Australia’s aid program in Timor-Leste: “...in the past I think Australia's development programs were too scatterbrained” (The Australian, 2010, para,7). In 2009, the Australian National Audit Office found that most of Australian aid to countries in the region, including Timor-Leste, is designated for expensive salaries of technical assistance. It created a ‘boomerang aid’ effect as most of the technical assistants were Australian nationals and most of the money will go back to Australia. Another criticism is regarding its aid planning and program management. It operated with no country program strategy for Timor-Leste until in 2010 and it lacked transparency (Eureka, 2009). The latter referred to the lack of progress reports on indicators as well as evaluations on the failure or success of Australia’s aid programs.

Furthermore, some says the AusAID program is designed to meet Australian national interests and Australia will make sure that no other country makes their presence obvious in Timor-Leste. Australia’s 2006 White Paper states so that its aid program is an integral part of Australia’s foreign policy and security agenda and it is based on Australia’s national interest. In short, Australia does not want to see other countries’ military engagement with Timor-Leste, especially China. Moreover, criticisms have also mounted regarding Australia’s aid program to Civil Society Organizations. Australia’s aid was seen as a coercive tool against local NGOs. For example, in 2005 there was an incident where AusAID canceled grants to several national NGOs (after the grants were committed) that criticized Australian’s policy on the Timor Gap and oil exploration (Neves, 2006).

Australia has an aggressive tendency to be dominant in its aid program approach and the attitude became more apparent during the Gusmão government in 2007. For example, in the area of public administration, Australia slowly dried up its multilateral support through one of the UN agencies that has been involved in public administration projects since 2002. In so doing, it aimed to open up opportunity for its consulting firm, GRM, to take over the responsibility in the area of public administration development. It seemed to imply that its contribution through multilateral organizations, at least in the context of Timor-Leste, serves as a window curtain to prevent it from seeing been as the only player. In supporting the establishment of the first Timor-Leste Public Service Commission, Australia took over responsibility almost as if they were the single player—they wanted one of their advisors to become the Public Service Commissioner. In response, the Government of Timor-Leste, through a Council of Ministers meeting, rejected the proposal on the basis of sovereignty provision. In addition, Australia has been trying to make sure to place its technical advisors in key national positions such as in the office of President, Office of the Prime Minister, Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance. This resulted in some government ministries’ needs for advisers being neglected.

As for China, the criticism refers to its emerging assistance on infrastructure development in the country. Some traditional donors view China’s intervention as an intrusion, with the intent to gain the confidence of the government and the people of Timor-Leste. These donors may not publicly criticize or become openly judgmental of China’s growing intervention, but in private or in informal conversations they do. Whenever there is talk about China’s presence and its infrastructure development, almost everyone raises their eyebrows. A former senior AusAID officer said in an interview:
“...China’s aid is politically influential...politically they do create prestige, well-received, get a lot of political credit...but they are not really doing development. We don’t get much credit even out of more than 50 million in support...China’s aid is not yet (a type of) development assistance...but Timorese leadership, and the government think it is good for them and for China...” (Personal interview: Dili, July, 2010).

Some international NGOs and local NGOs that are critical of development in Timor-Leste share their view that China’s recent support in public infrastructure is not a type of development for the people of Timor-Leste—it is more like a symbolic gesture, but it does not directly benefit the people of Timor-Leste. During a field research interview, an international NGO worker judged China’s infrastructure development:

“That is not infrastructure (development)...I would not call it infrastructure. It is a physical object, I mean you can call is infrastructure but in terms of infrastructure that benefits people like roads, water, electricity etcetera, it is none...The fancy Foreign Ministry and the President Palace does not do anything for people. I do not call is infrastructure—it is more of a symbol” (Personal interview: Dili, July, 2010).

On the contrary, the government of Timor-Leste considers China’s assistance as complementary to what traditional donors have provided for the last nine and a half years and China’s assistance does support the development of Timor-Leste as it provides a roof for the government to carry out its public functions. China’s assistance in infrastructure development is seen as an alternative support to fill the gap of traditional donors. In the interview with senior representative in the parliament the incumbent said:

“...For the people of Timor-Leste, the Chinese government talked to the Timor-Leste government, they (Chinese government) came and saw our problems and they were willing to help, we appreciate their help. If other donors were also willing to help, the people of Timor-Leste would appreciate their support. China comes with concrete things, people of Timor-Leste could see with their naked-eye. They come with what we need...they (Chinese) know what we need...we need houses, they provide it and we need training, they provide it...we appreciate their assistance“(Personal interview: Dili, July, 2010).

The above argument seems to be that between donors, especially DAC-affiliated donors, and the government of Timor-Leste, they have a different understanding of defining development. Donors, mostly western ones, fail to understand the dynamic of development and the real needs of the recipient government. While western donors tend to translate development only from the psychological or soft development perspective, such as institutional building, the recipient government attempts to broaden its definition of development to include both physical and soft development. As a post-colonial and conflict country, Timor-Leste has gone through major physical and psychological destruction in 1999. Any support from its partners is part of a contribution to the nation and state-building needs.

CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, the two countries’ foreign aid assistance shares many commonalities especially in relation to their delivery approaches, goals and national interests. Both Australia and China implement ‘tied aid’ in the form of providing contractual services only to serve their national’s companies to implement aid activities. This form of tied aid is known as “nationally-tied aid” (Aid Watch, 2009). The implication of this approach creates a “boomerang aid.” Both countries’ aid programs are also rigid and strict in their distribution, their aid programs are largely determined by themselves. This tied aid is called project/program tied aid (Aid Watch, 2009). The two countries’ aid serves as “soft power” or a type of currency for engaging with Timor-Leste to achieve their ultimate long-term goals that reflect their national interest in the geopolitical, geostrategic and
economic spheres. For geostrategic and geopolitical interests both countries compete with each other to become a middle power and to have a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia. In Australia’s case, Timor-Leste is considered as its backyard, it perceives that Timor-Leste is naturally a part of its architecture on the “arc of instability” range. Therefore, Timor-Leste’s existence should be part of its national and foreign policy agenda. All in all, in the end, all the competing interests are for economic demands.

The sharp difference between the two countries’ aid lies on the quantity, visibility and the scope of work—Australia is dominant in terms of aid quantity and its aid programs that are more diversified and broader. While China’s aid is very small in terms of the quantity, however, its aid programs generate greater visibility, which is able to attract the government and many Timorese citizens’ attention as important components of development. China’s focus on infrastructure development activities might expand in the future along with the government’s national priorities or national strategic plan to decentralize the development activities to rural areas. In terms of their approach, while Australia attempts to be more aggressive in its approach, China prefers to play a modest role with a more low profile approach to its engagement with the recipient.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA: PATTERN AND ISSUES

Wu Ming Chu
Centre for Social Change and Trends, Faculty of Creative Industries
University Tunku Abdul Rahman, Selangor
wumc@utar.edu.my

ABSTRACT

Taiwan’s small and medium industries were forced to look for investment overseas in the 1980s by circumstances. Malaysia was a favourite country for the Taiwanese investors. We first traced the background of the Taiwanese investment in Malaysia. The Taiwanese investment took place in three different waves: the sporadic wave of the 1970s, the big rush that started in mid-1980s, and the encouraged wave after the “Go South” policy of Taiwan in the beginning of the 1990s. This paper examines the pattern of Taiwanese investment in Malaysia and the issues faced by such investment. We conclude by suggesting the future path for Taiwanese investment in Malaysia.

Keywords: Taiwanese Investment in Malaysia, Foreign Direct Investment

INTRODUCTION

When the Kuomintang (KMT) government in China retreated to Taiwan after the loss of mainland China in the Chinese Civil War, a gold-standard reserve currency in Taiwan was established with the part of precious metal and foreign currency reserve of mainland China which it brought over to Taiwan. This helped to stabilize prices and reduce hyperinflation. Along with the financial aid and soft credit provided by the US over the 1945-1965 period, Taiwan had the necessary capital to restart its economy. Further, the KMT government instituted many laws and land reforms that it had never effectively enacted on mainland China. All these were crucial in the formative years of Taiwan’s economy, spurring industrialization and security.

The expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the United Nations in 1971, coupled with the 1973 oil crisis and the switching of US diplomatic relations, heavily affected the economy of Taiwan. Uncertainty about the US commitment accelerated the country’s shift to export-led growth. With the maintenance of economic links with US, development of foreign trade and exports helped absorb excess labour from the decreased importance of agriculture in the economy. It moved in the 1970s from cheap, labour-intensive manufactures into an expansion of heavy industry and infrastructure. Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo's Ten Major Construction Projects at the same time served to lay the foundation for heavy industrial development in Taiwan. By the 1980s, Taiwan had moved to advanced electronics, and the economy was becoming increasingly open and the government moved towards privatization of government enterprises.

Taiwan's economy began to stabilize in the 1980s. It had become an economic power, with a mature and diversified economy, solid presence in international markets and huge foreign exchange reserves. Together with Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, Taiwan became known as one of the “Four Little Dragons”. Its economic growth was impressive.

Foreign trade has been the engine of Taiwan's rapid growth. Taiwan's economy remained export-oriented, thus it depended on an open world trade regime and remained vulnerable to downturns in the world economy. Export composition changed from predominantly agricultural commodities to industrial goods.

In 1983, the Taiwan government relaxed the restriction on import-export and investment. In 1987, it further introduced the “Management of Foreign Exchange Regulation” to fully relax the restriction on
non-English
alternative. Directly investing in SEA countries thus appeared attractive. Taiwanese businesses emerged, from being meagre investors before 1986, to become the largest investors in the region thereafter. In addition, the requirement of low pollution and energy saving also tended to burden heavily on the production cost. All these factors contributed to make Taiwan unsuitable for Taiwan's labour-intensive industries to survive.

Taiwan investment in SEA has concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and later Vietnam (after 1990). Amount of investment increased yearly after 1987. In 2001, Taiwan's overall investment in the four SEA countries - Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam - reached US$983.20 million. During the same period, its investment in China amounted to US$7.7 billion (see Table 1).

Meanwhile in Malaysia, the government is inviting foreign direct investment (FDI) together with very favourable terms and conditions, such as taxation, cheap labour, skilled workers, infrastructure, and so on. This serves to attract Taiwanese investors to Malaysia.

Moreover, there is not much of cultural gap for them in Malaysia since many Chinese Malaysians can speak Mandarin and are of Hokkian original. These push and pull factors lead to many Taiwanese SMI manufacturing companies coming to set up firms in Malaysia, especially in the Hokkian speaking areas.

In the following, the term Taishang will be used to loosely refer to Taiwanese businessmen or Taiwanese investors in general.

Table 1: Taiwan Investment in Southeast Asia (in million USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-1989</td>
<td>1,257.05</td>
<td>2,097.25</td>
<td>1,384.58</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,347.83</td>
<td>782.70</td>
<td>618.30</td>
<td>135.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,326.17</td>
<td>583.50</td>
<td>1,057.80</td>
<td>224.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>574.70</td>
<td>289.90</td>
<td>563.30</td>
<td>617.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>331.18</td>
<td>215.40</td>
<td>358.90</td>
<td>791.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,122.76</td>
<td>477.50</td>
<td>2,484.03</td>
<td>575.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>567.80</td>
<td>1,803.90</td>
<td>567.40</td>
<td>974.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>310.40</td>
<td>2,785.20</td>
<td>534.60</td>
<td>488.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>480.40</td>
<td>414.30</td>
<td>3,419.40</td>
<td>301.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>263.40</td>
<td>253.60</td>
<td>165.20</td>
<td>243.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>70.26</td>
<td>211.10</td>
<td>1,486.10</td>
<td>238.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>241.07</td>
<td>437.41</td>
<td>134.54</td>
<td>498.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>296.58</td>
<td>158.69</td>
<td>83.85</td>
<td>1,378.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>66.29</td>
<td>62.93</td>
<td>83.18</td>
<td>566.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>163.69</td>
<td>338.83</td>
<td>117.54</td>
<td>679.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>109.09</td>
<td>268.53</td>
<td>68.87</td>
<td>539.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>113.64</td>
<td>417.66</td>
<td>133.39</td>
<td>711.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>110.48</td>
<td>284.30</td>
<td>218.62</td>
<td>375.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>118.79</td>
<td>247.75</td>
<td>51.40</td>
<td>1,894.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>256.07</td>
<td>222.81</td>
<td>306.23</td>
<td>8,862.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>209.38</td>
<td>155.56</td>
<td>118.43</td>
<td>1,490.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>326.62</td>
<td>139.57</td>
<td>85.40</td>
<td>1,219.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011(1-3)</td>
<td>49.08</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>166.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,712.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,595.46</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,046.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,980.54</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA

The wave of FDI from the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) into SEA in the second half of the 1980s has triggered significant process of transnationalization for the enterprises of the NIEs. As early as the 1970s, there were already sporadic cases of Taiwanese companies investing in Malaysia, as well as other SEA countries like Indonesia and Thailand. We may call this period the ‘first wave’ of Taiwanese investment to SEA countries.

This first wave of outward investment had positive influences to the economy of Taiwan. First, it temporarily solved the crisis of SMIs being closed down. Second, it increased the experience and capability of Taiwan businesses in the operation of international business. Third, it provided the necessary pioneering and promotional effect for Taiwan SMIs to move outwards.

By the 1980s, Taiwan has already accumulated over 30 years of economic development, with its export witnessing continued growth. Its foreign exchange reserves increased cumulatively. By 1987, its reserve has ranked first three in the world. At that time the unfavourable conditions in Taiwan drove the local enterprises to look for new ventures overseas for their businesses, thus starting a big wave (the second wave) of investment fervour from Taiwan to SEA, Malaysia included.

Basically, investment from Taiwan in this period was mainly centred in export-oriented and labour-intensive SMIs. These were the so-called sun-set industries in Taiwan, characterized by small capital, flexible operation, but highly sensitive to market sentiment. Once they found it difficult to survive in Taiwan, exploring outside became the only logical choice. Most of them ventured ‘privately’, without approval from Taiwan government or government of the investing country. They survived in their own ways (Hsiao and Kun 2002).

Malaysia was a good choice for Taishangs because it was stable politically, not plague by anti-Chinese issues. It was blessed with rich natural resources. It also had a good system of law and administration, and possessed excellent public facilities. It had the largest proportion of Chinese population besides Singapore, giving the advantage of ease of language communication for Taishangs (Kung, 2005). Besides the above factors, Malaysia also had the following advantages over the other countries in SEA: good geographical location giving easy access to other countries, matured industry, lower production cost, multiethnic society which was an advantage for export.

Following the changes in the economic environment, the pattern of Taiwanese investment in Malaysia started to shift, especially after the 1990s. Capital-intensive large enterprises started to take an interest in setting up their operations in Malaysia. Notably, companies such as Acer Group, Inventec Group, Tatung Group and Hualon had started their operations in Malaysia around 1987-1991 (Lin, 2002).

The amount of Taiwan investment in Malaysia started to increase in 1988, reaching a peak in 1990. Subsequently it started to declare, quite sharply after 1991, but increased again in 1994. After that it started to decline again sharply reaching low in 1999 and 2002. The investment picked up slowly after 2008. The increased investment until it reaches its peak in 1990 is due to the pushing factor of expansive labour cost in Taiwan, coupled with the pulling factor of cheaper labour cost in Malaysia and the welcoming attitude of Malaysian government though informal. The subsequent rapid decline is accountable by the beginning of Taiwanese investment in Mainland China. Table 2 shows the amount of investment from Taiwan to China for 1991-2003. This period also coincided with the rapid increase in labour cost in Malaysia in the early 1990s. But the expansion of the existing Taiwanese companies and the subsequent investment of their collaborative factories contributed to the subsequent increase of investment in 1994. Thereafter, Malaysia began to lose its comparative advantage of labour cost to Thailand and China, and the Taishangs began to move their capital there (Qin and Tan, 2000).
Table 2: Taiwan Investment in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Amount (in million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>9,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,519</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recalculated from Chiu (2004) Table 1.

After 2008, Taishangs in China began to encountered difficulties. They felt the pressure of wage hikes and increased competition. Some of them felt it necessary to look into other options for the future. There was an urgent need to diversify their investments. It was in this light that Taishangs were considering withdrawing from China and relocating to SEA again as an important destination for future investments (Hong, 2009). This explains the slight increase in Taiwanese investment in Malaysia after 2008.

PATTERNS OF TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA

The description ‘walk-the-world with a suitcase’ (Hsiao and Kung, 2002) aptly described the ‘outward-moving’ approach adopted by the SMI businessmen of Taiwan when the survival of their businesses was threatened. This was the attitude taken by Taishangs when they first came to Malaysia sporadically in the 1970s.

Their investment actions were carried out privately and on their own accord. Without formal diplomatic relation between Taiwan and Malaysia, they did not go through the formal channel of getting approval by Taiwan authority. They often relied on their own social network and relation available to them. In most cases their investment did not even go through approval by local authority. In some cases, the names of local contacts were utilized. In a sense such investments were unofficial, or semi-official at most, opportunistic, and embedded (Kung, 2005).

After the announcement of “Go South” policy, Taiwan’s transnational capital began to flock into SEA in large number. The in-flow of such capitals were considered as ‘migratory’ in nature, and were of opportunist type. The impression was that they would exploit local resources, and would move elsewhere afterwards. However, when the big corporations started to set up their plants in Malaysia, and started to yield good profit, they began to gain respect from high-level officials in Malaysia government. Big corporation that set up plants in Malaysia include, among others, ACER Group, Evergreen Heavy Industrial Corporation, ACER Group, TECO Group, Tatung Corporation, Ornasteel Enterprise Corporation, Hualon Corporation and Inventec Electronics. Malaysian government recognized the contribution of these investments by conferring the awards of ‘Datukship’ to the chairmen of these Taiwanese companies: Stan Shih, Theodore Huang, Lin Cheng-Yuan, Yao Wu-Nian, Ong You-Ming, and Yeh Kuo-I, and so on.

In the statistics from Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) on Taiwanese investment, over the period from 1959 to 2008, there is a total investment of USD 10,113.18 millions and
a total of 2239 items of approved investment. In terms of ranking of FDI to Malaysia, Taiwan was ranked number 1 in the years 1990 and 1994, number 10 in 1999, number 11 in 2006, and number 13 in 2007. The average ranking, however, stands at number 3 in the period from 1959 to the first half of 2008.

Recent data show that there are about 20 Taiwanese companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). There are also more than 20 Taishangs being awarded and carried the prestige of Datukship in Malaysia. Taishangs have set up a united association in Malaysia since 1990. The association is named Taipei Investors’ Association in Malaysia (TIAM). TIAM is the representative of Taishangs in Malaysia to look after their welfare as well as to negotiate with the local authorities for various issues encountered, such as taxation, securities, labour and the status of staying. As a matter of fact, Taishangs play the role of promoting the economic as well as diplomatic development between the two countries. They also help in forging collaboration between institutions of Taiwan and Malaysia in a number of industries.

Kung (2005) considered the economic actions of Taiwanese investment in Malaysia as one of ‘embedding’ in the local Chinese community. In a survey conducted by Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research in 1994 on the channel of investment by Taishangs in five SEA countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines), apart from those who moved there on their own (33.8%), 19.8% of them were introduced by local Chinese. In the case of Malaysia it is more significant because of the large percentage of Chinese population there.

The process of investment usually involves the following steps: acquisition of land, construction of factory, and plant operations. At each of these steps, Taishangs had to deal with local authorities, and their lower ranking officers. Taishangs often sought assistance from local Chinese and their network of contacts. Utilizing such local Chinese network relationship greatly reduced the cost of investment, as well as reducing the risk of investment.

Taiwan’s SMIs, being small scale, are sensitive to the global economic climate and maintain a high level of vigilance over the situation. A flexible collaborative up-stream production material supplier network is involved to sustain their contingency function. The production line, if necessary, can be adjusted within a short time so as not to incur too much extra cost. Another feature is the involvement of small ‘invisible’ factories, such as outsourced companies and family factories. When such SMIs relocated their plants to Malaysia, how to reconstruct these associated collaborative supplier network became a problem. One solution is to duplicate such a network in Malaysia; in so doing, they would invite their companies in the collaborative supplier network to invest in Malaysia. Another solution is to do everything within the plant with a continuous production process. A further solution is to organize such a collaborative supplier network within Malaysia. Whatever approaches adopted, the network formed by the Taishangs is separate from the local Chinese network.

Another feature of the Taiwanese investment in Malaysia, and SEA in general, is their reliance on technical expertise from Taiwan. There are several reasons for that. Technology wise, Taiwan is more advanced than Malaysia, and technical information is more readily available from Taiwan. Second, for investments which are daughter companies of Taiwan corporations, technology is supplied by the parent companies. In such cases, Taiwanese investment merely opened up their production plants overseas.

In the system of production operation, Taishangs adopted the ethnic division of labour to manage the multi-ethnic personnel in their plants which are of different cultural background. Taiwanese are placed as the principal person in charge, local Chinese are production managers and administrators, Malays and foreign workers are mainly workers. This systematic arrangement of ethnic division of labour is different from the mono-ethnic personnel structure in Taiwan. It is an important mechanism that they adopted for survival in a foreign land.

ISSUES OF TAIWANESE INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA

‘Ai bia jia e ya (to brave death to succeed)’ is the popular slogan used by Taishangs when they went to SEA to look for opportunities for investment in the 1970s. These early pioneers had to brave all odds to gain a foothold in a strange land. The issues and problems faced by them then were: (a) pertaining to local
conditions and situations, (b) related to business operation, (c) problem of adaptability to local environment, (d) problem with the attitudes of workers.

Malaysia was a strange land to Taishangs when they first came. Although there was large percentage of Chinese in Malaysia, not all of them could speak Mandarin and Hokkien, the language commonly spoken in Taiwan. English was often the common language of communication in Malaysia. But Malay was the official language and was used in most dealings with official channels. Effective communication between the Taishangs and the local people was hence restricted in the early years. In most cases, the Taishangs had to rely on the local Mandarin- or Hokkien-speaking Chinese to get around for communication.

There were also cultural differences. Food presented a problem to the Taishangs on their first encounter. Dealing with people in Malaysia was also a problem because of the differences in customs and cultural backgrounds, even with local Chinese.

The purpose of Taishangs coming to Malaysia is to invest there. But they were unfamiliar with local laws and regulations, and the local working conditions. To begin with, they had to deal with matters related to land acquisition to build the factory. There were legal issues involved, and they had to consult legal opinions. Usually they went through their network and contacts to get things done. Building the factory involved more issues: appointing the architect, getting the contractor, supervising the project of construction if necessary, license application for electricity and water, application for pioneer status if applicable, etc. There were also issues that they had to overcome in the course of factory operation: hiring of staff and workers, implementing the system of factory management, control of production process, etc. They would draw on their experiences from Taiwan, but those experiences might not be suitable and applicable. In most cases adapting to local conditions could be challenging.

Dealing with local staff and workers could also be challenging. Malaysia is a multiethnic society. The Malays are Muslims. Taishangs therefore have to accommodate their eating habits and religious practices. The workers in the factories are mainly Malays and foreign workers, and they are considered as ‘lazy, irresponsible and slow wit’ (Kung, 2005). These workers therefore are not as productive as the workers in Taiwan, contributing thereby to lower productivity.

When Taishangs relocated their plants to Malaysia, reconstructing their associated collaborative supplier network became a problem. Duplicating such a network in Malaysia is one way, by inviting the collaborative companies in the supplier network to invest in Malaysia. Another solution is to do everything within the plant with a continuous production process. A further solution is to organize such a collaborative supplier network within Malaysia.

One of the major factors attracting Taishangs to invest in Malaysia was the abundance of cheap labour. But by the early 1990s, there was a sudden shortage of labour in Malaysia. The local workers were replaced by foreign workers, of various countries of origin. Managing workers of different ethnic origins was not easy for Taishangs. The effect of this was the increase in the production cost. At around the same time, there was a rush for Taiwanese SMIs to invest in China. Both factors combined to contribute to the reduced direct investment by Taishangs in Malaysia.

This downward trend was compensated, at least in part, by the influx of big corporate companies from Taiwan to set up plants in Malaysia. Such investments were viewed quite favourably by the Malaysian government with encouragement and ease of facilities despite having no formal diplomatic relation between the two countries.

The liberalized tariff environment under ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA) offers yet another opportunity for Taishangs in Malaysia. They can market their products in ASEAN. Under the ASEAN FTA (AFTA), goods produced in Malaysia can enjoy lower or zero tariff when export to other countries in the ASEAN. Goods from Taishang’s companies in Malaysia can take advantage of this arrangement to export their goods to the other countries in the ASEAN.

On the other hand, with ASEAN signing separate FTAs with Japan (AJFTA 2008), Korea (AKFTA 2009) and China (ACFTA 2010), Taishangs in Malaysia find that they face a difficult problem. This is because raw materials imported from Taiwan by Taiwanese companies in Malaysia, tariff duties are levied, whereas lower tariff or no tariff duties are levied on raw materials imported from China, Japan and
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia

Korea by the respective investment companies. Under such unfavourable conditions many SMI
Taiwanese companies find that they are no longer competitive, and would decide to opt out of Malaysia,
unless they are given the same preferential status as China, Japan and Korea.

The signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and
Taiwan in 2010 is a milestone event. It potentially widens the market for Taiwan's exports, with more
than 500 products made in Taiwan to enter China at low or no tariffs. The significant effect of ECFA it
builds a bridge for Taiwan to enter into economic cooperation agreements with other countries.
Furthermore, foreign investors can form joint venture with Taiwan’s enterprises to operate business in
Asia together, and ASEAN specifically. In this sense, Taiwan can provide not only great soft power,
innovation and relatively abundant human resources, but become the innovation research center of high
technology, electronic and IT industries or even become the center of financial information service
(Chiang, 2011).

CONCLUSION

Taiwanese investment to Malaysia occurred in three waves. The first wave started in the 1970s. During
this period, most of the investors ventured on their own to Malaysia without official or even semi-official
contacts between Malaysia and Taiwan. The second wave began in mid-1980s, at the time of sharp
appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar and rising wages in Taiwan, and also during the economic
downturn in Malaysia. The third wave was from the end of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s. This period
also witnessed the interest of large Taiwanese corporations to set up factories in Malaysia. The climate of
big scale investment from Taiwan to Malaysia during this period was spurred by the “Go South” policy of
the Taiwan government.

The interaction of Taishangs with the local Chinese business community is a complex issue. The
Taishangs, because of their cultural background, do not quite fit in with the local Chinese community,
although they speak the same language (Mandarin and Hokkien) and have similar food. Furthermore, the
Taishangs are closely linked back to Taiwan for technical support, for raw material supply and for market
intelligence. In some cases, the entire up-stream suppliers may also open up their factories in Malaysia to
support a certain industry. In such cases the investor industry and its collaborative up-stream suppliers
form a network by itself, which does not quite fit in well with the network of local Chinese businesses.
The description of Taiwanese business network in Malaysia as being embedded within the Chinese
business network in Malaysia (Kung, 2005) is an over-simplification.

In the past, Taishangs relied, for their contacts in Malaysia, heavily on a small sector of the
Chinese community in Malaysia, especially business circle related to their businesses, and former
graduates of Taiwan universities. This type of contacts is very restricted. Taishangs in Malaysia should
look beyond the Chinese business communities in Malaysia. They could help drive policy-making, in
Malaysia. A role that Taishangs might be able to play is to act as a partner for ASEAN economies and to
help building better production chains in the ASEAN region (Severino 2009). In this way, Taishangs
would be part of ASEAN regional integration process. Involvement in ASEAN’s production chain could
also give Taishangs access to other markets. For this to happen, Taishangs must be able to contribute
effectively to the ASEAN integration process (Parsons, 2009).

It has been noted by the Taishangs that the local Chinese staff working in their companies are
lacking in spirit and drive when compared to the workers in Taiwan. This view can only be partially true.
It is certainly not true for the entire Chinese community. It has widely accepted that the Chinese in SEA
were successful in business and trade. It has also been reported that the success of a Chinese farming
community is attributed to their pioneer spirit and ‘their ability to adapt to changing situation’ (Wu,
1995). Taishangs did not involve much with local Chinese as their business partners. It would be
interesting to see what the partnership would lead to if Taishangs were to team up with high-spirited local
Chinese.

Taiwan’s joining APEC and WTO has given Taiwan some space in furthering its trade and
investment with the rest of the world. Although APEC does not have the restrictive power, it nevertheless
allows Taiwan to voice out its views. WTO allows Taiwan full power as an economic entity. It is recognized that WTO is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. Under the rule of WTO Taiwan is expected to be treated equally as any other members. Ideally any FTA signed between any two countries, the same FTA would have to be extended to a third country as well. Thus if a country signs a certain tariff agreement with another country, then Taiwan can ask for equal treatment from both countries.

Taiwanese investment is mainly in SMIs. When TIAM was established in 1990, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia Dr. Mahathir Mohamed was present, showing the importance the Malaysia government attached to Taiwanese investment to Malaysia. It is recognized that SMIs form the backbone of the country’s economy, as they have the function of providing stability to the society. Malaysia should take advantage of the fact that Taishangs, and therefore the associated SMIs, preferred to invest in Malaysia over other countries in the ASEAN. Giving them more preferential treatment would be able to lure them to stay, if not to expand their investment. With a strong Taishang group, it would help to strengthen the local SMIs and to develop them into a strong force. One can even go beyond this to suggest for Taishangs to play a bigger role in ASEAN. The total Taishangs’ investment in ASEAN is sizeable, and is mainly in the SMIs. Recognizing that the economies of most of the countries in ASEAN are at the verge of taking off, developing their SMI strength would be their priority (Pitsuwan, 2011). This is an area that Taishangs can play an influential role, using their experiences and expertise. Furthermore, ASEAN is exerting its soft power as a group in its international dealings. For it to play an effective role, it has to develop strong SMIs to back it up.

Taiwan has started to engage in a dialogue with Singapore with the view of reaching the Taiwan-Singapore FTA (The China Post, 2011). As Taiwan is a valuable partner for Malaysia, it is time for Malaysia to also forge a FTA with Taiwan. This will give the signal to Taiwan that Malaysia encourages higher volume of investment from Taiwan. China’s reaction to this move would not be strong, as Taiwan investment will not overshadow China’s investment and trade. Moreover, there is certain urgency in this matter, as the move has to be taken before Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, which are also countries favourable to Taiwanese investors. The recent reported plan by Taiwan to build a petrochemical complex project in Malaysia (Focus Taiwan News Channel, 2010) is certainly a positive step towards strengthening bilateral tie between Malaysia and Taiwan.

REFERENCES


Focus Taiwan News Channel. (2010). ‘Talk of the day - ECFA effect: Taiwan begins FTA talks with Singapore’.2010/08/05.

http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?ID=201008050009&Type=aTOD.


THEME FOUR

ASEAN ECONOMY COMMUNITY
MAKING OF THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: ASEAN INTEGRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON WORKERS

Qaiser Munir, Fumitaka Furuoka, Beatrice Lim, Roslinah Mahmud and Khairul Hanim Pazim
Human Resource Economics Program, School of Business and Economics
Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Sabah
fumitakamy@gmail.com / fumitaka@ums.edu.my / qaiser@ums.edu.my / gshaziaqaiser@hotmail.com / beatrice@ums.edu.my / roslinah@ums.edu.my / k_hanim@ums.edu.my

ABSTRACT

ASEAN integration can be considered one of the most important geopolitical agenda in the region. This paper examined ASEAN integration and its impacts on the workers in the region. It used the theories of economic integration to explain how economic integration would affect the employment situations and working conditions of the workers in the ASEAN countries. It is interesting to note that it took more than 40 years after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 to create the Free Trade Area (FTA) in the region. Moreover, AFTA still has not adopted the Common External Tariff (CET). The free movement of goods and services under the FTA tends to have less direct effects on the workers in the FTA member countries. Furthermore, in 2003, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish the ASEAN Community by 2020. However, ASEAN leaders carefully excluded the free movement of labour under this “incomplete” Common Market. In short, these facts seem to indicate that ASEAN integration would have some indirect impacts on the employment situations and working conditions through foreign direct investment or international trade. However, ASEAN integration, so far, would have minimal direct impact on workers in ASEAN countries because the free movement of workers was carefully excluded from the discussions and negotiations in making the proposed ASEAN Community.

Keywords: Economic Integration, Workers, ASEAN, ASEAN Community, ASEAN Free Trade Area, Labour

INTRODUCTION

It is well-known fact that the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is one of the most successful and most ambitious economic integration in the world. The association was established on August 8, 1967 at the capital of Thailand with signing of the ASEAN Declaration, or so-called the “Bangkok Declaration” (ASEAN, 2011a).1

The ASEAN consists of the following ten member countries, 1) Brunei, 2) Cambodia, 3) Indonesia, 4) Laos, 5) Malaysia, 6) Myanmar, 7) the Philippines, 8) Singapore, 9) Thailand and 10) Vietnam. The original member countries of the ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei became member state in 1984 while Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995. Two more countries, Laos and Myanmar became the ASEAN member countries in 1997. Finally, Cambodia joined the ASEAN in 1999 (ASEAN, 2011a).2

1 Other successful economic integrations in the world are the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The origin of the EU was a international organization called the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC) which was established on July 23, 1952 with signing the Treaty of Paris. On the other hand, the NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994.
2 Currently, EU consists of 27 member states while the NAFTA consists of 3 countries only. The original member states of EU are: France, (West) Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. The member countries of NAFTA are: Canada, Mexico and United States and it does not expand its membership to other countries.
According to the Bangkok Declaration, there are seven main aims and purpose of the ASEAN. First of all, ASEAN aims to promote economic, social and cultural development in the region. Secondly, ASEAN aims to promote regional peace and stability. Thirdly, ASEAN aims to promote active regional collaboration. Fourthly, ASEAN aims to provide assistance to each other. Fifthly, ASEAN aims to collaborate more effectively for the utilization of resource and expansion of international trade, Sixthly, ASEAN aim to promote the Southeast Asian Studies. Finally, ASEAN aims to maintain closer relationship with other international organizations (ASEAN, 2011a).

On February 24, 1976, the leaders of original five ASEAN countries, namely, 1) Lee Kuan Yew, 2) Ferdinand Marcos, 3) Hussein Onn, 4) Kukrit Pramoj, 5) Suharto signed an important document called the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” (TAC) at Denpasar, Bali. This treaty became a underlying foundation of unique characteristics of ASEAN, or so-called the “ASEAN Way” (ASEAN, 2011b).

According to the treaty, there are six fundamental principle of ASEAN. The first principle is the “mutual respect”. The second principle is the “freedom from external interference”. The third principle is the “non-interference in international affairs of other member countries”. The fourth principle is the “peaceful settlement of dispute”. The fifth principle is the “renunciation of use of arms”. Finally, the sixth principle is the “effective collaboration” (ASEAN, 2011b).

It is very interesting to note that there is huge discrepancy among ASEAN member countries in terms of their population, total area and income. First of all, in terms of population, the largest country in ASEAN is Indonesia with population of 231 million. The second largest country is the Philippine with population of 92 million, followed by Vietnam with population of 87 million.

By contrast, the smallest country in ASEAN, in term of population, is Brunei with population of only 0.4 million. The second smallest country in ASEAN, in term of population, is Singapore with population of 4.9 million, followed by the Laos with population of 5.9 million.

Secondly, in terms of total area, the largest country in ASEAN is Indonesia with total area of 1.860 million square kilometres. The second largest country is Myanmar with total area of 0.676 million square kilometres, followed by Thailand with total area of 0.513 million square kilometres.

On the other hand, the smallest country in ASEAN, in term of total area, is Singapore with total area of only 0.7 thousand square kilometres. The second smallest country in ASEAN, in term of total area, is Brunei with total area of 4 thousand square kilometres.

Thirdly, in term of total national income, Indonesia has the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in ASEAN and it amounted to US$ 546 billion in 2009. Thailand has second largest GDP and it amounted to US$ 264 billion, followed by Malaysia and its GDP amounted to US$193 in the same year.

By contrast, Laos has the smallest GDP in ASEAN and it amounted to only US$ 5.5 billion in 2009. Cambodia has the second smallest GDP and it amounted to US$ 10.3 billion, followed by Brunei and its GDP amounted to US$10.7 in the same year.

Finally, in term of income per person, Singapore is the wealthiest country in ASEAN and its per capita GDP amounted to US$36,631 in 2009. The second wealthiest country is Brunei and its per capita income amounted to US$26,486, followed by Malaysia and its per capita income amounted to US$6,822 in same year.

On the other hand, Myanmar is the least wealthy country in ASEAN and its per capita GDP amounted to only US$419 in 2009. The second least wealthy country is Cambodia and its per capita income amounted to US$692, followed by Laos and its per capita income amounted to US$910 in same year.
Table 1: Basic Fact of ASEAN (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Area (thousand km²)</th>
<th>GDP (US$ billion)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>26,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>2,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>6,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>36,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>3,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>4,435</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>2,532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Selected basic ASEAN indicators” from ASEAN (2011c)

There is also huge difference in the labour market condition in ASEAN countries. In term of labour force, Indonesia has the largest labour force in ASEAN. Indonesia’s total number of labour force amounted to 116 million and 108 million workers are employed in 2010. Vietnam has the second largest labour force in the region. The total number of labour force in the country amounted to 50 million and 49 million workers are employed. The Philippines has the third largest labour force in the region. Total number of labour force in the country amounted to 38.8 million and 36 million workers are employed.

By contrast, Brunei has the smallest labour force among ASEAN countries. Brunei’s total number of labour force amounted to only 198 thousand and 193 thousand workers are employed in 2010. Laos has the second smallest labour force. The total labour force in the country amounted to 2,776 thousand and 2,738 thousand workers are employed. Singapore has the third smallest labour force. Singapore’s total number of labour force amounted to 3,135 thousand and 3,045 thousand workers are employed.

In term of unemployment rate, the Philippines’ unemployment rate is highest in ASEAN and its unemployment rate is 7.4 percent in 2010. Indonesia has second highest unemployment rate and its unemployment rate was 7.1 percent, followed by Myanmar and its unemployment rate was 4.0 percent in 2007.

On the other hand, Thailand’s unemployment rate is lowest in ASEAN and its unemployment rate is 1.0 percent in 2011. Laos has second lowest unemployment rate and its unemployment rate was 1.3 percent in 2005, followed by Cambodia and its unemployment rate was 1.8 percent in 2001.

Next, in term of male labour force participation (MLFP) rate, Indonesia has the highest MLFP in the ASEAN and its MLFP rate is 83.76 percent in 2010. Myanmar has the second highest MLFP and its MLFP rate is 82.04 percent in 2007, followed by Vietnam and its MLFP rate is 82.0 percent.

By contrast, Cambodia has the lowest MLFP in the ASEAN and its MLFP rate is 72.1 percent in 2001. Brunei has the second lowest MLFP and its MLFP is 76.4 percent in 2007, followed by Singapore and its MLFP rate is 76.5 percent.

Finally, in term of female labour force participation (FLFP) rate, Vietnam has the highest FLFP in the ASEAN and its FLFP rate is 73.0 percent in 2010. Cambodia has the second highest FLFP and its FLFP rate is 64.4 percent in 2001, followed by Thailand and its FLFP rate is 64.2 percent.

By contrast, Malaysia has the lowest FLFP in the ASEAN and its FLFP rate is 46.1 percent in 2010. The Philippines has the second lowest FLFP and its FLFP rate is 49.7 percent in 2007, followed by Myanmar and its FLFP rate is 49.8 percent in 2007.
Table 2: Labour Market Condition in ASEAN (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labour Force (thousand)</th>
<th>Employed workers (thousand)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate (percentage)</th>
<th>Male Labour Force Participation (percentage)</th>
<th>Female Labour Force Participation (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (2001)</td>
<td>6,309</td>
<td>6,243</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>116,527</td>
<td>108,207</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos (2005)</td>
<td>2,776</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>11,517</td>
<td>11,129</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (2007)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>38,894</td>
<td>36,025</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>38,643</td>
<td>38,037</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>50,392</td>
<td>49,048</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n/a is an abbreviation of the “not available”

ASEAN integration can be considered as one of most important geopolitical agenda in the region. This paper examined the ASEAN integration and its impacts on the workers in the region. It used the theories of economic integration to explain how the economic integration would effect the employment situations and working conditions of the workers in the ASEAN countries.

This paper consists of five sections. Following this introductory section, the second section examines the creation of ASEAN community. The third uses the theory of economic integration to examine the future of ASEAN. The fourth section is conclusion.

**ASEAN INTEGRATION: MAKING OF ASEAN COMMUNITY**

The ASEAN integration started as an informal production network led by Japan after the World War II. This production network was known as the “Flying Geese” pattern of economic integration, which, in effect, could be regarded as the first attempt at ASEAN integration (Furuoka, 2005).

According to Furuoka (2005), it took decades for Japan to restore its economy after the war. The huge US market has been vital for Japan’s export-related industries. In order to bolster its increasing economic power, Japan embarked on creating a production network in East Asia.

Zhang (2011) pointed out that Japan played a leading role to create the “Flying Geese” production network in East Asia. This production-based economic integration could explain the rapid expansion of inter-regional and inter-industrial trade in the region. More importantly, the “Flying Geese” pattern of economic integration in ASEAN is a result of market force. There is no formal mechanism for the economic integration in ASEAN.

However, the “Flying Geese” pattern of economic integration was destroyed by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998-1999. Simon Tay (2002) commented that the Asian economic crisis has scattered the flock of geese that followed the Japanese model of development.

On the other hand, formal process of ASEAN integration took place by creating the free trade area in the ASEAN or so-called the “ASEAN Free Trade Area” (AFTA). According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia, the creation of the AFTA started in 1992. The six countries of ASEAN member countries or so-called ASEAN-6, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore...
and Thailand, signed the AFTA agreement at the ASEAN Summit in Singapore on January 28, 1992 (MITI, 2011).

There are three main objective of creating of the AFTA. The first objective of the AFTA is to establish a single market in the South East Asia. The second objective of the AFTA is to attract multinational corporations (MNCs) to invest in the region. Third objective of the AFTA is to increase international trade and investment among ASEAN countries (MITI, 2011).

According to Malaysia’s MITI, the creation of the AFTA is the ASEAN countries’ response to the emerging other economic integration in other regions, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the expansion of the European Union (EU) (MITI, 2011).

Under the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPTs) scheme, the ASEAN-6 countries successfully lowered intra-region tariffs. The tariff rates of more than 99 percent of all products in the CEPT inclusive list have been brought down to 0-5 percent range by January 1, 2010 (ASEAN, 2011d).

At the Ninth ASEAN Summit at Bali, Indonesia on October 3, 2003, ASEAN leaders agree to establish the ASEAN Community by signing a declaration known as the Bali Concord II. There are three pillows of the ASEAN Community, namely 1) political and security cooperation, 2) economic cooperation and 3) socio-cultural cooperation (ASEAN, 2011e).

Furthermore, at the Twelfth ASEAN Summit at Cebu, the Philippines on January 13, 2007, the ASEAN leaders agreed to accelerate the creation of the ASEAN Community by 2015 by the signing of another declaration known as the “Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community” (ASEAN, 2011f).

The ASEAN leaders signed the constitution of the ASEAN community, the “ASEAN Charter” at the Thirteenth ASEAN Summit at Singapore on November 20, 2007, (ASEAN 2011g). The ASEAN Charter can be considered as a firm foundation of the ASEAN community by providing its legal and institutional framework (ASEAN, 2011g).

In other words, the adaptation of the ASEAN Charter would transform the ASEAN integration from the market force-based regional organization into the regulation-based one. However, Pushpanathan commented that the ASEAN Charter is a “form” rather than “substance”. The substantial outcome would be achieved only after the regulation and institution would become more mature (Pushpanathan, 2009).

More importantly, the ASEAN Charter would ensure that the ASEAN member countries would speak out other member countries’ political situation. The ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan commented that the ASEAN member countries could not discuss about the internal matters of each member in the past. However, after the adaptation of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN member countries are able to express their concerns, to give warnings, to ask for explanations (Hotland, 2008).

**ASEAN INTEGRATION AND ITS IMPACTS ON WORKERS**

There are four stage of economic integration. The first stage of economic integration is known as the Free Trade Area (FTA). The main characteristic of the FTA is that all member countries will remove the tariffs on other member countries’ products. However, each member country would retain its independence in imposing individual tariffs on non-member countries’ products (Appleyard, et al, 2006; Holden, 2003).

The second stage of economic integration is known as the Custom Union (CU). The main characteristic of the CU is that all member countries will remove the tariffs on member countries’ products. At same time, all member countries would impose same tariffs on non-member countries’ product. This tariff is called the “Common External Tariff” (CET) (Appleyard, et al, 2006; Holden, 2003).

The main purpose of the CET is to prevent the trans-shipment strategy. When each country imposed on own external tariffs, non-member countries would export a product to the country which has the lowest external tariff. This strategy is called the “trans-shipment strategy”(Appleyard, et al, 2006).

The third stage of economic integration is known as the Common Market (CM). The main characteristic of CM is that all member countries will remove the tariffs on member countries and adopt the CET. At same time, member countries remove all barriers to the factor movement among member countries.

The final stage of economic integration is known as the Economic Union (EU). The main characteristic of the EU is that all member countries will remove all barriers to the free movements of goods, services, labour and capital and will adopt the CET. At the same time, all member countries would unify the economic institutions and adopt common economic policies (Appleyard, et al, 2006; Holden, 2003).

The four stages of economic integration can be summarised in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of economic integration</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Area (FTA)</td>
<td>No tariffs among member countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custom Union (CU)</td>
<td>FTA + common external tariff (CET)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Market (CM)</td>
<td>CU + free movement of labour and capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Union (EU)</td>
<td>CM + common economic policy and institution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appleyard et al. (2006) and Holden (2003)

First of all, a famous example of the Free Trade Area (FTA) is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The origin of the NAFTA is the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement which was signed on October 4, 1988. It expanded its membership to Mexico and become the tripartite FTA in 1994 (Cockerham, 2010).

Secondly, the well-known example of the Custom Union (CU) is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The SACU is the oldest customs union which was established in 1910 and consists of following five countries, 1) Botswana, 2) Lesotho, 3) Namibia, 4) South Africa and 5) Swaziland. The SACU will collect the import duties on products from non-member countries and tariff revenues would be allocated to member countries following a revenue-sharing formula (SACU, 2011).

Thirdly, a famous example of the Common Market (CM) is the European Economic Area (EEA) which came into force on January 1, 1994. The CM consists of twenty-seven member countries of the European Union (EU) and three member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or so-called EEA-EFTA countries, namely, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (EFTA, 2011).

Fourthly, the well-known example of the Economic Union (EU) is the European Union (EU). The origin of the European Union is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by signing the Treaty of Paris on April 18, 1951. There were only six countries in 1951 and currently are twenty-seven member countries in the European Union (EU, 2011).

It is very well-known fact that the AFTA have not adopted the Common External Tariff (CET). In other words, the stage of ASEAN integration remains as the first stage of the Free Trade Area (FTA). The free movement of goods and services under the FTA tends to have least direct effects on the workers in the FTA member countries.

Furthermore, in 2003, ASEAN leaders agree to establish the ASEAN Community by 2020. However, the ASEAN Community would not a “complete” Common Market in the all member countries would remove all barriers for the goods, service, labour and capital. In other words, the ASEAN Community would be a single market in which all member countries would remove barriers for goods, services and capital (Cockerham, 2010). It should be noted that ASEAN leader carefully excluded the free movement of labour under this “incomplete” Common Market named ASEAN Community.

These facts seem to indicate that ASEAN integration would have some indirect impacts on the employment situations and working conditions through foreign direct investment or international trade. However, ASEAN integration, so far, would have minimum direct impact on workers in ASEAN countries because the free movement of workers was carefully excluded from discussion and negotiation of making ASEAN Community.
CONCLUSION

ASEAN is one of the most successful and most ambitious economic integration in the world. This paper examined the ASEAN integration and its impacts on the workers in the region. It used the theories of economic integration to explain how the economic integration would effect the employment situations and working conditions of the workers in the ASEAN countries.

It is interesting to note that it took more than 40 years to create the Free Trade Area (FTA) in the region after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. Moreover, it is very well-known fact that the AFTA still have not adopted the Common External Tariff (CET). The free movement of goods and services under the FTA tends to have least direct effects on the workers in the FTA member countries. Furthermore, in 2003, ASEAN leaders agree to establish the ASEAN Community by 2020. However, ASEAN leader carefully excluded the free movement of labour under this “incomplete” Common Market named ASEAN Community.

In short, these facts seem to indicate that ASEAN integration would have some indirect impacts on the employment situations and working conditions through foreign direct investment or international trade. However, ASEAN integration, so far, would have minimum direct impact on workers in ASEAN countries because the free movement of workers was carefully excluded from discussion and negotiation of making ASEAN Community.

REFERENCES

ASEAN (2011c). “Selected basic ASEAN indicators”, http://www.asean.org/stat/Table1.pdf [accessed on September 30, 2011]


COOPERATION WITHIN THE ASEAN PLUS THREE CONTEXT: INCIDENTAL OR COINCIDENCE?

Mohd Hafizuddin Md Damiri
East Asia Studies
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
hafizz.damiri@aol.com

ABSTRACT

The way forward for ASEAN to be competitive and a renown regional grouping is by strengthening her political and security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation with other developed countries in the region. Thus by creating a caucus known as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), which comprises ten ASEAN Member States and three East Asian nations – mainly PR China, Japan and Republic of Korea – further enhancing the ASEAN organization, through mutual cooperation and understanding in 20 broad areas. But, was it merely a coincidence, due to the Asian Financial Crises of 1997 or was it based incidentally, through the “Asia for Asians” slogan, forged during the Second World War by Japan? This article will provide some insights and observations to the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation.

Keywords: ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation, East Asia Study Group, East Asia Vision Group, Asian Financial Crisis.

BACKGROUND

The ASEAN Plus Three cooperation began in December 1997, with the convening of an informal summit among the leaders of ASEAN and their counterparts from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), at the sidelines of the 2nd ASEAN Informal Summit in Malaysia.

The ASEAN Plus Three Summit was institutionalized in 1999 when the Leaders issued a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation at their 3rd ASEAN Plus Three Summit in Manila. The ASEAN Plus Three Leaders expressed greater resolve and confidence in further strengthening and deepening East Asia cooperation at various levels and in various areas, particularly in economic and social, political and other fields.

A number of key documents have been adopted to set the direction for ASEAN Plus Three cooperation. These include the Report of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) of 2001 and the Report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG) of 2002.

Subsequently, to facilitate and to assist the ASEAN Plus Three co-chairs to coordinate and monitor ASEAN Plus Three cooperation, the ASEAN Plus Three Unit was established at the ASEAN Secretariat in December 2003 to fit the purpose.

THE BEGINNING OF A COOPERATION: THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 1997

The East Asian Financial Crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of Asia beginning in the summer of July 1997 and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown or financial contagion. It is also commonly referred to as the East Asian currency crisis or locally as the IMF crisis.

The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht caused by the decision of the Thai government to float the baht, cutting its peg to the USD, after exhaustive efforts to support it in the face of a severe financial overextension that was in part real estate driven. At the time, Thailand
had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the collapse of its currency. The drastically reduced import earnings that resulted from the forced devaluation then made a quick or even medium-term recovery impossible without strenuous international intervention. As the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping currencies, devalued stock markets and asset prices, and a precipitous rise in private debt.¹

Though there has been general agreement on the existence of a crisis and its consequences, what is less clear were the causes of the crisis, its scope and resolution. Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were also fairly hurt by the slump. China, India, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam were relatively unaffected. Japan was not much affected by the crisis but was going through its own long-term economic difficulties. However, all of these Asian countries saw their currencies fall significantly relative to the United States dollar, though the harder hit nations saw extended currency losses.

Although most of the governments of Asia had no national debt and seemingly sound fiscal policies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was forced to initiate a $40 billion program to stabilize the currencies of South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, whose economies were hit particularly hard by the crisis. In Japan, which had already been in a state of profound recession due to a highly inefficient banking system laboring under mountains of bad debt (much of which up to that point had been relatively invisible because of the established Japanese banking practice of hiding the losses of major customers), the United States intervened to stop a precipitous slide in the value of the yen by agreeing to buy some $2 billion worth of the Japanese currency. In doing so, the United States hoped to increase the value of the yen, which had fallen to its lowest point in some eight years.²

The efforts to stem a global economic crisis did little to stabilize the domestic situation in Indonesia, however. After 30 years in power, President Suharto was forced to step down in May 1998 in the wake of widespread rioting that followed sharp price increases caused by a drastic devaluation of the rupiah. The effects of the crisis lingered through 1998. In the Philippines growth dropped to virtually zero in 1998. Only Singapore and Taiwan proved relatively insulated from the shock, but both suffered serious hits in passing, the former more so due to its size and geographical location between Malaysia and Indonesia. By 1999, however, analysts saw signs that the economies of Asia were beginning to recover.³

ASEAN PLUS THREE: AN INCIDENTAL COOPERATION?

Since the 1997 financial crisis, there has been a growing trend toward regionalism in East Asia. In addition, increasing regionalism elsewhere has made it necessary for East Asia to focus more on securing common regional interests in the multilateral trading arena. This trend toward East Asian economic integration has been accelerating under the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework.

In 1998, ASEAN Plus Three established The East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) of eminent persons which reported in 2001. In turn in 2001 the East Asian Study Group was established. In 2002, ASEAN Plus Three received the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group⁴. In 1999, a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation was issued on the topic of East Asian integration by ASEAN.

⁴ The East Asia Study Group or EASG, consisting of Government Officials, was established in March 2001 to assess and report the outcomes of the recommendations of the East Asia Vision Group or EAVG. The EACG consists of eminent intellectuals from ASEAN Member States, People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, which provide recommendations, suggestions and implications of establishing an East Asian Community and the East Asian Summit.
⁵ The Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, signed by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN at the 3rd Informal ASEAN Plus Three Summit in Manila, Philippines on 28 November 1999 was based on the earlier decision by the Leaders of ASEAN, People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea at the 5th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in December 1998 on the importance of holding a regular meeting among them, and recognizing the ongoing efforts of the East Asia Vision Group, they agreed to enhance this dialogue process and strengthen cooperation with a view to advancing East Asian collaboration in priority areas of shared interest and concern even as they look to future challenges, including the establishment of an East Asian Community.
The APT framework is an important element for fostering East Asian regionalism. The APT leaders at the Manila summit in November 1999 agreed on broad economic cooperation, and resolved to promote economic linkages among East Asian countries toward integrating the ASEAN region with China, Japan and ROK.

The APT framework has a multi-layered structure, consisting of three levels: ASEAN+3, ASEAN+1, and ASEAN. The APT summit has been held annually and ministerial meetings in foreign affairs, economics and finance were established permanently in 2002 to discuss various issues and regional cooperative programs. Eight ministerial meetings have been held so far, including the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM). Moreover, the establishment of diverse cooperative channels such as the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), the East Asia Study Group (EASG) and the Vice Finance Ministerial meetings has strengthened systematic fundamentals for intra-regional cooperation.

As a consequence, the EASG was inaugurated in 2001 and the final EASG report encompassed 26 projects, including 17 short-term projects and nine mid-to-long-term research plans. As a means to further strengthen cooperation, the EASG recommended that the annual APT summit meetings be developed into the East Asian Summit (EAS) and also advocated the formation of an East Asian Free Trade Area.

However, the APT process has already been overshadowed by the ASEAN-China initiative towards a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement, which includes the free trade agreement (FTA) that was signed in 2002. After China agreed to the FTA with ASEAN, Japan, confronted with losing its position of leadership on East Asian economic cooperation, eagerly pursued general cooperation with ASEAN and promptly agreed to an FTA with Singapore. In addition, the Japanese government hosted a Japan-ASEAN summit in December 2003 and held the Japan-ASEAN commemorative summit as a prelude to firmer economic relations with ASEAN.

As shown in the process of its FTA negotiations with China, ASEAN has tried to woo Japan, Korea and India into establishing closer economic partnership with economies in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, regional integration under the ASEAN+1 process may provide an important building block for establishing an East Asian integrated market. Although APT countries have taken different standpoints on the EAFTA, they held the common belief that an EAFTA would help boost intra-regional trade and investment as suggested by the East Asia Study Group (EASG).

In terms of the regional cooperation frameworks that currently coexist in East Asia, Korea should exploit each and every one, be they small or large, including EAS, ASEAN+3, and ASEAN+1. Korea should contribute to building a collective security system in East Asia by promoting EAS to the level of diplomatic and security cooperation, while developing APEC into an OECD for the Asia-Pacific region. Then, ASEAN+3 would evolve into an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) in trade and strengthen the Chiang Mai initiative in finance.

**COOPERATION MISCONCEPTIONS: COMMONNESS IN REGIONALITY OR ECONOMY-POLITICS?**

Through commonality of the Asian region in socio-culture and historical values, ASEAN together with China, Japan and ROK developed cooperation in both economics and politics (ecolitics) aspects. But in the midst of enhancing cooperation with regard to its common pull-factor, this ‘coalition’ appears to be taking shape towards establishing an Asian financial institution. Most ASEAN Plus Three meetings address the issue of regional finance, besides promoting economic and technological exchange within the region. Therefore, the idea of a unified Asia has long derailed from its original concept and if not taken seriously, the ASEAN Plus Three congregation will soon be nothing than a mere cooperation.

China, as the emerging economic superpower of the east and strongest controller of the US dollar overseas, has long eyed the ASEAN caucus. Japan on the other hand has moved towards technological advancements and financial assistance, in which ASEAN Member Countries are eagerly to accept
assistance of. For ROK, it is still on the cards, waiting patiently for its grip to strengthen in the aspects of industry, financial, technical and technological cooperation.

For ASEAN Plus Three to unify to support its own vision of the international economy, all thirteen states will first have to overcome the considerable tensions that exist between them. While the need for economic unity could well promote conciliation in the security realm, the obstacles are significant. Moreover, there is no clear economic model that it can defend or promote, though all thirteen states strongly support a Westphalian understanding of the international system, and most agree that the state potentially has an extensive role to play in the organization of the domestic economy. Ever if these obstacles could be overcome, the long-term implications for ASEAN remain uncertain. While ASEAN may have an initially important role to play in realizing the ASEAN Plus Three caucus, the effectiveness of such instrument is contingent in relations between the Plus Three powers. If these countries did resolve their differences enough to make the ASEAN Plus Three a real possibility, then ASEAN’s role as a regional intermediary would decline.

As time goes by, most of the academia wondered if this cooperation will move further or will stumble. Financial crisis, it seems, was the basis for this cooperation and it is hoped that this cooperation will never again rely on another financial crisis to take place.

REGIONAL FACTORS: ANOTHER POINT FOR COOPERATION?

The most important antecedent of ASEAN Plus Three is, of course, ASEAN itself. Although ASEAN has provided an important foundation for the development of a wider grouping, there are some important differences in the formative dynamics of both groupings that merit brief emphasis. ASEAN, as noted earlier, was very much a product of the aftermath of the decolonization process, the Cold War and the great power contestation that continues to grip the region. Regionalization – or the private sector-driven economic integration manifest in denser trade and investment flows – was not a decisive force in encouraging closer political cooperation in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, intra-regional trade is still modest between the non-complementary and essentially competitive economies in most of ASEAN.6

It is important to remember that ASEAN is composed of a number of small economies, the structure and development of which has been profoundly shaped by firstly colonialism and latterly by the activities of more powerful economic and political forces from outside Southeast Asia.7 In other words, there have been integrative forces encouraging economic regionalization, but these have emanated from countries like Japan, which are outside the smaller ASEAN grouping and are an expression of wider East Asia forces. At the level of regionalization, therefore, an expanded ASEAN Plus Three grouping that takes account of such pan-regional forces makes intuitive sense.

The underlying logic of the broader East Asian region’s multi-tiered development experience, in which Japan pioneered an industrialization process that spread initially to South Korea, Taiwan and then onto Southeast Asia and China, has led to a flurry of initiatives designed to consolidate regional integration. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), for example, reflected Southeast Asia’s incorporation into region-wide production networks.8 More recently, both Japan and China have moved to consolidate their economic relations with Southeast Asia through bilateral trade agreements.9

Plainly, competition rather than cooperation between Japan and China – as they attempt to realize their respective regional leadership ambitions – may have a good deal to do with such initiatives. However, the attempt to enhance regional autonomy by institutionalizing and increasing intra-regional trade and investment is also a reflection of a more fundamental and enduring reality; the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and its aftermath dramatically brought home to East Asia’s political and economic elites just

---

how dependent they are on external markets and how vulnerable they are to outside political pressures.\textsuperscript{10} The crisis was consequently a watershed at a number of levels and led to a number of crucial political and economic initiatives that have given impetus to the ASEAN Plus Three project.

**CONSOLIDATION OR CONFLICT?**

It is important to emphasize that the idea of a specifically East Asian grouping to represent the possible collective interests of the region is not new or something exclusively associated with the crisis and its aftermath. The East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by the former Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamed was frustrated by a combination of US opposition and a directly consequential Japanese ambivalence.\textsuperscript{11} Equally significantly, ASEAN Plus Three has continued to develop momentum despite the fact that it is essentially Mahathir’s vision in another guise.

Political cohesion, as expressed in common outlooks and positions and in the exercise of collective leadership, is an essential prerequisite for regional economic integration. Economic integration depends to a large extent on political will, driven by political as well as economic considerations, and inspired by long-term political vision. Without a higher degree of political cohesion, real economic integration is not possible. Conversely, regional economic integration is a necessary condition for political cohesion, as well as for the competitiveness of the region. As the European experience has shown, political cohesion needs to be built on economic foundations, which gives countries an economic stake in regionalism. For this reason, these two endeavors – political cohesion and economic integration – need to be undertaken in an interrelated way. The intimate linkage between them ought to be clearly recognized and vigorously acted upon.

In some ways, this should come as no surprise: despite the frequently noted diversity of the East Asian region which provide ASEAN Plus Three with a potential basis for regional identity and consolidation. Moreover, the members of ASEAN Plus Three had already begun to forge common perspectives through inter-regional initiatives like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Indeed, the fact that such an exclusively East Asian grouping appeared a more ‘natural’ expression of an identifiable region reveals how misconceived those analyses which continues to focus on a wider ‘Asia-Pacific regionalism’ actually are.\textsuperscript{12} The key question for ASEAN Plus Three is whether the sorts of initiatives it has undertaken will be able to build more successfully on its putative regional identity.

**OBSERVATIONS**

Given the number of political, economic and strategic variables currently in play, it is wise to keep in mind about the dangers of prediction – especially about the future. However, it is possible to identify key dynamics that are likely to shape regional outcomes and extrapolate from existent trends.

The first observation to make about ASEAN Plus Three is that, like other regional organizations such as APEC and the narrower ASEAN grouping, it promises much but has arguably delivered relatively little so far. Like ASEAN and APEC, ASEAN Plus Three is displaying signs of institutional consolidation and has spawned a plethora of Summits, Senior Official Meetings and working groups in areas such as finance and trade, political and strategic cooperation, as well as energy and environmental cooperation.\textsuperscript{13} Such initiatives clearly help to give institutional ballast to the region, build confidence and identity, and may ultimately prove to be important parts of an effective regional institutional infrastructure. At present, however, they are more reminiscent of the, possibly well-intentioned, efforts of APEC to promote economic reform and facilitate integration through the establishment of functionally-oriented working


\textsuperscript{13} Nick Thomas, “From ASEAN to an East Asian Community? The Role of Functional Cooperation”, Working Paper Series, No. 28, (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2002).
groups and the like. Like APEC, ASEAN Plus Three’s adherence to the ‘ASEAN way’ of consensus and voluntarism,\(^\text{14}\) and lingering concerns about establishing a powerful secretariat that might ultimately threaten national autonomy is also likely to make the development of effective and binding regional initiatives much more difficult.

Second observation: the diversity of governance in East Asia. In East Asia, by contrast, not only are there profoundly different levels of development, modes of governance and potentially disparate policy perspectives as a consequence, but the regional mega-economies of Japan and China are also integrated into the global economy in ways that make the identification, let alone the implementation of common policy positions inherently problematic. This is not to say that there are not important historical forces that might encourage greater regional economic and even political cooperation, but whether the desire for a greater sense of regional identity can overcome the different policy positions that fundamentally different economic structures generate, to say nothing of overcoming the long-standing regional rivalries that exist between Japan and China, is a moot point.

Third observation: the potential influence on the course of East Asian countries’ development emanates from outside the region. Directly or indirectly, the US continues to exert a critical influence an East Asian regional development. Significantly, the effect of American influence appears to vary across issue areas: while America’s intervention in the region’s post-crisis development had the effect of accelerating the process of regional political and economic cooperation, it seems safe to predict that the trajectory of East Asian regionalism will continue to be profoundly influenced by American actions and essentially reactive as a consequence. The only question now is whether such constraints will ultimately spill-over into the economic sphere and make even that aspect of the ASEAN Plus Three regional integration less feasible? From what it is viewed, the foreseeable of the ASEAN Plus Three will be marked by a form of ‘reactionary regionalism’ in which regional initiatives are designed to mediate and moderate external influences.

CONCLUSION

As competition is building up within the ASEAN caucus itself, it is very important to be aware on the types of challenges and constraints in integration. Furthermore, as a competitive ASEAN generates higher economic growth, coupled with stable regional politics and heightened security efforts, development gaps within the region needs to be addressed, in ensuring ASEAN prosperity is shared among over her 550 million inhabitants. This will ensure equal knowledge distribution and skills upgrade, for her inhabitants to be competitive, participate and benefit from the regional integration and future sustainability of ASEAN.

After a series of failures, ASEAN and its neighbors created another regional grouping the ASEAN Plus Three, established in 1997 and institutionalized in 1999. The significance of this grouping was demonstrated in the response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. ASEAN Plus Three appeared to take the role of community building in East Asia and as a result, the status of ASEAN Plus Three is unclear with the existence of the more recent East Asia Summit established in 2005 following this process and involving all the members of ASEAN Plus Three, together with India, Australia and New Zealand.

At the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) East Asia Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on 13 December 2005, the leaders of ASEAN Plus Three, Australia, India and New Zealand met to study a regional cooperation mechanism to create an East Asian community. However, the Asian Regionalism presents many characteristics difficult to modify and overcome in the future. In addition, the enlargement of EAS will face two challenges. First, there is not still an agreement on the members and the model of institution that the future community should follow and second, who will be tasked to play the leadership role in the East Asia community building has not been confirmed yet. The construction of an East Asia community is still an ongoing process\(^\text{15}\).


\(^{15}\) In order to further strengthen and deepen regional cooperation, various ASEAN Plus Three cooperation bodies could conduct research and/or studies in areas of mutual interest to all East Asia Summit countries, to serve as an institutional mechanism for broad-based social exchanges and regional cooperation in East Asia.
THEME FIVE

ASEAN AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
POSITIONING ASEAN IN THE GLOBALISED WORLD: ORGANIZING THE ASEAN INTER-CITY FOOTBALL LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Lim Peng Han
Department of Information Science
Loughborough University, United Kingdom
p.h.lim@lboro.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

In our globalised world, China is poised to be the second largest economy and have been very successful in attracting foreign investment by its sheer size and growing spending power of its consumers. From the years 2007 to 2010 the total inflow of Foreign Direct Investment into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has declined from US$69.5 billion to US$36.1 billion. The globalization of English Football League (EPL) has generated billion dollars revenues from TV rights. The ASEAN broadcasters paid about US$ 182 million to televise the matches. ASEAN could position itself in the globalised world by integrating its football leagues into one 20 Inter-city Football League and creating a ten-month regional free-to-air sports broadcasting programme that could generate TV rights and advertisement revenues. The free-to-air programme can reach 139 million household TV sets in ASEAN.

The EPL pay TV subscribers total about 6 million. The Inter-City League can attract indigenous and foreign companies to sponsor the league, teams and players. It can stimulate intra-ASEAN travel and tourism among each city’s fans and supporters to attend the 380 matches. Traditional and contemporary song, dance and music of each ASEAN country can be shown before each game to showcase and understand ASEAN’s socio-cultural diversity as one method for socio-cultural integration. The Inter-city League is a viable project because there is a ready supply more than 30 football stadiums scattered among the ASEAN cities. The projected TV rights and sponsorship revenue can sustain and expand the league in and beyond ASEAN.

Keywords: ASEAN, Economic Integration, Sponsorship, Broadcasting, Socio-Economic Integration

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to justify the initiation of an ASEAN-Inter City Football league consisting of 20 teams spread throughout the region to position Southeast Asia in the globalised world of sports and to provide sustainable development in the media, transportation, tourism and cultural industries. Using existing data on football stadiums, cable TV subscribers, free-to-air TV households, internet users and total annual advertising expenditure in the region, the author suggests that the League can create a regional and localized sports and cultural media industry and facilitate the growth of transportation and tourism hubs. It can be a vehicle for ASEAN to achieve economic and social integration by 2015 with its existing infrastructure and not having to depend on any FDI.

ASEAN PLANS FOR 2015

In 1967 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in Bangkok by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and the deputy prime minister of Malaysia.
The initial objective was to place regional reconciliation (in the wake of Indonesia’s Confrontation of Malaysia) within an institutionalized structure of relations (Leifer 1999, 50). By 2011 ASEAN consists of ten countries namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. ASEAN has a total population of more than 590 million as shown in Table 1. There are differences in official languages, currencies, and wide disparities in per capita income and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among member countries.

Table 1: Selected indicators of ASEAN countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developing countries</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Official languages</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Per Capita Income (US $)</th>
<th>Foreign Direct Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>Burmese</td>
<td>Kyat</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>Khmer</td>
<td>Riel</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>313.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos PDR</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Lao</td>
<td>Kip</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>Dong</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>4,310.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>Filipino and English</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>732.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>231.4</td>
<td>Bahasa Indonesia</td>
<td>Rupiah</td>
<td>2,363</td>
<td>6,243.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>491.3 (83%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newly Developed Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>Baht</td>
<td>3,950</td>
<td>3,511.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>Bahasa Malaysia</td>
<td>Ringgit</td>
<td>6,822</td>
<td>3,313.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Brunei Malay</td>
<td>Dollar (B $)</td>
<td>26,177</td>
<td>247.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>English, Chinese, Malay, Tamil</td>
<td>Dollar (S $)</td>
<td>36,631</td>
<td>17,341.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100.7 (17%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>592.0 (100%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ¹ASEAN 2011a; ASEAN 2010.

At the Bali Summit in 2003, ASEAN Leaders declared that the goal of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) shall achieve regional economic integration (Bali Concord II) by 2020. However, at the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007 the leaders agreed to hasten the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 and to transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour and freer flow of capital (ASEAN 2008, 1).

However, there are still many recurring issues of economic connectivity and integration. Recent available data from 2005 to 2008 revealed that a large imbalance in basic infrastructure exists among ASEAN members countries. Only 13 per cent of the population in Myanmar has access to electricity, compared to 64.5 per cent in Indonesia. Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam trail member countries in terms of access to sanitation infrastructure.

Furthermore, plans to upgrade the 38,400 km ASEAN Highway Network project, build the 7,000 km Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) and designating 51 airports and 46 ports to form integral parts of the trans-ASEAN transportation network are hampered by many issues, particularly the need for effective coordination and financing (Bhattacharyay 2010).

The total FDI inflows into ASEAN has significantly declined from US$ 69.5 billion in 2007 (ASEAN 2009) to US$ 36.1 billion in 2010 (ASEAN 2011a). Therefore it is not possible for ASEAN to depend on FDI
with the deepening instability, uncertainty and continuing weakness of the global financial markets and institutions unfolding among three key players:

**SLOWDOWN IN THE US ECONOMY**

The financial crisis of 2008 originating from the United States triggered a series of housing loan defaults and wipeout many of the hard earned savings of Asian investors who bought the subprime-mortgage-back securities and its related financial products. The Government sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy mortgages in the secondary market and sell them as securities having government agency status. Most of the bonds were held by Japan and China. In 2007 China was estimated to hold US $376 billion in long-term US agency debt – most of which was issued by Fannie and Freddie. China’s stock of Fannie and Freddie debt amounted to at least 10 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product.

However, a decade prior to the crisis, Fannie and Freddie were poorly and at times illegally run. They were operating in the rapidly expanding mortgage market with significantly lower ratios than banks, including huge accounting issues discovered in 2003. Furthermore, Congress failed to regulate Fannie and Freddie at a time and manner that could have helped prevent the financial crisis (Thompson, 2009).

The relaxation of requirements concerning making a significant down payment caused the housing cycle to get out of control (Kling 2010, 31). During the decade 1997-2007 home mortgage liabilities rose from US $2 trillion to over US $10 trillion (Wray 2007, 27). By the beginning of 2008, an estimated 8.8 million households, or a tenth of the total, had experienced negative equity (Blackburn 2008, 17). Real estate process fell on average by 10.2 per cent between January and February 2008. By 2008 more than 24 per cent of sub-prime mortgages were in foreclosure. This represented more than 1.3 million households which were facing foreclosure, an increase of 79 per cent from the previous year (Sapir 2008, 90).

In July 2007 two Bear Sterns hedge funds, of about US $ 10 billion went into liquidation and were later sold to JP Morgan for a fraction of their market value (Foster 2008, 8). This crash was soon followed by the failure of the British mortgage leader, Northern Rock. The US Congress provided a fiscal stimulus package of US $ 150 billion and the world’s central banks co-ordinated an emergency line of credit of US$ 200 to distress banks (Blackburn 2008, 65). Two government-sponsored mortgage companies own or guarantee about half of the US $ 12 trillion mortgages in the US. For the first time in over 50 years, the reserves of the US banks held by the Federal Reserves were negative. If the crisis spreads to defaults in other debt markets, the entire US banking system could be imperiled (Lucarelli 2008, 34).

The US economy is effectively caught in a debt trap. As the world’s largest debtor nation, it is impelled to attract a net inflow of capital in order to finance its ever burgeoning and cumulative current account deficits. At the same time, the US needs to ensure that the rate of return on US dollar assets is high enough to maintain this inflow of capital and prevent a loss of confidence in the US dollar. Since 2000 the US’s net international investment position has deteriorated dramatically. Sooner or later the fall-out from the vast accumulation of private debt will precipitate a phase of quite severe debt-deflation (Lucarelli 2008, 34-35).

In addition President’s Obama’s initial US $ 787 billion federal stimulus and US 288 billion tax cuts to stem the rise in unemployment proved woefully insufficient (Judis 2011, 18). Over 8 million jobs were lost at the height of the recession, but only one and a half million jobs have been added since the recession’s trough. According to the US Department of Labour, Bureau and Economic Research there was 28.4 million unemployed and underemployed in March 2011 (Magdoff 2011, 24-25).

**A SEVERE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN THE EURO ZONE**

The Greece government’s deficit and public debt exploded during their tenure in the 1980s. Going through several years of the Organization for European Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Factbook, Zahariadis (2010, 89) noticed that the budget deficit increased from less than 3 per cent in 1981 to 11 per cent in 1991. During the same period, public debt rose from roughly 30 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 114.4 per cent in 2001. Much of the increase in public debt is attributed to a ballooning public service
sector, generous industrial subsidies, social benefits and increasing debt payment. By 2009, some 850,000 people were employed in the public sector in a country of 11 million (Dody 2010, 2).

On 17 December 2009 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s sovereign debt to BBB+, driving up borrowing costs. On 12 January 2010 the European Union (EU) formally condemn Greece for falsifying data on public figures, causing further jitters in an anxious market. Unfortunately, investors began dumping Greek bonds (Kontogiannis 2010, 2). Without access to the US$ 150 bailout fund, by other 16 Eurozone countries, Greece as a member, could run out of funds and pitch the fragile global economy into a fresh recession (McCAlatchy, 2011). European officials have turned to Asia to help bankroll their plan to ease Greece’s debt obligation and prevent its fiscal collapse. But China’s US $400 billion sovereign wealth fund is fully invested and currently do not have the resources to make a significant contribution to Europe’s bailout. The Japanese is ready to support Europe, but did not offer details as to what those measures would be (Vaughan, McMahon and Davis 2011).

CHINA’S GROWING DEBT PROBLEMS

China is the second largest economy in the world contributing to 19 per cent of economic growth in 2010 (Miller 2011, 30). Hence more FDI will flow into China at the expense of other regions, including ASEAN. However, China’s government debt has been the focal point for economists, investors and policy makers. Before the economic reforms in 1978, China did not have domestic or foreign debt. After the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, China adopted an expansionary fiscal policy from 1998 to 2003 and budget deficits increased at an extraordinary rate. After the 2008 financial crisis, government debt reached 5,974 billion yuan in 2009, accounting for 17.81 per cent of GDP in 2009. China also has foreign debt, local government debt and public university debt (Li and Lin, 2011). China’s National Audit Office (NAO) revealed that the country’s total debt burden amounted to 10.7 trillion yuan (US $ 1.65 trillion) at the end of 2010, or about 27 per cent of the GDP. Analysts cautioned that indebtedness could be well bigger since state-government statistics routinely overstated or understated the figures to conceal rising defaults and misuse of funds. The authority recognizes the level of local government debts represents a problem. What it needs to do is to stop local level leveraging before risks in the financial system careens out of control (Chan 2011, 91).

Hence in addition to the worries as to whether the US will plunge into a double-dip recession and whether the euro zone will collapse, economists are looking at the possibility of China’s growing US $ 6 trillion economic bubble that may burst. China’s strength is essential to the recoveries of both the US and Europe. If China crashes, the reverberations will be felt everywhere (Miller 2011, 30).

Meanwhile the European football leagues in England, Italy, Spain, France and Germany have globalised the world by exporting the broadcasting rights of their matches. In 2005 the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) sold its broadcasting rights to 233 nations, including 53 in Africa, 58 in North and South America, 55 in Europe, 32 in Asia, 13 in the Middle East and 22 in Oceania. In the same year 1.5 billion people watched the final between Liverpool and A C Milan (Solberg and Turner 2010, 354). Since its inaugural season in 1992, the English Premier League (EPL) matches were broadcasted to 600 million homes in 202 countries. In the United Kingdom BSkyB paid US$2.6 billion for a three-year period. Other deals around the world accounted for a quarter of the league’s roughly $US1.8 billion broadcasting revenue (Spiegel 2008, 1).

However, in August 2010 the EPL dropped from the schedules of many of its last remaining major free-to-air terrestrial television broadcasters and made it matches available through Pay-TV stations (Gold 2010, 1). In October 2009, Singapore Telecom or SingTel, with a TV subscriber base of 100,000, secured exclusive rights to broadcast 380 EPL matches for three years from August 2010 (Lim 2010, 1). Business Times estimated Singtel could have paid between US$150 million to US$300 million (Chai 2010, 1). TV provider, ASTRO was reported to have committed in excess of US$235 million to keep its exclusive rights to broadcast the 2010/2013 EPL matches in Malaysia (Jayaseelan 2010, 1). ESPN Star Sports (ESS) paid an estimated US$600 for the EPL rights across most of Asia for the same period (Hicks 2010, 2). In Southeast Asia ESS have the rights in Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos DPR, Myanmar and the Philippines. In Malaysia and Brunei, it works in partnership with Astro (AFP 2010, 1). In 2008 ESS sold the EPL exclusive rights to TV
provider Aora in Indonesia for US$25 million (Latul 2010, 1-2). It may not be possible to ascertain how much in total the operators in Southeast Asia paid to the EPL and ESS for the 2010/2011 season. Using the secondary published data in the newspaper reports and in the internet, it is likely that the total amount could add up to US$182 to US$184 million per season.

The EPL can only reach a maximum of total Southeast Asian subscribers of about 6 million. Therefore it would be to ASEAN’s interest to reduce or minimize this outflow of money by initiating its own ASEAN Inter-City Football League (AIFL) consisting of 20 teams playing 380 matches over a ten-month period. The AIFL free-to-air broadcast have a potential reach of 139 million households with TV sets. The TV audience can also reach all the commercial shopping centres and large and small inexpensive eating places, reaching the majority of the middle and lower middle income Southeast Asian population as shown in Table 2. Content can also be disseminated the League official website considering the regional internet penetration of more than 88 million is than the cable TV subscribers.

The AIFL will be able to begin with no infrastructure costs and can be sustainable and self-financing by obtaining sponsorship of the tournament, teams and marketing of free-to-air broadcasting rights. It can create a regional sports broadcasting and advertising industry, promote the selected cities and towns and stimulate the growth of intra-ASEAN tourism and transportation networks.

Table 2 Population and media research of Southeast Asia region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (2011) ¹</th>
<th>Cable TV</th>
<th>TV sets</th>
<th>Internet users (2008) ²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>231.4 mill.</td>
<td>0.5 mill. °</td>
<td>52.0 mill. ³</td>
<td>33.3 mill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>28.3 mill.</td>
<td>0.5 mill. °</td>
<td>5.5 mill. ³</td>
<td>13.0 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4.9 mill.</td>
<td>0.7 mill. ²</td>
<td>1.0 mill. ³</td>
<td>3.4 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.4 mill.</td>
<td>0.02 ²</td>
<td>0.2 ²</td>
<td>0.3 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>67.0 mill.</td>
<td>0.8 mill. ²</td>
<td>17.3 mill. ³</td>
<td>10.2 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>87.2 mill.</td>
<td>2.1 mill. ⁰</td>
<td>21.4 mill. ³</td>
<td>22.0 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>92.2 mill.</td>
<td>1.2 mill. ²</td>
<td>16.0 mill. ³</td>
<td>6.2 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>59.5 mill.</td>
<td>0.06 ²</td>
<td>25.7 mill. ²</td>
<td>0.2 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>5.9 mill.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.3 mill. ²</td>
<td>0.05 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>14.9 mill.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.07 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>591.7 mill.</td>
<td>5.9 mill.</td>
<td>139.4 mill.</td>
<td>88.72 mill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ¹ASEAN 2011a; ² International Telecommunication Union 2011 (selected pages); ³ Euromonitor 2010, 351; ° internet (various sources); ⁰ International Telecommunication Union 2009 (selected pages).

NO INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS

There are more than 40 professional or semi-professional football teams based in cities and towns scattered throughout Southeast Asia. Hence it is possible to select 20 teams with hypothetical mascots representing all ASEAN countries shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Hypothetical teams and names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/Town Team</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Stadium</th>
<th>Crowd capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Bander Seri Bagawan Swifts</td>
<td>0.3 million</td>
<td>Sultan Hassal Bolkiah</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Phnom Phen Rats</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>National Olympic</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Jakarta Rhinos</td>
<td>8.7 million</td>
<td>Bung Karno</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Surabaya Crocodiles</td>
<td>3.0 million</td>
<td>Gelora 10 Nopember</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Medan Deers</td>
<td>2.0 million</td>
<td>Teladan</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Makassar Whales</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>Mattoagin</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Laos
7. Vientiane Elephants 0.5 million National Stadium 18,000

Malaysia
8. Kuala Lumpur Tigers 4.8 million Shah Alam 69,000
9. Georgetown Swifts 1.2 million Negeri Pulau Pinang 40,000
10. Kota Kinabalu Sparrows 0.5 million Likas Stadium 35,000

Myanmar
11. Yangon Pythons

Philippines
12. Manila Eagles 14.7 million Rizal Memorial 30,000

Singapore
13. Woodlands Deers 0.1 million Jurong 6,000
14. Kallang Cranes 0.2 million Jalan Besar 6,000

Thailand
15. Bangkok Cobras 11.9 million Rajamangala 65,000
16. Chiangmai Bats 0.9 million 700th Anniversary 25,000
17. Songkla 1.3 million Tinasulanon 20,000

Vietnam
18. Hanoi Hornets 6.5 million National Stadium 40,000
19. Ho Chih Min City 4.9 million Thong Nhat 25,000
20. Nha Trang Turtles 0.3 million Nha Trang 25,000

Sources: Internet (various sources).

OWNERSHIP OF THE AIFL
The ownership of the AIFL will be shared with the ASEAN Football Federation (AFF) and the other ten football associations in each ASEAN country as shown in Table 4. There is lateral communication and coordination between the ASEAN Secretariat and its AEC and ASC Committees as well as FIFA. The AIFL should be formed as a corporation and managed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and marketing, operational, financial and administrative departments.

Table 4: Proposed management structure (Preliminary)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)</th>
<th>ASEAN Football Federation (AFF)</th>
<th>10 National Football Federations</th>
<th>FIFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ASEAN Inter-City Football League Council/Corporation

Note: FC means Football Club.
REVENUE FROM TV RIGHTS

In 2010 the month long AFF Suzuki Cup played among ASEAN countries became Southeast Asia’s top rating TV programme with 192 million viewers in key markets. The audience’s ratings of broadcasters RCTI in Indonesia, RTM in Malaysia, ABS-CBN in the Philippines, Mediacorp in Singapore, BBTV in Thailand, VTV in Vietnam and ESPN Star Sports’ regional platform saw a 32 per cent increase from the 2008 Suzuki Cup. The second leg final alone generated a 79 market share while the second leg semi-final was RCTI’s highest rated programme of all time with a market share of 82 per cent. In Malaysia, national free-to-air broadcaster RTM recorded shares of 40.3 per cent and 48.4 per cent respectively for each of the two final leg matches. Vietnam delivered the second largest viewership after Indonesia with a total audience of 74.5 million (AFF 2011, 1).

The proposed AIFL will stretch for 10 months excluding the pre-league and post-league publicity. Sponsors’ branding on the perimeter boards place around the football field has the potential reach of about 139 million household TV sets throughout the region compared to EPL matches with a potential reach of 6 million household subscribers. Furthermore, the free-to-air matches can be seen in restaurants, fast food chains and the small eating stalls that have TV sets. It is possible to earn at least US $ 45 million from the sales of TV rights because this is one per cent of the total TV advertising expenditure in ASEAN. See Table 5 showing the AIFL has an advantage of reaching a wider TV audience than the EPL broadcast matches.

Table 5: Comparing Pay TV and free-to-air in Southeast Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Outflow of revenue</th>
<th>Inflow of revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>380 English Football League matches over a ten-month period</td>
<td>US$182-184 mil. (estimate)</td>
<td>US$45 mill. (estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9 million Cable TV subscribers</td>
<td>138.9 million TV sets</td>
<td>²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay TV</td>
<td>Free-to-air</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited retail presence since bar and coffee shop owners have to pay licensing fees to show the EPL matches to its customers</td>
<td>Extensive retail presence since coffee shop owners have free access to AIFL matches.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: the US $ 45 inflow of advertising revenue is one per cent of the total advertisement expenditure in Southeast Asia for one year.
Sources: ¹ Compiled from Hicks 2010, 1; Jayaseelan 2010, 1; Latul 2010, 1-2; internet (various sources); ² Lim 2010, 70.

REVENUE FROM TOURNAMENT SPONSORS

Brand owners and corporate sponsors will be interested to be one of the exclusive product sponsor of the tournament because by sponsoring the AIFL no other competing brand is allowed to be a sponsor. If Toyota has agreed to be one of the tournament’s official car sponsor, not other car brand is allowed to be the sponsors of the league. Sponsor have the rights to advertisement boards with the perimeter of the football field, display their products or services within each football stadium and their logos are featured in all advertisement and promotional materials related to the tournament. In addition each sponsor is given block seating for their VIP and corporate guests for all matches and each sponsor will be given priority to purchase block seats for corporate events and their distributors and dealers.

Sponsorship of the league allows sponsors like official car (Toyota), official bank (Maybank), official airlines (Thai Airways), and others, to combine and create powerful several advertising and promotion campaigns and consumer contests. The sponsorship fee for each sponsor could be US$1.5 million a year in cash or a combination of products and services and cash. Assuming there are ten sponsors coming on board the sponsorship revenue is worth US$15 million a year. Table 4 shows many potential local or foreign
sponsors in their respective product categories and services. The sponsorship cost is within the means of large companies if we were to consider a Singapore telecommunication company paying about US$ 8 million a year for the F1 event (Lim 2010, 1). However, the actual live TV coverage was no more than two hours during the race day. The AIFL stretches over 380 matches over a ten-month period. In 2009 Malaysian Petronas paid US$24 million to sponsor the Yamaha racing team (Nigel 2009, 4). Therefore the initial proposed sponsorship fee of US$1.5 million can a seen as affordable and value for sponsorship money. See Table 6 for the potential list of sponsors. The brand names in bold indicate they were involved with football sponsorship in other countries or other football events.

The sponsorship package of this League can provide many international companies or brands as well as indigenous Southeast Asian companies or brands widespread media exposure and presence in the region. The potential sponsors can plan and execute one integrated marketing and advertising sponsorship programme to reach 10 ASEAN countries simultaneously. They can have greater in roads paved by each respective country’s football associations and partners (tourist associations, local media and distribution channels) to promote their brand and services.

### Table 6: List of potential sponsors by product category (about 10 – 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Southeast Asian/Asian brands</th>
<th>American/European Global brands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cars</td>
<td>Kia, Suzuki, Geeley</td>
<td>Ford, Skoda, Chevrolet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proton, Hyundai, Toyota</td>
<td>Alfa Romeo, Opel, Renault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Maybank, DBS, OCBC</td>
<td>HSBC, ING, Stanchart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td>AirAsia, Emirates, Thai Airways</td>
<td>KLM, Qantas, United Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>Samsung, LG, Huawei</td>
<td>Motorola, Nokia, NTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>Petronas, Pertamina</td>
<td>Caltex, Shell, Esso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>Acer, Toshiba, Lenovo</td>
<td>HP, Dell, Apple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>MDIS, Raffles Institute, LimKokWing Arts College</td>
<td>Monash, UNSW, Curtin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer</td>
<td>Pokka, Sarsi, Indocafe</td>
<td>Coca Cola, Pepsi, Walls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>Baidu, Sony, Indosel</td>
<td>Yahoo, Google, Amazon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telco</td>
<td>Telecom, Singtel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Brands in bold refers to companies or brands have sponsored football tournaments, teams or players.

The sale of TV rights (US$45 million) and sponsorship fees from 10 exclusive product category sponsors (US$15 million) totaling US$60 million can be distributed to the 20 clubs for the duration of the tournament. In addition, each of the clubs would have their own funding through sponsors, gate receipts, club membership fees, the sale of merchandise and possibly, some local government funding.

### MANAGEMENT OF CLUBS AND SPONSORS

The Korean professional football league was launched in 1983. The most striking feature about the professional football in Korea is that large commercial corporations own all the teams except for two. The teams function as an advertising tool (Chun 2004, 122). The pattern of ownership of Japan’s J-League clubs is a balance between local (city and prefecture) government and sponsors (Amara 2005, 199).

Therefore, the AIFL football clubs can each form corporate entities. But its ownership could also be shared between sponsors, local municipal government and each club’s supporters. It is possible for each team to secure sponsorship as the official attire (like Adidas, Nike, FBT and Puma) as well as branding printed on the front of each jersey. The branding on the front side of each jerseys should cost about US$50,000 to US$150,000 per year, depending on the popularity of each team. Each team can also seek sponsorship by
endorsing products not related to football or sports like jeans off the playing area or a particular soft drink like Pepsi or Coca-Cola. It is possible for each team to secure such sponsorship totaling at least US$100,000 per team.

These are modest projections if we were to consider the cheapest estimated shirt sponsorship for Blackpool F. C. And Wolves F. C. For the 2010/11 Premier League season is £400,000 a year. Thailand’s Chang Beer paid Everton F.C. £2.6 million and Samsung paid Chelsea £13.8 million. The highest sponsorship fee was £20 million a year for Manchester United (Aon) and Liverpool (Standard Chartered Bank) (Glendinning 2010, 33). Spanish football clubs receive an average of 2 million Euros for the 2008/09 season (Ledwith 2010, 16). In addition Manchester United endorsed other product lines like Nike sportswear, Audi cars, Hublot timekeeper and Turkish Airlines (Lefton 2010, 2).

It is essential that each club has a sponsor’s name, the city’s name and its mascot’s name. Maybank Kuala Lumpur Tigers is one example as shown in Table 5. This is to ensure that at all times the branding of the city stays all the time. In time to come many of the proposed 20 ASEAN cities will be as famous as Manchester, Barcelona or Liverpool, made famous by each of the city’s football club. A mascot for each club is needed for merchandising purposes. In the event that there is no major team sponsor, the club can be called Nha Trang Turtles or Yangon Pythons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Mascot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maybank</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Tigers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kia</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>Turtles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung</td>
<td>Yangoon</td>
<td>Pythons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canon</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Cobras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nokia</td>
<td>Vientiane</td>
<td>Elephants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual players can look for sponsors for the football boots they are using and also product endorsement. However, the sponsorship fees belonged to the individual player and not the team. See Table 8 for some examples of potential team and individual sponsors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team sponsorship</th>
<th>Individual sponsorship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official wear</td>
<td>Jersey ad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adidas</td>
<td>Maybank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levis jeans</td>
<td>Adidas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft drinks</td>
<td>Nike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakfast cereals</td>
<td>Puma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s toiletries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TEAM MERCHANDISE AND RETAIL DISTRIBUTION (IN EACH COUNTRY AND AIRPORTS)

An average K-League match attracts less than 10,000 spectators per stadium. Match averages in the J-League and Chinese League come close to 20,000 (Manzenreiter and Horne 2007, 568). The population of ASEAN cities varies from about 1.6 million in Kuala Lumpur to as high as 9.5 million in Jakarta and 11.9 million in Bangkok as compiled in Table 2. Therefore the number of spectators would vary from city to city. The sale of merchandise and mascots would also vary. The marketing plans should included distribution in chain stores and airport shops in the region. The production of merchandise for the clubs can create a merchandise industry by itself.

It is envisaged that the initial annual revenue of TV rights and tournament sponsorship fees totaling US $60 million as compiled in Table 9 will be sufficient to run and management the League. At the same time each individual clubs are expected to obtain their own funding through membership fees, merchandising and sponsorship that can vary from US$ 3.5 million or more.
Table 9: Estimate revenue and expenditure of the football league and each club

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue of Inter-City League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product/Service sponsors</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales of TV rights</td>
<td>45,000,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial set up to administer the league</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for each club at 2,000,000 per club</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000,000(for contingency expenditure or development expenditure or prize money)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue for each club</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding from central funds</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attire sponsor</td>
<td>100,000 (or more depending on each club)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branding on jerseys</td>
<td>100,000 (or more depending on each club)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate receipts (19 matches X 10,000 per match less stadium expenses)</td>
<td>190,000 (or more depending on each club)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees from club membership</td>
<td>1,000,000 (or more depending on each club)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales of club merchandise</td>
<td>30,000 (or more depending on each club)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure for each club</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries for 20 players (30,000 a year)</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coach, assistant coach and two trainers</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two equipment staff (20,000 each)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight administrative staff (25,000 each)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative cost of office and equipment</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous monthly expenses (12,000 per month)</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and paramedical staff (total of 4)</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget for medical expenses and insurance</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub total to manage a team (A)</td>
<td>1,684,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelling expenses to 19 cities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 players and 8 staff including coaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ 300 X 28 = 8,400 X 19 trips</td>
<td>159,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel expenses at US 100 per day for 4 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 players X 100 X 4 X 19 trips</td>
<td>212,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub total for travelling expenses (B)</td>
<td>372,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenses</td>
<td>2,056,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance (for other unknown expenses)</td>
<td>1,363,600 (put to development cost if not spent).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The above are only estimate revenue and expenditure. The expenditure is slightly inflated to prevent under budgeting.

INTEGRATING A TEN-MONTH SPORTS TOURISM FOR THE TEN ASEAN COUNTRIES

The ten-month ASEAN Inter-city league will stimulate the travel industry in air, land and sea transport as supporters of each club, travel to the 20 cities to watch the 380 matches over a ten-month period. The influx of sports tourism in each city will help boost the local hotel and retail industries. It will also encourage inter-
ASEAN tourism since the club supporters interest, time and money could be diverted into travelling to each city to attend the football than to travel out of the Southeast Asian countries. Table 10 shows the intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN tourist travel in 2008 and 2009. The AIFL can encourage more intra-ASEAN travel.

### Table 10: Tourist arrivals in ASEAN in 2008 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intra-ASEAN</th>
<th>Extra-ASEAN</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Intra-ASEAN</th>
<th>Extra-ASEAN</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Intra-ASEAN (Decrease)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>225.8</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>157.5</td>
<td>235.2</td>
<td>20.3 (-21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,774.7</td>
<td>3,654.3</td>
<td>6,429.0</td>
<td>1,582.4</td>
<td>6,642.0</td>
<td>8,224.5</td>
<td>1,192.3 (-43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4,125.2</td>
<td>10,472.3</td>
<td>14,597.5</td>
<td>4,007.6</td>
<td>14,091.0</td>
<td>18,198.6</td>
<td>117.6 (-3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>515.6</td>
<td>3,738.3</td>
<td>4,253.7</td>
<td>318.9</td>
<td>3,453.3</td>
<td>3,772.2</td>
<td>196.7 (-38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>254.1</td>
<td>2,885.3</td>
<td>3,139.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,705.0</td>
<td>434.4 (-14%)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Data for Intra-ASEAN travel in the Philippines for 2009 was not available.

Source: ASEAN, 2011b.

The inflow of sports tourists should significantly contribute to tourist spending in countries like Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, since the club supporters also visit other interesting or historical places in addition to watching the football games. Assuming if 200 supporters from each club travel to 19 away matches and each supporter spent US$300 in each city, the total expenditure adds up to US$1,140,000 in each city. Since there are 20 clubs the total expenditure spread to the 20 venues will work out to more than US$20 million. It can contribute to the tourist spending for each country shown in Table 11. Furthermore, there will be constant flow and exchanges of tourists from the rich ASEAN countries to the poor ASEAN countries. Every football stadium will have to organize close to two matches each month during the 10-month period. It can slowly encourage the growth of small businesses and the hotel and tourism industry.

### Table 11: Tourist spending in ASEAN countries in 2008 in millions (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brunei</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Laos</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist receipts</td>
<td>324.74</td>
<td>1,258.67</td>
<td>5,178.22</td>
<td>261.07</td>
<td>14,306.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist spending</td>
<td>509.24</td>
<td>134.64</td>
<td>4,636.67</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>5,636.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist receipts</td>
<td>48.47</td>
<td>5,455.53</td>
<td>10,009.48</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,860.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist spending</td>
<td>39.73</td>
<td>1,735.39</td>
<td>12,822.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,125.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Euromonitor International 2010 (selected pages).

**SOCIAL CULTURAL INTEGRATION**

During the football season each visiting team and its supporters travelling to 19 other cities or towns enabling them to experience the many Southeast hospitality and culture. It is also possible to promote socio-cultural
integration by having a one-hour traditional and modern cultural and musical performance from the many diverse communities one hour before each football game. This can effectively increase the speed of the integration process and also as a counter measure against the relentless flow of Western culture and consumerism into the environment and social-cultural space.

CONCLUSION

In order to achieve economic and socio-cultural integration by 2015 in the globalised world, ASEAN will not be able to depend on FDI from the United States, Europe or China. The AIFL is an effective vehicle that has the potential to gradually position ASEAN into the world’s media, sports and cultural programming, tourism and transportation landscape since there is no need for FDI and all the necessary infrastructure are already available. It is also sustainable League that can benefit ASEAN and its members through many linkages, connectivity and ways:

1. The League can become a regional sports and cultural programming block, like ESS and perhaps much bigger. The League can create its own sports and cultural content that can reach more than 140 households when compared to 6 million cable TV subscribers (Table 2). The initial estimate sale of TV rights is only US $ 45 million, one percent of the total TV advertisement expenditure in ASEAN. It has the potential to increase rapidly because the programme has the potential to have high TV viewership or ratings. In the UK the EPL domestic TV rights revenue grew 15 times from US$62 million in 1992/93 to US$ 927 million for the 2009/10 season (Editor 2010, 28). Media companies (print and non-print) will support the League because they will save a lot of money by allocating time and space by featuring the League and its many local stories.

   It will fast track broadcasting capabilities each of the every city or town will have to rely live matches through ASEAN. The programmes can also be exported to other regions or countries. The League can also create a new income generating platform for new media. There are about 89 internet users in ASEAN.

2. Twenty teams and their supporters will be travelling to 19 other cities. This will stimulate intra-ASEAN travel, support air, land and sea transport and help the hotel and tourism industry to grow.

3. The League will have a powerful platform to popularize traditional and modern Southeast Asian music and cultural performances by showing these programmes one hour before each of the 380 games are played.

4. The 20 ASEAN cities and its teams (KL Tigers, Hanoi Hornets or Surabaya Crocodiles) can be as popular as the cities and their football team in Europe (Manchester City, Barcelona FC or Chelsea FC). Many of the famous English clubs began about 100 years ago. The speed of popularity of the ASEAN cities and teams will increase rapidly because of today’s pervasive media environment.

   The consideration, formulation and implementation of the League is very much depended on the understanding and political will of the ASEAN members. The author hopes to do further research through interviews or surveys to gather opinions from stakeholders like the football associations, potential sponsors, broadcasters, media owners (print and non-print), tourist associations and hotel associations about the proposed League.

REFERENCES


ASEAN. ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2008


ASEAN. “Selected Basic ASEAN Indicators” at ASEAN Secretariat website: http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table2.pdf accessed 26 July 2011a


FIGURING ASEAN ON EQUAL DEVELOPMENT OF MDG’S, HOW REALISTIC?

Arzad Sectio
Department Politics and Government, Faculty Social and Political Science
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
arzadsectio@mail.ugm.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyze how realistic Asean countries can achieve 2015 as final stage of Millennium Development Goals. How MDG’s generates challenges to equality of development in Asean countries, is main research of paper. The paper will gather data from published journals, articles, textbooks, newspapers and any related publications.

Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) is a set of several points of ideal human development. It is inspired by official definition and urgency of human security by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which published on Human Development Report 1993. In September 2000, the United Nations came up with eight points of ideal goal, then it has been ratified by entire nations of the world, including Asean countries. The 8 goals have been ratified by the year 2000 and set to be achieved by 2015, some of goals are poverty alleviation, promoting universal primary education, child mortality reduction, etc.

Today is 2011, and there still 4 years ahead to accomplish. Asean members have been still battling with many problems including the gap of development among members. For instance, according to UNDP 2010 report, Singapore got 0.846, the highest score of Human Development Index among region. Meanwhile Myanmar got 0.451, the least developed one. It shows the gap between the most and least developed is quite wide. So it will be a serious concern for Asean to achieve equality of prosperity level.

Keywords: ASEAN, MDG’s, Human Development

HUMAN SECURITY: A NEW PURPOSE OF NATIONHOOD

“We will have time to reach the Millennium Development Goals - worldwide and in most, or even all, individual countries - but only if we break with business as usual. We cannot win overnight. Success will require sustained action across the entire decade between now and the deadline…”(Kofi Annan)

In his speech in an international summit, Kofi Annan –as General Secretary of United Nation- urged all nations about the importance of defining prosperity. Kofi Annan said the country should prioritize about the needs of citizen. Prosperity was one thing that he talked about. And now, the prosperity is still being a big issue that global encounters with. It is come up with the fact that global faces a distinctive condition on standard of living and so on. This term is also brought from the idea about human security.

And then, what is Human Security? Actually it is not a new thing. It was born by the concern about the distinctive performance in many countries. UNDP defines human security as “first, safety from such chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression. And, second, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life --- whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (Prasetyono,2003). So, human security according to UNDP definition refers to “freedom of fear and freedom of want”. 

187
Currently, the term of human security has been spread into any activity. It is now adapted by many organizations (local and international) and institution (government), and then it is used to frame the global and local politic agenda. It has also replaced the old security (national security and military) into new security agenda (non-military agenda) that contains politics, economy, and social issue within it.

Globalization plays important role in the shift of security concept into non-military or human security agenda. As stated by Giddens (1990), globalization provides culture and ideas to be distributed and developed by many various actors. Peace and security studies after the end of war have been started to perceive that peace in international politic stability determined by non-military aspects. It gradually emerges the idea of how important civil rights compliance which addressed to the scholars community, international summit among nations, economic and business forum, and so on. It surely implies the possibility of new variety of economic/business relations among nations, and even the political discourse. Governments have been forced to adopt the importance of human security for their development policy either to local or international issues.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A BACKGROUND

September 2000 was become a beginning moment in new millennium for every nation to declare the meaning of public welfare to citizen. United Nations, with its specific agency namely United Nation of Development Programme (UNDP) has initiated an international summit -Millennium Summit- which attended by all United Nation members. And in that summit, United Nation also published a document that directly ratified by 189 country members as a commitment to improve and accomplish the goals in the next 15 years. The document was entitled “United Nation Millennium Declaration.”

Millennium Development Goals was born from that document which contained 8 main development goals, also completed with 48 monitoring indicators to inspect and view performance of members since 1990 till 2015 (United Nation, 2010). And these 8 goals also were considered as main purpose for human security development, which spanned to welfare, education, health issue and green environment aspects, completed with certain target for each goal. Those 8 goals and several objectives are:

**Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**
- Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar per day

**Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education**
- Target 1: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

**Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women**
- Target 1: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and in all levels of education no later by 2015

**Goal 4: Reduce child mortality:**
- Target 1: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

**Goal 5: Improve maternal health:**
- Target 1: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

**Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases:**
- Target 1: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread HIV/AIDS
- Target 2: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

**Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability:**
- Target 1: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
• Target 2: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of population without sustainable access to safe drinking and basic sanitation

**Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development:**

• Target 1: Address the special needs of the least developed countries, land-locked countries and small islands developing states
• Target 2: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system
• Target 3: Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ASEAN: A DESCRIPTION**

South East Asia is one of region around the globe which growing fast and dynamic, beside China and India. Blessed with a strong and sustainable growth at early 80’s and 90’s, most of ASEAN countries has reached and achieved a better way of economy improvement. Devan (1987) also describes ASEAN as one of the most “vibrant regions” in the world (Dixon, 1991:04). Attention is drawn to the region’s resources endowment such as market potential with a huge population over 500 millions in latest 2010 report. And these endowments benefit for ASEAN countries to decoy and to enrich themselves with a heavy Foreign Direct Investment. As supported with regional stability, the FDI so far has played a significant role to change the face of region, because it drives the economy, it stimulates economy to grow, as well as it benefits the countries to create a massive employment. And then Gross Domestic Product also surges rapidly due to high investment.

Singapore is the earliest ASEAN country who has enjoyed a robust growth in earlier decade and then well-known as Asia Tigers, together with Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea. A quality growth provided a better improvement on the Singaporean’s way of life. Afterwards, the neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, followed and attempted to grow as well as Singapore did.

**Table 1: ASEAN in Figure 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>GDP Nominal (in million USD)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP Per-capita (in USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>11,963</td>
<td>417,000</td>
<td>31,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>11,360</td>
<td>14,148,000</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>706,735</td>
<td>234,377,000</td>
<td>3,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>6,341</td>
<td>6,443,000</td>
<td>984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>237,959</td>
<td>28,251,000</td>
<td>8,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>35,646</td>
<td>61,187,000</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>188,719</td>
<td>94,013,000</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>222,699</td>
<td>5,165,000</td>
<td>43,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>318,850</td>
<td>63,878,000</td>
<td>4,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>103,574</td>
<td>5,165,000</td>
<td>1,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ASEAN</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,843,846</strong></td>
<td><strong>596,136,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,092</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF, 2011

ASEAN is consisted by 10 various countries, filled by heterogeneity in the terms of economy, politic and demography. These various backgrounds bear a different facet of prosperity for citizen on each country. Income per-capita is often being a hint to measure a purchase power for its citizen. And it also somehow reflects an inequality in any countries grouping, because gap of income among countries has never been narrowed (Wade, 2001). The table above clearly shows that today ASEAN has two members whose the citizens earn a high annual income -Singapore and Brunei Darussalam- which those may be classified into two of the highest income countries in the world. Meanwhile, the majority of ASEAN
countries is listed somewhere around middle income countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines. And the rest is classified as low income countries, namely Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Myanmar.

This distinctive difference about this heterogeneity has born a significant contrast on welfare development. Public services of education, healthcare system and also infrastructure projects are likely different among them, comparing reality between a country and others. Policy and politic orientation among countries are proper answer to respond a question why the difference existed.

And how to reveal the difference, looking the Human Development Index perhaps can be a way-out to compare the quality of life, because it uses comparative measures of life expectancy, literacy, education, standard of living for countries worldwide, including standard of child welfare. Human Development Index is also used to distinguish whether the country is a developed, a developing or under-developed country.

And then countries classification is split into four categories, they are Very High Human Development country, High Human Development country, Medium Human Development country and the last Low Human Development country. Each of these ranking has a specific index range. A Very High Development country possesses index over 0.788. A High Development country possesses index range between 0.677-0.787. And a medium development country has index range between 0.489-0.676. Meanwhile Low Human Development country possess index below 0.488. Now, take a look on table 2 below to see the condition in South East Asia countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>HDI 1990</th>
<th>HDI 2000</th>
<th>HDI 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.hdr.undp.org

According to various result above, in a short summary, Asean countries experience a good progress of improvement. For example, in the statistical year 1990, Vietnam possessed HDI score about 0.407, in the next ten years the score climbed up to 0.505, and also in 2010 the score mounted to reach 0.572. The progress also can be looked at all countries in region.

The progress can be interpreted as a good thing, but if we take a look on classification, there is a gap of development among members. Singapore, for instance, has the highest score of HDI comparing to 9 neighboring countries. Also Brunei is also placed in the same category along with Singapore. The majority of Asean countries has Medium Human Development predicate. Meanwhile Myanmar, is the only least developed countries which has the lowest score, the score is 0.451.

Asean perhaps can be proud about the achievement, moreover it states the majority is associated with Medium High Development class. But there is something that should be thoughtfully pondered. The gap of development among members is quite wide. There are several countries which have a highly

---

1 Some agencies also split into 5: The Highest Human Development, High Human Development, Medium Human Development, Low Human Development, and The Lowest Human Development.
developed service and infrastructure in many ways, but there is a country which lack of everything. This thing should be a concern to all Asean members.

### Table 3: Ranking and Classification of HDI among Asean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>HDI 2010</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>Very High Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>Very High Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>High Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>Medium Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>Medium Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>Medium Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>Medium Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>Medium Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>Medium Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>Low Human Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASEAN ON THE LATEST MDG’S REPORT**

There are so many indicators to account successfulness of MDG’s implementation. There are 48 monitoring indicators that can be used to exposure it. The number is quite wide, and it needs a simplification to summarize the result. I am about to simplify that numerous indicators into some big issues that tightly correlated to the purposes of human development: leading a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and enjoying a decent standard of living. And here the results of those simplified Millennium Development Goals as below:

**Poverty rate**

Poverty seems to be a main issue to view in Millennium Development Goals. The determination of poverty rate is supposedly politicized, but the important thing is whether people can see the progress of poverty alleviation in certain country. There are two ways how to measure poverty rate: firstly, using an indicator of poverty below $1 per-day and secondly, using indicator which is brought from National Poverty Line. Poverty below $1 indicator is become a standardization to measure the successfulness of goals implementation, and then National Poverty Line is a basic parameter that derived from local authority’s released publication.

### Table 4: Poverty below $1 and National Poverty Line among Asean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Poverty below $1</th>
<th>National Poverty Line</th>
<th>Annual Change</th>
<th>Annual Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>-9.24%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>27.71%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>-3.20%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>-13.03%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>-20.00%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nation, 2005
At the table above, there is a progress of declining number of poverty in South East Asia countries. Asean started the decade 90s by good progress, the number of poverty fell gradually in early year of ‘90s, because the region experienced what we called “Asia Miracles”. Asean 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) had a good growth rate 6-8% in per-annum (Linblad, 1998:180). This condition benefited countries to lessen number of poor.

But in the mid 1997, South East Asia was jolted by high scale monetary quake, commenced by the fall of Thailand currency, Baht, and then led several currencies of region to follow suit. Majority of Asean main countries fell into crisis and they lost years-built development. The poverty rate jumped quickly due to lack of employment. Many people were fired from job, and this condition was bad for regional stability. Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand experienced a negative growth outlook. The economy growth shrank to below zero percent. Malaysia grew -6.8%, Thailand grew -10.4% and Indonesia, the worst hit country, fell to -13% growth. The poverty rate in Malaysia jumped from 6.1% in 1996 to 7.0% in 1997 (Hadi, 2004:155). In Indonesia, poverty rate ballooned to double than previous year. In 1996 poverty rate in Indonesia was 11.3%, and in the end of 1997 the rate hit 24.2% due to bad inflation (Waspada, 19/01/2011).

But after recovered from crisis, Asean countries has been back to start competition in reducing poverty line. Economy has been back to normal, and middle class has been pumped to drive the economy. Take a look on table4, the poverty rate is declining either measured by Poverty below $1 or National Poverty Line. The percentage of poor people below $1 declines quickly. Thailand, Vietnam and even Malaysia have already dropped into low number. Only Lao PDR which is reported stepping backward.

If we view from National Poverty Line indicator, Thailand is the fastest country which successful to eradicate the number of poor. The annual declining rate in Thailand is -14.69%. The trend is also experienced by Cambodia, yet inadequate. Meanwhile, Indonesia sees no improvement. The size of poverty even hit twofold prevailing 1990 size.

**Health issue: Infant and Maternal Mortality Ratio**
The second and third indicators which are used to calculate the successfulness of MDG’s are Infant Mortality Ratio and Maternal Mortality Ratio. The targets of each goal are Reducing by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate and Reducing by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Ratio per 1,000 live birth</th>
<th>Maternal Mortality Ratio per 100,000 live birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Infant Mortality Ratio: www.esa.un.org
Maternal Mortality Ratio: www.whqlibdoc.who.int
Infant Mortality Ratio is accounted by the number of death of infant in every 1000 live birth. Asean countries experience the declining number of infant death prevalence. Take a look at table above, since 1990-2000, there is a significant progress due to quality improvement of facility and medical procedure. In the 2010 report, majority of Asean countries has achieved the target of goals before 2015. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are proper to shoulder a predicate “early achiever”. Meanwhile, Cambodia is backsliding due to slow progress. And also, Lao PDR and Myanmar, they go nowhere.

Meanwhile, the second parameter -Maternal Mortality Ratio- is accounted by the number of maternal death in every 100,000 live birth. Majority of Asean countries actually has a good progress. Indonesia and Cambodia have dropped the number the most. In the year 1990, Indonesia and Cambodia have 620 and 690 maternal death in every 100,000 live births. Both countries are also titled as the second and third biggest among region, after Lao PDR which take place in first grade with 1,200 death cases in 100,000 live births. But in the 2000, Indonesia has slowed the number to 270 cases, and so did Cambodia with 350 cases. And on the latest report, Indonesia has good performance. It has scaled the number down to 240 deaths in 100,000 live births. Cambodia also has good performance, showed by prevalence of death down to 290 per-100,000 live birth. Meanwhile, the worst progress is experienced by Singapore. Singapore is stepping backward comparing its performance in 1990. Singapore maternal death ratio in 2010 is 9 cases per 100,000 live birth, while 1990 ratio is 6 death per 100,000 live birth. But in a short summary, Singapore has the lowest number of maternal death in region.

Primary Education Completion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Primary Enrollment Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations Statistic Division

The third main target of Millennium Development Goals is Primary Education. Asean, in general terms, actually made a significant progress. According to table6, Asean is on behalf “on the track” to qualify the goals by 2015. The enrollment ratio hikes every-year, even tough in some countries experience a slight regression,. For example, Malaysia faced a slight regression. The ratio fell consecutively to 97.5% (2006), 96.1% (2007), and 94.1% (2008). But Malaysia is still categorized into “early achiever” due to its good performance. Similarly to a grouping country like Philippines and Lao PDR which experienced a positive trend. Overall, majority of asean will qualify this goal by 2015.

Environment Sustainability: Forest Coverage

Environment is perceived to be one of serious concern in region. Asean now is facing the ongoing forest destruction and it loses thousands hectare area every year. Logging activity is accused to be one of problem main sources, whether it is legally or illegally conducted. A legal logging activity is permitted by government to deplete the forest for certain reason. For instances, Malaysia Government has issued
permit to several authorized companies to open the forest for rubber and palm estate. Likewise, Indonesia exploits the forest for raw wood material to export, such as rattan, plywood etc. The forest depletion is also caused by some intolerable activities, such as illegal wood cutting or irresponsible attitude like burning bushes that possible to cause a haze and so on. And then look at table below to see condition of environment in Asean:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Forest Coverage (thousand hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>12946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>116567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>17314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>22376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>39219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>10574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>15965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>9363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk)

Asean countries are apparently facing a degrading quality of forest, which is led by Indonesia in declining number. According to the table above, Indonesia performs as the fastest country in region that losing forest area in significant number. Indonesia is also ranked as the second fastest in the world after Brazil (cited from [www.palmoilaction.com](http://www.palmoilaction.com)). The number of Indonesia forest coverage by the year 1990, 2000 and 2005 consecutively declines to 116,567 thousand hectares, 97,852 thousand hectares, and 88,495 thousand hectares. This grim situation also occurred in all entire members, except Singapore and Vietnam which applauded due to their effort to maintain the number in same level or even enlarge the size from previous period. The size of forest in Singapore is kept as big as 2 thousands hectare in latest report. Meanwhile Vietnam has successfully enhanced it by adding thousands hectare in several years.

**REPORT: HOW REALISTIC DOES ASEAN BEAT THE GOALS?**

Today is 2011 and there remain four years ahead to Millennium Development Goals deadline. Asean countries are still doing their best effort on how to accomplish the goals optimally. The report -as mentioned in previous chapters- tells us about the detailed figure of Asean today, and it illustrates implicitly that there many things should be fixed as necessary. For a further understanding, take a look on table below:
Table 8: Asean on some indicator tracks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty $1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Completion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maternal Mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TB Prevalence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forest Cover</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Brunei Darussalam |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Cambodia          |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Indonesia         |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Lao, PDR          |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Malaysia          |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Myanmar           |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Philippines       |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Singapore         |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Thailand          |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Vietnam           |   |   |   |   |   |   |

Source: United Nations, 2005

Table above is modified and drawn from MDG’s report that released annually. The symbol ▼ shows the country is slipping backward or stagnating, ■ implies country has a slow progress (expected achieve the target but after 2015), ▶ means country is on the track (expected meet the target by 2015), and lastly ● indicates that country has already met the target.

MDG’s report shows that in 2010 Asean has made a great leap of achievement, yet the results vary in each country. Most of Asean country has found a proper formula how to develop country especially the way they should to provide citizen with an adequate basic need. Education perceived to be priority and healthcare facility have been built, yet the quality is still questionable. Infant mortality is getting lower and lower, meanwhile the maternal mortality ratio declines despite in some countries are stagnating. And the poverty line declines tough not that fast. The only disappointment rises over sustainability of environment. The sign is alarming. Majority of members lacks to sustain the environment because there is no strong law enforcement to protect it. In this case, Asean perceived will not qualify the target by 2015, because the efforts to rehabilitate and reforest do not fruit anything. In fact, the number of forest degradation widens every year.

Overall, South East Asia achievement is concluded as “not bad”. The progress in Asean is better comparing other region like Sub Sahara Africa. This SSA region even has failed to promote and embrace a sustainable human development. Africa is on critical alert because most of MDG’s indicator is alarming.
red. It is clearly seen there is no improvement in many ways. Africa has missed this opportunity to overcome the “cancer” that ailed Africa for many decades. However, if Africa still eager to accomplish the goals, they need an extra energy and additional time to battle with. They need to transform and stamp out corruption for injecting accountability into their populations (Okonofua, 2005).

Asean has to learn about SSA’s flops in the term of achieving the goals. SSA fails to define and distribute what the actual meaning about sustainability whereas redefining sustainability is due as guidance to integrate the aspects that associated with it. As stated above, SSA failed to understand and inject it into a proper policy. That is why the condition in SSA has been never changed. Zubaedi (2007:181) mentions there are three aspects that should be integrated. They are:

a. Environmental Sustainability
   Environmental sustainability talks about several dimensions: The existence of natural resources either renewable or irrenewable, the natural endurance, and the natural provision.
b. Economic Sustainability
   Economic Sustainability talks about quality of growth which may eradicate the number of poor. This aspect is about the economy efficiency and competitiveness, including expelling corruption and red-tape bureaucracy within it.
c. Social Sustainability
   Social sustainability talks human empowerment such as education, health system and so on.

There remain 4 years ahead, Asean still needs a massive scale of work to beat the goals. Asean should consider three aspects above and insert them into policy in to accelerate development. The gap of development also should be narrowed. Therefore a proper and interconnected policy framework should be delivered and understood by all members. Because a good policy will bear the region into stability, balance and equality, without leaving a country left behind the others.

CONCLUSION

The deadline of Millennium Development Goals is fast approaching and there remain only four years to accomplish. Asean needs to build a massive scale of work to qualify the target. There still existed a homework that should be vanquished. The gap of development inside is also quite wide. Perhaps, according to report, the basic needs such as standard living, education, health and so on may be perceived as “on the track”. Nevertheless, the quality of achievement is different case.

It should be fixed as necessary. We do not want Asean shrink to as same level as Sub Sahara Africa. Asean should ponder and start new approach how to make the thing sustainable. Three dimensions of work should be integrated such as Economic, social and environmental sustainability- in order to reach equality on the region
REFERENCES

Books:

Journals, Reports, Articles:
International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database*, 2011

Website:
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/DB01_Period_Indicators/WPP2010_DB1_F06_1_IMR_BOTH_SEXES.XLS downloaded 23 August 2011
United Nations Statistic Division, Total net enrolment ratio in primary education both sexes.
THEME SIX

SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
ASEAN DOUBLE CRISIS: ASEAN COMMUNITY’S CONSTRUCTION REVISITED

Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi
Centre for Southeast Asian Social Studies
Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia
bela.pertiwi@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyze why, despite ASEAN’s claims of having crafted significant efforts toward ASEAN Community 2015, there seems to be no major differences that we are getting closer to be a community. This paper argues that this condition is caused by the so-called ASEAN double crisis in which there are two major problems in current institutional construction of ASEAN Community. The first is horizontal crisis caused by the lack of cohesiveness and positive synergies among the three pillars to support the bigger framework of ASEAN Community. As each pillar walks its own way, this lead to the question of conformity of policies and purposes among them, which then considered decreasing the intended impact of ASEAN’s effort to forge a single community. The second crisis is vertical crisis regarding the relations between government and masses in each pillar. The apparent gap between these two poles has provenly upheld ASEAN as a mere intergovernmental cooperation which exists in elite level. Therefore, no greater sense of belonging or altogether mass movement ever exists since the first initiative of ASEAN Community.

Keywords: ASEAN Community, Institutional Construction, Double Crisis, Inter-Pillars Relations, Government-Masses Relations

INTRODUCTION

One of the most intriguing questions one may ask in related to ASEAN Community probably is why, despite the significant progress made by our elites toward ASEAN Community, we as the people of ASEAN do not feel closer as a community.

It has been noticeable that after the initiative of establishing ASEAN Community by 2020 during the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003, the progress made by ASEAN has been remarkable. The ten countries who previously agreed on integrating themselves under the three-pillar community were then formulating the plan of action to materialize the ASEAN Community which later known as “Vientiane Action Plan”. This step was followed by the publishing of ASEAN Community blueprint for each pillar which comprise of guidelines and roadmap toward the targeted goal in 2020. A further development was made on the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu 2007 when the heads of ASEAN countries decided to accelerate the ASEAN Community from 2020 to 2015. And only the following year, the countries have also ratified the constitution-like ASEAN Charter. This document has undoubtedly marked a significant turn point for the organization as it not only acts as a foundation for a stronger cooperation but it also changes the loose association into a rules-based organization and transforms ASEAN into a legal actor in international relations.95 With the legal basis and institutional arrangement in the state level have been settled, the organization now seeks to embrace non-state actors to participate in the making of ASEAN Community. Under the so-called ASEAN Foundation, ASEAN has conducted various activities to

promote ASEAN awareness among youth, academics, business people, civil society organizations and many others. It also aims to provide regional solution for the regional problems such as poverty alleviation and developmental cooperation.96

Yet, despite the above-mentioned progress and attempts made by ASEAN, there are still many people who do not aware of what ASEAN is, do not feel closer toward ASEAN community or let alone feel the impact of the policies made in regard to ASEAN Community. Although no specific data supporting this argument,97 the development in the root level of each pillars reflected the same picture of ASEAN people’s attitude and lack of awareness toward the Community. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) that often be considered as the most developed pillars in ASEAN Community has claimed to have completed 73.6% of the targeted goals with 82% achieved goals in term of liberalization and even 100% in the equitable economic development.98 Yet, the recent publication of ASEAN Community in Figures (ACIF) showed that intra-ASEAN trade fall from 25.1% in 2003 when the Community was established to 24.5% in 2009.99 The same fashion also apply to foreign direct investment (FDI) come from intra-ASEAN countries which only counted for 13.1% of total ASEAN FDI compared to 85.1% that come from extra-mural investment.100 If one still believes in transactionalism, it would be disappointed to see that no greater transaction occurs in the region. The number of tourists’ arrival among ASEAN countries only increases 1.5% and it is still less than the total percentage of ASEAN tourists visit from non-ASEAN countries.101 These numbers have told us how ASEAN enthusiasm to liberalize the regional economy and create a single market is not followed by positive attitude from other stakeholders. The same tendency occurs in ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC). For certain, the monitoring of the APSC is somewhat less apparent as it is lack of quantifiable targets.102 Yet, as the pillar aims to address the so called comprehensive security, expectation has raised that the mere intergovernmental organization would address broader range of non-traditional security threat and would embrace more non-state actors. Nevertheless, the experiences of natural disasters in various ASEAN countries, human rights abuses to the even corruption have clearly proved that no ASEAN Community exists in that sense. The mitigation of those issues has been much contributed by international if not domestic actors. Above all, the most apparent evidences of the lack of ASEAN awareness among common people can be found in the last pillar ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC) which for the briefness of this paper will not be elaborated any further.

Those examples, however, have sufficiently showed us the fact that there is a significant gap between what ASEAN has done toward ASEAN Community and the actual impact felt by the society. Instead of accepting this as the usual inability of ASEAN to meet the stated goal, this paper aims to analyze this missing link in the construction of ASEAN Community that causes the problem. The above elaboration has indicated that ASEAN policies haven’t been effectively delivered to the targeted stakeholders and particularly to ASEAN citizens, that is to say it is the issue of policy effectiveness. Hence, this paper argues that there must be a severe crisis in the ASEAN institutional construction which leads to policy ineffectiveness. This crisis is twofold, horizontally among ASEAN pillars and vertically among ASEAN elites, member states governments and vernacular actors. The often uncoordinated

97 The only survey to assess ASEAN awareness is that of conducted by Dr. Eric Thompson in 2007. Yet, this survey is not helpful as it is only done toward University’s students and both method and scope of the interview are not comprehensive enough to represent the general people’s attitude toward ASEAN Community. See Eric C. Thompson & Chianne Thianthai (2007). Attitudes and Awareness Toward ASEAN: Findings of A Ten Nations Survey. Jakarta: ASEAN Foundation. http://www.aseanfoundation.org accessed 08/09/2011 10:29
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
policies among pillars and among actors in ASEAN have contributed significantly to the ineffectiveness of ASEAN policies in the grassroots level.

To better elaborate this issue, the following part of this paper will provide conceptual background on the effective policy-making in international cooperation and the ideal type of ASEAN construction that support the effective policy making. The second part then will provide actual situation in ASEAN which still contains gap between elite and the people and analyze why such gap occurs in ASEAN based on the previously-provided conceptual background. This analysis will bring us to the conclusion of this paper.

**EFFECTIVE POLICY-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THE ISSUE OF COHERENCE**

An effective policy-making in international cooperation has its own challenge as compared to that of intra-state because the strong belief that there is no sovereignty above state. Therefore the issue of ‘effective policy-making’ questions the ability of the international cooperation/organization to manage the relations of sovereign states and to implement the decision making through a multilayer level. It is for this reason; the issue of effective policy-making is closely related to the issue of coherence.\(^{103}\) The last mentioned refers to not only ‘the absence of contradiction’ but also to ‘the existence of positive synergies’ among components within an institution.\(^{104}\) Abellan, Pascal Gauttier and Simon Nuttal\(^{105}\) divided coherence into several parts that should be accomplished in order to create a strong institution and an effective policy. The first is horizontal coherence implying that the policies made should be coherent to one another. Second, vertical coherence in which the implementation in the state level should be coherent to that of agreed in the community level. The last is institutional coherence which obligates the coherence among institutions within an organization/community. In the case of ASEAN, it is also important to add the ‘issue coherence’ which ensures that the issue highlighted in the regional level is also the central concern of the people. This inclusion is relevant as ASEAN has long been perceived as a tool for the ‘club of dictators’ to preserve the power by maintaining regional stability for the sake of domestic interest. As ASEAN transformed itself from an elite-centred organization to a community which committed to serve the interest of the people, it is then crucial to warrant that the issue discussed in the regional level is suited to the concern of the people. This way, the policy made will be effective and ASEAN will gain positive response from the people which made the community building is even easier. Failure or inability to meet all the above criteria of coherence will produce incoherence or, in this paper, crisis and therefore ineffective policy or gap as exampled in the previous part.

**THE IDEAL ASEAN CONSTRUCTION FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY MAKING**

The question then is how does the ideal ASEAN construction that is conducive for an effective policy making.

ASEAN, as many have noticed, is on its way to create an ASEAN Community which is ‘politically cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible in order to effectively respond to current and future challenges and opportunities’.\(^{106}\) In doing so, ASEAN has established three supporting pillars namely ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC). Ideally, the three pillars, together with their policies, should be coherent toward each other in order to effectively achieve the mentioned goal. The interlocking

---


mechanism suggests that the policy and progress in one pillar will affect the other and vice versa. Thus for example the political stability in the first pillar would be a conducive ground for the economic integration in the second pillar. And to ensure that the economic development benefit the people, the second pillar should be in accordance with the third pillar. Uncoordinated policies across the pillars or different speed of development among the three will reduce the intended impact of the community.

In addition to horizontal coherence, each pillar should also be vertically coherent from the regional level to the most bottom of the society. The detail is as follows.

APSC aims to create a peaceful and democratic community by implementing comprehensive security which includes not only traditional security issues but also non-traditional security issues. The traditional security issues might be handled by regional cooperation and elites in the state level. Yet, non-traditional security issues require a close cooperation among state and non-actors such as academia and civil society organizations (CSOs). Thus, coherence in this pillar needs at least a vertical coordination from ASEAN, state to CSOs.

The AEC on the other hand strives to realize prosperous and competitive single market and production base. The mission for deeper and broader economic integration which prospering the people signifies that economy is not merely the business of the political and economic elites in a higher level but also other economic stakeholders including small enterprises. It is for this reason; vertical coherence in the AEC requires close cooperation at least from state, high level corporations and small enterprises.

Lastly, the ASCC intends to pursue a caring society with an increased participation of other non-state actors in the construction of ASEAN Community. It expects to anticipate social issues which are not covered or may arise from the first and second pillars such as disaster management, education, environment, health, labour, rural development, poverty, youth and woman. It is obvious therefore that coherence in this pillar is the most difficult as it should embrace all grassroots actors not only to develop ASEAN awareness but also to encourage them to actively participate in the ASEAN Community.

If we draw a picture, the ideal construction of ASEAN Community will be as follows.

---

THE ACTUAL ASEAN CONSTRUCTION FOR POLICY MAKING

ASEAN basically has understood the importance of coherence for effective policy making and has provided structural bodies to ensure coherence in all sectors of cooperation. Horizontally, ASEAN has been equipped with ASEAN Coordinating Councils designated to coordinate the community councils in each pillars as stated in Article 8 (2c) of ASEAN Charter. Particularly in related to cross-pillar issues, ASEAN Charter assigned each ASEAN Community Councils to "coordinate the work of the different sectors under its purview, and on issues which cut across the other community councils". It also obligates the relevant ministers in each pillar to organize a special inter-ministerial meeting to discuss cross-pillar issues under the supervision of ASEAN Coordinating Councils.

Meanwhile, to guarantee the vertical coherence, each member countries must be embedded with national secretariat which is appointed to coordinate the implementation of regional policies in the national level. ASEAN Foundation was also established to promote ASEAN awareness among the grassroots people and encourage closer cooperation with non-state actors such as CSOs, business sector, academia, and other stakeholders. The general description of the present ASEAN structure can be seen in the chart below.

Yet, despite this anticipative structure, horizontal and vertical incoherence still exist and to some extent very apparent that we call it a crisis in the ASEAN structure which then become the main factor of policy ineffectiveness. This double crisis has reduced the impact of ASEAN Community in the grassroots level and created the gap as discussed previously.

---

108 Article 9 (4b) ASEAN Charter
109 Article 7 (2c) ASEAN Charter
110 Article 13 ASEAN Charter
111 Article 15 (1) ASEAN Charter
HORIZONTAL CRISIS

This aspect of incoherence might be less known because it operates exclusively in the elite level of ASEAN. Yet what might seems well implemented may still contain some problem and it affects seriously to the policy effectiveness in the grassroot level.

Horizontal crisis in ASEAN occurs as a consequence of pillarization. Yet different from European Union whose pillars directed by different actors from different level and thus policies generated often contradictive each other, all ASEAN Community’s pillars are directed by member states with variations of collaborating actor. As a result, policies generated may be not contradictive but they are often uncoordinated each other. Yet, this disparity is sufficient to lower ASEAN’s effectiveness.

ASEAN pillars which supposed to be interlocking and balance are now moving into different direction. Both pillars APSC and ASCC seems to be only the supporting ground for AEC. As a result, AEC is now developing far exceeding the other two pillars. This scheme poses several dangers as in the case of fast growing ASEAN-China economic cooperation. First, growing economic cooperation between the two parties has created a greater level of ASEAN’s dependency to China’s economy. In fact, China is the biggest trading partner for ASEAN followed by EU and Japan. Despite economic advantage of cooperating with the biggest economy in the world, the different economic advantage shared by member states has to certain degree caused divergence of their perception on China in other sector. This case is apparent in the conflict of South China Sea where member states are splitted on their attitude toward China. The claimants countries such as Vietnam and Philippiness may show adverse policy toward China. Yet, non-claimant countries which have substantial economic stake with China such as Singapore and Thailand will be more cooperative in finding the solution of the conflict. This discrepancy finally led to ASEAN unable to speaking with one voice over the dispute, decelerate the problem solving and dampen ASEAN reputation as a security community. Second, the ASEAN’s inclination for outward looking by expanding cooperation with various trading partners under the scheme ASEAN+1, ASEAN +3, EAS, APEC and many other without the same degree of inward-looking or deepening in the local ASEAN has contributed in reducing the impact of ASEAN community itself for its people. ASEAN Connectivity which is supposed to integrate ASEAN countries also include China in its program. The current development shows agressive China policy to build transportation network particularly with mainland Southeast Asia which might result in a closer relations between mainland Southeast Asia with China rather than mainland with other countries in Islands of Southeast Asia. This, eventually, may lead to question whether the final regional community will be East Asian community or Southeast Asian community. At the moment, these vagueness has played role in the lack of ASEAN identity among ASEAN people.

VERTICAL CRISIS

In contrast to the horizontal crisis, this vertical crisis has been the debate topic among observers despite less has been done to explore further the causes and its dynamic. This part will elaborate the vertical crisis in each pillars and its contribution to the missing link between the top and bottom part of ASEAN Community.

As has been mentioned earlier, APSC aims to create a peaceful and democratic region using comprehensive security approach. Coherence in this pillar requires the conformity of issues in all level

---

112 When European Union was divided into pillars, EC and CFSP pillars often produced diminishing policies. In the cross-pillars issues; EC who was directed by EU Commission as the supranational body of the EU easily agreed on issues related to the community. Yet, when this issue was brought into CFSP, agreement was difficult to achieve because EU Council who is in charge in the pillar was representing their own states. Thus issues which didn’t suit to the interest of respective states will be rebuffed.

and cooperation between state and non-state actors. Certainly, there have been major development in this pillar as issues which previously excluded from the APSC concern is now included. Nevertheless, there hasn’t been conformity of issues in the regional and domestic level. The major security issues discussed in the regional level are still around inter-state conflict, nuclear free zone, with vague increase on transnational crime. Yet, this concern is not conformed with the main concern in the domestic level for instance in Indonesia which are overwhelmingly centred on corruption and religious conflict during the last year. These issues, despite domestic in origin, have now become transnational issues and should gained more attention from ASEAN. Finally, the disjuncture between regional and domestic issues has caused lack of awareness and participation in the grassroots level.

Added to issue incoherence, the APSC also suffers from vertical incoherence between state and non-state actors. ASEAN, hitherto, has engaged various CSOs in conducting its activities. In fact currently there are 58 accredited CSOs in a close tie with ASEAN.114 The problem is that this number is too small to represent the total number of CSOs115 or let alone the total number of ASEAN societies particularly when very few of these CSOs represent the most bottom part of societies.116 Even in case of engagement, these CSOs tend to be co-opted under ASEAN interest as can be seen in the mechanism of engagement where CSOs should abide to ASEAN regulation and other criteria in order to be accredited;117 or they are more equally engaged but their ideas accepted with caution. This way, CSO is more representing the ASEAN in its relations with other CSOs rather than the other way around. As a result, CSO lost its independency and its role as a constructive advocate in implementing comprehensive security and thus causes policy ineffectiveness.

Moving on second pillar, AEC intends to create a competitive single market which can prosper the society. Vertical coherence in this pillar demands a close cooperation from the state elites, high level business sector and small enterprises. The significant incoherence appears as in the regional level, member states have undertaken various policies in all pillars of AEC ranging from single market, competitive economic region, equitable economic development and integration to global market. Nevertheless this progress which is solely made by state is not well socialized to other stakeholders. Consequently, many still do not have idea what the figures and progress means for them and how to response to it. This has been exacerbated by the fact that the development in creating single market and integrating to global economy is far exceeding the development achieved for competitive region and equitable economic development.118 From the AEC scoreboard, it is so evident that ASEAN made significant effort to liberalize the market without laying strong foundation for competition policy, protection of consumer and intelectual property rights, and sufficient empowerment to small enterprises.119 As a result, foreign direct investment and goods import from non-ASEAN countries flooding the region uncontrollably while domestic market particularly small enterprises which accounted for the majority of enterprises in Southeast Asia remain vulnerable.120

116 See ‘Register of ASEAN Affiliated CSO’ to look at the area of expertise of each CSOs
118 The data shows 82 percent targets have been completed in the single market policy while only 50 percent targets have been achieved in the making of competitive region. In addition, 63 measures have been implemented in the single market pillars during 2008-2009 compared to only 34 measures in the competitive region pillar and 3 measure in the equitable economic development.
120 http://www.aseansec.org/ accessed 09/06/2011 13:50
121 Ibid.
122 In 2009, extra-regional trade accounted for 75.5% of total ASEAN trade, import from non-ASEAN countries is as high as 74% of total ASEAN import and ASEAN export to non-ASEAN countries is also as much as 72% of total export. This imbalance also occurs in foreign direct investments (FDI) in which FDI from non-ASEAN countries dominating the market with 85.1% from total share.
In the last pillar, the purpose of ASCC is to create a caring society with greater sense of community and thus greater participation of ASEAN people. In doing so, the promotion of ASEAN awareness among ASEAN people requires coordination among state (national secretariat), ASEAN Foundation, CSOs and the most important the people itself. As reported in the official documents from each institution, both ASEAN Foundation and member-state national secretariat have undertaken series of socialization to various elements in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless the program is uncoordinated and unevenly conducted toward various actors. The annual report of ASEAN charter 2009 indicated that more activities are dedicated for youth and academia followed by business sector and small percentage of cultural communities and NGO. From this small number, most of the activities are not sustainable and include only limited participants. Thus, it is no surprise if there are still huge number of persons who do not aware of what ASEAN is because the majority of people in most ASEAN countries are still living in rural area, aged between 20-50 years old, and with more than half of them works as farmer and manufacture. These are groups who gained less attention in the socialization program.

CONCLUSION

Having discussed the above issue, it has been apparent that significant horizontal and vertical crisis have occurred in ASEAN institutional structure which then contributed to the policy ineffectiveness in ASEAN followed by the lack of sense of belonging among ASEAN people. From the horizontal incoherence, the development gap among the three pillars has reduced the intended impact of the overall ASEAN community. The inclination of ASEAN for outward-looking without the same degree of deepening in the intramural ASEAN has upheld ASEAN merely in the state level cooperation. This has been exacerbated by the vertical incoherence in each pillar which made ASEAN more distant to its people. These factors together answer the central question raised in this paper why despite the significant effort made by ASEAN toward ASEAN Community, many of ASEAN’s people still do not aware of what ASEAN is, do not feel as part of ASEAN and do not feel the impact of ASEAN Community. Having known the reason, it is then imperative for ASEAN to reexamine its institutional structure so that its policy is effectively delivered to its people and the deadline for ASEAN Community by 2015 remain reachable.

REFERENCES


Guidelines On ASEAN’s Relations with Civil Society Organization http://www.aseansec.org/18362.htm


Integrating South-East Asia: China Coming Down the Tracks, A Railway Boom Promises to Tie South-East Asia Together and Boost China’s Sway. The Economist 20 January 2011 


THEME SEVEN

ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITIES
POSITIONING SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR GLOBALIZATION VIA EXPANSION OF BUSINESS ENTITIES; SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE LLPs

Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas
Department of Civil Law, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyah of Laws
International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
zuhairah@iiu.edu.my

ABSTRACT

A business entity is basically a structure which is recognized by law as a valid medium to conduct trade. Globally, there are many types of business entities. The common business entities practiced all over the world are the sole proprietorship, partnerships (firm) and companies. In Malaysia, these three are the only business structures which are offered in the market place whilst in Singapore, there had been a great expansion in business entities since 2005. In many other countries, particularly the developed countries, business entities have been expanded and developed to cater to business needs. One of the latest inventions of business entity is the limited liability partnerships (LLPs).

LLP is a fascinating business structure as it could have the status of either a legal entity which is not a body corporate or a body corporate. In the United Kingdom, for example, the offshores LLPs, such as the Isle of Jersey LLPs have the status of a legal entity which is not a body corporate whilst in the mainland; the UK LLPs have the status of a body corporate. In the Southeast Asian region, at present LLPs are only available in Singapore. In Malaysia, there is a positive indication towards introducing LLPs in the near future as the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) had completed the draft bill of LLP and circulated for discussion by professional bodies in March 2009.

This paper intends to discuss features of LLPs as a new business entity and as the latest creation of a body corporate. Special reference is made to the Jersey LLPs and the UK LLPs to highlight different types of LLPs structure and also to the Singapore LLP Act 2005, the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) consultation documents on LLP (April 2008) and CCM draft bill of LLP (March 2009) to underline the attributes of LLPs which are available in South East Asia.

Keywords: Business Entity, Limited Liability Partnerships, South East Asia

INTRODUCTION

Choosing a correct business vehicle is seen as one of the measures which a businessman could apply to minimize business risk. For example, by forming a corporation as a business entity, if it is properly formed and operated, creditors of the business should not be able to sue the directors and members for their personal assets. This is due to the shield of limited liability which a company provides to its members and directors.

Nevertheless, not all business vehicles provide the protection of limited liability to the businessmen. In sole proprietorships and partnerships structures, the shield of limited liability is not available which resulted to the owner/partners personal assets can be seized to settle the business debts. As such, it is important for businessmen to know the attributes of their choice of business vehicle, so that they can be proactive in planning and strategizing their personal’s risk and liabilities in business.

In the developed countries, such as in the United States of America (US) and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain (UK), the function of business vehicles in minimizing personal risks in business is highly acknowledged. This can be seen from the expansion and development of business vehicles; from the
conventional structures to new and fascinating business structure. It is observed that the development of business vehicles in these countries mainly relates to maximizing the shield of limited liability and minimizing payment of tax. For example in the US, the pass through entity is applied to S-Corp and LLC to give the businessmen the option to choose what is the best tax structure for their business (Rands William J. 1995).

BUSINESS VEHICLES

A business vehicle refers to a business entity in which business is carried on. There are three common business vehicles which are practiced in countries all over the world. They are sole proprietorships, partnerships and companies.

A sole proprietorship is a “one-man” business. It is registered, managed and dissolved only by one person; i.e. the owner. Legally, a sole proprietorship is inseparable from its owner whereby the business and the owner are treated as one. This means the owner reports business income and losses on his/her personal tax return and is personally liable for any business-related obligations, such as debts or court judgments. Despite the sole debt bearer element, the merits of setting up sole proprietorship is that all profits goes to the owner and the decision making power is vested solely in him/herself. It is a well known fact that one of the reasons why people set up business is to be one’s “own boss” and a sole proprietorship is a good option as the business is owned by him/herself without any intervention from any other person. For the small and micro businesses, sole proprietorship is normally the most opted vehicles, particularly due the small-scale business, minimum business risk and small return of profit. The advantages of this business vehicle are its simplicity, less formalities and minimum restrictions whilst its main disadvantages are unlimited liability and possible difficulty in raising capital.

A partnership structure is a business owned by two or more people. It is basically a business arrangement between two or more persons to carry out similar nature of business with the agreement that the net profits shall be shared among them (I’anson Banks R.C, 1990). A partnership is not a legal entity although in some countries, partnerships are regarded as a legal entity, for example, in Scotland (David Bennet, 1995) and in the US (Alan R. Bromberg et al., 1997). In general partnerships, the partners and the business are not distinct from one another. In fact, the firm actually represents all partners collectively (Samsar Kamar, 1998). Any action against or by the firm constitutes as action of the all partners. Partners in a partnership are jointly liable for debts of the business mainly because they are not separated from the firm. Debts incurred by the firm in the due course of business are treated as debts of all partners and their extent of liabilities in the firm are extended to their personal assets (Stephen Graw, 1994). Creditors or third parties dealing with the firm could claim their debts against the personal property of the partners in the event that the partnership assets are not sufficient to settle all debts (Keith L. Fletcher, 1996).

A partnership is not a tax entity under the Income Tax Act 1967 and as such no tax is imposed on the firm (Goh Chen Chuan, 1996). Each partner is treated as if he was a sole proprietor and assessed in accordance with his share of the partnership income. Sole proprietorships and partnerships make sense in a business where personal liability is not a major concern. For example, in cash based business where the owner buys and sell in cash and does not need to enter into contract of loan or contracts with the creditors.

A company or a corporation is a business entity which is recognized by law as a legal person (Farrar, 1998). The juristic personality of the company gives it certain attributes which are not available to sole proprietorships and partnerships. Different from the two business associations, a company has a separate legal entity distinct from its incorporators. A company also has statutory rights to own property, enter into legal proceedings limit liabilities of its members and perpetual succession. Limited liability is one of the main advantages of a company compared to other business entities (Easterbrook et al, 1985). In the Solomon case, the House of Lords held that although Mr. Solomon is the majority shareholders of the company, he could not be made liable for debts of the business as the company is distinct from its members. In a limited company, liability of the members shall be limited either by guarantee or by share. In the event that the company being wind up, the members shall only be liable to contribute to the company’s debts, up to the amount which they
guarantee or up to the amount of unpaid capital, respectively. Nonetheless, if the company is an unlimited company, the members’ liability to contribute to the company’s debts in the event of winding up is unlimited.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS VEHICLES

It is observed that the development of business vehicles mainly concentrates on the merit of limited liability and tax status.

**Limited liability**

The development of business vehicles in relation to limited liability is very obvious in partnerships structure amidst the criticism of the unlimited and joint liability principle (Joanna Gray, 1997). From merely the traditional form (general partnerships), the structure has been expanded to include limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships (LLP).

A limited partnership differs from a general partnership in the role and responsibilities of the partners (Terence Prime, 1995). Limited partnerships comprise of the general and limited partner. The general partner controls the limited partnership’s day-to-day operations and is personally liable for business debts. Limited partners on the other hand, have minimal control over daily business decisions or operations and in return, they are not personally liable for business debts or claims.

Another fascinating structure which is said to be an extension of partnership structure is limited liability partnerships (LLP). However, to conclude that the LLP is a partnership structure is not very accurate as it is actually a hybrid creature of a company and a partnership. It has a separate legal entity and therefore enjoys most of the attributes of a company such as limited liability, right to own property and right to take legal action. The external obligations of LLP are also similar to requirements applicable to companies such as audit and disclosure requirements. However, as regards to its internal regulation, LLP has the flexibility of a partnership, as the members are given the right to decide through the members’ agreement.

Despite the similarities in the external and internal regulations, there are three types of LLP. The first type of LLP has the status of a partnership, for example the US LLP, the second type is the LLP which is a legal entity but not a body corporate, for example the Jersey LLPs whilst the third type of LLP has the status of a body corporate, for example the Singapore LLP and the UK LLP.

For the company structure, the application of limited liability is apparent as it is an inherit attributes of a body corporate. However, in the United States of America (US), a country where the business vehicles went through a vigorous expansion, the company structure has been extended to include S-Corporations and limited liability companies (LLC). Both entities have the status of a body corporate but different tax status. For the S-corporation, it has similar attributes, external responsibilities and internal regulations of a company but the members have the option to pay income taxes similar to sole proprietor or a partner. The LLC structure is generally similar to the UK LLP but in the US, members of LLC can choose for the LLC to be taxed as an entity or profits are passed through to the partners and taxed on their personal income tax returns.

**Tax Status**

From the aspect of taxation, both limited partnership and LLPs works like a general partnership in that it is a pass through operation with profits passing through to the partners or members who then include their allocated income on their personal tax returns.

For the S corporation, it is subjected to the Subchapter S of the Inland Revenue Code which entitled the members to pay income taxes similar to sole proprietor or a partner. In this structure, all business profits go to the owners who will report them as personal tax returns and the company will not be subjected to any further tax although it still has to file an informational tax return similar to a partnership.

The LLC one the other hand has a special tax status which the IRS calls a “pass-through entity,” like a partnership or sole proprietorship. All income of the LLC is passed directly through to the personal returns of the members. When property is transferred to the LLC or distributed from it, there are no separate tax
consequences. The only tax paid is on the income earned, which is reported on the owner's personal tax return. This system avoids the complications and potential double taxation that plagues the corporate format.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS VEHICLES IN MALAYSIA

In Malaysia the initiative to expand the option of business entities was made by the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) under its Corporate Law Reform Program. One of the terms of reference of the CLRC is to consider whether the existing legal forms of business vehicles i.e. the partnership and the corporate forms are able to provide alternative and adequate choice of establishing legal forms of business entities. This objective was executed by the CLRC by establishing Working Group A. One of the outcome of the CLRC’s efforts is the 2003 consultative document (CD) for an alternative business vehicle for small businesses and venture capital arrangements. The second consultative document was issued in April 2008. The main objective of both consultative documents are to gather responses from the public, business community, financial institutions, academician and practitioners, as regards the proposed structure of Malaysia’s own limited liability partnerships. Pursuant to the feedback received from public consultations on the in 2003 and 2008, CCM published the discussion draft bill of LLP in March 2009. The draft bill now waits for its second and third reading which has been scheduled for the 2011 Parliamentary session.

LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS (LLP)

LLP is a business structure that combines the best features of partnerships and company. It enjoys all the attributes of a body corporate, namely, separate legal entity, limited liability, perpetual succession and legal entity but at the same time retaining the internal flexibility of a partnership.

There are three types of LLPs; the first one is LLP with the status of a legal person but not a body corporate, the second one is LLP with the status of a body corporate and the third one is LLP with the status of a partnership. For the purpose of discussion for the first and second types of LLPs, references shall be made to the United Kingdom where both types of LLPs are available.

The Jersey LLPs

The Isle of Jersey is a constituent of the United Kingdom but with a crown dependency enjoying substantial measure of autonomy (Phillip Morris et al, 1997). Other than having powers of self-government, Jersey which is subject to the Community law enjoys free movement of industrial and agricultural produce but is otherwise exempted from most of the EC law, including free movement of persons and tax harmonization. Consequently, Jersey is able to thrive as an offshore financial center with a fiscal structure and portfolio of legal vehicles attractive to manage funds and wealthy individuals (Phillip Morris et al, 1997).

The Limited Liability Partnerships (Jersey) Law was enacted in 1997 and revised in 2008. Similar to the UK LLP, the Jersey LLP has a separate legal entity, distinct from its partners. However, different from the UK LLP, it does not have the status of a body corporate (Phillip Morris, 1997). The Jersey LLPs are not required to appoint an auditor or to have its accounts audited. However, the LLPs are required to keep ten years of accounting records which are sufficient to show and explain its transactions and are such as to disclose with reasonable accuracy at any time its financial position.

Pertaining to limited liability, the Jersey LLP Law 1997 clearly provides that the LLPs shall be liable for any debt or loss of the business. A partner or former partner in a limited liability partnership shall not be liable for any debt or loss of the business. As regards, the internal regulation, the Act clearly provides that the rights and duties of the partners in the LLPs shall be determined by the partnership agreement. Partners in the LLPs are only agent to the LLP and not to other partners.

---

The Body Corporate LLP
The second type of LLP is the LLP with a body corporate status. Examples of this LLP are the UK and Singapore’s LLPs. An interesting feature of the second LLP is that although it has the status of a body corporate; its internal regulation is via partners’ agreement, which is akin to a partnership agreement. This means partners of LLP may adopt any forms of internal arrangement, which they prefer. Nonetheless, when it comes to external obligations, LLP is subjected to similar requirements applicable to companies such as reporting and disclosure requirements. In Singapore, the LLPs are only required to submit annual insolvency/solvency report but there is no obligation to lodge the audited account report to the Registrar.

One important principle to be highlighted is that despite adopting the internal regulation, which is similar to a partnership, the UK LLP Act 2000 and the Singapore LLP Act 2005 clearly provides that the partnership law is not applicable to the LLP whilst the company law is expressly (unless otherwise provided) applicable to the LLP.

Another interesting feature of the incorporated LLP is its tax status. Although it has the status of a body corporate and subjected to the company law, the LLP is treated as a partnership for tax purposes (Linda L.Ng, 2009).

The safeguard mechanism for the creditors in incorporated LLP is the “claw back mechanism” whereby upon winding up, past or present members of the LLP will be liable to contribute to the assets of the LLP in respect of any property withdrawn from the LLP within specified period preceding the commencement of the winding up, if it can be shown that at the time of the withdrawal, the LLP was insolvent. This means, before making withdrawals, members need to be cautious of the possible consequences in the event of insolvency. This restriction on withdrawals will act as an assurance to potential creditors that the assets shown in the published balance sheet will not be depleted.

LLPs with a partnership status
This type of LLPs is available in the United States of America (US) whereby the LLPs are also regarded as a partnership. Interestingly, despite the partnership status, the US LLPs are recognized under the law as a legal entity; distinct from its partners. This means the LLPs incur its own liability and provides limited liability for its partners.

Due to the status of a legal entity, partners of LLPs are only agent to the firm and not to one another as applied in English and Malaysian partnerships. As regards the internal regulations, the LLPs are governed by the partnerships agreement similar to general partnerships. However, the partnership agreement shall not exclude certain rights which are provided under the Act.

The US LLPs are treated as a “pass through” entity by the Inland Revenue Services (IRS) whereby it passes through its taxation to its partners. Each partner needs to report his share of the company’s income or loss on their individual tax forms. This allows LLPs to avoid paying federal income taxes at the company levels. Partners report their portions of earnings and losses on their individual tax forms.

OBSERVATION
Fascinating facts about the three types of LLPs is that although all are recognized as legal entities; the incorporated LLP has the status of a body corporate whilst the other two has either the status of a legal entity which is not a body corporate or a LLP with partnership status. Only the incorporated LLP is subjected to the company laws whilst the other two LLPs are not subjected to the company law.

There are also differences pertaining to reporting requirements. For example, in the Singapore LLP, which is an incorporated LLP, there is a statutory duty to lodge the annual declaration of solvency/insolvency to the registrar whilst for the Jersey LLP, and US LLPs, no reporting requirement is imposed. Nonetheless, in all types of LLPs, there is no duty to submit audited accounts to the registrar though they are required to keep accounting and other records which are sufficient to indicate transactions and financial position of the LLP and which give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the LLP.

As regards to limitation of liabilities, all types of LLPs provide limited liability to its partners.
However, the partners could be held liable for claims from losses resulting from his wrongful act or omission.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LLP AND A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

The main difference between the LLP and a limited liability company lies in the internal governance structure; whereby a company is strictly regulated by the Companies Act whereas the LLP is governed by a contractual agreement between partners/members. The LLP also have lesser compliance requirements as compared to a company, whereby for registration, it is not required to submit legal documents similar to Memorandum and Articles of Association. LLP is also not required to submit its audited account to the registrar.

The tax regime of LLP is also totally different from a company as LLP is taxed similar to a partnership.

Other than the tax status, internal regulation, registration and disclosure requirements, LLP is very much similar to a company. Both entities have separate legal entity distinct from its members and enjoy attributes as a legal person, such as ability to own property, enter into legal proceedings and perpetual succession.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LLP AND A PARTNERSHIP

The main difference between the LLP and a partnership is that in both types of LLP, the members or partners are not personally liable for the business’s debts and liabilities. Creditors of the LLP cannot go after the members’ or partners’ personal assets to pay off the LLP’s debts. Whereas in a partnership structure, all partners have unlimited liability for the business debts to the extent that their personal assets could be claimed by the creditors if the business assets are not sufficient to pay the creditors.

It also important to highlight that in a partnership, all partners are liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner but in a LLP, liabilities of the partners or members are limited to his agreed contribution. As such they are not liable on account of the independent or un-authorized acts of other partners, thus allowing individual partners to be shielded from joint liability created by another partner’s wrongful acts or misconduct.

Despite having different liability regime, LLP and partnerships are almost identical when it comes to internal regulation and taxation. In both types of business entities, the internal affairs are regulated via an agreement between the partners or members. There is no formal constitution such as the Memorandum and Articles of Association which determined how the internal relationships should be governed. Members and partners in LLP enjoy the internal flexibility similar to partners in a partnership. In relation to taxation, both partners and members of LLP and partnerships report business income or losses on their personal tax returns; the business itself does not pay tax on the income.

LLP IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA

The LLP structure is practiced worldwide such as in the United Kingdom, United States of America, India and Japan.. However, in the Southeast Asia, at present LLP is only available in Singapore and Labuan, the Malaysian offshore. Nonetheless, in Malaysia’s mainland, there was a positive indication for the introduction of LLP as the LLP Bill 2011 is scheduled for its second and third reading in the 2011 Parliamentary session.

LLPs IN MALAYSIA

In Malaysia, at present LLPs are only available in Labuan, i.e. its offshore. The Labuan LLPs law is unique as they are incorporated under the same Act with limited partnership, i.e. the Labuan Limited Partnership and Limited Liability Partnerships Act (LP and LLPA) 2010.
Labuan Limited Liability Partnerships (LLLP)

Under the LP and LLPA 2010, any two or more persons may form a Labuan limited partnership for any lawful purpose. An individual or a corporation may be a partner in a Labuan limited liability partnership.

To register a Labuan limited liability partnership, the designated partner shall submit all relevant documents to the Authority and accompanied by the prescribed fee as may be specified by the Authority. The name of a Labuan limited liability partnership shall end with the words “Labuan Limited Liability Partnership” in full or the abbreviation “(Labuan) L.L.P.” or “(Labuan) LLP” or any other form of abbreviation in Romanized character or words in the national language of a country which connotes a limited liability partnership or any abbreviation thereof as may be approved by the Authority.

Upon registration, the Labuan limited liability partnership shall be a body corporate and has legal personality separate from that of its partners. It shall also enjoy perpetual succession and have all the powers of a natural person. Similar to a company, Labuan LLP is capable of suing and being sued, acquiring, owning, holding and developing or disposing of property, both movable and immovable and having a common seal under its own name. Any change in the partners of a Labuan limited liability partnership shall not affect the existence, rights or liabilities of the Labuan limited liability partnership.

As a legal entity, Labuan LLP shall be liable for its own debts arising in contract, tort or otherwise. The liabilities of the Labuan limited liability partnership shall be met out of the property of the Labuan limited liability partnership. A partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly solely by reason of being a partner of the Labuan LLP. However, the protection of limited liability shall not be applicable for personal liability of a partner in tort for his own wrongful act or omission. In such a case, the LLP is liable to the same extent as the defaulted partner. This means the third party can make a claim against the defaulted partner and the LLP.

In the Labuan LLP, every partner is the agent of the LLP and accordingly, the acts of a partner in the partner’s capacity as a partner shall bind it. However, the LLP shall not be bound by any act of the a partner with the third a party if the partner has in fact no authority to act for the LLP and the person knows that the partner has no authority or does not know or believe that partner to be a partner LLP.

The mutual rights and duties of the partners inter se and between the LLP with its partners are mainly governed by the partnership agreement. Only in the absence of an agreement that such matter shall be referred to the Labuan LP and LLP Act 2010.

In the Labuan LLP there must be at least one designated partner. A partner may become or cease to be a designated partner by and in accordance with an agreement with the other partners. A designated partner shall be responsible for all acts required to be done by him under the Act and shall be personally liable to all penalties imposed on the LLP for any contravention of Parts IV and V of the Act unless the court decided that he should not be liable.

Similar to other business entities, Labuan LLP is assessable and chargeable to tax as an entity. In Labuan, tax shall be charged at the rate of three per cent for a year of assessment upon the chargeable profits of a Labuan entity carrying on a trading activity for the basis period for that year of assessment whilst a Labuan entity carrying on non-trading activity for the basis period for a year of assessment shall not be charged to tax for that year of assessment.

Proposed Malaysian LLP

Different from the UK LLP, which was introduced to resolve the problem of increasing insurance claims for professional negligence of accounting firms (Diana Faber, 1997), the Malaysian LLPs is proposed to stimulate growth of the SMEs and to enhance the domestic business activities. It is also aim to prepare the local market for the international business environment.

Referring to the LLP discussion draft bill, the Malaysian proposed LLP is akin to the incorporated LLP, whereby the LLP shall have a status of body corporate but tax as partnerships. The draft Bill highlighted important features of the proposed LLP:
(a) limited liability for all members of the LLP but without the strict management procedures of an incorporated body;

(b) perpetual succession of the LLP whereby changes in membership will not affect the legal entity of the LLP; and

(c) flexibility in determining the internal arrangements between the members.

As the LLP is proposed to have the status of a body corporate, it shall have all the attributes of a company, namely separate legal personality, limited liability, perpetual succession, to sue and be sued and to acquire its own property. As regards to limited liability, the consultative document and the draft Bill proposed for all partners of the LLP to be entitled for unlimited liability in respect of tort and contractual claims against the LLP. The conferment of limited liability status will shelter the individual partners from the debts and liabilities of the LLP as well as personal liability from the acts of another partner, which were carried out during the course of business. However, such power will not insulate a partner of the LLP, which he would otherwise incur by his own wrongful act or omission, even though such acts were carried out in his role as a partner of the LLP. It is also proposed that limited liability shall be given to innocent partners only whilst the defaulting partner shall be jointly liable with the LLP for the damage, loss or injury suffered by a third party.

Other than the attributes, it is important to highlight that similar to other LLPs, registration is required for the proposed LLP. However, the partners’ agreement is not required to be lodged with the Registrar. As for the number of members, the proposed minimum number is two but there shall be no maximum number. It is also stated that in the case that the number of partner falls below two, a certain grace period shall be allowed for the LLP to operate. Failure to fulfill the minimum requirement after the grace period means that the LLP shall be wound up. Memberships of the proposed LLP are open to both natural and artificial person.

The draft LLP also proposed for the need to have a designated compliance officer who must be a natural person residing in Malaysia. The job’s scope of the designated compliance officer is akin to a company secretary. Different from the UK and Jersey LLP, the CCM proposed that the designated officer should not necessarily be a partner of the LLP but shall be subjected to disqualification requirements/criteria under sections 125, 130 and 130A of the Companies Act 1965.

As regards to internal arrangement, CCM proposed to adopt the UK’s approach whereby the members should have all the rights to draft the LLP internal regulation. However, default rules shall be included in the proposed LLP Act, so that in the absence of the partners’ agreement, the default rules shall be applicable.

Pertaining to relation with the third parties, partners of the proposed LLP shall only be agents to the LLP and not to one another. The LLP shall be responsible for any act of the partners, which are committed within the partners’ authority. However, the CCM highlighted that to avoid unnecessary confusion on whether a person is a partner and the liability of retiring partner, the doctrine of constructive should not be applicable where transactions with third party is concerned. The proposed LLP Act shall resolve these issues by providing provisions to bind the LLP on acts done by its partners as long as they have authority. The draft LLP Bill also states that any limitation on the authority of partners, which are stated in the partners’ agreement, will not prejudice the third party.

As regard protection of creditors, it is proposed that there should be a claw-back provision provisions requiring contributions from partners and former partners who have withdrawn any property from the LLP within a stipulated time frame of the commencement of the winding up, if it can be shown that the LLP was insolvent at the time of withdrawal or that the member(s) knew or have reasonable grounds for believing that the LLP was or would not be able to pay its debts. The respondents were also of the view that an appropriate time-frame should be provided for to ensure fairness to both creditors and partners of the LLP. It is also proposed that this claw-back provision should be limited only to the amount withdrawn by the partner or former partner of the LLP.
THE SINGAPORE LLP

Generally, the Singapore LLP is akin to the UK LLP. It has the status of a body corporate and thus enjoys all the attributes of a company. In order to set up the LLP, the members are required to submit certain statement to the Registrar. Different from the UK LLP Act 2000, the Singapore LLP Act 2005 does not require submission of incorporation document for registration although content of the incorporation document of UK LLP are generally similar to the required statement for registration of Singapore LLP. The procedures to register the LLP are generally similar to the procedures to register a company; for example the reservation of name and right of the registrar to refuse to register certain name. The only different between the LLP and a company as regards to registration is the incorporation documents.

As regards to the internal management, the LLP adapted the flexibility of a partnership whereby the partners have the liberty to decide their duties and rights via the partners’ agreement. In the absence of the partners’ agreement, the Act provides default rules which are generally similar to default rules of partnerships under the Partnerships Act. However, despite the freedom to decide the internal arrangement, the LLP Act expressly provides that the LLP must have at least one manager whom duties are akin to the company secretary.

Another important agenda which need to be highlighted is the external regulation of the LLP; as regards to relation with both the regulator and third parties. For the regulators, the LLP Act expressly stated that the LLP has the statutory duty to submit annual declaration of solvency/insolvency. The Act does not require submission of annual reports on accounts although the LLP has an express duty to keep records of accounts and other records which would sufficiently explain the transactions and financial position of the limited liability partnership and enable profit and loss accounts and balance-sheets to be prepared from time to time which give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the LLP. Failure to perform this duty shall render the LLP and every partner liable for prosecution and the penalty may be a fine or imprisonment, or both.

For the creditors, the LLP Act provides “clawback” mechanisms which provides that upon winding up, past or present members of the LLP will be liable to contribute to the assets of the LLP in respect of any property withdrawn from the LLP within three years preceding the commencement of the winding up, if it can be shown that at the time of the withdrawal, the LLP was insolvent.

Pertaining to partners liabilities, the LLP shall be solely liable for all obligations arising in contract, tort or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the limited liability partnership. The partners shall not be personally liable, directly or indirectly, for obligations of the LLPs. However, the shield of limited liability shall not affect the personal liability of a partner in tort for his own wrongful act or omission. Nevertheless, in the circumstances where a partner of the LLPs is liable to any person (other than another partner of the limited liability partnership) as a result of a wrongful act or omission of his in the course of the business of

---

2 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 4(1)
3 Separate legal personality; sec 4(1) and 4(3), perpetual succession; section 4(2); right to sue and be sued; section 5(1)(a) and right to hold property; section 5(1)(b).
4 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 15(1)(a)-(f).
5 See Limited Liability Partnerships (UK) Act 2000; section 2(b) and (c).
6 Nonetheless, the Registrar may, in any particular case require the statement referred to in 15 (1)(a) –(f) to be verified in such manner as the Registrar considers fit; Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 15(2).
8 First Schedule of Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 10(1)
9 First Schedule of Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 10(10–11).
10 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 23(3).
12 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 25
13 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 25
14 Schedule Five Schedule 1 of Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 84.
15 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 8(1).
16 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 8(2).
17 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 8(3).
the limited liability partnership or with its authority, the LLPs shall be liable to the same extent as the defaulting partner. For criminal liability, only the culpable officers shall be liable.

CONCLUSION

It is observed that the LLPs in the South East Asia is more akin to the corporate structure; with the status of body corporate, formal registration requirement, the juristic personality, the attributes and method of dissolution. Comparing LLP to a partnership, it could be seen that the most significant difference between the two would be the legal entity, whereby the LLP is recognized as a legal entity and therefore inherit all the attributes of a juristic person. On the other hand, the most significant difference between LLP and a company lies in the internal regulation whereby partners in LLP have flexible arrangement in deciding how their internal management should be regulated.

Another obvious difference between LLP and partnership is the application of the agency rule. In LLP, partners are only agent to the LLP whilst in partnerships; partners are agent to both the firma and other partners. There is no dual agency relationship in LLP. This principle is important as it manage to resolve problems caused by the unlimited liability regime. When partners are only liable for his action and not for other partners’ action, it is obvious that the scope of partners’ liability has been reduced. They are only liable for their own action/default and not for other partners’ default. To make things better, if the default of the partners were committed within their authority, the LLP will bear the consequences, as it is the principal. Whereas in partnerships, any default either committed by a partner or all partners, all partners will be liable as the firm is not separated from them and all the partners are collectively, the Principal.

The LLP also marked a difference in the requirement of legal existence. In general partnerships, partners could set up their firm without registering the business. As long as the partners fulfill all the elements of partnerships, namely relations between persons carrying on business in common, a partnership could validly be carried on. Whereas for the LLP, the law is clear that registration is condition for existence although the procedures are not as complicated as registering a company.

Albeit all the differences, there are also some similarities between the proposed LLP and existing partnerships structure. In both structure, partners’ agreement is important in regulating the internal relation. The tax scheme is also similar for both LLP and partnerships, whereby partners are taxed based on their income and not on the business.

In the South East Asia, the Singapore LLP Act 2005 and the Malaysian LLP Bill 2011 marked a major development in the region business law, as it indicates a serious initiative from the lawmakers that there will be new and alternative business structure in the market. Due to its fascinating features, tax advantage and ability to attract international business, it is proposed that other countries in South East Asia to introduce this business entity in their respective country.

REFERENCES

Statutes
Labuan Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2010
Limited Liability Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1997 (amendment 2008)
Limited Liability Partnerships Act (UK) 2000
Limited Liability Partnerships Act (Singapore) 2005
Limited Liability Partnerships (Malaysia) Bill 2011

Book

18 Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 8(4).
19 A culpable officer provision shall apply, with the necessary modifications, to a limited liability partnership as if the reference in that provision to a director (or a person purporting to act as a director) were a reference to a partner or manager (or a person purporting to act as a partner or manager, as the case may be) of the limited liability partnership; Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 58(1)
20 See also Limited Liability Partnerships (Singapore) Act 2005; section 58(2)


Frederick Hallis (1930), *Corporate Personality; A Study in Jurisprudence*, Oxford University Press, London, 1930

Frederick Maitland, Translator Introduction to Gierke’s Political Theories of the Middle Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1938


**Journal**


Rands, William J. (1995), Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences under Federal Tax Law; 49 S.M.U. L. Rev. 15
ASEAN: SECURITY COMMUNITY BUILDING AND REGIONAL SECURITY POLITICS IN MALACCA STRAITS

Sartika Soesilowati
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science
Airlangga University, Surabaya, Indonesia
sartikas@hotmail.com / sartika.soesilowati@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This research demonstrates both the extent and the limits of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) ability to cooperate as a security community. The intent of the research is to analyse the relevance and feasibility of preserving sovereign prerogatives within a framework of regional cooperation among the five core ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. The study particularly reflects the tensions between the individual member-states’ traditional sovereign prerogatives and the Association’s stated ambition to develop into a regional security community. The research argues that to build a security community that can succeed in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN member-states must rely on managing ‘adaptable sovereignty’. Adaptable sovereignty allows the adjustment of sovereign prerogatives enabling compromise that provides the impetus toward community-building, but not to the point where the primacy of sovereignty is surrendered. The two case studies, combating terrorism, and maritime security in the Malacca Straits examine how ASEAN manages sovereignty to permit security cooperation. The case studies indicate that building a security community within ASEAN can only occur if the member-states do not have to substantially sacrifice their national sovereignty prerogatives, while simultaneously strengthening their sense of community over time. This ‘adaptable’ form of sovereignty can be seen in their simultaneous protection of state-centric primacy, while also pursuing the higher levels of institutionalisation and interdependence necessary for effective security cooperation to develop.

Keywords: ASEAN, Security Community, Sovereignty, Regionalism

In creating a security community (Deutsch 1975: 5) among ASEAN member-states the concept of sovereignty raises important questions. How, for example, will the ASEAN states manage their ‘sovereign statehood’ within the process of security community building? What type of security community might ASEAN become? It is important to explore these questions because the institution is now at a genuine crossroads, changing from informal structure to more formal one, by issuing the ASEAN Charter. The policies adopted by ASEAN will determine whether a security community will become the predominant form of security management in Southeast Asia.

The case study of cooperation in securing Malacca Straits examines how ASEAN manages sovereignty to permit security cooperation. The case studies indicate that building a security community within ASEAN can only occur if the member-states do not have to substantially sacrifice their national sovereignty prerogatives, while simultaneously strengthening their sense of community over time. Current collaborative security efforts demonstrate that ASEAN’s key member states are capable of striking a judicious balance between their respective sovereign prerogatives and community building efforts, but not to the point where the primacy of sovereignty is extinguished. This ‘adaptable’ form of sovereignty can be seen in their simultaneous protection of state-centric primacy, while also pursuing the higher levels of institutionalisation and interdependence necessary for effective security cooperation to develop.
ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY

Concern has been directed toward ASEAN’s long standing norms of prioritising sovereignty and safeguarding non-interference in internal affairs. These ‘principles’ are still held to be sacrosanct by most ASEAN states and, arguably, have been responsible for that institution’s failure to design appropriate responses to various domestic crises. Consequently, observers critical of what they view as ASEAN’s excessive focus on sovereignty have proposed that there is a need for member-states to ‘legitimate the interference’ (Moller 1998: 1.104, Haacke 1999: 581-611) or to ameliorate national sovereignty as a necessary precondition for greater levels of security cooperation (Narine 2002: 5). These arguments suggest that to the extent that ASEAN fails to modify sovereignty, intra-ASEAN cooperation will not be fully realized, and regional security will be more difficult to establish.

Any modification of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference is therefore a central issue for ASEAN’s security politics. State sovereignty and non-interference norms have acted as constraints within ASEAN’s overall pattern of regional security cooperation. On the one hand, the preservation of state sovereignty and the adherence to the principle of non-interference challenges the building of stronger institutional cooperation within ASEAN. On the other hand, norms of sovereignty and non-interference have underwritten the ground rules around which this particular security grouping has been formulated. Without extended guarantees of non-interference, moreover, newer ASEAN member-states such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would not have joined ASEAN. Yet ASEAN members have still not implemented specific mechanisms capable of commanding widespread consensus among them to reconcile this evident contradiction: the safeguarding of sovereign rights versus the development of a stronger collective security identity.

THE ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY DEBATE

The debate over the nature of ASEAN as an institutional example of security community building deserves careful scrutiny. The three dominant theoretical approaches of realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism have all contributed to the ongoing debate on security community theory. However, these perspectives have also tended to differ on what actually constitutes a security community and what factors really shape the development of a security community in ASEAN. The debate generated by these perspectives about the merit, weakness of and possibility of creating a security community in ASEAN still has not really succeeded in capturing the complexity and uniqueness of ASEAN.

It is problematic for realists, for example, to accept the very idea of a security community among developing countries in an ASEAN context. They see no prospect for a security community within ASEAN because inherently, there is no language of ‘community’ within realists’ paradigmatic approach. The notion of a security community is at best utopian. Rather than having succeeded in creating a community, ASEAN is more an illusion of community (Jones and Smith 2007: 149). ‘ASEAN scholarship’ thus promotes ‘regional delusion’ rather than proper analyses (Jones and Smith 2008: 94). Therefore the prospect of a security community in ASEAN from a realist perspective is a flawed concept from the outset.

Realist explanations tend to simplify the complexity of the relationships between Southeast Asian countries and undervalue ASEAN’s very existence. They are to some extent correct when they argue that the relationship between the states is based on reconciling potentially diverse national security interests within a power equilibrium designed to achieve conflict avoidance on national interests. However, a realist analysis of ASEAN’s potential to create a security community in Southeast Asia neglects the significant achievement of the member states in managing the historical conflicts between them by peaceful means. The idea of a pluralistic security community in Southeast Asia’s case therefore needs to be linked more closely with the actual story of how regional cooperation has developed in that region.

Neoliberalist or institutionalist perspectives alone also yield an incomplete analysis of ASEAN security politics. The neoliberalist tendency to focus on regulative norms and supra-national bodies as qualifications for meaningful cooperation leads adherents of this approach to reject the idea that ASEAN is
undergoing a process of security community building. From the neoliberalist perspective, ASEAN is only loosely institutionalised, thereby limiting its capabilities to manage key issues.

Neoliberalism promotes ASEAN’s interdependence, the viability of its binding rules, the authority of ASEAN’s actual regional purview and Southeast Asian states’ willingness to transfer or share sovereignty at the institutional level. The ASEAN Summit and the recent expansion of ASEAN Secretariat role are evidentiary of the neo-liberal outlook taking greater hold of member-states’ calculations about the institution.

However, neo-liberals are still concerned that ASEAN is not using those instruments it has established to strengthen that institution’s credibility as effectively as they might (Kahler 2000: 551). ASEAN’s style of regionalism has, according to other neo-liberals, failed to develop that organisation’s potential as a viable community-building institution. Neoliberalists do not take into sufficient account, however, that ASEAN member-state relations are very often based on informal norms. Neo-institutionalists may not too much credit in to developing a security community that requires a style that reflect Western institution-building. However, given the Southeast Asian region’s culture, history and vulnerabilities, such a change may not be completely justifiable in ASEAN case.

To examine ASEAN’s development as a security community by adopting an exclusively constructivist perspective is also problematic. Constructivist analysis looks at constitutive norms and identity. It is difficult in ASEAN’s case to define the patterns and regularity in these areas with any real precision. What precisely is a ‘norm’ and when does it matter? For example, Amitav Acharya (2001: 71-72; 2005: 98-106; 2000: 12-14) has focused mainly on norms and identity as the most significant factor to qualify ASEAN as a security community. However, a security community is not only about norms and identity. It must also include the interests of member states, their capacity to engage in institutional and legal processes with other members and with support accepted from exogenous factors such as powerful non-member states as indicated with the supportive role of growing EU regionalism.

As constructivists note, regionalism has developed a unique character predicated on the development of member-states’ identity that has allowed ASEAN to evolve into an organization that can eventually ‘mature’ into a security community. In reality, these developments have not reached a level where a fully constructivist blueprint equating to a security community is in evidence. Constructivists such as Acharya (1997: 328-333; 1998: 207-214; 2005: 95-118) for example, tend to exaggerate the intimacy of relationships among the ASEAN members.

To conclude any analysis of the security community idea in Southeast Asia should be linked to a judicious combination of factors that can be selectively derived from neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist thought. A more amalgamated approach can reduce analytical ambiguity and limit theoretical bias when it comes to judging ASEAN values. To analyse security community evolution in the Southeast Asia, this study further interrogates the process by selectively drawing on the reflectivist perspective. One way to interpret this particular approach is to focus on the concern with ‘the way things were’ (Smith 2001: 229). ASEAN should be interrogated closely to what has really happened and what actually ‘mattered’ in its institutional development.

CASE STUDY: REGIONAL SECURITY POLITICS IN MALACCA STRAITS

The case study of security politics in the Malacca Straits between three ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (latter Thailand joint) is an appropriate example of how core ASEAN states have either collaborated with or contested each other in ways that test their ability to reconcile their individual sovereign interest with community-building approaches for managing one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. The analysis will examine the measures adopted by the three states to create modes of security cooperation that reflect ASEAN member-states’ ability to formulate a joint response to problems that challenge their ability to develop a sense of community.

The section will begin by identifying the significance of the Straits in a general sense and how each states values this vital sea lane according their national interest. It will followed by examining the nature of security cooperation between the three ASEAN members and evaluate the importance of this collaboration.
before discussing some obstacles to the development of this cooperation. This will conclude by assessing the prospects for the maritime security cooperation in the light of ASEAN’s future development as a security community.

**Perceptional Divergences**

Maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits is an important precedent from which it may be possible to envisage the form of the security community within ASEAN. The ASEAN members have themselves recognized the significance of maritime cooperation among the member states as contributing to the development of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), in Article No 5:

> Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in an holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community (ASEAN 2003)

As the Declaration demonstrates, the member-states recognise the potential that the successful management of maritime security issues have for providing a major contribution to building a security community within ASEAN. In practice, managing collective action in the Straits has been carried out through mutual respect for state sovereignty and commonality for exposure to such threats, however they also have different perceptions of what are their own priorities in the straits.

Each state, for example, has a different view about how instability in the Straits would affect its own national security. To Singapore the Straits are vital to their national security and economy. A blockade of the Strait – from any cause – would cripple Singapore’s role as an international entrepôt and have a devastating influence on its service-based economy. Regarding Malaysia’s national interests the Straits also have high importance for both security and economic reasons (Mak 2004: 3) However, unlike Singapore, Malaysia’s east coast provides it with alternative access to the Straits, giving it more options and flexibility in the event of the Malacca Straits being closed for some reason. For the large archipelagic state of Indonesia any problems in the Malacca Straits would be a concern, but they would not touch on its vital national interests, political or economic. From an Indonesian perspective, the Straits are just one of many strategic waterways within its territory.

Their perceptions also diverge on the relative importance of the various threats to security in the Straits. The range of threats in the Malacca Straits varies from petty crime, smuggling people and arms, illegal fishing and logging, piracy and terrorism to the possibility of a major environmental disaster. These differences also influence the way in which the ASEAN littoral states view and apply a range of international conventions and initiatives that attempt to govern international maritime trade and security such international agreements include the 1982 United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and various conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For example, Singapore ratified SUA in 2003, largely due to its dependency on international trade, which makes it highly receptive to measures designed to enhance maritime security. However, for states such as Indonesia and Malaysia, who closely guard their territorial sovereignty, acceding to conventions like SUA is a contentious issue and both states have only recently signed the convention. The reasons for this hesitation are that SUA imposes financial obligations on signatory states as well as having the potential to encroach on their national sovereignty. This type of intervention in domestic issues is a sensitive topic among ASEAN nations, making the actual application of SUA in the Straits problematic.

The three littoral states see the issue of piracy in different perception. For Singapore piracy remains the primary threat, along with fears that criminal gangs might find a common cause with terrorists to create a major incident in the Straits (Valencia 2006). Malaysia has continually downplayed the issue of piracy,
insisting that it is not a serious problem. Indonesia argues that concerns about Malacca Straits should also entail other issues such as illegal logging, smuggling, and illegal fishing rather than just prioritizing piracy. Indonesia and Malaysia both dispute the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)’s statistics and argue that the IMB has exaggerated the incidence of piracy. One reason for this tendency by Malaysia and Indonesia to downplay the threat of piracy is that both nations are concerned to maintain their ability to exercise their conceptual and practical sovereignty over the waters of the Malacca Straits.

The importance of UNCLOS definition to both Indonesia and Malaysia is that it designates ‘piracy’ as a crime that occurs only on the high seas, i.e. beyond the jurisdiction of any state. This definition explicitly excludes such acts when they occur in territorial waters like the Singapore and Malacca Straits. Another significant distinction is that the UNCLOS definition of piracy also excludes crimes that occur in port. The two definitions are noteworthy when applied to the Malacca Straits, since under the terms of the UNCLOS articles most of the thefts that happen at sea occur will be within the 12 mile limit and thus cannot be classified as piracy, but only as acts of armed robbery.

When it comes to the threat posed by the possible nexus of piracy and terrorism, Singapore is again at odds with Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia and Indonesia has objected to the idea that the Straits are a particular target for this type of terrorism’s (Ahmad 2004). In contrast, Singapore has embraced this threat as a real possibility. As a close ally of the US that is also surrounded by Muslim states, Singapore fears that radical groups from the region could attack its trade by hi-jacking a ship, placing conventional or even nuclear explosives on it and then detonate the device in its port.

In an attempt to address these and other concerns about piracy, Japan has fostered a Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy or ReCAAP to provide a framework for enhancing co-operation, information exchange and capacity building among fourteen regional nations. Singapore is the member of ReCAAP, but Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to become full members of the agreement. Indonesia has remained aloof because it fears the initiative may be a mechanism for internationalizing the Malacca Straits (Antara News 18 August 2007). It has also questioned why the information sharing centre has been entrusted to Singapore, when the security of the Strait is as much the responsibility of Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia’s stance on ReCAAP serves to highlight differences between the littoral states regarding international conventions and initiatives and how these stem from varying threat perceptions, as well as disparities in the way each nation perceives its national interests.

The issue of piracy and other security concerns in the Malacca Strait continue to divide the littoral states. Given the diversity of threats to the security of the Straits and the differing interests of the nations concerned it is not surprising that consensus has been difficult to realise. International initiatives only tend to increase the divergence, since they aim to satisfy a broad constituency of nations, rather than the particular priorities and interests of one or more of the three littoral states.

**Show Case of State Sovereignty**

One reason for intra-ASEAN conflict is the tendency of these states to perceive their interests in the Straits as issues of state sovereignty. This contrasts with the emphasis of user states and commercial interests who are primarily concerned with ensuring the freedom of passage in the Straits as an international waterway. Mark J. Valencia (2004) believes that both Indonesia and Malaysia can be seen as “defending the Westphalian Treaty”. Nationalist Indonesian view is that Malacca Straits is an ‘etalase’ (prism) for showing state sovereignty’. Beyond such nationalist rhetoric, Indonesia and Malaysia argue that they have sound legal claims to the Straits. Under 1982 UNCLOS the waters in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore constitute part of the territorial waters of the littoral states over which they have sovereignty. For these reasons any activities or maneuvers in the Straits by foreign vessels, which are not exercising the right of transit – whether they are for civilian or military purposes – are subject to the consent of the respective coastal states (Wisnumurti 2004).

Indonesia, particularly, has special reasons to enforce state sovereignty in the Malacca Strait. The concept of Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelagic Outlook) defines Indonesia as a unitary entity consisting of its islands and archipelago waters. Indonesia’s position is that its territorial waters are an extension of its land
territory, making the provision of security in its territorial waters its sole responsibility. Moreover, Indonesia has a tradition of non-alignment so that its laws, regulations and foreign policy do not permit the deployment of foreign forces in its territory for any reason. Outside intervention could endanger the country’s national sovereignty of countries in the region and destabilize their domestic politics.

This concept is further reinforced by its right (along with that of Singapore and Malaysia) to maintain territorial authority over the Straits based on the 1982 United Nations Convention the Law of the Sea. Indonesia and Malaysia prefer to apply the right of innocent passage, while Singapore and the international community have a clear preference for the right of unimpeded passage. The application of these different standards has the potential to create conflict between the three ASEAN littoral states. In essence, the application of these different charters by the three nations means that Singapore’s position challenges the national interest of Indonesia and Malaysia and vice versa.

The sovereignty issue has also underlined other divergences in the Straits security politics. The main differences occur over who should instigate security measures. As a basic principle, Indonesia and Malaysia reject any military collaboration with other countries. For Indonesia, the security in the Malacca Straits has always been the responsibility of the three ASEAN littoral states. Malaysia and Indonesia also argue that shipping companies should not employ private armed escorts in either the Strait of Malacca or the Singapore Strait. Indonesia’s preference is for user states to assist it with building its own capacity to secure the Straits through measures such as the provision of technical assistance (Hermawan 2007). This response was also given to the aforementioned US offer of assistance in 2004, relating to the report of the U.S. Pacific Command, which suggested that American marines could help patrol the Straits (The Indonesian Foreign Ministry 2004).

The reasoning behind rejecting foreign assistance and the use of security companies in the Straits relates to the protection of national sovereignty. Both Malaysia and Indonesia feel that rejecting direct assistance is the best way to protect themselves from gunboat diplomacy and other forms of foreign intervention in their national affairs (Valencia 2004). These sensitivities to intervention are derived from their colonial past, while the rejection of foreign assistance is based on their interpretation of UNCLOS III provides no legal basis for the naval vessels of foreign powers patrolling in their territorial waters (Sutarji 2008).

Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a firm stand against the deployment of foreign forces in the Strait of Malacca to combat piracy, whereas Singapore initially welcomed the US proposal for joint patrols in the Straits. Indonesia clearly felt annoyed when Singapore indicated its strong support for a larger US presence in the region in 2004, arguing that the island-state was only thinking about its own interests and not considering those of its neighbours (The Jakarta Post 9 June 2004). Singapore has also allowed private security companies to escort ships and their crews passing through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. In the eyes of Indonesia and Malaysia, these vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of the states whose waters they are transiting. Thus any such pursuit technically usurps the ‘host’ state’s law enforcement role.

Singapore prefers the involvement of external parties in the security of the Malacca Straits. This country worries that that the task to secure the Straits beyond the will and the capability of Malaysia and Indonesia, and thus feels that the responsibility for security in the Straits could be borne by the ‘international community’. However, this position seemingly opens the Straits to just the type of unilateral intervention that Malaysia and Indonesia categorically reject. Some see Singapore’s willingness to allow external parties including private companies of armed escort service to operate in the Straits as another tactics in its attempt to get Malaysia and Indonesia to allow Singapore anti-sea robber and anti-terrorist patrols into their waters (The Jakarta Post 9 June 2004). Under pressure from its neighbours Singapore eventually agreed ‘to manage without foreign intervention’. Recently, in January 2011, although situation in the Straits has already more secured, Indonesia still rejects the participation of US in the supervision as Singapore want US involved of the Straits of Malacca. Although Indonesia welcomes US to help tools and surveillance equipment.

It should be noted that Thailand stayed clear of the Malacca Straits Patrol agreement made by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to conduct joint sea and air patrols until 18 September 2008. Thailand was less enthusiastic to become involved in the Malacca Straits because it has no significant territorial
sovereignty over the Straits. More importantly, Thai defence doctrine has always given top priority to the Gulf of Thailand, due its traditional strategic value, rich marine resources and overlapping claims (Chongkittavorn 2008). The Royal Thai Navy has paid attention only to surveillance of the Andaman Sea, concerned mostly with protection of the Thai fishing fleet and dissuading the arrival of refugees from nearby Burma and Bangladesh. However, the recent influx of Rohinya refugees from Burma landing in Thailand’s eastern coastal provinces and increases in the use of maritime routes to support Thai insurgent groups in Southern Thailand has upgraded the strategic relevance of the straits to Thai government.

From above description has shown that the interests of the three states diverge and converge as they attempt to deal with a range of security issues in the Straits, with a particular emphasis on the issue of piracy. These influence the way they manage security cooperation programs in Malacca Straits.

**Trilateral Cooperation**

The ASEAN littoral states have embarked on a range of security cooperation programs. For example, members of the Police Coast Guard of Singapore, the Malaysian Marine Police and the Indonesian Marine Police of the Riau region have met regularly for discussions. However, there are also a number of trilateral security programs such as Malacca Strait Sea Patrol of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (MALSINDO), Eyes-in-the-Sky and the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network (MSP). Each of these initiatives will be discussed more fully below.

**MALSINDO**

On 20 July 2004 heightened security cooperation in the Malacca Straits began was attained with the launch of a trilateral MALSINDO. The importance of these coordinated naval patrols is that they constitute a cooperative arrangement that developed out of an informal network of bilateral agreements. Given the negative ‘motivation’ of Admiral Fargo’s RMSI announcement, the MALSINDO patrols were clearly intended to preclude the US, and to lesser extent Japan, from assuming any more direct roles in the provision of security in the Straits. These trilateral patrols were built upon bilateral patrols conducted by the three states for over a decade. Without this precedent, it is unlikely that the trilateral patrols would have been formalized so quickly or have reached the same level of effectiveness (Bradford 2005: 200).

The coordinated naval patrols include about seven ships from each country working together, but each remaining in their own territorial waters. The MALSINDO patrols have been planned to operate on a year round basis, making them very different from the previous bilateral operations. Under this arrangement, the participating states conduct coordinated patrols while facilitating the sharing of information and intelligence between ships through a Monitoring and Action Agency (MAA). These arrangements permit patrol activity to take place all year and 24 hours per day. The coordinated patrols are a compromise with the idea of a joint patrol, which would require much greater levels of integration and collaboration.

**Eyes in the Sky (EiS)**

An attempt to further enhance the effectiveness and coverage of MALSINDO naval patrols, Malaysia proposed an ‘Eyes-in-the-Sky’ or EiS surveillance initiative. This initiative mobilises other military assets of the three littoral nations such as maritime patrol aircraft to complement the naval surface patrol arrangements under MALSINDO. Launched on 13 September 2005, EiS provides for maritime patrol aircraft from each of the three states to conduct two sorties per week along the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Every flight carries a Combined Maritime Patrol Team (CMPT) consisting of military personnel from each of the participating states. CMPTs report ‘suspicious activities’ to centres on the ground in each of three countries for follow-up action by maritime law enforcement agencies. For operational purposes, the Straits are divided into four sectors, with each patrol usually covering two sectors.

The addition of Thailand to these joint patrol programs was discussed at a meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Force from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand in Kuala Lumpur on 2 August 2005. However, due to the intensification of internal political problems in Thailand in early 2006, planning to
include that country in the cooperative patrol program was cancelled (Suara Karya 25 January 2006). In August 2007, Thailand renewed its interest in joining the cooperative effort to patrol the Straits. There was little follow-up beyond this intent, until finally on 18 September 2008, Thailand became the fourth country to join the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP). Thailand’s participation in the MSP was formalized in signing ceremony for the revised Standard Operating procedures and Terms of Reference for the Malacca Straits Patrol joint Coordination Committee.

**Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network (MSP)**

In order to bring together the existing security cooperation of surface patrols and air surveillance, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia signed an agreement to formalise the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network (MSP) on Batam Island in Indonesia on 21 April 2006. Under the terms of this agreement Malaysia and Singapore are responsible for contributing five naval and two air patrols, while Indonesia is providing seven naval and two air patrols. The agreement has no provisions for ‘hot pursuit’ into each others sovereign territories, but the three states did agree to sign a Terms of Reference for a Joint Coordinating Committee (TOR JCC) that will oversee both the air and sea patrol programs. There was also agreement on Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the patrols. Perhaps the most important feature of the planned JCC is that it will act as a channel for communication and information exchange, as well as coordination all operations in the Straits (Business Times Singapore 22 April 2006).

An MSP Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) was formed among the three participating states in 2006 to support the air and sea patrols. This led to the development of an information sharing platform called the Malacca Strait Patrol Information System or MSP-IS. The MSP-IS was set up in November 2006 for trial operations and has been in operation since then to share maritime intelligence. The MSP-IS is a demonstration of the resolve and capability of the states to meet the requirement to provide security in the Malacca Straits in a co-operative manner. The system has enhanced their situational awareness in the Straits and its approaches via information passed on by air and sea assets. Dealing with incidents can be managed through the Monitoring and Action Agencies (MAA) on a real-time basis to greatly facilitate a co-ordinated response. The MSP-IS has been enhanced with new features - an Open and Analysis Shipping Information System (OASIS) and a Sense-Making Analysis and Research Tool (SMART). OASIS provides a near real-time Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) drawing on a database of more than 150,000 vessels. SMART complements the OASIS database because it is capable of detecting any anomalous behaviour of ships transiting in the region and providing early warning to the MAA to cue operational responses where necessary. The SMART program thus promotes collaboration among the participating states through the sharing of detailed information on threats to maritime security in the region.

In late March 2008, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) or Indonesian Armed Forces, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (TRATF) participated in an inaugural Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) Information Sharing Exercise held at the Information Fusion Centre, Tuas Naval Base in Singapore. The two day exercise validated and strengthened the information-sharing linkages for maritime security amongst the four countries. The MSP Information Sharing exercise employed the latest Internet-based MSP Information System (MSP-IS) developed by the Singaporean Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA). The MSP-IS aggregates shipping databases and relevant real-time information to improve coordination and overall awareness of the situation at sea, thereby enabling timely responses to maritime incidents in the Malacca Strait. The exercise took place under the auspices of the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) initiative, which includes the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP), EiS and the intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). Together these programs comprise a set of practical co-operative measures which had been effective in enhancing the security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

**Achievements and Protracted Obstacles in Cooperation**

The fact that trilateral security cooperation has been successful is demonstrated by several factors. For example, functional cooperation has been achieved relatively smoothly (Ho 2005: 24). Cooperation has
Another register of success has been the significant decline in the incidence of piracy and other transnational crimes in the Straits. The recent drastic drop in piracy is a direct result of the intense efforts undertaken by the littoral states themselves. A reduction of 68% took place after the trilateral security cooperation programs were launched in 2005. The International Maritime Bureau’s Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, has acknowledged that the reduction was due to increased vigilance and patrolling by the three littoral states. Indonesia was particularly singled out for praise, after its navy targeted ‘hot spots’ in operations such as the GURITA series (Urquhat 2006). Since July 2005, these efforts have led to a marked decrease in the number piracy incident occurring in Indonesian waters. In 2010 there were close to zero piracy incident in Malacca Straits.

The repercussions of these successes have also been felt internationally. The insurance company designated status ‘war risk’ has been removed from the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Maritime insurer, Lloyds of London made the announcement, which has had the immediate result of lowering insurance rates for ships passing through the Straits (The Jakarta Post 15 June 2006). A further outcome of the cooperation between the littoral states has been a reduction in pressure from external states to intervene in the region’s affairs. This result has been particularly satisfying to Indonesia and Malaysia, who feared the consequences of military intervention by external parties.

Even though the coordinated security cooperation between the littoral states has been successful, obstacles remain that impede the ability of the three nations to further their cooperative efforts. The first of these obstacles is the relatively informal nature underscoring much of the ongoing nature of cooperation. The Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSP) is a coordinated rather than joint patrol program, with each state responsible for security within its own maritime jurisdiction. This level of cooperation is insufficient to secure the Straits against transnational crimes, for example, because the trilateral collaboration does not include the right of hot pursuit across territorial borders. Some maritime experts do not recognize the coordinated patrols as being sufficiently serious efforts and still press the littoral states to mount joint patrols. They argue that joint patrols would close loopholes such as hot pursuit and prevent suspected pirates from evading capture simply by crossing into another jurisdiction.

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) restricts the operational effectiveness of the patrols. At present there are also no plans to upgrade the MSSP from coordinated to joint patrols. Before joint patrols become a reality the three ASEAN littoral state partners, and perhaps Thailand as well, will need to address some problems, particularly over the issue of whether joint patrols could impinge on one another’s territorial rights. Malaysia has indicated that while joint patrols are a possibility, the three partners must first overcome certain ‘sensitivities’ - a veiled reference to sovereignty concerns (Associated Press 17 April 2007). Indonesia does not want to create joint patrols with Malaysia and Singapore because it feels that these would remove each country’s sovereign rights, by allowing forces from the other nations to enter Indonesian territory freely.

There is also a view in Indonesia and Malaysia that the coordinated patrol program has already achieved the necessary objective of bringing better security to the Straits. The view that the success of the current arrangements obviates the need for more extensive joint patrols also allows the ASEAN partners to avoid such difficult issues as which country should command any joint patrol program. The issue of command and control hierarchy within joint patrols is a highly sensitive one. When Malaysia urged the idea of joint patrols in April 2007, for example, Indonesia rejected the proposal due to a less than clear demarcation of who would assume overall command of the exercise. Singapore would also like to adopt a joint patrol program, but has recognised the reluctance of its partners on this issue and is currently not pursuing the idea.

Apart from the issue of command, the most important obstacle to any joint patrol program is the question of rights of ‘hot pursuit’. Under the SOP, MSSP ships now have right to pursue a suspect vessel up to a maximum 5 nautical miles (nm) into the territorial waters of another state. However, in practice, this has
never occurred and the arrangements for hot pursuit have been dealt with on a bilateral basis between Indonesia and Singapore, and Indonesia and Malaysia. Recent years, there were often some accidents and misunderstanding between Indonesian and Malaysian navy patrols over the issues of unclear demarcation. Singapore and Malaysia, do not have such an agreement and need to seek official permission before entering each other’s territorial waters (Business Times Singapore 22 April 2006). The lack of an agreement covering hot pursuit indicates that the existing sensitivities between Singapore and Malaysia over their mutual respect for national sovereignty is seen as being more important than effective policing of the waterways.

Another example of operational impediments is the weakness of the EiS component in the MSSP. Officially, the MSSP is capable of securing the Straits around the clock, but the veracity of this statement is doubtful. Due to lack of night-vision surveillance equipment EiS patrols are not conducted at after dark, the period when most piracy and other crimes occur (Storey 2008:119) There are also problems regarding detection, identification, and interdiction of suspect vessels (Hong and Ho 2005). The areas of operation are too large for the current number of aircraft sorties to cover in a significant way. Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s inability to purchase enough of equipment to handle the area become the reason for the assistance of external members to enhance capacity building. However, a liberalisation of littoral state positions on sovereign prerogatives will need to occur if such assistance is to be forthcoming or employed effectively.

Other problems arise from the differing approaches adopted by each state to deal with maritime security cooperation at the higher level, especially regarding transnational threats. Singapore has opted for a high degree of coordination between its maritime security forces and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). In contrast, Indonesia has opted to decentralise much of its maritime policing functions from the central government to the provinces. For example, the Indonesian Navy is no longer the sole agency responsible for maritime security. In line with the goal of decentralisation, Indonesia’s armed forces have recently been placed under the Minister for Defence, while the Police Force has been put under the Minister for Home Affairs. The result of these moves has been to diffuse power and create the need for new modes of operation. Indonesia lacks a dedicated Coast Guard and the impetus to create such a force is still not great. In addition, no single military or civilian component is responsible for maritime security. Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (Bakorkamla) or Maritime Security Coordinating Board is an ad hoc body with no coordinating function (Santosa 2005). This means that responsibility for maritime security is shared between the navy, police, customs service and the Ministry of Transportation’s Sea and Coastal Security Unit or Kesatu Pengawas Lepas Pantai (KPLP), with the result that there is a great deal of overlap and even competition between these various agencies.

One result of these differing policy approaches to the problems of maritime security is that, while cooperation between the navies and other maritime agencies of the three littoral states is excellent at the tactical level, this level of proficiency does not extend to the operational level. With Malaysia pursuing centralisation, Singapore coordination and Indonesia decentralisation the different decision-making structures resulting from each nation’s security approach to straits security contributes to the lack of operational efficiency in their cooperative maritime security efforts. The incompatibility of command and control organization makes it difficult to achieve any degree of competence at the operational level and impedes performance when it comes to both the decision-making and interdiction. This has specific implications for future joint patrolling prospects.

For Indonesia a key problem constraining its cooperative ability is, again, the limited capacity and capability of its Navy. Despite being an archipelagic state, the Indonesian Navy is not well developed and suffers from a serious lack of adequate funding. The result is that the navy is chronically under-manned, under-equipped, and underpaid (Suara Karya 28 January 2006). Effectively, then, Indonesia lacks a suitable agency to support its share of responsibility for maintaining the security of the Malacca Straits. Indonesia thus lacks the capacity to fully exercise its responsibilities because its navy is smaller and poorly equipped, relative to its two partners.

A lack of basic trust is another problem which detracts from the effectiveness of the trilateral cooperation initiatives. Although joint efforts by the ASEAN states have gradually strengthened and the
general levels of mutual trust have been greatly enhanced, nevertheless the problem trust between the three littoral states has not been totally resolved. Indonesia still accuses its neighbours of creating many of the problems in the Malacca Straits. For example, Indonesia has accused Singapore of gaining more benefits from defence cooperation agreement. This basic lack of trust is further emphasized by the ongoing territorial dispute between the three parties, with clashes over ownership of islands (such as Ambalat and Nipah) contributing to their mutual suspicions. Without such basic security consensus, it is difficult to imagine the two states engaging in more effective cooperation for the security of the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

Though joint patrols would be a sign of greater trust between the littoral states, they would not in themselves deal with the basic causes of crime and insecurity in the Straits. The current levels of cooperation do not really touch on the roots of the problem. By addressing only short-term solutions, multilateral and international efforts are ultimately like trimming the leaves of an invasive weed, rather than pulling it out by its roots (Young 2007: 3). To be effective, policies aimed at addressing the causes of piracy need to prioritise programs aimed at economic development in coastal regions and deal with rampant corruption in order to give various elements of the societies surrounding the Straits a viable stake in the economies of their respective nations. This would be more challenging task for the littoral states, especially Indonesia.

The real challenge to making improvements such as joint patrolling, and, indeed, to achieving overall closer regional cooperation lies with how the ASEAN states conceptualise state sovereignty. Sovereignty remains the paramount reason limiting cooperation, which has, in essence, functioned as a type of preventive diplomacy undertaken to relieve tensions, rather than arrive at a lasting solution.

CONCLUSION

The Malacca Straits are a real and significant security concern for all of the littoral states. While there remain divergences between them, essentially their national interests on this issue are closely interrelated. Indeed, many of these interests are mutually supportive and complementary. They face a common problem because the transnational nature of crimes such as piracy, armed robbery, smuggling and environmental degradation represent shared threats that require cooperative solutions. These mutual threats have been the impetus for the littoral states to develop new levels of security cooperation.

As a response to these threats, trilateral cooperation in the security of the Malacca Straits between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore has reached unprecedented levels. These recent developments show that security cooperation between ASEAN members is not impossible. Although there remain some important areas of divergence regarding the perception of threats, national priorities for addressing problems and more basic questions of capacity, there are also strong indicators of willingness to cooperate in order to address the immediate issues by all three countries. To be even more successful, the littoral states will need to agree on common interests and mitigate their national priorities in order to achieve regional goals that in the long term will uphold their respective national interests.

Outstanding problems stem from questions of how to share the responsibility for the security of such a vital international waterway, while reconciling this requirement with very discrete national interests that are at best divergent and at worst conflicting. The causes of these tensions are not just differing national priorities, but also mistrust and a lack of confidence. Nevertheless, the cooperative security efforts of the littoral states in the Malacca and Singapore Straits have achieved much more than reducing the incidence of piracy and lowering the insurance rates for ships using the Straits.

Cooperation has taught the ASEAN member-states that by working together they can defend their state sovereignty from the external intervention. In many ways their main purpose for cooperation was not the illegal activities that disturbed the international community (piracy, smuggling, freedom of navigation), but more as a reaction from external political pressure that threatened intervention in their domestic affairs and territorial waters. Even so, in the context of building a security community in Southeast Asia, the cooperative efforts of the littoral states in working towards maritime security in the Malacca Straits, for all the residual tensions, shows genuine promise.
Their current collaborative security efforts demonstrate that ASEAN’s three key littoral states are capable of striking a judicious balance between their respective sovereign prerogatives and community building efforts, but not to the point where the primacy of sovereignty is extinguished. This ‘adaptable’ form of sovereignty can be seen in their simultaneous protection of state-centric primacy, while also pursuing the higher levels of institutionalization and interdependence necessary for effective security cooperation to develop. With regard to the Malacca Straits, their cooperation has now shown the world, and themselves, that they are able to collaborate and achieve significant goals.

REFERENCES


Business Times Singapore. 2006. Three littoral states agreed to set up a Joint Coordinating Committee. 22 April.


Economic Intelligence Unit. 2008. Singapore risk: Infrastructure risk, 29 July.

Hermawan, A. 2007. Malacca coast patrol to stay local. The Jakarta Post. 26 August


______ 2005. Managing the peace conflict continuum. IDSS Commentaries 28 November

International Herald Tribune . 2007. Thailand to join patrols of Malacca Strait to help boost maritime security. 25 August.

International Herald Tribune. 2007. Malaysia says joint patrols with Indonesia, Singapore in Malacca Strait can be examined. 17 April


Storey, I. 2008. Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress, Asia Policy. 6: 95-127
Santosa, N. I. 2005. RI, Thailand to secure Strait of Malacca. The Jakarta Post 10 June
The Jakarta Post. 2004. Concerns over Straits of Malacca. 9 June.
The Jakarta Post. 2006. ‘Lloyd’s urged to drop Malacca Strait from piracy blacklist’ 15 June
______ 2006. Straits cooperation: A glass half-full. The Jakarta Post. 21 December
Wisnumurti, N. 2004. Upholding security in the Malacca Straits, The Jakarta Post, 12 April
CREATING HUMANITARIAN SPACE THROUGH ASEAN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Annisa Gita Srikandini
Department of International Relations
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
annisagita@yahoo.co.id

ABSTRACT

ASEAN received positive appreciation for its role in the aftermath of Myanmar Cyclone Nargis. This natural disaster, the worst in Myanmar's history, resulted in 138,000 lives lost. The Myanmar Government which refused to provide visas to foreign aid workers, allowed ASEAN to begin coordinating humanitarian action in their country. By that time, ASEAN was the first actor which entered Myanmar. This event became the stepping stone for ASEAN in establishing regional disaster management. In 2009, ASEAN countries agreed to establish ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA). The AHA Centre shall be established to facilitate co-operation and coordination among the Parties, and with relevant United Nations and international organizations. Several concerns remain including political agreement in creating humanitarian space. Humanitarian space is related to aid access for conducting humanitarian action. Within this context, countries should place the principle of humanity above political interests. As a manifesto, by signing the agreement on AHA, ASEAN countries agreed to receive ASEAN ‘intervention’ in the relief and rehabilitation phase. This paper will answer one main question: to what extent the AHA can open the humanitarian space in Southeast Asia countries? The concept of humanitarian action will be used to perceive the disaster response run by humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian action will become a framework to analyse the complexity of humanitarian crises from various related aspects: politics, legal, social, public health and psychology.

Keywords: ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance humanitarian action, disaster management, coordination, natural disaster.

DISASTER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Within this decade, countries in Southeast Asia has suffered from various disruption caused by natural disaster. According to the United Nations International Strategy for the Disaster Reduction, disaster is defined as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (IOM Community Based Disaster Risk Management). On 2004, Indonesia became one of the countries struck by Tsunami. Over 120,600 people died and another 114,900 were missing (BBC: Aceh after Tsunami). This tsunami also created 500,000 displaced persons (Foley p 134) and destroyed 20% of infrastructure (LSE: Between Conflict and Peace). On 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar resulted in 138,000 people losing their lives (United Nations Development Programme: Community Driven Recovery). This natural disaster, the worst in Myanmar's history, damaged the infrastructure of the country and affected the livelihoods of 2.4 million people, including the breakdown of economic activities and social conditions (United Nations Development Programme: Community Driven Recovery). 75 per cent of health facilities in the affected areas were destroyed or severely damaged along with approximately 4,000 schools (ReliefWeb: Comprehensive assessment of Cyclone Nargis). Within this year, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand also struggle with managing natural disaster which caused by
typhoon and floods. On September 2011, 16 people died in Manila due to powerful typhoon in the Philippines (CNN: Powerful Typhoon). This typhoon triggering floods and cutting power in the capital, Manila and throughout the main island, Luzon (CNN: Powerful Typhoon). In Vietnam, during September 2011, heavy rain and flood killed at least eight people and flooded thousands of houses plus thousands of hectares of crops (ASEAN: Heavy Rain in Vietnam). Meanwhile, over 34,000 people in the worst-hit provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh have evacuated their homes after days of torrential rain (BBC: Thousands Flees Vietnam). In another case, Thailand also face the worst flood in half century when the death toll had risen to 356, with nearly 9 million others affected (CNN: Thai Flooding). This disaster has caused more than 113,000 people staying at the shelters, which can cater for about 800,000 (CNN: Thai Flooding). Flood in Bangkok not only brought any damage to the infrastructure but also affect the economy of Thailand. On the last report, it was mentioned at least 14,000 factories have been affected nationwide, with about 250,000 people out of a job due to the floods (CNN: Thai Flooding). In terms of psychosocial issue, Thailand Health Minister said that, after months of flooding, 107,101 Thais have been diagnosed with stress, 6,214 with depression and 878 at risk of suicide (CNN: Central Bangkok spared worst of flooding).

Various natural disasters which struck Southeast Asia has made this region turn to be an area with high risk of exposure to hazards. Southeast Asia is one of the largest disaster-prone areas in the world (European Union: Disaster Preparedness). The region is exposed to a numerous potential of natural hazards such as floods, typhoons, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions to drought and forest fires (European Union: Disaster Preparedness). International Development Research Centre’s Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) on their project tried to measure the level of vulnerability from Southeast Asia countries toward hazards. It was concludes that Cambodia turn to be ‘unexpectedly vulnerable to disasters’ (Bakosurtanal: Southeast Asia Map). This country is not sufficient enough to deal with disaster (Bakosurtanal: Southeast Asia Map). Moreover, the study also highlights areas where should be recognized as ‘the most vulnerable zones’:

a. Mekong Delta in Vietnam and Bangkok, because of their exposure to sea level.
b. The northern part of the Philippines was also particularly vulnerable, being at high risk from tropical cyclones.
c. Jakarta become the most vulnerable areas not only because the city lie at the intersection of all but one of five climate-related hazards - drought, floods, landslides and sea level rise - it is also densely populated.

(Bakosurtanal: Southeast Asia Map).

This study tries to present potential hazard in the Southeast Asia countries. An understanding toward the concept of hazard is necessary to ensure how disaster management should be implemented. The United Nations secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defined disaster management as ‘the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster’ (IOM Community Based Disaster Risk Management). Disaster can be occurred when hazard could not be adapted by vulnerable community.
Hazard is identified as ‘a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage’ (IOM Community Based Disaster Risk Management). Vulnerability means the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of hazard (IOM Community Based Disaster Risk Management). Through this logic, best formula to work on disaster management is through improving the coping capacity to deal with disaster.

**Regional Collaborative Approach**

In dealing with humanitarian crisis, Indonesia has established a disaster response mechanism under the President called Indonesian National Body for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB)). In doing their work, BNPB and BNPD are obliged to provide humanitarian space for international humanitarian actors. During pre-disaster, international humanitarian actors provide an assistance/technical work to Indonesia. In the case of Myanmar, all coordination for disaster management is being conducted by Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement. This ministry is consists of social welfare department, relief and resettlement department and fire service department (Yin Aye: Report on Disaster Management). Meanwhile, aside from this ministry, Myanmar government also established the Central Committee on Natural Disaster. This committee is lead by Prime Minister which managing sub-committee on emergency communication, search and rescue, assessment, losses, rehabilitation, reconstruction and health (Yin Aye: Report on Disaster Management). In the Philippines, National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) developed into an institution which in charge for disaster management. This institution is the highest policy-making body for disaster management in the Philippines (Duque: Disaster Management). NDCC has 80 Provincial Disaster Coordinating Councils, 113 City Disaster Coordinating Councils, 1,496 Municipal Disaster Coordinating Councils, and 41,956 Barangay Disaster Coordinating Councils, and 17 Regional Disaster Coordinating Councils (Duque: Disaster Management). Since the division of authority has been distributed to local level, emergency response unit which obliged to act first after the disaster is the NDCC in provincial level. However, the national government is exists to provide their resources in order to support local government (Duqueand: Disaster Management). In Thailand which most disaster is associated with water, the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee (NDPMC) is the institution which responsible to disaster management. This institution is a policy maker, chaired by Prime Minister (Pakuschon: Disaster Management in Thailand). All the activities on disaster management are conducted within three levels: national, provincial, and local (Pakuschon: Disaster Management in Thailand). As a national response, the existence of this institution represents the needs from countries to cope with inevitable natural hazards. Further, this commitment expands into regional level when ASEAN offers coordination function and collaborative approach.

Miller and Rivera on their book ‘Comparative Emergency Management: Examining Global and Regional Responses to Disasters’ stated three reasons why regional collaborative approach on disaster management should be taken:

1. World continue to globalize and countries become more interdependent and it’s essential to looking across and outside the borders.
2. Disaster does not recognize borders. It can struck and affect trans-boundaries. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami directly impacted 13 countries on two continents.
3. Any damage by disaster might affect the stabilization of region.
4. Government in the region will be able to support the affected country from having serious loss of life and property.

(Miller and Rivera p xxvii)

Based on this reasons, both Miller and Rivera suggest a new paradigm of multilateral cooperation which should be introduced. Since national institution is working as a mechanism to manage the impact of disaster and creating humanitarin space, the regional mechanism also deal with the same functions.
Humanitarian space is a key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy consists of establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (NOHA Course Reader p 4).

For some countries, humanitarian response could be politicized. It is related to the fact that international community might be present in the affected country on behalf of humanity. The charges go further when the enemy construction places foreign humanitarian response as a threat. In a consequence, the government can decide for not allowing foreign humanitarian action to enter the country, even though International Humanitarian Law and United Nations have been agreed on the practice of humanitarian space. Both International Humanitarian Law and United Nations agreed on the obligation of sovereign state to provide humanitarian assistance and/or to give its consent to ensure that it is provided by humanitarian actors, the right of civilian population to receive it and the corresponding right of third states, International Government Organizations (IGOs), Non Government Organizations (NGOs) to provide it within certain limit (Carey and Richmond p 59). By humanitarian space it indicate that humanitarian action should be organized by independence and neutrality organization without involving military and political forces (Olson). The situation in Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis could be suitable case to explain this behavior of the state. The Burmese authorities have been criticized for their refusal to provide visas to foreign aid workers and their decision to reject the US’ offer to deploy three naval ships and two planes to the region (British Broadcasting Corporation: Aid arriving in Cyclone Hit Burma). The government asked the international aid agencies to negotiate with the military authorities before entering Myanmar (The Guardian: Cyclone Nargis in Burma: The Aftermath). The international community asked the Myanmar Government to allow access for humanitarian aid workers. In an article, the New York Times, describes how ‘the secretive and xenophobic junta was still fearing a seaborne invasion by Western powers’ (New York Times: Cyclone Nargis). Thus, it is essential and imminent to establish regional collaborative approach to ensure that humanitarian space can be granted when humanitarian crises outbreak in one of the country.

ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance CENTER (AHA CENTER)
The establishment of AHA Center could not be separated from its legal umbrella: ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). AADMER is the region's response to the need for a regional disaster management framework. As part of its mandate, ASEAN Countries agreed to establish AHA Center which gains its full function by 2011. AHA Centre will be the regional hub for information and knowledge for disaster management (ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta ready to host). Furthermore, this center will also serve as the centre point for mobilisation of resources to disaster affected areas, act as the coordination engine to ensure ASEAN's fast and collective response to disasters within the ASEAN region and serve as a centre of excellence for disaster management in the ASEAN region (ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta ready to host). Under AADMER article 20, AHA Center has several mandates:

1. The ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) shall be established for the purpose of facilitating co-operation and coordination among the Parties, and with relevant United Nations and international organisations, in promoting regional collaboration.

2. The AHA Centre shall work on the basis that the Party will act first to manage and respond to disasters. In the event that the Party requires assistance to cope with such a situation, in addition to direct request to any Assisting Entity, it may seek assistance from the AHA Centre to facilitate such request.

(ASEAN Post Nargis: AHA Center)
Moreover, this center shall also perform the following functions:

| No | Area of work                                      | Mandate as mentioned on the AADMER                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|----|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------|
| 1  | The ASEAN disaster information center            | i. receive and consolidate data as analysed by and recommendations on risk level from the National Focal Points (Article 5.4);                                                                                                                |
|    |                                                  | ii. on the basis of such information, disseminate to each Party, through its National Focal Point, the analysed data and risk level arising from the identified hazards (Article 5.4);                                    |
|    |                                                  | iii. receive information on measures taken by the Parties to mobilise equipment, facilities, materials, human and financial resources required to respond to disasters (Article 10.2);                              |
| 2  | The center for assistance mobilization for ASEAN | facilitate the establishment, maintenance and periodical review of regional standby arrangements for disaster relief and emergency response (Article 8.5);                                                                                           |
|    | member countries                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 3  | The operation coordination center                | a. receive information on measures taken by the Parties to mobilise equipment, facilities, materials, human and financial resources required to respond to disasters (Article 10.2);                              |
|    | a. joint emergency response;                     | b. facilitate joint emergency response (Article 11);                                                                                                                                                                             |
|    | b. administrative coordination center            | c. where appropriate, facilitate the processing of exemptions and facilities in respect of the provision of assistance (Article 14.e);                                                                                                       |
|    |                                                  | d. where possible and appropriate, facilitate the processing of transit of personnel, equipment, facilities and materials in respect of the provisions of assistance (Article 16.2);                                               |
| 4  | The coordinating center for knowledge and study  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|    | on disasters in ASEAN                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |

(ASEAN Post Nargis: AHA Center)

In terms of the AHA functions, it is demonstrate that ASEAN countries agreed to conduct regional coordination within three phases of disaster management: mitigation, response and recovery. Mitigation defined as imitating of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disaster (United Nations secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). Meanwhile, emergency response consist of relief and recovery phase in which relief is related to the response actions that reduce the impact of the disaster event after it has happened (Collins p 27). In the other hand, recovery process means the process of restoring lives, livelihoods and infrastructure to a locally acceptable standard (Collins p 27). Beach on his book ‘Disaster Preparedness and Management’ stated that through the recovery phase, evaluation of post efforts become a lesson learned which contribute to the mitigation phase afterwards (Beach p 4).

**Table 1: Disaster Continuum**

![Disaster Continuum Diagram](image_url)

(Beach p 4)
AHA Center: Political and Humanitarian Engagement

AHA Center is one of the models to reflect that regional collaboration could contribute in the disaster management. Despite the fact that the establishment and functions of AHA Center is driven by political agreement from ASEAN member countries, their genuine obligation in humanity should be empowered. This issue might be emerged as challenges for the work of AHA Center since the functions of coordinating and accommodating is a crucial point. AHA Center becomes a hub mechanism when all the information and resources are distributed and manage collectively. Belgard and Nachmias mentioned that when the governments decide to support humanitarian aid efforts, they seldom to do so without considering how their own political interests (Belgard and Nachmias p 4). By analyzing through realist perspective, it can be addressed that national interest is always present behind every action of countries. In order to eliminate the political intervention toward its work, AHA Center should work on the track of humanitarianism.

Regina Nockerts and Peter van Arsdale on Journal of Humanitarian Assistance defined ‘humanitarianism’ as any action to help human beings in need without considering any state boundaries. This concept has been driven by the obligations to help someone which have been suffered from various disruption. The importance of ‘obligations’ has been projected as a moral foundation for humanitarian action (Jocelyn Kelly). It indicate any relief of the suffering which must be guided solely by needs and priority (NOHA Course Reader p 31). Moreover there are two moral reasons which become a basis for this humanitarian action: one is the tendency to respond to people with certain kinds of respect which may be bound up with ideas about their dignity (Glover p 22). The other human response is sympathy: caring about the miseries and the happiness of others and perhaps feeling a degree of identification with them (Glover p 22). The construction of humanitarian principle also recognized ‘humanity’ and ‘impartiality’ as another basis for humanitarian assistance. The principle of ‘humanity’ highlighted the obligations to addressed human suffering wherever it is found with attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly (NOHA Course Reader p 31). Further, the principle of impartiality stress out on the need to provide humanitarian assistance without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion (NOHA Course Reader p 31).

REFERENCES

Jakarta Ready to Host ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center. Secretariat of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Pakuschon, Amorntip. Thailand on Disaster Management 2012.
THEME EIGHT

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
CHILD SAFETY ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN ASEAN REGION

Mubarak, A.R.
Department of Social Work and Social Planning,
Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia
mubarak@flinders.edu.au

ABSTRACT

Mental health is a major concern for all the countries in the ASEAN region. The stigma attached to mental illnesses and those who are mentally ill is still widely prevalent in these countries. Governments of this region have been struggling to find a balance between culturally-oriented ideologies regarding mental illness and many reforms in the area of community mental health proposed by the World Health Organization. This paper will summarise the challenges faced by ASEAN countries in implementing community mental health programs and will discuss the issues and challenges Malaysia is facing in implementing its own community mental health program.

Keywords: Mental Illness, Stigma, Psychiatric Treatment, Community, Primary Health Care, Community Health

INTRODUCTION

Cyber space has created endless opportunities for humanity. A few decades ago many segments of population, particularly ethnic and minority communities living in remote parts of the world could not imagine connecting themselves with wider world and becoming active members of the global community. In recent years the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has helped these population groups to get connected with mainstream communities and enjoy their fair share of development and prosperity. Economic analysis indicates that ICT has served as a key catalyst for growth and productivity of many countries. As a result, Governments have shown keen interest in investing in IT infrastructure developments and encourage their population groups to widely use ICT tools. Kraemer and Dedrick (1994) have analysed the relationship between IT infrastructure expenses and productivity and economic growth in 12 Asia Pacific countries. They observed a close and significant association between the level of IT infrastructure development and economic growth in these countries. This has resulted in a significant increase in the use of ICT tools by population groups around the globe and ASEAN countries are not an exception to this trend. Use of ICT tools have rapidly grown in this region in recent years and this growth is forecast to multiply given the increase in population of young people in this region. The penetration rate of internet in ASEAN region ranged from 0.21% in Myanmar to 80.73% in Brunei Darussalam. It was predicted that ICT use will grow by 10900% in Myanmar and 12034% in Vietnam by the year 2010 (www.internetworldstats.com).

While this ICT revolution has advantaged many segments of ASEAN population, some segments of population have been facing a variety of challenges due to the increasing use of ICT tools. One such population group is children. Children living in ASEAN region are not an exception to the world-wide trend of children engaging in highly risky behaviours while using the ICT tools such as accessing inappropriate materials suitable only for adults, children interacting with adults such as paedophiles, children becoming victims of exploitation by adults, accessing pornography, knowingly or unknowingly engaging in child prostitution, etc. Especially, children have been found to be increasingly at risk of harm by technological
revolutions happening in mobile phone and internet technologies. A few years ago, internet and mobile phones were separate entities and children could access internet only through personal computers. This meant that parents were aware of the times during which their children were accessing internet. However, due to the recent convergence between internet and mobile phone technologies, children have started accessing internet through their mobile phones which has rapidly increased the number of people accessing internet. Further, this technological convergence has also facilitated access to internet to all people including those who are located even in remote areas. This paper will discuss the ways in which ICT revolution within ASEAN countries have increased the vulnerability of children and exposed them to dangers which were never envisaged in the past. This paper will argue that the newly emerging tech savvy cyber- crimes involving children has created the urgency for ASEAN countries to come together and take a region-wide unified approach to fight for the safety of their children in cyber space.

ICT TOOLS AND CHILD SAFETY ISSUES IN ASEAN REGION

Since the late 1990s member countries within ASEAN region have seen rapid increase in the use of ICT tools by children. During the earlier part of this technological revolution web browsers assisted in the creation of tools such as instant messaging, chat rooms and online games which were very popular among children and ASEAN communities embraced them whole heartedly. There was optimism that internet technology will empower ASEAN children as it had the capacity of reaching children living in all geographic and socio-economic conditions. While this optimism was true in a few ways and internet did succeed in empowering many communities through its capacity of global reach, in many ways it also exposed children to many dangers which were not envisaged during the earlier phases of internet revolutions. The World Wide Web contained many materials which were not suitable for children. Let us discuss some of these materials and their impact on children in ASEAN region.

Access to sexual images and pornography

Young people exposed to pornography have the possibility of developing unrealistic and unhealthy expectations in young minds. Traditionally sex education was passed from one generation to another through highly supervised and healthy ways which were tested through generations. Unfortunately, internet has changed this tradition and children who are exposed to online pornographic materials at a very young age may develop wrong understanding of sex and its role in intimate relationships. Pornography often depicts gender-biased violence and unnatural expectations from sexual activities. Children look upon these sexual acts as role models and engage in unwanted sexual acts. For example, in Cambodia, two teen age boys reported to have raped a seven year old girl after watching pornographic video (Phoom Penh Post, 2003). While children in developed countries access internet at homes which limits their exposure to unwanted sites, in developing countries children often use public venues such as internet café where there is no parental supervision. This increases their vulnerability. The internet cafés created many forms of private facilities where children and adults used internet in dark spaces sitting at close proximity (Muhammad, 2004). ASEAN region has seen rapid growth in internet use and this has specifically increased the possibility of ASEAN children accessing pornography in high numbers. A survey from Thailand suggests that 35% of 7 – 11 year olds reported watching websites displaying pornographic images (Michelet, 2003).

Chat rooms and grooming

The internet technology which has the capability of creating virtual spaces has posed another challenge to children and young people. There are virtual spaces such as internet chat rooms which are meant for adults only. These facilities are not suitable for children since members of these chat rooms freely express their ideas and emotions. Unfortunately, these virtual spaces have no restriction of access and curious young people pretend to be adults and get exposed to contents which are not suitable for them. Worst still, paedophiles and other anti-social elements easily prey on innocent victims such as children. They manage to groom the
children pretending to be their well-wishers and sexually exploit them resulting in significant damage to childhood development. Recently, the online interactive game sites have introduced chat facilities which have significantly increased the use of chat room by children. A survey conducted by Michelet (2003) in Thailand reveals that 24% of respondents who were 7-11 year olds reported meeting face-to-face with someone they met online and 58% of these respondents reported unpleasant experiences while meeting these strangers.

**Dangers related to accessing internet through mobile phones**

Mobile phones have started using internet technology and this has significant impact for ASEAN region. During the earlier phases, internet technology required a few basic electronic infrastructures such as personal computer, local area network, internet connection, etc. Traditionally its penetration rate was restricted to population groups which could only afford them. Whereas the combination of mobile phones and internet technology has removed this restriction and the penetration rate of internet technology has overcome the major hurdle and it is evident that even children living in lowest socioeconomic regions in ASEAN countries have the possibility of having access to internet technology in near future. It was estimated that nearly 1 billion people will be mobile phone users by 2010 (from 230 million in 2000) (Chan, P, 2002). Nearly 12% of children in the Asia Pacific region were estimated to be mobile phone users in the year 2004 (France-Presse, 2004). Perhaps this percentage must have multiplied by now. This increasing use of internet through mobile phone by young people has introduced a couple of new challenges, namely, sexting and online gambling. It was reported from Indonesia that mobile phone cameras were used by teenagers to film girls and boys engaged in sexually explicit ways and circulating those images among friends. Sexting can cause serious damage to the reputation of young people and these images have all the possibilities of ending up in wrong hands such as pornography companies which can seriously expose the children to long term psychological trauma. Easy access to online gambling is another challenge young people face due to the combination of internet and mobile phone technologies. Gambling has cultural origins in many communities in ASEAN region. It has been an approved leisure time activity for adults and during festive occasions gambling has traditionally been a part of family and community activity. Until recently gambling was predominantly limited to adults but through online casinos which can easily be accessed through mobile phones, children could be actively participating in online gambling and possibly losing significant amounts of money resulting in extreme stress and other mental health problems.

**Online games**

Online games are another platform very popular among children globally. Millions of people have been playing these games 24/7 and children and particularly adolescents have been actively taking part in these games. In order to increase their customer base, the corporations designing these games have significantly increased the rewards for regular users. Some companies have introduced many types of creative rewards such as tokens which will be rewarded to high achievers and these tokens can be traded for money. This has increased the vulnerability of children and particularly those living in regions where job opportunities are limited. Recent studies have been reporting these games as having high potential of creating psychological addiction among users. This has emerged as a potential public health concern which will devastate the wellbeing of children and particularly vulnerable children living in low socio economic regions of ASEAN countries.

**Pornography involving children**

Apart from the above mentioned challenges related to routine use of internet and mobile technologies by ASEAN children, creation and distribution of child sexual abuse and exploitations using ICT is another major cyber-crime challenging the children living in this region. Easily accessible Internet, cheaply available digital cameras and cameras built-in mobile phones have dramatically reduced the cost of production and distribution of child pornographies. By the year 2000, international police force had collected evidence for possession and distribution of hundreds and thousands of images involving child sexual abuse (Carr, J., 2004). ASEAN communities have been seriously affected by a rapid increase in the production of child pornography.
materials and distributing them in other countries. In recent years there is yet another form of child abuse perpetrated through internet. The internet has facilitated live child prostitution and child pornography using web cameras. Audience for these live shows from all over the world log on to these sites and reward the children by paying money. In Philippines, for example, children perform sexual acts in front of web-cameras as instructed by a viewer who will pay for this particular sexual act (Trinidad, A.C, 2005). The child pornographies have been direct outcomes of high vulnerabilities of children due to lack of awareness that their sexual images will remain in cyberspace forever. Another major contributing factor to child pornography is poverty. Parents sell their children to prostitute rings and these child prostitutes are usual targets of paedophiles. In some communities innocent children are allowed to spend a lot of time on the streets and they become easy targets to predators who abuse them by giving rewards.

Cyber Bullying
A culture of bullying using ICT has emerged as a challenge to children in many parts of the world and children in ASEAN region have also been experiencing this bullying in cyberspace. Usually, children use many medium such as emails, phone text messages, chat rooms, social networking sites etc. to bully children who are weak and vulnerable. The consequences of cyber bullying have been profound and recently there are many incidents involving bullied children committing suicide. The worst aspect of cyber bullying is that the person engaging in bullying can choose to remain anonymous complicating the whole process and at times bullying can go for a long time without the perpetrator being identified and bullying stopped. Further, due to anonymity and remote location of victim, the person engaging in bullying does not see the direct effect of bullying on victims this increases the severity of bullying. Cyber bullying has become widely rampant due to an increased use of mobile phones by ASEAN children. As of 2007 60 cases of cyber bullying were reported to Malaysia’s CyberSecurity team. Similarly, in Singapore 80 cases were reported to WiredSafety which is an online safety and assistance team (http://cyberbullyinglaws.wordpress.com/2010/09/09/cyber-bullying-in-malaysia). Similarly, the Wisdom Society for Public Opinion Research of Thailand conducted a survey among 2500 children and this survey indicated that 43.1% of the children included in the survey had experienced cyber bullying (http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2010/12/02/technology/Cyber-bullying-problem-for-Thai-kids-30143640.html). Cyber bullying has been a trend which is fast spreading to various parts of ASEAN region requiring the attention of policy makers.

THE NEED FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVE TO SAVE CHILDREN IN CYBERSPACE – IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES

When the factors contributing to safety issues of ASEAN children in cyber space are analysed, a few obviously evident issues can be seen as predominantly contributing to vulnerability of these children. The disempowered situation of families and communities to fight against the exploitation of children emerge as a predominant factor contributing to ongoing challenges ASEAN children face. Poverty and lack of resources to fight against cyber-crimes is a predominant issue majority of ASEAN families are experiencing. This menace is further complicated by loop holes in policy making and innate corruption wide spread in some countries of ASEAN region. While loopholes in policy making and corruption have been prevalent in this region for many decades, the cyber space has further complicated the situation due to its enormity in size extending beyond traditional borders and legal jurisdiction of countries. For example, criminals living in various countries can easily exchange information related to secret locations within ASEAN region where opportunities exist for criminal and exploitative activities. Worst still, the criminal activities perpetrated by one criminal can be instantly shared among members of criminal rings world-wide resulting in severe damage to victims of criminal acts. The technologies such as file sharing between computers have the capability of sharing thousands of images without the knowledge of any third party. Recently, paedophile rings have raced against law enforcement agencies by embracing advanced technologies which help them to actively engage in criminal activities involving children and spread the criminal activities beyond national borders. The loopholes existing in law making and law enforcement of one country can be shared among criminals and
unless the country concerned is extremely quick and alert to learn this loophole and instantly rectify it, the vulnerable target groups such as children can easily be subjected to repeat offending. The advancements in ICT in recent years have complicated law making process and have resulted in the process of redefining the criminal behaviours, criminal justice system, legal prosecution and jurisdiction of criminal behaviours. Countries around the world have created a variety of new global and regional collaborations between law making and law enforcement authorities. One major milestone in this direction is the formation of United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime which has helped countries to cope with the global nature of criminal behaviours in cyber space. In the year 2003 the UN passed a draft resolution on Cyber-security and the protection of critical information infrastructures which invited countries and all relevant organisations to cooperate through sharing of information related to cyber-crimes. Another major milestone is the formation of Council of Europe’s Cyber-crime Convention which initiated a regional mechanism among European countries to fight against cyber-crimes. Since then many regional bodies such as Interpol, The Organisation of American States, The Asia Pacific Economic Council and ASEAN have initiated regional initiatives to fight against criminal acts against children in cyber space. While in some ways these initiatives have proved effective in protecting children in cyber space, they have been facing their own internal differences due to cultural diversity and other differences among member countries.

Member countries of ASEAN as a regional body started taking a few key steps to prepare themselves to deal with the challenges posed by information and communication technology revolution in late nineties. In 1998 the leaders of ASEAN met in Hanoi and proposed the establishment of a joint body known as ASEAN Information Infrastructure or AII. As a part of this initiative it was proposed that member countries will work towards designing, standardisation, inter-connection and inter-operability of Information Technology systems by 2001. This initiative resulted in the formation of e-ASEAN which will link ASEAN member countries and also link them with global telecommunication infrastructure. This initiative will seek to harmonise policies, regulations and standards in information and communication technology tools of member countries. When this initiative was launched, ASEAN faced with a few challenges such as lack of IT skills and immediate need for radical changes in the mind sets of policy makers in member countries. Particularly, it was realised that the wide gap existing between technological advancements of member countries could even widen the technological divide in the region (Severino, 2000). In spite of these challenges formation of e-ASEAN helped member countries to acknowledge the urgent need for regional cooperation in order survive in digital age. However, a closer look at the terms and conditions of e-ASEAN reveals the narrow agenda of member countries to merely benefit from economic advantages ICT can bring. At that time, ASEAN did not seem to realise the need for preparing itself to fight against the by-products of digital revolution such as child abuse and child exploitation in cyber space.

Since 1997 ASEAN countries have acknowledged the need for cross-border operations to curb criminal activities in the region. ASEAN conducted series of ministerial meetings and commenced the meetings of ASEAN National Chiefs of Police (ASEANPOL). In this year ASEAN interior and home ministers assembled in Manila through ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime and agreed the need for regional coordination of crime control measures. Subsequently a meeting was held in 1999 in Myanmar and this meeting resulted in the formation of Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime or SOMTC which involved ministerial level initiations to fight against regional criminal activities. In one of its SOMTC meetings in Singapore, ASEAN member states highlighted the urgency of fight against computer crimes and reiterated the need for strong partnership between ASEAN and other international networks such as Interpol and the UN. Subsequently, member states of ASEAN started making policy changes to incorporate cybercrime but these policies have not been coordinated well. For example, Thailand passed its Thai Cyber Law in the year 2007 which allowed police officers or other authorities to seize computers on private premises suspected of containing pornographic material or evidence for any cybercrimes.
PROTECTION OF ASEAN CHILDREN IN CYBER SPACE – THE WAY FORWARD

In spite of significant increase in vulnerability of ASEAN children in cyberspace, member countries in ASEAN are yet to adopt a region-wide policy on child protection issues such as child pornography, online child prostitution, use of internet cafés by children, child trafficking through online forums, etc. While there has been a concerted effort to promote cyber security in general among member nations, ASEAN is yet to formulate a uniform policy on child protection in cyberspace. For instance, ASEAN is yet to develop a region-wide uniform policy on legal definition of production, dissemination, storage and use of materials involving sexual abuse of children. However, it is noteworthy that ASEAN is not the only regional body having this problem. It is reported that only 29 out of 187 countries which are members of Interpol have passed legislation to fight against child pornography and 93 countries have never passed legislations regarding child pornography (International Centre for missing and exploited children, child pornography, 2008). Further, member countries of ASEAN region have a few other basic issues which are fundamental in nature. For example, the age of consent to have sex and the meaning of sexual relationship with children differs significantly among ASEAN countries due to their cultural and belief systems. Some countries will allow adults to have sex with children as young as 13 years or even immediately after attaining puberty. For example, in Cambodia 15 years is age of consent to have sex whereas the legislations in Brunei Darussalam will allow children as young as 13 years to get married. This fundamental difference is used as a loophole by criminals to exploit children. It is also easier for criminals to cross borders to commit crimes. For example, Singaporeans have been reported to be a major population group which will cross borders to Thailand and Indonesia to commit serious child sex offences (Williams, Lyons and Ford, 2008).

The legal obligation of Internet Service Providers (ISP) to protect children in cyberspace is an area which needs specific mention. ISPs are major partners in crimes against children in cyberspace but their legal obligations are yet to be clearly defined in ASEAN region. Particularly, the ISPs are well known to engage in manipulative behaviours of storing illegal images in countries which have inadequately defined legal framework on child pornography images and upload those images for clients in other countries in which uploading of these images is illegal. Until now ISPs in ASEAN region are not obligated to identify the whereabouts of people who upload illegal images of children or businesses which operate child prostitute rings. It is timely that ASEAN region introduce legal obligation on behalf of ISP to ensure that materials passing through their network is legal and does compromise the safety of children and treat children with dignity and respect.

The mobile phone companies in ASEAN region might need specific attention in terms of child protection issues. Currently, there is no uniformity in minimum age to obtain mobile phones in different ASEAN region nations. Further, it is timely that these companies are obligated to educate their customers regarding safe use of mobile phones and internet.

Installation of internet filters can be one safe way of protecting children from accessing unwanted materials while using the internet. While these filters are heavily used in countries such as Singapore, in other countries these filters are rarely used. It is possible that ASEAN regional countries can obligate all ISPs to install blocking software to every customer at a minimum cost. Even more prudent will be to obligate ISPs to monitor materials that are not suitable for children and either to stop uploading or to alert the families regarding the materials that are not suitable for children.

Cyber bullying is a challenge countries in ASEAN region are facing on a large scale. However, since cyber bullying is happening at child level, adults usually are not aware of it. Governments are not exception to this. It is timely that ASEAN region takes cyber bullying seriously and starts a region-wide awareness creation campaign to reach children, families, schools and communities. Further, legal recognition of cyber bullying is not uniform among countries in ASEAN region. In some countries cyber bullying is not even categorised as illegal act. Without criminalisation of cyber bullying it is extremely difficult to educate society about the seriousness of cyber bullying.
CONCLUSION

Since many countries in the ASEAN region have been affected by serious child abuse and other criminal activities, it is timely that the region takes a unified approach in protecting the children who are affected by illegal activities in cyberspace. Children who have been affected by criminal acts need to be helped to rehabilitate without stigma and criminalisation. These children need help while recovering from the psychological harm caused by the criminal act perpetrated against them. It will be helpful if legislations are passed which will help the children to receive rehabilitation services to heal the pains caused in their life and move on with a healthy future. Since ASEAN is a body which consists of both rich and poor nations, it is timely that rich countries realise their obligation to contribute to the welfare of children in poor nations and bridge the gap in child protection initiatives of member nations resulting in a healthy ASEAN with healthy citizens. Another challenge facing ASEAN countries is the cultural and economic diversity of this region which challenges the implementation of joint initiatives. (Khoo, 2003 – Khoo, B.H., Police cooperation in fighting transnational organised crime: an Asian perspective – In: Broadhurst, R., (Eds) Bridging the GAP: A global alliance on transnational organised crime, Hong Kong Police: Printing Department HKSAR, Hong Kong). The economic gap between member countries in the region is another challenge facing the region. Older members of ASEAN which includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have stronger economies than recently joined member countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Among the member states, the smallest nations Singapore and Brunei have the most advanced economic growth. Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand can be categorised as medium development category and Indonesia and Vietnam can be categorised as a medium growth economy. States such as Cambodia and Laos have been through many challenges due to wide spread poverty in their states (Caballero-Anthony, 2006 – Bridging development gaps in South East Asia: towards an ASEAN community, UNISCI Discussion Paper No.11……). In spite of these challenges countries in ASEAN have started taking firm steps to protect themselves against cyber crime.

REFERENCES

STRESS AS A CAUSE OF DEPRESSION AMONG FEMALE PRISONER AND ITS EFFECT TOWARDS AGGRESSIVENESS

Nurul Hazrina Mazlan and Affizal Ahmad
Pusat Pengajian Sains Kesihatan, Kampus Kesihatan
Universiti Sains Malaysia, Kelantan
hazrina2402@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The objectives of this study are to examine the relationship between stress and depression, and to acquire the effect of depression towards aggression. The focus is on female prisoners in Peninsular Malaysia. Stress is suggested as one of the common causes for depression among female. Depression is a type of common mental health problems among female prisoners and is suggested to contribute to aggressive acts among them, which consequently may lead to criminal deeds. In many countries, studies regarding depression among offenders population are very common and the findings evidenced that depression is related to aggressiveness. The methodology of this study is designed based on cross-sectional study. Regression is used for data analysis. The finding shows that stress is strongly related to depression ($p < .001$) and thus can be regarded as a prominent contributor to depression among female prisoners. Consequently, depression is found positively related to aggression, particularly in anger ($p < .05$) and hostility ($p < .001$). Depression however does not contribute to physical and verbal aggression. As expected, depression contributes to aggression. In conclusion, stress strongly linked to depression and thus, may contribute to aggressive act among female prisoners.

Keywords: Stress, Depression, Female Prisoner, Aggression, Criminal Deeds

INTRODUCTION

Involvement of female in the justice system has tremendously increased over the years. In some countries in the South East Asia region, a marked increase of female prisoners in total prison population has been observed, including Malaysia. In the year of 2010, Thailand had the highest percentage of female prisoners per total prison population (14.6%), followed by Vietnam (11.6%) and Myanmar (10.7%). Malaysia was at the eight places among 10 South East Asia countries [1]. The same pattern was seen in most countries in other region where the number of female prisoners continuously grows over a few decades, exceeding much the growth of male counterpart over the same period of time [2] [3]. This circumstance should no longer be ignored. The society worldwide should start taking particular action to prevent further growth in the number of female offender. This includes more specific study on female offenders’ population.

There has been few research and study on female offenders compared to the male counterpart. Theory and research related to the criminal justice system had been focused on male [2] [4] and therefore, the correctional program that has been used for female is also based on the study on male. As a result, it often failed to fulfill the needs of female [4] [5], lead to the lack of efficient correctional and rehabilitation. Male and female offenders had been suggested to be different in their risk factors for offending, such as mental health and relationship problems [6], those which need to be studied and interpreted individually in order to produce the most appropriate rehabilitation program [7] [8] and consequently, prevent repeat offending [9] [10].
Mental health problems have been suggested as a risk factor that likely to contribute to criminal behavior among offenders, especially female. The rate of having at least one mental health problems among female offenders was often found high [11] [12] [13] [14]. Many studies had been conducted to explore the prevalence of mental health in prison setting, particularly across the western countries such as the United State of America [13] [15] [16], England and Wales [11] [17] [18]. One of the mental health problems often being relate to, especially female offender is depression [2] [5], where major depression has been identified as the most prevalent mental health problems among imprisoned female [19].

Depression can be defined as a persistent and continuous disturbance of mood, markedly as low or sad as compared to normal. It often affects eating and sleeping patterns, concentration as well as motivation [20]. People suffering depression often lose interest to enjoy life as others do [21], often sad and have discouraged mood [22]. Compared to male, female offenders were more likely to be identified with major depression [2] [5] [23]. Neurotic symptoms such as depression, sleep disturbance and extensive worry were more likely to be reported among female in prison [24]. Baillargeon and colleagues (2009) identified depression as one of the contributor factors towards repeat offending among offenders. In the same study, depression was diagnosed among 38.7 percent of imprisoned female. Furthermore, in both female and male who were identified with depression, 48.5 percent had at least one previous incarceration [16]. Depression also was diagnosed as the most common type of mood disorder among New South Wales prisoners, with 14.4 percent positively diagnosed in females [20]. A review done among prisoners across 12 countries found 12 percent of female offenders involved in the review was diagnosed with major depression. It was suggested that the prisoners had two to four time higher tendency to suffer major depression compared to the people in general population [11].

In a study involving prisoners in the North Carolina prisons, eight percent of imprisoned female were found severely depressed using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). In the same study, female were identified to have higher score than male on the instrument [25]. Neurotic disorder including depression were reported among two third of 771 women prisoners in England and Wales, with significant neurotic symptoms were reported higher among those on remand than sentenced population [26]. Major depression was also diagnosed among 44 percent of the sample representing female prisoners in Victoria [27], whereas in another study involving females who were admitted to in-prison substance abuse program across five prisons in California, more than 50 percent of the respondents reported depression [28]. Major depression were also identified among 38 percent of imprisoned female in a study involving four research center in the United State, with female had 2.2 to 3.3 times higher tendency to have major depression than the male counterpart [23]. Among incarcerated female in Recife, Brazil, 80 percent of the sample met the criteria for depression [29]. Depression also had often been reported among female who had tried or committed self-mutilation where it has been suggested as the contributor to the self-harm aggression. Roe-Sepowitz (2007) reported the occurrence rate of 47.7 percent of depression among female prisoners who had self-mutilation compared to female who has not (20.7%), which may as well explain the self-mutilation’s act [30].

The high occurrence of depression among female offenders suggests that the mental health problem might be the result of some contributing factors such as stress and past or current experience. Elevated stress due to environmental and past experiences had often been related to the development of mental health problems among female [2] [4] [5]. In many researches, experiences of past victimization, especially during childhood had been suggested as the main source of stress and the core risk factors towards mental health problems [2] [4] [5] [10] [15]. This is followed by socioeconomic problems such as low education status, underemployment and poverty [2] [4] [5] [31], all which contribute to elevate the stress among female.

Stress can be defined as ‘a chronically high level of mental arousal and bodily tension that exceed a person’s capacity to cope, results in distress, disease or an increased capacity to cope’ [32]. It also can be explained as ‘the rate of wear and tear within the body’ [33]. According to Butler and Hope (2007), stress reflects the pressure a person is under or the burden carried by a person. It also reflects a person reaction to the pressure or burden. The signs of stress include irritability, anxiety, fear, forgetting thing, and difficult to concentrate [34].
Female was found to be strongly affected by their surrounding and experience [2] [4] [10] [31]. Relationship to people in their surrounding, experience of abuses as well as stress reflected from their environment seem to be the core factors to mental health problems among female. Abusive relationships can be referred to as childhood abuse experience and violence by intimate partner. A study conducted among female prisoners revealed that crime often influenced by stress and emotional instability as well as influence by others including intimate partner [35]. Relationship matters motivate a female as far as to commit crime especially in situational pressures such as a threat of losing a relationship [36]. Criminal behavior among female seems to be the result of continuous social problems such as abuses and extreme disadvantage [37].

In combination with diathesis, stress plays an important role to determine the occurrence of mental health problems, as explained by diathesis-stress model [38]. Diathesis refers to ‘vulnerability or predisposition to disorders within an individual’ [38]. As suggested by this model, ‘specific types of psychopathology such as depression and anxiety arise from a combination of vulnerability factors (diathesis) in the context of life stress’ [39]. A considerable risk for the development of disorders is presented by the levels of psychological vulnerabilities upon any traumatic experiences [40], where high level of vulnerabilities may increase the risk of developing psychological disorders. Stressful environments include negative life events such as death and divorce. Low income residence and places with high occurrence of crime and violence also creates the stressful environments [41]. Socioeconomic circumstances are definitely plays a strong role to create stressful environment that may lead to psychological disorders [42], especially among female [2] [37].

Chronic stressful environments have been suggested to initiate tendency to engage in risky behavior. The stressful environments include aggressive and violent act, rule breaking, and illegal behavior [43]. Negative life events also may result in risky behavior due to coping strategies practiced by an individual [41]. This may also refer to mental health problems which develop due to coping strategies to the presence of stress, such as substance abuse [44] and anxiety [39]. Combination of socially learned violence and stressful conditions may lead to the practice of the violent behavior itself [45]. This situation may happen as violence can be learned socially and when there is vulnerability in an individual, he or she may engage in the violence behavior upon exposure to stress which in form of violence [45]. Individual’s future behavior may significantly being influenced by social environment factor such as family violence [44]. Consequently, when exposed to the same type of stress in the future, the individual may either engage into the same act [41] or become disempowered [44]. Stress also may lead to multiple occurrences of mental health problems. Among people with personality disorders, elevated level of stress and depression had been observed compared to those without personality disorders. This concluded that elevated stress might influence the presence of mental health problems such as depression and personality disorders [46].

Prevalence of mental health problems among offender population suggests the relationship between mental health problems and aggression as well as violence [15] [47] [48] [49]. This indirectly associated mental health problems to criminality. Individual extensive studies on depression among female offenders suggest depression as a predisposing factor towards aggressiveness and violence [48] [49], and thus a risk factor for a female to commit a crime. People with depression may become aggressive and violent if subjected to particular conditions [47] [50]. Depression among female offenders was also found related to self-harm and suicide [30], suggesting the tremendous effect of depression. This demonstrates that depression may lead to aggressive behavior against others as well as oneself, such as self-harm.

The first objective of the current study is to examine the relationship between stress and depression. This is followed by the second objective, to acquire the effect of depression towards aggression. In the current study, we aim to identify stress as one of the risk factors towards the occurrence of depression among female prisoners. We also aim to establish the effects of depression in form of aggression. The findings can be very helpful for rehabilitation program.
METHODOLOGY

Participants
In the current study, 199 female inmates from four prisons (in Peninsular Malaysia) were selected to participate. Convenient sampling was done according to the number of prisoners available at each prison. The participants were aged between 21 to 55 years and were required to be able to read and write (in Malay) on their own.

Measures
a) Demographic Information. This section consist of three parts; personal information, socioeconomic background, and family background. Personal information includes age, ethnicity and marital status. Socioeconomic background inquires education and working experiences, and family background inquires family information during the participant grew up.

b) Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). It is a psychometric instrument designed by Cohen and colleague (1983), to identify how stressful respondents find their lives. It contains 10 items using five-point Likert scale: (0 = never, 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = fairly often, 4 = very often. The reliability of this instrument is 0.85 [51].

c) Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). It is a screening instrument designed by Radloff (1977), to measure common symptoms of depression. This instrument uses 4-point scale. The scale is as follows: 0 = rarely or none of the time, 1 = some or little of the time, 2 = occasionally or moderate and 3 = most or all of the time. The questions are related to certain depression symptoms such as poor appetite, sleep disturbance and loss of concentration. The reliability of the instrument range from .64 to .77 [52].

d) The Aggression Questionnaire (AQ). It was designed by Buss and Perry (1992), containing 29 items using 5-point Likert scale (1 = extremely not like me, 2 = somewhat not like me, 3 = neither like nor unlike me, 4 = somewhat like me, 5 = extremely like me). The aggression scale consists of 4 factors which are physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger and hostility. The reliability of this instrument is .92 [53].

Back-translation and validation of the instruments
All the instruments were back-translated into Malay language, since the original instruments are in English and majority of female prisoners communicate in Malay rather than in English. Validation process of the translated version was done and the reliability of all the instruments was found above the acceptable value ($\alpha > .50$). The Malay-translated versions of all the instruments were found valid and reliable to be used in the current study.

Data collection
The data collection process took place at the selected prisons. Prior to data collection, the selected participants were briefed on the current study. A detailed explanation was given on the procedures and a written informed consent form was signed as proof that the participants voluntarily agreed to take part in the study. A set of screening instruments were given to the participants and they were asked to answer each instrument within a given time. The information was then extracted from the instruments and electronically compiled into systematic data. The average time taken by participants to complete all the instruments was 10 minutes.

Data analysis
The data was analyzed using SPSS 19.0. Descriptive statistics were used to summarize the demographic information. Simple linear aggression was conducted to examine the relationship between stress and depression, as well as the relationship between depression and aggression.

RESULTS
Table 1 shows the summary for demographic information. The age mean for the participants is 32.4 years. In terms of ethnicity, the majority are Malay (59.8%). Most of them are married (39.7%), completed their secondary education (65.3%) and had a permanent job prior to incarceration (36.7%). As children, most of the participants had four to five siblings (35.2%), with family incomes of RM501 to RM1000 (34.2%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never been to school</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent job</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always switching jobs</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single child</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – 5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income (in Ringgit Malaysia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 500</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 – 1000</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001 – 2000</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2000</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Summary of demographic information**

The regression analysis between stress and depression showed a significant result ($p < .001$). This finding demonstrated the significant relationship between stress and depression, where stress significantly contributed to the occurrence of depression among female prisoner in the current study.
### Table 2: Regression analysis between stress and depression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>Outcome variables</th>
<th>Simple linear regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$r^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress</td>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Regression analysis between depression and aggression scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>Outcome variables</th>
<th>Simple linear regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$r^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hostility</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next regression analysis showed a significant result between depression and all scales of aggression, except for two scales. The finding demonstrated significant relationships between depression and anger, hostility and aggression in total ($p < .001$). On the other hand, no significant relationships were demonstrated for depression with physical and verbal aggression ($p > .001$). Overall, depression significantly contributed to anger, hostility and aggression in total, but it does not contribute to physical and verbal aggression among the participants.

### DISCUSSIONS

The relationship between risk factor and mental health problems has often being discussed in many studies [2] [4] [5] [37]. Risk factor may either contribute to or increase the occurrence of mental health problems. In order to prevent the occurrence of mental health problems, the risk factors must be identified and prevention must begin at this stage. As suggested, stress is a risk factor for mental health problems, especially among female [2] [4] [5]. Elevated stress may lead to worse consequences when overlook or not relieve properly.

There are many sources of stress among women, especially prisoners. The demographic information showed that majority of the participants are married, followed closely by unmarried and divorced. Each status gives women particular stress especially among those who married or divorced with children. Married women may confront problems related to the family, such as problems with her partner, children and the socioeconomic of the family. This problem became more significant among prisoners who are being away from the family. Among those who were divorced, socioeconomic problems are the biggest concern since they became the only support for the family, especially when there are children around. The status as divorcée itself gave particular stress to women since divorced women often being looked down in the society.

Majority of the participants received their education up to the secondary level only. Less than 10 percent had their tertiary education whereas more than 10 percent had never been to school. This showed the low education status among the participants which may contribute to stress. In employment status, although majority had a permanent job before being incarcerated, it is followed very closely by those who always switching job. This circumstance demonstrated underemployment among the participants which may be the result of low education status. It also showed unstable economic status that often plays the biggest role in socioeconomic stress, especially among those who had no other economic support such as a single mother. Low education status, underemployment and unstable economic status that have been demonstrated among
the participants showed that all the socioeconomic status may play crucial roles in incarceration among them, particularly through elevated stress.

In their family, most of the participants had four to five siblings which are considered high. This is followed very closely by participants with more than seven siblings. High number of siblings might pose some considerable stress, especially during childhood due to lack of attention from the parents and possible negligence. At the same time, majority had family incomes of RM501 to RM1000 which is considered insufficient for family with many children. Almost 20 percent of the participants had family income less than RM500, which is very low. These showed an inadequate childhood circumstances that may contribute to the low education status and consequently, stress among the participants. Having many siblings with low family income may also lead to experience of childhood trauma such as negligence and abuse. These demographic findings confirmed that certain family background plays important roles that may lead to unexpected act among female, such as crime.

The simple linear regression between stress and depression confirmed that there is significant relationship between both variables (as shown in Table 2). The significant result showed that stress significantly contributes to the occurrence of depression, and thus is a risk factor for depression. Presence of stress among female prisoner may lead to certain consequence such as depression and it should not be left untreated. As mentioned earlier, depression may lead to various other effects such as aggression, violence and even self-harm [30] [48] [49] [50]. To prevent the consequences of depression, stress should be first managed among the population.

It is not possible to avoid being stress, especially among prisoner’s population. This population, particularly women face a lot of stress due to being imprisoned, such as family’s issues, society and stress due to the new environment. As discussed in demographic, majority of the participants might face a lot of stressful issues. Thus, it is important to identify any excessive stress among the population and conduct stress management session. Stress management can be helpful to teach them how to manage and control their stress. Individual counseling and group discussion can also be done to relieve the stress by communication with others.

Significant relationship between depression and aggression has been demonstrated in the current result (as shown in Table 3). The simple linear regression analysis showed that depression significantly contributes to anger, hostility and aggression in total. On the other hand, depression does not contribute to physical and verbal aggression. This showed that depression is more likely to cause a person to become angry and hostile towards others, than to act physically or verbally aggressive. However, depression does cause aggression in total. This means that although a person with depression is unlikely to engage in physical or verbal aggression, however they may act so under certain circumstances. Both anger and hostility may contribute towards other aggressive act when they became excessive or uncontrolled. Anger refer to the emotional component of aggressive behavior, whereas hostility represents the cognitive which consists of negative thoughts about others, irritation and distrustful of other [54]. Likewise, physical and verbal aggressions represent the behavioral dimension or motor component. All these factors are related [54] thus demonstrates the possibility to act physically or verbally aggressive upon elevated anger or hostility. This possibility is demonstrated by the total aggression score of all factors.

The relationship between depression and aggression has been discussed in many previous studies [30] [47] [48] [49] [50]. Given a particular circumstances, people with depression may become aggressive and even violent [47] [50]. The result of the current study supported that depression does contribute to aggressive act among female prisoners. The aggression may also refer to aggression against oneself such as self-harm or suicide. As mentioned earlier, depression may contribute to aggression against oneself [30]. While the current study found that the participant was unlikely to act physically aggressive, there is possibility for the participant to act aggressive against themselves since depression does contribute to aggression in total. As discussed earlier, increase anger and hostility may also lead to physical act if left untreated. Instead of physical or verbal acts against others, person with depression may choose to act against themselves, especially when under influence of negative thought.
Significant relationship between depression and aggression demonstrates that the mental health problem may contribute significantly towards criminal behavior among female. High prevalence of depression among female offender has been related to their criminal act. Although depression is unlikely to cause physical aggressive act, there has been cases where depression lead to serious or violent crime such as murder. Co-occurrence of depression with other mental health problems such as substance abuse and personality disorders may contribute towards a more serious crime. Since depression was found to contribute towards repeat offending [16], the high prevalence of depression among the current participants showed that particular attention should be given to the occurrence of depression. Although stress management and counseling can be given, depression required a more specific treatment and help. It should be diagnosed properly and symptoms such as eating and sleeping disturbance, extensive worry and loss of concentration should be considered during the treatment. People with depression is more likely to have negative thought regarding their life and future [52], thus it is important to bring back their confidence to pursue their life like others do.

Stress plays a crucial role towards development of depression among female in the current study. Depression on the other hand leads to aggressive behavior which indirectly may cause criminal act. Therefore, various sources of stress which has been discussed earlier indirectly contribute to criminal act among female. This is particularly true for childhood trauma experiences and socioeconomic problems [2] [4] [5] [10] [15] [31]. Elevated stress may increase the probability to develop mental health problems as well as involvement in crime.

There are some limitations in the current study. The first limitation is the methodology. The current study was preliminary which only screen the problems and the result was not absolute. To confirm the result, proper diagnosis through clinical method should be done in the future. Nevertheless, the current results are very helpful to guide any future study. The second limitation is the screening instruments. All the instruments used in the current study are based on the Western studies since no local psychometric instruments are available during study. There might be differences in the culture and understanding of the questions given by the instrument. Instruments based on studies involving local or regional population, such as South East Asia is more preferable since the culture might be similar or close. The third limitation is the study was done on female prisoners who were currently imprisoned during the data collection. The findings might be bias to their current circumstances. As example, the stress and depression they felt might refer more towards their current circumstances rather than before imprisonment.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, stress was found strongly related to depression. Depression on the other hand significantly contributes to aggressiveness among female prisoners, particularly anger, hostility and aggression in total. However, it does not contribute to physical and verbal aggression. It can be concluded that stress is a risk factor for depression and depression may lead to aggression, which in turn likely to be a risk factor towards female criminal behavior. The effects of depression which can be against others or against oneself requires particular attention for treatment among prisoner’s population.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Thank you to University Sciences Malaysia and USM Fellowship for supporting this study. Thank you to Jabatan Penjara Malaysia for the opportunity to carry out this study in the selected prison, to all the inmates for giving a dedicative and kind cooperation during data collection, and to the prison staffs and officers for pleasant assistance.
REFERENCE


A STUDY ON CHILDHOOD TRAUMA EXPERIENCES IN RELATION TO DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER AMONG FEMALE IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

Nurul Hazrina Mazlan and Affizal Ahmad
Pusat Pengajian Sains Kesihatan, Kampus Kesihatan
Universiti Sains Malaysia, Kelantan
hazrina2402@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between childhood trauma experiences (CTE) with substance abuse (SA) and borderline personality disorder (BPD). In many countries, various studies regarding CTE among female, especially those involved in the criminal justice system is very common. The findings showed that CTE is strongly related to occurrence of mental health problems (MHP), especially SA and personality disorders. Development of MHP such as SA and BPD due to experiences of traumas during childhood is suggested as a coping method to deal with the stress caused by the experiences. The methodology of this study was designed based on cross-sectional study. Two groups of female were involved, female prisoners and female from the society in area of the Peninsular Malaysia. Regression is used for data analysis. The finding shows that among female prisoners, CTE is strongly related to SA and BPD, particularly physical, emotional and sexual abuses (p< .05). Physical neglect does not contribute to SA but does contribute to BPD. Emotional neglect contributes to both (p< .05). Among female from the society, abuses do not contribute to SA and BPD, except for emotional abuse. Physical and emotional neglects also do not contribute to SA (p> .05), but contribute to BPD (p< .05). In conclusion, CTE strongly contributes to SA and BPD among female. The differences between groups might be influenced by the occurrence of SA and BPD in both groups.

Keywords: Childhood Trauma Experiences, Mental Health, Substance Abuse, Borderline Personality Disorder, Female

INTRODUCTION

Over the past years, involvement of female in the criminal justice system has been increasing all over the world. In the South East Asia region as well, increase of female prisoners in total prison population has been observed, including Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam [1]. Over a few decades, growth of female prisoners’ population has continuously increased, exceeding much the growth of male prisoners’ population over the same period [2] [3]. These circumstances demonstrated the needs to examine the underlying problems and consequently develop solutions to the problems such as prevention and rehabilitation programs.

Why female commit crime? Various studies have been conducted recently to answer the question. Research and study on female, particularly female offenders have been increasing with the number of female prisoners all over the world due to the lack of knowledge regarding this population. For long, male had been the focus of theory and research related to the justice system [2] [4], leading to the failure to fulfill the needs of female counterpart [4] [5]. Separate knowledge on female criminality is needed to provide an effective correctional and rehabilitation program [6] [7]. The same is applied to the preventive measure to control or decrease the involvement of female in crime. Repeat offending, as one of measures to a successful rehabilitation program has been proved to need an exclusive knowledge on female criminality to be prevented [8] [9].
As the studies among female offenders are growing, many previous studies have found the close relationship of mental health problems to criminal behavior among female [9] [10]. Female offenders were found to have at least one mental health problems [10] [11] [12]. Increase in the number of studies regarding mental health problems among prisoners across countries such as the United State of America [10] [12] [13], England and Wales [11] [14] [15], shows that there are some connection between mental health problems and offending. Among female, mental health problems that often being related to criminal behavior are substance abuse [14] [16] [17] and borderline personality disorder [18] [19] [20].

Substance abuse has long been discussed as the main contributor towards crime among prisoners worldwide [2] [9] [15]. The abuses of substance include both drug and alcohol [14]. Increase in the use of drug since one time ago has been related to the increase in the number of female involved in crime [2] [16]. Drug and crime can be related in two ways [21] where involvement in drugs is facilitated by criminal lifestyles [22], or dependence on the drug that lead to the crime [23] [24] [25]. Crimes related to drug usually are non-violent such as theft, shop-lifting and burglary, but recently it was found that serious crimes related to drug such as murder has been increasing [21]. A study on drug abuse and its relationship to criminal behavior in Penang, Malaysia confirmed that there is a relationship between drug abuse and conviction of crime among inmates in a Government Rehabilitation Centre in this state. Majority of the inmates reported were involved in criminal activities in order to tolerate their drugs dependency, demonstrated the strong connection between drug abuse and crime against property [25]. Strong association between drugs to both violence [26] and aggression [23] has been evidenced, proved that substance abuse undoubtedly related to the risk of criminal behavior [27].

Substance abuse has been reported extensively among female offenders all over the world. In the United State prisons, it was estimated that 70 percent of female inmates had used drug at some time in their life, with majority reported had used major drugs such as cocaine and heroin [16]. In another study, 95 percent female who participated reported had used substance prior to imprisonment [28], demonstrated that majority of imprisoned female had substance abuse. Among female prisoners in Queensland, 80 percent reported had used an illegal drug at some time of their lives, with the most common used drug was cannabis, followed by methamphetamine and opiates [29]. In a systematic review that was conducted across 13 studies related to substance abuse among prison population, it was estimated that the prevalence for alcohol abuse among female prisoners ranged from 10 percent to 24 percent, whereas for drug abuse the prevalence were 30 percent to 60 percent [14]. In comparison to the male counterpart, female had higher estimated prevalence for drug abuse (10% to 48% for male). Female also was found to have used drug more often, used harder drug and had distinct causes to use drug compared to male [5]. The same pattern of substance abuse was observed among prisoners involved in a study at New South Wales. Females abused drug more than males whereas males were more likely to abused alcohol [15].

Other than substance abuse, borderline personality disorder has also been related to criminal behavior among female. It often been assessed among female prisoners [30] and was found presented more frequent in women [15] [18] [19] [20]. Borderline personality disorder was identified as the most prevalent personality disorder among female prisoners in New South Wales, with the rate of its occurrence was higher in female compared to males [15]. In another study, borderline personality disorder was the second highest personality disorder often being diagnosed among violent women [31]. It was reported that in the United State, incarcerated women were 2.2 to 3.3 times more likely to have borderline personality disorder [19]. Borderline personality disorder also was often reported among female offenders involved in several studies in the United State [18] [32]. In a prison in North Carolina, borderline personality disorder was identified as one of the personality disorders with the highest prevalence among its incarcerated female [33]. At a maximum security prison in the United State, about a quarter of female met the diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder [34]. It was suggested that female offenders are more likely to have borderline personality disorder compared to female in the community [35]. Clinical symptoms of borderline personality features were found more prevalence among incarcerated female at a county jail in the Washington, which was reported greater than any other personality disorders [20]. The findings demonstrated high tendency for borderline personality disorder among female offenders.
High prevalence of mental health problems among female offenders has lead to the inquest of its underlying reason. The factors that contribute to the development of mental health problems among female involved in the justice system has been discussed in many literatures (e.g.: [4]; [13]; [16]) and mostly suggested that mental health problems among the population was strongly initiated by the experience of past victimization or traumas, usually during childhood [4] [5] [9] [13] [16] [36]. Childhood trauma experiences include physical, emotional and sexual abuse [13] [17] [37] and it had been found in substance abuse [5] [24], as well as personality disorder [38] [39]. Use of substance itself has been identified as the second highest risk factor for mental health problems among female, specifically drug [2] [4] [9]. Substance use may lead to substance abuse and it was found high among people with mental health problems [9] including personality disorder [38]. This is followed by socioeconomic problems [16] [17] such as low education status, underemployment and poverty [2] [4] [5] [16] [17] [24].

Females are known to be motivated by relationship matters even into committing illegal act such as crime, especially when there is pressure through the situation [40]. Experience of childhood traumas has been suggested to strongly affect female [2] [4] [9] [17]. Continuous social problems such as abuses and extreme disadvantage seem to result in the criminal behavior among female [16], and this has been suggested through the influence of mental health problems. Experiences of traumas, especially during childhood such as abuses and negligence have lead to the development of psychological vulnerabilities where the levels of these vulnerabilities determine the risk for the development of mental health problems [41]. Mental health problems may develop among the population through their relationship with people in their surrounding, experiences of abuses and stress reflected by their environment [42].

It has been suggested that negative life events may result in risky behavior such as substance abuse. This occurred due to coping strategies practiced by an individual [43]. In response to past traumatic experiences, it has been suggested that substance is used as a coping method, often practiced by female involved in substance abuse to hide the pain of losing their self-respect [9] [44]. This coping strategy eventually leads to the development of mental health problems such as substance abuse [45] and anxiety [46]. Childhood trauma experiences often develop some stress that needed to be coping with and this may lead to co-occurrences of mental health problems. It was found that elevated level of stress and depression present among people with personality disorders compared to those without. Co-occurrence of mental health problems present with elevated stress, demonstrated the influence of stress to the development of mental health problems [47].

Childhood trauma experiences had often been observed among female involved in the criminal justice system (e.g.: [5]; [9]; [24]; [36]). It had been suggested as a cause or risk factor towards criminal behavior, particularly substance abuse, and offending among female [24]. Incarcerated female were found to have experienced childhood abuses and negligence far higher than female in the society, with many reported multiple types of abuses [24]. A study involving prisoners who undergo treatment for drug had found that female also were more likely to have experienced childhood physical and sexual abuses than male [5]. This is supported by findings in another study where female were found to have greater significant relationship between use of drug and relationship problems, which include childhood trauma experiences, compared to male [9]. Experiences of trauma during childhood, particularly abuses among female in prison had also been reported to extend into adulthood [2].

The objective of the current study is to examine the relationship between childhood trauma experiences with substance abuse and borderline personality disorder. Childhood trauma experiences are divided into several subscales according to the instrument been used. The relationship of each subscale with both substance abuse and borderline personality disorder are examined in the current study.
METHODOLOGY

Participants
Two groups of female were involved in the current study. The first group consisted of 199 female inmates from four prisons. Convenient sampling was done according to the number of prisoners available at each prison. The second group consisted of 186 female from the society. The sampling for the second group was also based on convenient sampling. Both groups involve female in the area of Peninsular Malaysia only.

Measures
a) Demographic Information. This section inquired personal information such as age, ethnicity and marital status. Education and working experiences were also asked.

b) Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ). This instrument was designed by Bernstein and Finks (1998). It contains 28 items using Likert scale. It is designed to gather information about childhood event in objective and non-evaluative terms. The instrument measures five scales; physical abuse (PA), emotional abuse (EA), sexual abuse (SeA), physical neglect (PN), and emotional neglect (EN). Physical abuse refers to bodily assault, emotional abuse refers to verbally assault meanwhile sexual abuse refers to any sexual conduct or contact made by an older person to a child. Physical neglect and emotional neglect refers to failure to provide a child’s basic physical and emotional needs by the caregivers. The reliability of CTQ is .80 with validity range from .50 to .75 [48].

c) Simple Screening Instrument for Alcohol and other Drug (SSI-AOD). It is a screening instrument developed by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT, 1994) to assess both alcohol and drug use. It contains 16 items represent consumption pattern, self-awareness of a problem, loss of control over substance abuse, adverse physical, psychological and social effects, and physiological effects of tolerance and withdrawal [49]. The respondent will have to answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on each question. The reliability of SSI-AOD is .97, sensitivity is 92% and overall accuracy is 81.9% [50].

d) McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder (MSI-BPD). It was developed by Zanarini and colleagues (2003) specifically for screening of borderline personality disorder. It contains 10 items, each with yes or no responses. The items ask about common symptoms of borderline personality disorder such as impulsivity, emotion instability, and unstable relationship. Total score of 7 or higher indicates borderline personality disorder. The previous study found that MSI-BPD yielded sensitivity of .81 and specificity of .85 [51].

Data collection
For the first group, the data collection process took place at the selected prisons. On the other hand, the data collection for the second groups was done at places preferable by the participants. Prior to data collection, the participants were briefed on the current study. A detailed explanation was given on the procedures and a written informed consent form was signed as proof that the participants voluntarily agreed to take part in the study. A set of screening instruments were given to the participants and they were asked to answer each instrument within a given time. The information was then extracted from the instruments and electronically compiled into systematic data. The average time taken by participants to complete all the instruments was 10 minutes.

Data analysis
The data was analyzed using SPSS 19.0. Descriptive statistics were used to summarize the demographic information and the occurrence of each variable. Simple linear regression was conducted to examine the relationship between childhood trauma experiences and substance abuse, as well as borderline personality disorder.
RESULTS

Table 1 shows the summary for demographic information. The age mean for the participants in Group 1 is 32.4 years, whereas for Group 2, the age mean is 36.7 years. Most of the participants in both groups are married (39.7% and 65.9% respectively), completed their secondary education (65.3% and 75.7% respectively) and had a permanent job (36.7% and 66.7% respectively). The employment for Group 1 refers to their employment prior to incarceration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (%)</td>
<td>N (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>55 27.6</td>
<td>47 25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>79 39.7</td>
<td>122 65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorcee</td>
<td>51 25.6</td>
<td>9  4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>14  7.0</td>
<td>7  3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never been to school</td>
<td>21 10.6</td>
<td>3  1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>33 16.6</td>
<td>16  8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>130 65.3</td>
<td>140 75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>15  7.5</td>
<td>26 14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent job</td>
<td>73 36.7</td>
<td>124 66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always switching jobs</td>
<td>70 35.2</td>
<td>31 16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>56 28.1</td>
<td>31 16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary of demographic information
As shown in Table 2, substance abuse is significantly higher in Group 1 compared to Group 2. Borderline personality disorder also was found higher among participants in Group 1. For childhood trauma experiences, participants in Group 1 were more likely to experience moderate to severe and severe to extreme childhood trauma in comparison to Group 2. Abuses were more likely occurred among participants in Group 1. On the other hand, negligence was more likely to be experienced by participants in both groups. Nevertheless, Group 1 had higher tendency to have experience negligence.

The regression analysis between childhood trauma experiences and substance abuse for Group 1 showed a significant result (p < .001), except for physical neglect. This finding demonstrated the significant relationship between childhood trauma experiences and substance abuse, where childhood trauma experiences significantly contributed to the occurrence of substance abuse among female prisoners in the current study. However, physical neglect demonstrated no significant relationship towards substance abuse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>Outcome variables</th>
<th>Simple linear regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$r^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Regression analysis for Group 1
All scales of childhood trauma experiences showed significant relationships to borderline personality disorder \((p < .05)\), as demonstrated by the result of regression analysis. As shown in Table 3, emotional abuse, sexual abuse and emotional neglect highly contribute to borderline personality disorder \((p < .001)\). Physical abuse and physical neglect also contribute to borderline personality disorder but with lower strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>Outcome variables</th>
<th>Simple linear regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Regression analysis for Group 2

The regression analysis for Group 2 (as shown in Table 4) showed no significant result for almost all childhood trauma experiences scales. For abuses scales, significant result was demonstrated between emotional abuse and substance abuse \((p < .01)\) only. Significant results were also demonstrated for physical and emotional neglects with borderline personality disorder \((p < .05)\). The findings showed that childhood trauma experiences do not contribute to occurrence of substance abuse and borderline personality disorder among female in the society, except for emotional abuse, physical and emotional neglect.

**DISCUSSIONS**

Development of mental health problems among female has often being relate to risk of aggressive and criminal behavior. Many studies have been conducted to explore the factors that may contribute to the development of mental health problems, especially among female offenders. So far, childhood trauma experiences have often being suggested as the biggest contributor towards mental health problems among female. Childhood trauma experiences were found high among female with mental health problems, particularly among offenders population.

The demographic information of the participants in the current study showed similarities between both groups. Majority of participants in both groups are more likely to be married, completed their secondary education and currently have or had permanent job. However, a large number of participant in Group 1 (female prisoner) are divorcee. This marital status might occur due to the incarceration or otherwise, the status that lead the participant to involve in crime. A considerable high number of participant in Group 1 are also widow. In comparison, higher number of participant in Group 2 had their tertiary education compared to Group 1. On the other hand, higher number of participant in Group 1 had never been to school or had only primary education. This showed that participant in Group 2 is more likely to be highly educated compared to Group 1. Lastly, high number of participant in Group 1 was always switching jobs or unemployed prior to
incarceration. In comparison, participant in Group 2 is more likely to have a permanent job than always switching jobs or being unemployed. This finding demonstrated the stability in socioeconomic among participant.

Occurrence of substance abuse and borderline personality disorder (as shown in Table 2) demonstrated higher tendency to suffer mental health problems among female prisoners. Participants in Group 1 significantly had higher occurrence of both substance abuse and borderline personality disorder as compared to participants in Group 2. Furthermore, childhood trauma experiences were found more often among Group 1, particularly abuses, suggesting the contribution of childhood trauma experiences towards mental health problems among female prisoners in the current study. Although majority of the participant in both groups had experienced none to minimal childhood traumas, a considerable number of participants in Group 1 had experienced either moderate to severe or severe to extreme childhood traumas. A considerable number of participants in Group 2 had also experienced negligence. These findings suggest possible relationship between childhood trauma experiences and mental health problems, particularly substance abuse and borderline personality disorder.

Regression analysis between childhood trauma experiences and substance abuse for Group 1 demonstrated significant relationships \((p < .001)\), except for physical neglect (as shown in Table 3). These findings confirmed that childhood trauma experiences significantly related to substance abuse, as suggested by previous studies [5] [9] [24]. As found in the current study, childhood trauma experiences highly contribute to the occurrence of substance abuse among female prisoners involved in the study, except for physical neglect. Physical neglect on the other hand did not contribute towards substance abuse among the participants.

Significant relationships for all subscales of childhood traumas had also been demonstrated by regression analysis between childhood trauma experiences and borderline personality disorder. These findings confirmed that childhood trauma experiences also contribute to borderline personality disorder among female prisoners in the current study. The relationship is especially strong for emotional abuse, sexual abuse and emotional neglect \((p < .001)\), as demonstrated by previous studies [36] [38]. Physical abuse and physical neglect did also contribute towards borderline personality disorder, but to a lesser extent.

Regression analysis for Group 2 demonstrated non significant relationships for almost all subscales except for several relationships. As found in the current study, emotional abuse significantly contributed to substance abuse \((p < .01)\) among female participants in Group 2. Physical and emotional neglect also contribute towards borderline personality disorder among the participants \((p < .05)\), as shown in Table 4. These findings suggested that among female in the general population, childhood trauma experiences does not significantly contribute to the occurrence of substance abuse or borderline personality disorder. However, the findings might be influenced by the low incidence of all variables among female in Group 2, as discussed earlier.

Comparison of the regression analysis between Group 1 and Group 2 showed that occurrence of childhood trauma experiences significantly contribute to the development of substance abuse and borderline personality disorder among female prisoners. These findings are supported by previous studies where childhood trauma experiences and mental health problems were significantly higher among female in prison [24] [36]. On the other hand, less female in the society had experienced childhood traumas, thus had lower occurrence and probability to develop both mental health problems. This is confirmed by the regression analysis.

There are some limitations in the current study. The first limitation is the methodology of the current study. In the current study, only screening instruments were used to collect the data and thus the result was preliminary only. Proper diagnosis through clinical method is required to confirm the result in the future. Nevertheless, the current findings are very helpful to guide any future study. The second limitation is the screening instruments. All the instruments that were used are based on the Western studies since no local psychometric instruments are available during the course of the current study. There might be differences in the culture and understanding of the questions given by the instrument. Instruments based on studies involving local or regional population, such as South East Asia is more preferable since the culture might be
similar. The third limitation is the findings. The regression analysis was done separately on both groups, due to the significant differences in score for each variable. Therefore, the result of the current study cannot be simply used as cut-off point for future study.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, childhood trauma experiences were found strongly related to substance abuse and borderline personality disorder, particularly among female prisoners. On the other hand, childhood trauma experiences were found insignificant for substance abuse and borderline personality disorder among female in the society, except for several relationships. Among female in the society, emotional abuse, physical neglect and emotional neglect significantly contribute to either mental health problems. It can be concluded that childhood trauma experiences are risk factors for substance abuse and borderline personality disorder among female, where female who had experienced childhood trauma had higher tendency to develop both mental health problems.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Thank you to University Sciences Malaysia and USM Fellowship for supporting this study. Thank you to Jabatan Penjara Malaysia for the opportunity to carry out this study in the selected prison, to all the inmates for giving a dedicative and kind cooperation during the data collection, and to the prison staffs and officers for pleasant assistance. Finally, thank you to all the participants who volunteering to participate in the current study.

REFERENCE


GENDER, SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AND PUBLIC RESTROOMS IN MALAYSIA

Mawaddah
Gender Studies
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
mawaddah_adah@siswamail.um.edu.my / fia_violet@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT
Gender equality has been discussed in all aspect of social life in Southeast Asia from issues related to politics, economy to culture. Focusing on Malaysia, the research examines gender (in)equality in terms of the provision of public restrooms for both sexes taking as its case studies these facilities at bus terminals for long distance route in Kuala Lumpur. A main problem that has existed is the longer lines at public restrooms for women than that for men. The other issue is the lack of facilities needed by each gender. Every gender has its own needs and it should not be generalized. Planners should consider these differences in needs between women and men whether it is due to biology or socialized. The researcher using the conceptual framework of substantive equality argues that equality should not be defined in terms of the similarity in the provision of public facilities but how these facilities provide equal benefits. As going to the restroom is a daily necessity, the study discusses substantive equality from an important that simple issue to illustrate the true meaning of gender equality. As gender and public restroom is a topic that has not been researched in the Malaysian context, the study fills a gap in the scholarship. The research findings will be beneficial to improve gender equality in the provision of public facilities in Malaysia and contribute to lessening gender discrimination in Southeast Asian countries.

Keywords: Gender Equality, Substantive Equality, Public Restrooms, Public Facilities

GENDER, KESAKSAMAAN SUBSTANTIF DAN KEMUDAHAN TANDAS AWAM DI MALAYSIA

ABSTRAK
Isu mengenai kesaksamaan gender telah ramai dibincangkan dalam pelbagai aspek kehidupan di Asia Tenggara. Mulai dari kesaksamaan gender dalam hal politik, ekonomi sampai kepada budaya. Negara-negara di Asia Tenggara khususnya Malaysia yang kental dengan unsur budaya Timur yang kebanyakannya mengikut sistem patriaki menyebabkan kesaksamaan gender menjadi isu yang sering diperdebatkan. Dalam kajian ini diangkat isu mengenai kesaksamaan gender dalam kemudahan tandas awam. Pengkaji melihat kes kesaksamaan gender dari hal yang paling penting dan sederhana agar memudahkan masyarakat awam mengerti akan erti sebenar kesaksamaan gender. Permasalahan yang didapati ialah dalam tandas awam wanita sering berlaku barisan yang sangat panjang berbanding tandas lelaki. Masalah lainnya ialah kekurangan fasiliti yang diperlukan masing-masing jantina dikeranakan rancangan pembangunan tandas awam lelaki dan wanita dibuat sama rata tanpa mengambil kira perbezaan keperluan mereka. Kesaksamaan tidak boleh didefinisikan dalam hal persamaan layanan tetapi bagaimana layanan memberikan kesaksamaan manfaat. Kesaksamaan substantif diketengahkan untuk mencapai manfaat sama antara lelaki dan

**Kata Kunci :** Kesaksamaan Gender, Kemudahan Awam, Tandas Awam, Malaysia

**PENDAHULUAN**

Masalah ketidaksaksamaan menjadi satu isu penting dalam kajian gender. Ketidaksaksamaan dalam kehidupan sosial khususnya dalam hal akses terhadap kemudahan awam oleh pemerintah akan berakibat timbulnya masalah ketidakadilan dan diskriminasi bagi beberapa pihak. Untuk melihat analisis sosial yang lebih kritikal yang harus difahami ialah konsep gender dan seks. Seks merupakan hal yang biologikal dan telah di bawa sejak lahir sedangkan konsep gender merupakan peranan yang dibentuk dan dipelajari dari budaya dan persekitaran.


**KAJIAN LITERATUR**


---

1 Konstruksi sosial merupakan peraturan-peraturan yang dibuat oleh persekitaran sosial, yang juga dipengaruhi oleh budaya, nilai dan norma sesebuah masyarakat itu sendiri.

275

Kemudahan tandas awam merupakan kemudahan yang sangat penting dan sangat diperlukan dalam ruang publik. Kebanyakan para ahli akademik di bahagian Asia Tenggara kurang mengkaji mengenai hal kemudahan tandas awam dikeraskan ia dianggap sebagai sesuatu yang masih remeh temeh. Anthony merupakan salah satu ahli akademik yang mengkaji mengenai tandas awam, beliau menyatakan bahawa seorang individu mengunjungi tandas awam sebanyak 6 hingga 8 kali sehari dan lebih dari 2,920 kali dalam setahun bagi purata setiap orang dan dalam umur 80 tahun kita menghabiskan masa 2 tahun kita di dalam tandas (Davidson, 2010).


Salah satu pernyataan dari pejabat tinggi di Amerika Syarikat Wakil Steve Cohen (D-Tenn) menyatakan pengalamannya ketika menghadiri konser. Didapati barisan wanita sangat panjang dan menyebabkan barisan tersebut keluar batas sampai ke tandas awam lelaki sehingga wanita juga ikut menggunakan tandas awam lelaki (Milbank, 2010). Pengetua kongres juga memberikan testimoni bahawa ia mengalami hal yang sama saat menunggu isterinya yang terjebak dalam barisan panjang pada saat rehat di pertemuan penting untuk pembuatan undang-undang. Pengetua merasa risau ketika penentuan undang-undang akan segera diumumkan sedangkan isteri beliau masih lagi terjebak dalam antrian panjang di tandas awam wanita (Milbank, 2010).


“Pregnant women feel an increased need to urinate, and many suffer health consequences if they are forced to hold their urine” (Banzhaf., 2002b; Anthony., Dufresne., 2007. ms:274).

Dari petikan di atas didapati wanita mengandung yang menahan buang air kecilnya lebih berisiko mengalami penyakit berkaitan sistem perkemihan. Maka dari itu wanita mengandung memang memerlukan layanan khas untuk kemudahan tandas awam. Wanita yang mengalami menstruasi maupun kehamilan memang menghabiskan masa lebih lama berbanding lelaki di dalam tandas awam berbanding lelaki. Mereka

2 Tempat perkemihan di dalam tandas awam yang boleh digunakan dengan hanya berdiri oleh lelaki.
juga memerlukan tuala wanita serta air yang mengalir serta tisu toilet lebih banyak berbanding lelaki mengingat kesihatan dan kebersihan yang penting untuk tubuh badan mereka.

Selain itu, wanita dan lelaki memiliki sistem urinari berbeza. Petikan yang diambil dari Kajian Shapiro (1989) yang tertera di bawah ini merupakan penjelasan perbezaan biologikal lelaki dan wanita:

“As shocking as it is, even experts know little about the basic anatomy and physiology of the female genitourinary system. The classic text, Gray’s Anatomy, devotes several pages to the male genitals and urinary tract but only one sketch of the female urinary system. Most doctors see the female urinary system as an inadequate of defective system, rather than as a complex system in its own right.”


Kutipan tersebut menjelaskan bahawa sistem urinari wanita dijelaskan dengan sangat ringkas dan tidak lengkap, sedangkan sistem urinari lelaki dijelaskan dengan detail dan lengkap. Hal tersebut merupakan bias gender dalam penulisan ilmu pengetahuan mengenai biologikal wanita dan lelaki. Hal ini boleh berakibat pada kurangnya pengetahuan yang disampaikan kepada pembaca. Akibat ketimpangan pemahaman masyarakat mengenai sistem urinari wanita dan lelaki mengakibatkan impak terhadap perancangan pembangunan tandas awam yang tidak sensitif gender.

Wanita menggunakan tandas awam harus beradaptasi dengan fizikalnya, lelaki secara fisiologinya sesuai menggunakan urinari dan ramai lelaki boleh dilayani dengan ruang fizikal yang relatif kecil sedangkan wanita menggunakan toilet untuk kencing dan memerlukan ruang yang lebih luas (Molotch, 1988). Dengan membuat ruang yang sama besar antara wanita dan lelaki boleh merugikan sebahagian pihak yakni pihak wanita berbanding pihak lelaki.

―According to Professor Day's study, women frequently spend twice as long as men in the restroom. They attribute their longer stays in part to having more clothes to manipulate; having children with them; or taking the time to comb their hair, adjust their make-up, smoke or just talk. But because none of these is an immutable sex-based characteristic, it may seem unfair to some -- and may, to others, constitute discrimination against men -- to provide men with smaller restrooms that have fewer overall facilities simply because many females want to talk, primp or smoke in restrooms.”

(Banzhaf, 1990:1).

Daripada kutipan di atas dapat dilihat bahawa wanita menghabiskan masa bukan hanya disebabkan oleh faktor peranan sosial tetapi juga biologikal serta karakter yang berasaskan pada seks yang telah dihaturkan masyarakat. Dalam setiap majlis, wanita mengalami ketidakselesaan dengan menunggu di barisan panjang di depan tandas awam dan kehilangan berbagai aktiviti yang mereka harus lakukan sedangkan wanita menggunakan toilet untuk kencing dan memerlukan ruang yang lebih luas (Molotch, 1988). Dengan membuat ruang yang sama besar antara wanita dan lelaki boleh merugikan sebahagian pihak yakni pihak wanita berbanding pihak lelaki.


“Thus, to provide equality of results, more than equal space, equal access or even an equal number of facilities may be required. In other words, if women are not to be forced to endure waits much longer than men during intermissions at theaters, for example, it would seem women’s rooms may have to be far larger than men’s rooms, and have substantially more toilets than the total number of toilets and urinals in the men’s room. Or at least some may argue.”

(Banzhaf, 1990:1).


Ketaksaksamaan gender dalam tandas awam merupakan salah satu sempadan baru dalam perjuangan feminis (Banzhaf, 1990). Ia merupakan perjuangan untuk mencapai hasil yang saksama dan manfaat yang saksama untuk kedua-dua jantina. Dalam konteks tersebut kesaksamaan terhadap manfaat lebih diutamakan daripada kesaksamaan luas ruang yang ada. Tambahan lagi, kesaksamaan terhadap akses lebih diutamakan daripada kesaksamaan terhadap jumlah dan fasiliti yang ada. Ini bermaksud untuk mencapai kesaksamaan bukanlah harus sama dalam hal bilangan dan fasiliti melainkan boleh berbeza mengikut keperluan masing-masing agar wanita dan lelaki mendapat manfaat yang sama.

METODOLOGI

Metod yang digunakan ialah kuantitatif. Analisis kuantitatif digunakan dengan bantuan SPSS (statistical package for the social sciences) berdasarkan analisis deskriptif melalui perbandingan jumlah serta peratusan dari hasil pemerhatian yang dilakukan ke atas keadaan fasiliti tandas awam di setiap bas terminal.

Carta 1 : Rangka kerja kuantitatif

\(^3\) Potty Parity merupakan undang-undang mengenai kesaksamaan tandas awam yang berasaskan gender. Di Amerika Syarikat telah diberlakukan “Potty Parity Act” untuk meningkatkan kesaksamaan gender dalam kemudahan tandas awam.
Pemerhatian yang dilakukan ialah ke atas jumlah tandas yang tersedia dan jumlah fasiliti yang ada di dalam tandas. Pengkaji melihat perbandingan kemudahan yang ada di tandas awam lelaki dan tandas awam wanita. Tempat kajian yang diambil ialah 4 terminal bas utama iaitu Hentian Puduraya, Hentian Putra, Hentian Duta dan Terminal Bersepadu Selatan dan 1 terminal bas sementara iaitu terminal bas sementara Bukit Jalil.

HASIL DAN ANALISIS

Terdapat 5 tempat kajian yang diambil dalam kertas kerja ini. Tandas awam yang pertama yang dilihat ialah di terminal sementara Bukit Jalil. Terminal ini memiliki satu lokasi tandas awam yang berada di bahagian belakang terminal.

Adapun fasiliti yang terdapat di sana ialah dapat dilihat dari jadual di bawah ini:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tandas</th>
<th>Lelaki</th>
<th>Wanita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tandas tertutup</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinki</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cermin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempat sampah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jadual 1 : Fasiliti di Tandas Awam Sementara Bukit Jalil


Gambar 1 : Keadaan Tandas Awam di Terminal Bas Sementara Bukit Jalil
Dari hasil kaji selidik di terminal bas sementara Bukit Jalil didapati tandas awam lelaki yang boleh digunakan lebih banyak iaitu sebesar 67% sedangkan wanita hanya 33%. Kemudahan yang disediakan sangat amat kurang memuaskan. Tidak terdapat tissue, sabun pembasuh tangan serta pengering tangan. Dari segi kemudahan yang ada di dalam juga terlihat sama antara lelaki dan wanita. Wanita tidak memiliki kemudahan seperti tuala, tempat membuang tuala serta tissue yang sangat diperlukan oleh wanita. Tidak terdapat tandas untuk Orang Kurang Upaya dan tempat menukar lampin bayi.

Tempat kajian selanjutnya ialah di Terminal Bas Hentian Duta. Diantara kemudahan dan keadaan tandas awam di sana dapat di lihat dari gambar dan jadual 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kemudahan</th>
<th>Lelaki</th>
<th>Wanita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tandas</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinki</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cermin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kipas angin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paip</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>penyangkut beg</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disposal unit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tempat sampah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jadual 2 : Kemudahan yang Terdapat di Dalam Tandas Awam Hentian Duta

Daripada jadual di atas yang menjadi perbezaan hanya tempat membuang tuala terdapat di tempat wanita. Tempat membuang tuala hanya terdapat di dalam 2 tandas, jumlah ini masih kurang kerana tempat membuang tuala haruslah terdapat sebuah di setiap tandas untuk memudahkan wanita menukar tuala di dalam tandas tandas. Di terminal ini diharuskan membayar RM 0.30 untuk memasuki tandas dan apabila memerlukan tissue diharuskan membayar RM 0.50. Keharusan membayar ini terbilang mahal dikeranakan perkhidmatan yang kurang lengkap. Keadaan ini dapat dilihat melalui gambar ini.
Gambar 2 : Keadaan tandas awam wanita di Hentian Duta

Peratusan Jumlah Tandas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kemudahan</th>
<th>Lelaki</th>
<th>Wanita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tandas</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinki</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cermin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paip</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>penyangkut beg</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tempat sampah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tempat tukar lampin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tandas OKU</td>
<td>1 (tak berfungsi)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sabun pembasuh tangan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carta 3 : Perbandingan Jumlah Tandas Wanita dan Lelaki di Hentian Duta

Dari carta di atas didapati tandas awam lelaki masih lebih banyak iaitu sebesar 62% sedangkan wanita 38%. Jumlah ini sangat tidak sebanding mengingat keperluan wanita ialah berbeza berbanding lelaki.

Tandas awam selanjutnya berada di terminal bas Hentian Putra. Adapun kemudahan yang terdapat di dalamnya ialah seperti jadual berikut ini.

Dari jadual carta di atas, dapat dilihat bahawa tandas awam lelaki lebih banyak iaitu 69% sedangkan wanita hanya 31%. Untuk memasuki tandas diharuskan membayar RM 0.20. Perkhidmatan ini sangat amat kurang bagi wanita mahupun lelaki. Keadaan tandas dapat dilihat melalui gambar di bawah ini.

Gambar 3 : Kondisi Tandas Awam Wanita (Atas) dan Tandas Awam Lelaki (Bawah)


Dari carta di atas didapati perbandingan jumlah tandas wanita dan lelaki iaitu 33% berbanding 67%. Peratusan ini memperlihatkan jumlah tandas lelaki jauh lebih banyak berbanding jumlah tandas wanita di Hentian Pudu.
Jadual 4: Kemudahan di dalam Tandas Awam di Hentian Pudu

Dari jadual 4 dapat dilihat perbezaan jumlah tandas yang sangat jauh, kemudahan tambahan yang berbeza hanya tempat sampah untuk membuang tuala wanita. Kesemua tandas di Hentian Pudu memerlukan bayaran RM 0.30 untuk setiap kali masuk, RM 0.50 untuk tissue dan RM 1.00 untuk sebuah tuala wanita. Tidak disediakan tissue di setiap tandas kerana ia diperjualbelikan oleh pihak penyedia tandas. Adapun keadaan tandas dapat dilihat pada gambar di bawah ini.

Gambar 4: Keadaan Tandas Awam di Hentian Pudu

Terdapat 3 lokasi tandas awam untuk orang kurang upaya. Tandas ini tidak memerlukan bayaran dan tidak ada simbol lelaki atau wanita, dengan kata lain tandas orang kurang upaya ini didesain untuk uniseks yang bererti lelaki dan wanita kurang upaya boleh memasuki sebarang tandas OKU yang disediakan. Diantara kemudahan yang disediakan ada di dalam jadual ini.
Kemudahan | OKU (uniseks)
--- | ---
tandas rendah | 6
Paip | 6
penyangkut beg | 6
sinki rendah | 6
Cermin | 6
sabun pembasuh tangan | 6
pegangan tangan besi | 6
Cermin | 6

Jadual 5 : Kemudahan Tandas OKU di Hentian Pudu

Selain tandas OKU terdapat lagi satu tempat menyalin lampin bayi yang diletakkan di salah satu lokasi tandas awam di aras G. Tempat lampin bayi ini diletakkan di luar tandas lelaki ataupun wanita. Tetapi simbol yang ada di depan pintu masuk tempat menukar lampin hanyalah simbol wanita sahaja, hal sedemikian menyebabkan lelaki segan untuk memasuki tempat menukar lampin bayi tersebut. Adapun kemudahan yang terdapat di dalamnya ialah 2 sinki beserta 2 cermin dan 6 tempat menukar lampin bayi.

Gambar 5 : Simbol Wanita di Tempat Menukar Lampin di Hentian Pudu

Tandas awam selanjutnya terdapat di Bandar Tasik Selatan atau disebut juga dengan Terminal Bersepadu Selatan. Terdapat 5 kawasan tandas yang tersebar di aras 3 dan 4. Adapun kemudahan yang terdapat di keseluruhan tandas awam yang ada di TBS ini dapat dilihat di jadual di bawah ini.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kemudahan</th>
<th>Lelaki</th>
<th>Wanita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
tandas | 40 | 20 |
Paip | 40 | 20 |
penyangkut beg | 20 | 20 |
tempat membuang tuala wanita | 0 | 20 |
Sinki | 20 | 20 |
cermin | 5 | 5 |
kips angin | 5 | 5 |
sabun pembasuh tangan | 10 | 10 |
segulung tissue | 5 | 5 |
pengering tangan | 5 | 5 |
tempat salin lampin bayi | 0 | 5 |
bilik setor | 0 | 5 |

Jadual 6 : Kemudahan Tandas Awam di TBS-BTS
Dari kemudahan yang dapat dilihat di atas masih lagi terjadi perbandingan yang tidak seimbang antara tandas lelaki dan tandas wanita. Kemudahan di luar tandas yang terdapat perbezaan antara lelaki dan wanita ialah tempat membuang tuala wanita. Bilik setor tempat penyimpanan perkakas kebersihan juga diletakkan di dalam tandas wanita.

![Peratusan Jumlah Tandas](image)

**Carta 7 : Perbandingan Peratusan Tandas Awam Lelaki dan Wanita di TBS-BTS**

Masih terdapat ketimpangan dari segi jumlah tandas yang boleh digunakan iaitu lelaki banding wanita 33% : 67%. Tempat menukar lampin juga hanya berada di dalam tandas wanita. Di kesemua lokasi tandas di TBS-BTS ini tidak dikenakan bayaran apapun sebelum memasuki tandas. Begitu pula dengan tempat menukar lampin hanya ada di dalam tandas wanita, bagi lelaki yang membawa bayi tentu tidak boleh memasukinya kerana ia berada di dalam tandas wanita.

![Gambar 6 : Lokasi Tandas Wanita, Lelaki, OKU dan Tempat Menukar Lampin](image)

Terdapat satu tandas untuk orang kurang upaya di aras 3 bagagian tengah dengan kemudahan 1 paip di buat lebih rendah daripada amnya, 1 mangkuk tandas berduduk yang lebih rendah dengan pegangan tangan di sebelahnya, 1 sinki, 1 kaca, 1 tempat sampah dengan tissue dan pengering tangan. Adapun keadaan gambar yang ditangkap oleh penyelidik ditampilkan di bawah ini.

![Gambar 7 : Tandas Orang Kurang Upaya di Terminal Bersepadu Selatan-Banda Tasik Selatan](image)

Dari kesemua hasil data fasiliti tandas awam yang ada di Kuala Lumpur, kesimpulan analisis dari segi perbandingan jumlah mendapati tandas lelaki selalu lebih banyak berbanding wanita. Purata perbandingan peratusan lelaki dan wanita secara keseluruhaninya iaitu 66 % : 34 %. Jumlah ini dikatakan tidak saksama
mengingat keperluan wanita juga jauh lebih banyak berbanding lelaki. Hal tersebut berasaskan kepada sistem biologikal wanita yang berbeza dari lelaki serta peranan sosial mereka yang berbeza.

KESIMPULAN

Kajian mengenai kesaksamaan perkhidmatan tandas awam ini merupakan satu pembelajaran mengenai apa erti sebenar kesaksamaan. Dari kajian terdahulu yang mendapati bahawa wanita mengambil masa lebih lama di dalam tandas berbanding lelaki dan didapati juga kenyataan yang paradoks bahawa tandas lelaki lebih banyak jumlahnya dari wanita. Hal sedemikian juga terjadi di terminal-terminal bas utama di Kuala Lumpur. Hasil kajian menunjukkan purata bahawa tandas lelaki memiliki peratusan 66% sedangkan tandas wanita hanya 34%. Kemudahan yang hampir sama rata menyebabkan wanita yang memiliki keperluan biologikal yang berbeza dari lelaki merasa kurang puas akan perkhidmatan yang ada. Jauhnya perbezaan jumlah tandas dan masa menggunakan tandas wanita yang lebih lama berbanding lelaki merupakan sebab mengapa di tandas wanita sering terjadi antrian yang panjang daripada lelaki.


Dari penelitian ini diharapkan untuk masa hadapan pemerintah bekerjasama dengan arkitek dan perancang bangunan yang terbit untuk membuat pengubahsuaian dan lebih memperhatikan keperluan wanita. Diharapkan pengungkapan sebenar makna dari kesaksamaan substantif melalui kesaksamaan perkhidmatan awam boleh meningkatkan lagi sensitif terhadap isu gender di kalangan akademik, pemerintah serta masyarakat di Asia Tenggara.

BIBLIOGRAFI


USAHA KE ARAH PEMBANGUNAN SOSIAL WANITA DI MALAYSIA: ANALISIS PERANAN PERTUBUHAN BUKAN KERAJAAN (NGO) WANITA DALAM MENENGANI ISU PERCERAIAN

Siti Saleha Binti Adnan
Rancangan Pengajian Gender, Fakulti Sastera Sains Sosial
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
sctgender@gmail.com

ABSTRAK

Perceraian merupakan masalah sosial yang kian menular di Negara kita dan telah membawa implikasi terhadap wanita dan anak-anak. sehingga hari ini, usaha yang dilakukan kurang berkesan dalam menangani masalah social ini.


Sebagai kesimpulannya, sumbangan besar dapat dilihat melalui usaha yang dilakukan oleh NGO wanita melalui kerjasama daripada pelbagai agensi kerajaan. Konsep perkongsian bijak (smart partnership) yang dilakukan banyak membantu melaksanakan program yang dirancang. Ramai ibu tunggal pasca perceraian telah berjaya dalam kehidupan mereka setelah mengikut program-program yang dijalankan. Keberkesanan program yang dianjurkan dapat dilihat daripada penyertaan yang memberangsangkan. Justeru, usaha ini dilihat sebagai pemangkin kea rah pembangunan social wanita di Malaysia.

Kata Kunci: Perceraian, NGO Wanita, Ibu Tunggal, Peranan, Keberkesanan Perjuangan

PENGENALAN

Kertas ini membincangkan:

(1) Statistik perceraian peringkat nasional dan negeri.

(2) Cabaran yang dihadapi oleh wanita pasca perceraian.
(3) Peranan yang dimainkan oleh NGO wanita dari segi program-program, aktiviti-aktiviti serta perkhidmatan yang disediakan.

(4) Keberkesanan perjuangan NGO wanita dalam menangani isu perceraian.

**KONSEP PERKAHWINAN**

Raihanah Abdullah mendefinisikan perkahwinan sebagai suatu ikatan yang wujud di antara lelaki dan wanita yang menghalalkan perhubungan jenis antara kedua-duanya. Melalui institusi perkahwinan ini, ia akan dapat mengatur kehidupan rumah tangga dan keturunan yang akan menjadi susunan kepada kelompok masyarakat yang besar. Keadaan ini digambarkan dalam Al-Quran:

*Terjemahannya:*

―Dan antara tanda-tanda kekuasaan-Nya, Dia menciptakan untukmu isteri-isteri daripada jenismu sendiri supaya kamu cenderung dan merasa tenteram kepadanya, dan dijadikan antara kamu rasa belas kasihan." (Ar-Ruum:21)

**KONSEP PERCERAIAN**


Terdapat banyak jenis perceraian yang dinyatakan di dalam Al-Quran. Namun begitu empat jenis perceraian yang sering digunakan ialah: (Rujuk Jadual 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jenis</th>
<th>Huraian</th>
<th>Seksiyen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talaq</td>
<td>Perceraian jenis ini difailkan samada oleh suami atau isteri yang hendak bercerai di mahkamah syariah setelah usaha-usaha perdamaian telah dilakukan oleh kedua belah pihak gagal.</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasakh</td>
<td>Pembubaran nikah disebabkan oleh sesuatu hal keadaan yang diharuskan oleh hukum syara‘</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taklik</td>
<td>Seseorang isteri yang berhak mendapata perceraian menurut syarat-syarat yang terkandung di dalam surat perakuan takliq yang dibaca semasa majlis akad nikah boleh memohon perceraian di mahkamah.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuluq</td>
<td>Isteri menebus dirinya agar dibebaskan oleh suaminya dengan cara mengembalikan mas kahwin yang telah mereka sepakati sebelum ini kepada suaminya.</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jadual 1 menunjukkan jenis-jenis perceraian serta peruntukkan-peruntukkan yang terkandung di dalam Akta Undang-undang Keluarga Islam Wilayah Persekutuan 1984 (akta 303). Daripada jadual di atas, didapati bahawa bilangan kes yang merangkumi empat jenis perceraian ini semakin meningkat dari tahun ke tahun. (Rujuk Rajah 1).

**Rajah 1: Statistik Perkahwinan dan Perceraian Di Malaysia Dari tahun 1990-2008**


Jadual 2: Statistik Perceraian Di Malaysia Mengikut Negeri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERLIS</td>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEDAH</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>2,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PULAU PINANG</td>
<td></td>
<td>499</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERAK</td>
<td></td>
<td>717</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>1,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELANGOR</td>
<td></td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>3,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUALA LUMPUR</td>
<td></td>
<td>452</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>1,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGERI SEMBILAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>288</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MELAKA</td>
<td></td>
<td>317</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHOR</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>2,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAHANG</td>
<td></td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERENGGANU</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KELANTAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>2,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARAWAK</td>
<td></td>
<td>305</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>1,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABAH</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.P LABUAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUMLAH</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,194</td>
<td>13,317</td>
<td>13,605</td>
<td>22,289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sumber: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM)*

Daripada Jadual 1, pengaruh Islam tidak dapat menjelaskan trend perceraian yang mana kadar perceraian adalah tinggi di beberapa buah negeri di Malaysia iaitu Kelantan, Terengganu dan Kedah.3 Didapati bahawa statistik perceraian di Kelantan mencatatkan jumlah yang tertinggi berbanding negeri-negeri lain pada tahun 90-an. Ini kerana walaupun negeri Kelantan mempunyai pengaruh Islam yang kuat tetapi negeri tersebut masih terkendali dari segi kemajuan ekonomi serta taraf pendidikan yang rendah pada waktu tersebut.4 Kemajuan ekonomi dan peluang pekerjaan yang lebih baik di negeri-negeri Pantai Barat mendorong migrasi penduduk Kelantan bagi memperoleh penghidupan yang lebih baik.5


---

METODOLOGI KAJIAN

Terdapat empat jenis metod yang telah digunakan bagi menjayakan penyelidikan ini iaitu:

A. Tinjauan dan persampelan
B. Temubual
C. Pemerhatian ikut serta
D. Penyelidikan perpustakaan

A. Tinjauan dan Persampelan

B. Kaedah Temubual:
Di samping menjalankan kajian lapangan di persatuan-persatuan ibu tunggal, kaedah temubual turut digunakan untuk menemubual pegawai-pegawai di NGO wanita yang dilawati. Seramai lima orang pegawai NGO telah ditemubual mengikut bidang tugas masing-masing. Kaedah temubual ini digunakan bagi mengetahui pengalaman mereka dalam mengendalikan program-program serta perkhidmatan-perkhidmatan yang disediakan bagi pembangunan serta pemerkasaan golongan ibu tunggal.

C. Pemerhatian Ikut Serta:
Bagi kaedah ini, pengkaji telah menyertai beberapa program yang dianjurkan oleh NGO wanita. Tidak cukup dengan itu, kaedah ini dipilih kerana pengkaji dapat melihat sendiri pengisian program-program yang dijalankan bagi manfaat ibu tunggal. Untuk itu, beberapa keeping gambar telah diambil sepanjang perjalanan program tersebut.

D. Penyelidikan Perpustakaan:

DAPATAN KAJIAN

Rajah 2: Carta Pai Kumpulan Umur Responden Mengikut Peratus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kumpulan umur responden mengikut peratus</th>
<th>Peratus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 - 30 tahun</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 35 tahun</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 - 40 tahun</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 45 tahun</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gambar rajah 2 menunjukkan golongan berusia dalam lingkungan 46-50 tahun merupakan responden yang paling ramai iaitu sebanyak 25% dan golongan yang berusia 26-30 tahun merupakan responden yang paling rendah iaitu sebanyak 4%.

Rajah 3: Carta Pai Tahap Pendidikan Responden Mengikut Peratus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tahap pendidikan responden mengikut peratus</th>
<th>Peratus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tidak bersekolah</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekolah Rendah</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekolah Menengah</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Berdasarkan gambar rajah 3, di dapati bahawa tahap pendidikan menengah merupakan responden yang paling ramai iaitu sebanyak 59% diikuti pendidikan rendah iaitu sebanyak 21%. Ini kerana golongan yang berkahwin pada usia muda menyebabkan mereka kurang matang dalam menangani konflik rumah tangga.6

Gambar rajah 4: Carta Pai Jenis Perceraian Responden Mengikut Peratus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jenis perceraian responden mengikut peratus</th>
<th>Peratus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talaq</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasakh</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taklik</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidak tahu</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gambar rajah 4 tersebut menunjukkan bilangan responden yang bercerai dengan cara talaq adalah sebanyak 63% diikuti oleh fasakh sebanyak 20%, taklik 11% dan lain-lain sebanyak 6%. Talaq mencatatkan peratusan tertinggi kerana talaq jenis ini sering dilafazkan oleh pihak suami dan berlaku di luar mahkamah.  

CABARAN YANG DI HADAPI WANITA PASCA PERCERAIAAN

Berbanding gambar rajah 2, didapati bahawa bilangan responden yang mempunyai tahap pendidikan menengah adalah yang paling ramai dan secara tidak langsung memberi implikasi negatif kepada kehidupan mereka dan anak-anak pasca perceraian. Ini kerana cabaran besar bagi wanita ini adalah tiada sistem sokongan yang dapat membantu memulihkan keadaan mereka apabila lagi, jika mereka tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami mereka pasca perceraian. (Rujuk jadual 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jadual 3: Ketiadaan Sistem Sokongan Responden Mengikut Peratus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ya</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tidak</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missing value</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---


Berdasarkan Jadual 4, pengkaji mendapati bahawa sebilangan besar responden tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Terdapat 71.9% responden menyatakan tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Manakala, sebahagian kecil responden yang menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami iaitu sebanyak 28.1%.

Antara responden yang tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami ialah Rosmawati Karia, seorang ibu tunggal berusia 45 tahun. Beliau menuntut nafkah daripada bekas suami. Manakala, sebahagian kecil sahaja responden yang menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami iaitu sebanyak 28.1%.

Berdasarkan Jadual 4, pengkaji mendapati bahawa sebilangan besar responden tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Terdapat 71.9% responden menyatakan tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Manakala, sebahagia kecil sahaja responden yang menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami iaitu sebanyak 28.1%.

Berdasarkan Jadual 4, pengkaji mendapati bahawa sebilangan besar responden tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Terdapat 71.9% responden menyatakan tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Manakala, sebahagia kecil sahaja responden yang menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami iaitu sebanyak 28.1%.

Jadual 4: Peratusan Responden Menerima Nafkah Zahir Daripada Bekas Suami Sekarang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Menerima nafkah</th>
<th>36</th>
<th>24.0</th>
<th>28.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tidak menerima nafkah</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Berdasarkan Jadual 4, pengkaji mendapati bahawa sebilangan besar responden tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Terdapat 71.9% responden menyatakan tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami. Manakala, sebahagia kecil sahaja responden yang menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami iaitu sebanyak 28.1%.

Antara responden yang tidak menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami ialah Rosmawati Karia, seorang ibu tunggal berusia 45 tahun. Beliau menuntut nafkah daripada bekas suami. Manakala, sebahagia kecil sahaja responden yang menerima nafkah zahir daripada bekas suami iaitu sebanyak 28.1%.

Wawancara bersama Puan Rosmawati Karia, di Petaling Jaya pada 11 Mei 2009.

“Saya tuntut nafkah daripada bekas suami untuk kebajikan anak-anak yang hidup dalam serba kekurangan.”\footnote{Wawancara bersama Puan Rosmawati Karia, di Petaling Jaya pada 11 Mei 2009.}
Ramai di kalangan bekas suami yang tidak bertanggungjawab dan mengabaikan tanggungan nafkah kepada bekas isteri dan anak-anak sehingga si isteri terpaksa meminta bantuan dari badan-badan kebajikan lantaran untuk meringankan derita yang dipukul. Meski pun terdapat perintah mahkamah, ramai bekas suami yang enggan untuk membayar nafkah tersebut. Terdapat juga di kalangan bekas suami yang memberi nafkah tidak tetap, terlalu sedikit dan tidak munasabah untuk menampung kepentingan hidup ibu tunggal. Bekas suami ini dikatakan telah melakukan diskriminasi sosial kerana membiarkan bekas isteri menjalani kehidupan dengan pendapatan yang dia perolehi lebih sedikit berbanding semasa dalam perkahwinan sebelumnya.  

Bukan itu sahaja, menurut Yang Amat Arif Tan Sri Ibrahim Lembut, Ketua Hakim Syarie Malaysia statistik yang dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia menunjukkan bahawa daripada lebih 14,000 kes dipilah di Mahkamah Syariah dari tahun 2002 hingga tahun 2009, dianggarkan lebih 12,300 bekas suami dikekan masih berdegil dan enggan membayar nafkah kepada bekas isteri dan anak masing-masing walaupun mereka sudah diperintah berbuat demikian oleh mahkamah syariah di seluruh negara. 

Atas kesedaran ini, telah muncul beberapa NGO wanita yang berusaha membawa pembangunan sosial kepada golongan ibu tunggal. Diantara NGO tersebut adalah SISTERS IN ISLAM, Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Belaian Kasih, dan Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Mutiara Kuala Lumpur.

**SISTERS IN ISLAM (SIS)**


Objektif utama SIS adalah untuk menegakkan dan membangunkan satu kerangka hak-hak wanita dalam Islam yang mengambil kira pengalaman dan realiti wanita, menghapuskan ketidakadilan dan diskriminasi terhadap wanita dengan mengubah amalan-amalan serta nilai-nilai yang menganggap bahawa wanita adalah lebih rendah daripada lelaki serta membina kesedaran awam melalui pendidikan awam dan perancangan strategik dan pembentukan dasar. Namun kajian ini hanya memfasiskan kepada dua unit berkaitan iaitu Pendidikan Awam dan Komunikasi serta Perkhidmatan Perundangan, Advokasi dan Pembaharuan dasar.

**PENDIDIKAN AWAM DAN KOMUNIKASI**


Manakala dalam Sesi Pembelajaran *(Study Session)* pula, perbincangan isu pada mulanya hanya melibatkan wanita semata-mata. Namun apabila melibatkan perbincangan isu yang lebih besar, SIS telah meluaskan skop penyertaan dengan menjemput penceramah luar umpamanya Mufti Besar Bosnia-

---


Herzegovina seperti Raisul Ulama, Mustafa Ceric dan Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Pengerusi Cordova Initiative (USA) yang bercakap tentang “Cabarang-cabarang Islam di dalam Masyarakat Majmuk”.

SIS akan mengadakan sesi pembelajaran pada setiap bulan. Isu yang dikupas adalah berkaitan Islam, kesihatan dan hak-wanita, aurat dan pakaian, menjadi seorang muslim dalam Islam oleh tokoh-tokoh semesta. Contoh syarahan umum yang pernah dianjurkan ialah Musawah pada bulan Mac tahun 2009 dan dihadiri oleh ramai aktivis sosial dari dalam dan juga luar negara.18

**PERKHIDMATAN PERUNDANGAN, ADVOKASI DAN PEMBAHARUAN DASAR**


Di samping itu, SIS juga mempunyai kolum Literasi Undang-Undang di akhbar Utusan Malaysia pada setiap hari Jumaat di Ruangan Undang-undang dan Keluarga. Melalui kolum ini, pembaca boleh menghantar sebarang kemusykilan ke kolum ini dan pegawai undang-undang SIS akan menjawab segala kemusykilan tersebut. Isu yang dikendalikan di ruangan ini ialah perkahwinan, perceraian, naflah anak, harta pusaka, tuntutan harta sepencarian, khalwat dan zina.19

**PERSATUAN IBU TUNGGAL BELAIAN KASIH**


18 Temubual bersama Cik Noorhayati Kaprawi di SIS Forum Malaysia pada 11 April 2009.

Plate 1: Kursus solekan yang dianjurkan oleh Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Belaian Kasih bersama jurumekap profesional dari Shiseido

Kursus ini memberikan pengetahuan kepada peserta iaitu ibu-ibu tunggal mengenai teknik asas solekan yang boleh membantu mereka untuk mendapat pengetahuan baru yang boleh dimanfaatkan untuk menjana pendapatan tambahan bagi menanggung kos sara hidup ibu-ibu tunggal tersebut. Pengkaji turut mengikuti kursus asas solekan yang dianjurkan oleh persatuan ini bertindak sebagai pemerhati kursus. Selepas tamat kursus, peserta juga diberikan sample produk Shiseido sebagai cenderahati.

Plate 2: Pengkaji bersama dengan peserta kursus dan juga jurumekap profesional dalam sesi bergambar selepas tamat kursus

PERSATUAN IBU TUNGGAL MUTIARA KUALA LUMPUR


Di peringkat persatuan beberapa program telah di susun atur seperti kursus membuat kraftangan. Program ini dijalankan kepada ahli supaya mereka dapat memiliki kemahiran yang tertentu dan seterusnya memberi peluang kepada mereka untuk membuka perniagaan yang berasaskan kepada kraftangan pada masa hadapan.

Plate 3: Produk kusyen yang dihasilkan oleh peserta dalam kursus yang dianjurkan oleh Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Mutiara

Plate 4: Produk pasu bunga daripada manik yang dihasilkan oleh peserta dalam kursus yang dianjurkan oleh Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Mutiara

Plate 3 dan Plate 4 menunjukkan kursus kraftangan yang dianjurkan oleh Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Mutiara untuk ibu-ibu tunggal. Produk yang dihasilkan juga dijual pada hari berkenaan. Kursus-kursus kraftangan sebegini diharapkan dapat membantu ibu-ibu tunggal untuk memperoleh pendapatan tambahan bagi menampung kos sara hidup mereka dan anak-anak.

Di samping memberikan kursus-kursus kemahiran kepada ahli-ahli, persatuan ini juga menjalankan program kelompok sokongan bagi membina keyakinan kendiri ahli-ahlinya. Program kelompok sokongan ini diadakan pada hari sabtu dan akan bermula pada jam 3 petang dan tamat lebih kurang jam 5.30 petang. Di dalam program ini, semua ahli akan berkumpul bagi berkongsi masalah yang mereka hadapi di samping ahli-ahli lain cuba membantu mencari jalan bagi menyelesaikan masalah tersebut.


Nasihat perundangan yang diberikan termasuklah proses dan prosedur yang perlu dilalui oleh wanita itu sebelum ke mahkamah, semasa di mahkamah, dokumen-dokumen yang diperlukan dan juga hak-hak yang perlu mereka tuntut selepas perceraian.21

KEBERKESANAN NGO WANITA DALAM MENANGANI ISU PERCERAIAN

Seterusnya, penilaian terhadap keberkesanan perjuangan NGO wanita melalui beberapa aspek yang ditonjolkan dalam perjuangan mereka akan dinilai. Bagi merangkumkan kepelbagaian aspek tersebut, pengkaji menilai keberkesanan perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh NGO wanita terbabit menerusi maklum balas yang diterima. Pendapa t responden tentang sesuatu organisasi merupakan penunjuk penting terhadap prestasi organisasi tersebut. Memetik pendapat Bhatia, menerusi kajiannya mengenai pembangunan wanita dan NGO, beliau merumuskan pendapat yang kurang baik menunjukkan bahawa organisasi tersebut tidak dapat memenuhi aspirasi dan harapan wanita.22 Namun begitu, keberkesanan perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh NGO wanita telah banyak member sumbangan yang besar kepada masyarakat terutama golongan golongan wanita yang menghadapi masalah perceraian (Rujuk Jadual 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tahun</th>
<th>Jumlah Kes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (sehingga September)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sumber: Data Sisters in Islam

Melalui khidmat telenisa yang dikendalikan oleh SIS, maklumat yang diperlukan oleh golongan wanita dapat dilakukan dengan lebih mudah. Mereka lebih mudah mengakses informasi yang dikehendaki tanpa perlu bertemu dengan pegawai undang-undang yang lain. Pegawai-pegawai SIS iaitu Puan Ratna Osman dan Puan Azareena Abdul Aziz turut memberi ulasan tentang maklumat balas yang diterima daripada wanita-wanita yang pernah mengikuti program SIS.

Menurut Puan Azareena, selepas peserta mengikuti program yang disediakan oleh SIS, kebanyakan wanita menyatakan bahawa kepentingan hak-hak wanita dalam undang-undang keluarga Islam amat perlu diketahui dan difahami oleh umum.23 Sementara itu, menurut Puan Ratna pula, melalui Klinik Undang-Undang Bergerak, didapati bahawa terdapat wanita yang berpuas hati dan mencadangkan supaya program dijalankan dengan lebih kerap dan konsisten kerana mereka memerlukan lebih pendedahan.24 Namun begitu, terdapat wanita yang kurang berpuas hati kerana sesi ceramah yang agak singkat membataskannya. Wanita-wanita tersebut mendapatkan lebih banyak maklumat. Di samping itu, lokasi tempat tinggal yang jauh menyebabkan mereka sukar mendapat akses kepada program tersebut. Selain itu, melalui khidmat telenisa yang dikendalikan oleh SIS ramai wanita menyatakan bahawa maklumat yang diberikan amat berguna tentang prosedur yang perlu dilalui semasa di mahkamah syariah.

BANTUAN DARI SEGI PELUANG PEKERJAAN YANG DISEDIAKAN OLEH NGO WANITA

Melalui pengalaman pengkaji, kebanyakan ibu tunggal mencari sumber pendapatan menerusi perniagaan sekitirannya mereka tidak mempunyai pekerjaan dan tidak kurang juga yang berjaya dalam perniagaan tersebut.


KESIMPULAN

Hasil kajian pengkaji mengenai isu perceraian ini, pengkaji mendapat NGO wanita telah berusaha sebaiknya untuk membantu golongan ibu tunggal dengan menyediakan pelbagai perkhidmatan meskipun terdapat halangan-halangan tertentu terutama dari segi sumber kewangan dan kerjasama dari agensi-agensi lain. Bukan itu sahaja, kadangkala perjuangan NGO ini tidak mendapat kompromi daripada sesetengah pihak kerana menganggap bahawa perjuangan mereka adalah berbentuk radikal seperti yang diperjuangkan oleh SIS.

23 Temubual bersama Puan Azareena Abdul Aziz di SIS Forum Malaysia pada 30 September 2010.
24 Temubual bersama Puan Ratna Othman di SIS Forum Malaysia pada 30 September 2010.
Tetapi, kita perlu sedar bahawa perjuangan mereka itu sebenarnya merupakan perjuangan yang bercorak keintelektualan. Untuk itu, kerajaan juga turut menyedari sumbangan SIS yang besar ini kerana perjuangan SIS telah mencerminkan imej Malaysia sebagai sebuah negara Islam yang progresif.  

Perjuangan daripada NGO bukan sahaja berbentuk ‘top to bottom’ iaitu daripada peringkat atas kepada peringkat bawahan yakni masyarakat, tetapi juga berbentuk dua hala di mana ia juga memberi kesan kepada ‘bottom up’. Ini merujuk kepada peranan NGO dan pelbagai agensi kerajaan yang berperanan dalam melaksanakan program yang bersesuaian dengan keperluan kaum wanita dalam masyarakat hari ini. Bagi Tan Boon Kean dan Bishan Singh peranan NGO di Malaysia diumpamakan sebagai “important vehicle” kerana menjadi medium penting kepada masyarakat bagi menyuarakan pandangan mereka kepada kerajaan.  

Menurut Nik Safiah Karim kerjasama yang melibatkan NGO dan kerajaan dalam hal ini adalah disifatkan sebagai “smart partnership arrangement” kerana isu-isu yang dibawa NGO wanita di Malaysia tidak hanya tertumpu kepada isu kebajikan tetapi kini lebih menurun kepada isu-isu sejagat.  

Menurut Nik Safiah Karim kerjasama yang melibatkan NGO dan kerajaan dalam hal ini adalah disifatkan sebagai “smart partnership arrangement” kerana isu-isu yang dibawa NGO wanita di Malaysia tidak hanya tertumpu kepada isu kebajikan tetapi kini lebih menurun kepada isu-isu sejagat. Menerus program dan perkhidmatan yang dijalankan di NGO terbabit, taraf kehidupan dan kebajikan wanita kini lebih terjamin. Namun begitu, ramai wanita yang tidak mengetahui kewujudan dan kepentingan NGO ini dalam memperjuangkan hak serta membantu mereka semasa mengalami saat sukar selepas perceraian.  

Kadangkala ilmu pengetahuan dalam mengetahui hak-hak dan memahami sistem perundangan menyebabkan ramai wanita pasca perceraian dibiarkan teraniaya dan dicabuli hak mereka sewenang-wenangnya. Walhal sebenarnya, melalui sumbangan NGO wanita, lebih ramai wanita bangkit dari dan berani mempertahankan hak mereka dan tidak menganggap percercaian merupakan sesuatu yang malang dalam hidup mereka. Menerus program dan perkhidmatan yang dijalankan di NGO terbabit, taraf kehidupan dan kebajikan wanita ini lebih terjamin. Walau bagaimanapun, keaktifan NGO wanita ini perlu ditingkatkan kerana secara realitinya ramai wanita masih kurang faham dan menyedari kepentingan perjuangan NGO. Hal ini telah menyebabkan mereka tidak boleh memanfaatkan kelebihan yang diberikan oleh NGO dalam membantu mereka yang mengalami masalah percercaian dan mempersiapkan wanita supaya lebih berdikari untuk meneruskan kehidupan bersama anak-anak sebagai ibu tunggal.  

Secara umumnya, permasalahan ini bukan sahaja melibatkan peranan NGO wanita dan kerajaan tetapi juga masyarakat perlu sedar bahawa isu-isu berhubung dengan percercaian kini adalah suatu masalah sosial dan tidak boleh dianggap sebagai isu peribadi sahaja. Kesedaran umum ini merupakan pemangkin terhadap perubahan sosial dalam masyarakat Islam di Malaysia.  

RUJUKAN


Temubual bersama Cik Noorhayati Kaprawi di SIS Forum Malaysia pada 11 April 2009.

Temubual bersama Puan Azareena Abdul Aziz di SIS Forum Malaysia pada 30 September 2010.


Temubual bersama Puan Ratna Othman di SIS Forum Malaysia pada 30 September 2010.

Temubual bersama puan Siti Noridah Abdullah, pengerusi Persatuan Ibu Tunggal Beltaan Kasih Kuala Lumpur pada 30 Januari 2008.


POLITICAL FACEBOOK: PUBLIC SPHERE OF THAI MIDDLE CLASS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Wimonsiri Hemtanon
Department of Southeast Asian Studies
University of Passau, Germany
wimonsirih@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The violent crackdown on Thailand’s pro-democracy movement in 2010 established Facebook as a crucial channel for information and communication among the Thai middle class in a situation of political uncertainty. It was not only used as a hub to self-broadcast a collage of news media snippets mixed with accusations and tales documented by citizen journalists and sourced from a variety of social media platforms as the events unfolded. Today, Facebook has become of increasing importance as a vehicle for the casual commentator to air political opinions and a tool to channel support for political campaigns and related activities in the struggle for meaning of political causes on people’s minds.

While the 1970s aspirations towards democracy were driven by leaflets of Thailand’s students movements and the ‘mobile phone mobs’ that preceded Bangkok’s ‘Black May’ in 1992 were still bound to traditional dimensions of communication, the current color-coded struggle between Red and Yellow Shirts is being fought out in a virtual and multi-directional flows of interactive mass self-communication on social media sites. This raises the question whether Facebook established an arena of free political articulation and engagement or a battleground of narrow ideologies.

Facebook has the potential effect/consequence to expand the concept of the public sphere by allowing the people to engage in political action freely. It, however, became the battleground of individual ideology. The habitus allows individual to engage in discourses which can be found in public sphere from the comments and its related info status on Facebook. Moreover, the discourses could lead to simulacrum of “Thainess” which was widely used by the individual as the subject of societal movement in particular.

This article will explore how Thai middle class, as the agent of change, use facebook as a communication tool to reproduce political discourses in order to maintain and enhance their power by using Bourdieu’s concept of capitals and habitus.

Keywords: Middle Class, Public Sphere, Simulacrum, Thainess, Habitus

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-2000s business and consumers alike discovered a buzz in social media as an enabler of two-way communication and, to stick with the jargon of marketing pundits, peer-to-peer interaction. A trend which also made Facebook one of the websites that attracts most internet traffic from Thailand - this is only exceeded by Google’s search engine - and a place where about 9,275,000 users interact and engage on a regular basis. About 8,240,000 of these users are located within the Bangkok metropolitan area which, given Thailand’s urban-rural divide, hints at a user base that is predominantly characterized by the urban middle class that indulges in interacting within a network of friends and acquaintances on issues ranging from the latest tech gadgets, fashion trends, or dhamma talks. (Facebook Ad Targeting Tool, Alexa.com)

But this cozy commercial climate began to change with the not only politically hot season in March 2010. While Thai media outlets and mainstream opinion where still under hegemony of the government and
the military, Red Shirt protestors set out to march into the scenery of showcases of Thai middle class consumerism. Since events unfolded, Facebook emerged as an information hub for reposting of news, tales, as well as citizen reporting, disclosing of political affiliation, and airing support for the respective camps that are involved in Thailand’s color-coded political saga.

This paper aims at the investigation of Bangkok’s urban middle class’ perspective on political issues related to the events of 2010 and their expression of ideological affiliation during a period of political uncertainty within a social media environment. This study looks at Facebook as a virtual public sphere that Bangkok’s urban middle class became familiar with over the last years and which emerged as an arena for discourse during the political unrest in 2010. For this reason we will first sketch the path to political uncertainty and the growing dissonance between the official version of reality as presented by mainstream media and the information that circulated unfiltered between Facebook users. As we will argue, Bangkok’s urban middle class tends to not use the freedom offered by social media to engage in a deliberative discourse, but rather to adopt new means of horizontal communication to reproduce traditional ideological underpinnings that persist.

For this reason we will outline development and characteristics of a class of achievers in consumerism which were hoped to be a driving force of democratization, and the traditional ideologies that are underpinning their development and position within Thai society. For the connection between the ideology of Thainess and its hindrance for deliberative discourse, this paper draws on empirical data which had been collected from posts and comments on Facebook pages during the political turmoil in Bangkok in 2011.

THE PATH TOWARDS UNCERTAINTY & DISSONANCE

In a Web 1.0 world, the internet was mainly associated with either professional or educational use or rudimentary entertainment which only offered limited interactivity in communication. Back in the early-1990s, mobile phones played the major role in technologically mediated interaction for the urban middle class’ everyday life due to Bangkok’s traffic congestion. People spend hours in their cars and mobile phones were necessary to call clients to apologize for late arrivals at appointments, to call home about the evening meals, and chatting with friends as a simple way to overcome the boredom of being stuck in traffic. What appears to be rather profane was to give the middle class a sort of first mover advantage in adopting their lifestyle to the information age.

As Ockey (1992) notes, the popularity of mobile phones not only triggered a fierce competition in the telecommunication sector over the new symbol of prestige and middle class status as people wanted to keep up with their neighbors, it also provided new opportunities of horizontal communication to subvert and bypass the state censor. During the pro-democracy protests 1992, and while the military government sought to tighten its grip on television and press reports to prevent pro-democracy protest, owners of mobile phones, middle class journalists and academics had the opportunity to represent the events unfiltered. (Ockey 1992)

Similarly casual, the use of Facebook started out with keeping circles of friends and acquaintances up to date by posting leisure and consumption related pictures, commenting such content in return, or to indulge in social gaming within the network. But this was to change with the rising tensions in Bangkok when the Red Shirt protest turned into a violent clash between demonstrators and Thai security forces and when eyewitness reports leaked from the battlegrounds around Democracy Monument and the Khaosan road, a tourist hotspot in Bangkok’s historical city center, to online video portals, personal blog websites, and sections of foreign news outlets that provide space for user-generated content. While television, controlled by the government and military, still broadcasted trivia and entertainment, mobile devices recorded pictures and videos which were online and accessible in almost real time or with a delay of a couple of hours. Shaking pictures showed protestors clashing with security forces, dubbed by gunfire and explosions, panicking crowds suspecting army snipers on rooftops, and the remainders of live bullets which were still denied by government spokes persons in the days following the clashes in April 2010.
Every peak of the escalation until the final crackdown on the protesters was accompanied by a wave of pictures and videos for which Facebook served as a hub of reposting and provided an arena for heated discussions about what was happening as street politics took its course. Moreover, there emerged the awareness about a strong dissonance with what had been reported on mainstream media. One informant reported on his status update during the night of 10th of April, “there are people shooting outside, but television keeps broadcasting soap operas and game shows.”

As the conflict continued over the weeks, the feeling of dissonance developed into suspicion against the Thai media machine itself and that “there is no way to stop news spreading via the internet these days.” Other factions, even suspected a conspiracy of foreign media and a bias against the Thai authorities, as posted by one informant: “Dear foreign folks, please be careful when you get information about the situation in Bangkok. If you want to know what is really happening, ask me via Facebook or any other electronic channel. Thanks!”

In addition to these kinds of comments, users also provided hyperlinks pictures and videos to support their points and which were difficult to locate on the vast space of internet contents. These evidences then spread virally among circles of similar affiliations and discussion mushroomed. Amongst others there were groups condemning the Red Shirt protesters (423 groups), affiliating with the Thai monarchy (144 groups), endorsing the protests (122 groups), supporting the actions taken by the government (77 groups), and condemning the use of force against the protestors (74 groups). (Media Monitor 2010)

What had emerged was a competition over different versions of reality, based on the interpretation of “facts” seen on the internet and denial of the other side’s evidences. For the understanding of the themes and patterns that began to emerge within the discourse, we will sketch the emergence of the Thai middle class on an historical timeline and introduce the concept of dominant theme of Thainess as a result of the Thai national education system.

FROM HETEROGENEITY TO PARTICIPATION

Looking at explanations of class formation, Ockey (2001) examines two main explanatory approaches within the literature: the structural and historical. Structural approaches explain the emergence of class based on specific socio-demographic criteria such as education, status, relations of production, or in the case of analysis of the participants in the 1992 pro-democracy demonstrations, their levels of income. (Ockey 2001)

Following this structural approach, Anusorn et al (2001) identify five distinct societal groups while conducting a survey on the characteristics of the middle class in Bangkok. First, a capitalist class consisting of large scales employers of 500 of more employees and/or investors of a minimum of 50,000,000 THB in entrepreneurial ventures. Second, a new middle class made up of professionals and managerial staff that comprises high level white collar workers, business persons, and social service workers. Third, the old middle class made up of petty bourgeoisie that includes merchants, small scale business owners, and small family business owners. Fourth, a marginal middle class of clerical workers, low level white collar, semi- or associate professionals, and employers in small enterprises. Finally, a working class of wage workers, employees in small enterprises, and farmers. What becomes apparent here is that the Thai middle class is by far no homogenous group but made up of the individuals who have similar interests and lifestyle or who share the same core value as will be discussed later in this article. (Anusorn et al, 2001)

The historical approach, as exemplified by Thomson (1968), focuses on the way in which a class creates itself historically and examines the circumstances that cause it to coalesce into a coherent and conscious group. This historical approach has been applied to the middle class by Frykman & Lofgren (1987). According to the historical approach, the middle-class constructs a distinct lifestyle to set itself apart from both the aristocracy and the lower class. They identify that lifestyle with particular attitudes and characteristics that they believe only they properly value. The middle class then claims superiority for its lifestyle and may attempt to impose that lifestyle on other classes within society. (Frykman & Lofgren 1987, Thomson 1968)
For the case of Thailand, as the middle class expanded rapidly in the late 1950s and the 1960s a new set of attitudes and a new lifestyle had to be constructed to incorporate new and heterogenous members. The understanding of this lifestyle requires an examination of the distinguishing characteristics of the regime of the time. The Sarit regime (1957-63) was the first government since the transformation from absolute monarchy in 1932 that did not seek legitimacy through an appeal to democracy. Instead, it appealed to development, to security, and to the monarchy. Each of these would have an impact on the formation of the middle class lifestyle. Since the student revolution of 1973, the role of the middle class in Thailand has changed significantly. Before the pro-democracy riots of 1992, the Thai middle class saw itself as an extra-parliamentary force whose major role was criticizing and challenging the established system. After 1992, middle-class citizens took more direct political action by becoming members of the upper and lower house of the Parliament. After the establishment of the 1997 Constitution, they became involved in policy formation as well as the legislative process. A major shift that underlies the current political conflict in Thailand emerged when Thaksin, originally elevated by the middle class, began to base the legitimacy of his government on the demands of Thailand’s rural north and northeast. (Anderson 1977, Chang Noi 2009, Pasuk 2007)

Askew (2002) adds a more psychological level to the class consciousness in Thailand that reaches beyond the institutional march. He notes that middle class shares a number of core values which include an emphasis on the importance of education, the individual and that of the children, social respectability that includes appropriate public behavior, particularly in social intercourse, continuous self-improvement, and a concern for a safe, secure and orderly environment for their families; which makes the home a key symbol and space. As middle class, they think and behave differently. They are more open-minded, more concerned about their children’s future, more influenced by abstract values than traditional mores. In addition, Nidhi (2009) offers an authoritarian interpretation of the consciousness of the Thai middle class which is a belief in hierarchy, enshrinement of the concept of peace and order, trust and reliance on autocratic government, internationalism, the primacy of the economy, technocratic trust that technology solves any kind of problems, and homogeneity by nationalism. The middle class also is visible as consumers, able to purchase cars, televisions, numerous household appliances and new high tech consumer gadgets. These kinds of characteristics, promoted consumerism and other middle class values but were also channels to mediate ideological messages. (Askew 2002, Nidhi 2009)

THE SIMULACRUM OF THAINESS: THE THAI NATION IS GOOD.

As will become apparent in the analysis of the discourse of Facebook during the troubled weeks in 2011, the ideological concept of Thainess is still embedded in the thoughts and consciousness and behavior and expression of the urban middle class in the virtual space. The ideology of Thainess which is received from and transported by the educational system and forms the core values as described above. While middle class emphasizes the importance of education as the means for status mobilization, the state, mainly by the Ministry of Education, uses the educational system to transport the concept of Thai nation-state into the Thai language reading materials which is the foundation of mainstream education. The definition of Thainess emerges within the context for the centralized political structure and becomes the basis of the ideology to establish legitimacy for the centralized political regime and the hierarchical social structure. (Nuchjaree 2008, Saichol 2005)

For the understanding of the ways used by the state to inject the concept of Thainess via the educational system, a look at Thai reading material for elementary school students enables us see to how story-telling is employed to form identification with the Thai nation. The curriculum that was used by the ministry of education between 1978 and 1990 for grades 1 to 6, which comprises students between 8 and 12 years of age, transports a simple but clear message about the community of Thais: Thailand is good.

The plot and characters of the material mirrors the age and stages of development as the students grow up during their elementary education as they begin to be aware of their social community and what is being perceived to be prudent in a Thai society. A girl named Manee, one of the main characters of the story that develops throughout the six years of elementary education, learns in her daily life what it means to be a good Thai person. As a good Thai student, she enshrines the three pillars of Thai society, which are the love
Goods students are supposed to maintain Thai traditions which include respect to authorities like parents and teachers. Moreover, the student uses gentle and polite speech, knows the Boonkoon – the appreciation of kindness after one got the good treat from somebody - and the way to endure disappointment systematic and patiently. Money is something to be saved and the merit of the community has to be well considered when it comes to spending. Individual action is supposed to be brave and honest and a practice, aimed at the welfare of Thai society. As Askew (2002) has pointed out, these values have been gradually absorbed into the consciousness of the Thai middle class and suggest a significant stake in building and maintaining the Thai nation. (Askew 2002, Department of Curriculum and Instruction Development 1992)

According to the curriculum, Thainess makes the Thai nation good and although Thailand is confronted with problems, it remains superior to other nations because of the incorporation of the Buddhist concept of metta, loving-kindness as promoted in Theravada Buddhism, causes people in different social classes to behave kindly and generously toward each other and Thais live in unity with the king as a worldly spiritual center. Moreover, Thainess helps to prevent severe conflicts and exploitation within Thai society because Buddhism made Thais patient and enduring and the Thai king was the focus of people’s loyalty, which made him the center of harmony for the whole nation. Therefore Thainess could make people live together with conciliation in society. Furthermore, Thai-style governance, based on a patronage system, protects Thais to live more peacefully than other nations, and protected Thai people from the shackles of colonialism and helped to prosper and to grow as a nation. (Saichol 2005, Nidhi 2009)

As Saichol (2005) argues, the narrowness of the mainstream thought on Thainess leads to questioning whether the Thainess that they are aware of can keep up with reality. Explanations of social problems in the framework of mainstream Thainess are often too inconsistent to result in an understanding of issues at hand and they are often insufficient to finding appropriate solutions. At the same time, various experiences that have happened since the late-1960s, such as the conflict between nation state and communism, do not correspond to mainstream Thainess to an extent that they raise questions as to whether many characteristics of “Thainess” are real. For instance: “Thailand is good” and Thai Society is characterized by the reconciliation as could be find in Thai reading materials, are the concepts that overlooked the truth that actual happened in Thai society, the farmers’ conflict for instant, by that time. (Nuchjaree 2008)

Unsurprisingly, the generation of students who grew up being exposed to the curriculum internalized the concept of Thainess into their worldview and value system, and react to Manee and her playmates with nostalgia for the cultural utopia which had repetitively been challenged, and for many also threatened, by the actual real politc in Thailand. This sentiment surfaced during the time of the crackdown Thailand’s UDD that was preceded by tense weeks of stand-off between the Thai government and the protesters. As one informant posted in a Facebook status update to implicitly deny the protestors the right to draw on the three pillars of identity indicate, Thainess began to serve the prudent standard to discriminate between the out-group of the supposedly rural uneducated masses laying siege to the icons of Thai consumerism and the prudent Thai middle class with moral superiority as the common bond. The image of the protestors as terrorists to the Thai nation, as it was reinforced by the Thai media, also to over the discourse of Facebook. As another informant noted in a call for decisive action of the security forces, “I encourage the government to get rid of the terrorists, but, please do protect the people and the protestor demonstrators.” Among the authoritarian camp of the informant one noted, that “the only way to stop those terrorists who are destroying our country is to get rid of them, once and for all!” Additionally, in some cases, the monarchy served as a point of reference to stop the turmoil: “Princess Chulaporn said that this King is tired after he was working so hard for this country. We should learn from his example, join hands, and serve our nation as good as we can, when our nation needs us. Long live the King.”
TOWARDS A NEW PUBLIC SPHERE?

The launch of Facebook in 2004 took peer-to-peer communication to another level, whereas mobile phones added the dimension of immediate feedback to the communication setting. The social media in so far distinct as the objects of communication are the at same time subjects of interactive communication. This results in what Castells (2009) conceptualizes as the ‘creative audience’, an audience, though, still limited by the digital divide among age groups, that engages in a variety of modes of communication and is empowered to participate in peer-to-peer communication that allows for remixing messages individualized by one’s own identity, values and projects enabling horizontal modes in the creation of meaning. The usage of mass self-communication happens on behalf of the time budgets formerly allocated to traditional media programs. (Castells 2009)

In the case of social networking sites like Facebook, users can create a personal profile pages that they fill with content of other online media, they add other users to their friend lists and enable them to take part in their thoughts and daily lives and they exchange messages privately within an internal messaging system or publicly as comments on their profile pages. Users with similar interest can connect as they cluster in user groups around share interests and life projects and, by exploiting vast data bases, Facebook suggests additions to friend lists based on workplaces, schools and college, and other shared characteristics. The company itself claims more than 750,000,000 active users worldwide of which, by the time of writing, 9,275,000 are located in Thailand and which grew by about 370 % since the outset of the 2010 protest. (Facebook Ad Targeting Tool) However, to afford this communication of service, as Ubonrat (2011) reminds us, the users need a certain spending power to purchase devices like laptop computers, smart phones and the like to access internet. This seems to restrict the use of Facebook primarily to the urban middle class of Bangkok metropolitan area, which is can afford to purchase internet enables devices, and have acquired the necessary level of computer literacy by their educational training and professional practices. (Chuwat 2011)

To become a member of the Facebook platform, users have to register with the social-networking site and create their own profile page. The profile page is then used to communicate to and interact with the network of contacts in which the user is embedded, the one that the owner use to communicate with others. This communication is based on status updates ranging from expressing current moods and random thoughts on events, sharing of pictures of various leisure activities, posting of links to video clips or other websites, and the publishing of notes as a diary-like feature. Upon log-in to the account, the user is directed to a second page titled “home”. On this page, RSS technology lists a torrent of the aforementioned activities of other users from the Facebook database in a chronological order to provide an update about activities within the personal network which then allows for interaction and response to what is happening. In particular, this feature allowed to follow the informants during the time of political unrest as it allow the younger generation of the Thai middle class to rebroadcast the news they had consumed online, to exchange information about the situation in the areas that were affected by the protests, and to keep track of events as the information were brought to them on their electronic devices that could connect to Facebook.

But how does Facebook foster connections with ones in-group? Given the common privacy settings, interactions across profiles are visible to second-tier contacts which allows for extension of the network upon request, e.g. users may recognize by their names and share contacts that they had been classmates or just link up because they appreciated the contribution of one another within an interaction of a third persons profile page. To identify particularity and similarity, Facebook offers a further section which is titled ‘info’ and which contains background information ranging from current location and hometown, a brief description of one’s persona, education and work places, philosophical and political affiliation, to preferred arts, entertainment, activities, interests and contact details.

These information have been conceptualized by Bourdieu (1992) as a form of “capital” which he distinguished into four different types: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic. The idea of capital, as it had been adopted from the field of Economics, also applies to the social sphere. Cultural capital represents a variety of legitimate knowledge, qualities of a personality that enable a higher status in society. Social capital expresses the value of social relationships between individuals, i.e. group membership, relationships,
networks of influence and support. Symbolic capital represents honor, prestige, and appreciation by others. The sum of these capitals which make up “wealth” or “poverty” that Bourdieu had coined “habitus”. Habitus describes “mental, or cognitive structures” through which people deal with the social world. Bourdieu recognized that people are endowed with a series of internalized schemata through which they perceive, understand, appreciate, and evaluate their social world. It is through such schemata that people both produce, and perceive and evaluate their practices.

Looking at the ‘info’ section of key informants’, we found congruence in their attitudes amongst each other, their lifestyle, and their socio-demographic background. It appears that, the social network reproduced and expanded itself as a network of mutual and similar friends of which the main variables were current or former educational institution as well as workplaces. Users tended to accept the friend request, if the requestor is a part of his or her extended, a cue which becomes visible by the suggestion of “mutual friends” based on information that are stored in Facebook’s database, or simply by the visibility of interactions of others. Before accepting a friend request, users tend to consider a basic set of information provided on the ‘info’ section of the requestor’s and to evaluate the degree of similarity in habitus. Once this barrier has been overcome, the direct connection between users allow for the reading and interaction by commenting on updates and postings. These interactions turned out to involve the political realm on several levels.

First, is the expression of one’s own political standpoints on the situation during the conflict between red shirt protesters and the Thai government forces as one informant cheerlead the government as he posted, “I encourage our prime minister and the military to take action against the reds to restore order!” while others blatantly aired their disgust, writing about the “Word of the day: Red Shi(ri)t in the streets of Bangkok”. Others simply were seeking relief by dissociating themselves from the protestors, noting: “Before I get to bed, I want to make sure that all of you know my standpoint: I am no red shirt, again, I am not pro-red!” Over the weeks sentiments turned more radical as some observers of the conflict became frustrated over the standoff between the security forces and demonstrators, which also found its expression in the status update: “Another disappointed night before I get to bed. I am not asking for the use of violence, but, the government should urgently take a brave decision and act decisively to bring forth a solution that takes our society back to normal.” Others acted as casual political analysts of the red shirts disruptive strategies, evaluators of moral and intellectual superiority, or mourning the legal double standards that were applied to the reactionary People’s Alliance for Democracy that disrupted everyday life in Bangkok just two years before.

Second, comments and status updates helped to assess the situation in the streets of Bangkok as well as this would impact everyday life. Not only did reports about blocked traffic and limited public transports, also “no-entry areas”, news about casualties among protestors and security forces spread rapidly.

Most remarkably, Facebook also served to mobilize real-life gatherings of a group which considered themselves as “multi-colored shirts” to express their rejection of any political camp that was involved in the conflict. Ironically, their leader, Dr. Tul Sittisomwong had been involved in the protest of the royalist People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD or “yellow shirts”) that saw the siege on government house and the blocking of Bangkok’s airports and which lead to the dissolution of the elected government of the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party (PPP) just two years earlier. It has been debated whether or not the numbers of participants, as presented by the Thai mainstream media, hold true. Another Facebook group titled “Bangkok Restoration” gathered on 23 May 2010 for joint “Bangkok clean up day – together we can” with other Facebook groups to clear the remainders after the crackdown on the red shirt protest to bring the city back to normal. (NNT Online 2010)

CONCLUSION

During the political unrest between March and May 2010, social media has taken an increasingly important role in communication and challenging the conventional means of news consumption of the urban middle class by its characteristics, fast, accurate and it can be cross-checked from other sources. Along with growing access to information technology, the number of new media users has increased but it remains questionable
whether the freedom provided by social media can help to overcome the class consciousness. Given the cues that are accessible on social networking sites like Facebook, we found that users can not strip off the features that distinguish characteristics of class membership and lead to the reproduction of respective social networks. Hence, individuals that populate social network appear to remain only hypothetically equal.

Even though Facebook is hypothetically equal, in the real world especially during the uncertainty situation in 2010, the urban middle class used social media as a virtual sphere to express and reproduce a discourse that resulted from the consciousness of being Thai that seems to be internalized by many years within the national education system. Features like comments, status updates, notes, and groups in Facebook were used as spheres to endorse and reproduce the political attitude which is already in line with the account owners’ opinion and based on a relatively homogenous habitus of Thailand’s urban middle class. Even though the urban middle class gained freedom of expression as provided by new social media, it appears that their class consciousness remains strong. During a transitional period with a focus on political issues, Facebook in Thailand seems to remain a tool for the urban middle class that enables a discourse among their peers, and that does not go beyond but reproduces traditional conceptions of Thainess.

REFERENCES
Anusorn Limmanee, et.al., The survey of middle classes in Bangkok. A report submitted to the program for Southeast Asia Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei. Bangkok: Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences, Chulalongkorn University, 1999.


Big Cleaning Day at Ratchaprasong lively” NNT Online, accessed 8/8/2011

QUALITY OF LIFE OF RURAL NATIVE COMMUNITY: AN UNDERSTANDING USING PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

Novel Lyndon, Sivapalan, S. and Mohd. Yusof, H
School of Social, Development and Environmental Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Selangor
novellyndon@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The ineffectiveness of a development program in increasing the quality of life of an indigenous community is often linked to the attitude of the planners who fail to understand the needs and life aspirations of the target group as well as the realities of their social world. Therefore, the objective of this study is to understand the world-view of the Bidayuh community about quality of life. This research has drawn on the phenomenological approach utilising abductive logic based on idealist ontology and constructionist epistemology. This study was conducted in the Serian District, Sarawak which is one of the four districts under the administration of Samarahan Division. The size of the sample for this study was achieved through the continuous support toward measurement or the criteria on theoretical saturation. Data in this study was collected using the technique of in-depth interview and informal group discussion. The themes of capability, participation and empowerment are the themes that became the main choice of the suburban Bidayuh community. However, the themes of residence, income, money and savings, employment, infrastructure and public services, customary land and land grant and accessibility to agricultural produce market are the themes that became the main choice of the rural Bidayuh community. The findings also showed that even though the position of the categories of quality of life based on world-view between the respondents who live in the suburban and rural areas differ, the respondents’ interpretation of each theme contained in those categories are almost similar. Suggestions for further action are addressed to the development agencies, development planners and policy makers so as to give more emphasis on the bottom-up approach in designing or planning any community development programmes.

Keywords: Native Community, Phenomenological Approach, Quality of Life

INTRODUCTION

Previous research clearly shows that the ineffectiveness of a development programme to improve the quality of life of the rural community is often associated with the attitude of the planners who fail to understand the life’s needs and aspirations of the target group as well as the world realities of their social lives (Shamsul, 1977; Katzner, 1979; Fishers, 1998; Horowitz, 1998; Sen, 1999; Van Wicklin, 2001). In addition, the objectives of a development plan typically highlights two things. First, the planners are also the economists or those who have received training in the field of economics, and second is the tendency toward the approach to Rostow Theory, that is the changes from the traditional to modernisation, which is characteristically unilinear without taking into consideration its suitability to a community particularly from the socio-cultural aspect and acceptance toward modernism (Myrdal, 1970; Shamsul, 1977; Sanjaya et al., 2005). The main focus of development programmes is the economic development plan that only prioritises economic growth dan social changes as a measure of successful developments (Shamsul, 1977; Sen, 1993). This situation further led to the development programmes that are planned by the government to improve the quality of life of the community which often experiencing failures (Ngidang & Abdul, 1999; Ngidang, 2002). As the result, the rural
Community has been portrayed by Western orientalists as a community that has cultural values of laziness, hard to change, not highly ambitious, submissive to fate, and has traditional characteristics that are considered an impediment to the development (Grijpstra, 1971; Abdul Rashid, 1990; Walker, 1998; Minos, 2000; Madeline, 2004). However, this depiction in actuality can be disputed.

Research by economists, anthropologists, social psychologists and sociologists regarding the concept of quality of life often uses different orientations and concepts. Sociological and anthropological studies focused on developmental construct methodology based on conflict and balance oriented models in order to look at the concept of the quality of life, while economic studies emphasized economic growth and social change based on Rostow’s construct methodology, Stages of Economic Growth. Social psychology studies placed emphasis on the cognitive and emotional aspects to discuss the concept of the quality of life by using the free will environment which is an environment where social actors are determined to be free from poverty. This paper seeks to understand the meaning of the quality of life of the rural Bidayuh community based on ontological interpretation where the social actors define their realities under the social environment and practical barriers faced by them in their daily lives.

METHODOLOGY

Description of Study Area
This study was conducted in the district of Serian, which comprises of 261 kampungs or villages. Serian District is under the administration of Samarahan Division and administered by a Resident after Samarahan was officially designated as a Division on 1st January 1987 (Sarawak, 2004). Each district is administered by a District Officer. Meanwhile, Sub Districts are governed by the Administrative Officer (Pejabat Residen Samarahan, 2009; Unit Pentadbiran, Jabatan Ketua Menteri, 2010) Serian District is located about 64 kilometres south of Kuching City and has several sub-districts within it, one of it is the sub-district Tebedu which is the Main Gateway (International Border Crossing) for Malaysia/Indonesia (Sarawak, 2004). The District of Serian covers an area of 2,040 sq km consisting of 13 zones with a total population of 80,061, of which 40,085 (50.06%) are males and 39,976 (49.9%) are females (Sarawak, 2004). Out of this, only six zones are the Bidayuh areas, namely Tebedu, Ampungan, Amo, Tebakang, Kedup and Bukar. The study area for this research covers two zones or sub-districts, which are Tebedu and Kedup where the poverty programme was carried out.

Research Design
Phenomenological approach was used in this study. This is because the phenomenological approach suggests that, understanding the reality of life of the social actors should be through the subjective experience of the social actors that includes their views, conscience, and the attitude toward their world and themselves and not influenced by the modernization process taking place in their social environment (Blaikie, 2000; Bhaskar, 1979; Giddens, 1976). Consequently, social researchers should make interpretations of the observed reality since the social actors and social researchers are bound to each other when making interpretations. The in-depth interviews with all the informants had been conducted in Bidayuh language. Respondents in this study were identified using non-probability sampling, with a combination of judgmental or purposive sampling, snowball sampling and theoretical sampling. The data had reached saturation after 30 interviews. Data saturation is referred to as a point where the information one gets from the interviews becomes redundant (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). The interview process was a learning process thus, the topic discussed developed as the interviews progressed. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct a second round of interviews particularly with those who were interviewed in the early stages. The number of second-round interviews was determined based on the point when theoretical saturation was reached. A total of 50 respondents took part in this study.

Data Collection and Timing
Data were gathered using in-depth interviews within the period of four months. The in-depth interviews in this study involved conversations between two parties namely between the researcher and the respondents.
with one specific aim which is to understand the quality of life from the view of the Bidayuh community. These interviews between the researcher and the respondents focused on quality of life, daily life, their perception about life and the Bidayuh’s understanding of quality of life based on their own experiences. Most of the interviews conducted took two to three hours and there were also some interviews which took longer time. All the interviews were transcribed and formatted for inclusion into the Nvivo database and were used to create categories for data indexing. Second stage interviews were also conducted with the purpose of testing intensively the categories that had been identified during the early stages of the interviews. In addition, it was also aimed in reviewing the validity of the categories that were produced in the interviews.

Data Analysis
There are five chains of activity that were carried out by the researcher during the data analysis process. They are as following: i) interviews that was recorded with each respondent will be copied and translated into transcript format; ii) before these transcripts are written or produced, the researcher will listen to the interviews that have been recorded at least twice to ensure no interviews have been omitted or neglected; iii) as soon as the transcription process is completed, each transcript or text will later be reviewed or given reconsideration and rearranged to reflect a brief description of the Bidayuh community’s quality of life; iv) the data are later saved in files using different names; v) a few jargons in Bidayuh language used by the Bidayuh community in their daily lives when making descriptions or narratives about the quality of life are maintained in original words; and finally vi) the next step that is considered very important in this study is managing the data through the categorisation process. In the process, the researcher will develop a matric table as a way to tabulate the results into a style or way that is more structured and organised. By using themes derived from the continuous comparative analysis, the researcher next tabulates specific excerpts based on the line numbers that appear in the scripts.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY AND DISCUSSION

The rural Bidayuh community’s interpretation about quality of life predominantly put across issues about basic needs and accessibility to infrastructure facilities in their environment. This matter is parallel with comments given by a few scholars such as Azahan (2007), Anuwar (2002), Abdul Kadir (2010) and Abdul Rahman (2005) who mentioned that the view of rural communities about quality of life is often influenced by self-readiness, rural development support system, rural environment, infrastructure, and accessibility to the environment that is provided in the rural area. Accordingly, the meaning of quality of life that is stated by the respondents in this study is not only a measure of the existing environment, but also assesses the aspects of their self-readiness and accessibility to the environment provided by the rural surroundings. Table 1 shows the ranking of the 23 themes that have been interpreted by the rural Bidayuh community as their view about quality of life. Based on the table, the themes of residence or house, income, money and savings, employment, infrastructure and public services, customary land and land grant and accessibility to agricultural produce market are the themes that have become the main choices of the rural Bidayuh community.

Table 1: Arrangement of the Ranking of Quality of Life Themes of the Rural Bidayuh Community According to Main Choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Interpretation of quality of life themes of the Bidayuh community in the rural areas</th>
<th>The total of respondents who made the choice on the themes (n=50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Residence/House</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Income, money and savings</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Infrastructure and public services</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Customary land and land grant</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All these themes on quality of life of the rural Bidayuh community’s view can be broken into seven main categories as presented in Figure 1 namely: i) security and stability; ii) community, resources and environment; iii) physical and psychological well-being; iv) family relationship; v) participation; vi) potential; and vi) empowerment. These seven categories were determined by two main factors which are importance and enjoyment of life. These categories are interconnected with each other. Therefore, the findings of this research is a bit different from the results of previous local studies carried out by Madeline (2004), Gusni (2003), Gusni and Kasim (2006), Abdul Malek (1996), Asnarulkhadi (1996) and Mohd Yusof (1990) who concluded that aspects of income and assets are the main measure of quality of life and social stratification of the indigenous communities in the rural areas. This is because the meaning of quality of life that is understood by the rural Bidayuh community is more representative of their view and involves aspects such as residence, income, infrastructure, land, accessibility, health, education, family relationship as well as relationship between the community members. As noted by Azahan (2007), the meaning of quality of life is not the measure of the existing environment, but also evaluates aspects of self readiness of the rural community and accessibility to the environment provided in the rural areas and also the view of the community about quality of life. Meanwhile, Higgs (2006) in his study on perception of quality of life of the South African community in the rural areas found that aspects of physical or psychological needs are the main needs of the rural community. The same opinion is expressed by Easterlin (2001) who concluded that aspects of income and financial situation as well as physical and psychological needs are the key indicators of the rural community’s quality of life in several developing countries. In the meantime, Diener and Lucas (2000), Ravallion (2001) and Milanovic (2002) in their studies found that communities who live in the rural areas are more inclined to choose objective well-being such as material aspects and basic facilities as the main indicator in determining their quality of life.

The findings obtained by Katiman and Abd. Hamid (1996) on the development of the poorest people in Kuala Terengganu are quite consistent with the results of this study. This is because the results of their study found that even though there exists a rapid process of development in the rural areas such as land development through the opening of oil palm plantations and construction of factories, but quality of life indicators such as residence, income, employment, land, education, security, food, infrastructure and public services, relationship with community members and local administration and the government still remains as the main choice. Research conducted by Narayan et al. (2000) on the voice of the poor involving twenty three countries comprising of countries in the Middle East, South East Asia, West Asia, latin America, East Europe...
and the Caribbean particularly in the rural areas is also consistent with this research. Their research findings found that the view and perception of the rural communities in those countries about the quality of life are more inclined to indicators that are associated with material well-being such as food security, assets and employment and give less emphasis on issues which are subjective in nature such as freedom of speech, freedom to have access to education and skills, freedom of movement, principles of justice, integrity and human rights. This is because shortage of food supply, shortage of resources namely land for the purpose of agriculture and financial problems to meet the needs of the family members have been identified as the major problem that continuously haunts their quality of life.

This situation clearly shows that economic development through the process of modernisation is not the only condition sufficient to reduce poverty or improve the quality of life of the rural community. This is because economic development through the process of dualism is not necessarily able to reflect the existence of equitable resource distribution between the urban and rural areas, freedom from oppression, exploitation or even equal participation in the economic and political aspects (Esteva, 1985; Rahimah, 1989; Zell, 2007).

Giddens in his theory of structuration states that this situation emerges because of the existence of conflict between the social practice that is understood from two different angles which is from the angle of the view of the social actors (micro structure) and from the angle of the view of the social institution (macro structure) (Giddens, 1984). Meanwhile, important aspects in measuring development like development for whom, the purpose of the community development, the form and content of community development, the method and strategy of community development are often disregarded or left behind. The interests of investors, financiers and view of the policy makers in the macro level structure are the ones prioritised.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security and Stability</th>
<th>Residence/House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income, money and savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customary land and land grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accessibility toward agricultural product market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of Debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material to go through life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community, Resource and Environment</td>
<td>Infrastructure and public service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship with community members, neighbours and friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local administration and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical dan Psychological Well-being</td>
<td>Spiritual, religious practice and moral being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hope and aspirations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relationship</td>
<td>Relationship with parents/parents-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship with siblings and relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship between children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husband and wife relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life at an older age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential</td>
<td>Achievement in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goals and mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery of public service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Inner empowerment/strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional empowerment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Ranking of the Categories and Themes of Quality of Life of the View of the Bidayuh Community Living in the Rural Area
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

There are 23 types of themes and seven categories of interpretations of the rural Bidayuh community about quality of life. In terms of the ranking of the themes, residence, income, money and savings, employment, infrastructure and public services, customary land and land grants and accessibility to agricultural produce market are the themes that are the main choice of the rural Bidayuh community. This situation clearly shows that the view of the rural Bidayuh community about quality of life is constructed based on the nature of their social world life such as the world of common sense, the world of everyday life, the world of daily work and common realities that have been embedded for so long in their daily lives. In other words, the view of the Bidayuh community about quality of life in this study does not only depend on will alone, and is not only limited in terms of material or physical needs but also involves other needs that are subjective in nature such as cognitive, sociological and psychological. In addition, it is also closely related with helplessness or inability as well as links economic indicators with the social and environmental aspects. The implication of this research is that policy makers should give priority to the bottom up approach in the implementation of the development programme that is by taking into consideration the needs of the local community, the local culture and knowledge system itself. Future research should focus on the relationship between the view of the quality of life that is conceptualised by the policy makers with the world-view of the quality of life constructed in the structure of the local community level.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


FRAMING OF HIV/AIDS AND SOCIAL MARKETING PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIAN MAINSTREAM NEWSPAPERS

Tham Jen Sern and Hasmah Zanuddin
Department of Media Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
jason87_tham@yahoo.co.uk / hasmahmedia@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The role of media is an essential vehicle in the interpretation of epidemics and in shaping people’s opinions, behaviors and notions on an issue or event. To date, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) are no longer considered as health problems, but a development issue all over the world. In addition to their purpose of alerting the public of the epidemic and its prevention, media practitioners “make up” the related news in a different way in order to shape people’s notion of social phenomenon. Hence, media framing is a quintessential means in addressing the epidemic.

The primary focus of this study was to analyze how the mainstream media frame the HIV/AIDS-related news and social marketing program in selected Malaysian mainstream newspapers namely Utusan Malaysia, The Star and Sin Chew Daily for a period of six months. This study employed content analysis of the way HIV/AIDS news articles and social marketing programs were framed. The study found that HIV/AIDS was framed more than just a public health issue.

Keywords: HIV/AIDS, Media Framing, Social Marketing, Newspapers

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The December 2011 marks 25th anniversary of the outbreak of HIV/AIDS in Malaysia since first case of the epidemic recorded in December 1986. For the past 25 years, there were 12,943 people die due to the epidemic per se. As of today, there is still no any vaccination to cure this epidemic. To date, in accordance with the statistic from Ministry of Health, there were 91,362 HIV cases have been recorded in this region since 1986. Base on the premise, if there were no prudent strategy implemented efficacious by respective party in tackling the uniform growth of HIV infection, this figure prone to increase to 300,000 cases in 2015. (Utusan Malaysia, 2011, May 10)

Most agree that the role of media is an essential inevitability vehicle in the interpretation of epidemics and shaping people’s opinion, behavior and notion on an issue or event. Consequently, in regards to give a better notion about HIV/AIDS-related issues among general population, media have been instrumental in creating public awareness about HIV/AIDS by “dressing up” the related news in a specific theme in order to shape people’s sense of the social phenomenon. In fact, putting media obligation beyond solely reporting an issue or event towards its audiences is imperative in terms of responsible in educating and circulating accurate yet adequate information on HIV/AIDS to the public. (Naga Mallika & Rakesh S. Katare, 2004)

There is a possibility, indeed, people who stand next to us might have HIV/AIDS, and it is difficult for us to identify it solely through our eyes. Hence, sufficient information provision through media vehicles is rather making sense for public to have a great ideal of HIV/AIDS-related issues in terms of social marketing programmes on HIV/AIDS. True, the notion of social marketing is fairly new among the general population, yet it is at the threshold of a new era in health domain. Most of the people might have some ideal of commercial marketing, but they might not know much of the social marketing concept especially in addressing HIV/AIDS-related issues. In a manner of speaking, social marketing is explicitly different from
the traditional marketing as it “sells” behaviour rather than tangible products to the target consumers (Kotler, P. et al., 2002). Thus, examining media framing in terms of HIV/AIDS news and social marketing programmes with regard to the epidemic is sort of quintessential, notably on rein in the epidemic per se.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of framing was abundantly explained by saying that process of framing involves selection and salience. This process, in short, means to select some aspects, events, or issues that perceived vital to the community and make them salient in a communicating text. By doing such way, the issue or event can promote and unravel, for instance a prominence problem definition and/or treatment recommendation. (Entman, 1993) Actually, framing is not a fairly new concept for media practitioners. They use the function commonly whenever they need to get their views across to the audiences. As mentioned above, framing is a process and this process has several locations in communication process. (Entman, 1993 & Claes H. de Vreese, 2005) That consists of communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture.

It is plausible that communicator selects certain issue accordance to their needs and considered essential as dew to the community. The issue, further, will be framed in specific theme in addition to make it more salience to the public. That issue, indeed, will be covering in communicating text which indicates certain keywords, sentences, images, source of information, etc, thereby presence the issue more salience. Framing in the text, however, will induce receiver to think the issue and give an impact to the culture ultimately. (Entman, 1993) In short, no matter what it is, framing in all four locations has the same functions and objectives—selection and highlighting.

Regardless, agenda setting scholars intended to integrate agenda setting and framing into the school of thought because they deemed it is an extension of agenda setting. In the discipline of agenda setting, we do often hear the phrase media do not tell people what to think, but what to think about. (Stanley J. Baran and Dennis K. Davis, 2006) Against this background, it finds conflicting in agenda setting. (Amira Sariyati Firdaus, 2004) True, agenda setting divided into two levels. At the first level of agenda setting, it just involves the selection of an issue or event for public viewing, in particular for saliency purpose. However, it does not consider media influence on the public’s opinion. Hence, over the years, more researches have concentrated on second level agenda setting effects such as framing.

In the natural of agenda setting, media agenda, public agenda, and policy/government agenda are always intertwined in a peculiar relationship. Amira Sariyati Firdaus (2004) has well described in her paper of “Agenda setting theory: A comprehensive review” that for media agenda to influence other agendas, news coverage on certain issues must have high visibility, high audience salience and distinct valence. Wherefore, keeping an issue or event (in this context HIV/AIDS-related news) at the top of the news agenda is another key obligation of media to ascertain it. By achieving such responsibility, framing is the key concept of bulk of this paper. Nevertheless, Kim et al. (2002) argued that framing should be separated from agenda setting because it does not seem applicable to public opinion. (Quoted in Amira Sariyati Firdaus, 2004). Instead, framing influences how audiences think about issues, whereas agenda setting makes certain issues more salient. (Tong JingJing, 2006)

In sum, the effect of framing is unpredictable and might have a sustainable impact to an issue or event per se in any case. It is plausible that “packaging” an issue or event in terms of HIV/AIDS-related news to focus on certain themes or attributes prone to impact on the public’s opinion in perceiving the epidemic.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the above theoretical framework, this study is going to answer the following research questions:

1) What is the dominant frame of HIV/AIDS that has been covered by each selected newspaper and are they significantly different amongst the three newspapers?

2) Is there any significant relationship between the HIV/AIDS news framing and news positioning in the newspapers?
3) Which type of social marketing program on HIV/AIDS has been covered by the three newspapers and are they significant difference?

METHODOLOGY

This paper applied quantitative content analysis in identifying the news frames on reporting HIV/AIDS-related issues and scrutinizing the type of social marketing programmes in accordance with HIV/AIDS in print media. Three selected mainstream daily newspapers were selected based on their circulation. Utusan Malaysia is representing the Malay readers, while Sin Chew Daily is representing Chinese Mandarin readers. Both of them are broadsheet newspapers. However, The Star is focusing on English speakers and it is actually a “serious” newspaper.

The search period of this study was from 1st January 2011 until 30th June 2011. Throughout the six months period, 48 articles were identified in HIV/AIDS-related issues and social marketing programmes. Due to the limited of news coverage on HIV/AIDS-related issues and social marketing programmes for six months period, every two months of news coverage were collapsed. For example, full news for January and February were combined together; March and April were combined together; and May and June were combined together for data analysis.

University of Malaya Main Library and Za’ba Memorial Library provided three newspapers for this study purpose. The unit of analysis in this study is the news story. All the news items that content the keywords of “HIV”, “AIDS” or “Red ribbon icon” in all chosen newspapers were selected for study purpose. Coder (researcher) determined the units of analysis and recorded them into a standardised coding sheet. The instruction in choosing a unit of analysis which is the key element for content analysis and coding attributes had also been made clear by generating a coding book as guidance.

In addition to avoid subjectivity while categorizing and measuring the context units, inter-coder reliability test was conducted to ensure the high quality research outcome. Holsti (1969) percent agreement index was applied in this statistical procedure. The inter-coder reliability coefficient, ultimately, both .70 on average and for the all samples, which indicating satisfactory levels agreement reached by two coders.

FINDINGS

Table 1 shows the news distribution of the HIV/AIDS-related issues emphasized by the three mainstream newspapers. Overall, there were 48 HIV/AIDS-related news articles have been identified. The Star contributed the most HIV/AIDS news articles with total 22 units or 45.8% for the past six months. This followed by Sin Chew Daily (15 units or 31.3%) and Utusan Malaysia (11 units or 22.9%). Finding shows
that there is an inconsistent trend on HIV/AIDS coverage contributed by all selected newspapers throughout the six month periods. Finding shows that Utusan Malaysia reported three units or 27.3 percent HIV/AIDS stories for the months of January and February. That figure increased to five units or 27.8 percent for the months of March and April. However, the coverage declined to three units or 15.8 percent for the months of May and June. The Star newspaper presented quite consistent trend of its trend of reporting the HIV/AIDS news coverage throughout the six month periods. For the months of January and February, The Star covered six units or 54.5 percent HIV/AIDS news articles, and decreased a little in March and April with five units or 27.8 percent articles. Regardless, in May and June, the HIV/AIDS news stories in The Star increased significantly to 11 units or 57.9 percent. Sin Chew Daily only reported two units or 18.2 percent of HIV/AIDS-related issues for the months of January and February, and increased six units more (eight units or 44.4 percent) for the following two months, but it declined to five units or 26.3 percent in May and June.

Table 1: News Distribution of HIV/AIDS-related Articles by Three Selected Malaysian Mainstream Newspapers for January to June, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Coverage</th>
<th>Jan – Feb</th>
<th>March – April</th>
<th>May - June</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utusan Malaysia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Star</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin Chew Daily</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N= 48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dominant frame of HIV/AIDS

Of all the stories in the three mainstream newspapers, social frame which focuses on public responsibility and people’s concern about an issue, turned out to be a dominant frame in covering HIV/AIDS-related issues (see table 2(a)) in Utusan Malaysia with the mean rank of 26.45 if compared with other frames in the particular newspaper. Uniquely, The Star was the outstanding newspaper in addressing the HIV/AIDS news as both in health and religious perspectives with the mean rank of 24.77 and 25.09. Besides, with the mean rank of 25.20, Sin Chew Daily was the most salience newspaper framed the HIV/AIDS-related issues in government perspective which concerns new strategy or policy regarding the epidemic or patients in a national or global context. If we look at the frequency itself, (Table 2 (b)) The Star is the outstanding newspaper in reporting the HIV/AIDS stories as social perspective with overall 15 units or 68.2 percent contrary to 10 units or 66.7 percent in Sin Chew and eight units or 72.7 percent in Utusan Malaysia. While reporting the HIV/AIDS stories from health perspective, The Star reported more (four units or 18.2) compared to Sin Chew Daily (three units or 20 percent) and Utusan Malaysia (two units or 18.2 percent). Only The Star covered HIV/AIDS news from religious perspective and only one story has been covered compared to none of the story in that perspective covered by Utusan Malaysia and Sin Chew Daily. Concerning the policy or/and new strategy from government in addressing the HIV/AIDS, both The Star and Sin Chew Daily reported two units or 9.1 percent for The Star and 13.3 percent for Sin Chew Daily, and only one units has been reported by Utusan Malaysia. Table 2(c) shows the finding of using Chi-Square statistic test to examine if there is no significantly different on framing the HIV/AIDS-related news amongst the three newspapers. However, the finding pleads that there is statistical significant difference ($\chi^2 = 51.667$, $df = 3$, $p<.05$) between frames of HIV/AIDS-related issues amongst the three newspapers. This is logically proved that for instance, The Star was the dominant newspaper in framing the HIV/AIDS-related issues as social frame with the frequency of 15 units or 68.2%, followed by Sin Chew Daily reported 10 units or 66.7% and Utusan Malaysia with eight units or 72.7% throughout the six month periods.
Table 2(a): Mean Rank of FramesDesigned by Three Selected Malaysian Mainstream Newspapers in Reporting HIV/AIDS-related Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>N=48</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utusan Malaysia</td>
<td>26.45</td>
<td>23.68</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>24.18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Star</td>
<td>25.36</td>
<td>24.77</td>
<td>25.09</td>
<td>24.18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin Chew Daily</td>
<td>21.80</td>
<td>24.70</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2(b): Cross Tabulation of Frames Designed by Three Selected Malaysian Mainstream Newspapers in Reporting HIV/AIDS-related Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Utusan Malaysia</th>
<th>The Star</th>
<th>Sin Chew Daily</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2(c): Chi-Square Table for Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.667</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between framing and positioning HIV/AIDS news

In the interest to answer the research question 2, Spearman’s rho Correlation test was applied on attesting whether or not there is a relationship between framing HIV/AIDS news and positioning the news in newspaper. Table 3 indicates that there is no relationship neither between the length of headline is more than two columns; length of headline is more than half page; news article is on the front page; news article is above the fold; nor total news coverage is more than ¾ on the column and framing. The $P$ values for all tested variables are showed not significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 3: Spearman’s rho Correlation between Framing and Positioning HIV/AIDS News in Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positioning</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of headline is more than two columns</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of headline is more than half page</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News article is on the front page</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.465</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News article is above the fold</td>
<td>-.217</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total news coverage is more than ¾ on the column</td>
<td>-.193</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=48

Table 4(a): Social Marketing Programmes in Three Mainstream Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Programmes</th>
<th>Utusan Malaysia</th>
<th>The Star</th>
<th>Sin Chew Daily</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness message</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=48

Table 4(b): Chi-Square Table for Type of Social Marketing Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Social Marketing Programmes</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.833</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social Marketing Programmes

Table 4(a) reveals that awareness message on preventing, educating and promoting HIV/AIDS information and relevant treatments for controlling the epidemic to the public are highly contributed by all selected newspapers (29 units or 60.4%). Among the newspapers, The Star contributed quite high amount of social marketing programme in terms of awareness message compared to other types, which were 12 units or 54.5% identified for the past six months, followed by Sin Chew Daily with 10 units or 66.7% and Utusan Malaysia with seven units or 63.6%. From the government perspective, there is a significant fewer amount of social marketing program in terms of policy, which focuses on new drug development, sex education or/and prudent strategies on preventing the HIV/AIDS infection, covered by all three newspapers. When concerning about the health campaign, The Star reported the highest units with four units or 18.2 percent compared to two units each for Utusan Malaysia and Sin Chew Daily. Four units or 18.2 percent social marketing programmes were not applicable in The Star, Utusan Malaysia with one unit or 9.1 percent and two units or 13.3 percent in Sin Chew Daily. The Chi-Square statistic was used to examine if there are no significant differences on type of social marketing programmes in the different media coverage. Table 4(b) reveals that there are significant differences ($\chi^2 = 32.833$, $df = 3$, $p<.05$) on type of social marketing programmes in the different media coverage. This seems to be logical considering that for instance, The Star which was the highest newspaper covered four units or 18.2% of campaigns on HIV/AIDS towards the public, followed by Sin Chew Daily and Utusan Malaysia with equally 2 units. Hence, we concluded that there were significant differences on type of social marketing programmes in the different media coverage.

DISCUSSION

The intention of this study is to examine to what degree of the Malaysian mainstream newspapers frame the HIV/AIDS-related issues and its social marketing programmes. The quantitative content analysis provided answers to all of the research questions. Social frame is the dominant frame used by all selected newspapers while addressing HIV/AIDS-related issues. This attests that HIV/AIDS is an issue which people should be concerning about. The finding showed notably that different newspapers play different roles in framing the HIV/AIDS-related issues. Utusan Malaysia frames HIV/AIDS-related issues as social perspective; The Star frames HIV/AIDS-related issues as health and religious perspective; and Sin Chew Daily frames the issue as government perspective. This elicits that when there are stories involving cultural issues, human rights, public responsibility and fundraising with regard to HIV/AIDS issues throughout to the public, Utusan Malaysia is the forthright newspaper for that mission. Simultaneously, when there have stories on educating public about the prevention and treatment availability of HIV/AIDS or/and when there have events on dealing with religious perspective in looking at HIV/AIDS-related issues, The Star is the remarkable print media working on that angle. Moreover, when there are government policies or social marketing programmes which need to be addressed for public awareness, Sin Chew Daily is the outstanding newspaper for this particular issue. Regardless, The Star showed more salience in all perspectives (social, health, religious, and government) when reporting HIV/AIDS stories throughout the public.

Framing HIV/AIDS-related issues neither on the social, health, religious nor government perspective showed statistical significant no relationship with positioning the issue amongst the three selected newspapers. This suggested that all selected newspapers are not considering HIV/AIDS-related issues as prominence as other events. Although it has been well-informed by World Health Organization (WHO) that Malaysia is being classified as “concentrated HIV epidemic” due to its exponential growth of HIV infection rates in this region (UNGASS, 2010), yet the reach ability of the stories is not taken into account by selected newspapers. Notwithstanding the early discussion revealed framing HIV/AIDS stories as social perspective was at the dominant level, studying media planning on that particular issue will not be completed unless we examine the reach of the HIV/AIDS stories coverage in selected newspapers by looking at the story’s prominence. The finding is not in line, however, with the literature which pleaded that the cornerstones of framing are selection and highlighting (Ethman, 1993) an issue or event, where able to influence the public opinion and promoting a behavioural change of the people for a quality of life. Regardless, this fundamental
idea is not applied by any of the selected newspapers in this study. In the interest for media agenda to influence other agendas, news coverage on certain issues must have high visibility, high audience salience, and distinct valence. (Amira Sariyati Firdaus, 2004)

Awareness message on preventing, educating, and informing public about the awareness and treatment of HIV/AIDS was significant framed by all selected newspapers. The Star contributed a high amount of social marketing programmes in terms of awareness message about HIV/AIDS. However, other social marketing programmes such as marketing on policy which concerns new drugs development policy, sex education, or law and regulations on preventing HIV/AIDS as well as campaign which concerns educational and workshop were slightly least in the media coverage. Base of the premise, this is remarkably proved in the finding that there is a significant different on type of social marketing programmes in the different media coverage. Different newspapers carry different type of social marketing programmes with different frequency. However, advocating social marketing programmes on preventing HIV/AIDS, in particular is rather insufficient to accrue public awareness of its importance and applicability in this study as whole. Therefore, in a way to advocate a good behaviour among the general population, the process in social marketing (designing, executing, evaluating, and promoting) have to be clearly identified. (Kotler, 2002)

CONCLUSION

HIV/AIDS is a hyperendemic. This study looks into only a small piece of the whole picture. Identifying the way of three mainstream newspapers frame the HIV/AIDS-related issues and social marketing programmes are rather insufficient to curb the epidemic comprehensively. However, in so far as some efforts have been done by researcher to give a row background of how media practitioners frame the HIV/AIDS news and its social marketing programmes in the sense of increasing the public awareness on preventing the epidemic as whole.

REFERENCES

FACEBOOK MOTIVATION: SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FACTORS AND USERS DIFFERENCES IN INDONESIAN YOUTH

Reza Safitri and Hasmah Zanuddin
Department Of Media Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University Of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
rezasafitri@yahoo.com / hasmahz@um.edu.my

ABSTRACT

The emerging of information and communication technology (ICT) has changed society significantly, in term of the way they communicate. This new technology, particularly the internet, enables someone to connect with anyone easily—in any parts of the world—as geographic boundaries have now becoming ‘borderless’ and the space becoming more ‘narrow’, just like a global village, as predicted by McLuhan. The development of Web 2.0 enables the forming of social media. One form of this which is nowadays popular to be used by the society is the Social Networking Sites (SNSs) Facebook and Twitter. The aim of this study is to explore the motivation of users of SNSs Facebook among youth and how individual differences relate to motive for SNSs use. A survey of 420 students was conducted at 23 Senior High School students in Malang, East Java, Indonesia. Factor Analysis was used to categorize the motives among youth. In accordance with Uses and Gratifications Theory used in this study, it is found that main usage of SNSs Facebook and Twitter is for entertainment and interpersonal relationship. There is also some pattern differences between boys and girls, which is girls were tend to maintain existing relationships, meanwhile boys use is to build new relationship or make new friends.

Keywords: Motive, Social Networking Sites, Gender

INTRODUCTION

SNSs (Facebook and Twitter) have become surprising phenomena worldwide. This includes Indonesia. According to the survey conducted by e-Marketer, the number of Facebook and Twitter users in Indonesia by January 2010 is 15.301.280 people. This amount is ranked as the second highest number in the world after US, as the country where Facebook and Twitter were first established. According to the research of Yahoo toward 2000 respondents in cooperation with Taylor Nelson Sofres in 2009, it was mentioned that the highest number of Internet users were aged from 15-19 years old, 64% of the total users. About 53% of the youth access Internet in the net center, and the 19% do it via cellular phones, 28% via other sources like personal computer and laptop. (Kompas 8 February 2010 pp. 15).

The rapid interest of people toward SNS is due to several reasons. One of them is that SNS provides facilities for the users as message producer which enable the users to send texts, upload photos, music, or video beside its basic facility in connecting people. It goes along with the main purpose of Facebook and Twitter, sharing information with people you know, and observe people activities around you (Facebook.com). The Pew Internet Project (2006) mentioned that the main specialty of Internet is to help the society to be connected to each other in social network. Some of the most popular social networking sites which have large numbers of users in Indonesia are Facebook and Twitter.

Youth as the largest user of Facebook and Twitter is mentioned by Don Tapscoot (2009) as ‘digital native’, in which they grew and improved along with the development of Information Technology, therefore it is not strange that the youth is the most expert and also the most often in using the information technology, especially Internet.
The important and interesting matter here is exploring the reasons of youth in using SNSs (Facebook and Twitter). In other words, this paper will acknowledge what kind of gratifications sought from this new media. It is said by Rubin and Papacharissi (2000) that the rapid and broad Internet development needs an overall understanding regarding both personal and social attributes which influence the reason of a person in using Internet as a CMC (Computer mediated communication) media and the outcome of CMC related behavior. CMC itself offers a new interpersonal relations called by Rafaeli in Jaffe (1995:3) as ‘interpersonal mass medium’. Several studies which have been conducted mentioned the positive sides of Facebook and Twitter, but not few of them also mentioned the negative sides of Facebook and Twitter (SNSs). Study conducted by Lovejoy, Horn, and Hughes (2009) stated that there is a lack of awareness of the users in protecting their privacy from threats which might be emerged from other parties. Kim and Haridakis (2009) mentioned the factors causing someone to be an Internet addict. But there are still few of the studies exploring about who are the users of Facebook and Twitter, and what is the outcome in their social network. What are the motives or gratifications sought in using Facebook and Twitter, what are the characteristics of the individual (age, gender, education) which are related to the motives in using Facebook and Twitter.

Although there are a lot of studies conducted toward Internet media generally and SNSs particularly, however this study is still considered as important to be done due to the fact that almost all of the studies concerning SNSs are dominated by the US and European countries. Besides, there is a kind of development today where SNS is also used as a marketing tool so that the business aspect is included in this study in accommodating the development of SNS.

Studies concerning the motivations of SNS users have been done by Sheldon (2008) and Joinson (2008). Sheldon (2008) mentioned the existence of six motives of Facebook usage including relationship maintenance, passing time, virtual community, entertainment, coolness, and companionship. While Joinson (2008) mentioned seven motives of Facebook usage including social connection, shared identities, photographs, content, social investigation, social network surfing, status updates. In the prior study there is consistency which makes it needs deeper observation. Boyd and Ellison (2007) also stated the needs of study exploring the motivations in other countries especially the non English spoken countries.

**MOTIVE TYPOLOGY**

The McQuail research (1972) represents the original/classical motives of uses and gratifications; Rubin and Papacharissi (2000) apply the uses and gratification model to the Internet and Joinson’s research is the first research applying uses and gratifications directly to Facebook.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the classical motives</td>
<td>Internet motives</td>
<td>Facebook motives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal identity</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>social connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surveillance</td>
<td>interpersonal utility</td>
<td>social investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diversion</td>
<td>information seeking</td>
<td>shared identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal relationships</td>
<td>convenience</td>
<td>content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pass time</td>
<td>social network surfing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>status updating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In his journal entitled *Looking at*, ‘Looking up’, or ‘Keeping up with’ *People-Motives and Uses of Facebook* written by Joinson (2008), he constructed an investigation the uses of social networking site especially facebook, and the gratification users derive from those uses. In that journal he identifies six unique uses and gratifications of Facebook: social connection, social investigation, shared identities, content, social network surfing and status updating.

Social connection contains items predominantly concerned with ‘keep in touch’ and has a clear focus on re-connecting with people, finding out what are friends doing, receiving a friend request, connecting with people, contacting friends who are away from home, and maintaining relationship with people you don’t see
often. Social investigation comprises items related to a unique affordance of social networking site; the ability to view other people’s social network and friends. Shared identities is also a social motive and comprised three items related to joining groups, organizing of events and communication with like-minded people. These activities are the skin of ‘social browsing’ identified by Lampe et al. The study further identifies content as one of the motivations for Facebook use. This relates to the usual ‘content gratification’ although the term covers main applications within Facebook as playing games, discovering applications and quizzes.

This study encompasses the use of Facebook to meet or view new people, talk to new people and to find out more about people who are met offline. Social network surfing signifies the ability of the users to move from one person to another via friend links, although it may also relate closely to a process gratification. Status updates comprises items related to the newsfeed and status updates within Facebook. The newsfeed provides updates on both ‘friends status, alongside recent activity.

Rubin and Papacharissi (2000) construct an Internet motives scale as a combination of interpersonal, media and Internet motives with focus on the computer mediated communication (CMC). As a result, they offer five primary motives for the Internet use: information seeking, interpersonal-utility motivation, pass time, convenience, and entertainment.

The items that played an important role in using the Internet for information seeking were: simplicity, cost, new way of doing research and seeing what is out there. The motive of interpersonal utility motivation includes: helping others, participating in discussions, showing others encouragement, belonging to a group, getting more points of view and telling others what to do just to mention some of the subcategories of the term. By passing time, they meant the use of the Internet when one has nothing else to do and is looking for something to occupy his/her mind. The main two factors of convenience were that it is easy (to email rather than to tell people) and cheap. Entertainment is simply represented by the fact that it is entertaining and enjoyable. (Papacharissi and Rubin, 2000).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The first question in this study is What the motives (gratifications) of the youth in using Facebook and Twitter? The second question is, Is there any significant difference between the motivation of boys and girls?

METHOD

Sample dan procedure

In answering these questions, a survey was conducted toward 500 students of Senior High Schools in Malang-Indonesia. The study was conducted toward 21 schools both public and private schools in Malang, 3 schools were not willing to be explored, so the study results cover 18 schools only. The questionnaires spread among 500 students, and about 55 questionnaires were not returned and 14 questionnaires was not completely filled, therefore the research data covers only 431 respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Characteristics of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account SNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access SNS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The respondents of the study were mostly girls (55.5%) out of 431 respondent, aged between 15-16 years old (66.1%), mostly used Facebook account (98.6%), do the access via cellular phones (66.4%) or computers (69.4%), access the Internet for about 11-15 times per day (82.4%) for the duration of access about 6-30 minutes (46.1%). These findings reflect that SNSs have become the part of High School Students activities today.

Measurement
The respondents were asked to voluntarily fill the questionnaires concerning their usage of Facebook and Twitter. Generally the respondents spent around 7-15 minutes in filling the questionnaires.

Demographics
Boys were given the code of 0 and the girls were given the code of 1. In the questionnaire the age of the respondents are also asked.

Motives
In measuring the motives, the researchers adapted the measurement made by Papacharissi and Rubin (2000), Pavica Sheldon (2008) and Adam N. Joinson (2008). The adjustment was done by adding business aspect as one of the motives. In the questionnaire, the respondents were being asked about their motivation in using Facebook and Twitter. Five points of Likert Scale is used in answering questions, 1 defines highly disagree, 2 defines disagree, 3 defines neutral, 4 defines agree, and 5 defines highly agree.

FINDINGS
The overview of the number of friends in Facebook and Twitter is also varied. The observation result of friends number in Facebook may reach 7500 friends and 8500 followers in Twitter. The friendship network in Facebook mostly covers 501-2500 friends (55.9%) and in Twitter for about 100 friends (78.7%). Most of Senior High School students choose Facebook account in accessing SNSs, as it can be seen from Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Friends</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 100 friends</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-250 friends</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251-500 friends</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000 friends</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-2500 friends</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501-5000 friends</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5000 friends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Number of Facebook Users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>431</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Number of Twitter Users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>431</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results of Factor Analysis

In this study, factor analysis test was conducted in four processes consisted of interdependency test, factor extraction, factor matrix, and formed factor labelling. The interdependency testing was done to acknowledge whether there was interdependency between one variable to the other. In other words, the variables which was not have any correlation with other variables could be excluded from the analysis in (to be retested later on).

This variable interdependency testing was meant to filter the suitable variables to be used in factoring process and to exclude the improper variables. This test was conducted by using scores of Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO). Factor Extraction could be done when the score of Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) was more than 0.50.

The core process of factor analysis is to do extraction toward a group of attributes in order to form one or more factors. The method in factor extraction in this study is Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method. This method is based on the eigenvalues, the variance percentage or the cumulative percentage. Eigenvalues is the value representing the total of varians defined for every factor. Besides, in factor extraction it is resulted a communality value for each variable. Communality is meant as the amount of variance owned by each attributes which can be defined by the extracted factors. The last part is interpreting the results of factor loading which measure the correlation between attribute and the formed factors.

The measurement of KMO score obtained the value of 0.901 which explained that the result of observation of 23 motivation attributes is correlated each other. The score of KMO suggested that in analysis is more than 0.50. Then, it would be conducted a factor extraction by using the method of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) toward the motivation in using SNSs. It was measured by 23 attributes which were resulted in the extraction of 5 factors. The total of cumulative variance which could be explained by these six factors are 60.144%. The results of factor extraction in detail can be seen in Table 5:

Table 5. Results of Factor Extraction of the Motivation in Using SNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Eigen Values</th>
<th>Total Percentage</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Cumulative of Total Variance Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.002</td>
<td>34.790</td>
<td>34.790</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.951</td>
<td>8.483</td>
<td>43.273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.722</td>
<td>7.487</td>
<td>50.760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td>4.832</td>
<td>55.592</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.047</td>
<td>4.552</td>
<td>60.144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>3.873</td>
<td>64.016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>3.713</td>
<td>67.729</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>3.466</td>
<td>71.196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>3.179</td>
<td>74.374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td>2.921</td>
<td>77.295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factor extraction by using the method of Principal Componet Analysis (PCA) in studying the motivation of SNS usage resulted in five main factors. The loaded information of the first factor to the fifth in sequence are 34.790%, 8.483%, 7.487%, 4.832% and 4.552%. Furthermore, in the result of factor extraction, it was explained that the amount of loading factor of each attributes existed in each factors. The value of loading factor which was more than 0.50 was considered as enough in representing the extracted factor. The optimum estimation of loading factor was obtained after the rotation process. Rotation was done by using varimax method so that the optimum value of each columns was obtained. Here is the table of matrix component rotation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>F1</th>
<th>F2</th>
<th>F3</th>
<th>F4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Friends</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get to know the New Friends</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Exchange</td>
<td>0.683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Interest</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining Friendship</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Spreading</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Time</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boredom</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertaining</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination Tips</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Information</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Purchasing</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest/ Hobbies</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See activities</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain networking</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read opinions</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Talk</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Solving</td>
<td>0.587</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Expression</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definition: The empty cells means that the loading factor is less than 0.50.
From the table above, it can be seen that the loading factor of each attributes after the factor rotation being done. A group of attribute forms a factor when it has stronger coefficient of correlation compared to the other attributes. The sequence of factors explains the data structure exists in the motivation of SNSs usage, the first factor explains the main problem in the motivation of SNSs usage, while the next factor explains the further problem structure. Categorization of a group of attributes to be five factors would be named as a new factor representing the attributes inside. Here is the table of factor naming:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7. Summary of Attributes of Factors in Motivation of SNS Usage.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 : Interpersonal Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking new friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowing others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost all of my friends are using Facebook or Twitter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanging Information which might be useful for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking for people with the same interest as me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining my friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring information which is unavailable in other place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spreading information that I have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 : Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending leisure time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving/ Dismissing Boredom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertaining me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3 : Business and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting tips in facing examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting information concerning reproduction health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committing my interest and hobbies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 4 : Personal Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeing the activities done by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping the relationship with the person I rarely see directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making plans with friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicating with the person I often see in my daily life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading others’ opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 5 : Freedom in Expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s easier to talk online than to speak directly face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving my private problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing ideas more freely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the table above, can be seen that the motivation of SNS usage among the Senior High School student is not only a need but also a connector to other/ interpersonal relationship, as well as used in an entertainment, business and information media.

**Result of Differential Testing on Motivation of Internet Usage**

The Factor extraction of motivation in SNSs usage was continued with the testing of average difference between the group of boys and girls. The analysis was done by using the independent t-test between two groups. The table below is the summary of the results of average difference of t-test.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Factor’s Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>T-count</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>2.133*</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>2.908**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Business and Information</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.579**</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interaction and Communication</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.709ns</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.344ns</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definition : ** = P-value <= 0.01 ; * = 0.01 < p-value <= 0.05 ; ns = p-value > 0.05

There is a significant difference (p < 0.05) in the factors of interpersonal, entertainment and business and information. In the group of girls these three factors are the dominant characteristics of motivation in SNSs usage than among the boys. Meanwhile, due to interaction and communication as well as comfort in communication online, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between the motivation of the boys and girls. The test result explains that the girls tend to have higher motivation in using SNSs compared to the boys.

**DISCUSSION**

Today youth spends more time in writing or seeing blogs and visiting social networking sites compared to the prior generation. However, there are still few studies in Indonesia concerning the motivation of the youth in using Facebook and Twitter. To observe the motives or gratifications and whether there are some differences in motives of boys and girls, a study of 431 respondents spread in 21 Senior High Schools in Malang City was done.

From the research, the data reveal that all of the respondents have account in Facebook and Twitter. The respondents are mostly girls (55.5%), aged between 15-16 years old (66.1%), mostly used Facebook account (98.6%), do the access via cellular phones (66.4%) or computers (69.4%), access the Internet for about 11-15 times per day (82.4%) for the duration of acces about 6-30 minutes (46.1%).These statistics shows that SNS has become part of youth activities nowadays. In the time being, Facebook is still the most popular Social Networking Site oftenly visited by the youth (98.6%) compared to Twitter (63.3%).

Other interesting findings in this study is that the youth access SNSs via cellular phones (66.4%). It goes along with the research conducted by Nielsen (Kompas 14th September 2011) mentioned that in America 40% of the people access the social networking sites via their cellular phones. Accessing SNSs through cellular phones explained the high number of visiting these sites. Phones are cheap, too: Indonesia is
flooded with Chinese handsets costing only $30-40. This country is also one of the largest markets for Research In Motion (RIM), the maker of BlackBerrys. Indonesians typically connect with each other via mobile devices, not personal computers. It reflects that social media become embedded in youth social life. Indonesian culture seems particularly receptive to online socialising. People love publicity, don’t fret much about privacy and gleefully follow trends. “Everything is about friends and location,” says Andy Zain, the founder of MobileMonday Indonesia, a networking forum (Jakarta Post, 6th January 2011).

The biggest motivation of the youth to access SNSs is for Interpersonal Relationship either it is with new friends or someone who already connected previously. The findings of this study shows that new friends is the main factor. This factor differs from previous study conducted by Sheldon (2008:15) which mentioned that the main motivation of youth in using Facebook is to maintain relationship with people they know. Joinson (2008:1030) also mentioned that the main motivation in accessing Internet is social connection where someone is finding out what old friends are doing now and reconnecting with people you have lost contact with.

The second motivation of the youth access SNSs is to get entertainment. In spending their leisure time, they tend to choose accessing Facebook or Twitter as an alternative. The youth access Facebook and Twitter in order to dismiss their boredom and to entertain themselves. This motivation goes along with the study conducted by Sheldon (2008:15) that mentioned that the second motivation is to pass the time when bored. Meanwhile Joinson (2008:1030) mentioned that the second factor is to share identity including joining of groups, organization of events, and meeting ‘like-minded people’.

The third motivation of the youth is doing business and getting information. The youth mostly do their online shopping due to the development of Facebook or Twitter as a media in marketing goods. From a huge number of friends, it could not be denied that Facebook and Twitter can be an easy, cheap and fast online marketing media. Therefore, it is no wonder that this business factor emerges as one of the motivation of youth in using Facebook or Twitter. This factor would also differentiate this study with the other previous similar studies.

The study conducted by Sheldon (2008) and Joinson (2008) did not mention the factor of business and information as one of the motivation in using Facebook or Twitter. Sheldon (2008) mentioned the third motivation is virtual community. It consists of developing a romantic relationship, finding more interesting people than in real life, finding companionship, meeting new friends and being less lonely. Joinson (2008:1031) mentioned the third motivation as photographs including viewing photos, being tagged in photos, tagging photos, and sharing/posting photographs.

There are differences in motivation between boys and girls in accessing Facebook or Twitter. The data shows that a significant difference (p < 0.05) in the interpersonal, entertainment, business and information. In the group of girls these three factors are the most dominant factors in the SNSs usage than boys. Meanwhile, the motivation due to interaction and communication as well as comfort in communication online has no significant difference between the groups of boys and girls. The test result explains that girls students tend to have higher motivation in keeping relationship in using SNS compared to the boys students. This goes along with the study conducted by Pavica Sheldon (2008) and Parks and Floyd (1996) mentioned that girls go to Facebook for relationship maintenance motives more than boys.

The time spent in accessing Facebook and Twitter correlated to Interpersonal Relationship and Entertainment Factors. The youth who often access Facebook or Twitter are always want to maintain their relationship with other, spend leisure time, dismiss boredom, Facebook or Twitter can also entertain the youth.

Generally the findings in this study do not go along with the study conducted by Sheldon (2008) and Joinson (2008). There are some significant differences in motivation in this study, the main purpose of the youth in accessing Facebook and Twitter is to get new friends. However, the prior studies showed that the main motivation was to maintain relationship with people they know. The next difference is the emerging of business motivation via Facebook or Twitter either it in purchasing or selling goods online. The emerging of business motivation seem to be appropriate with the phenomenon in getting new friends, because new friends are highly possible to be the target of marketing expansion.
According to the Uses and Gratifications Theory, social and psychological factors influence the motives in communicating. This study, found that the gender factor is also the main factor in differentiating the motivation of Facebook or Twitter users. Girls spend more time in accessing Facebook and Twitter compared to the boys.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

This study is limited to several aspects. There is a possibility that the motivation list is less comprehensive. There are still some overlapping matters between motivation and the pattern of use. It is expected that the next study can categorize the motivation and pattern of use better. The second limitation is that the researcher only saw gender differences aspect in the motivation of SNS usage.

This study, however, is better in some ways. First, this study has included the aspect of business in the motivation of Facebook and Twitter usage in which this motivation has never been mentioned before by the prior researchers. Indeed, the addition of this business motivation can help other researcher in comprehending the more popular phenomenon of online marketing. Besides, this study also helps us to understand the motivation of the youth in using SNS Facebook or Twitter.

The next research might be able to distinguish the behavior of youth who have account in SNSs, and the ones who have not. Other researchers are expected to explore more on individual differences such as age, education, and social economic status. Besides, it could be explored whether social network is correlated to the forming of social capital among the youth. The later study might be able to use different theory too such as the theory of third-person effect and theory of agenda setting.

REFERENCES


Stafford, Stafford and Schkade. 2004. Determining Uses and Gratifications for the Internet. Decision Sciences, 35(2)


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERFORMANCE BASED PAY AND JOB SATISFACTION IN MALAYSIAN PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING (IPTSS)

Azman Ismail, Najmi Mohd Radzi, Zulkifli Yahya and Ali Boerhanoedin
Faculty of Defence and Management Studies
National Defence University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
alifeaum@yahoo.com/azisma08@gmail.com/najwan113@yahoo.com/zulkifli_yahya@yahoo.co.uk

ABSTRACT

Performance based pay is viewed as an important segment of compensation and benefits program. It has two salient features: participation in pay systems and adequacy of pay. The ability of management to properly implement such pay features in designing and administering pay systems may have significant impact on job satisfaction. Even though the nature of this relationship is significant, the role of performance based pay as a predicting variable has been given less attention in the compensation and benefits program research literature. Therefore, this study was conducted to examine the relationship between performance based pay and job satisfaction using 334 usable questionnaires gathered from employees who have worked in Malaysian IPTSs of higher learning. The results of exploratory factor analysis confirmed that the measurement scales used in this study satisfactorily met the standards of validity and reliability analyses. Further, the outcomes of stepwise regression analysis showed two important findings: First, participation in pay systems significantly correlated with job satisfaction. Second, adequacy of pay significantly correlated with job satisfaction. Statistically, this result demonstrates that performance based pays as an important determinant of job satisfaction in the studied organizations. In addition, discussion, implications and conclusion are elaborated.

Keywords: Participation in Pay Systems, Adequacy of Pay, Job Satisfaction

INTRODUCTION

Compensation is a reward system where it deals with salary and wages, remuneration, reward and/or pay system which is often used interchangeably in organizations.(Bergmann & Scarpello, 2002; Milkovich & Newman, 2009). In a human resource management perspective, compensation is often viewed as an employer who designs and administers the various types of pay systems to reward its employees who provide certain job or jobs outcomes. (Henderson, 2009; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005). Many employers design compensation programs to pay and reward their employees based on job and performance/s. Job based pay is also known as membership and seniority based rewards where an employer provides the type, level and/or amount of monetary and non monetary payments based on the merit of job (e.g., pay rates are allocated according to employees’ skills, efforts, responsibilities, and job conditions) (Bergmann & Scarpello, 2002; Figart, 2000; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005; Hellriegel & Slocum, 2008). For example, time based pay, membership based pay and tenure based pay. Adoption of such pay systems, although may still be appropriate and applicable in stable and highly predictable business conditions (Wilton, 2010; Mahoney, 1992; Kanter, 1989), it is still viewed as insufficient to attract, retain and motivate competent employees to increase organizational performance (Bergmann & Scarpello, 2002; Maurer et al, 1995).

In an era of global competition, many employers have shifted the paradigms of compensation program from a traditional job based pay to performance based pay in order to support their organizational strategy and goals (Henemen, Ledford & Gresham, 2000; Lawler, 2000). Performance based pay is also known as person based pay where an employer provides the type, level and/or amount of monetary and non
monetary payments based on employees’ skills, knowledge, competencies and/or merit (Bender, 2003; Blau & Kahn, 2003; Henderson, 2009). Performance based pay has two major types: pay for group performance (team based pay and gain-sharing) and pay for individual performance (e.g., merit pay, lump sum bonus, promotion based incentives and variable pay) (Milovich & Newman, 2009). However it still use the similar criterion to apportion pays, which is when an employer rewards additional pays to basic pay in order to meet high performers’ needs and expectations (Chang & Hahn, 2006; Lawler et al., 1993; Lee et al., 1999). In other words, the rules for distributing rewards, the fluctuations of pay levels and structures are now reliant upon the level of performances, skills, knowledge and/or competency exhibited by the employees and not the nature of their job structure (Amuedo-Dorantes & Mach, 2003; Appelbaum & Mackenzie, 1996; Lee et al., 1999).

Many scholars think that performance based pay and job based pay have used different treatments in allocating rewards to all employees who work in different job categories, however the ability of management to properly implement performance based pay will be able to attract, retain and motivate employees to achieve the major objectives of the organizational pay system; efficiency (i.e., improving performance, quality, customers, and labor costs), equity (i.e., fair pay treatment for employees through recognition of employee contributions and employees’ needs) and compliance with laws and regulations (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a & 1992b; Milovich & Newman, 2009). Hence, it may lead to sustained and increased organizational competitiveness in a dynamic marketplace (Appelbaum & Mackenzie, 1996; Lawler, 2000; Beardwell & Claydon, 2007).

Performance based pay has two salient features: participation in pay systems and adequacy of pay (Brown et al., 2010; Fay & Thompson, 2001; Ismail et al., 2007; Lee et al., 1999). According to a high performing human resource practice, participation in pay systems is often seen as an employer who encourages employees in different hierarchical levels and categories to discuss and share information-processing, decision-making, and/or problem-solving activities related to pay systems (Belcher & Atchison, 1987; Ismail et al., 2007). Most organizations practice two major participation styles: participation in pay design (e.g., start-up stages of pay system) and participation in pay administration (e.g., operation stages of pay system) (Belfield & Marsden, 2003; Kim, 1996 & 1999; Lee et al., 1999). Participation in the design of pay systems refers to employees who are given more opportunity to provide ideas in establishing pay systems to achieve the major goals of its system, stakeholders needs and/or organizational strategy (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a & 1992b; Lawler et al., 1993). Participation in the administration of pay systems refers to employee participation in both input and output. Participation in input means employees provide suggestions to determine the enterprise’s goals, resources, and methods. Participation in output means employees are permitted to share the organization’s rewards in profitability and/or the achievement of productivity objectives (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Kim, 1996 & 1999). For example, a pro-social organisational behaviour literature highlights that making constructive suggestions in performance based pay system (e.g., merit pay and gain-sharing plans) will encourage employees to be honest in making personal contributions, this may lead to improved job satisfaction (Giacobbe-Miller et al., 1998; Mani, 2002).

Many scholars often interpret adequacy of pay from cultural, organizational and individual perspectives. In terms of cultural perspective, an individualistic culture perceives adequacy of pay as equity (e.g., equitable or inequitable pay) whereas a collective culture perceives adequacy of pay as equality, pay for the length of service or seniority and pay for individuals’ needs (Giacobbe-Miller et al., 1998; Money & Graham, 1999). In organizations, adequacy of pay is often defined as the type, level and/or amount of pay which is provided by an employer to its employee who work in different job groups based on the organizational policy and procedures (Anthony et al., 1996; Milovich & Newman, 2009). From an individual perspective, adequacy of pay is often viewed based on a social comparison theory, which posits that an individual perceives the adequacy of the type, level and/or amount of pay based on a comparison between what he/she receives and what he/she expects. An individual will perceive the type, level and/or amount of pay as adequate if he/she views that the pays are provided equitable with his/her contribution (e.g., ability to perform job, merit, skills and/or performance) (Adams, 1963 & 1965; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993).
Surprisingly, extant research in pay systems shows that the ability of management to properly implement performance based pay features may have a significant impact on work attitudes and behaviors, especially job satisfaction (Brown et al., 2010; Heywood & Wei, 2006; McCausland et al., 2005). In an organizational context, job satisfaction is often seen as a result of employees’ perception or appraisal of their jobs (McShane and Von Glinow, 2005; Spector, 1997). If employees have experienced high satisfaction with their job, this may create a pleasurable or emotional state (Bartolo and Furlonger, 1999; Locke, 1976) and a positive reaction in organizations (Feinstein, 2002; Oshagbemi, 2000a and 2000b). In a performance based pay model, many scholars think that pay for performance and job satisfaction are different constructs, but strongly interrelated. For example, the ability of management to properly implement participation in pay decisions and determine adequate pays based on employee contributions (i.e., ability to perform job and/or merit) may lead to an enhanced job satisfaction in organizations (Brown et al., 2010; Heywood & Wei, 2006). Therefore, it encourages the researchers to explore the nature of this relationship.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study has two major objectives: First, to measure the relationship between participation in pay systems and job satisfaction. Secondly, this study is conducted to measure the relationship between adequacy of pay and job satisfaction.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Evidence Supporting the Relationship between Performance based Pay and Job Satisfaction

The relationship between participation in pay systems and job satisfaction is consistent with the notion of procedural justice. For example, Leventhal’s (1976) self-interest model suggest six justice rules in making decisions: decisions based on accurate information, apply consistent allocation procedures, do correct decisions, suppress bias, practice moral and ethical standards in decision-making and ensure allocation process meet recipients’ expectation and needs. Secondly, Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group value model suggest three types of relational judgments about authorities: standing or status recognition (e.g., assessments of politeness, treatment with dignity, and respect individuals’ rights and entitlements), neutrality (e.g., decision-making procedures are unbiased, honest and decision based on evidence), and trust (e.g., motives of the decision-maker are fair and reasonable or otherwise). Thirdly, Folger et. al (1992) due-process appraisal system suggest three justice characteristics; adequate notice (e.g., explanation, discussion and feedback about performance criteria), fair hearing (e.g., informing performance assessments and their procedures through a formal review session) and judgment based on evidence (e.g., applying consistent performance criteria and honesty and fairness principles, as well as providing better explanations about performance ratings and reward allocations). Adams’ (1963 and 1965) equity theory and Allen and White’s (2002) equity sensitivity theory clearly posit that individuals who perceive that the type, level and/or amount of pay that they received are equitable with their contributions (e.g., merit, skills and/or performance) may affect his/her attitudes and behavior. Application of these theories in a performance based model shows that the willingness of management to highly encourage employees participate in allocating the type, level and/or amount of pay based on employee contributions is consistent the meanings of such procedural justice principles and this practice may motivate employees to enhance their job satisfaction in organizations (Brown et al., 2010; Heywood & Wei, 2006; McCausland et al., 2005).

The relationship between adequacy of pay and job satisfaction is consistent with the notion of distributive justice theory. For example, Adams’ (1963 and 1965) equity theory and Allen and White’s (2002) equity sensitivity theory clearly posit that individuals who perceive that the type, level and/or amount of pay that they received are equitable with their contributions (e.g., merit, skills and/or performance) may affect his/her attitudes and behavior. Application of these theories in a performance based model shows that the ability of management to determine adequate type, level and/or amount of pay based on employee
contributions is inline with the meanings of such distributive justice facets and this practice may motivate employees to increase their job satisfaction in organizations (Adams, 1963, 1965; Allen & White, 2002).

**Empirical Evidence Supporting the Relationship between Performance based Pay and Job Satisfaction**

Many previous studies used a direct effects model to investigate the design of pay systems using different samples, such as 9,831 different individuals in United Kingdom (McCausland et al., 2005), respondents taken from the 1988 wave of the US National Longitudinal Study of Youth (Heywood & Wei, 2006), and 2,336 employees in a large public sector research organization (Brown et al., 2010). These studies found that the ability of managers to appropriately determine the levels of pay according to employee performance and properly design and allow employee participation in making pay decisions had increased job satisfaction in the organizations (Brown et al., 2010; Heywood & Wei, 2006; McCausland et al., 2005). Therefore, it can be hypothesized that:

H1: There is a positive relationship between participation in pay systems and job satisfaction
H2: There is a positive relationship between adequacy of pay and job satisfaction

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS**

The above literature has been used as foundation to develop a conceptual framework for this study as shown in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance Based Pay:</td>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Participation in Pay Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1. Conceptual Framework**

Based on the framework, it can be hypothesized that:

**H1: There is a positive relationship between participation in pay systems and job satisfaction**

**H2: There is a positive relationship between adequacy of pay and job satisfaction**

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

This study used a cross-sectional research design that allowed the researchers to integrate compensation management literature, the in-depth interview, the pilot study and the actual survey as a main procedure to gather data. Using such methods may gather accurate data, decrease bias and increase quality of data being collected. The main advantage of using such methods may gather accurate and less biased data (Cresswell, 1998; Sekaran, 2003). The unit of analysis for this study was employees who have worked in Malaysian private institutions of higher learning (IPTS). At the initial stage of this study, the in-depth interviews involving 15 experienced academicians and non-academicians who have worked in the Malaysian institutions of higher learning sector. In terms of compensation system, a performance based pay has been implemented at all levels in the organizations. In this pay system, performance appraisal is used to measure employee performance and outcomes of this appraisal will be used to determine pay rises. For example, percentages of merit increment, bonus and certain benefits are different between high performing employees (i.e., excellence service award employees) and non high performing employees (i.e., non excellence service award employees). In order to ensure equity in compensation management, the managers use standardized allocation rules to determine the type, level and/or amount of pay (e.g., recognitions, incentives and pay preferences),
and recognizing employees’ views when attending informal and/or formal meetings organized by the management of this organization (e.g., departmental and group work meetings). A further investigation of the interviews’ results reveals that the ability of managers to appropriately allocate the type, level and/or amount of pay based on employee contributions (e.g., job and/or merit) and comfortably use interaction style (e.g., show respect and accountable) in dealing with employees’ demands and complaints has been major factor that may increase employees’ fairness about the design and administration of pay for performance. As a result, it may lead to an increased job satisfaction. Although the nature of this relationship is interesting, little is known about the predicting variable of performance based pay features in the pay system models of the studied organizations.

Information gathered from the interviews was categorized and compared to the performance based pay literature. Next, outcomes of this comparison were used to develop the content of survey questionnaire for a pilot study. Thus, a pilot study was done by discussing the survey questionnaires with 20 academicians and non-academicians who have worked in the higher learning sector. Their opinions were sought to verify the content and format of survey questionnaires for an actual study. Back translation techniques were used to translate the survey questionnaires into English and Malay languages in order to increase the validity and reliability of research findings (Cresswell, 1998; Sekaran, 2003).

The survey questionnaires used in this study had four sections. First, participation in pay systems had four items that were adapted from pay administration literature (Greenberg, 1996, 2003; Milkovich & Newman, 2008; Money & Graham, 1999; Pettijohn, et al., 2001). Second, adequacy of pay had four items that were adapted from pay design literature (Milkovich & Newman, 2009; Kim, 1996 & 1999; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a & 1992b). Third, interactional justice had four items that were adapted from organizational justice literature (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Cropanzano et al., 2001; Folger et al., 1992; Greenberg, 1996, 2003; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Finally, job satisfaction had nine items that were adapted from job satisfaction literature (Oldham et al., 1976; Warr et al., 1979). All items used in the questionnaires were measured using a 7-item scale ranging from “strongly disagree/dissatisfied” (1) to “strongly agree/satisfied” (7). Demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, race, status, length of service, salary and position) were used as a controlling variable because this study focused on employee attitudes.

The researchers had obtained an official approval to conduct the study from the heads of the organizations and also received advice from them about the procedures of conducting the survey in the studied organization. After considering the organizational rules, a quota sampling technique was used to determine the sample size based on the length of this study and financial constraints, which were 334 employees. After that, a convenient sampling technique was used to distribute the survey questionnaires to employees who have worked in every department in the organizations. This sampling technique was chosen because the list of registered employees was not given to the researchers and the survey questionnaires must be distributed through the HR office in the studied organizations. From the total number of 334 distributed questionnaires, 132 usable questionnaires were returned to the researchers, yielding 52.8 percent of the response rate. The survey questionnaires were answered by participants based on their consents and voluntarily basis.

A Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 16.0 was used to analyze the questionnaire data. Firstly, exploratory factor analysis was used to assess the validity and reliability of measurement scales (Hair et al, 1998). Secondly, Pearson correlation analysis and descriptive statistics were conducted to determine the collinearity problem, further confirm the validity and reliability of constructs and thus test research hypotheses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Yaacob, 2008). Finally, Stepwise regression analysis was utilized to test the mediating hypothesis because it can assess the magnitude of each independent variable, and vary the mediating variable in the relationship between many independent variables and one dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Foster et al., 1998). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the mediating variable can be considered when a previously significant effect of predictor variables is reduced to non-significance or reduced in terms of effect size after the inclusion of mediator variables into the analysis (Wong et al 1995). In this regression analysis, standardized coefficients (standardized beta) were used for all analyses (Jaccard et al. 1990).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 shows the majority respondents were females (20.8%), ages between 26 to 30 years old (17.3%), Bachelor degree holders (17.6%), position as a lecturer (19.6%), work in an academic division (28.7%), workers who served between 3 to 5 years (15.5%), types of service (permanent and confirmed) (27.5%), their salary between RM1001 – 1500 (10.8%) and Malaysian citizens (36.2%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Profile</th>
<th>Sub-Profile</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Less Than 25 years</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 to 30 years</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31 to 35 years</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 to 40 years</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41 to 45 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>SRP / LCE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPM / MCE</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STP / HSC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Professional &amp; Management Group</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting Group</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor &amp; Associate Professor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Lecturer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Academic</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Service</td>
<td>Less Than 2 years</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 to 5 years</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 to 8 years</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 to 11 years</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 to 14 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 15 years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Service</td>
<td>Permanent &amp; Confirmed</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent &amp; Probation</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary (Malaysian Ringgit)</td>
<td>Less than 1000</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1001 to 1500</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1501 to 2000</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001 to 2500</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2501 to 3000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3001 to 3500</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3501 to 4000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4001 to 4500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4501 to 5000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5001 to 5500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5501 to 6000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 6001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Malaysian</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 shows the results of validity and reliability of the measurement scales. A factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation was done for four variables with 21 items. Next, the Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin Test (KMO) which is a measure of sampling adequacy was conducted for each variable and the results indicated that it was acceptable. Relying on Hair et al. (1998), and Nunally and Bernstein’s (1994) guideline, these statistical analyses showed that specifically, these statistical results showed that (1) all research variables exceeded the acceptable standard of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s value of 0.6, (2) all research variables were significant in Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, (3) all research variables had Eigen values larger than 1, (4) the items for each research variable exceeded Factor Loadings of 0.40 (Hair et al., 1998), and (5) all research variables exceeded the acceptable standard of Cronbach Alpha of 0.70 (Nunally & Bernstein, 1994). These statistical results showed that the measurement scales used in this study met the acceptable standard of validity and reliability analyses as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: The Results of Validity and Reliability Analyses for Measurement Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>KMO</th>
<th>Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity</th>
<th>Eigen Value</th>
<th>Variance Explained</th>
<th>Cronbach Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Pay Systems</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.59 to .91</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>760.99</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>73.54</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of Pay</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.56 to .86</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>295.66</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.54 to .71</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>991.09</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>45.41</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows the results of Pearson Correlation analysis and descriptive statistics. The means for all variables are from 3.29 to 4.54, signifying that the level of participation in pay systems, adequacy of pay, interactional justice and job satisfaction are ranging from moderately high (3) to highest level (7). The correlation coefficients for the relationship between the independent variable (i.e., participation in pay systems and adequacy of pay) and the mediating variable (interactional justice) and the relationship between the dependent variable (job satisfaction) were less than 0.90, indicating the data were not affected by serious collinearity problem (Hair et al., 1998). Thus, these statistical results provide further evidence of validity and reliability for measurement scales used in this research (Hair et al., 1998; Nunally & Bernstein, 1994).

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation (r)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Participation in</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay Systems</td>
<td>2. Adequacy of Pay</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant at **p<0.01

Table 4 shows the results of testing hypotheses in Step 2. Firstly, participation in pay systems significantly correlated with job satisfaction (ß= 0.27, p<0.001). Secondly, adequacy of pay significantly correlated with job satisfaction (ß= 0.34, p< 0.001). In terms of explanatory power, the inclusion of these variables in this step had explained 28 percent of the variance in dependent variable. Statistically, this result confirms that pay for performance does act as an important determinant of job satisfaction in the studied organizations.
Table 4: Results of Stepwise Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (Job Satisfaction)</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Service</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Pay systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of Pay</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediating Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactional Justice</td>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Δ R²</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>11.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F Δ R²</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>52.11***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

**DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS**

Based on theoretical considerations, this study has proposed a model linking the constructs of performance based pay and interactional justice to the job satisfaction construct. The results of this study also provide empirical evidence of a link between performance based pay and interactional justice, performance based pay and job satisfaction and interactional justice and job performance. In addition, interactional justice acts as a mediating variable on the relationship between the performances based pay and job satisfaction. In this sense, this study confirms that interactional justice does act as a mediating variable in the pay system models of the studied organizations. Consequently, the four hypotheses of the study were supported. In the organizational context, managers use compensation policy and rules set up by the stakeholder to determine the type, level and/or amount of pay for high performers. Employees perceive that the managers able to allocate sufficient rewards based on their performance. Besides that, managers encourage employees who work in different job groups to participate in the design and administration of pay systems. Employees perceive that the managers actively practice such participation styles among employees who work in different job groups. When employees perceive that they receive adequate pays from their employers and they are actively involved in the pay systems, this has increased employees’ feelings of interactional justice. As a result, it may lead to higher job satisfaction in the studied organizations.

The implications of this study can be divided into three categories: theoretical contribution, robustness of research methodology, and practical contribution. In terms of theoretical contribution, the findings of this study highlight two major issues: firstly, participation in pay systems indirectly affects job satisfaction through feelings of interactional justice. This result is consistent with studies by Pettijohn et al. (2001), and Ismail et al. (2007). Secondly, adequacy of pay indirectly affects job satisfaction via feelings of interactional justice. This result is consistent with studies by Money and Graham (1999), Omar and Ogenyi
In sum, this study has provided a great potential to understand the influence of feelings of interactional justice in the pay for performance models of the studied organizations, as well as to support and extend previous research conducted in most Western countries.

With respect to the robustness of research methodology, the survey questionnaires used in this study have exceeded a minimum standard of validity and reliability analyses; this could lead to the production of accurate findings. In terms of practical contributions, the findings of this study may be used to upgrade the efficiency of designing and administering pay for performance in organizations. The improvement efforts can be done in two major aspects: Firstly, revising the extra rewards for high performers according to current national cost of living and organizational changes. For example, the willingness of employers to provide extra rewards will increase employees’ positive perceptions that such rewards can fulfill their expectations, standards of living and statuses in society. As a result, it may motivate them to achieve organizational goals. Secondly, by improving the content and method of management development programs according to the current organizational needs. For example, the ability of employers to give more focus on creative soft skills (e.g., stimulate employees’ intellects in doing job, respect employees’ voices, counsel employees to increase their potentials to achieve better career, learn new problem solving skills approach and share the organizational interests) may upgrade the ability of managers to practice comfortable interactional styles in solving employees’ complaints and demands. If organizations heavily consider such suggestions, this will decrease employees’ misconceptions and misjudgments, as well as increase their acceptance and understanding about the implementation of performance based pay in organizations. Thus, it can motivate employees to sustain and support organizational competitiveness in an era of global competition.

The conclusion drawn from the results of this study should consider the following limitations. Firstly, the data was only taken once during the duration of this study. Therefore, it did not capture the developmental issues such as intra-individual change and restrictions of making inference to participants and/or causal connections between variables of interest. Secondly, this study only examines the relationship between latent variables and the conclusion drawn from this study does not specify the relationship between specific indicators for the independent variable, mediating variable and dependent variable. Thirdly, this study only focused on particular elements of performance based pay and neglected other important factors (e.g., communication, pay distribution criteria and management responsibility). Fourthly, other performance based pay outcomes (e.g., job commitment, job performance, job turnover and deviant behavior) that are significant for organizations and employees are not discussed in this study. Fifthly, although a substantial amount of variance in dependent measures explained by the significant predictors is identified, there are still a number of unexplainable factors that can be incorporated to identify the causal relationship among variables and their relative explanatory power (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Finally, the sample for this study was taken using a convenient sampling technique in a single public organization sector. These limitations may decrease the ability of generalizing the results of this study to other organizational settings.

The conceptual and methodology limitations of this study need to be considered when designing future research. Firstly, the organizational and personal characteristics that act as a potential variable can influence the effectiveness of performance based pay should be further explored. If organizational and personal characteristics are used in research, this may provide meaningful perspectives for understanding the individual differences and similarities that affect attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Secondly, the weaknesses of cross sectional research design may be overcome if longitudinal studies are used to collect data and describe the patterns of change and the direction and magnitude of causal relationships between variables of interest. Thirdly, the findings of this study may produce different results if this study is done in more than one organization. Fourthly, as an extension of the interactional justice, other theoretical constructs of organizational justice theory (e.g., distributive justice and procedural justice) needs to be considered because they have been widely recognized as an important link between performance based pay and personal outcomes (Ismail, et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2010; Omar & Ogenyi. 2006). The importance of these issues needs to be further discussed in future studies.
CONCLUSION

In sum, this study used a conceptual framework/model that was developed based on the performance based pay research literature. The measurement scales used in this study satisfactorily met the standards of validity and reliability analyses. Outcomes of stepwise regression analysis confirmed that interactional justice partially mediated the effect of performance based pay (i.e., participation in pay systems and adequacy of pay) and job satisfaction in the studied organizations. This result has also supported performance based pay literature mostly published in Western countries. Therefore, current research and practice within the pay system model needs to consider perceptions of interactional justice as a critical aspect of the pay systems. This study further suggests that HR managers and/or managers should be trained to consistently practice good and fair treatments while allocating rewards and involving employees in making reward decisions. The ability of HR managers and/or managers to practice such treatments will strongly invoke employees’ feelings of interactional justice, which in turn lead to increased positive attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Thus, such positive outcomes may help to maintain and sustain organizational strategy and goals.

REFERENCES


E-SEA: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC BOOK PUBLISHING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Teresa Paula De Luna  
Department of Speech Communication and Theater Arts  
College of Arts and Letters  
University of the Philippines, Philippines  
teresa_paula.de_luna@up.edu.ph

ABSTRACT

Does technology determine culture change? The power of the internet in altering how human beings connect with one another is already felt and expected in this post-industrial era, giving way to computer-mediated-communication (CMC) almost instantaneously with its invention. It is established that CMC has set off changes in the society that may eventually alter the way we make sense of our “selves” and our interpersonal and intercultural relationships in the global community.

This paper looks into a specific consequence of technological innovation that has the potential to cause radical change in the society implicating power relations across political, economic, social and cultural arenas.

The electronic book (e-book) is a current product of CMC technology that has initiated change in the manner that we perceive books in the roles of content makers, publishers, and readers. This article aims to explore how negotiation of power is carried out by the international publishing industry stakeholders, including authors, publishers, readers, technology companies, related businesses and governments, with each protecting its own interests. Results show the disparity of availability of e-book technology and content between countries generally perceived to be modern and liberal and those countries that are perceived in the opposite. Possible reasons are tackled within anthropological and social concepts of power relations and political economy using data gathered from the international electronic publishing industry. Focus is given to findings on the Philippines and Southeast Asian countries and territories, with the aim of providing an initial roadmap for local and regional publishing industry stakeholders’ entry into the international electronic publishing community.

Keywords: culture change, technology, power relations, computer mediated communication (CMC), electronic book (e-book).

INTRODUCTION

“Books of the coming century will all be printed leaves of nickel, so light to hold that the reader can enjoy a small library in a single volume. A book two inches thick will contain forty thousand pages, the equivalent of a hundred volumes; six inches in aggregate thickness, it would suffice for all the contents of the Encyclopedia Britannica. And each volume would weigh less than a pound.” (Edison as cited in Novak, 2011).

In 1911, famous American inventor Thomas Edison saw the electronic book (e-book) coming: as of this year—exactly 100 years after Edison’s prediction—data from the Association of American Publishers (AAP) and book retailers such as Amazon and Barnes & Noble show that the e-book is outselling the printed
book in the United States. Given today’s global economy and connectivity, replication of this trend in many other countries is to be expected.

Presently, people and organizations who produce and consume books and other reading materials are dealing with a technological innovation that is not only drastically changing the act of reading, but also disrupting the entire ecosystem of the global publishing industry, and consequently effecting changes in various sectors in the society.

As the giant international publishing companies contribute and adapt to, and take advantage of the effects of the introduction and utilization of the e-book technology, it is interesting to ascertain how Southeast Asia (SEA), perceived to be the underdog in this socio-economic phenomenon, is impacted by this technological alteration.

This paper explores the consequence of e-book publishing technological innovations that pose potential radical modifications in the society’s “way of life,” implicating power relations across political, economic, social and cultural arenas. Special focus is given in this research to the Philippine setting. The Philippines is SEA country that uses English as primary language for education, business and a good portion of its entertainment. As such, the Philippines is perceived and categorized mainly as a consumer and subordinate country within the global publishing industry, given that the majority of the content providers of its English reading materials are publishing conglomerates based in North America and the United Kingdom and their local partners. Language proficiency at the same time enables Filipinos to locally publish reading materials in English as easily as materials in our national language and other dialects, whether for education, business or entertainment.

Leslie White’s perspective in culture change is employed in the analysis of the current socio-economic and socio-political consequences brought about by e-books in Southeast Asian nations. White asserts that one of the significant attributes of culture is its transmissibility by non-biological means. “Culture in all its aspects, material, social and ideological is easily and readily transmitted from one generation, one age, one people, or one region, to another by social mechanisms” (White as cited in Moore and Sanders 2006). He further states that it is organized in such a manner through subdividing the whole cultural system into three subsystems namely:

- Technological - composed of material mechanical, physical and chemical instruments;
- Sociological - made up of interpersonal relations expressed in individual and collective patterns of behavior, and;
- Ideological - composed of ideas, beliefs, knowledge expressed in articulate speech or other symbolic form.

Although the three subsystems are interconnected, the technological subsystem performs the primary role and is independent of the other two cultural subsystems. In White’s view, technology dictates how the sociological and ideological subsystems are formed. As a result it has the potential to create or build a culture, but it also possesses the capability to destroy it. This argument is given proof by historical evidences proving how the tools and technologies we used and are still using prodded us to experience life in a society in a certain way, the “way” by which technologies come and go and cultures from various generations are described differently from one another. This is illustrated in how people often describe the past to be different from the present, such as labeling people according to the generation they belong to (e.g., baby boomers, yuppies, generation x and millennia babies). The labels most often than not indirectly represent the technological change that prompted changes in behavior and character of individuals from one generation to another.

In the case of the Yi Yoront aborigine tribe, a considerable degree of culture change transpired when the stone axe, viewed both as a totem and a serviceable device, was replaced by the steel axe (Sharp, 1952). The stone axe represents the technological aspect of the cultural system that generated norms for governing social relationships, which in turn are rationalized by ideologies. Members of the society themselves construct ideologies in order to make sense of their individual and collective beings. When technologies change,
meanings of interpersonal relations and corresponding ideologies may also change, although some may not.
New technologies that do not drastically affect the sociological and ideological subsystems may replace some existing technologies. The introduction of the telegraph and the telephone in the field of communication is an example of this. It made sending and receiving messages faster, but did not alter much of how we experience and made sense of our environment and interpersonal relations.

Other technologies still may completely alter the cultural system of a society. An example of such technology is electricity. The power and energy provided by electricity, manifested through hegemonic works supporting a materialistic culture, propelled and progressed capitalistic ideology. Because of the technological effects that created the capitalistic ideology, production of goods is made faster and easier thus leading to mass production. If in the past, one can use or consume the “thing” made by his hands; in a capitalistic society, more often than not, it is impossible for a factory worker to purchase his own work. One prevailing effect of global capitalism is the business strategy termed as outsourcing, a business strategy wherein a business task is contracted to persons and/or organizations outside of the companies that require them, in most cases from foreign countries offering the highest cost savings due to lower wages. Publishing is one of those industries that take advantage of “cheap” labor in Asia, specifically in South and Southeast Asia, in the production of books and digital content.

Based on White’s body of work, therefore, electronic publishing may be characterized as a technology that has shown actual results and further significant potential to alter all three cultural systems: technological, sociological and ideological.

E-BOOK?

What is an e-book, or electronic book? The help page on the website of international publishing giant Simon & Schuster defines an e-book as “…a digital edition of a book you can download and read on your computer, laptop, handheld computer, PDA, or portable eBook device.”

E-book publishing is classified under the non-traditional publishing category. Non–traditional publishing is enabled by a combination of technologies and innovative business models. Traditional printing today can be considered digital printing because the digital file goes directly to lithographic press (Greco, et al., 2007 cited at Bradley, Helm & Pittner, 2011). The definition though of non-traditional publishing is hinged with the concept of its counterpart—traditional publishing. Both types of publishing cannot be defined with precise elements and factors such as technology, thus the industry is best described through the types of relationships the publishers engage in with their authors. “Mainstream publishers pay an author for a manuscript through royalties. Once the manuscript is purchased, the mainstream publisher makes the decisions, often in consultation with the author, and pays the bills.” On the other hand “Non–traditional publishers secure material in various ways other than the royalty method; they make the publication decisions, and they pay the bills (Helm, Bradley, Fulton, Pittner, 2011). E-book publishing, which is the focus of this paper, is a particular type of non-traditional publishing. Following is a comparison of the traditional publishing set-up and a non-traditional publishing model independent of a publisher.

Traditional
1. Author submits manuscript to the agent;
2. Agent sends manuscript to multiple publishers. Publisher who accepts book pays an advance against future royalties;
3. Publisher edits manuscript, creates dust jacket and sends copies to the media;
4. For a debut novel, publishers typically print less than 10,000 copies;
5. Publisher ships finished books to bookstores and wholesalers. Publisher also creates e-books for distribution;
6. Publisher, aided by author, markets and publicizes book.
Independent or self-publishing
1. Authors must decide whether to use an electronic publishing and distribution service;
2. Author or contractor designs e-book cover image;
3. Author or contractor formats the book for various e-book file types and screen sizes such as mobile phones, tablets and PCs;
4. Author must price the book. Low prices encourage greater readership while higher prices can reap better profits;
5. If self-distributing, author must upload formatted book files and cover art to automated self-publishing platforms. If using an electronic publishing and distribution service, the service provider uploads the e-book file and cover to the publishing platform/s.
6. Author markets the book. Many use social networking sites.

Source: Wall Street Journal research (traditional); Smashwords (self-publishing)

FLASHBACK: IN THE BEGINNING

When e-book technology was introduced, giant publishers and booksellers such as Barnes and Noble and Amazon responded by digitizing traditional printed books. Computer hardware companies engaged their research and development in the creation and production of devices that can support the e-book technology (technological developments on digital publishing are obviously tied to technological advancements in gadgets that would allow the electronic content to be “enjoyed” and “appreciated”). Consumers often would say, “so the technology is amazing, but how do you read e-books? Certainly, the software needs to be supported by the hardware. From the late 1990s to the late 2000s, people who engaged in this business struggled. Initially, both the producer and consumer sectors were in awe of the “promise” of the technology. As a result, several capitalists gambled on a promise. Unfortunately, the fulfillment of the promise was delayed. A number of companies who took the risk either gave up or went out of business, such as Nuvomedia with the Rocket eBook and Softbook Press with Softbook (Rothman, 2009). The conclusion was that the society was simply not ready to read books on-screen in the manner that technology was presenting. In this sense, the technology failed to effect societal change.

WHAT’S HAPPENING NOW?

Evidenced by the self-publishing success of authors like Amanda Hocking and John Locke, digital publishing has started to make a serious dent in the global practice of production and consumption of books and other reading materials. Related news include mainstream thriller writer Barry Eisler turning down a lucrative mainstream contract offer in order to self-publish (SPR, 2011b); Joe Konrath, thriller writer and blogger well-known for writing about the tipping point (the point where an author can make more money self-publishing than with a mainstream contract), converting to self-publishing and spells out why in dollars and cents (Konrath, 2010); writers who are not as well known as Hocking, Locke and Konrath also having the opportunity to make a living through self-publishing, according to Sullivan (2011) (Bradley, Fulton, Helm, Pittner, 2011).

The community of giant mainstream traditional publishers initially displayed ambivalence in the new format. Some groups even expressed scorn stating that the e-book publishing system fosters degradation of the “integrity” of books published. The new system provides a platform for authors who are rejected by “reputable” publishers to get their work produced and distributed to the public. Distribution is easier in this set-up because the e-books are distributed online and thus are more accessible due to the global network the Internet provides. “(De Vita, 2007) argues that self-publishing is a good choice while Laura Miller (2010) states that while there are undoubtedly some gems among self-published manuscripts, most of them are of the type rejected by mainstream publishers, in other words the slush pile, and they are really bad” (cited in Bradley, Fulton, Helm, Pittner, 2011). Such comments are to be expected since the traditional publishers are starting to feel the threat to a practice they were used to for a very long time.
Some groups of authors might also be concerned that the stature and notability of having been chosen by publishers will be compromised. However, other personalities in the mainstream media, such as Anita Bartholomew (2010), view the situation otherwise. She challenges Miller’s view of the slush pile, “claiming that much, although certainly not all, of it is good, just not good enough, and could be fixed if a good editor wished to take the time” (cited in Bradley, Fulton, Helm, Pittner, 2011). Meanwhile, well known authors who get into self-publishing through e-books generated ethical concerns. Some literary agents began to be open to self-publishing authors (Rinzler, 2010). The article How Publishing Really Works (2009) presented and examined the news that some “mainstream publishers were referring their rejected manuscripts to self-publishing companies elicited comments about the ethical dimensions of such a practice.” An example of this practice, Harlequin, a leading publisher of romance fiction, is partnering with Author Solutions, a leader in self-publishing (Montgomery, 2009 as cited in Bradley, Fulton, Helm, Pittner, 2011).

Nevertheless, 2010 and 2011 are touted to be the years when e-book established its “staying power” in the global market. This is particularly due to reports indicating its sales overtaking printed manuscripts. “In 2010, mainstream publishers and Amazon struggled over prices for e-books, with some publishers securing the ability to set prices (the agency model), amidst consumer hostility (Rich and Stone, 2010). In January 2011, Amazon announced that e-books had outsold paperbacks, with 115 e-books to 100 paperbacks (Pepitone, 2011 as cited in Bradley, Fulton, Helm, Pittner, 2011).

The e-book phenomenon is further emphasized and put on the spotlight by the recognition and response of the faculty and administrators of the Columbia Publishing course at Cambridge, Massachusetts (Bosman, 2011). Experts in the industry attest to the unpredictability that digital publishing brings. This is explored and expounded by e-book publishing expert Nicholas Callaway in his lecture to students of the course entitled “Reinventing the Reading Experience: From Print to Digital”. Along with Mr. Callaway, “managers from Penguin Group USA explained how to master “e-marketing,” and a panel of digital experts talked about short-form electronic publishing—not quite a magazine article, not quite a book—which is so new, the genre doesn’t really have a name (Bosman, 2011).

Currently, the story has turned to the opposite direction from ten years ago. There are several platforms and models from which e-book publishing can be accomplished. Among the most popular are the following:

1. Amazon.com where Jeff Bezos is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) offers the Kindle Direct Publishing that lets publishers and writers upload books for sale on Amazon.com and the e-books can be read on Amazon's Kindle e-reader or other devices that support Amazon Kindle applications (“apps”). Amazon gives 70% of the e-book price to authors or publishers for e-books priced from $2.99 to $9.99 and purchased by consumers in certain geographic markets (Austria, Canada, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). E-books priced outside of the defined price range and the purchased from outside these territories are given 35% of its list price for every unit sold.

2. Barnes & Noble’s (BN) William Lynch, CEO presents “PubIt!” a system that lets publishers and writers upload books to Barnes & Noble’s online e-bookstore. The uploaded e-books can be read on BN’s own e-book device Nook and other devices that support its format. BN, which operates only in North America, gives 65% of the e-book price to authors or publishers for every unit sold of e-books priced within the same range as Amazon’s suggested $2.99 and $9.99. E-books priced below or above this range are given 40% of their list price for every unit sold.

3. For Apple, former CEO Steve Jobs states that they allow authors to upload and distribute books to its iBookstore, which is part of the larger iTunes electronic storefront that also sells music, movies and other digital content. Users of Apple’s popular devices—the iPad and the iPhone—access the iBookstore through and read e-books on its iBooks application. Apple operates iTunes/iBookstore stores (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, the United States) and six gives 70% of the price of the e-book to authors or publishers for every unit, regardless of the price of the e-book.

4. Print and digital self-publishing company Lulu publishes an estimated 20,000 new titles per month. According to its CEO Bob Young, Lulu doesn’t charge authors to publish, but does charge for a range of services that include editing and cover design. Lulu.com takes 20% of the revenue from each sale.

5. Smashwords is a digital distribution platform that supports a variety of ebookstores, including Sony, Apple and Barnes & Noble. Founder Mark Coker offers 85% of the net proceeds from the e-book’s sale back to the authors. To date, they have more than 12,600 titles. Smashwords is an example of a publishing platform that does not use Digital Rights Management (DRM), the technology for protecting e-book files from copyright infringement, e.g. unauthorized copying and re-distribution.

6. Fast Pencil is a website with social networking features for authors to simplify writing and producing books. CEO Steve Wilson provides services for publishing in print and in a variety of e-book formats.

7. Scribd is a website for publishing documents that can be read online or on a range of mobile devices. According to CEO Trip Adler, it allows authors to give e-books away for free, or set process and sell them on site. Authors get an 80% share of revenue.

8. Author Solutions is a self-publishing company that charges authors for preparing, marketing and selling their titles. CEO Kevin Weiss presents their imprints, which include AuthorHouse, iUniverse and Xlibris. The company claims to have published more than 125,000 titles by more than 85,000 authors.

It is apparent that the leaders in this “new” publishing ecosystem are directly if not closely related to a few inter-dependent industries: consumer electronics (Sony and Samsung), computer hardware and software (Apple and Microsoft) and online services (Amazon and BN). These industries converge to cooperate and compete to ensure availability, distribution and readership of e-published works. They aim to provide content to the iPad, Kindle, Nook and a long list of devices based on Google’s Android tablet operating system, where e-books can be read. The individual companies are constantly on the lookout to develop and/or acquire “better” technology to snare wider consumer adoption of their products, and thus a larger market share.

Authors, meanwhile, are beginning to realize opportunities for their creations, which were not obtainable before the introduction of the technology.

E-SEA

These are only some of the current publishing industry trends in the West. How about in Southeast Asia? How are we responding to this breakthrough for authors, publishers and consumers?

The most glaring fact is the lack of prominence of Asia in this discourse. Where is the Southeast Asia in the picture? Whenever one seeks information about e-books, it is rare to come across work from the Asian region. One has to include the word “Asia” to be able to get data on e-books in Asia. Does this reflect again the dominance of the West in a platform that unsettles the capitalist hegemonic notion that the West determines what is to be consumed?

Who are the authors who were successful in their shift to e-book publishing? To date, they are predominantly from Northern America and Europe. It is a fact that Asians are not as popular as their western counterparts in the business of publishing, but with the current shift in the industry, perhaps we could take advantage of the opportunity to contribute to further modifications in terms of the power play in the publishing industry.

Are our works available on the Amazon Kindle Store, Apple iBookstore, or Barnes & Noble Nook Store? Most probably not since what we do in the region is create our own platforms. The result therefore is that we are mostly the only ones who are able to access and enjoy our books.
Our ultimate goal as authors is for our works to be made available in the global community, to enjoy the same opportunity in terms of readership as those works distributed on Kindle, iBooks and Nook. If our response to this opportunity is to simply transform the traditional content to an electronic version, then we are just maintaining the notion of dominance of the West in the publishing industry.

ASIA ON THE MOVE

Going back to the question on how Asia is responding to this development in the publishing industry, the query provides a glimpse at the current state of socio-cultural and international relations of the region. At the moment, various Asian countries demonstrate interest in joining the e-book publishing industry. How they approach this undertaking illuminates their perceptions of the functions and effects of e-books in their culture and society. How the international community, which includes the major players in the industry who are predominantly in the West, responds to the Asian initiatives shows as well how they perceive the Asian market will react and should react. Just like in the traditional publishing practice, power relations are displayed, with the role of dominant players given to the West while Asians are relegated to the subordinate or supporting part. Clearly with the difficulty or lack of purchasing power given to most Asian countries by giant companies such as Apple, Amazon and Barnes and Noble (Kindle, Nook, iBookstore are not available in most Asian regions) the e-book revolution of the West seems to be transpiring in a different plane compared to what’s happening in Asia. The glossy picture that paints self-publishing as an easy and attainable task for authors is not as simple as what is presented. Asian authors find it difficult to upload local books in the major distribution platforms such as Amazon’s Kindle and Apple’s iBookstore, more so on BN’s Nook. It is possible but not unproblematic. Therefore, Asian publishers create their own platforms to provide service directly to the Asian market.

The important question to be asked here is this: given the opportunity that e-book technology brings to the publishing trade, what are we going to do about it? If we concentrate our efforts in e-book publishing with mostly the Asian market in mind, how do we get out of the dominant-subordinate dialectics? If our authors are not given equal opportunities as their Western counterparts in terms of marketing and distribution, then the role of technology here is not as simple as what is presented. Asian authors find it difficult to upload local books in the major distribution platforms such as Amazon’s Kindle and Apple’s iBookstore, more so on BN’s Nook. It is possible but not unproblematic. Therefore, Asian publishers create their own platforms to provide service directly to the Asian market.

China, the most populated nation and biggest economy in the world, has expressed plans in developing programs involving the e-book industry. In 2010 “China Publishing Group plans to raise as much as 1.8 billion yuan ($264 million) in an initial public offering in Shanghai by the end of 2010; Chinese all, the largest e-book aggregator and distributor in China rolled out a Copyright Purchase plan with a total investment of 10 million yuan ($1.48 million), aiming to further expand its content base; and Hanwang has just announced partnership with 40 Newspapers, which certainly strengthens its leading position in the China eReader industry” (epublishasia.com). The e-book industry goes beyond the economic aspect in the way that China is responding to the technology. A newspaper article posted ten predictions on how e-books will transform some areas in the Chinese way of life:

Ten predictions for China’s digital publishing industry in 2011
China’s digital publishing industry developed rapidly in 2009 and 2010. What about the situation in 2011?

- Prediction One: The telecommunication operators will dominate the “food chain” of digital reading. Among the three major operators, China Mobile will account for the largest market share.  

360
• Prediction Two: There will be an important breakthrough in the integration of the industrial chain. China will form an industrial alliance in the digital publishing area to establish an open platform for the rapid development of China’s digital publishing industry.

• Prediction Three: Xinhua Bookstores in different regions will take part in digital publishing. The producers of e-reading devices should seize the good opportunity to expand their marketing channels.

• Prediction Four: The sales of three mobile reading terminals will increase sharply. The increase in the sales of E-books, Tablet PC and intelligent mobile phones will promote the popularization of digital reading.

• Prediction Five: The number of e-schoolbag pilot schools will rise highly. The e-schoolbag plan will make a contribution to reducing costs for teaching materials.

• Prediction Six: The national digital publishing bases will develop rapidly. There will be 10 national digital publishing bases in China by the end of 2011, and the total output value will exceed 100 billion RMB.

• Prediction Seven: There will be no monopoly position in the e-paper industry for Yuantai. The other two e-paper producers, Youda and Gaotong, will compete with Yuantai, which will lead to a price reduction in the e-reading market.

• Prediction Eight: The distribution channels through iPhone/iPad will become popular with traditional media. More and more traditional magazines and newspapers launch their digital versions on the App Store Platform, and more Chinese publications will join them in 2011.

• Prediction Nine: Smuggled Kindle device will capture a share of China’s e-book market. The smuggled Kindle will enter China’s e-book market, affecting the sales of national brands, such as Hanvon and Hanlin.

• Prediction Ten: E-book terminals attached to publishing houses will be closed, stopped, or merged. Publishing houses should focus on content rather than e-book terminals.

Source: Ten predictions for China’s digital publishing industry in 2011 (In Chinese)

Japan is also on the move. In an article posted on japantoday.com, writer Dennis Posadas asserts that e-book publishing should be considered especially by university presses. He states that economic and financial challenges faced by these institutions will be covered and solved through this approach in publishing. He maintains that high standards for editorial work are still in place but due to the exorbitant cost of traditional publishing a number of “deserving” publications have yet to be printed and distributed. “Their (university presses) operations are often supported by razor-thin grants that are hard to come by in these recessionary times, except perhaps in universities with large endowments or state and grant funding. They are chartered to publish and protect the production of new knowledge and culture; but often, their only strength is the name and reputation of the university itself” (Posadas, 2010). Posadas adds that the new publishing platform could even improve the compensation conditions of those working in the industry since “E-books are a way to lower the costs of publishing, as the cost is limited to editorial, copyediting and design and no longer includes printing and storage costs” (Posadas, 2010). One of Japan’s organizations that is devoted to this emerging modification in the publishing industry is Japan Electronic Publishing Association (JEPA) a membership organization whose members are companies and organizations coming from various fields and industries, including publishing, printing, electronic devices manufacturing, software development/marketing, digital contents distribution and information communication providers (http://www.jepa.or.jp).

South Korea has the Korea Electronic Publishing association (KEPA). The organization focuses on the development of Korean electronic publishing industry. Its primary objective is to raise public awareness in issues and matters relating to electronic publication. It also provides assistance for certifications for VAT exemption of electronic publications. This is accomplished through the operation of electronic publication certification center, electronic publishing education center and joint electronic publication production center. They are also looking into the market entrance of digital publication by publishing companies through consulting (http://www.kepa.or.kr).
In the Southeast Asian region Singapore’s iG Publishing has started digitizing books primarily about Asia. At present, they claim to have already converted 50,000 titles from more than 100 reputable North American, European and Asian academic publishers. Titles are in the categories of Asian studies, business and management, engineering, humanities and social science, law, medical and health science. Sung Tinnie, iG’s publishing director for International Sales and Marketing maintains that libraries in Australia, China, Korea and the Southeast Asia subscribe to their platform. According to Dr. Aung Maw, director of the development team in Thailand, iG continues to improve its e-book platform to better serve consumers.

Thailand’s Asiabooks is one of the country’s biggest English-language booksellers; it also has its own e-book platform. Their business development team offers self-publishing opportunities. Their e-books are available in their own Asiabooks e-bookstore. Paul Salvette (2011) through his correspondence with Khun Orapin Asiabooks’ Business Development Director presented the procedure in self e-publishing with Asiabooks:

1. Asiabooks pays author 50% of sales at the end of every month (in Thai Baht)
2. Author is responsible for cover, editing, content (must not be plagiarized, etc.)
3. A formal contract is required that is valid for two years
4. Author can set the price of the e-Book for sale on the Asiabooks site
5. Pricing policy is similar to Amazon, and the minimum price for a book will be about 30 Thai Baht (~$US1)
6. eBooks can be published in PDF or ePub formats (formatting tips for PDF and ePub files can be found in the free Smashwords Style Guide)
7. eBooks need an ISBN (author’s responsibility)
8. Author must provide meta-data and FTP their files per Asiabooks’ instructions


There are other countries in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines that have engaged in e-book publishing. Knowledge of this technology may have already existed even before the current upsurge of e-books in the global community. Companies such as Innodata-Isogen and SPI Global, with their data processing roots from the 1990s, shifted their focus from database projects to e-book conversion for Western publishers. Barnes and Noble’s Digital Content Division operated a Philippine a subsidiary during the late 1990s to early 2000s specifically for the production of e-books. Filipino employees were the ones crafting books in different electronic formats. Thus, it is safe to claim that a number of Filipinos through the outsourcing set-up of giant publishers possess e-book making knowledge and skills. I used the word making instead of publishing since that was what exactly we were doing in the Philippines. As previously discussed in this paper, the success of the e-book was delayed by a decade. However, during this 10-year technology incubation period Filipino or Philippines-centric companies continued to service giant publishers for their e-book conversions as part of the country’s growing offshore business process outsourcing (BPO) sector. One such company, Flipside Digital Content, an offshoot of the BN subsidiary for e-books, continued working with its former parent company and publisher-clients to convert thousands of books according to industry specifications as set forth by the International Digital Publishing Forum (IDPF). Flipside Digital Content continues to provide outsourced work for major publishers in the U.S. and the U.K. It is the only outsourcing provider, however, to recognize the fact that it can afford the same expertise to local authors and publishers. Thus, its affiliate Flipside Publishing Services was established to help local authors and publishers release their works internationally and locally via e-book publishing. Flipside’s local affiliate was only recently launched given the still-emerging opportunities available to Asian publishers as presented by the increase in global interest in e-books. Initial evidence of this conclusion was observed in the increased volumes of titles shipped to the Philippines for e-book conversion from major publishers in the industry. What is different in Flipside’s platform compared to other Asian e-book publishing companies is its capability, gained from 12 years of outsourcing experience, to produce e-books within the IDPF’s EPUB 2.2 and 3.0 specifications, as well as the nuanced proprietary implementations for Amazon’s Kindle (mobi) format and Apple’s advanced
Fixed Layout, Enhanced and Read Aloud EPUB formats. This capability allows Flipside to make locally authored books available on the top three DRM-secure book distribution platforms: Amazon’s Kindle, Apple’s iTunes iBooks and B&N Nook. Under this program, the works of local authors have a chance to be on the same stage as those released by giant Western publishing houses and consequently, the opportunity to be recognized in the international publishing scene.

The main confirmation though that e-books are finally welcomed by Asian society is the renewed interest that Western giant publishers express. According to Fei Chen Lee, Deputy Head of Publishing with Singapore-based Times Publishing Ltd's Marshall Cavendish, digital publishing, Asia is picking up pace. “I would think that almost every publisher should have some digital plans by now. The bigger publishers would likely develop in-house competencies, while smaller publishers would look for partners to work with.” Jo Lusby, General Manager with Penguin China is optimistic that the locals will embrace e-books positively: “China's publishing economy is on a very similar trajectory to the United Kingdom and the US.” Jonathan Atkins International Development Director with UK-based Pan Macmillan, which runs an office out of Hong Kong, for his part notices how Asians embraced popular devices that carry e-books: “Here, people want their device to be more than a reading device. They want it to be a phone, they want it to be a music player”. This observation points toward the popularity of iPhones and iPads in the region. This further affirmed by Arief Hakim Sani, Secretary General with the ASEAN Book Publishers’ Association, based in Malaysia: “I don't think that people buy these devices for reading purposes. But when they discover they can buy e-books, they will. Once they have the device, there is no turning back” (Hong-Kong-Trader-Hong-Kong-Edition/Seeking-The-E-In-Asia.htm, 2011).

At this point in this socio-economic and socio-political game, the focus is not anymore on who can create the “best” platform for e-books. Admittedly, it took more than a decade before the standards are finally and confidently established, but the international industry has already fully adopted the EPUB specification of the IDPF. It will be very difficult and counter-productive to let another decade pass just to develop another set of standards. Hence the logical step to take is to get our content out there in the world, not just in Asia, using the international standard.

The challenge for much of the Asian market’s inability to purchase e-books from the top three retailers Amazon Kindle, Apple iBookstore and Barnes and Noble Nook, still needs to be hurdled. Experts affirm this “readers access e-books and media here may be different from models in the West. While Kindle sales are peaking in the US and UK markets, the Amazon device is not available in many parts of the Asia-Pacific. Nor are mass consumers particularly won over by dedicated e-readers” (Hong-Kong-Trader-Hong-Kong-Edition/Seeking-The-E-In-Asia.htm, 2011).

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

It is clear that the introduction of e-book technology in the publishing industry triggered societal changes in the economic aspect of the publishing cultures. It impacted the author-publisher relationship and poses other alterations in other social spheres. According to an article published in Hongkong Trader, industry experts from giant publishing companies such as Penguin, Pan Macmillan and Random House, observe that “The trend for aspirational living across Asia has spurred the popularity of business and self-learning books, which transition well to e-formats. That same young, energetic, ambitious demographic has more disposable income and readily accepts new technology, leading publishers to think that take-up could snowball. Fast monitoring of sales and buying trends could mean publishers react quicker in the marketplace, with printing, distribution and storage logistics lessened by digital's impact” (Hong-Kong-Trader-Hong-Kong-Edition/Seeking-The-E-In-Asia.htm, 2011).

Education is an example of a social institution that will most probably experience system changes. The conversion of textbooks to e-textbooks may impact the learning process of students positively or negatively, specifically, the processes of imparting knowledge such as teacher-oriented and student/self-facilitated learning styles. What could be the cultural repercussions of the introduction of e-books in an institution highly influential in honing identities of society members? In China, the Municipal Education
Commission, Municipal Press and Publication Bureau and Hongkou District government in Shanghai recently signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement on Promoting a Digital Learning Environment to promote the “e-schoolbag” project in Shanghai’s Hongkou District. In the first half of this year, eight schools in the district have successfully conducted the pilot project, supporting the “e-schoolbag” network, content and terminal services platform” (Source: “e-schoolbag” Project Will Be Promoted in Schools in Shanghai).

Currently, a couple of schools in the Philippines are testing the use of e-books in teaching basic education in place of the traditional textbooks. E-textbooks are loaded in tablet devices for the consumption of students as young as grade-schoolers. This is carried out without much research on the possible effects or consequences on the ability of students to acquire expected competencies. The initial rational given by both school administrators and parents for adopting this scheme is to lighten the physical burden of children having to carry heavy books to school. Presently, concerns are coming out on the effect/s of utilizing applications in the “enhanced” and “interactive” versions of the e-converted textbooks on attaining learning objectives. For example, will concentration on the interactivity of e-books compromise development of students’ motor skills in their ability to write on paper, or will enhanced e-books prevent, stunt or help children in utilizing the faculty of imagination?

If the Yi Yoront tribe changed after the introduction of the steel axe, it is interesting to discover if changes within the range of impact of the Yi Yoront tribe will transpire in the Philippines due to e-books. It is equally interesting to find out and anticipate the effects of Asia engaging in e-book publishing in the power-relations and political economy of the global community.

Will e-books’ impact reach the ideological level of change? Will it trigger alterations of perceptions on the dominant dialectics? It is indeed a tool to resist the status quo. Who knows what will happen, perhaps the tip of the scale will turn to our favor. Maybe it is our turn to be read.

Our hope that our thoughts and stories will be read by a wider audience composed not only of Asian readers may come true if only we are able to look outside of ourselves. For us to stop perceiving ourselves as exotic beings with exotic stories. We should look at the global community as our audience. We do this by producing works that can be related to by “everybody”. If and when we are able to accomplish this, perhaps we, who are more often than not on the receiving end of hegemonic devices, too can cultivate our own hegemonies that may be consumed by our perceived counterparts.

Ultimately, since books are repository of cultures, e-book technology might be able to mediate conflicts brought about by intercultural misunderstandings. Ethnocentrism might be reduced because people from different parts of the global community will have access to information and knowledge of peoples who possess different cultures from them. E-books might contribute to the reduction of conflicts since it may reduce ignorance or lack of understanding of how “other” people live.

Let’s wait and see, because e-books are here to stay.

REFERENCES


Fowler, Geoffrey A. & Trachtenberg, Jeffrey. The Future of the Book. geoffrey.fowler@wsj.com, jeffrey.trachtenberg@wsj.com. (Retrieved July 2011)


CITY OF GHOSTS: CITY OF GHOSTS: AN ONTOLOGY OF MOVEMENT AND VALUE IN THE LIFE OF A SAIGON SALES-GIRL

Robbie Peters
Department of Anthropology, School of Social and Political Sciences
The University of Sydney, Australia
robbie.peters@sydney.edu.au

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the everyday life of a sales girl in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and takes up Walter Benjamin’s ideas of modernity to understand the essentially ephemeral nature of its experience in the Southeast Asian urban context. For the sales girl depicted here, this experience of the city is dominated by private motorbike transport. Her experience sheds light on the new type of urban citizen that is emerging out of a dominant development trajectory towards investment in transport infrastructure as the key to economic growth and income distribution in Southeast Asian cities.

Using biography as a revealing tool of social scientific analysis, the paper traces the girl’s purchase of a motorbike, migration to HCMC, move into a rooming house and work in a department store to her annual pilgrimage home during the New Year. As revealed in a short story written by the girl, this paper considers the conclusion that the city is a place of ghosts where nobody finds belonging: a place where people are both in transit and transition, but never at home. The generality of this experience of the city is also considered using comparisons with motorbike use among the poor in Indonesian cities.

Keywords: Transport, Cities, Development, Labor, Home

MOTORBIKES AND MENTAL LIFE IN THE CITY: THE STORY OF A SAIGON SALES GIRL

The movement of people into Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), represents the current global demographic shift towards cities and seemingly affirms Jane Jacob’s (1984) controversial idea that cities are the nation’s key units of economic growth. HCMC is the centre of migration, attracting 3 million rural to urban and 1.5 million urban to urban migrants in the second half of the 1990s. Long Hai, a town three hours out from HCMC with an economy based on pilgrimage only partly reflects the growth of urban corridors and what McGee, Young and others have referred to variously as the urbanisation of the rural in Southeast Asia as urban corridors form along major roads, absorbing small towns into peri-urban regions (McGee, 1967; Dick and Rimmer, 2009). On the edge of the busy HCMC-Vung Tau corridor, the town of Long Hai, is the site of rapid change as new roads are being built and widened, land reclaimed for development by the government, and new hotels, guest houses, temples and beach fronts developed as the town forms part of a beachside recreation strip stretching over fifty kilometres north to an MGM Grand Casino now under construction. To the west, a four lane boulevard connects to the colonial-era tourist town of Vung Tau and the gas refinery town of Ba Ria, from where a road is being widened all the way to HCMC. Congested with minibuses, trucks and motorbikes, the road reflects a nation of people on the move between towns and cities. Despite its diversity, this movement is predominantly private and made possible by the transport revolution created by cheap mophead motorbikes (Dick and Rimmer, 2009). According to Dang, et al (1997: 321), the open market reforms put in place since the mid-1980s under the name of DoiMoi have had wide reaching social effects, but none more ‘obvious than the spatial mobility’. AlexandreDormeiereFreire (2009: 74) points to the motorbike as symbolising these social changes. This paper will analyse the social effects of these changes through the experience of Tuong, a sales girl in HCMC and recent migrant from Long Hai.
Tuong, 33, has been visiting Long Hai every few months since leaving in 2005 to earn income in the salons and massage clinics of HCMC. A visitor to her hometown of Long Hai and newcomer in HCMC, she epitomises the increased geographic mobility of poor labour migrants, who the World Bank define as a force of economic growth and poverty alleviation in the Developing World:

Labor migration promotes growth. Within countries, the accumulated empirical evidence shows that labor migration increases the earnings prospects of people who move. It also shows that labor migration contributes to aggregate growth by improving the distribution of labor, driving concentration. And by clustering skills and talent, migration drives agglomeration spillovers (World Bank, 2009: 162).

Migrants to HCMC are credited with performing most of the jobs in the city, increasing its GDP and lifting themselves from poverty (Locke, et al: 9, 10). In income terms at least Tuong has lifted herself from poverty: earning $30 per month from her small market stall in Long Hai to $40 per month for washing hair in a backstreet salon in HCMC to $60 massaging clients of the global cosmetics chain, Shiseido, to $150 in her current role as a Shiseido sales girl in one of HCMC’s major department stores. Since she first arrived in HCMC back in 2005, working as a hair washer and earning around 50 per cent of the average income for an individual (of $850 pa), Tuong has gained work experience, received months of cosmetics training with Shiseido and learned English; all of which have helped her increase her income to over three times what it was when she first arrived. In income terms, Tuong has done well, validating the abovementioned idea that ‘labour migration increases the income of those who move’.

Development theorists, however, have been arguing at least since some unconventional economists asserted that a person’s poverty is determined by more than income alone and should be understood in terms of what Amartya Sen calls their freedoms – an enlightenment idea of an individual freed from the bonds of tradition to access the entitlements (education, decision making, health care, food) that he says determine that freedom. In this idea of freedom as distance from bonds, the individual resembles the commodity as a freely circulating object, separated from its constitutive relationships and ultimately mortified in the Baudrillardian sense of commodification as death. This separation, following Simmel produces value. Through the story of Tuong, this paper posits an ontology of counter-value embedded in a sense of time and body that resists their commodification.

IMMOBILITY AS EXCEPTION

Migration was familiar for Tuong. Her family had been on the move around Central and South Vietnam since her mother’s death in 1990. The death of her mother, a skilled tailor and the family’s major income earner, placed great financial stress on her father, forcing him to take Tuong and her two sisters, one older and one younger, out of school and into work to help their father support their five-year-old brother. In search of work, the father travelled around South Vietnam in search of work, carrying his son with him. His daughters were left in the place where their mother had died, a town in central Vietnam called Ben fue, where they rented a market shack, slept in it at night and sold cigarettes, toiletries, packaged snacks and lottery tickets from it during the day. After six months, Tuong’s father had settled several hundred kilometres to south in Long Hai and asked his daughters to join him and help him in his stall on the edge of a market, where he was earning enough money altering clothes. Tuong found work in a nearby market stall selling coffee to the market traders, while her two sisters helped their father with his business.

After a year selling coffee in the market and making little money, Tuong returned to the family’s hometown of Wanghai to support her widowed grandmother and find work. She grew onions on her family’s half acre plot, farming it collectively with the owners of five surrounding plots, hauling the harvest to market every few weeks, selling it to a buyer there and dividing the returns. Earning only enough money for one meal of rice and tofu per day, Tuong supplemented her income and her diet by bicycling ten kilometres into the forest each day to forage for nuts and by waking at 2am each morning to go to the shoreline while the tide was
out and harvest the seaweed on the exposed rocks and sand banks. After two years Tuong’s father ordered her to return to Long Hai, demanding that the family should not be separated and that Tuong must join them under one roof. Tuong reflected positively on her time in Wanghai, pointing to the independence she felt regarding the diversity of income earning activities in which she engaged:

*I was only a young girl and usually should have been under my family roof, but I was doing many different things: although the work was hard I liked it because I felt industrious and that may life was changing and maturing with what I was learning and seeing through all the different work. I could no earn much on the farm growing onions or foraging in the forest and on the beach, but I could see much: much outside the home and the market, which was all I knew until that time.*

Tuong’s reflections here provide an ontology of work as personal growth beyond the confines of family: a value that was well placed in the then new DoiMoi Vietnam as more women left their families to join the rural exodus of young adults to the cities (Locke, et al, 2008: 3). Tuong was still only in her mid-teens, however, and would have to wait another ten years before she had the confidence to leave her family for work in the city. When Tuong returned to Long Hai, her father’s alterations business had grown along with the surrounding market area. Soon after, however, a fire destroyed the market, leaving her father with nothing but the outstanding credit to his debtors for the cloth he had purchased. Tuong helped her father pay his debts by renting a tiny shack in the market, where she cut people’s hair and did their make-up. After many years of paying off the debts and beginning to save a small amount of money, she decided to look for work in HCMC.

When Tuong was preparing to migrate to HCM, the government was relaxing its restrictions on movement, enabling people to more easily gain permits to live and work outside their home provinces as part of its decollectivisation of rural life through land transfers to individuals and families, leading to a massive increase of land poor or landless who left the countryside, seeing no reason to stay now that the government’s subsidy and rationing system was being abolished. Decollectivisation effectively withdrew a major means of subsistence protection for poor families and shifted investment away from rural health care and education facilities (Dang, et al, 1997: 319, 321, 326; Locke, et al, 2008: 4). This shift of investment sparked a shift of people from the country to the city and came at the cost of what Dang et al (1997: 332) called ‘social distance’.

**A MOBILE CITIZEN**

In 2005, aged 27, Tuong was ready to move to HCMC. In preparation for her journey, she gathered $150, the equivalent of almost six months income from her tiny cosmetics stall in the market. The money came from her own savings, the sale of her old bracelet and money borrowed from friends. With it she purchased a second hand motorbike for $150, leaving five dollars: enough for a tank of petrol to get her into HCMC. For the sacrifice of six month’s income, Tuong joined the growing ranks of private motorbike owners, whose numbers had been growing continuously since the late-1980s when the government privatised transport as part of its open market reforms. Tuong attests that she could not live in HCMC without motorbike, the main means of transport for almost all the city’s residents, compared to a quarter of residents in the region’s two largest cities, Bangkok and Jakarta. Describing her motorbike in prosthetic terms as her ‘arms and legs’, Tuong epitomised the symbiosis of machine and body to form what ... calls the cyborg citizen, for whom the motorbike is a necessary appendage that enables them to live in the city (Dang, et al: 321; DormeiereFreire, 2009: 69, 77; Naohiro Kitano, 2000: 137).

In the academic literature on Southeast Asian cities, the motorbike is more typically associated with the conspicuous consumption of a fashion conscious middle class. As a fashion accessory that purveys wealth and style, what Pierre Bourdieu calls ‘...’, motorbikes are highly disposable items that lose style the longer they are retained (Truitt, 2008; DormeiereFriere, 2009). This disposability has led to a large market in second hand motorbikes, enabling poor migrants like Tuong to purchase cheap old models. Rather than admiring new
motorbikes, the poor despise them as a form of ostentatious wealth that insults their poverty, or what DormeiereFriere (2009: 80) terms a form of symbolic violence. The second hand motorbike challenged this violence through a counter value of retention rather than disposability. This logic of retention made no sense to the HCMC middle class, as Catherine Earl (2004: 364) explains through the example of a status conscious middle class woman named Cuc:

Cuc considered the fascination that foreigners had for restored 50cc Honda Charlys or “retro” Vespas to be incomprehensible. Based on her assumption that all foreigners had disposable income, she could not believe that they would not hesitate to buy a new Japanese motorbike. She believed that Hondas were of the highest quality and produced the best performance. Each member of her family owned and ran a Honda Dream II, one of the latest models.

Contrary to Cuc’s desire for self affirmation through the possession of latest model motorbikes, the very disposability of such fashionable models serves to efface rather than validate the person. This idea of effacement rather than validation comes from George Simmel (1978: 69), who suggests that the desire for commodities forms the basis of their value and that this value is only possible through the separation of people from commodities. The unity of self and commodity is achieved only fleetingly due to the inherent disposability of commodities. As Simmel states, the value of commodities ‘originates from the separation between the subject and the content of enjoyment as an object that stands opposed to the subject as something desired’. For Tuong the value of her motorbike originated from her inseparability from it. Tuong valued her motorbike because, as she states: ‘it was like a book about me … my biography from the time I came to HCMC until now. You read it and you see my life [both] now and before’. Rather than valued as an ephemeral fashion item that must be disposed of and replaced by a newer model, Tuong’s motorbike is valued for the life journey it conveys.

Here, in Tuong’s relationship with her motorbike, lies an ontology that counters the ephemerality of urban existence with a sense of time as journey. Symbolising her journey through time, the old motorbike conveys what Martin Heidegger (1962: 423) calls the ‘stretching’ of time rather than the ephemerality of the moment. Through what he calls ‘making present’ versus ‘moment of vision’, Heidegger (1962: 399) contrasts the ephemeral present with an elongated time as the projected future through which the person brings themselves into a more authentic existence.

Migrants to HCMC note Locke, et al (2008: 9) ‘wait and see how they fare in the city’. Tuong was no exception: always thinking ahead to where she might be living or working, or as she says. As she put it herself, ‘I am always thinking about where I will in the future rather than where I am now in relation to other people in the city’. This ontological sense of herself over time rather than in the present was suited to partial citizenship of the city. Tuong did not have a temporary leave certificate from Long Hai, making her ineligible for a temporary residence permit for the city and, like most migrants, she chose to remain unregistered (Locke, et al, 2008: 7). Tuong’s illegibility lead to her illegibility: an ontological condition she likened to the wandering ghosts that are said to roam HCMC streets and public spaces. ‘I am like a ghost here in HCMC’, she stated, giving metaphor to her feeling of being illegible to government, or what she called ‘invisible’.

In Vietnam, the ghost represents not absence but invisibility through their occupation of an unseen world that is engaged by the living through offerings of food, prayer and the burning of incense to the dead. The smoke of the incense explains Tuong dissipates into that world, reaching its inhabitants and reminding them of the accompanying food and prayers offered to them. Despite their regular appeasement, these ghosts are said to have become more demanding of recognition by haunting people more often to prompt donations of the money and food that they see as having come into abundance under DoiMoi and which they missed out on in their worldly lives when times were less opulent (Kwon, 2007).

This unseen world and its unseen yet sentient personas parallels the administrative invisibility of the migrant as those denied the privileged access to formal employment, motorbike registration, health care and educational entitlements (Locke, et al, 2008: 6). The illegible migrant has become a figure of crime and social evils, forcing the government to begin accommodating them by relaxing regulations on residency permits, such
as issuing them permits based on six month’s work. Tuong’s roommate likens the government’s concession of some rights to migrants to the exchange that takes place between the living and the anonymous dead, where the former propitiate the latter to give them recognition and a share in Vietnam’s newfound wealth in order to appease them so that they won’t be haunted.

Like these public ghosts, migrants occupy the streets as fleeting anonymous personas. In a city that is now increasingly intolerant of street-side vendors, prostitutes, beggars, buskers or the like, migrants can make only the most temporary claims to the streets (ref). The most legitimate form they can take is ‘on the back of a motorbike’ as one of the city’s many fleeting, anonymous commuters. Like the migrant, their motorbikes are administratively invisible; established through an informal contract between buyer and seller, as Truitt (2008: 9) explains:

This social contract allowed the buyer and seller to avoid the lengthy procedures of transferring ownership, which required both parties to sign papers validated by the police stations in their areas of residence and for the new owner to purchase liability insurance and pay other fees. ... For people who purchased new motorbikes, and especially for those who intended to resell the vehicles, the registration process was compulsory.

The recycling of motorbikes enabled the migrant to avoid the costliness of a static, administratively defined citizenship fixed to a geographically defined area. As such, the recycled motorbike helped Tuong remain uncertified: a condition she preferred.

For a society in which the state apparently expressed itself through what Anh Nguyen Pham (2005: 1) terms ‘the use of space as a form of social control and an exercise of power to impose a specific social order’, Tuong was able to escape this administrative encapsulation in space and remain both ontologically and epistemologically itinerant. The distinction between these two modes of being is apparent in Henri Lefebvre’s (1991: 230) notion of lived experience, or ontology, as irreducible to its representation, or epistemology, stating: ‘knowledge falls into a trap when it makes representations of knowledge the basis for the study of ‘life’, for in so doing it reduces lived experience’. Epistemologically illegible and ontologically a ghost, Tuong embodied a counter narrative to the State’s ‘simplification’ of the social: an administrative gaze that views people in objectivist social scientific terms as what Norbert Elias (1970: 118) calls ‘isolated objects in a state of rest’. Elias (1970: 118) urged us to see ‘that a person is constantly in movement; he not only goes through a process, he is a process’. This view of time as process is biographical; looking back as one moves forward: a sense of time best captured in Walter Benjamin’s (1973: 259-60) angel, which looks back to the past as it hurtles forward into the future. Using the motorbike as her reference point, Tuong conveys a similar sense of time, stating: the world I see is from a motorbike, both looking ahead and looking back through the (rear-vision) mirror. Like Simmel’s view of the mental life of the metropolis as ... or Raymond Williams’ view of the city as the perspective of a walking person, Tuong views the city as a person passing through its streets.

SETTLING IN THE CITY

A political economy of dislocation underpins Tuong’s experience of the city. Regularly forced out of housing due to her inability to afford the rising rent costs, she contextualises her itinerant home life in the city as one precipitated by eviction:

I first arrived in HCMC and stayed with my brother, who was then finishing High School. For two years I shared his room of 3x3 metres at a total cost of $40. I made money washing hair in salons, while he repaired computers by night in a corner of the room. By the end of the year, he returned to Long Hai. His departure coincided with the landlord’s hiking of the rent to evict me and replace me with higher paying tenants. Determined not to return to Long Hai and forfeit my employment in HCMC, I again borrowed money from friends and family, rented a small room of 5x5 meters,
scribbled a request for roommates, made several duplicates at a nearby photocopy shop and pinned them to walls and power poles in the neighbourhood. Within a week I was sharing the rent with four recent migrants: young women from regional towns who had come to work and study in HCMC.

As required of all new tenants, Tuong and her roommates had to give the landlord photocopies of their family books to take to the police for documentation. The required temporary leave certificates from their hometowns were never requested; a sign that Tuong and her roommates interpret as the government managing the migrant problem through this semi-formal exchange of documentation due to its inability to make the population entirely legible. The municipal bureaucracy’s incapacity to register the many thousands of urban migrants and Tuong’s desire not to seek a residency permit, meant that she remained uncertified.

Aware that her residence in HCMC was dependent on her ability to earn an income, Tuong saw little benefit in the expensive and time consuming process of obtaining a permit, reasoning that she could lose her job at any time, quickly run out of money and be forced to return to Long Hai. In contrast to Jeremy Seabrook’s notion that the poor desire registration, the choice to remain unregistered was a growing trend in HCMC, with many poor migrants not bothering to register, while those with the temporary leave certificates did not bother to upgrade to permanent residency and only 1 per cent of migrants bothered to seek permanent household registration in HCMC (Locke, et al, 2008: 7).

Since arriving in HCMC, Tuong has lived in the peripheral TanhBinh district, which has the city’s largest migrant population, living predominantly in small shared rooms accommodating around five people, often women, who dominate migration to the city (Locke, et al, 2008: 3, 51, 4, 42-3). Forced there by rising rent costs, these women have to tolerate worsening living conditions in a city flooded with as much as five times the number of migrants of Hanoi and beset by a so called ‘land and housing fever’ lead by property developers and an emerging middle class eager to sink their assets into property (Locke, et al, 2008: 4). Housing has become perhaps the most tangible measure of the growing gap in wealth in Vietnam.

At the time of writing Tuong and her room mates were living in a tiny room infested with rats and mosquitoes after being evicted from their place of two years because the landlord wanted to renovate the room and increase the rent. The new room cost $200 per month, which was all they could afford. Cooking instant noodles on the floor beneath her motorbike, Tuong’s roommate used the noodles as a metaphor of their condition, stating: ‘these noodles are instant; cheap and convenient for people without time or money like us.’ Despite its convenience, such a diet was taking its toll. Tuong had been in the new place for six weeks and was becoming sick, her voice hoarse and body thin. Describing the place, she states:

I don’t like this place, its very hot, many mosquitos and rats. My legs have many mosquito bites. Last night the rats ate all my food, including a bunch of cillies and garlic! We don’t want to live here, but we can’t afford anything else. This is all you can get for the price in HCMC. We can’t find a place like where we were living before this for the same price now. The landlord there renovated the place for her son, installing an air-conditioner and painting the place, but he ended up not staying there. Now she wants us to come back, but for ... No matter how much I suffer here, I refuse to pay that much for the same place. I don’t need an air-conditioner. Even if I had the money, I wouldn’t stay there now.

Tuong explained her move to lesser accommodation not only in terms of her poverty but also in terms of her refusal to submit to the new parameters set by her old landlord. Her suffering was a moral statement against the injustice of HCMC’s revanchist-like housing market as well as a statement of her ability to resist middle class comforts and remain at home in the city as an unsettled urban resident.

Her room conveyed this sense of unsettlement: clothes hung drying from a rope strung across its opposing walls, making it difficult to stand. ‘Not a problem’ according to Tuong because she only used the room to sleep. Housing little else, the room lacked the space for pictures of her family or a small altar to the spirit world. Aware that her room was no place to dwell, she explained its qualities: ‘The most important thing about this room and any room I rent in this city is that it has space to park my motorbike’.
Tuong’s daily routine highlighted her dependence on the motorbike. Each morning she would wake around 6am, rush to the nearby market, purchase tofu, sausage and any cheap protein along with some leafy vegetables, bring it home and cook it in an old aluminium pot over a portable gas stove. With some rice prepared the day before, she would pack the food for her lunch, shower, make up her face, don a mask to protect her from the soot and gloves to protect from the sun and push her motorbike out of the room and head off into the city along the city’s major arterial, battling the morning peak hour. She would arrive home before midnight, leaver her no time to develop the neighbourhood social bonds that Catherine Earl (2010: 97) says so often fill the void left by one’s absence from their family. Even her roommates, with whom she shared the closest bonds, communicated with her by leaving notes on her sleeping mat or through text messages on her phone.

Time poor, Tuong depended on her motorbike as the only viable form of transport, stating:

_I caught the bus in the early days when my motorbike was stolen. The bus was very time consuming. I didn’t have the time for it and would have had difficult working, cooking and getting enough sleep if I persisted with the bus. There is nothing strange about this; even my roommates, who have less money than me, own cheap motorbikes, because they also have to study and work all day and know that it is almost impossible to live in HCMC without a motorbike._

Aside from her motorbike, Tuong’s most important possession was her array of documents: family book, identity card, cosmetics course certificates, a notebook recording her daily spending patterns and a diary of her thoughts. One afternoon, in her muggy unventilated room on a rare day off and while her roommates were at work, Tuong took the opportunity in their absence to spread these documents out across the floor of the room. From their place on a bottom shelf beneath her clothes in the room’s only cupboard, she gathered them with both hands and carefully spread them on the floor, flicking through the notebook and scanning her eyes across the certificates and family book to make sure that none were missing. She turned the pages of her notebook to show page after page recording her weekly expenditure, dating back to the first month of her arrival five years earlier when she earned only $1.30 per day washing hair in a salon. This income was recorded alongside her spending on petrol, vegetables, water and toiletries, leaving her only …, which she put forward to the next day: showing over months a gradual increase in her income as she gained more customers and saved more money to cover repairs on her motorbike, return journeys home, support for her family and donations to the temples she visited.

Tuong’s maps and sums were the intellectual appendage of her motorbike: calculative practices that determined travel times, shortest routes, varying peak hours, fuel consumption and food consumption, helping her develop an economy of distance and nutrition. She made these calculations, she said, ‘to get the most out of the little I have’. Her ‘strategy of looking ahead, not behind’ typified her approach to the city (Truitt, 2008: 13). Tuong is not concerned with the city at the moment but the city that lies ahead: an anticipatory approach to the city that denies any place for comparison to those around her. She explains her strongest character trait, noticed by all her friends and work colleagues in HCMC:

_My friends often laugh at me because I am always worried. Worried about what I will do next, about what I will do tonight, in the morning, the next day. I worry about what I will cook for dinner, what time I should leave home for work, whether there are any traffic accidents or police operations; what I should do on the way to work, whether I should fill up my tank with petrol on the way to work or on the way home, whether it is better for me to sleep a little longer and buy my dinner after working late; whether I should drink more water because of the poor quality, salty street stall food I have been eating; whether I should leave my motorbike for repairs at the mechanic; whether I should wake up early and buy clothes from the market and send them to my family to sell in Long Hai. I’m always thinking of the next step. This worry stops when I return to Long Hai._
Tuong attests that this attitude of anticipation was brought on by the city, beginning with notes in her notebook, but transferring to intellectual notes that she says swirl around in her head as she rearranges them to plan out her best approach to the city. The anticipatory maps she builds are meant to factor in the unexpected: work could be busy, ending her shift an hour late as food stalls are closing, requiring that she wake up early and prepare tofu and vegetables, go hungry or eat late. Tuong’s anticipatory mapping of the city helped her attune her biorhythms to the varied work-rhythms of the city in an attempt to anticipate tiredness and fend off the invasion by illness or malicious spirits that tiredness allows.

For Tuong, motorbike accidents epitomise tiredness: her legs are marked with scars from falling off her motorbike; exhaust pipe burns and grazes from the passing motorbikes of other people. She explained all these accidents as the result of tiredness taking away her attentiveness and causing her to daydream. A daydream-like ponderous attitude is dangerous for Tuong and counter-balanced by a constant attentiveness to her engagement with the city. Without the certainties of entitlement through the bond of state and citizen in pre-reform Vietnam to provide a modicum of health care and land, comes a new type of citizen who requires a constant self atonement to the changes of city life.

Anticipation is a more ontologically real condition for Heidegger (1962: 386-7), who describes it as a condition where the ‘future must first win itself, not from the present, but from the inauthentic future’. Unlike the flaneur, Tuong is never absorbed by the moment but projects herself ahead of it. Heidegger (1962: 388) calls this self projection into the future as the ‘authentic coming-towards-itself of anticipatory resoluteness’. This is what he calls ‘making present’ by ‘falling into the world of one’s concern’. Tuong’s constant projection entails a leaving behind of the present, a placelessness and ephemerality that is the foundation of her condition as an itinerant boarding house city resident without any rights to property or any claim to permanence in the city: a woman whose only social statement is through the contrast between her motorbike as an enduring object stretching across time and the wealthy person’s motorbike as doomed to redundancy.

THE ABSTRACT CITIZEN

The city’s main thoroughfare takes Tuong from the outer district of TanhBinh directly through to her work in the city centre. The road is an effacing space of passage: rimmed by the broad windows of new shop fronts and footpaths, and obstructed only by the traffic lights of large intersections, it enables the uninterrupted flow of traffic and no place for peddle powered vehicles or slow moving motorbikes, everything moving at least 50 kilometre per hour. Here warns Tuong, ‘there is not time to stop and ask directions, no one staying around on the street to help, everything is on the move’. This opening up of the city with thoroughfares, has commonly been viewed as annihilating spatial boundaries and the differences they produce, giving rise to an amorphous, abstract citizen (Lefebre, 1999: 303). It was during the time after the establishment of broad boulevards in London, Paris and Berlin by the middle of the 19th Century that the fleeting anonymous crowd came into existence and with it the abstract citizen who captured the imagination of writers on the city from Baudelaire to Simmel and Benjamin, with the later interested in a new optics he called the bird’s-eye-view of the photograph as opposed to the impression of the ‘unmarred eye’ (1973: 225). The bird’s eye view captured the crowd, bringing it into existence and eliminating any sense of the person in the crowd.

Cities of boulevards and mechanically reproducible images brought the crowd into existence and effaced the individual, who became imagined by positivist social scientists of the period as a component object, undifferentiated from his/hersurrounding others and together forming what Durkheim called a social fact external to the individual. Conveying this disappearance of the person by the crowd, Durkheim (1952: 310) suggests that ‘instead of becoming isolated, [the individual] becomes grouped and combined, [producing] something new in the world ...’ Termed the ‘collective conscious’, which he likens to ‘cosmic forces’ that ‘affect the individual from without’, this powerful external force condemns the individual to the silence of anonymity with its insidious potential for suicide (Durkheim: 1952: 309). Brought on by the crowd and imagined communities, this insidious silence enables discourse to be projected on to those rendered most silent and without recourse to the privileged organs of public debate like political parties, politicians, middle-class social organisations and journalists.
In HCMC this silence of the crowd and resultant projection on to its anonymous personas is seen during the morning peak every Sunday as young women head into the city on their motorbikes along the main thoroughfare. On old motorbikes that rattle into town from the outer suburbs, these women wear Ai Yai, the tight silk costume synonymous with nationhood and chaste femininity. The sea of bright coloured costumes formed by these women turns them into projectors of nationhood and womanhood. Their embodiment of this collective identity is not chosen, but demanded of them as sales girls ready to serve the city’s middle-class and tourists who converge on the department stores of the city centre every Sunday. In these women, service, sensuality and consumption become conjoined in a collective identity beneath which their status as persons with their own particular histories is rendered silent.

Amidst much writing on the loss of social bonds through modernity and the inconceivability of the independent individual interacting with other independent individuals (Marr, 2000: 774), Vietnamese modernity produced Durkheimean-type organicist ideas of society that viewed people as abstract citizens within corporatist groups like workers, farmers and bureaucrats. With reference to the abstract categories through which social beings were constituted, the 20th century German sociologist, Georg Simmel, recognised such collective abstraction of relationships as the unique of achievement of man. He held that as ‘soon as life … is determined by abstractions, averages and synoptic views’, there emerges an abstract person, who is free from the constitutive bonds of master and servant (Simmel, 1978: 161, 326). This freedom from bonds was deceptive, however, ending in the unfreedom of subject to categories. Simmel (1978: 434-5) captures this condition through the difference between what he calls positive and negative freedoms. The latter, he suggests, was only a freedom from bonds: an abstract ‘freedom from something, not liberty to do something’. There is no peace from things until we can engage with things according to Simmel (1978: 436). Only through an escape from the oppressive epistemology of categories can ontology be realised. Freedom, then, is when ontology can free itself from epistemology.

In Vietnam, this ontology of a peace from things through engagement with things centred on the family home, where one escapes the corporeal existence of the citizen as a body with prescribed rights, but devoid of any bonds, and reclaims themselves from the disarray of modern life to consolidate enduring bonds with family, neighbours and family spirits (Marr, 200: 772). Self cultivation and spiritual awareness cannot occur without a home: ontology and home are inseparable. In one of the early studies of village life in South Vietnam, the American, Gerald Hickey (1964: 276-9), captured the effects of the social dislocation brought about by poverty and migration, stating:

One of the dreads of poverty is that the family may disintegrate as members quit the village to seek a livelihood elsewhere. For the village it is extremely important that the family remains together: in addition to the comfort of having kinfolk about, immortality lies in an undying lineage.

Migration imposes‘social distance’ (Dang et al, 1997: 332) away from the protective bonds of family. While it is expected that women will depart the family home, this departure ideally takes place through marriage which joins her with another family. Departure for work in the city, by contrast, loses the woman to the crowd: an amorphous, ghostly zone where she becomes invisible, like the wandering ghosts that roam public space. Tuong attests to her father’s concerns, stating:

My father worries about me a lot because I am far from home, living and working just to get by in the city where anything could happen to me. He worries a lot. When I return to Long Hai my family is always busy buying and preparing food because we are all together with me there. Although my family worry when I’m gone and are happy when I’m there, my father also respects me and listens to me.

Respect from her father seems to help integrate a distant daughter back into the family and conveys a conventional idea of transgressive female sexuality easily seduced by the city and departing from the austere, mothering female who surrenders herself to family where she was legitimate and secure (Drummond, 2006: 374).
A woman’s homecoming redeems her from the social evils of the city, but the respect and attention she received also conveyed a more submerged respect in contemporary Vietnam for the independent woman able to live beyond these bonds (Taylor).

These dilemmas are conveyed in the imagination of the independent entrepreneurial lower class female as immoral and at the mercy of social evils (Rydstrom, 2006), and at the same time a revolutionary labourer and smasher of the confines of patriarchal tradition (Locke, et al., 2008: 13; Leshkowich, 2011). Moral or otherwise, common to these impressions is a sense of self improvement linked to work, what Tuong considered the overcoming of the inertia of getting nowhere with herself in Long Hải by cutting hair and applying make up in a small stall where she made little money. Through this sense of self improvement a journey of self becoming, Tuong realised the transition from an epistemological ‘freedom from’ to an ontological ‘freedom to do’.

For Simmel (1978: 458), this impression of freedom to do depended on an idea of labour as the overcoming of laziness rather than just physical activity. Giving a similar take on freedom through labour, Tuong used the oft quoted motto of ‘something to do, something to love and something to believe’ as her fundamental ontological take on life. She did not relate this motto to family but to the person in a state of becoming beyond the family: a view that challenges the conventional view of the woman as the ‘pillar of the house’ (tru cot), who waits behind as their husband migrates for work, government service or war (Rydstrom, 2004: 80). Tuong gave her grandmother as an example of this conventional view. An unmarried woman who bore children to three different men, all of them itinerant migrants passing through town during the era of wartime nation building when migration was largely male, her grandmother was a person who stayed home.

Tuong’s reflections concern a new ontology of womanhood tied to migration rather than home and epitomised by herself as representative of the demographic shift in Vietnam towards female migrants, three quarters of whom are unmarried (Locke, et al., 2008: 16). Her reflections resemble the more general public debate around the effects of female migration on gender relations (Locke, et al., 2008: 16). However, unlike the discourse in women’s magazines, which Rydstrom (2004) sees as reproducing a conservative domestic role in tune with State’s messages on gender relationships, Tuong grapples with herself as a person detached from the formative bonds of home and family: a struggle not to redeem bonds but how not to fall into the abyss of the commodity as a depersonalised, freely circulating abstraction formed by the new economy of appearances.

Tuong’s grappling with this market constituted identity reflects a different ontology of the person to that formed under regimes of embedded State socialism, where the abstraction of the woman as depersonalised servant of the nation more accurately reflects Bourdieu’s (1984: 480-1) idea that the ‘fate of groups is bound up with the words that designate them, “proletariat”, “working class”, “cadres” etc’. What this idea fails to realise is the a more contemporary post-socialist version of the person as a depersonalised commodity. In this new form of abstraction, the person is unhinged from family and nation as a freely circulating component of the unpredictable market.

Tuong seeks differentiation from herself over time, rather than from others in the present. This biographic rather than mimetic sense of herself, emphasises her inconspicuousness vis-à-vis others in the city. As she explains:

*I am OK in the city because I don’t cause trouble, don’t draw the attention of neighbours who would call the police, don’t draw the attention of the traffic police who might request a full identity check. And, I don’t draw attention to myself by trying to look better than someone else or trying to copy someone else. I worry about where I have come and where I am going: about myself compared to myself.*

While declaredly unconcerned with a sense of herself vis-à-vis others, Tuong is visually distinguished from others by her poverty. Her motorbike is old, rattling, paint chipped and she has not bought clothes in a year. In the morning she wears old jeans, faded sweater, cheap resoled heals. Her hair is spotted, skin sun spotted, eyes jaundice, as she dons a cheap mask and starts up her motorbike to slowly move through the
morning traffic. Pointing to her unconcern for comparison, Tuong stated, ‘I don’t know the latest singers, movies or celebrities’ and related the following discussion with her workmate:

Yesterday my workmates laughed at me. For several months, one of them treated me with condescension. She bossed me around, but I responded without anger, much unlike others. Now the woman respects; calling me often, asking my advice. What I know is that I must now worry about others but concern myself with where I am going.

Tuong’s sense of detachment from narcissistic concerns required the self cultivation of visiting pagodas in the city to pray; writing letters in her notebook to her deceased mother; giving money to people in need of help; abstaining from meet for a month to clean her blood and mind so as not to be seduced by the libidinous desires of the economy of appearances; not purchasing clothes; not looking in mirrors; not seeking an impression of herself. These practices were encapsulated in her philosophy of not comparing herself with others: what she calls ‘looking ahead to her future rather than around to others’. Through this counter-persona to the conspicuous consumption of others around her in the city, Tuong was nurturing a futurist ontology that resisted a laterally constituted persona dependent on comparison with those present to longitudinally constituted persona depended on a comparison of herself in the present with herself in the past and the future. Tuong’s ontology seemed remarkable given that she worked as a sales girl for a global cosmetics chain in one of the new department stores, where she promoted an ephemeral beauty.

THE MALL

The increasing gap in income between HCMC middle class and its low income migrants and the latter’s limited access to entitlements in health care, education, housing and food has been defined by Locke, et al (2008: 13) as a ‘retrogressive’ trend for poor women, whose labour has become commodities by the growing middle class demand for domestic servants and nannies. Domestic service, however, is only one component of this commodification of femininity. A major and more conspicuous component has been the growing demand for sensualised services in the form of hostesses, waitresses, masseuses and sales girls. The commodification of sensualised service has led to an idealised corporeal body: one that is sexual and enticing, or what Nguyen-Vo (2006: 274-5), citing Grosz (1995) calls the disaggregated of the lower class female body as poor migrant women rush to don the fashionable commodities of the urban middle class. Disaggregation is erotic because it effaces the young woman’s relational social being as mother, sister or daughter by valuing only the sensual components of her: creating what Bakhtin (1993: 224) called a homology between the lower social strata of females and their lower body parts.

The lower class woman as sexual object rather than relational social being is epitomised by the sales-girl, who conveys what Nguyen-Vo (2006: 274) calls the labouring and desiring body of the contemporary Vietnamese working class woman as both labourer and libidinous beauty model. Poor sales-girls, however, are not always complicit in the commodification of their bodies. Tuong was unlike the young garment workers in Pham Thí Hoai’s (1995) story, Saigon Taylor Shop, who Nguyen-Vo (2006: 275) views as overtaken by their desire to model the fashionable clothes they produce. As Nguyen-Vo (2006: 275) states, these women ‘rush to their disaggregation because of their consuming desires for these libidinal objects constructed as such in a commodity economy’. Not only could Tuong not afford such a libidinous style, she deliberately rejected it. Whereas the factory workers were rushing to a libidinous style they did not embody, Tuong was rejecting a libidinous style she had to embody. Tuong lamented her embodiment of beauty, pointing to her make up, tight pants and shirt, explaining: ‘I don’t like standing around looking like this in tight clothes and make-up, it is not me. I don’t like make-up: I only wear it because of work’. For Tuong, commodified sexuality was imposed and, as Bourdieu says of embodied styles, ‘could not be chosen’. When questioned, Tuong alluded to the hidden injuries of such embodiment:
Robbie: Why don’t you like to wear make-up?
Tuong: I just don’t like it
Robbie: Because people will see you differently when you go outside?
Tuong: No, it has nothing to do with how people will see me
Robbie: What then
Tuong: I’m tired of wearing make-up because I have to wear it everyday. I have to put on more than other people to hide the spots and marks on my face. If I don’t wear so much make up, customers will not believe me. For example, if I’m trying to sell them a product, telling them it is good for their skin, they will ask me why my skin is not good. They won’t believe me.
Robbie: So you have to hide yourself with make up?
Tuong: Yes and I don’t like that. Everyday I have to wear make up and it is not good for my skin, makes me hot, takes my time. It tires me
Robbie: Tires your body?
Tuong: Yes it makes my body tired (translate): It makes me do what I don’t want to do with my body and that makes me tired in my mind (translate)

Tiredness of body caused a tiredness of mind, a feeling of injustice and anger at the violence of the bodily façade she maintained. Tuongexplained that her workmates are often ill because of the physical demands of work. She described them as suffering blood in the stools, damaged skin, dandruff, psoriasis, gingivitis, nasal problems, sore feet and back: all attributed to the bodily abuse of sales-work. Beauty burdens the minds and bodies of these women, who like the proletarian in Marx (43), ‘sinks to the level of the commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities’, suffering a ‘loss of reality’ that ‘mortifies his body and mind’ The mortification of the bodies of Tuong and her friends, however, derives not from their alienation from commodities but their simulationof them through the façade of beauty, which as Baudriallard (1988: 34) suggests, is a precondition of the sale and circulation of commodities. Unlike the proletariat, who suffers‘the degradation of being into having’ (Best, 48), the sales girl suffers what Debord called the ‘transformation of having into appearing’, which leads to the sales-girl’s embodiment of illusions, pseudo forms and counterfeit lives(49).In this economy of appearances, where beautification is the precondition, Tuong experiences a simulation of rather than alienation from beauty as commodity.

Tuong’s appearance had to be of precise dimensions. The from one of her monthly training sessions outline the dimensions of this prescribed beauty. Reading through her notes, she explains:

The heels on our shoes must be no more than 5 centimetres. We must have make-up, but not too much. Our teeth must be clean, our breath fresh, we must smile and we must not wear too much jewellery. What is important is that we must not be overdone. Everything must be exact.

The goal of this beauty is to attract customers through what Tuong calls kynang, or communication skills. She contrasts this method of selling with du do, or the pushinessand trickiness of sellers in the market. She describes kynang as being honest and polite, sitting down with the customer, listening to them and describing the product in objective, impartial terms. Unlike whatLeshkowich (2011: 283) identifies as the soft persuasion of young female market stall workers, who ‘talk nonsense’ about the products they sell, kynang tailors information to the customer based on the biographical detail that the sales girl is able to elicit. While Tuong acknowledged that kynang required more skill than du do, she was disliked its emphasis on attentiveness to the customer, which she says is ‘alien in Vietnam’ where sales are done fast and based on what she could best describe as a ‘take it or leave it’ approach to sales. Like make-up, she claimed that this approach tired her, because it forced her to convey a false persona.

Unlike Lindquist’s (2004) discussion of migrant woman on the Indonesian island of Batam, for whom façade unburdened them of their feelings of shyness (malu), Tuong felt burdened by façade, which forced her into a lateral sense of self – comparing herself to others around her – and pulling her away from a longitudinal sense of self – comparing herself to herself over time and in the future. Façade forced Tuong to emphasise the
ephemerality of the moment, by which people noticed her as they passed-by in the plaza. She defines experience as ‘waiting’, as opposed to doing. Tuong lamented on her life as a sales girl, stating: I wait here. My life is waiting. This contrasts the freedom of middle class waiting: a class privilege dependent on the façade of sensualised feminine services.

CONCLUSION

Facade is heavy because it annihilates the person. This account of the ontology of the migrant sales-girl in Vietnam’s largest city does not depict her among family when she returns home to Long Hai every few months and for major events on the lunar calendar. That component of the sales-girl’s existence embeds her in relations of reciprocity and indebtedness that redeem her from the alienating abstractions of the commodity. There is no room in this paper for an exploration of home in the larger ontology of the sales-girl. It will form another paper. For now, this paper’s emphasis on the sales girl and the city goes some way to providing a response to Marr’s thoughts on the person in contemporary Vietnam Marr (2000: 796) states: ‘How persons in these uncharted waters proceed to look upon themselves is one of the important questions for the twenty-first century’. The suggestion posed by this paper is that people are engaged in a struggle with the violence of a new set of categories: a new post-socialist epistemology based on the market. The struggle is to redeem an ontology from this epistemology.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


THEME NINE

CULTURE, ARTS, LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
PERFORMING THAI AND INDIGENOUS IGOROT AMERICAN FOLKLORE AND IDENTITIES: ETHNIC AND CULTURAL POLITICS REVEALED

Jonathan H. X. Lee and Mark S. Leo
Asian American Studies Department, College of Ethnic Studies
San Francisco State University, USA
jlee@sfsu.edu / markleo@sfsu.edu

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the interplay among performing ethnic culture through folklore, the politics of identity formations, and subjectivities. Within Asian American Studies, cultural performance and its relationship to identity formation has commonly been viewed as a lineal, and positive phenomena, especially among the youth population. As marginalized Asian Americans, Thai, Cambodian, and Indigenous Igorot American folkloric performances reveal conflicts and tensions. These conflicts and tensions are situated from within (i.e. inter-ethnic), and from outside (intra-ethnic). They reveal that cultural and folkloric performances can be employed as both a strategy and mechanism for ethnic and cultural hegemony (as in the case of Filipino/Filipino American misappropriation of Igorot/Igorot American folklore and performances), and as a counter narrative to the dominate Asian American narrative of exceptionalism (i.e. the Model Minority). This examination argues that the forces of globalization and modernization is transforming what it means to be “Southeast Asian/Southeast Asian American” and that multicultural expressions of Thai, Cambodian, and Indigenous Igorot Filipino/American cultural and folkloric subjectivities is challenged by the advances in social media, internet and telecommunication technologies. Transnational linkages, roots, and movements for social justice against hegemonic cultural groups are challenged by Thai, Cambodian, and Indigenous Igorot Filipino American youths. Cambodian American youth employ Khmer folklore and culture as expressed through pop and hip hop music to question the lack of political freedom and transparency in Cambodia. Thai American Buddhists perform Thai religious identity and rituals to question the misappropriation of Thai Buddhism by non-Asian Buddhists and the “Protestantization” and “white-washing” of Thai/Thai American Buddhist identities. Indigenous Igorot Filipino American challenge mainstream Filipino/Filipino American cultural and narrative hegemony by acting and performing their folklore and customs in their own space as a critique of an invisible cultural and subversive domination that is interethnic. We offer a critical view of performing Thai, Cambodian, and Indigenous Igorot Filipino/American folklore and identities. We question the meaning of “belonging” and reveal the complexity of the interplay between the emic and ethic, revealing uneven relationships of power and struggles for agency as expressed in performing folklore.

Keywords: Thai American, Igorot American, folklore performance, identity, cultural politics

INTRODUCTION

The perennial question: “Who am I? Asian? American? Asian American?” has preoccupied Asian American subjects, especially the youth, since the Asian American movement unfolded in the late 1960s. Several decades later, identity is still one of the fundamental and foundational issues for Asian American youth. We examine Thai and Igorot American youth’s encounter with identity construction and politics. Both Thai and
Igorot American communities are “minority” communities in Asia America in terms of population size and, for Thais, the length of time in the United States. Additionally they are both easily categorized as “Southeast Asian American,” and as evident from recent scholarship and popular discourses, is a peripheral “emerging” category within Asian America that privileges Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and Filipino Americans. Thus, we seek to show that identity politics continues to be a viable and critical issue in Asian American Studies, and that it is not just an issue of Asian Americans against white supremacy, but rather, an intra-ethnic issue of Asian Americans in conflict with other Asian Americans, especially minoritized Asian American communities such as Thai and Igorot Americans. In large part, both historically and currently, identity politics within Asian America revolve around racial ideology of white supremacy. Invoking Joseph Cheah, we understand white supremacy to mean “a hegemonic understanding, on the part of both whites and non-whites, that white Euro-American culture, values, attitudes, beliefs, and practices are the norm according to which other cultures and social practices are judged” (2011). The case study of the Berkeley Thai Temple, Wat Mongkolratanaram, illustrates this type of inter-ethnic encounters with Euro-American white supremacy. As such, the small, but vocal Thai American youth were able to mobilize support from within the Asian American community. The indigenous Igorot American community is an example of intra-ethnic conflict: Igorots are from the Philippines, thus they are technically “Filipino,” however Igorot subjects within the Filipino American community are discriminated against in an Orientalist fashion by non-Igorot Filipino Americans who consciously mimic Spanish and white American standards. Identity politics within Asian American communities is still a foundational issue because American and Asian American societies are still constructed on racial ideologies of white supremacy. In the case of Igorot Americans, it is the appropriation and mimicry of white supremacy as expressed by mainstream Filipino Americans. Through identity politics, Thai and Igorot Americans engage in the politics of community consciousness-awakening and individual self-empowerment. Articulating their experiences as Thai and Igorot Americans, they claim their position in American and Asian American societies and express their agency—individually and collectively.

THAI AMERICAN IDENTITY POLITICS: TEMPLE, COMMUNITY, AND BUDDHIST EXPRESSIONS

The temple, or wat, is the central location for the Thai Buddhist community in Thailand and, more so, in the United States, used for religious ritual and faith expressions, and serving as a community center where Thais learn to express their “Thai-ness” in terms of language and cultural performances. Wat Mongkolratanaram, locally referred to as the Berkeley Thai Temple, was established in 1978. For nearly three decades the Berkeley Thai Temple held a Sunday Food Offering (locally called the Thai Temple Sunday brunch) where members of the temple prepared and served food to visitors—Buddhist, non-Buddhist, Thais, non-Thais. Thai and Thai American Buddhists who volunteer at the Sunday brunch understand their work as an expression of thambun, which means “making merit.” Merit is the counter of karma, which Buddhists believe chains all living creatures in endless cycles of reincarnation and suffering. Merit, as the counterweight of karma, may be gained primarily by supporting the community of monks and nuns, assisting the needy, or by meditating on compassion and peace. Merit is also believed to be transferable. Hence, the living may perform rituals and offerings to earn merit, which may then be transferred to their beloved to assist them in the afterlife and in being reborn into the human realm. From a Thai American perspective, volunteers at the Berkeley Thai Temple engage in the religio-cultural practice of thambun, which provides for the livelihood of the Thai monks who reside there and sustains the temple for the community as well. Priwan Nanongkam makes the following observation about Buddhist and Christian Sunday practices:

Unlike a Christian who is supposed to go to church every Sunday, the Buddhist has no regular schedule for going to temple. One can go whatever day is convenient. That is because, theoretically, practicing Buddhism can be done anywhere, anyplace, and at all times. Most Thai Buddhists, however, regard their religious practice, thambun when they go to offer food to monks at the temple (2011: 105).
We agree with Nanongkam’s perspective that for Thai Buddhists, *thambun*, is Thai cultural performance because marking merit “. . . embodies cultural content that. . . . [reveals] . . . a particularization of how Thai Buddhists practice their religion. On the surface, among common Buddhists *thambun* means ‘correcting good things,’ so that it will bring one to heaven after life ends” (2011: 105).

The popular Sunday Food Offering came under attack in summer 2008 when the Berkeley Thai Temple applied to the City’s Zoning Adjustments Board to build a Buddha hall (*bood*) beyond the size allowed by the municipal code to house Buddhist icons and relics. Nearby residents on Oregon Street gathered to protest the proposed expansion of the temple, citing that the “architecture” will change the character of the residential neighborhood (Sookkasikon 2010: 118). Additionally, Oregon Street residents used this opportunity to voice their concern about the Sunday Food Offering, after they discovered that the temple’s 1993 zoning permit only allowed for food to be served three times a year. They cited it as “detrimental” to the health of the neighborhood, and suggested that the food service be moved away to a different site because it created noise, parking and traffic problems, neighborhood littering, and is the source of “offensive odors” (Sookkasikon 2010: 122–124). The temple’s weekly Sunday Food Offering is well attended by more than 600 visitors. Some Oregon Street residents said, “We believe we have a right to reside in peace, to enjoy our residential neighborhood without a large commercial restaurant in our midst,” (Fowler 2009). After the initial hearing about the zoning problem, the Berkeley Thai Temple was granted a zoning adjustment: This is good news for them and their supporters. However, at the hearing, there were accusations that the food served at the temple was drugged. Some opponents of the temple’s food service suggested that they were forced to live with odors. Others were more focused on their complaints. As recorded in *The Wall Street Journal*:

“We have no opposition to Buddhism,” says Ms. Shoulders, the neighbor. “We have no problem with Thai culture. We even actually like Thai food.” All she is seeking, she says, is changes in the temple’s operations (Fowler 2009).
It appears that the Berkeley Thai Temple became a victim of its own success and popularity. Those who supported the Berkeley Thai Temple and wanted to save the food service argued that there is a direct connection between saving the food service and saving the temple because the majority of its operating funds are derived from the weekly food service. However, local neighbors and homeowners—especially neighborhood residents—had a right to challenge offensive odors, loud early morning noise, and excessive traffic, that they felt adversely impacted the quality of life in their neighborhood.

Model of proposed Buddha Hall. (Photo by Jonathan H. X. Lee)

THAI AMERICAN YOUTH AND SAVE THE THAI TEMPLE CAMPAIGN

Viewing these claims as a subtle expression of racism (Sookkasikon 2010: 113–117), Thai American youth activists formed the Save the Thai Temple Campaign, advocating for their parents, grandparents, and community elders who did not have a strong command of English and local codes and politics. The campaign members were primarily youths who had been raised at the Berkeley Thai Temple. “They launched an awareness campaign to educate the general public on Thai Buddhist practices and the religious significance of merit-making (thumboon)” (Chatikul 2011: 70). On September 22, 2009 the Berkeley City Council voted unanimously (9–0) in favor of the broader land use permits granted by the Zoning Adjustment Board (ZAB) in a decision favoring the Berkeley Thai Temple, Wat Mongkolratanaram.

BERKELEY THAI TEMPLE AS SITE OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL IDENTITY

In their advocacy for the rights of the community, a strong expression of Thai cultural and national identity can be seen among the members of the Berkeley Thai Temple and among Thai American youth who formed
the Save the Thai Temple Campaign. The temple serves as a bridge for Thais in America to connect to their homeland through the expressions of religio-cultural and political activities. These cultural practices carry particular cultural codes, which, in this case, are mainly religious and reveal the specific attributes that have led to a new Thai identity among Thai immigrants in America that is politically transnational, yet local. We invoke Milton Singer’s understanding of “cultural performance” that includes “[p]lays, concerts, and lectures . . . but also prayers, ritual readings and recitations, rites and ceremonies, festivals, and all those things we usually classify under religion and ritual rather than with the cultural and artistic” (1972: 71). Expressions of Thai and Thai American identity are implicitly, if not explicitly politicized—transnationally and locally—because Thai subjectivity is founded in the parameters of Thai-ness based on the Thai national identity created by King Vajiravudh (r. 1910–1925) (Nanongkam 2011: 102).

From the demands of nationalism in the early twentieth century, the King created the basic national triad of chat-satsana-phramahakasat, “nation-religion-monarch” to promote the unity of the nation. He set up a national identity for all Thais regardless of their personal and ethnic identities, based on the King’s policy, “Thai people should act in ways conducive to the nation’s goals” (Wyatt1984: 229 cited in Nanongkam 2011: 102). This old political identity continues as a core value in Thai society today, and Thai immigrants bring it with them to express their Thai-ness in America. It is reproduced as Thai American cultural productions in America in the form of social organizations. Thai language and Buddhism are the two Thai American cultural performances that carry descriptions of how they are related to the creative idea of Thai political identity, the “Thai nation,” and the “Thai people” (Nanongkam 2011: 102).

By maintaining cultural patterns, as expressed in thambun Thai Americans are able to sustain the national identity that is defined by their monarch, which results in linking Thai America to Thailand. Additionally, Thai American youth express a political identity as “American” through their advocacy to save their temple. They tell the community that they are “here” and that they plan to invoke their Constitutional rights to practice their religion. In so doing, Thai American youth do not conform to the popular conception of Asian Americans as “model minorities” who do not rock the boat.

PERFORMING ETHNIC AND NATIONAL SUBJECTIVITIES: IGOROT AS FILIPINO AMERICANS

We now turn to a second case study of how performing Igorot folk dances are essential to two different identities within Filipino America: mainstream Filipino American and Igorot American identities. Our definition of the Filipino American “mainstream” refers to the dominant Tagalog-speaking, Catholic, and hetero-normative Filipino American community (Espiritu1995; Root 1997). We argue that Igorot folk dances are employed by both communities to authenticate competing ethnic and cultural identities. Performing Igorot folk dances perpetuates the identity politics that privileges mainstream Filipino American subjectivity, which in turn established a status hierarchy that stratifies ethnic groups within the fictive homogenous Filipino American category. The performance of Igorot folk dance is utilized by both dominant (pan-Filipino American) and subordinate (Igorot American) communities to affirm self, ethnic, cultural, and national subjectivities: Filipino American versus Igorot American. The misappropriation of Igorot folk dance by the pan-Filipino American community a la Filipino Culture Night (PCN) performances at university and college campuses nationwide, give rise to a “paradox of decolonization.”

The paradox of decolonization illustrates the complexity of intra-ethnic social stratification and prejudice; it is the process by which one group colonizes—directly or indirectly—another group in an attempt to—explicitly or implicitly—liberate themselves from their historical experience with colonialism. Among Filipino American college students, decolonization from Spanish and American colonialism is achieved through cultural and folkloric performances at PCN. However, the decolonization agenda is achieved by PCN through colonizing the Filipino natives: Liberation and self-empowerment is not completely beneficial for all parties involved—bringing into question the limits and ethics of performing Igorot folk dances. Igorot Americans continue to face prejudice within the Filipino American communities because they are socio-politically perceived as “native.” For instance, on social networks such as Facebook, Igorot Americans post
comments or send messages to one another regarding discrimination that is experienced either personally or by someone they know. For example, a Filipina nurse tells her fellow coworker of Igorot heritage that one of the Filipino patients had a very noisy visitor during visitation hours. The Filipina nurse began to describe this noisy Filipino guest as looking “like an Igorot.” When the nurse of Igorot heritage asked the other nurse to describe what an Igorot “looks like” she described the visitor saying, “. . . you know, she got slit eyes, mukhaniyaparang, Native American Indians, matapangangmukha.” Translated, the nurse is suggesting that Igorot’s physical features are similar to Native American Indians, who looked “like noble savages.” The Igorot-heritage nurse revealed she is Igorot, and the other nurse jokingly said, “You do not look like an Igorot.” This response illustrates the way Igorot subjectivity is locked in a colonial imaginary: Igorot is embedded in the image of a pre-colonial savage subject, thus Igorot and Igorot identity does not exist in modernity.

As a person of Igorot heritage, author Mark Leo and his classmate experienced intra-ethnic prejudice while growing up in San Diego, California. While attending high school, they enrolled in a Tagalog class to fulfill a foreign language requirement. One of the assignments was to do a “show and tell” presentation. Together, they presented on Igorot heritage and showed a video of an Igorot performance. Their peers, mainly non-Igorots giggled at them and created an environment that was not socially accepting. The Igorot youth assumed the laughter was due to the immaturity of high school peers. However, the comments by their classmates during Q&A revealed something more sinister. The words “savage” was used to describe Igorots. The description of Igorots as having a “tail” was also brought up: Something they learned from their parents. The next day, their teacher, who was a mainstream Filipino showed contrasting images of Igorots: one in traditional attire and setting buttressing one that became “civilized” after attending schools that were established by the United States. Leo recalls being infuriated because his teacher did not acknowledge his Igorot heritage, and felt the contrasting images of the Igorots to be troubling.

The experience of Leo and the Igorot nurse is, unfortunately, commonplace. Hence, examining the paradox and contradiction of decolonization as represented by PCN validates the angst and anxiety that Igorot Americans know, feel, and experience. Examination of PCN cultural productions reveals that Igorot Americans remain relegated to a pre-colonial savage subject, thus Igorot and Igorot identity does not exist in modernity.

PERFORMING SELF AND OTHER: A DECOLONIZING PARADOX REVEALED

Although not titled as such, PCN can be traced to the 1930s; the first event occurred to promote a Filipino national culture in the diaspora. In his study of PCN in contemporary Filipino America, Theo Gonzalves argues that these cultural productions consist of two genres, one that uses folkloric forms—dance, song, music, and costumes—and the other consisting of theatrical narration, in the form of a play or skit (2005: 68–69). PCN’s mission is twofold: It is a vehicle for the perseveration of a created homogenous Filipino heritage that is naturalized through time and stage performances as uncontested reality. Additionally, PCN acts as a vehicle to transmit Filipino heritage for future generations of Filipino Americans. As such, truth of cultural, ethnic, religious, and regional differences among Filipinos from within their country of origin is ignored. By analyzing the trends of how PCNs are organized and produced we can see how the inclusion of Igorot folk performance is problematic. According to Gonzalves, the PCN narrative follows a protagonist who does not know his/her history or “culture; as the show progresses the protagonist comes into contact with the culture that is sought in the form of indigenous Igorot folk dance performances, along with many others; the show concludes when the protagonist reaches an epiphany and becomes a “born-again Filipino” (2005: 70).

Invoking a quasi-religious experience of transformation, Leny Strobel argues that contemporary Filipino American students are “born-again Filipinos.” The Filipino American community and identity are produced through the “born-again process” that requires the (mis)appropriation of various indigenous Philippine cultures as a means of affirming a pan-Filipino homogeneity that promotes “diversity” and celebrates various ethno-linguistic and cultural traditions of the Philippines as a singular “Filipino.” This obfuscates the heterogenic reality inherent in Filipino America. Igorot American youth engage in a counter
narrative that highlights particular ethnic and cultural communities and identities, in which they “reclaim” and “decolonize” their subjectivity from the homogenous pan-Filipino American umbrella. According to E.J.R. David and Sumie Okazaki colonial mentality is “… characterized by a perception of ethnic or cultural inferiority that is … a specific consequence of centuries of colonization under Spain and the U.S. … and … involves an automatic and uncritical preference for anything American” (2006: 241–252). Maria Root’s analysis of the aftermath of colonialism in the Philippines illustrates the colonial mentality well:

Four hundred years of combined colonization, first by Spain and then by the United States, widened the Filipino gene pool with the possibilities of lighter skin, hair, and eyes. The tools of colonization gave meaning to the variation in physical appearance among Filipinos. Spain introduced colorism . . . . Centuries of this education primed the Filipino for vulnerability to internalize American rules of race. Colorism inculcated the notions “White is beautiful,” “White is intelligent,” and “White is powerful” in the psyches of many brown-hued Filipinos, thus inferiorizing the Filipino (1997: 81).

As a means to move away from colonial influence in Filipino culture, and to deconstruct the colonial mentality of Filipino subjects, PCN performers and producers invoke Igorot folk dances and clothes to connect with a pre-colonial period. This act of decolonization communicates Igorot folk dances and customs as a representation of “authentic” Filipino culture. It thus claims the “other,” the indigenous, in general, and Igorot, in particular, as part and parcel of a singular Filipino-ness. What the Filipino nation-state identity and Filipino Americans designated as the savage other has now become a hot commodity in the process of decolonization. More specifically, what was considered outside the realm of Filipino identity is now being included to promote what it means to be a Filipino American and to emphasize Filipino-ness. To be Filipino is simply to be from the Philippines. All people from the Philippines are one and the same. We, however, argue that the colonized mentality is taken for granted: The Indigenous is over extended. To be a more “authentic” Filipino replaces the Spanish with the indigenous. Ironically, in this process of decolonization, Spanish-influenced folk dances and cultural practices still play a prevalent role in Filipino and Filipino American identity.

As Gonzalves asserts, the performance of folk dances is consistent with the theme that goes against the assimilation paradigm, and would be seen as a form of the decolonization described by Strobel. According to Anna Alves, “It [PCN] serves as a cultural identity entrance point and rite of passage for its participants, becoming folkloric practice of sorts . . . . [that results in the] embrace [of] a larger community, naturalizing a notion of what it means to be Filipino in the United States . . . .” (2011: 396–398). From the perspective of Filipino Americans who self-identify as such, PCN is viewed positively. However, from the vantage point of the Igorot American community that occupies both the insider and outsider positions within the boundaries of “Filipino America,” PCN performances of Igorot folk dance are problematic. Along with the production of Filipino, the Spanish cultural influence and mentality is normalized as part of the episteme of Filipino America. The Filipino American habitus is ahistorical and natural: All Filipinos are from the Philippines, speak Tagalog, and are Catholic. Ironically, although Strobel advocates for a move away from Spanish and American colonial influence, she becomes a victim of the colonial apparatus, whereby she reflects what Homi Bhabha describes as “mimicry” and Frantz Fanon describes as the colonized becoming the inverted image of colonizer (Bhabha 1994; Fanon 2008). Filipino Americans who unquestionably adopt the pan-Filipino American narrative and perception of self and society are, as Bhabha describes, part of the ambivalence of their post-colonial condition (1994: Chapter 6).

This leads to a paradox of decolonization: PCN is a decolonizing act, but it is only possible through colonizing Igorot and other indigenous Filipino and Filipino American folkways and communities. The Igorot and Igorot American communities thus experience double colonialization: First by the Western colonial forces, and then an internal, intra-ethnic colonization by other Filipinos. Decolonizing PCN requires a deconstruction of its parts and a critique of its larger intent.
THE PROBLEMS WITH PERFORMING FILIPINO-NESS

The focus here is on PCN’s (mis)appropriation of indigenous Filipino folk dances. As established above, the performance of Igorot folk dances at PCN is a decolonizing act. It represents what post-colonial scholars describe as a “counter-discursive” activity that is critical of dominant (colonial) discourse. Organizers of PCNs ignore—wittingly or unwittingly—the problematic issues of authenticity of the dances they perform. “On the one hand, PCN organizers rely on folk forms invented by Francisca Reyes Aquino to authenticate their understanding of Filipina/o culture . . . . On the other hand, the folk forms also draw from the highly stylized rendition of the Philippine dance theater work popularized since the late 1950s” (Gonzalves 2005: 72). But the latter, Aquino contends, is “not folkdance” and “therefore does not have a claim on authenticity” (Gonzalves 2005: 72). According to Alves, students wrestle with this issue every year during the planning stages of the PCN. Alves notes, “Though I agree with the dangers of its ‘essentializing’ tendencies, as a consistent PCN producer myself, having participated in five shows as a creator and organizer of content in each, there is something that drew me to that particular arena of production, year in and year out” (1999: 24). This “something” that Alves briefly mentions is touched upon again when she argues that,

The “essential Pilipino” as an ambiguous concept is thus standardized, allowing for individual interpretation of meaning. This ambiguity allows for great maneuvering—what you see is an essentialized package; what you get is distinctive and varied. In other words, the effort to “essentialize” culture in one production during one night is actually an attempt to “socialize” mass numbers of new students into an ideology of “Pilipino is good and valid” in the face of an American society that barely acknowledges their communal existence (Alves1999: 56–57).

Alves shows a consensus that the end—affirming and creating a baseline Pilipino identity—justifies the means, which (mis)appropriates Igorot folk dances in PCN to essentialize diversity.

PCN performance of Igorot folk dances is, thus, particularly problematic because of its questionable authenticity: The tempo is faster, costume protocols are overlooked, and moreover, the dances are performed out of context and out of sequence. They are learned by counting movements instead of through feeling and intuition (Tolentino and Ramos 1935). Because PCN performances are all “theatrical,” the contextual authenticity of the dance is never accounted for. This is because the dance is not performed for its original purpose, but instead, is performed for theatrical means to inform an audience of its identity and subjectivity as Filipino. What one sees, hears, smells, and feel is a fictive Filipino-ness. We invoke Catherine Bell’s thoughts on the interplay of ritual and performance to reveal the dialectical relationship between performers and audience. Bell posits that there is a dialectic relationship between the performer and the audience; the performer creates and projects an identity to the audience, which in turn, is informed of and simultaneously affirms the performed identity (1998). In this case, the performed identity is a homogenous Filipino American identity. What happens if the audience does not identify with the pan-Filipino American identity? What happens if s/he identifies with Igorot?¹

¹ Although it is not discussed in this paper, another interesting question: How will the identity of Filipino Americans be perceived by non-Filipinos in the audience?
Similar to the PCN productions of Filipino culture that affirm a pan-Filipino American identity and conceptualization of Filipino-ness, young Igorot Americans are also performing their folk dance traditions as a means to decolonize themselves from multiple colonial complexes: Spanish, pan-Filipino American, and American.\(^2\) By learning and performing Igorot folk dances in community organizations such as BIBAK, which represents Bontoc, Ifugao, Benguet, Apayao and Kalinga indigenous communities, Igorot American youth gain knowledge of their distinctive identity that offers a counter narrative to the pan-Filipino American identity and experience.\(^3\) Learning these folk dances provides them with agency and a sense of ethnic and cultural pride that is unique for those that identify with the various Igorot tribes by either blood or culture. Igorot youth learn the folk dances from Igorot elders. The direct result of this transmission is the development of Igorot pride and identity that is not subsumed in the pan-Filipino American umbrella. These dances represent more than just a multicultural event performed once a year for Igorot youth—they reflect a way of life. Although these dances are no longer accompanied with their traditional rituals, they are performed at community celebrations, during rites of passages (i.e., courtship dances are performed at weddings), and to memorialize stages of Igorot life events (i.e., funerals).

The forces of immigration and modernization have compromised Igorot folkways; Igorot folklore has been lost or modernized to adapt to American culture. The BIBAK performance space fuels a consensus and identification with being Igorot and Igorot American. For example, at regional BIBAK gatherings known as Canyao—analogous to the Native American pow-wow—regional chapters meet to network and celebrate with other tribal members. Simultaneously, the pan-Filipino mainstream community utilizes the performance of Igorot folk dances in the production of their mainstream multicultural identity, reinforcing a romanticized connection to pre-colonial Philippines as a means to naturalize their identity and sense of self as both Filipino and American.\(^4\) For instance, the dance movements are modified, the purpose of the dance is redefined, and the context becomes utilitarian. The transformation in Igorot folk dance is a byproduct of not only transplanting and adapting to Filipino American customs, but also of the wholesale (mis)appropriation of Igorot folk dance to affirm pan-Filipino American Filipino-ness. The problem is not with their being outsiders of the Igorot American community, but rather with how Igorot is portrayed. Moreover, pan-Filipino American

---

\(^2\) We utilize Carl G. Jung’s concept of “complex” here. According to Jung, a complex is a core pattern base on perceptions, memories, emotions, and wishes in the personal unconscious organized around a common theme, such as status or power. For Jung, complexes may be conscious, partly conscious, or unconscious. Complexes can be positive or negative, resulting in good or bad consequences. There are many kinds of complex, but at the core of any complex is a universal pattern of experience, or the archetypal.


\(^3\) BIBAK is a social organization with chapters around the world that represent the five major Igorot tribes—Bontoc, Ifugao, Benguet, Apayao and Kalinga—found throughout the cordillera mountain region of the Luzon. BIBAK teaches and encourages young Igorot Americans to maintain their folk heritage and their way of life.

\(^4\) Both groups rely on body movement and Igorot traditional clothing as expressions of selfhood that is local and transnational.
(mis)appropriation of Igorot folk dance is problematic because as non-Igorot, the performance is done out of context and primarily as the subject of the pan-Filipino American gaze. More controversial is that it is not inclusive of people from within. The life experiences of pan-Filipino Americans versus Igorot and other indigenous Filipino Americans are different and reveal different processes of ethnic and community formation. Further, it illustrates how identity politics is problematically an intra-ethnic issue, especially in the case Igorot American identity formation.

BIBAK San Diego youth performing the Kalinga Tadok for the opening ceremony at the 1st Annual Asian Cultural Festival in San Diego, 2010. (Photo by Diane Balitang)

Igorot folk dances performed at Canyao or other Igorot events differ from the performances of those dances at PCNs. At PCNs, they are overly choreographed, performed without stylistic flair, and, more importantly, are devoid of “feeling.” Performed on the basis of count, they are rendered emotionless and mechanical. Further, there is a difference in the way the music is played. At PCN performances, dancers beat their gongs differently than when performed in Igorot spaces. PCN gong beating follows the theatrical choreography and movement counts—again, rendering it mechanical. Rather, in Igorot performances, the gong beat dictates the dance steps, allowing for spontaneity of movement, sudden changes in tempo, and depth of emotion since there is no official step count dictating the transition to a different movement. Igorot American performance of Igorot folk dances at Igorot community and cultural events is organic and inclusive. Audience and performer are not separate or removed; rather the interaction between the two merges and is fluid, resulting in the creation of a shared community. In this way, Igorot American social relationships are forged and affirmed and the Igorot way of life is maintained. For example, during Igorot weddings, it is customary for the bride and groom to perform a rendition of the Igorot family’s tribal courtship dance at the reception. Simultaneously, family and friends will perform their celebratory tribal dances. There is a cacophony of sound and an orderly chaos of movement that comes together organically and emotionally.

PCNs’ theatrical performance of Igorot folk dance is an unsuspecting act of colonization; in the guise of multiculturalism, it reveals an underlying assumption and colonialist prejudice toward indigenous people. They perpetuate the orientalistic image of the romantic savagery of the Igorot people as falling beyond the sphere of civilization. This is especially apparent in PCN performances of Igorot war and courtship dances. These two dances are always depicted as identities of the Filipino pre-colonial encounter—what all Filipinos were supposed to be like before the colonization of the country and its introduction into Western modernity. Since Igorot identity is showcased as an identity of the past, it is assumed that Filipinos of Igorot heritage no longer exist, which is quite the contrary. Igorot identity—an identity that is distinct to a specific region in the

Interestingly, in New Zealand, the Maori Warrior Dance, a source of national pride, starts off a Rugby game; whereas football teams in the United States coopted Native American symbols disrespectfully and are no longer permitted to do that because it was offensive to Native Americans. These are two cases that demonstrate how folk dance can be appropriated: One that respects another’s dignity and becomes the pride of the nation while the other that did not.
Philippines—is being absorbed by the pan-Filipino identity, but is problematically situated in the past. There is no acknowledgment of Igorot identity in the present. The message is: Non-Igorots are the preservers/saviors of Igorot heritage.

The goal of PCN is to decolonize Filipino American subjectivities from Spanish and American colonial espitemes. In order to achieve a subjectivity that is decolonized, PCN cultural producers and viewers must colonize Igorot folk and folkway. This unfolds squarely within the dominant episteme that is based on a set of fundamental assumptions about Filipino and Filipino American identity that are so basic so as to be invisible to the colonial forces operating within it. Invoking Fanon, we argue that pan-Filipino American subjectivity, as expressed through PCN, creates a negative racial construction of a colonized self: Colonized subjects (i.e., Filipinos) become an inverted image of the colonizer (Fanon 2008). This leads to a paradox of decolonization; PCN is a decolonizing act, but it is only possible through colonizing Igorot and other indigenous Filipino and Filipino American folkways and communities. The Igorot and Igorot American communities thus experience double colonialization—by Western colonial forces as well as by other Filipinos.

When PCN performances showcase pre-colonial Igorot folk dances to enforce the Filipino American community’s homogenous conception of Filipino-ness, it engages in an act of domination. In reclaiming their folk dances and transmitting them into the future Igorot Americans act in resistance to the entire discursive field within which PCN operates in a post-colonial world. Ironically, in an effort to decolonize and community, indigenous Filipino cultures of the Philippines are (mis)appropriated into the homogenous mainstream pan-Filipino American community and, by extension, identity, which is a form of “colonization” in itself because it continues to perpetuate the social hierarchy that originated from the period of Spanish, American, and Christian colonial formations. For instance, the mainstream Filipino American narrative tells the stories of those immigrants that are defined as Filipino in the Philippines, however the narratives fail to include the narratives of immigrants who are classified as “other”—the indigenous. More importantly, it ignores the intra-ethnic discrimination that they encountered, not just from the dominant white society, but from the dominant mainstream pan-Filipino American community.

CONCLUSION

Thai and Igorot American youth advocating for visibility as sovereign Asian American communities and subjects reflect the legacy of the Asian American movement of the late 1960s. They remind Asian American civil rights activists that their work is not yet completed. Moreover, in addition to addressing inter-ethnic discrimination, Asian American scholars and activists must also consider intra-ethnic social injustices. As a small, yet vocal, community, Thai American youth have effectively managed to utilize community resources
to combat the discrimination that attacks a fundamental civil liberty all Americans struggle to enjoy: Freedom of religious expression. Igorot American youth courageously ask their fellow Filipino Americans: “What about us?” Identity politics is powerful and has real, immediate, and concrete effects. Beyond simply knowing about self, it is empowering a community.

WORKS CITED


Rediscovering Native Dances—University of Philippines Tackles Job Recording Indigenous Dances and Also Melodies. Graphic, Manila, August 12, 1937.
MALAY SHI’ITES PILGRIMAGE IN IRAN AND IRAQ:
A CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY OUTLOOK

Mohd Faizal Musa
Institute of the Malay World and Civilization (ATMA), National University of Malaysia (UKM)
Faculty of Regional Studies, al Mustafa International Research Institute
Qom, Republic Islam of Iran
kajianakademikft@gmail.com / mfaizalmusa@ukm.my

ABSTRACT
There are two dominating schools of thought in Islam. Nusantara region is perhaps the largest crater of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah’s (Sunni) followers. On the evening of 15th of December 2010 more than 200 Malaysian Shiites who were attending a religious gathering were arrested by the Selangor Islamic Religious Department (JAIS) at a community centre called Hauzah Ar Ridha Alaihissalam. The publicized incident unleashed the existence of Shia adherents as a minority group in Malaysia. Following the raid, one-sided media coverage adds more suspicions and help to spread many versions of myth about them as an isolated community. Still their existence remained mysterious to the mainstream Sunni here. The Shiite minorities in Malaysia claimed that they have their own specific identity and cannot be generalized as other Shiite Muslims in other regions. Therefore the existence of Shia adherents as a minority in this region is an interesting study to conduct. This paper is concerned with the Shiites in Malaysia as a minority Muslim group and their seasonal pilgrimage in Iran and Iraq. From an emic perspective of cultural anthropologist their ritual and behavior during their ziarah (visits) to many sacred places in Iran and Iraq were documented. Adapting Charles Brooks’s methodology through social interaction, participant and observation this paper ambitiously intended to peel off part of their secrets hence to fill in an academic vacuum. By giving them justice, this paper also aims to correct common misconceptions about them.

Keywords: Shiites, Anthropology, Minority Studies, Karbala, Pilgrimage

INTRODUCTION
Shia mazhab (sect) is also often referred as the devotees of Prophet Muhammad’s household or ahlul bait² (Luis Alberto Vitto, 2010: 242). Shi’ism meant in this paper is limited to Ithna ‘ashariyya or also known as Twelver or Ja’fari (Ahmad Zuhdi Ismail, 2006). It’s a well known fact that the largest denomination of Islam is the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Sunnite). Shi’ites somehow are estimated around 15 percent of all Muslim. Majority adherents of Shia live in Republic Islam of Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain. There are also a huge number of Shi’ites in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Lebanon (The World Fact Book, 2011)³. In contrast, Nusantara

1 I would like to thank al Mustafa International Research Institute, Qom, Iran for funding my trip to Iran and Iraq and Persatuan Mahasiswa Malaysia-Iran for helping me to join the Malay Shi’ites pilgrimage twice; during ashura (tenth Muharam) 2009 and during wiladah (birth celebration) of Imam Husein in 2011. I would also like to thank the leader of the caravan, Mr Abu Zainab for accepting my participation in their closed rituals and taking care of my security ‘in dangerous and risky Iraq’ even though knowing me as a Sunnite. Many thanks also to the Malaysian Shi’ite leader, Mr Kamil Zaharih Ab Aziz for cooperating with me in understanding Shi’ism generally and their struggle in Malaysia.

2 In this paper the term Ahtul bait indicates Prophet Muhammad pbuh, his daughter Fatimah Zahra and the twelve infallible descendants of Prophet Muhammad pbuh, the Imams as. In order to give an academic justice to the subject studied, I am referring all Islamic terms related to Shi’ism in this paper in accordance to the Shia definition. There are also many kinds of spellings concerning Imam Husein. In my text I standardize it to Imam Husein but I tolerate other kinds of spelling when it happened to be quotations from other sources. In this paper, the term of Shi’ism indicates denomination in contrast with Sunnism while Shi’ite refers to a follower or devotee in singular form and its plural one is Shi’ites. The same applies to Sunnite (singular) and Sunnites (plural). The term Shi’itic is used for adjective and Shia for noun. Most of the Shia related terms are referred to Sayyid Khadim Husayn Naqavi (2007), Dictionary of Islamic Terms, Qom: Ansariyan Publications.

3 The World Fact Book is published annually on-line by the Central Intelligence of the United States.
region (the Malay world) is perhaps the largest crater of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah’s followers (Sunnite). Therefore the existence of Shia adherents as a minority in this region is a very interesting study to be conduct. It is significant to address that this paper is concerned with the Shi’ites in Malaysia, and its place in the Sunni community as a minority Muslim group. The main highlights are discussing their rituals, in this context, their seasonal ziyarat (pilgrimages) to Iran and Iraq.

Therefore, this study is not interested in theological aspects and controversial subjects that may lead to sectarian debate.

THE EXISTENCE OF SHI’ITES IN MALAYSIA

On 5th May 1996 a Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Affairs in Malaysia (2011) discussed the state of Shi’ites in Malaysia. The Meeting then has decided to ‘determine that the Muslims in Malaysia should only follow the teachings of Islam which based on the beliefs of Sunni Islam in Doctrine, Law and Islamic Morals.’ The implication of this ‘fatwa’ is that Shia in Malaysia is not recognized. On the evening of 15th of December 2010 more than 200 Malaysian Shi’ites including children, who were attending a closed religious gathering to remember the martyr of Imam Husin a.s (the third Imam within Shi’ism reached martyrdom on 10th October 680 AD or 10 Muharam 61 CE) were arrested by the Selangor Islamic Religious Department (JAIS) at a community centre called Hauzah Ar Ridha Alaihissalam. They were then charged under section 12(c) of the Enactment 9 1995 Sharia Criminal Enactment (Selangor). Following the incident, on 27th of December 2010 the Shi’ites bravely converging The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) submitted a memorandum.

Part of the contents of the memorandum by the Shi’ites elucidated that the act of trampling by the religious authority are due to (i) lack of dialogue and (ii) lack of study on their history, culture and ethnicity. The memorandum also amplified that local scholars have pretermitted their existence in the Malay world especially in Malaysia. In addition, the Shi’ite minority in Malaysia claimed that they have their own specific identity and cannot be generalized as other Shi’ite Muslims in other regions.

It is often argued that Shi’ism existed in Malaysia only after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. Nonetheless, Kamil Zuhairi Abd Aziz, an Iranian-trained leader of the Hauzah Ar Ridha Alaihissalam attested in an AFP interview that Shi’ism is not new in this region.

―Shi’ism came to the shores of Malaysia in the 14th century when Islam arrived here as many of the Arabic, Indian and Persian traders who brought the religion were also Shi’ites. The authorities must recognize that we are not a recent phenomenon and that we should be respected just like any other faith in the country. (Romen Bose, 2011)‖

Kamil Zuhairi’s statement above is not vacuous. In fact, there are abundance of evidences regarding the existence of Shi’ites in the Malay world, but due to lack of space, this essay should be satisfied focusing the title given. Today, according to Zamihan Mat Zin, an officer of National Council for Islamic Affairs in Malaysia, Shi’ites in Malaysia estimated as many as one million people (G.Manimaran, 2011). Moreover, Shi’ites in Malaysia, as the rest of minority Shi’ites in the world chose to hide their faith or dissimulation (what they called as taqiyyah) because of many reasons mainly because of unfair, discrimination and bias manner towards them since the period of Umayyad and Abbassid (Ahmad Zuhdi Ismail, 2006: 24). Christopher Marcinkowski (2006: 10) observed in his research that Malaysian Shi’ites prefer to ‘congregate in secret’ due to ‘persecution’ and ‘prevailing restrictive climate’ in Malaysia. His

---

4 According to section 12 (c) of the Enactment 9 1995 Sharia Criminal Enactment (Selangor) any person who acts in contempt of lawful authority, or reject, in violation of or disputes the orders or directives of: a) His Majesty the Sultan for His attribute as the Leader of the Islamic religion; b) The Council; c) The Mufti, expressed or provided by a fatwa, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgits or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both. Charged under this particular enactment implicates that being a Shi’ite is a ‘crime’ in Malaysia as only Sunnism is accepted for Muslims. By this paper are written, Mr Kamil Zuhairi Ab Aziz, Malaysian Shi’ite leader told me that he will enter defense in October and November 2011 for those charges related to the raid on 15th December 2010.

5 I am conducting a research on this matter and still writing a book about this particular topic.
observation seems to be true, as mention before the Selangor Islamic Religious Department (JAIS) raided a Shia community centre (Hauzah Ar Ridha Alaihissalam) in Gombak on 15th of December 2010 even while they were having a religious prayer to commemorate the martyr of Imam Husein closed door. The rise of Wahabism in Malaysia whom preachers adopted extreme attitude towards the Shi’ites was also the reason why Shi’ites prefer to be in ‘hide’.

Again, in order to be on the right track this paper is tied, only, to discuss Malaysian Shi’ites’ religious ritual during their pilgrimage in order to understand them more.

**NOTES ON SHI’ITIC CULTURE**

As pointed out before, Shi’ites in Malaysia complained to The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) that ignorance on their existence had lead to bias point of view towards their beliefs, norms, and values. It is important to mention here that Shi’ism offers cultural formulas for social emotions for their believers. In order to analyze these formulas, one need to understand the most basic teachings in Shi’ism; their faith towards Imamology.

The main Shi’ism distinctive teaching compare to Sunnism is Imamology. According to Shia, the Imamate or socio-religious leadership in Islam is central and that the Imam is responsible to the ummah ‘from the perspective of Islamic government, of Islamic sciences and injunctions and of leadership and innovative guidance in the spiritual life’ (Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, 2007: 191). It is important to clear some misperceptions that Shi’ites believed and placed their Imam above the Prophet (in this context Prophet Muhammad saw). The fact that, Shia point out that the basis of prophecy is to receive Divine injunctions while the Imam is the guardian of Divine religion. Therefore, the existence of an Imam is necessity after the demise of the Prophet as an Imam is responsible to guard the religion and to guide the ummah. Shia also believe that the ‘functions of Prophecy and Imamate may be joined in one person’ as appointed to prophet Abraham and Prophet Muhammad saw (Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, 2007: 206-207). In conclusion, the Imam is ‘the person whose shoulders lies the responsibility for the guidance of a community through Divine Command’ and that they are ‘the most virtuous and perfect of men’ (Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, 2007: 211’.

Numerous prophetic hadiths have been transmitted in Shi’ism concerning the description of the Imams, their number, the fact that they are all of the Quraysh and of the Household of the Prophet, and the fact that the promised Mahdi is among them and the last of them. Also, there are definitive words of the Prophet concerning the Imamate of Ali and his being the first Imam and also definitive utterances of the Prophet and Ali concerning the imamate of the second Imam the same way the Imams before have left definitive statements concerning the Imamate of these who were to come after them. According to these utterances contained in Twelve-Imam Shi’ite sources, the Imams are twelve in number and their holy names are as follows: Ali ibn Abi Talib, Hassan ibn Ali, Husayn ibn Ali, Ali ibn Husayn, Muhammad ibn Ali, Ja’far ibn Muhammad, Musa ibn Jaafar, Ali ibn Musa, Muhammad ibn Ali, Ali ibn Muhammad, Hassan ibn Ali and the Mahdi (Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, 2007: 212).

---

Saifulizam Mohamad (2011), “Wajib tolak fahaman Syiah‖, September 10th September 2011, [http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2011&dt=0910&pubs=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Dalam_Negeri&pg=dn_24.htm](http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2011&dt=0910&pubs=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Dalam_Negeri&pg=dn_24.htm), accessed 10 September 2011 at 7:19pm. Sulaiman Saloomi, a Saudi preacher claimed that through his research, Shia believed that holy Quran was modified and that Shia’s al Quran is different compare to the Sunnis. Note that, Malaysia government through National Council for Islamic Affairs in Malaysia organized International al Quran Recitation Competition every year since 1961. Since then 10 of the male winners (qari) are Shi’ites from Iran and Iraq. In fact in 2009, the winner Osama Abdul Hamza is a muazzin (a prayer call maker) at Haram Imam Husein in Karbala. Refer Dar al Quran al Kareem 1432 H, Imam Husayn Holy Shrine Foundation Karbala, page 46, a booklet. Applying simple syllogism, Shi’ites whom believed in ‘other holy Quran’ should not be recognized or even invited in such prestigious competition as they surely are not Muslims.
Today four of the Imams’ tombs are in Medina, Saudi Arabia. One of them is in Mashad, Iran and six of them is in Iraq. Shi`ites believe that the twelfth Imam, the promised Mahdi went into occultation (ghaibah) and will appear again to fill the world with justice and confront all kind of corruptions.

As mentioned above ‘the Imams’ are essential and central to the Shi`ites. Their struggle and tragic life gave a huge impact to the Shi`ites. Considering that, their ziyarat (pilgrimage) or visit to pay respect to these Imams is something need to be look at. According to Sayyid Hossein Nasr (2007: 255) the religious rites perform or practice by the Shi`ites and Sunnis ‘are essentially the same’ including the hajj (in Mecca and Medina) but ‘it is the pilgrimage to other holy places that is emphasize more in Shi`ism than in Sunnism’. He added:

The visit to the tombs of Imams and saints plays an integral role in the religious life of Shi`ites, one which in fact is compensated for in a way in the Sunni world by visits to the tombs of saints or what in North Africa are called tombs of marabouts. Of course, these forms of pilgrimage are not obligatory rites such as the prayers, fasting and hajj, but they play such an important religious role that they can hardly be overlooked (Sayyid Hossein Nasr, 2007: 256).

The cultural activities included, or performed during their pilgrimage such as rawdah khani (a combination of sermon, recitation of poems and Quranic verses and drama to depict life of the tragic Imams especially Imam Husein whom are martyed in Karbala) are keys to understand more about them (Sayyid Hossein Nasr, 2007: 256).

Steven L. Gordon (1981) explains that culture provides ways to express social emotions. The act of mourning and griefs at the loss of their leaders are express directly or non-directly during these ‘ziyarat’. Other than rawdah khani, there are also presentation of ta’zieh (passion play) and ‘street processions which people chant, cry and sometimes beat themselves’ (Sayyid Hossein Nasr, 2007: 257). The social emotions expressed during the pilgrimage are interpreted, evaluated and modified according to their feeling rules. From sociology point of view, feeling rules are ‘appropriate ways to express the internal sensations’ (Joan Ferrante, 2011). These cultural behaviors are also presented symbolically.

In this case, Shi`ism is a transnational-supraethnics belief crossing many kind of boundaries. For instance it is interesting to conduct a study on how Pakistani Shi`ites or Turkish Shi`ites or Malay Shi`ites express their griefs commerating the martyred of Imam Husein on Ashura day. There must be differences and similarities.

Kamil Zuhairi (2010) a Malay Shi`ites leader stated that one cannot generalized all Shi`ites are the same7. Moreover, Ithna ‘ashariyya Shia is divided into two catagories; usuli and ahbari. The differences between them is technical as the usuli believed that ‘during the absence of the Twelfth Imam, the qualified Muslim scholars (mujtahid) are allowed to engage in independent reasoning to solve their daily problems’ while the ahbari believed that during the occultation of Imam Mahdi ‘it is not permissible for religious scholars to engage in the use of reason to enact a certain judgement, to apply the principles of the law to a specific problem or situation’ (Kallim Siddiqui, 1996: 112-113). The usuli Shi`ites must follow guidance of their own elected marja’i taqlid (any senior mujtahid selected to be their guidance in fiqh) while ahbari Shi`ites do not follow any marja’i taqlid or mujtahid. In sum, usuli and ahbari is a scholastic dispute over jurisprudential methodology. These two perspectives offer different ways of thinking and act. During the ziyarat or pilgrimage, the usuli and ahbari Shi`ites have their own ways to express social emotions. For instance, the act of qama zani (beating chest and back with knives on the day of ashura in Karbala) is only performed by the ahbari Shi`ites while the usuli Shi`ites avoid this controversial act since there are religious rulings (fatwa) by their mujtahid or marja’ forbidding qama zani8. Thus, usuli Shi`ites chose to donate their

---


8 From my interviews, I learned that most of Malay Shi`ites chose Grand Ayatullah Ali Khamenei as their marja or mujtahid in order to guide them in any fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) problems. Grand Ayatullah Ali Khamenei verdict forbid qama zani and he stated that ‘the practice that causes bodily harm, or leads to defaming the faith, is Haram’. Ayatullah Ali Khamenei added, that ‘accordingly, the believers have to steer clear of it. There is no
blood to hospitals rather than shedding it. Most of Malay Shi’ites are usuli and their views toward qama zami are to avoid it in parallel with their marja’s rulings.

Taking all these complexities, Shi’ite culture provides us rich ingredients and broad areas of study. This point lead us to an interesting question of this essay; how, and what are the content of Malay Shi’ites’ pilgrimage to Iran and Iraq?

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY OUTLOOK

As stated earlier, this paper is not interested into dwelling controversial subjects of human rights or sectarian debate. The most important part of argument to note here is that the Malay Shi’ites claimed that they were denied their rights because of lack of dialogue and discourse. In the memorandum to The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia or SUHAKAM, Mr Kamil Zuhairi stressed that; “oleh kerana tiadanya dialog dan wacana di antara pihak berkuasa agama tempatan dengan komuniti kami (Syiah) di Malaysia maka telah berkembang kejahilan, kekeliruan dan salah anggap yang sangat besar terhadap kami. Fitnah yang disebarkan mengenai kami Pencinta Ahlul Bayt (keluarga) Rasulullah Muhammad s.a.w. (Syiah) di Malaysia mengakibatkan salah faham yang sangat buruk terhadap kami. Salah faham yang buruk ini mendorong pertaun-undang yang tidak adil buat kami.”

Kamil also stated a very interesting remark: “Etnik Melayu yang berketurunan Aceh, Minang, Bugis, Jawa, (hanya beberapa contoh) dan umat Islam dari keturunan Siam-Ayuthya, Pakistan dan Arab terdapat sebahagian kecilnya adalah pendokong Ahlul Bayt (keluarga) Rasulullah Muhammad s.a.w Syiah sejak turun-temurun (daripada nenek moyang). Kami mempunyai bukti atau hujah akademik serta warisan sejarah keluarga yang mesti diperakukan menurut Piagam Hak Asasi Manusahaan Persuburan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu, dan Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia bahawa kami adalah bermazhab Syiah atau mengamalkan fikah Ja'fari sebagai MAZHAB ASAL kami.”

The above statement claimed that there are ‘original Shi’ite’ within the Malay-Muslim community and their history, tradition and heritage were neglected for a long period of time. Another daring explanation that should be notice in the context of cultural anthropology is that Kamil Zuhairi’s expressed regret that they were alienated and oppressed due to academic ignorance. His words are quoted here: “Ekoran tiadanya dialog dan kajian sejarah, budaya dan etnik yang tersusun dari pihak berkuasa dan juga sarjana akademik tempatan menyebabkan kami telah disudutkan dan tidak diketahui kewujudannya sekian lama. Komuniti Pencinta Ahlul Bayt (keluarga) Rasulullah Muhammad s.a.w. (Syiah) di Malaysia TIDAK BOLEH DISAMAKAN dengan masyarakat Syiah di rantau lain, seperti rantau Indo-Pakistan, Asia Tengah atau Timur Tengah yang...
mempunyai tradisi dan kebudayaan berbeza. Kami minoriti Syiah di Malaysia mempunyai jati diri yang khusus. Adalah kami minoriti Syiah di Malaysia tidak boleh digeneralisasikan sama seperti umat Islam Syiah di rantau lain.¹³ Moreover, there is no doubt that a cultural anthropology research or study on them will in fact lead to some interesting findings. Due to this manner, this paper intends to contribute a small portion of knowledge in the academic world about ‘a lost society’; the Shi’ites disciples in the Malay world.

However, as stated from the title, this paper is interested in getting answers on (i) to understand why Malay Shi’ites make a pilgrimage to Iran and Iraq (ii) to observe the rituals practiced during their ziyarats (visits) to the sacred places in Iran and Iraq (iii) to perceive what are the meaning of symbolic objects or acts during their ziarah and finally (iv) to comprise Malay Shi’ite culture. By adapting Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism as conceptual framework, this study will have its own-self vitality and vigor.

Symbolic interactionism suggested that ‘objects for the human being are really social objects’ and these objects are ‘defined and redefined in interaction’ (Joel M Charon, 1979: 38-39). Basically an object changes because the use for it changes. Joel M Charon (1979: 39) made an example how the term communism change as a different object to ‘a Soviet patriot than is to a Wall Street broker’. In this context, the term ahlul bait or the Prophet’s household and his descendants have different meanings, definitions, representations and importance between a Sunnite and a Shi’ite. Symbols as a form of communication can be interpreted and can be found through i) words; as words represent ideas, feelings, values and have social meanings ii) acts; as acts can be intentional and meant for something or someone iii) objects; as objects when given a meaning represent something valuable such as a cross or a piece of cloth named flag (Joel M Charon, 1979: 42). The rite of pilgrimage by Malay Shi’ites and their other activities such as prayers therefore is a symbol and an act of communication between people, between themselves and their Imams and these symbols are meaningful and arbitrary. As promised this essay chose Malay Shi’ites as a reference group. By studying these symbols, Malay Shi’ites social world can be acknowledged adn what lies beneath can be put on the table.

Erving Goffman (1991: 12-13) explained that political and religious gatherings or carnivals gave ‘enough collectivities’ to understand the ‘celebrant’s behavior’, that anything ‘macroscopically significant resulted from the ceremonies’ can be examine and considered researchable. Goffman also stressed that ‘the number of people responding in unison to the same platform event apparently had lasting influence on some participants’ and it’s interesting to see how the rituals reflected on the participants and ‘how the occasion contributed to the political hegemony of its impresarios’. It is no doubt that in order to understand Malaysian Shi’ites, the best opportunity is to join their rites during their pilgrimage or ziyarat in Iran and Iraq. It is through the perspective of symbolic interactionism that any presence of ‘micro-ecological metaphors’ and ‘iconic symbols’ during the ziyarat can be well documented and analyzed.

One of successful cultural anthropology study using symbolic interactionism was conducted by Charles R Brook. He who experienced in researching Hindu religious culture in India and joined the Hare Krishna ceremony suggested among others; (i) anthropologists identify themselves with the particular faction by wearing same clothing or accessories, (ii) anthropologists should participate and observe using unstructured, open ended interviews in order not to loath informants (Malay Shi’ites), this is also because the goal of these interviews is to explore the chosen topic in depth, (iii) anthropologists are encouraged to use random verbal surveys, this method is beneficial especially in the case where informants are concerned with their confidentiality, (iv) documenting as much as possible physical aspects of the subject or object studied by

13 Translation: Following the systematically lack of dialogue and study on our history, culture and ethnicity by the authorities and the local academic scholars, we have been confined at the corner and this lead us to be alienated and not to be known for so long. The community of Shia in Malaysia not to be confused with the Shia communities in other regions, such as the Indo-Pakistan region, Central Asia or the Middle East which have different traditions and cultures. We Shi’ites minority in Malaysia have a specific identity. Shi’ites as the minority in Malaysia cannot be generalized as Shi’ite Muslims in other regions.

14 Interview with a Malay Shi’ite from Trengganu, who joined the pilgrimage caravan to Iran and Iraq on 8th of July 2011 in Mashad. He wanted to remain anonymous. After the interview, it happen that he received a text message from Malaysia informing that charges against four Malay Shiites from Gombak were dropped by the Gombak Barat Sharia Court. Note that the charges mention by him is not the one related to the raid on 15th December 2010 but another raid by Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor on 24th May 2011. Malay Shi’ites attending open luncheon commemorating the birth of Lady Fatimah Zahra was raided and intimidated. Refer http://abma.ir/data.aspx?lang=fa&id=252114. The man from Trengganu showed me the text message and look at me asking, ‘It’s just a matter of time. Sometimes it is answered late, but many times it is answered immediately. Now do you really understand what I mean just now?’
taking photographs. Brook stated that in order to access the subject matter (in this context Malay Shi’ites behavior during their pilgrimage in Iran and Iraq) it is important ‘to find a role through’, which to interact with ‘others’. Hence, taking Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism as conceptual framework and Charles Brook’s methodology, this research will be stressing social interaction, participant and observation in collecting data during the religious rituals. By doing so, it will comprehend readers in understanding Malay Shi’ites and their behavior while doing their pilgrimage in Iran and Iraq.

Due to limitation of space in this paper, only two from eight sacred sites are highlighted here. Sites chosen are Mashad (Iran), and Karbala (Iraq). Sites that were omitted here are Qom (Iran) Tehran (Iran), Najaf (Iraq) Kufah (Iraq), Samarra (Iraq) and Kadzimain (Iraq). It is important to note here that those sites that were not included in this essay are as important as those being observed here. However, the two sacred sites, Mashad-Karbala, are considered barely sufficient to reach the objective of the paper as most of the rituals are repetitive and were visited for a brief of time. Since, this paper is also a preliminary study two chosen sites are adequate to be a study case.

MASHAD

The main and focal point of Mashad is without doubt the tomb of Imam Reza (765-818 AD), the eighth Imam of Shi‘ite Muslims. Imam Reza was born in Medina, politically cheated and forced to move to Khorasan and was martyred by Abbasid Caliph, al Ma’mun on the last Friday of the month of Safar in 203 CE (Sayyid Saeed Arjmand, 2008: 84). He was buried in Mashad. The word Mashad is an Arabic word for ‘the place of meeting’. It is placed 24 km from Toos, the capital city of Khorasan, 924km from Tehran. Shi‘ites refer to Imam Reza’s tomb as ‘Holy Shrine’ or just ‘Haram Imam Reza’ and this essay will adopt the same manner in explaining the site. Today, Haram Imam Reza is a huge complex consists of libraries, museum, religious seminars, dining hall, a university campus and prayer halls. Nevertheless, the central attraction of Haram Imam Reza is the zarih or the holy burial chamber. According to the guide prepared by the office of Haram Imam Reza (Public Relations Office of Astan Quds Razavi, 2009: 22), zarih is where ‘the sacred body of Imam Reza has been buried’. It should be mention here, the office of Haram Imam Reza also published a guide book in Malay language entitled Mahligai Cahaya Mengenal Imam Ali bin Musa Ridha A.S. Another Malay language book entitled Adab-adab Ziarah Ahlu Bayt Rasulullah Sallallahu ‘Alaihi Wa Aalih was also provided to every participants of pilgrimage to Iran and Iraq. This can be evidence that numbers of visitor among Malay Shi’ites are not small and growing from time to time.

The rituals observed around the zarih among others are i) prayers recitation by groups or individuals ii) tawassul or recourse (petitions) by the visitors iii) kissing the doors of the Haram. Before elaborating those rituals, need to explain that the Shi’ites believed that their Imams are ‘still alive’ as revealed in holy Quran (3:169): ‘And reckon not those who are killed in Allah’s way as dead; nay, they are alive and provided sustenance from their Lord’. Therefore, according to them ‘the sacred souls of the Immaculate Imams were martyred in the way of God and Truth’, thus ‘are alive and aware’ of their pilgrimages, supplications or dua readings, and their petitions or simply mention above as tawassul (Legenhausen and Azim Sarvedalir, 2004: 13).

Main rite during ziyarat is to recite holy Quran and prayers ‘from the prophetic hadith and from the sayings of Imams’ as contained in ‘Nahjul Balaghah, al Sahifah al Sajjadiyyah, Mafatih Jinan and Usul al Kafi’. These recitations took long hours as the texts are long, such as Jawshan Kabir and Kumayl (Syed Hossein Nasr, 2007: 257). The recitations were done by group or individuals. Observation and examination into the text of ziyarats, prayers and litanies show a manifestation of Sufism (from Sunni point of view) or in the Shia term, Irfan. This observation was also confirmed by Luis Alberto Vittor (2010: 240-241), as quoted below:

The hadith literature in Shi‘ism and the anthologies of the hadiths handed down from the Imams are the veritable mines of Islamic gnosis. The Usul al Kafi of Kulyani and the other compendia of Shi‘i hadith are real treasures of irfan. Moreover, the Shi‘i prayers and litanies found in al Sahifah al
Sajadiyyah of the fourth Imam is the best exposition and representation of Islamic gnosis. Some Shi’i prayers, like Dua Shabaniyyah, Dua Arafah and Dua Kumayl highlight the highest themes of Islamic gnosis. Shi’i prayer books are replete with ritual formulae for acts of supererogation also much emphasized in Sufism and sometimes with identical formulations. The ritual invocation of the Beautiful Divine names and is recited by pious Shi’i on many occasions and at least once a week. Some identical formulae based directly and indirectly on the verses of the Quran are reiterated in both. The Shi’i canonical books of hadith are filled with themes which can be made the object of meditation and contemplation and which can find their true explanation in real irfan.

This point raised by Vittor is also agreed by Syed Hossein Nasr (2007: 258), he stated that ‘these devotional prayers and litanies come from the works of the saints, who in the Shi’ite world are identified with the Imams and the Household of the Prophet and in the Sunni world with Sufism in general’. Languages, or words, in this context the prayers and litanies are obviously a social communication and interaction between the Shi’ites and their Imams. From the angle of symbolic interactionist, these prayers and litanies signify something. According to Legenhausen and Azim Sarvedalir (2004: 14) Shi’ites pilgrimages to their Imams symbolize ‘a presence with yearning and spiritual visit to Imam’, and this act eventually ‘setting up a relation’ with those ‘proofs of God’. Pilgrimages or ziyarats are their way of ‘keeping alive the memory of the Imams’ and let them ‘to express love for and allegiance with the Imam’. Politically, pilgrimages are their ways to ‘announce that despite the martyrdom of the leaders, their names and goals will never be forgotten’. All the prayers recited during the pilgrimage are in the form of ‘declaration to support the leadership of the immaculate Imams and abhorrence toward the tyrannical idol powers and its way’. Therefore, needless to say, Shi’ite pilgrimage to their Imam is not only a spiritual basis, but also a social, cultural and political one.

Other than prayers recitation, tawassul or recourse (petitions) by the visitors can also be observed easily. Tawassul is without question a symbolic ritual through ‘instruments and intermediary means’. By definition it is ‘resorting to the special friends of God, the awliya in requesting the fulfillment of one’s needs from God the Almighty’ (Legenhausen and Azim Sarvedalir, 2004: 17). The words recited in tawassul nearby the zarih are:

O Abul Hasan, O Ali son of Musa, O devoted one. O descendant of the Messenger of Allah. O decisive argument of Allah over mankind. O our chief, O our master. We turn towards thee, seek thy intercession and advocacy before Allah. We put before you our open need. O intimate of Allah, stand by us when Allah sits in judgement over us (Abbas bin Muhammad Reza al Qummi, 2007: 985).

Another interesting rite that can be observed and might be thought strange to Sunni is kissing the doors of Haram Imam Reza. The symbolic act was performed to ‘respect the proof of God, the Immaculate Imam’. Legenhausen and Azim Sarvedalir (2004: 22) explained in the guide prepared for Haram Imam Reza, the rite is a way of Shi’ites honoring their leader:

The only reason we kiss the doors of the haram or the holy burial chamber or we believe they are sacred is to respect the proof of God, the Immaculate Imam. Their sanctity is due to the Imam’s holiness and blessings. It is just like kissing the cover of a Quran. Due to the holiness of the Quran the paper on which the words of the Quran have been written or the leather that has been used as the cover of a Quran obtain holiness. If the same leather had been used as a shoe or clothes, it would never have gained such sanctity.

Kissing the doors carry symbols and meanings as it is not an individual act, by the very nature it is a social one and done intentionally. This intended rite falls into what Blumer (1969: 68) had written that ‘each object changes for the human, not because it changes, but because people change their definition’. Observation around the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza shows that almost all visitors did the same with full
respect. Not just kissing the doors imply respect and honor, it can also lead to ‘an active relationship to the environment’ (Joel M Charon, 1979: 92) as one of the Malay Shi’ite point out in an interview after the pilgrimage that ‘kissing the doors of Haram is something really pure and I am conscious about it’, he added that ‘it is not just paying a respect to Imam but a symbolic act of asking help as the authorities back in my birthplace is discriminating me and my family, and I ask my Imam to look after me and my community. It is a simplest and humblest way of asking help from someone we love.\(^\text{14}\)

KARBALA

The main and focal point of Karbala is for sure the tomb of Imam Husein (626-680AD), the third Imam of Shi’ite Muslims. Imam Husein was born in Medina. He is the son of Imam Ali and Fatimah Zahra, a grand son of Prophet Muhammad pbuh who was brutally massacred together with his followers and family in Karbala by mercenaries of Yazid bin Muawiyah\(^\text{15}\), the second Umayyad Caliph, on Friday, tenth of the month of Muharam (or imply referred as ashura) in 61 CE (A.K Ahmed, 2007). According to Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i (2007: 542) ashura marked the martyrdom of Imam Husein and ‘has become the most solemn day of the Shi’ite calendar, marked by processions and universal mourning’. Ashura and Karbala indeed is the whole meaning of Shi’ism itself and the celebration of ashura ‘symbolizes the whole ethos of Shi’ism’. Karbala is 100km from Baghdad, the capital city of Iraq. Shi’ites refer to Imam Husein’s tomb as ‘Holy Shrine’ or just ‘Haram Imam Husein’ and this essay will adopt the same manner in explaining the site.

The rituals observed around the \textit{zarih} of Imam Husein among others are i) crying and weeping while listening to \textit{maddah} ii) reciting \textit{ziyarat} dedicate to Imam Husein.

Observation to the reference group - Malay Shi’ites in pilgrimage - found a very interesting rite. Together with the group they bring along two \textit{maddah} (elegy) reciters. Both of the reciters are responsible in reminding the participants of the pilgrimage on details of historical events surrounding all the Imams visited during the spiritual trip in Iran and Iraq. The aim of the elegy reading is merely to help them to cry or weep as all the historical facts are already known by them at the finger tips. By reading the elegy, the participants are reminded of what happen to their Imams and in this context it is Imam Husein. \textit{Maddah} reading is usually very long. It is in Malay and intend to get attention from the listeners to two simple but meaningful facts, i) allegiance for Imam Husein that they will follow his path ii) to protest and revolt against injustices and oppressive powers which were carried out in the name of Islam just like what Yazid did to him and the rest of the martyrs in Karbala. Therefore, the elegy recited all the way had historical information, political agenda and mourning purpose. It is difficult not to cry listening to the \textit{maddah}. In fact crying and weeping became group activities most of the time. Malay Shi’ites seems to be satisfied enough expressing their grief by listening to \textit{maddah} and beat their chest slowly.

As mention previously, crying and weeping in Karbala has a huge political philosophy behind it. Imam Khomeini (2000: 65), the founder of Islamic Republic of Iran, explained that ‘lamentation of the martyrs means preservation and perpetuation of the Movement’. Text quoted below from Imam Khomeini’s work explained the meaning behind the symbolic rite of crying and weeping in front of \textit{zarih} Imam Husein:

---

\(^\text{14}\) Interview with a Malay Shi’ite from Trengganu, who joined the pilgrimage caravan to Iran and Iraq on 8\(^{\text{th}}\) of July 2011 in Mashad. He wanted to remain anonymous. After the interview, it happen that he received a text message from Malaysia informing that charges against four Malay Shiites from Gombak were dropped by the Gombak Barat Sharia Court. Note that the charges mention by him is not the one related to the raid on 15\(^{\text{th}}\) December 2010 but another raid by Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor on 24\(^{\text{th}}\) May 2011. Malay Shi’ites attending open luncheon commemorating the birth of Lady Fatimah Zahra was raided and intimidated. Refer http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=15&id=252114. The man from Trengganu showed me the text message and look at me asking, ‘It’s just a matter of time. Sometimes it is answered late, but many times it is answered immediately. Now do you really understand what I mean just now?’

\(^\text{15}\) To understand more on the political events that lead to the tragedy in Karbala, refer to Taha Husain (1990), \textit{Fitnah Terbesar Dalam Sejarah Islam} (trans. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. Or see Abu Ala al Maududi (1986), \textit{Khilafah dan Kerajaan} (trans. Muhammad al Baqir), Shah Alam: Dewan Pustaka Fajar.
Don’t think that we weep and arrange these mourning meetings to please the Master of Martyrs. No, he has no need for our tears and our tears, per se, cannot do anything. But these lamentation gatherings and meetings unite the people and give them direction. 30 to 35 million people during the month of Muharam, especially the Ashura days, all have a united aspect and move in one direction. Some of the Infallible Imams (a.s) have wanted that elegies be recited for them from the pulpits, others have stressed that rewards will accrue to those who cry, make others cry or appear to be sad and crying. The issue is not shedding of tears at all, it is political for our Imams (a.s) with their divine vision wanted to unite and mobilize the nations, bring them together by various ways so that they won’t be vulnerable (p. 60).

The lamentation for the Master of the Martyrs is a mean by which his ideology (Islam) can be preserved. Those who want us not to observe the martyrdom of Imam Hosein (a.s) by mourning and lamentation do not understand the ideology of Master of Martyrs; they don’t know that these mourning sessions have preserved this ideology. It is now 1400 years that these lamentations, elegies and passion plays have kept us alive, have maintained Islam up to now. To these youths who want us to speak the language of the day we say the words of Imam Hosein (a.s) are the words of the day, it has always been the language of the day. In fact it is the Master of Martyrs who has brought forth the final word for today and left it with us. These lamentations have preserved the Master of Martyrs; his ideology has been preserved by the cries of mourning and by tears shed, by these passion plays, elegies and breast beatings. If instead of these actions, some saints would stay at home, confined to a room in which they would do nothing but recite Ashura prayers and use rosary beads, nothing would have survived. It requires clamour, every school of thought or ideology demands clamour. No ideology can be saved and maintained unless tears are shed for it and breast are beaten (p. 67).

Two paragraphs quoted above shows how respect towards the Karbala tragedy turned into a major political issue, to fight the oppression where ever you are and who ever the antagonists are. Hamid Ansari (1994) pointed out that ‘ashura and Karbala’ is the real source of energy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The tragedy of Karbala, as noted previously is the core of Shi’ism. Another interesting feature of the azadari (mourning) during pilgrimage is all the visitors to Haram Imam Husein wear black clothes or green clothes. Black signified mourning while green is the color of Imam Hussein. Stalls to donate foods and drinks, flags with slogans of Karbala and street stage plays are also common. Sayyid Imdad Imam (2009: 335) explained ‘mourning is a precept as well as a practice, an example of practice is to wear black or green clothes, to construct sarcophagus like Imam Husain’s tomb, to construct Husainiyahs, to install banners, hold meetings to commemorate Imam Husain’s martyrdom, feed mourners, distribute food among poor people, serve the poor and rich with eatables and drinks.’ Without doubt, Shi’ites rituals during their pilgrimage are full with symbols and by applying symbolic interactionism, easing the others to understand their rites.

Another thing, it is primer in Karbala for the Shi’ites to visit and touch zarih Imam Husein while reciting ziyarat. There are many recitations visiting Haram Imam Husein, among others are ziyarat warith, ziyarat Imam Husein and ziyarat ashura. After each visit to Imam Husein, Shi’ites will perform two prostrations at the Imam’s head and recite verses from holy Quran (Yasin T. Al Jibouri, 2007: 154-158).

Below is the excerpt of ziyarat ashura:

Peace be on you, who was martyred while fighting heroically in the cause of Allah, the son of Allah's fearless warrior, you were isolated and had been attacked with a vengeance! Peace be on you and on those souls who had gathered in your camp, and strided along with you, in your journey. I pray and invoke Allah to keep all of you tranquil and restful, for ever; so far I am alive, this is my prayer, and till nights and days follow each other. O Abu Abdullah! unbearable is the sorrow, nerve-racking is the agony, you put up with, for us and for all the (true) Muslims, crimes committed against you also shocked and unnerved the dwellers of the heavens, one and all. May Allah condemn and damn the people who laid the basis and set up the groundwork, to wander astray and turn aside from not only
you and your family but to take liberties and bear hard upon you. May Allah condemn and damn the people who tried to obscure and deny your office and status, willfully neglected your rank and class Allah had made know in clear terms. May Allah condemn and damn the people who killed you. May Allah condemn and damn the abettors who instigated and had a part in your murder. I turn to you and Allah, away from them, their henchmen, their followers and their friends, O Abu Abdullah, I pray and invoke Allah to send blessings on you. I make peace with those who make their peace with you, I make war on those who go to war against you, till the Day of Judgment us (Abbas bin Muhammad Reza al Qummi, 2007: 985).

Again, as shown in text above, the ziyarat recitation is a political one. Reading the full text of the ziyarat and the philosophical context of it, surely ziyarat ashura is ‘a framework for implicit dissent or explicit protest’ for the Shi’ites ‘in reference to Husayn's famous quote on the day of Ashura, every day is Ashura, every land is Karbala16.’ Ziyarat ashura is obviously a kind of framework from historical point of view transformed into the domain of ideology. As a Malay Shi’ites in the group of pilgrimage stressed at the beginning of one of the ziyarat ashura recitation session, ‘this is our only weapon as we are marginalized and oppressed, so let’s dedicate our recitation to our brothers discriminated by religious enforcer back home, and dedicate it also to our brothers massacred in Bahrain by the tyrannical regime of Hamad al Khalifa, and do not forget our Palestinian brothers even though they are Sunnites as they are also oppressed17.

Other than Haram Imam Husein, Shi’ites also visit zarih of Abu Fadhl Abbas (Imam Husein’s brother from different mother) nearby.

SHI’ITES IN MALAYSIA, THEIR FUTURE

Shi’ites are Muslims and discriminating them are wrong. Islamabad Declaration (2007) adopted by The Thirty Fourth Session Of The Islamic Conference Of Foreign Ministers stressed that "no Muslim, whether he or she is Shiite or Sunni, may be subject to murder or any harm, intimidation, terrorization, or aggression on his property; incitement thereto; or forcible displacement, deportation, or kidnapping. All Muslims to refrain seriously from any provocation of sensitivities or sectarian or ethnic strife, as well as any name-calling, abuse, prejudice or vilification and invectives."

There are differences between Sunnite Muslims and Shi’ite Muslims as stated above but that should not be an excuse of unity among Muslims.

CONCLUSION

It is hope that this particular research will enhance our knowledge, broadening our perspective and helps to bridge civilization through dialogues. There are many good intentions targeted by symbolic interactionism. One of the most important is to establish communication and dialogues between human, by this hopefully it will lead to problem solving, and minimizing or perhaps avoiding possible conflict in the society especially between groups. In this context, a cultural anthropology outlook via symbolic interactionism will hopefully put the Shi’ites minority in the Malay world at a right corner, at a just space, at a correct page; as a compatible member of our great Malay civilization specifically and South East Asia generally.

REFERENCES

Al Jibouri, Yasin T (2007), Kerbala and Beyond, Qom: Ansariyan Publications.

17 Words of a Malay Shiite from Penang, who joined the pilgrimage caravan to Iran and Iraq on 12th of July 2011 in Karbala.


Assistance of Propagation and Islamic Relations (without date), *Mahligai Cahaya Mengenal Imam Ali bin Musa Ridha A.S*, Mashad: Islamic Relation Office and Foreign Pilgrims Affairs.


Interview with a Malay Shi’ite from Penang, July 12th 2011 in Karbala, Iraq.

Interview with a Malay Shi’ite from Trengganu, July 8th 2011 in Mashad, Iran.

Interview with Mr Kamil Zuhairi Ab Aziz, June 17th 2011 in Kuala Lumpur.


Vitto, Luis Alberto (2010), Shi‘ite Islam: Orthodoxy or Heterodoxy, Qom: Ansariyan Publications.
STAGING COSMOPOLITANISM: PERPETUAL PEACE AND CONVIVIALITY IN THE THEATRE OF JOSEFINA ESTRELLA

Sir Anril Pineda Tiatco
National University of Singapore, Singapore
siranrilpt@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This essay critiques two works of Filipino director Josefina Estrella: her adaptation of Antonio Munoz Molina’s Spanish novel “Sepharad” into a devised theatre piece by Ronan Capinding of the same title and her take on the life of Spanish poet, Miguel Hernandez billed as “Recoged Esta Voz/Gather This Voice” a theatrical piece also devised by Ronan Capinding. The first few pages of the essay contends that Estrella contrasted her concepts of peace, Diaspora and global community to the visions of Spanish poet Miguel Hernandez and Spanish novelist Antonio Munoz Molina through the aforementioned theatre pieces. Borrowing cosmopolitan inquiries of Kwame Anthony Appiah and Paul Gilroy, it will be argued that Estrella strategically looked for connections between these Spanish literary geniuses and her locality as a Filipino theatre artist in pursuit of a global community and a shared humanity. Toward the end of this paper, it will be asserted that Estrella’s localizations of the Spanish texts are projected to a global orientation. It will also be argued that Estrella’s vision of a global humanity in her theatre is rooted in local contexts.

Augusto Boal (1979) states that the theatre is a “weapon, and it is the people who should wield it” (122). Thus, the theatre is a site for revolution or more so, it is a “rehearsal for a revolution” (122). Boal’s poetics of the oppressed is provocative and empowering, especially to communities belonging to the so-called third world or developing nations. Boal’s revolution is about inverting positions of power – calling all those who are being dominated (the masses, in particular) to unite to forcefully evict any form of bourgeois imperialism. Nonetheless, the assurance of ending the domination after the inversion is not clear in Boal’s poetics. It is in this stance that I see the theatre as a rehearsal for a more meaningful rehearsal of a revolution: the preparation for the encounter of common humanity.

Cosmopolitanism, says Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006), “starts with what is human in humanity” (134). Appiah asserts that the cosmopolitan will engages in the imaginative realm of human connections. Art, I assume, begins with this engagement as it navigates the meaning of existence and the meaning of being human via the creativity of the imagination. But it is only the theatre that such imagination is experienced in actuality because of embodiment. In the theatre, performing a character for example, “involves the level of imaginative engagement with another (fictional) person, a determination to occupy and understand that person’s actions, whether that is psychologically or socially. Acting might itself be considered a valuable rehearsal for the ethical principle of universal equivalence between all people” (Rebellato 2009: 71, emphasis mine). But more so, as a rehearsal for the encounter of common humanity, the theatre is an experience of “situations in a way that foregrounds the ethical dilemmas involved in them” such as war, terrorism, migrations and even the economic impetus of globalization. Finally, it is in the theatre that the “audience’s relation to itself can be an unusual experience of commonality” (Rebellato 72). It is in the theatre, that the individual experiences the stranger – the face in Levinas’ (1979) articulation, thus, the rehearsal for a cosmopolitan ethics.

A faculty member of the Department of Speech Communication and Theatre Arts in the University of the Philippines, Josefina Estrella finished an MFA in Directing at the Columbia University in New York under a Fulbright Scholarship. In a very thin cosmopolitan consideration, Estrella’s displacement in New
York may be considered as contributory to her cosmopolitan disposition. Since her return to the Philippines in 2001, her body of works touches issues of war, migration and transnational engagements.

In “Recoged Esta Voz / Gather This Voice / Tipunin Ilong Taghoy” [(Recoged) 2004] and “Sepharad: Voces de Exilio” [(Sepharad) 2005], Estrella pieced together narratives, statements, metaphors and other rhetoric and performativities of war, transnational issues and migrations from various Hispanic materials through local juxtapositions and connections. I argue, that although the variants of rhetoric of these global concerns are derived from Hispanic sources, the embodiments of these issues are very specific as these are also products of various Filipino imaginings. The specificities, nonetheless, do not hinder the universality of terror and trauma experienced in total annihilation in the case of war; and displacements in cases of transnational engagements and migrations. There are embodiments in Estrella’s staging of Recoged and Sepharad that do not only speak for some particularized concepts of war, transnationalism and migrations but are projected from a global perspective.

Recoged is devised from selected poems of Miguel Hernandez and some writings about him. Through the collaborative efforts of Ronan Capinding and Estrella, both forged a theatre piece that is not dramatically driven. In a sense, the poetry of Hernandez were translated and adapted into the poetry of the stage. The title of this piece is one of Hernandez’ popular poem. Literally, it means “Gather This Voice.” Translated as “Taghoy” in Tagalog and likely associated with “cry,” Hernandez was crying – in anxiety and in anguish. He was a victim of oppression from the very nation (Spain) he believed to be his sacred abode. Having lived in the country (Orihuela in the province of Alicante), he felt displaced in the city in hopes of encountering modern civilization. He was hopeful to be received as a poet in traveling to the city of Madrid. He went back to the country to rejuvenate the loss of his vigor as a poet. The civil war broke. Fascism emerged. Hernandez became active in writing poetry criticizing totalitarianism. He was imprisoned. His child died of malnutrition while he was serving in jail. He died in 1942 without seeing his son.

This is perhaps the tragedy that most audience members were anticipating in the piece. But as mentioned, Estrella seemed not interested in giving life to Miguel Hernandez as a Spanish tragic hero because there is something more in his poetry (and life) that could only be embodied by disemboding the Hispanic Hernandez. In a way, Estrella may have realized that the poetry of Hernandez speaks a more general condition than a specific condition experienced in Spain.

Reading the poem “Gather This Voice” gives a sense that Hernandez is inviting his readers to gather the different words inscribed in his writing and is asking his readers to create a voice for him. Estrella’s response is the repertoire – not just speaking the words out loud but to embody them more significantly as events. Reading the poem, one is hinted that Hernandez was referencing his hometown and his Hispanic origin as the subject but reading through, Hernandez may be inferred to use Spain as a reference point to talk about violence in its most banal existence. Going through the entire poem, the last part points to a more general condition of an experience of totalitarianism. Estrella could have been working on this particular premise in her staging. She, in a way, probably realized the performative and celebratory power of Hernandez’ poetry and in embodying these words, the voice that is in fervent desire to be performed has been projected to a different public: the Manila audience.

In the opening scene of Estrella’s Recoged, eight male actors are just standing rather bluntly wearing the same colors of costumes and corduroy. A lead performer enters proclaiming to the audience that there is sacredness in poetry. This indicates that the poem is like the host in the sacrament of the Eucharist venerated by the Catholics. This analogy suggests that both the host and the poem are instrumental in congregational conviviality: “The poem has to work as with the Holy Sacrament… When will the poet come with the poem in his finger, like a priest with a host, saying “Here is GOD” and we will believe it?” says the actor before

---

1 An excerpt from the poem, referring to Hernandez’ referencing of Spain: Caravans of beaten-down bodies / All is bandages, pain, and handkerchiefs, / all is stretchers on which the wounded / have broken their strength and their wings, / Blood, blood through the trees and the soil, / blood in the waters and on the walls, / and fear that Spain will collapse / from the weight of the blood which soaks through her meshes / right to the bread which is eaten. An excerpt of the poem referring to a more general picture of totalitarianism: Nations of the earth, fatherlands of the sea, brothers / of the world and of nothingness: / inhabitants, lost and farther / from sight than the heart, / Here I have a voice impassioned, / here I have a life embattled and angered, / here I have a rumor, but here I have a life. These excerpts were taken from the typescript of Recoged as devised by Ronan Capinding (2004).

2 All references on the lines of the play come from the typescript prepared by Ronan Capinding unless otherwise stated.
the audience. Using this a focal point, Hernandez was not primarily talking to the people of Spain but to the people of the world. The audience encounters an unusual experience of community and commonality. The sacredness of the poem is instrumental in a particular realization of a community founded in both the autonomy of the individual will and the universal community of beings where the audience members begin to share a “sharp sense of being both to themselves and to a part of a larger unity” (Rebellato 2009: 72).

As the theatre piece moves on, Miguel Hernandez, the Spanish poet is deterrioralized. The poems are stripped off form the pages of the books, from the life of Hernandez and even their specificities from Spain. The actor who pronounced that the poem should be thought of as a host brings the audience to a journey. He starts crossing and criss-crossing the stage as if a nomad-wanderer singing “Tantum Ergo,” inviting everyone to listen to the voice of the poem. Nonetheless, there are varieties of journeys that are present in the piece: sound of a moving train, shadow puppets of moving carriages, pieces of luggage carried on and off stage, sound of the bicycle, shadow of an airplane.

At first glance, the audience knows that the piece is based on and inspired by the life of Miguel Hernandez, a Spanish literary figure therefore expecting the scenes to be in Spain. With the various significations of journeys, Spain is brought to some familiar territory to the Filipino audience. On the other hand, Spain is also defamiliarised – brought out of Spain. For once, the only references of Spain in Estrella’s piece are the Spanish words performed onstage and the opening scene where performers introduce an individual as someone from Orihuela, the town where Hernandez was born. This does not mean, however, that there are no significations that may identify Spain. “Goating a milk,” for example, is not typically an activity elsewhere in the Philippines. It may not necessarily be an exact signification of Spain but the concept of a goat being milked is something that may be recognized as an activity elsewhere.

In dramatic theatre, audience members could easily identify that the setting is specifically referring to a concrete locality, and in most instance, a concrete territory. Estrella’s stage speaks of a local but does not signify territory. Every episode in Recoged suggests a familiarity of a place but no indication of concreteness. It suggests that the scene may take place anywhere or somewhere and at the same time it evokes a sense of familiarity where no one appears to be a foreigner or perhaps, even a local. But this does not account for a subjection to reconciliation as seen in one episode where the performers are interrogated by a fascist leader asking “what are you doing in this city?” One actor replies: “I am a writer and I am here for pleasure,” another goes on by saying “I am a journalist and I am here for pleasure,” another “I am a painter,” and another “I am a farmer” and so on and so forth. Estrella’s theatrical space suggests ambiguity and familiarity and makes the audience imagine a space where integration and differentiation are possible.

Miguel Hernandez is also brought out of Spain. Some poems of Hernandez specifically speak about his benevolent love for Spain. After the chorus introduces this actor as someone from Orihuela, no reference to Spain is heard or seen. At the same time this individual proclaimed as someone from Orihuela apparently looses this marker of territorial identity. Orihuela is transformed into a more general setting of the city. Each actor addresses himself as the “I.” The performance becomes personal. Following the introduction of the actor as someone from Orihuela, the actors begin telling the audience that even that boy from that town is in need of a new soil to be re-rooted or replanted. This speaks of our situated-ness in the world today: our identities are rooted, yet from time to time, they are in need of uprooting and re-rooting.

Estrella replants Hernandez (and Spain) in the stage of Manila (particularly at the Wilfrido Ma. Guerrero Theatre) arguably to locate some connections between Spain and the Philippines whether real or imagined. In the staging, Estrella seems to be convinced that even the imagined connections are more real than the perceived real. The experience of the cold war, for example, in Hernandez poetry is a specific moment in Spanish history but any war, in however picture it may appear, is still the same annihilation of difference and the destruction of integration. Etrella has imagined war as something that equates humanity with inanimate objects through a beautiful movement piece supplemented the war poems of Hernandez.

3 Tantum Ergo is a Latin Hymn by Thomas Aquinas. The English translation may be found in the Book of Vespers and Lauds in various Catholic seminaries. The verses in English is: Down in adoration falling / Lo! the sacred Host we hail, / Lo! o'er ancient forms depar ting / Newer rites of grace prevail; / Faith for all defects supplying, / Where the feeble senses fail. / To the everlasting Father, / And the Son Who reigns on high / With the Holy Ghost proceeding / Forth from Each eternally, / Be salvation, honor, blessing, / Might and endless majesty. / Amen.
Actors fall as bullets and bombs theatrically touch their bodies. Projected on screen is a city on fire. Sounds of animals personifying an anguished cry are heard.

Showing this complexity of ambiguity and familiarity, the actors enter with luggage on their hands and begin counting somberly in different Philippine languages. Other actors follow. The pieces of luggage are handed down to the other actors who also begin counting in various Philippine languages. Some actors exit with the luggage. The counting is continued by those who are left onstage. There is somberness and a hint of loneliness in the sound of the counting. A few actors who have left the scene with their luggage returns; and as they meet their lovers, the sound of counting becomes exuberant. There are those whose counting become more somber and more anxious. One actor stops, frozen before continuing counting. Another actor stops. She looks around, continues the counting and exits with tears in her eyes. One actor is blocked a little off-centered. He continues the counting but in a very undistinguishable tone until the counting fades out while lights are fading out.

This is a poetic image of mobility, of leaving a lover, of the anxiety and even joy of waiting and of the experience of exuberance upon the return of a loved one. The audience may be familiar with all these encounters but at the same time are probably alienated because of the soundscape produced by the counting. The counting, in my view, is a reference to the number of days or maybe moments of anxieties, joys and hope that individuals anywhere else vicariously share when a lover, or a family member is literally in-transit or in a position of displacement or in a situation of leaving home. Miguel Hernandez also experienced this anxiety when he left Orihuela for Madrid in hopes for a better life as a poet in the city. Ted Gennoways\(^4\) states that both Hernandez and her wife Josefinia Manresa were counting the singing of the nightingales, as a sign of their longing to feel home and be at home.

The case of displacing Spain and the poetic presentation of ambiguity and familiarity continue in “Sepharad: Voces de Exilo.” Based on the novel Sepharad written by Spanish novelist Antonio Munoz Molina, the lives of 17 Spanish individuals criss-cross. Literally translated as Spanish-Jews, Sepharad’s characters are immigrants, victims of the Holocaust, and political prisoners under Stalin and survivors of the Nazi regime. Estrella’s Sepharad begins with a group of Filipino overseas-workers (OFW) stationed in Spain. As an audience member, I assumed that these OFWs converge on a Sunday as it is typically the day-off for most overseas workers elsewhere. Sunday is also a very important rest day for most Filipinos – a Church day, a time for family and a time for sharing stories. Sunday is a time where homeland is reconstructed by the Filipino people overseas.

In Estrella’s staging, this recreation of homeland is reconstructed in one of the migrant-worker’s apartment. It is reminiscence of a Filipino barrio fiesta where a host prepares sumptuous meals for the guests as an act of thanksgiving to the Almighty (or the town’s patron saint) for all the blessings experienced within the year. Capinding, in reworking the novel, juxtaposed some lines of Molina’s novel with “memories” of the migrant workers about home. For instance, Capinding lifted this line from the novel: “We have made our lives far away from our small city. But we can’t get used to being away from it, and we like to nurture our nostalgia when it has been a while since we’ve been back,” and then imagined a parallel situation linking these words to a particular “cultural” memory about homeland: “16 years. Hindi na kita makilala. Marunong ka pa bang Mag-Ilocano?”.\(^5\) [16 years. I barely remember you. Do you still know how to speak Ilocano?]. Or take this example, “We realize that the oily dough sits a little heavy on our stomachs, but in our conversations we keep praising the savor of those hornazos, which are absolutely unique in the world and no one but us knows the name of” and then followed by an actor who claims “Bagnet! Tama, bagnet, wow! Gusto ko ng bagnet!”. [Bagnet! Yes, bagnet, wow! I like to eat bagnet!].

In this reworking of the text, Molina is displaced by the assignation of various lines seemingly alien from the world of Spain. Nonetheless, Capinding, in this parallel association, linking and de-linking, also defamiliarizes the homeland as some Hispanic significations are linked with those recollections and memories. The Sefaradic experience in the novel states “it’s been a while since you’ve been back.” A more familiar link to the Manila audience is “Hindi na kita makilala. Marunong ka pa bang Mag-Ilocano?”. [I did not recognize

---

\(^4\) This is lifted from the introduction of Ronan Capinding to the typescript of the piece.

\(^5\) All lines are lifted from the typescript prepared by Ronan Capinding (2005) for the play unless otherwise stated.
you anymore. Do you still speak our native language?]. A displaced experience in the novel states “that our children can vaguely understand from having heard them so often.” A probable unfamiliar to the Sefaradic world: “Ano? Tatlo na ang anak mo? Marunong ka na bang magluto,” [What? You already have three kids? Do you already cook?]. Pagluluto [cooking] is associated with the tie of a mother and her children. It’s a common view that Filipino kids oftentimes associate food with mothers. Food is perceived to have some kind of emotional bond between the kids and their moms. The novel gives “madeleine and Holy Week cakes” and “hornazos;” the insert gives us “dinuguan” [blood-stew] and “bagnet” [a popular deep-fried pork dish in the Ilocos region]. Somberly, Molina suggests “all the things we have missed and yearned for in Madrid,” the Filipino migrant workers responds “itlog na maalat na may kamatis!” [salted egg with tomatoes].

There are varieties of doubling defamiliarizations in this sense – Spain and the homeland, the novel and the theatre, nostalgia and enjoyment, the foreign and the local. Displacement, in the prologue of this theatre piece, is not just being displaced from a territory but it is a re-imagination of a previous placement to reconstruct the displaced locale in the present space. Just like in her take on Recoged, Estrella is playing along ambiguity and familiarity in adapting the novel into a theatrical piece. As the title of the novel suggests, the setting is in Spain – an indication of its foreign-ness. But then again, the opening scene is not suggestive of an alien locale but something “familiar.” It may be a common studio apartment of a middle-class Filipino in the metropolis. It is reminiscent of a place based on common stories that many Filipino people hear about a family member or a relative who has been living abroad as a foreign talent or as a domestic laborer. But as the text becomes embodied onstage, the familiarity of the locale becomes ambiguous. All of a sudden, we hear the actors talk about something foreign – something particularly Spanish (with reference to places like Madrid, Barcelona, paella, chorizos, etcetera) but at the same time the actors talk about something close to the experience of local audience. Nonetheless, this experience of familiarity may also be an overstatement as there are some references, which in a way, are not necessarily within the scope of the Manilan environment. For example, the bagnet, being a popular dish in the province of Ilocos, some 12 hour drive north of Manila. Thus, Estrella is trying to displace and replace the overseas migrant workers’ experiences by the experiences of local migration in the city particularly in the metropolis. In a sense, the Philippine experience of migration is embodied in this prologue as the familiar yet at the same time the unfamiliar.

In the next pages, I turn my discussion to the embodiments of war in Estrella’s staging of Recoged and Sepharad. In Recoged, when an actor announced the death of a child (a reference to the death of Miguel Hernandez’ son) because of malnutrition – a consequence of the civil war, a group of soldiers cross the stage from right to the left almost catatonic and followed by a child who stays on the rightmost corner. The stage is darkened while the soldiers are exiting. Only a direct spotlight illuminates the child but his face is not recognized. Then a mushroom cloud created by an atomic bomb is projected on stage. The child begins to sing:

Night is calm, peace in everyone
Even the stars in the bright night sky
In love, the wind sways softly
For a shared peace in the world
A season of peace is life lived
The gift of the Almighty to humanity
Night is calm, peace in everyone
Even the stars in the bright night sky

Slowly, the mushroom cloud subsides. Then there is darkness – only the child on the rightmost part of the stage is seen. His face is slowly revealed. The darkness enveloping almost all areas of the stage is an

---

6 The song is “Payapang Dagaidig” composed by National Artist Felipe de Leon. Here is the lyrics for reference: Ang gabi payapa, lahat ay tahimik / pati mga tala, sa bugbaw ng langit / Kay hinhin ng hangin, waring umilibig / Sa kapayapaan ng buong daigdig / Payapang panahon ay diwa ng buhay / Biyaya ng Diyos sa sangkatauhan / Ang gabi payapa lahat ay tahimik / Puri mga tala sa bugbaw na langit. Sung in the play in Tagalog, translation is mine.
image of emptiness. In contrast, is a young innocent child smiling and singing about the calmness of the night clad with a desire for perpetual peace.

In Sepharad, the final episode is a horrifying picture of torture and violence. The stage is transformed into a torture / gas chamber. The sound of a passing train is heard – perhaps, invoking the transit of the Jews and other victims of Nazism to their death in the concentration camps. Actors undress themselves as they compress somewhere off-center. As the actors deliver their lines, the stage becomes less and less orderly, less and less discernible and less and less recognizable. Each actor introduces a personality who was Diasporic and a victim of violence caused by what was considered as a necessary war. After everyone has introduced a personality, dolls and shoes fall from the battens. Above these actors is a light bulb – flickering similar to those used in action movies. Then, the stage is darkened. The light bulb stops from blinking.

War has a totalizing character – it equates all beings as one and the same. It does not see difference. It has one ultimate purpose: to annihilate everything. Economic expansion, capital domination, nationalist-ideology are some of the most articulated reasons and sometimes justifications of any engagement in war. In most instances, communities engage in this extreme form of violence because of a strong urge to invoke an obligation for the nation. Thus, the engagement is more of an interpolation – an obedience to a territorial domain more than an obedience to a larger cause for common humanity:

“War has always involved the destruction of life, but in the twentieth century this destructive power reached the limits of the pure production of death, represented symbolically by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The capacity of genocide and nuclear destruction touches directly on the very structure of life, corrupting it, perverting it. The sovereign power that controls such means of destruction is a form of biopower in this most negative and horrible sense of the term, a power that rules directly over death – the death not simply of an individual or a group but of humanity itself and perhaps indeed of all being . . . Biopower wields not just the power of the mass destruction of life (such as that threatened by nuclear weapons) but also individualized violence. When individualized in its extreme form, biopower becomes torture. Torture is today becoming increasingly banalized” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 18 – 19).

War is oftentimes allegorized and romanticized as a beautiful tragedy by nationalist propagandists. In the case of the Philippines, for instance, war is a necessary condition to obtain independence as illustrated in various drama simbolico performances during the turn of the 20th century. However, war as a romantic activity of the nation, saw its demise after World War II. The Holocaust incident is considered in the social sciences as the “failure of the nation-state to guarantee human rights” (Whitefield 1990: 104). Hanah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem [1994 (1964)] provides a clear exposition on how the concept of the nation-state failed towards the understanding of humanity. Adolf Eichmann was trialed in Jerusalem in 1962 for his crimes against humanity. At his trial, he pleaded not guilty for he was only obeying the laws of his state (Germany) and at the same time he was justifying his actions to be dutiful, lawful and righteous, again, based on German constitution and laws. It seems that human status is dependent on civic status; humanity depends on nationality.

Not only the nation was questioned after World War II, but also the context of war vis-à-vis humanity. In Europe, the Holocaust is considered to be one of the many meaningless episodes in the history of the Western World (or the history of the worlds per se). Gene A. Plunka (2009) explains that “the

\[ Drama Simbolico was an offshoot of the sarsuwela, a traditional musical theatre form in the Philippines. Literally means symbolical drama, this theatre form was established during the turn of the 20th century when nationalist theatre artists turned the stage to “a seditious purpose, though the authorities [had] not seen fit to censor it, except for the more daring of the dramas intended to stir up the native spirit” (Gilbert and Thompkins 2006: 1). These plays thwarted American propaganda. For that reason, American authorities branded these performances as seditious. Eventually, the skeptical authorities criminalized anyone caught or suspected of performing anything that seemed to be against them. These performances were chameleon plays because artists, “having tasted of the bitter lessons of the past, like the chameleon in a forest inhabited by bigger and more powerful forces, had realized the value and skill of blending colors with the surrounding flora and fauna, of disappearing momentarily, if his survival is to be assured” (Lapeña-Bonifacio 1972: 30). American viewers, at that time, never realized that they were being parodied and their governance in the archipelago was subtly criticized. On the other hand, the Filipino audience knew that these plays were about their agitations against the Americans.  

415
Holocaust has altered our notions of human dignity, our conventional concepts of God and humanity, and the humanistic idea of civilization aspiring to the norms of cultural existence” (3). The European Jews, particularly the German Jews were not simply murdered for being categorized as the enemy of the state, they were forced to experience agony and suffering. They were not treated as human beings but perceived as parasites, vermin, animals or the untermenschen (subhumans) (Plunka 2009).

Estrella’s non-commitment to a concrete locality in her staging, is in a way a subtle critique on this “failure of the nation-state” to understand war in its banality. She has provided a preliminary discourse that may only be commenced through specific contexts (i.e. Spanish civil war and the local conflicts in the Philippines) but does not end there. In particular, she has used the specificities of Spain and the Philippines but goes beyond these specificities by disembodying the Spanish and Philippine contexts of war to implicate a more general condition of humanity.

In philosophical discourses, in art practices and in social theories, the Holocaust incident provided a new venue to understand the meaning of existence. Despite various attempts to understand the Holocaust incident, debates whether or not the annihilation of humanity should even be represented. There have been questions of trivializing and sentimentalizing violence that occurred during the war. Lawrence L. Langer, for example, argues that art cannot depict the annihilation of humanity because

“We lack the psychological, emotional and even intellectual powers to participate in a ritual that celebrates such a demise. We feel alien, and not akin. The drama of fate reminds us that Man, the history of the Holocaust reveals that whether they chose or not, men died for nothing” (in Plunka 14).

Even cultural theorist Theodore Adorno joined in the debate and agreed with Langer. Adorno asserted that the Holocaust should not be celebrated, thus should be kept in silence to avoid its trivialization and the lack of respect for the dead.

On the other hand, cultural theorists like Bruno Bettelheim (1979), Alvin Rosenfeld (1980) and Primo Levi (1988) challenged Adorno and other theorists and artists who do not believe in the efficacy of representing and discussing the annihilation incident (i.e. Holocaust), particularly on their proposal of silence. For Bettelheim et al, remaining in silence is behaving as if the annihilation of common humanity never happened. Rosenfeld (1980: 14) asserts, “if it is a blasphemy the to attempt to write about the Holocaust, and an injustice against the victims, how much greater the injustice and more terrible the blasphemy to remain silent.”

In the theatre, the Holocaust incident was a favorite subject across Europe and the American stage. The debate on representation, respect and trivialization was even greater as theatre affects emotionally in a more direct way than other forms of art like poetry and fiction. The theatre possesses “a powerful immediacy effect between actor and audience that no other art form can match” (Plunka 16). When Ann Frank’s diary was adapted for the stage in Broadway, Frances Goodrich and Albert Hackett were accused of trivializing and sentimentalizing the Jewish experience of the Holocaust. In this stage version, “Anne’s universal appeal for the goodness of humanity cheaply sentimentalizes the Holocaust as a ready-made tale of forgiveness, at times making her sacred like a martyr who delivers a message of Christian love for all who suffer from oppression” (Plunka 7).

Estrella is not convinced with Adorno’s proposal of silence. She, like the other theorists, believes in the efficacy of talking about the horrible incidents to give room for further examination and reflection on what it means to be a member of humanity. Although, however, she was also cautious, that her way of shedding


9 “The Diary of Ann Frank,” a stage adaptation of the book of the same title narrates the experience of a young Jewish girl as her family takes shelter on an attic in the Netherlands to escape from the Nazis. It opened at the Cort Theatre in Broadway on 15 October 1955 under Garson Kanin’s direction. The cast included Joseph Schildkraut as Otto Frank and Susan Strasberg as Anne Frank.
light might trivialize and sentimentalize the experience of trauma and violence during the Second World War. Estrella, may be aware that in the theatre, the audience can serve as a community participating in a palpable rite of mourning for the Holocaust victims (Plunka 16). However, Estrella veered away from an actual reconstruction of the Holocaust or the Cold War in Spain. She is not after all concern with the rite of mourning. Elinor Fuch writes, “that rite cannot take place without the participation of the community of spectators as living witness. In the very act of representing the annihilation of the human community, then, the theatre itself offers a certain fragile potentiality for re-creation” (in Plunka 16). Estrella’s staging of the cold war in Recoged and the Holocaust incident in Sepharad ought not to recreate the experience and anguish of the victims but more so to activate that which was lost during the annihilation of common humanity: the sacredness of the face or a morality based on an understanding of the other.

Her choice of non-dramatic staging particularly in Recoged was to emphasize what I mentioned earlier as the rehearsal for the encounter of common humanity. Besides, in the post-dramatic tradition of theatre embodiment is more crucial than narrative (Lehmann 2006). In activating performance rather than the efficacy of the narrative, Estrella is pointing out that “performance has the power to question and destabilize the spectator’s construction of identity and the other – more so than realist mimetic drama, which remains caught in representation and thus often reproduces prevailing ideologies” (Lehmann 5). Just like what Malgorzata Sugiera asserts, Estrella’s staging is no longer a domain of an extensive metaphor of human life, but “rather as a means of inducing the audience to watch themselves as subjects which perceive, acquire knowledge and partly create objects of their cognition” (in Lehmann 6). In this sense, Estrella is inducing her audience not to look at the narrative of Miguel Hernandez and the summation of Molina’s novel but to look at the stage as a foundation of discourse. In particular, her stage is a provision for the understanding of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan conviviality for a Manila perspective from a global orientation.

In human interaction, the first encounter is always the face as it “constitutes the central zone of the body where our eyes and our mouth are located and play of features takes place” (Waldenfels 2002: 64). Through the face, the “other” is encountered. The face “is something present, but at the same time it is the other’s corporeal self-presence” (Waldenfels 64). Emmanuel Levinas (1979) asserts that through the face, we recognize the transcendence and heteronomy of the other. With this encounter, we activate our moral responsibilities with the other – the responsibility to humanity.

The face, says Levinas, is not an object. It is an expression in its purest form that affects the “I” (or me as an individual) before the “I” can even begin to reflect on it. The face paradoxically commands and summons. It carries resistance and defenselessness. No event or encounter is as effectively unsettling for a conscious holding persuasion in its world than the encounter with another person. In this encounter, the “I” experiences initially itself as called and liable to account for itself. The “I” responds as if to an unformulated command. The other does not give a de facto command but the command is part of the relationality between the “I” and the other. In this response, dialogue commences. Dialogue, for Levinas, is always a response – a responding-to-another, that is, to the summons of the other. This is the beginning of intersubjectivity as a lived immediacy.

In Estrella’s staging of Recoged and Sepharad, the “I” – the audience members in particular, discovers its own particularity when it is singled out by the gaze of the “other.” In a latter episode of Recoged, for example, the chorus members cover themselves with pieces of white cloth. Only the faces of the actors are seen. Then, the chorus proclaims, “our foundation will always be the same, the earth.” Eventually, darkness fills the stage. A video of a group of children is projected onstage. Faces of happy children walking hand-in-hand are seen while everyone in unison delivers, “men, worlds, nations, pay heed, listen to my bleeding cry, gather my breaking heartbeats into your spacious hearts because I clutch the soul when I sing.”

Looking at the faces of the actors at first and then the faces of these children projected on screen, there seems to be a gaze, which is both interrogative and imperative. The gaze from the stage seems to implore: just look at me, do not kill me! For Levinas, this gaze also implores a command and a supplication. Thus, it is here that transcendence is activated. The encounter of the face causes freedom of will to falter and opens an “I” to goodness. In this encounter of goodness, dialogue is encountered. The images that Estrella forged into her theatre made the audience member encounter this dialogue and opens up to discourse. The discourse is an
investigation of ethics because as the dialogue continues, the encounter with the other is weakened because the encounter or the event becomes eventually instrumental. Levinas says that it is not wrong to experience the weakening of the encounter because it is only in this weakened encounter that justice is posed as a significant response. For Levinas, justice is a reparation of wrongs, a disinterested equity, and an interest of the stranger. Estrella activates this universal impulse of the encounter in her poetic images onstage.

These images in Estrella’s theatre are fictional but they are real encounters. It is the rehearsal for transcendence. The focus is shifted to the repertoire rather than the archive. The audience members see that another human being is like him or her, acts like him or hear and appears to be a master of his or her conscious life. In this encounter, transcendence is activated. The other does not even have to utter words in order for the “I” to feel the summons implicit in the approach. The “I” for Levinas lives out its embodied existence. This is the activation of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan conviviality in Estrella’s theatre.

WORKS CITED


CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN STUDYING THE VISUAL OF COMIC ART

Karna Mustaqim and Muliyadi Mahamood
School of Visual Communication, Universitas Bina Nusantara (Binus University)
Faculty of Art and Design, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM)
karnamustaqim@yahoo.mail.com

ABSTRACT

Gray and Malins (2004) suggested that artistically paradigm of inquiry is illustrated as the role of ‘practitioner is the researcher’ whereupon the ‘subjectivity, involvement, reflexivity is acknowledge; Knowledge is negotiated – inter-subjective, context bound, and is a result of personal construction’. As for comics its impact to contemporary popular culture is huge but only lately, comics gradually succeed to influence other storytelling medium (Talon, 2004), as well as the eagerness to study comics at large make it notable as an emerging art and literature medium (Harvey, 1996; Hatfield, 2005). A study of comics as popular culture as art is a search for meaning through reading comics’ activities, or a re-reading the lived-experience into-the-world of comics. This study accordingly analyze the visual content based on observing the appearance of amount characteristics in purposively sampling of four local Malaysia’s comics magazines: Gila-gila, Ujang, Gempak and G3. In this study, the quantitative numbers simply denote the presence of a specific sign which is defined objectively and limited to the surface (manifest) characteristics of the comics. It focuses on the visual by carefully examine the drawings characteristics. This research into drawing method and models derived from Charles Sanders Pierce which is constructed within the triadic models of semiotics theories and develop by William Morris that deliberately used in visual communication design. The understanding of comic art is an intersubjective one. To read is to share the perception amongst the reader. This study is a re-reading for meaning through the lived-experience of comics.

Keywords: Art-Based, Lived-Experience, Comic Art, Phenomenology

INTRODUCTION

The reason we studying visual images, Ball and Smith (1992) argued were simply because it is everywhere and we used to reading them all the time (as cited in Holm, 2008, p. 325). Visual images have exhausted much of our physical and emotional energy on the act of seeing (Berger, 1998) and it inevitably play a central role in the culture of the twenty first century (Sturken& Cartwright 2004). Sturken& Cartwright (2004) in ‘Practice of Looking’ noted that culture arepliant and mutual in a ‘shared practices of a group, community, or society, through which meaning is made out of visual, aural and textual world of representation’ (p.3). As for comics which ‘are arguably younger than literature, certainly older than moving pictures have received less critical attention’ for quite a long time (Berninger, Ecke, &Haberkorn, 2010, p.1). Its impact to contemporary popular culture is huge but only lately, as a popular culture, comics gradually succeed to influence other storytelling medium (Talon, 2004), as well as the eagerness to study comics at large make it notable as an emerging art and literature medium (Harvey, 1996; Hatfield, 2005).
RESEARCH PARADIGM AND METHODOLOGY

Recently, research as the creation of knowledge draws increasing attention to the creative arts field (McNiff, 2006, p.11; Leavy, 2009, p.2). The usual assumption bear in mind attempts research as a form of knowing and explaining. Indeed, Shaun McNiff (2006) suggested that a research task could be preoccupied objectives such as the need to experience, to inspire, or to build a profession collectively. Egon Guba (1990) in *The Paradigm Dialog* imposed that a researcher ‘must understand the basic ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of each, and be able to engage them in dialogue’ (as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 191). Indeed, Joseph A. Maxwell (2005) asserted that underpinning any research, there are some at least implicit philosophical assumptions about the view of the nature of the world (ontology) and the way to understand it (epistemology); and by making them explicit, carefully considering them Gary Potter (2000) believed that will be of practical benefit (p.3). The philosophical assumptions known as worldview or ‘paradigm’, is significant thought disseminates by Thomas Kuhn (1922 – 1966) concerning our ideas about reality and how we going to gain knowledge out of it (Maxwell, 2005, p. 36). There are many paradigm, which is nothing more or less than a conceptual framework (Garratt, 2005), used in guiding research inquiry. The research paradigm helps to distinguish the inquiry in science, social science, and the arts. Correspondingly, Henk Borgdorff (2006) in ‘The Debate on Research in the Arts’ indicated that what will ‘make art research distinguishes and qualifies as academic research in its own right is by scrutinizing the question of ontological, epistemological, and methodological’ which means not only following what already been done and without proper knowledge about what the philosophical assumption behind the practices.
Table 1.1 Positing the study of art. The research paradigm helps to distinguish the inquiry in sciences, social sciences, and the arts.

The study of art is not the same as scientific study of nature. Natural processes investigated to find a causal link that was considered necessary according to the formulation of deductive-nomological, which phenomena that repeatedly experienced then it results in a covering law theory. If art studies using this approach as such, James F. Walker (2004) assured that the artist would perform an instrumental rationality that is controlling and manipulating (experimental) the art object. It treated art as ‘an impersonal representation of the world as described by an objectivist science’ (Matthews, 2006, p. 137), which end up in a deductive premise proposition as the literal meaning. Walker (2004) in ‘The Reckless and The Artless: Practical Research And Digital Painting’ argued that:

“...the absurdity of the 'objective' criteria of art school research speak, the absurdity of using the models of the physical or social sciences when framing research in visual art; the models should come from the humanities, where 'objective truth' is somewhat hedged around with questions of viewpoint and interpretation. It was as if visual art suffered from an inferiority complex, and had to wear a different set of clothes to look respectable...”

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Following Grossberg (1995) ‘studying popular performance can not be successful without the researcher being serious about her own connection to pleasure’ (as cited in Hanulla, Suoranta, & Vadén, 2005, p. 73). This study of comics as popular culture as such is a search for meaning through reading comics’ activities, or a re-reading the lived-experience into-the-world of comics. The study accordingly analyse the visual content based on observing the appearance of amount characteristics in purposively sampling of four comics magazines. The analysis of appearance things in the visual form from the selected sampling are not merely a statistical compilation but concerning the themes, iconicity, models or patterns and conceptual development which accepts as given existence that hopefully will serve as an aid to sensitization and interpretation in deciphering their meanings.
Table. 1.2 Research Methods: Comics Studies as Visual Art Research

Renée Green (2010) offering a definition for artistic research that can be contemplated and further probed developed taking from ShaXin Wei (2008) who described how art research differs from other form of research:

“…Like research in other domains, art research has its own archive, but whereas historians use textual archives, and anthropologists use materials gathered in fieldwork, art research’s “body of literature” is the body of prior works and the critical commentaries surrounding them. Like other research, art research is open-ended, we cannot declare in advance what is the “deliverable”; if we already know the answer, then we would not need to do the research… (as cited in Green, 2010, p.18).”

Studying art is not to explain the nature of art, because art is not a kind of knowledge whereupon to find the law of causation as natural scientific per se. Carole Gray and Julian Malins (2004) based on Guba’s analysis of paradigms suggested that artistically or designerly paradigm of inquiry is illustrated as the role of ‘practitioner is the researcher’ whereupon the ‘subjectivity, involvement, reflexivity is acknowledge; Knowledge is negotiated – inter-subjective, context bound, and is a result of personal construction’ (p.21). Regarding obscurity in art research upon two apparently disparate modalities, the visible (image) and the writeable (text), Jonathan LaheyDronsfield (2009) in ‘Theory as Art Practice: Notes for Discipline’, intriguingly put forward that ‘visual art is not simply visual – there is always something written in the work’, which he further expressed:

“It is a space, an interval, in the work of visual art which is given by how the work itself writes and writes of itself…, it is something writerly, what Jean-Luc Nancy calls “a certain writability or scriptuality”, which makes possible what we see, within what is seen, something which makes the art itself possible as something seeable. Art writing what it wants to say itself – this is what the researcher can draw out from the visible.”
Table 1.3 Artistic Research Paradigms inquiry by Carol Gray & Julian Malins (2004, p. 20) developed from Guba’s.

Patricia Leavy (2009) in ‘Method Meets Art’ introduced the emergent of a new methodological genre called ‘art-based research practices’ which she defined as ‘a set of methodological tools used by qualitative researchers across disciplines during all phases of social research, including, data collection, analysis, interpretation, and representation’ (p. 2-3). She asserted that ‘art-based methods….comprises new theoretical and epistemological groundings that are expanding the qualitative paradigm’ (p. 3). The term art-based research was coined by Elliot W. Eisner (1980). Art-based research is a form of qualitative research defined by the presence of aesthetics qualities which quite different from traditional forms of research that are associated with the social sciences (Barone, 2008, p. 29). But it need to differ that art research is not the same as art practice as argued by Sha Xin Wei (as cited in Green, 2010, p.18).

Influenced by Eisner, Leavy (2009) then purported ‘the emergence of art-based practices has necessitated a renegotiation of the qualitative paradigm with respect to fundamental assumptions about scientific standards of evaluation’ (p. 15). She further situated that:

“Traditional conceptions of validity and reliability, which developed out of positivism, are inappropriate for evaluating artistic inquiry. Unlike positivist approaches to social inquiry, art-based practices produce partial, situated, and contextual truths” (p. 15-16).

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF VISUAL CONTENT

Klauss Krippendorff (2009) as a leading exponent in content analysis argued that ‘the feature that distinguishes content analysis from other techniques of inquiry is that it provides inference by abduction’ (p.205). Abduction, as an interpretivist research strategy was also called as ‘logic of discovery’ by Russell Hanson and characterized as ‘reasoning to the best explanation’ by Gilbert Harman, as suggested by Jennifer Mason (2002) is a strategy that theory, data generation and analyses are developed simultaneously in a dialectical process such as moving back and forth between data, experience and broader concepts.
Krippendorff (2009) further explained that ‘content analysis utilizes text – writings, images and all kind of symbolic matter – as data to answer various social research question’ (p.205). Within popular culture studies, qualitative content analyses have been common for exploring films, magazines, and television (Holm, 2008, p. 329). Krippendorff (2009) inferred that ‘reading is fundamentally qualitative process’ (p.20) and ‘recognizing meanings is the reason that the researchers engage in content analysis’ (pp. 21-22). He also described that:

“Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use….The reference to text in the above definition is not intended to restrict content analysis to written material. The phrase “or other meaningful matter” is included in parentheses to indicate that in content analysis works of art, images, maps, sounds, signs, symbols, and even numerical records may be included as data – that is, they may be considered as texts – provided they speak to someone about phenomena outside of what can be sensed or observed” (Krippendorff,1980, 2004, pp.18-19).

We use content analysis as a systematic attempt to examine visual form that ‘goes beyond merely counting or extracting objective content from ‘texts’ to examine meaning, themes and patterns that maybe manifest or latent in a particular text’ (Yan Zhang & Wildemuth). Frequencies and cross-tabulation will be sufficient to describe the findings (Mosdell, 2006, p.107). Indeed, Bell as cited in Holm (2008) explained that it is not a theory-based process and does not tell much about meanings, it is better to establish variables with distinguishable values rather than just categories for classification (p. 328-329). Therefore, Holm (2008) suggested for exploring the messages intended to be perceived from the pictures, a content analysis needs to be combined with a qualitative semiotic analysis (p. 329).

Figure 1.2: A simplify visual semiotics diagram for comics studies.
VISUAL SEMIOTICS OF COMICS

Marcel Danesi (2004) argued that culture is everywhere “meaningful,” everywhere the result of an innate need to seek meaning to existence (p. 4). Niall Lucy (2001) further emphasized in Beyond Semiotics: Culture, Text and Technology by saying that:

“It would not be entirely wrong, though it may be provocative, to say that what used to be called semiotics is now called cultural studies. This would not be to infer that semiotics as such no longer exists - yet notice the ease by which an ‘as such’ can attach itself to ‘semiotics’ nowadays, seeming to diminish it. To say ‘semiotics as such’ is at the same time to say that Something has been lost to semiotics, that semiotics exists today as something less than it might have been” (p.25).

Semiotics, mostly renowned as the science of signs, is an enormous field of study which suggested by a few semiotician who believed that ‘everything can be analyzed semiotically’ (Berger, 2005), ‘encompassing anything that is used, invented, or adopted by human beings to produce meaning’ (Danesi, 2004); from a simple pictorial figure to a complex narrative or even scientific theory.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE AESTHETICS OF COMICS

Steven J. Taylor and Robert Bogdan (1984) in their Introduction to Qualitative Research Methodology elucidated that ‘the phenomenological perspective is central to our conception of qualitative methodology’ (p. 8). It is an exploration of intangible variables resulting in description of the phenomenon being studied. A researcher role in qualitative approaches suggested by Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett (1968) is part of the variable in the research design (as cited in A.A. Berger, 1998, p. 27), and as the research method (Gay & Airasian, 2003); or is the instrument itself (Janesick, 2001). As a method applied to art criticism, Edmund Burke Feldman (1994) gives a provisional understanding about phenomenology as art criticism:

“…a powerful method of focusing the critic’s perceptual powers on the actual features of an artwork. Through the epoché – or “bracketing” or suspension – of preconceived notions, the phenomenological critic endeavours to experience the distinctively aesthetic properties of the art object…” (pp. 16-17).

‘I’, the researcher, found that adapting the Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is particularly advantageous to be use as an investigation of the phenomenon in the creative arts. The discussion derived mainly in the phenomenological account of art of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment and temporality, and through the voices of others including Mikel Dreyfuss’s, Roman Ingardern’s, also refrain to the phenomenological conceptions provide by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

Merleau-Ponty implied ‘phenomenology is the study of essences’ and accordingly it includes finding the essence of comics through phenomenological inquiry as part of uncovering the meaning of comics.

The act of reading comic means a lived-experience to read in–between the panels (gutter) to disclose the treasure life-world behind an elliptical and paradoxical formulation using a sophisticated style of intricate and symbolic language found in comics. From this point of view, the understanding of comics as an invisible art is not only achievable through writing an explanation of the visible, but essentially need to do the practice of reading comics and explicate how is the comics show itself to the researcher as it is.

CONCLUSION

In this study of comic arts, the quantitative numbers simply denote the presence of a specific sign which is defined objectively and limited to the surface characteristics of the comics. The next step is to pursue an analysis of comic art via semiotics theory and intertwines correspondingly with psychology of art, art theory, aesthetics and related comics art theory. It focuses on the visual(art)-based research by carefully examine the
drawings characteristics. This research into drawing method and models derived from Pierce sign theory which is develop by William Morris that constructed within the triadic models of semiotics and deliberately used the visual communication design models. Last but not least, the understanding of comic arts is an intersubjective reading horizon. To read is to share the perception amongst the reader. To be immersing into comics is to be lived-in-the-being-of-the-gutter.

![Visual Characteristics Diagram]

**Figure 1.3:** The flow of studying the visual of comic art by appropriating the Art-based research methodology.

Comic art is not a mere reflecting of some pre-existing reality or a representation out of it, it does not mean to imitate or resemblance the world but it is a world picture of its own. The reader or spectator of comic art not just concerned with whether it is a resemblance of what it purports to depict, but with whether the world created through the work of comic artist is coherent, satisfying, illuminating, and appealing and believable.

**REFERENCES**


IRANUN TEXTILE TRADITION

Juita Jaafar Manap
Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Faculty of Social Science
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
juitajaafar@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This is a brief documentation of the weaving tradition practiced by the Iranun community in two villages, off Kota Belud in Sabah. There are about 20 active weavers in these villages combined. Majority of them are above 45 years old. Most of them have been weaving textiles since they were teenagers. This paper is a reference of knowledge and information about the history, ritual and process surrounding the weaving practices as told a matriarch in one of the village. One could even consider her a weaving activist. Her mission is to keep the Iranun weaving tradition alive. As the head weaver in her village, she has agreed to share her experiences and stories that were passed down from one generation to the next about the creation of patterns, the education of the weaving processes and the role of these textiles as part of their cultural heritage. This paper will also document the issues and challenges faced by Hajjah Pandian and the weaving community in her village today. This is also to create awareness of the diminishing interest in this art form within this community.

Keywords: Cultural Heritage, Weaving, Iranun Community, Sabah

INTRODUCTION

The Iranun tribal community in Sabah is a descendant of a group of people from Sulu and Mindanao islands in the Philippines (Waren, 1985). There is a theory that a volcano eruption in 1765 forced the Iranun to migrate, and they dispersed widely as far as Tampasuk, known today as Kota Belud situated on the west coast of Sabah (Waren, 1985). However there seems to be a dispute about the origins of the Iranun people.

Even among the Iranun, there is still uncertainty about the historical place and origin of their people (Smith, 2011). The elders and leaders in the Iranun community however, believe that they originated in Sabah and that some fled to the Philippines because they feared Sultan Makatunaw who ruled Tampasuk in the 13th century (Raja Ali, 1965). He was a very cruel ruler. According to Hj. Masrin Hj. Hassin, who is the District Chief in Kota Belud, the word makatunaw in the Malay language means ‘yang menghancur lebur’ which translates closely as ‘the destroyer’ in English. There is also another theory of an oral tradition telling of ten Datu leaving Borneo, they fled to the Philippines to escape the cruelty of their leader, Sultan Makatunaw (Smith quotes Datu’ Bandira, 1996).

Hj. Masrin and Datu Bandira, both in their writings, agree that the Iranun people existed in Sabah prior to the reported volcano eruption in the 1630’s in Mindanao, Southern Philippines (Smith, 2011). According to McKaughan (1996), there is linguistic evidence showing the Iranun of Sabah’s language is older than the Maranao language in the southern Philippines. He believes that the Iranun of Sabah is closer to the Proto-Danao than is Maranao in ways that there are linguistic features such as medial consonant clusters and beginning consonant clusters found in the Iranun language in Sabah, but not in Maranao (Smith quotes McKaughan, 1996). He also believes that languages tend to lose such clusters over time rather than introduce them. Thus, the clusters represent older forms in Iranun of Sabah than do forms without such clusters found in Maranao (Smith, 2011).

There are not many written documentations on the Iranun people let alone their weavings and other cultural traditions. Some researchers have studied the Iranun community from the perspective of their beliefs,
language, custom and origins but, seldom their art specifically textiles. Patricia Regis, former Director of the Sabah State Museum, claims that she has compiled information on Iranun weavings, patterns and design. However, this documentation has not been published. There has been no detailed document to introduce and inform the public about who the Iranuns really are. There is no reference about their history or custom. This does not help in the preservation of their cultural traditions.

**GROWING UP AS AN IRANUN**

This paper attempts to introduce and document briefly the life and works of Hajjah Pandian Bte Sulaiman. As a young girl she lived in a small hut only about three feet high made of coconut leaves and bamboo which would require a person to be on all fours to enter and exit, and squat to move around in the space. Cooking and cleaning were done outside the hut. The inside space was only used for resting. Although the structure was not a house, she says it was definitely a home for her and her family. They were very poor. This way of living was very common among the Iranun community from this remote village called Kampung Rampayan Ulu, situated in the northwest coast of Sabah. She has ten siblings from two mothers since her father remarried after the death of her mother. Until today they are very close. With much difficulty she tells about the hardship growing up as a young Iranun. Both her father and mother worked the land and go out to sea during fishing season.

They did all kinds of work and sourced for food in any way they can. They prepared their own sea salt and sold them or traded them in order to obtain other goods. They also had livestock such as cows and goats, which they sold and slaughtered for their own consumption especially during wedding ceremonies and at the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan. The Iranun people were known for breeding horses. Each family would have at least 10 horses, which they used as a mode of transportation and to help them work the land especially in the paddy field. Ducks and chicken were also common animals found in an Iranun family compound.

There were no electricity then so when there is a full moon, the woman would weave mats while the men pound paddy in the middle of the field where there is moonlight. On nights such as these, the woman and men weaving and pounding paddy will be entertained by the sounds of flute playing and the traditional kulintangan (a traditional ensemble of percussion instruments). They would accompany each other in the form of entertainment so that the people who are working would not get bored. Such was the support of the Iranun community then, which Hajjah Pandian fondly remembers.

There were no taps too, so they would have to get water from the river or a well. She remembers how difficult and tiring it was to get water as she had to make many trips, walking from the house to the well or river, just to get enough water for drinking, washing and cooking. Water was contained, collected and stored using bamboo. She often had to go double the trip when the weavers are ready to prepare natural yarns and dyes.

Her father decided to move the family to the neighbouring village, further downstream by the river mouth called Kampong Rampayan Laut. Hajjah Pandian was only a teenager when they moved. Life was difficult so her siblings and her helped their parents work the land and farm. She was often told by her older siblings that she was very lucky she got to tag along every time her father would go to town to sell their produce. According to her, because there were no roads and that they were surrounded by thick jungle, they had no choice but to go through rough terrains. It was almost a two-day journey on a horse from her village to the nearby town, which takes about thirty minutes car drive today, known as Kota Belud.

There is the weekend market known to the locals as *Tamu*, which they look forward to as a place for showing off their produce. They would bring salted fish, rice, sea salt and most precious of all, Iranun hand woven cloths. She was very close to her father, she said. Her father taught her how to fish, ride horses, row the *perahu* (a long and low boat) and plant all sorts of vegetation. She was very outgoing for a young Iranun woman. Her mother on the other hand, taught her all she needed to know about preparing meals, healing and most of all weaving.
Hajjah Pandian married at a very young age. She got married when she was a teenager. She is married to an Iranun man from another village known as Kampong Marabao. They have nine children. Four of her children, a daughter-in-law and three grandchildren live with them in their house in Kampong Rampayan Laut. They live in a part brick part wooden house located next to the river (on the right side of the house), facing the beach with a swamp at the back of her house. Beyond the swamp is a thick jungle where groups of monkeys can be seen on treetops in the evening.

Like her parents, Hajjah Pandian and her husband raise ducks and chicken around their house. They used to have horses but not anymore as some of their horses and cows have been stolen before. They plant an assortment of vegetation that can be eaten and used for medicinal purposes at the back of the house. Right next to her house in a newly built workshop made fully out of bricks.

She explains that life was really difficult when she had her second child. She said everyone in the village was very poor. They never had the opportunity to proper education. The school was very far and took about two hours journey on foot to get there. It was hard she explains especially when walking barefooted. She says that when the weather is bad, or when there are not enough hands to work the land or weave she does not go to school. They learn to use their hands.

Because of this, the livelihood of her family at that time was much dependant on the fertility of the land where crops were planted and catch from the sea, which is very unpredictable due to the constant change of weather and their health. Although times were hard, the Iranun community spiced-up their days by dressing in colourful textiles and spend their nights playing music and reciting poetry. Those days, everyone knew how to play an instrument and they would take turns in reciting poetry in song and rhyme. It was this rich tradition that the community escaped to in order to relieve themselves from the tiring and depressing days.

Hajjah Pandian is an Iranun master weaver and is considered a matriarch by her community. She is highly considered as the head of the weaving community in her village. She learned by observing her mother weave everyday since she could remember. There was no formal training. When she was about ten years old, she would take over her mother’s position at the loom when her mother had to stop to prepare meals. This was when she practiced and picked up practical weaving skills. As time went by, her mother started to share ritualistic procedures, which has been passed down from her grandmother to her mother.

These rituals surround the entire process of preparing dyes, yarns and the loom up to the weaving process itself. She still practices these rituals today. Although some parts of that process have changed, for example, they do not prepare yarns and natural dyes anymore. Natural yarn and dyes are prepared when there is special demand for commissioned work.

According to Hajjah Pandian, only two people today can weave the siambitan, and that is her and her daughter-in-law whom she taught to weave. With the support from the Sabah Museum, Sabah Tourism
Board, and Sabah Craft Council, Hajjah’s efforts in training and preserving Iranun weaving practices paid-off when she was awarded a special grant for building the workshop next to her house. The workshop is complete with 20 back strap looms and other weaving equipments in order for her to train other Iranun woman. She has about 20 apprentices today who can weave other types of Iranun weaving such as the muga, ampit and pajuntai. She is looking forward to teach them how to weave the siambitan.

She was also awarded the Special Recognition Award in 2009 by the Sabah Tourism Board for her efforts in preserving Iranun textiles and the title *Tokoh Adiguru Kraf Tenunan Sambitan* in 2006 by the Malaysian Craft Council.

**IRANUN WEAVINGS AND WEAVING PRACTICES**

There are eleven different types of Iranun woven textiles. They are kain siambitan (*munsalah-a-siambitan* and *tubau-a-siambitan*), ampik, baraburu, muga, mandarisipak, pajuntai, jail-jali, mandarakaruk, tubau landap maiatem and batabur. Each cloth is different in terms of design and colour. Kain muga for example has a plain black background with loose stripes in red, blue, ochre and white. Kain muga, ampit and baraburu were used as clothing in the old days because other forms of textile or coverings were not available due to the remote location and challenging geographical conditions of the village. These textiles were worn as body coverings for both men and woman. These textiles are used especially to cover the woman’s body including her head.

There is a certain way of placing the cloth so that it hangs over the head covering half of the face and the rest drapes onto the back and around the front wrapping the rest of the body all the way down to the ankle. The cloth is pulled over constantly so that most of the head and face cannot be seen. It is possible that the way they wear their clothes are influenced by their belief in Islam since the religion demands that all parts of the body be covered except for the palms and face. It is also possible that because the Iranun people are generally shy, their body language and how they dress resembles that characteristic. Kain muga was also used to cover and wrap the deceased before and when the body is buried.

All traditional Iranun textiles have similar function because other materials were not available. All the textiles are used during wedding ceremony, festivals, on special occasions, on a daily basis and even in death. Of all Iranun textiles, the most treasured is the kain siambitan.

The most intricate and special is the siambitan. It is said that the siambitan (*munsalah-a-siambitan*) cloth was created in a dream. An old Iranun master weaver dreamt that a snake had come to her. She was in a state of shock and feared the snake would do harm to her. The snake convinced her that it was not going to harm her. It told the women that there is something it had to show her. The snake said that it is an unusual piece of weaving where the front and back of the cloth looks the same. The snake then demonstrated and showed the woman how to weave the siambitan. There has been an evolution and improvisation to the *munsalah-a-siambitan*, which created another type of siambitan, one with borders called *tubau(w)-a-siambitan*. This is the *siambitan* used to fold and make a dastar (headgear).

Today, the *siambitan* is used not only during the festive seasons but also as small enterprise product. Weavers have produced pieces for home furnishing and decorative products. The Iranun weavers are appreciative of the fact that the *siambitan* cloth is promoted as more than a headgear, therefore prolonging its life as a treasured cloth. Although they do have apprehensions about the traditional function of the *siambitan* “is compromised” once it becomes commercialised.

The *siambitan* was almost extinct in the year 1999 where it was said that no one except for one weaver in the village who could weave the cloth. That person was Hajjah Pandian. The *siambitan* is a very intricate piece of textile. It is woven on a traditional backstrap loom. The backstrap loom is one of the oldest weaving equipment. It is still used today by traditional weavers in many parts of the world.
THE LOOM

The backstrap loom used by the Iranun weavers are made of two wooden stands, which support a rectangle frame where a bamboo stretcher is attached across at a horizontal position. The bamboo is the top part of the backstrap loom. Yarns are stretched from this point to the foot of the wooden stand where a weaver would sit to weave and control the tension of the yarns. Loom in the Iranun language is called aulen. The Iranuns sometimes refer to the loom as parabuat-aulen, which can be translated as weaving machine. The aulen is made out of many parts such as the surud (shutter speed), barirah (beater) and bibitan (headle eyes).

![Figure 2: A sketch of a backstrap loom with parts labelled in the Iranun language](image)

The length of the intended weaving is measured using a sudan, which is also known as the warping board. This tool also determines the position of other tools when dressing the loom. Dressing the loom means to fix the warp threads onto the loom while determining where the parts of the loom and tools sit between the warp yarns. This tool can be used to measure up to 4 meters length of yarns.

![Figure 3: A warping board known as sudan in the Iranun language](image)

It is said that in the old days, when the first weaver hit the barirah (beater) against the surud it was like a signal or a calling for other weavers to start weaving. The sound of the beating of the surud creates a rhythm that enhances speed through repetitive alternate beats from one weaver to the other.

The siambitan is woven without the tatalian (shaft), tulak (bobbin) and palati (placed between the bibitan and bubungan). These additional features to the aulen make it functional to weave all other types of cloth besides the siambitan. Although there are new tools which are introduced to the weavers, there has been no changes or modification made to the process of weaving the siambitan.

The siambitan is worn as a headgear. The cloth is folded into a triangle and this headgear is known as the dastar. Tubao-a-siambitan a square siambitan centrepiece attached to wide, bold borders around it. This cloth is usually used as a tanjak. The bold borders are usually on a black background to accentuate the siambitan in the centre of the cloth. The siambitan is a colourful piece of weaving. Red, orange, yellow,
white, blue, purple and green are used in harmony. The colour green is significant in Iranun custom and tradition where it is seen as a spiritual representation whereas, the yellow signifies royalty. White symbolizes purity. These three colours can be seen wrapped on tiered dish like shapes on wooden sticks on some tombstones in Iranun cemetery.

The unique feature of the siambitan is the soumak technique, which is used to create patterns and design. Soumak is a traditional off-loom method of inlaying and binding horizontal threads onto warp yarns (vertical threads). This technique used makes the weaving appear exactly the same from the front and reverse side, making it wearable both ways. This is a complicated and intricate process. The use of a variety of colours on each cloth makes it even more intricate.

There are four basic patterns used on the siambitan. The first is the corak tialalit, which is inspired by the lotus flower. This pattern is arranged in a repeated manner and is used on the munsalah siambitan and the tubao-a-siambitan. The second pattern is the corak bunga kapas or cotton flower pattern. This pattern is seen most on the tubao-a-siambitan or the dastar because of the placement of the pattern at the four corners of the square cloth. The third pattern is the corak daun kalinguan, it is inspired by the leaves of the tapioca and sweet potato plant. The pattern is arranged to create a flower like design. The fourth pattern is the corak siku-siku, which is an interpretation of the elbow. This pattern is used repeatedly to create a border. It is used at the edge of the cloth.

Additional pattern such as the corak sugi-sugi, which means gums in the Iranun language is used only as a border design. Corak unsud-unsud is purely decorative and is created to form gabs between patterns and design. Corak layupan-layupan (inspired by the centipede) when stand-alone it is known as the singular layupan and once combined with other patterns it is called layupan-layupan. The corak bunga kalungat is inspired by a creeper plant and must be placed sandwiched between the layupan-layupan patterns. This pattern is only used on the munsalah siambitan and tubao-a-siambitan.

Corak bunga berantai is an adaptation of the rock formation by the sea near the village called Teluk Bunga Berantai. This pattern does not decorate the borders of the siambitan. It is used on the body of the cloth. There are different variations to this design, some are singular and some in repeats. Patterns such as corak kipas-kipas or the fan pattern is a triangular shape design that must be woven repeatedly on all four corners of the cloth to complete the dastar. This pattern is usually paired with the corak bintang-bintang.

Corak bintang-bintang or the star shaped pattern acts as fillers to the corner design of the tubao-a-siambitan. The Pattern of corak pitak-pitak (square pattern) is a three layered square design decorated with a corak bunga pusar in the middle of the centre square design. Inspired by the children’s’ game of hopscotch, the corak bunga pusar is used as a filler to be combined with other patterns and designs. The corak tuarah is inspired by the flower of the tuarah plant and is a combination of the corak usud-usud and corak kipas-kipas. It is seen repeated on the body of the tubao-a-siambitan.

All Iranun patterns and designs are inspired from the nature. Like most traditional cultures, artists tend to draw inspiration from the flora and fauna from the environment. There are also designs that are adaptations of a dream. All Iranun designs are abstract and geometric in shape. This is due to the limitation in
the weaving method that makes creating curvy lines and shapes difficult. Most of the designs are formed from basic shapes of squares and triangles.

There has been representation of horse images that was incorporated on some old dastars. The Iranun people owned horses as means of transport. It is also used to lead the bridal procession in a wedding ceremony.

**RITUALS, BELIEFS AND TABOO**

There are many rituals to observe during the preparation and process of weaving the siambitan. One has to be absolutely silent during the warping of threads on the sudan (warping board) and during the transferring of threads from the sudan to the aulen. No one is allowed to sit or stand on the right side of the weaver during this process and while she is weaving. A forbidden act is to cross over or walk underneath the loom as it is said to bring bad luck. It is also seen as disrespecting the loom as an important weaving tool. To hit or bang on the pengutak is also forbidden because it is said that it makes the threads brittle and will break easily during the weaving process.

There are many tunes, rhymes and spells that are sung when the loom is being prepared and when the cloth is completed and used in special occasions. A particular song is sung during the threading of warp yarns on the surud to ask for an uninterrupted weaving. It is said that the singing is also a tradition referred to as ‘naming the thread’ or namakan benang. Leaves are also woven at the very top of the aulen where it is believed that just like a moving snake the cloth will be woven quickly and smoothly.

A special dance called the kinubao is performed or rather presented to the bride before the wedding ceremony takes place. The bride, dressed in her wedding attire is wrapped with a piece of kain mugah over her shoulders while she sits on the dias (a platform where the bride and groom would sit throughout the wedding ceremony). A group of married elderly women gather to sing and dance the special song around the bride while they move their kain siambitans placed in front of their bodies in a soft and flowy movement. The song is sung in the Iranun language, which, according to Hajjah Pandian is about the bride moving forward in search of the perfect mate.

In the old days, weavers sing while they weave and in the process they are able to complete a dastar within a day. It was believed that there were magical spells in the lyrics of the songs. Stories were told of weavers weaving and completing a dastar from five o’clock in the morning until six o’clock in the evening.

Traditionally the dastar is not only used as a headgear during wedding ceremonies, it was also used during the harvesting season (musim menuai). The Pesta Kematan is a festival held to celebrate the harvest. The dastar is not only used by the Iranuns. The Bajau people also have been using this cloth also as headgears for many traditional festivals and ceremonies. The Bajau people have been buying this cloth from the Iranuns since hundreds of years ago. As such it has become part of their cultural heritage too.

**CULTURE AND TRADITION**

There are many differences in the past and present cultural practice of the Iranun people. In the old days, during a wedding ceremony, the bride and groom would be dressed in colourful traditional wedding attire, adorned with intricately created jewellery, body ornaments and headgears. The dias where the bride and groom would sit would be heavily decorated with drapes of textiles in bright colours. In all areas where the ceremony takes place too, these colourful bright textiles are draped and hung to symbolize a wedding celebration is taking place.

In front of the dias there would be a centrepiece called the umpuk-umpuk which is made of an arrangement of assorted sweets, crackers and savoury which is given away at the end of the ceremony. It is arranged in a tree like arrangement symbolizing fertility, prosperity and the tree of life. While waiting for the groom to arrive, the bride will be seated on the dias while the elderly sing and dance the kinubao. This dance symbolizes the blessing of the bride from her family to be happily married. Again, textiles are used as a medium to communicate messages through its movement in song and dance.
In an Iranun wedding, the groom will be transported in a boat-like vehicle driven by the strength of strong young men carrying it in a procession all the way to the bride’s house. This boat-like vehicle is painted and decorated in bright colours and flags of textiles are used to add on to the decoration. Leading the procession is a man on a horse. This horse has been trained to trot about like as if it is dancing while decorated in colourful textiles and bells. The jingling of the bells would alert the bride’s family that the groom is nearby.

Somewhere close to the dias is a sipak manggis which is a triangle shape-piñata like object, hung beyond ten feet high and is used as a game. Anyone who can kick a ball high enough that hits and releases the content of candy, sweets, crackers and money hanging inside it is considered the winner and its content is the reward. This game is very challenging and can take several hours to end. The game is for the men folk and is played throughout the wedding ceremony. Much has changed since then.

Figure 5: Sipak Manggis

Cultural traditions were not only observed during wedding ceremonies. In the past, there were singing, poetry reading and dancing in their daily life, as explained by Hajjah Pandian. The women used to sing while they weave and work the fields. There is a song for almost everything as she remembered. Men sang too, while they worked the land, as they arrive at the jetty after a good catch in the sea and while they rest and relax after a long day. In the evenings, these men and woman recite poetry to each other. Sometimes it was as if one was answering to another’s calling describes Hajjah Pandian.

The poetic words and songs usually reflect their livelihood, events of the day, about a special occasion or inspirations from the natural environment around them. The poets are usually accompanied by traditional music. On a night of the full moon, there would be many musicians playing together forming a kulintang band. Kulintangan is a group of musician playing the kulintang, which are percussion or gong like instruments similar to the gamelan group by the Javanese people. These talented artists, poets, craftsmen and musicians are ordinary Iranun people. It was a way of life for them then.

There used to be a lot of dancing too, especially during wedding ceremonies and at the end of the harvest. Some of the dances symbolize or mean something as it is used as a medium for sending massages or advise about life. This tradition has changed.

The culture of the Iranun people has evolved into something modern to suit the younger generation. Traditional practices are sometimes forgotten and not even considered at times when planning an occasion especially a wedding ceremony. For example, the traditional way of decorating the dias with woven textiles, brass-wear and traditional ornamentation is replaced with a modern up to date design where none of the Iranun textiles are used as part of it. Even on special occasions such as the harvest festival or Eid (a
celebration which takes place after the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan), the Iranun people both men and woman do not dress in traditional costumes or accessories. According to Hajjah Pandian, this is due to the hot weather where the slightly thick textiles become unsuitable materials as body coverings.

There is no precession lead by a dancing horse when the groom is on the way to the bride’s house. Today they drive cars. Even then, the cars are not decorated to show that it is the bridal vehicle. The umpuk-umpuk is quickly replaced by the Malay bunga pahar but the design and function is much more contemporary. There are no rituals done for and to the bridal couple before or after the wedding. The playing of the sipak manggis has also been discarded as it does not blend in with the more modern setting. The kulintangan band is no longer an option and has been replaced with the more popular music compact discs, and the presence of a disc jockey who controls the music and karaoke equipment.

With regards to the singing of songs, recitation of poetry and dancing, this tradition which was once considered a way of life is considered lost in modernity. The younger Iranun do not speak the Iranun language. This is because once the children start school, they learn how to speak, read and write in the Malay language which is very different from the Iranun language. As a result, most parents speak the Malay language too. There is no recitation of poetry as young Iranun prefer to watch the television, play electronic games or mobile phones. They hardly play outside anymore. Young Iranuns are not interested to learn traditional dances, songs and playing traditional instruments. Their preference is more inclined to the western type of entertainment as seen in western music videos and movies.

As for the weaving practice, it is said that the siambitan can only be taught to an Iranun descendent, preferably a descendent of a master weaver. She is considered the chosen one to inherit the knowledge and skills of weaving the siambitan.

Hajjah Arijah who is 80 years old, aunt of Hajjah Pandian is the first weaver for the Sabah Museum from 1969 – 2001. According to her, no other weaver knows more about Iranun weaving than Hajjah Pandian. Even her own mother did not teach her all there is to know about Iranun weaving. There are about 2,750 Iranuns living in Kota Belud district and only 20 are weavers. This art of weaving the siambitan is slowly diminishing, as the younger generation of Iranuns prefer to pick up other skills such as sewing, baking, teaching or find work at food outlets. Unlike the older weavers who inherit their skills from their mothers and are passionate about weaving, the younger show less interest. They do not want to stay in the village but would rather move to bigger towns to find work and money. Those who weave for Hajjah Pandian only do it for money and if the pay is poor then they will refuse the offer.

Figure 6: Hajjah Arijah Bte Saman

Much of the Iranun customs have been lost and sacrificed in the process of fitting into the modern day lifestyle. Unfortunately, many of the masters in weaving, poetry, music and dance have passed away leaving no apprentice with sufficient skills and knowledge to train the young.
CONCLUSION

Hajjah Pandian weaves all year round. From the time she picked up weaving skills from her mother, she has not stopped since. Until today, the only time she would put weaving on hold is when it is fishing and harvesting season, because the profit is immediate compared to selling a cloth that takes a long time to complete. According to Hajjah Pandian, in the past she would wake up and head to sea from two o’clock in the morning and return by about six o’clock in the morning, in time for selling the catch of the day at the jetty and local market. She would continue to weave later during the day and even through the night.

If not for the hardship and poverty she went through growing up, she would not have learned so many skills and the meaning of endurance, determination and patience. She gives credit to her parents and grandmother who taught her how to survive in almost any condition and situation. It is that strength, patience and faith that is encouraging and keeping her vision and passion to preserve and keep Iranun textiles alive.

If not for the continued support from the state government who has promoted Iranun textiles in Malaysia and overseas, the siambitan would remain a treasured cloth only amongst this small community. It is in the interest of the Iranun people and with the efforts by Hajjah Pandian that this weaving practice is preserved. This is essential in protecting the existence of a people and their tangible and intangible culture and heritage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM IN MALAYSIA

Paramjit Kaur
Language Studies Department, School of Education and Modern Languages
College of Arts & Sciences
Universiti Utara Malaysia, Kedah
paramjit@uum.edu.my

ABSTRACT

Post independence language policy instituted in Malaysia saw the initial shift in functional range and importance towards Malay, the national language. However, the English language continued to function as an official language in administration, education, diplomacy and commerce for ten years after Malaysia’s independence. Subsequently, with the passing of the Malaysian Education Policy 1961 and National Language Act 1967, Malay came to be the national and sole official language as well as the medium of instruction in mainstream primary, secondary and tertiary education through public policy and strong nationalistic spirit (Asmah, 1992). English, termed the “second most important language” in Malaysia, has continued to survive in Malaysia, but with less proficient users as well as a marked decrease in formal and informal domains of use (Asmah, 1979).

This paper looks at the relationship between language and nationalism in Malaysia. Then, it examines two specific instances in the history of Malaysia where there have been strong reactions among the various ethnic groups when a new language policy is introduced. In the first instance, it looks at the tensions between the Malay and Chinese ethnic groups when the National Language Act was introduced in 1967. In the second instance, it looks at how Malaysia, in responding to global pressures to become a modern state, had to adopt a language policy that was a near-reversal of the policy practiced by the country since independence. There were yet again reactions from the different ethnic groups. These two instances can help us understand how, in Malaysia, the national language has been used in shaping the identity of the country and how closely the concept of language is tied to ethnicity.

Keywords: Malaysia, Language Policy, Nationalism, Ethnicity, National Language Act 1967

INTRODUCTION

Since independence, the government has used the national language policy in an effort to unite its people and create a Malaysian identity. The need for national integration has always been crucial to Malaysia given the political reality of having a society that is pluralistic in most aspects (Zawawi, 2005). The social and political reality in Malaysia is defined in terms of racial polarization where the three major ethnic groups i.e. Malay, Chinese and Indians, primarily identify with ethnic identity first before national identity. In Malaysia, language, specifically the national language, has been promoted as a means to unite the ethnically diverse population and to give a common identity to its populace. The planning of Malaysia’s national language policy is deeply rooted in the belief that language is the “soul” of the nation and a vindication of the country’s independence from its colonisers (Awang, 2003).

In this paper, I will examine how language is used to promote and strengthen nationalism, with a specific focus on the role of the national language in Malaysia. On the whole the policy of promoting the national language above other languages has been successful in achieving its objectives (Asmah, 1979; Gill, 2002, 2005; Rappa & Wee, 2006). However, a careful study of the implementation of certain aspects of the
policy, and the reactions following its implementation reveals underlying tensions and conflicts among the various ethnic groups in the country. These conflicts and tensions are often connected to the issue of ethnic identities, nationalism, in relation to the national language. Although the various ethnic groups have not openly challenged the language policy, there appears to be subtle resistance to the implementation of some aspects of the policy. There have been several occasions where various ethnic groups have shown resistance to change in the language policy and often are vocal for the maintenance of their vernacular languages.

The following section looks at the relationship between language and nationalism in the Malaysian context. The last section examines one instance in the history of Malaysia where there were terse reactions among the various ethnic groups when the National Language Act was introduced in 1967. In this paper, I examine the reactions to the introduction of the National Language Act (1967) in relation to the concepts of language, identity and nationalism. An understanding of these concepts will allow us to manage tensions that arise in a more calm and informed manner.

**LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM**

When Malaysia gained independence, the Malay language was established as the national language of the country to unify its people that differed in nearly all aspects of life, i.e. language, religion, history, culture, political affiliations etc. The importance of the national language and its functions in the Malaysian realm was explained by the first Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku Abdul Rahman as:

(i)t is only right that as a developing nation we should want to have a language of our own…..If the national language is not introduced our country will be devoid of a unified character and personality – as I could put it, a nation without a soul and without a life (cited in Abd. Rahim, 2002, p.21).

Thus the Malay language was chosen as the sole national language, and after 10 years of independence it also became the sole official language and medium of instruction in national schools and tertiary education. English was relegated to be the “second [only to the national] most important language” (Asmah, 1992, p.24). Vernacular languages of the ethnic minorities are allowed to be used as the medium of instruction in primary schools and these rights are ensured in Article 152 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

The national language bears the weight of being the medium to create an encompassing national identity in an effort to replace primordial group loyalties, i.e. Malay, Chinese, Indian and various indigenous group identities, and to act as an agent of social cohesion. The spread of the national language as a medium of instruction across the country has mostly been successful. English, until 2002, was only taught as a subject in schools at all levels; and vernacular languages are used as the medium of instruction in vernacular schools and are taught as a subject in national schools if there are requests from students. However, there was a change in policy in the use of English as the medium of instruction in the teaching of science and mathematics, in 2009 this decision was reviewed and the medium of instruction for both these subjects will revert to Malay by 2012 (Zulkifli, Zabri, & Chong, 2009).

Overall, the Malay language has, since independence, gained prominence in the important domains of government and education. However, the course of its journey has not been smooth as at various times in the history of Malaysia, the issue of the national language has created discord among the various ethnic communities in the country. The issue of language and national language is particularly volatile given that Malaysia is characterized as practicing “a vision of ethnic nationalism” (Ganguly, 2003, p.239). This vision, according to Ganguly (2003) has elevated the Malay language as the national language while allowing for the maintenance of vernacular languages, although these languages have no official status within the country. Language policy in Malaysia has always been strongly tied to the questions of “race, ethnicity and citizenship” and this has far-reaching ramifications when changes in language policy are introduced (Ganguly, 2003, p.240).
Although on the surface the national language policy has been successful in achieving its objectives, some tensions remain when questions of language and national identity come up. Ethnic groups uphold their respective languages through vernacular education (i.e. Chinese and Tamil) as a means to preserve and assert their own ethnic and cultural identities. Thus in Malaysia, there is a dilemma between balancing the basic group identities of the Malays, Chinese and Indians and that of being a Malaysian. Esman (1990) highlights this situation when he states that in the Malaysian context many Chinese and Indians may eventually lose their ancestral languages but as circumstances prevent the assimilation of their collective identities, group boundaries between the various groups will remain.

The role of the national language and the identity construction of a particular society can be understood using the concept of ‘nationalism’. Gellner (1994, p.286) defines nationalism as the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that”. Although culture is largely left undefined, one of the important criterion of culture might be language (Gellner, 1983). A common language is an important factor in the creation of a cohesive society. Language, in these terms, therefore, is a political tool that is used in the creation of a state and its identity. Thus in Malaysia, the notion of nationalism is usually imbued with ethnic and identity relationships. Although the national language has been successful in creating a cohesive society, the different ethnic groups still identify themselves with their ethnic identities as ethnicity is still held to be a marker of individuality. Ethnicity is defined as “the embodiment of race, religion, language, politics and occupation shared by a group of people which distinguishes them from other groups” (Omoniyi, 1999, p.371). Ethnicity is used by groups to distinguish themselves from others, and this is often reflected in the maintenance of vernacular languages belonging to the group. Establishing a national language may bring a diverse society together but when the individuality or distinctiveness of a group is threatened by the national language there may be resistance. There is a tenuous line between managing nationalism and managing a diverse society.

The national language has always been an important factor in the promotion of nationalism, but at times it has also become a divisive issue in Malaysia. Chai (1977) attributes this to the incongruent inter-communal views about language and ethnic identities in Malaysia. Some past incidences have shown that attempts to introduce any change in education, language and culture have resulted in racial conflicts and tensions (Abd. Rahim, 2002). Presently, there is more tolerance and a willingness to discuss and settle issues that arise. However, issues related to the national language and vernacular languages are considered to be sensitive issues and thus, anyone questioning the provisions1 related to these issues is punishable under the Sedition Act 1948 and the Internal Security Act.

The following section explores one instance where the issue of the national language has led to conflict and strained race relations among the different ethnic groups in Malaysia.

THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE ACT 1967

In 1967, the National Language Act was introduced as a result of pressure from political parties representing the Chinese and Malays. Article 152 of the Federal Constitution states that for a period of ten years after independence, English could be used in both Houses of Parliament, the Legislative Assembly of every state and for all other purposes. During this ten-year period there were various language issues that arose which led to the introduction of the National Language Act 1967.

In 1959, the Chinese community started demanding that the Mandarin be recognized as an additional official language. The Malays, meanwhile, in the early 1960s, were pushing for the government to be more assertive in making Malay the sole medium of instruction in all schools. Some factions in the Malay side accused the government of pandering to the non-Malays in delaying the conversion to the use of the Malay language in secondary schools. English was still being as a medium of instruction. After a lapse of ten years, in 1966 the government announced making Malay the sole official language. This, according to Kua (1999), alarmed the Chinese and they protested against the policy and fought for a “more liberal use of the Chinese

---

1 These provisions include Article 152 (pertaining to the national language) and Article 153 (pertaining to the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities) (Chai, 1977).
language for official purposes” (p.89). In 1967, a “modified” bill was passed to placate both fronts, i.e. the National Language Act of 1967. This Act upheld the national language as the country’s sole official language and the following clause was meant to placate the non-Malays:

Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the Federal Government or any State Government to use any translation of official documents or communications in the language of other communities in the Federation for such purpose as may be deemed necessary in the public interest………The Yang di-Pertuan Agung may permit the continued use of the English language for such official purposes as may be deemed fit.

[The National Language Act 1967]

Although the National Language Act of 1967 reaffirmed the provisions of Article 152 of the Constitution, both sides were not pleased with it. The Malays considered the provisions made for the other languages in the Act as a “betrayal of the Malay cause” and accused the Prime Minister of having “sold the Malays” (Kua, 1999, p.90). The Chinese were upset as a consequence of the Act, the Ministry of Education announced that students who wished to pursue studies overseas needed the Malaysian Cambridge Examination (MCE) or Government’s School Certificate (Kua, 1999, p.90). Thus Chinese students in the independent Chinese secondary schools would not be able to study overseas. The Chinese community then broached the idea of setting up a university locally to cater for these students. They suggested the setting up of the Merdeka University where the medium of instruction would be Mandarin. This was again met with resistance from the Malay front.

Geok (2004) observes that the 1950s and 60s saw escalating tensions among the ethnic groups and one of the causes was the issue of language. The escalating tensions led to the race riots of May 13 1969. The riots almost crippled the government and inadvertently shaped the political atmosphere to come. The race riots of 1969 taught all Malaysians, that issues surrounding the position and the role of the national language and the position of the vernacular languages need to be handled with care and these are volatile issues that cannot be questioned without understanding the historical aspect of language policy in Malaysia.

CONCLUSION

In Malaysia, the national language is intended to unite its people and create a Malaysian identity. Since independence, the policy of promoting the Malay language above all other languages has seen the Malay language gain power and status in the important domains of government and education. Historically, we have seen that any change of language policy evokes strong feelings amongst its multi-ethnic society and that the questions of language and identity are volatile issues in Malaysia. Although, the government diligently pursues a policy of promoting the Malaysian identity, it often has to deal with nationalistic sentiments which are deeply rooted in ethnic cleavages. Language can be used to foster nationalism but when ethnic identities appear in the equation, language and nationalism are no longer congruent. Language is one way of constructing nationalism and creating a national identity. But identity construction in the Malaysian context has not been a simple task given Malaysia’s policy of maintaining vernacular schools. The construction of nationalism is never free from pressures from within the society as well as external factors that also determine the course and nature of nation identity building. The national language has brought a diverse society together; however, in Malaysia identification in terms of ethnicity and race are still prevalent among the various groups. There is a fine line between managing nationalism and managing a diverse society that still identify with ethnicity, and this is the challenge we face today in Malaysia.
REFERENCES
THE MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL THAI CULTURAL IDENTITY THROUGH HYBRID MUSIC GENRES

Vicki-Ann Ware
School of Music, Conservatorium
Monash University, Australia
vicki-ann.ware@monash.edu

ABSTRACT

Thailand has experienced rapid industrialisation, modernisation and cultural change since the mid-nineteenth century. Many Western cultural forms have been adopted into Thai life, including Western popular music. An external view of these processes and their results might suggest that Thailand has become quite ‘Western’. However, closer analysis reveals that elements of foreign cultures have long been adopted and adapted into Thai culture, and used as social capital to build an image of modernity and cosmopolitan sophistication.

One of the adaptations made has been the fusion of Western genres with Thai ones, to form new hybrid styles of music. One hybrid genre that has developed largely over the past half century is Dontri Thai Prayuk (‘modernised Thai music’), which fuses aspects of Western pop with elements of Central Thai classical music. As this paper demonstrates, clear patterns emerge in the way Thai musicians have maintained markers of Thai identity and fused them with Western elements that signify modernisation.

Motivations behind this deliberate fusion of Thai and Western elements are explained by the theories of ‘musical accommodation’ and ‘acts of identity’ – that musicians will converge with or diverge from other music-cultures in order to gain approval or assert a separate identity, in ways that deliberately change the underlying rules of the source musics to form a new identity. Analysis of Dontri Thai Prayuk fusion music shows that it has changed the underlying rules of Thai classical and Western popular music to display a music-cultural identity that is Thai, yet modern.

Keywords: Thai Cultural Identity, Modernisation, Western Conceptions of Modernity

INTRODUCTION

There’s kind of this perception that the Thais have sold out to the West and the Western world, and it’s not true—it really isn’t (Bruce Gaston, interview 4 June 2003).

Thailand, formerly Siam, was never colonised by a Western political power. Yet by the mid-nineteenth century, all of her neighbours had fallen prey to Western colonial regimes. The early kings of the Chakri dynasty (1782-1851) had attempted to keep foreign powers at bay by demonstrating the splendour of Siamese cultural, religious and artistic traditions, but by 1850 this tactic was clearly wearing thin. It became apparent to the country’s leaders that the Thai people were faced with a choice—to adjust to Western cultures or be forcibly adjusted through their colonising power.

In 1851 a new king came to the throne – King Mongkut (Rama IV). Rather than passively resist these military and economic forces, he found a radical new way of dealing with them:

The first policy that King Mongkut employed in coping with the Western threat was the introduction of Western education within the court, with the purpose of educating in the ways of the West the royal children who would become future leaders. Through this learning they would be able to
negotiate with the Western powers on more equal and dignified terms and to maintain Siamese sovereignty (Rutnin 1996: 70).

Thus, the Thai aristocracy adopted the practice of borrowing Western cultural icons to demonstrate to the West their equal footing with Western powers, both in terms of their prestige and their ability to manage their own modernisation program.

This approach of engaging with foreign powers on their terms undoubtedly saved Siam’s political sovereignty. Yet it also set in motion far-reaching changes to Siamese society, changes which at times appear to have almost overwhelmed and even destroyed Thai culture. Today Bangkok has many Western fast food chains and department stores selling Western clothing, furniture and technology. The streets are choked with cars, bikes and trucks – all Western technological innovations. Western popular music booms where the serene sounds of Thai classical instrumental music were once heard.

Central Thai music and other performing arts no doubt suffered losses in the midst of these adaptations to Western culture: much simply died out; some traditional genres, such as Central Thai folk song, now exist only in a few recordings; and the Fine Arts Department preserved such classical performing arts as the khon (masked dance-drama) only in museumised form – they are not exactly thriving.

Yet Thai music-culture is far from dead. Thai folk song, for example, may have lost its original context, and its original performance practices are all but gone. However, its melodic and poetic structures live on in the ‘modernised’ forms of Luk Tung and to a lesser extent the Songs for Life1 genre. It appears that Thai musicians have utilised King Rama IV's strategy of borrowing Western icons in order to demonstrate that they could ‘modernise’ Thai music-culture without the assistance of the West. But this does not mean Western musical forms have altogether supplanted Thai ones. Rather, in many fusion genres that developed over the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Thai genres have largely survived by being blended with new foreign forms coming from Western culture.

This paper explores the processes by which Thai musicians have adapted to quasi-colonial forces by blending local and foreign forms. I utilise an adaptation of the social-psychological Communication Accommodation Theory as well as Acts of Identity Theory as a means of explaining the motivations that have driven contemporary Thai musicians’ experiments in combining two very different musical sources.

Given the vibrancy and wide variety of musical activity across Thailand, I have chosen to limit this study to the urban middle class of Bangkok. I argue that processes by which they borrow from both Western popular music and Central Thai classical music to develop the fusion genre of Dontri Thai Prayuk mirror the aristocracy’s attempts to borrow from Western cultural icons of prestige to demonstrate their modernity and their ability to participate in the global order on equal terms, whilst borrowing from traditional Thai icons of status to both demonstrate their maintenance of Thai identity and build their social prestige more locally.

The data for this study comes from interviews I conducted in the early 2000s with approximately a dozen Thai fusion musicians, as well as relevant observations from literature on Thai culture and music. This study is significant as there have been no other systematic, scholarly attempts to examine how Thais have engaged musically with modernity, whilst maintaining their own cultural identity.

The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, I introduce Communication Accommodation Theory and Acts of Identity Theory in order to provide a theoretical basis for exploring the ways in which Dontri Thai Prayuk mirrors broader societal responses to pressures for cultural change and maintenance. Following this, I present relevant facets of middle class Thai culture, to show how these theories explain everyday cultural adaptation behaviours in Thai society. Section 4 presents Dontri Thai Prayuk – hereafter referred to as Prayuk – and then section 5 shows how Prayuk musicians have prioritised particular facets of musical change and maintenance in order to present a modern-but-Thai identity. Section 6 concludes by drawing together evidence from this brief study of Prayuk musicians to show how these two social theories

1 Luk Tung is Thai country music, which combines Central and Northeastern Thai folk melodies with elements of international pop music. “Songs for Life” (a literal translation of the Thai Phleng Pluea Chiwit) is a genre that developed in the 1970s-early-80s, combining Central Thai folk melodies and singing technique with the folk-rock coming from the United States. These songs often had socio-political messages). I will describe these songs in more detail in chapter 6.
effectively account for the motivations and attitudes underlying the changes in the way Thais present their culture musically.

TO CONFORM OR NOT TO CONFORM: TWO SOCIAL THEORIES

In this section, I present two theories which may illuminate underlying processes and motivations for change (or lack thereof) within contexts of rapid culture change. Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) is useful in explaining why Prayuk musicians may choose to adopt some elements of Western music and maintain other elements of Thai classical music, while Acts of Identity Theory (AIT) helps to account for how they have gone about the process of fusing disparate music-cultures.

COMMUNICATION ACCOMMODATION THEORY (CAT)

Howard Giles first articulated his Speech Accommodation Theory in 1973 (Giles 1973). He developed this theory in an attempt to explain why speakers from one region of the UK with a particular accent may attempt to adapt to the accent of a listener from another region. Since the early 1970s, this social psychology theory has been tested in a range of different contexts and has been expanded to examine broader communicative behaviours, such as intergenerational communication and the interactions between police and their local community (Giles et al 2007). Therefore, it has been renamed Communication Accommodation Theory (Griffin 2009: 388).

Communication Accommodation Theory posits that a speaker will ‘...increasingly accommodate [or imitate] the communicative patterns believed characteristic of their interactants, the more they wish to ... elicit the other’s approval, respect, understanding, trust, compliance, and cooperation; ...or signal common social identities’ (Giles et al 2007: 147). That is, they will adjust their speech to become “more like the listener or less like the listener” (Downes 1984: 228) in order to gain the approval of or maintain their distinctiveness from their listeners. Becoming more like the speaker in order to gain approval or signal similar social standing is referred to as convergence, while maintaining or increasing distinctiveness is known as divergence.

In musical terms therefore, CAT posits that musicians will consciously adapt their musical practices to those of another culture or subculture with which they wish to signal common cultural identity (e.g. those of higher status), or from whom they wish to elicit approval or respect.

ACTS OF IDENTITY THEORY (AIT)

The very act of adapting one’s speech norms in order to define oneself as similar to or different from another person involves the speaker’s perception or construct of the listener’s identity. This is where reference to Acts of Identity Theory (AIT) helps to explain what I have observed in Thai fusion music. This theory holds that ‘speakers create linguistic rules to resemble those with which they wish to identify’ (Downes 1984:229). Not only do speakers adapt in the short term to accommodate the norms of listeners, but they change their underlying rules, leading to longer term change. Thus AIT posits that musicians create musical rules (or genres) ‘which resemble those with which they wish to identify’. As I will demonstrate shortly, in combining facets of both Classical Thai and Western popular music in Prayuk, Thai musicians have changed the underlying rules of both music-cultures to project the desired identity.

THE MIDDLE CLASS IN BANGKOK

In order to understand the significance of Prayuk as a case study of how Thais have managed their own modernisation program, it is necessary to understand where the middle class came from and how they utilise icons of social and cultural capital (e.g. music) to create social status. This section describes the origins and several aspects of Thai culture which are relevant to the current study.
Whilst Wyatt suggests that the urban middle class emerged around the early 1960s (Wyatt 1984: 294), their roots go back to about the turn of the twentieth century. The Siam of the early nineteenth century was a feudal society consisting largely of two social classes – the aristocracy and the rural peasants. Reforms to trade monopolies during the reign of King Rama IV and governance reforms during King Rama V’s reign led to the empowerment and education of a new intermediary group – the foundations of the modern, urban middle class (Mulder 1996: 133-134; Mulder 1997:13). This group were conscious of their different status compared to that of the rural poor, but grew too rapidly to be thoroughly absorbed into the old power structures (Mulder 1997:7). Their prominence in Thai society continued to increase throughout the twentieth century, and by the 1960s they had become a strong political force.

The characteristics of what is called the middle class in Bangkok are difficult to define. Wyatt attempts to define it as follows:

It is predominantly urban and non-agricultural….. For this group, modern education at the secondary level and above is the sine qua non for status and the middle-class lifestyle—which includes access to the mass media, especially television, sufficient income to assure quality education for one’s children and the achievement of some sense of upward social and economic mobility (Wyatt 1984: 294).

In his book on the public world of the middle class Thai, Mulder writes about how its members desire to increase their power base in order to take greater control of their members’ lives (Mulder, 1997: 7). One way of achieving this is to increase the status of the individual. The Thai middle class possesses much less economic and political power compared to the Thai upper class, or the middle classes in Western societies, but it is increasingly making its presence known in business and political arenas. Culturally, the middle class is in the process of negotiating a new balance between modernity and tradition. Prayuk music is in a similar position. As we will see shortly, musicians are negotiating between elements of classical Thai and Western popular music in this fusion genre, in order to negotiate a middle path between tradition and modernity.

In Thai society, status determines everything, and no two people have exactly the same status (Nathalang, 2000: 39-40). Status shapes the way in which people communicate with each other and the level of respect accorded a person, which in turn decides the degree to which that person has a voice in the community or the types of opportunities that open up in the workplace. Thais are said to be status-oriented, i.e. they put a high priority on increasing their status as a means of gaining respect and power in their community. Age is one of the means of gaining higher status: the older a person is, the higher his or her status. However, Nathalang observes other means of building status: ‘Status is determined by birth, age and level of education’ (Nathalang, 2000: 39-40). In the eight and a half years that I lived in Thailand, I also observed that wealth is a primary means of attaining high status.

In order for one’s implicit status to have any effect on one’s social standing, there needs to be cues for others to observe it – i.e. status needs to be displayed. Thais tend to achieve this by being ‘presentational’, by presenting oneself outwardly in the way one wishes to be perceived. As Mulder explains, there is an ‘implicit expectation that the surface also is the essence of social reality’ (Mulder 2000: 47). For example:

…people are expected to dress according to their station in life….., because presentation expresses the social persona and claim to status (Mulder 2000: 47).

Thus, investing in status symbols is very important to middle- and upper-class Thais. Again, as Mulder discusses:

In presentation, the expectations of society and the individual meet. Consequently, it calls for heavy investment in smooth interaction and in the projection of prestige and dignity. This investment is not simply an investment in cosmetics…. The value of presentation is also extremely psychological, serving the feelings of identity and acceptance. ….. [T]he primary Thai values are wealth, power,
seniority, rank, and being the boss…. Peoples build up stature by increasing their resources—and by the demonstration of them. (Mulder 2000: 48)

Hence if one wishes to be seen as ‘modern’ or ‘developed’, one needs to conduct oneself in a ‘modern and developed’ manner.

During the nineteenth century, when European colonial powers constantly threatened Thailand’s sovereignty, many of the changes that took place were intended to demonstrate that Thailand could modernise itself while keeping the West’s ‘colonial encroachment at a distance’ (Mulder, 1997: 287; see also Wyatt, 1984: 238). Likewise, many of Prime Minister Phibun's changes in the late 1940s were designed to demonstrate Thais’ ability to modernise on their own. Myers-Moro comments that ‘Phibun's programs were intended to make the Siamese appear “civilized” to the outside world…’ (Myers-Moro, 1993: 245). She continues on to say that ‘…Phibun's policy towards culture consistently favoured Western forms, Westernisation and civilisation being equated’ (Myers-Moro, 1993: 246).

Western culture generally has high status in the eyes of Thais, with Westerners in Thailand during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries being seen as ‘expert consultants’ who came in to assist Thais with their program of modernisation (Roongruang, 2003: 126). As a visible marker of Western culture, Western popular music is seen as being modern, and therefore a desirable symbol of status.

In direct contrast, the commonly held Thai perception is that Thai traditional music is backward and old-fashioned, hence not really ‘relevant’ in everyday life: I have often heard Bangkok Thais say that classical music is mai kiow khong chiwit prajam wan, meaning it has nothing to do with everyday life. By this they mean that classical music does not play an important role in their everyday lives. They do not listen to it on a regular basis, play it, attend performances or purchase recordings. Its chief function is as a form of remembrance of their traditional cultural heritage on special occasions.

Nonetheless, Central Thai classical music has typically been connected with the prestige of royalty. Myers-Moro noted that ‘….contemporary attitudes toward Thai music [in part] derive from the music’s association with the courts of royalty and noblemen’, and that ‘…Thai music connotes identity, prestige, and values central to being Thai’ (Myers-Moro, 1993: 20, 226). Prayuk is one significant form combining the ‘modernity’ of the West with Thai royal symbols, thereby creating a form of music that is aligned with both Thai and Western symbols of status. Unlike more traditional versions of classical music, Prayuk is relatively popular amongst middle class Thais.

DONTRI THAI PRAYUK

Dontri Thai Prayuk (literally adapted/modernised Thai music) is a genre that developed in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, largely as a result of government policies restricting the use of Central classical Thai music in the public arena. It mostly adapts classical Thai melodies, which are frequently (but not always) played on solo traditional Thai instruments, using elements of Western popular music, including rhythms and syncopations, homophonic texture, diatonic harmony on chords I, IV and V, vocal techniques and instruments. The Prayuk musicians that I interviewed suggest that the genre expresses the dominant Thai cultural heritage in a ‘modern’ way: it is ‘Thai yet modern’. Whilst Prayuk is not as highly visible as pop music in everyday life, it nonetheless performs a significant role in Bangkok's music-culture.

Prayuk is heard today in a wide range of contexts where middle-class urban Thais gather. These include some sophisticated nightclubs, such as the Tawandaeng German Brewery in the Yannawa district of Bangkok, as well as in commercial festivals that sell traditional Thai cultural artefacts in large shopping malls, at international exhibitions, and even in some religious settings. The most famous ensembles today are Boy Thai, Fong Nam, and Adjarn Tanit Sriglindee’s ensemble.
THE MUSICIANS’ APPROACH TO DONTRI THAI PRAYUK

In this section, I will now briefly discuss the results of my interviews to demonstrate how Prayuk musicians have adapted elements of both Thai and Western music to present their music-cultural identity. My interviews with Prayuk musicians show that there is a high degree of consistency in preferences about which Thai musical elements they use to represent Thai-ness and which Western elements represent modernity. However, some other musical elements are less clearly situated: some musicians think they should be maintained while others think they are dispensable (either partially or completely). Thus, I have identified some loose hierarchies of both Thai and Western musical elements for presenting modern Thai-ness.

During my fieldwork in Thailand, I interviewed 15 musicians, producers and promotions managers of fusion music. My informants were a diverse group who came from a full spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds, ranging in age from about 25 to 55 years. Twelve of them originated in Central Thailand, one came from the Northeast, one was born in Thailand but raised in the US, and one Western musician (Bruce Gaston) was a US citizen who came to Thailand as a conscientious objector during the Viet Nam War. Some grew up in big cities, others came from rural villages. These informants participate in several aspects of music-production – composition/arrangement, performance and management of performers – and have been involved in fusion music from about 1970 to the present day.

MARKERS OF THAI-NESS

Melody

It is clear from these interviews with Prayuk musicians that melody is their chief means of maintaining Thai-ness, even when all else derives from global popular music. Narongrit Tosanga's comments represent the intentions of most Prayuk composers:

Everything is important, but if we have to single out one thing and say it is the most important, then it would have to be the melody. If it is a good melody, you can add any rhythm and it will have a Thai flavour.

Some clear patterns as to how Thai identity is represented in a melody have emerged. Thai-ness tends to be maintained by the use of a pentatonic scale. Whilst diatonic tuning (i.e. a Western musical trait) predominates in fusion genres such as Prayuk today, the occasional use of a flat 7 also helps to preserve Thai-ness, by hinting at the Thai tuning system (an equidistant system with 7 distinct notes in an octave). Thai-ness is also maintained in the use of continuous and conjunct movement in melodies, which is a typical Thai melodic attribute. Thus, the rules of traditional Thai melody and tuning system have been altered by combining diatonic tuning with other typical Thai melodic traits.

Alignment of linguistic tones and melodic contours in vocal music

In vocal works, the close alignment between the pitch contours of linguistic tones and melodic lines is arguably of equal importance to the use of Thai melodic structures. This is a strong indicator to Thais of whether a vocal song sounds Thai or not. In my interviews, fusion musicians talked about the fundamental importance of this feature at least as strongly as they did about the need for Thai melodies. Bruce Gaston asserted that it is ‘absolutely essential’ to attain this close agreement. Tanit Sriglindee stated that ‘it is really important. … Because with Thai language, you have a set pattern of tones—it’s like music already’. Finally, Panya Roongruang commented that

You have to make them match each other. Because the Thai language is a tonal language, when they sing high pitches, it must fit the text.
Thus, this rule appears to be unchangeable, where Thais wish to *diverge* from Western music and present their Thai-ness.

Incidentally, this is not the case in Thai pop music, where there is little agreement. Many older Thai musicians complain about the lack of correspondence between tone and melody in Thai pop. This divergence from traditional Thai melodic structures and convergence with Western practices perhaps signals a desire amongst the young to identify more closely with a global culture than to maintain what they perceive as ‘outdated’ traditional Thai practices.

**The use of Thai instruments**

The next most important element for marking Thai-ness in fusion music is the use of melodic Thai instruments. Most musicians I interviewed concurred that a fusion song could sound Thai without the use of Thai instruments. Tanit Sriglindee asserted that ‘you can play a really Thai melody with only Western instruments’. Panya Roongruang also refutes the idea that the use of Thai instruments is necessary to mark Thai identity in fusion:

> *You know, some people say that Thai music must be performed on Thai instruments. But I don't believe that. Thai music is not just to be presented on Thai instruments.*

Thus, this rule of classical Thai music is negotiable, depending on the degree to which a given musician wishes to converge with or diverge from ‘modernity’.

**Classical vocal technique**

Following that, the hierarchy becomes a little looser. Classical Thai vocal technique is a very strong marker of Thai-ness. This includes the use of nasalisations of notes, abrupt changes of register, and *euan* – the traditional style of ornamenting vocal melodies. However, since the traditional Thai singing style is highly unpopular with middle-class audiences, *Prayuk* musicians rarely use it. Bruce Gaston explained the widely-held feeling of *Prayuk* musicians by commenting that audiences leave when they hear *euan*. He also observed:

*The Thais aren't into [euan] at all. The beauty and the profundity of the Thai vocal tradition is gone. Gone. Not ‘is dying’. Is ‘gone’.*

Nonetheless, a small number of *Prayuk* musicians continue to make occasional use of traditional vocal technique, particularly *euan*, to mark Thai-ness. Tanit Sriglindee felt that

> *[One] should use a bit, but not much... I don't really use much euan—just a tiny little bit. .... You have to look at the melody and the underlying chords. Sometimes if you euan it just doesn't fit.*

Thai vocal techniques, therefore, are seen as something which detracts from a modern identity, so *Prayuk* musicians tend to *converge* with Western practices to enhance their modernity.

**Thai drums and rhythmic patterns**

Thai drums and rhythmic patterns are occasionally used to mark Thai-ness. Some musicians referred to the use of Central Thai classical rhythmic patterns and drums as a useful marker of Thai-ness. However, it seemed to be a very low priority: often almost an after-thought. Wanchai Pinthong observed that

> *[Thai-ness] is in the melody. This is the first thing—a Thai melody. And then also elements of the rhythm must be similar to classical Thai rhythms—like they use on the klong yao [a traditional Thai drum], ...... Then you have to adjust it to Western music. But the rhythm is not that important.*
Thai imagery in the lyrics

Finally, the use of Thai imagery in song texts can be an important means of marking Thai-ness. This is not distinctive to Prayuk and was not something of which many Prayuk musicians were conscious, but many musicians nonetheless indicated it is an important element for displaying Thai identity. In the Songs for Life genre for example, bands such as Carabao utilised many elements of folk music in order to communicate an extra-musical political message. Kirati Phromsaka (an original member of Carabao and now a music producer and manager) commented that Songs for Life lyrics use imagery from everyday rural life in Thailand. He particularly commented that ‘They should have at least something in them that people can take and use, which is relevant. … You have to communicate’.

He is the only musician I interviewed who raised this issue. It is therefore lower down the hierarchy of musical elements used to communicate Thai-ness. Nonetheless, I have observed that it is significant in vocal songs. Part of my work as a community artist in Thailand involved running indigenous song-writing seminars, in which musicians regularly indicated to me that the use of Thai imagery in the lyrics made the song sound ‘more Thai’.

MARKERS OF MODERNITY

Middle-class Thai musicians also made conscious choices in adopting elements of global popular music to represent modernity. A clear order of preference was evident in the interviews: diatonic tuning, global pop vocal technique, harmony and homophonic texture, as well as the use of a rhythm section as the basis of the ensemble are the most significant markers of modernity. Verse-chorus form is also used as a marker of modernity to a lesser extent in Prayuk music.

Diatonic (Western) tuning

The general attitude of musicians is that ‘you can't play [fusion] without changing the tuning’ of Thai instruments to match Western ones (Tanit Sriglindee). In interviews, musicians clearly indicated an almost universal preference for using a common tuning system, thereby avoiding constant clashes. Thus, there is a changing of the ‘rules’ of Thai tuning where Thai instruments are used in Prayuk to converge with Western practices. However, it was more than just a desire to avoid clashes. The use of Western tuning also conveys a sense that this music is ‘modern’ or ‘international’.

I change everything to be in Western tuning. ... It's like this—it's like the end of the old ways (luk boran). If you are using Western music, your tuning continues to be used—and you can add whatever you like (Narongrit Tosa-nga).

Western popular vocal technique

The majority of Prayuk vocal music today employs the singing techniques of Western popular music. This is the style of singing most familiar to middle-class urban Central Thais today. The common perception amongst musicians is that audiences regard traditional singing as archaic and boring. Even some Prayuk musicians feel this way. Wanchai Pinthong stated,

I don't think [fusion] should have traditional ornamentation because this is one thing that causes classical songs to make us feel that they are so ancient, so long and boring. If we want to make people these days listen to Thai songs, we shouldn't make our songs sound like this.

Many Prayuk musicians still secretly cherish the old singing techniques of Central Thai classical and folk music, particularly those who have had a greater degree of classical training. However, they will not generally utilise it in fusion because they are unpopular with audiences.
Chordal harmony
The inclusion in Prayuk of chordal harmony is a conscious choice to associate with ‘modern’ Western forms, as it is not a part of the classical Thai tradition. Apart from Bruce Gaston, all of the Prayuk musicians I interviewed employ such chordal accompaniment to a given melody. However, they tend restrict their choice of chords to I-IV-V.

Inclusion of a rhythm section
Most Prayuk bands are based around a Western rhythm section (i.e. guitars, bass and drums). To some degree, the association of the rhythm section with Western pop bands signifies Prayuk music as a contemporary phenomena that has kept pace with changing musical tastes. Tewan Sapsanyakorn talks about how old Thai melodies can be made to sound new by simply arranging them for Western instruments:

We used old Thai songs and played them in a new way – with Western instruments. When you listened to them, you knew they were Thai songs. [But] they are different.

Verse-chorus form
The typical verse-chorus form of global pop music is the most preferred compositional structure in Prayuk music. Thai musicians have consciously discarded Thai forms because these ‘feel too long’ for audiences (Wanchai Pinthong). Bruce Gaston reported that he had tried to use Thai forms, but they ‘haven’t worked too well—they take too much time’.

SUMMARY
As this section has demonstrated, Prayuk musicians have an extremely reflexive and self-conscious approach to the creation of fusion music that reflects the dualistic modern-yet-Thai aspects of their music-cultural identity. They can clearly articulate their priorities as to which elements of traditional music they maintain as markers of Thai-ness (thereby diverging from Western music) and which Western elements they adopt to represent modernity (i.e. signalling convergence). Further, they make deliberate choices about how to blend Thai and Western elements to present a Thai-but-modern music-cultural identity.

CONCLUSIONS: MODERNISATION PROCESSES IN THAILAND
The literature demonstrates a range of ways in which Thais construct and present their social status through the use of icons of prestige. A range of studies also demonstrated the way in which the Thai aristocracy of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries responded to colonising threats by borrowing Western symbols of prestige and adapting them to demonstrate to the West their equal social standing, and their ability to manage their own modernisation program. However, in adopting icons of Western prestige, they did not completely replace their own. Rather, they selectively borrowed that which they perceived would enhance and fit with their own symbols of status, taking only that which they perceived as being advantageous to them, and blended it with their existing sources of prestige. This was done in order to enhance their social standing and negotiate with colonising powers, without ceding their own strong sense of cultural identity.

My application of Communication Accommodation Theory and Acts of Identity Theory to music accounts for both how and why urban middle class Thais have experimented widely with fusions of traditional Thai and Western musics. As the interview results demonstrate, Prayuk musicians employed two deliberate and parallel processes of accommodation utilising acts of identity in order to negotiate rapid modernisation, maintain a clearly Thai music-cultural identity and build their middle-class social status. That is, they purposively and consciously identified aspects of Western music which they perceive as embodying modernity, and combined these with elements of Thai classical music which symbolise Thai-ness.

The acts of identity performed in choosing to converge with some Western musical practices, whilst diverging in other areas (thereby converging with traditional Thai practices) shows the extent to which they
are prepared *accommodate* both Western and aristocratic Thai sources of prestige in order to build a modern, but fully Thai, music-cultural identity which symbolises and thereby presents the rising status of the middle class.

This effectively mirrors broader social processes they have observed in the aristocracy: since the mid-nineteenth century, the aristocracy have used the strategy of adopting – or *accommodating* – Western education, clothing and other cultural behaviour in order to demonstrate that they had equal status with the West, and could manage their own modernisation. Furthermore, this process is not new in Thailand, building on the traditional practice of patron-client relationships where a person of lower status (the client) can borrow from the social prestige of the patron to increase their own social standing (see Wyatt, 1984: 9, 71; and Mulder 1997: 159ff).

This study has briefly demonstrated the applicability of CAT and AIT to accounting for the construction of an adapted cultural identity in the context of rapid culture change and the threat of colonisation. Whilst I do not claim generalisability of these theories at this stage, it would be interesting to attempt to repeat this study in other cultures, including those who were actually colonized, to assess its broader applicability.

**REFERENCES**

Myers-Moro, P 1993, Thai Music and Musicians in Contemporary Bangkok, Centre for Southeast Asia Studies Monograph No.34, University of California at Berkeley.
TEXTILES OF THE KATANG AND MANKHONG ETHNIC GROUPS OF SOUTHERN LAOS

Linda S. McIntosh
Tilleke & Gibbins
Bangkok, Thailand
linda.m@tillekeandgibbins.com

ABSTRACT

Little is known about the hand-woven textiles of Katang and Mankhong minority groups of southern Laos. These groups belong to the Katuic subbranch of the Khmer branch in the Mon-Khmer ethno-linguistic family, and they primarily reside in eastern Savannakhet Province near the international border Laos shares with Vietnam. Field study for this presentation was carried out during 2004 with follow-up visits in 2005 and 2009. Sites of investigation included Katang villages in Phine District and Mankhong villages in Sepone and Nong Districts (McIntosh 2009).1 Women of both Katang and Mankhong ethnic groups are the primary producers of clothing, responsible for cultivating and/or raising raw materials, such as cotton, indigo, and silk. Synthetic fibers and chemical dyes are occasionally acquired from the market. Weavers produce fabrics decorated with complex patterning with continuous and discontinuous supplementary weft, weft ikat, and supplementary warp techniques to function and clothing and household accessories. Promoting Katang and Mankhong textile production is one method of preserving this cultural heritage and giving the weavers opportunities to earn money as regional trade has forced the government to open up the areas where these minority groups live.

1 Results are found in chapter 5 of Linda S. McIntosh, “Textiles of the Phu Thai of Laos.” PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 2009.

BACKGROUND

The Katang (population estimate of 107,000), who speak a Central Katuic language sub-branch of the Mon-Khmer ethno linguistic family, live in Xonbouly, Phine, Nong, and Thapangthong districts of Savannakhet Province, Laos, and the Mankhong ethnic minority (population estimate of 102,000) belongs to the Western Katuic language sub-branch of the same language family, and their villages are found in Xepone and Nong districts of Savannakhet.2 Members of the Katang and Mankhong ethnic groups are dependent on shifting cultivation for agriculture and supplement their diets with fishing, hunting, and forest gathering. They continue to speak their respective mother tongue, but males generally know Phuthai or Lao language, which is necessary for trade relations. However, nearly 100 percent of adult females are fluent only in their native language. Katang and Mankhong languages lack a written script.

In traditional Katang and Mankhong societies, a council of elders serves as the leadership of each village, and shamans conduct rituals that cure illnesses caused by spirit possession. The Katang and Mankhong continue to uphold animist beliefs and taboos, performing numerous animal sacrifices to appease the spirits.3 Important festivals include New Year, Cha Nga, and an annual feast, Lapuep. Traditional culture of both groups follows strict rules regarding rites of passage. For example, a woman is prohibited from giving

1 Consulting Curator, The Tilleke & Gibbins Textile Collection, Bangkok, Thailand.
birth within a house. An expectant mother goes to the forest to have her child and may return after three days if both are healthy, but today an expecting father may construct a small dwelling where the birth may occur as long as it is located outside the village. When a member of these groups pass away, the corpse is buried rather than cremated.

Members of both ethnic minorities reside in nuclear households in elevated homes composed of bamboo or wood. In the past extended families inhabited longhouses situated around a communal building. This type of village organization has ceased to exist in Laos. Gender roles dictate the delegation of work. Men are responsible for ploughing, hunting, and carpentry while women carry out household chores, such as gardening and gathering, and weave cloth. Mankhong and Katang’s weavers’ knowledge of frame-loom textile production and sericulture originates from a neighboring ethnic group, the Phuthai, which is the most populous and politically dominant ethnic group in their immediate vicinity. The exact time period in which the transfer of knowledge regarding sericulture and weaving technology occurred between the Phuthai and these groups is unknown, but Katang and Mankhong weavers have been weaving on frame, treadle looms for over 100 years, according to the informants. Due to the complexity of their textile designs and the advanced skills needed to create such patterns, it is plausible that the transfer of technology occurred more than a century ago rather than earlier.

The assimilation of technology from the Phuthai ethnic group is evident in the textile and weaving vocabulary of the Katang and Mankhong. For example, the Katang vocabulary for silk, silkworm, loom, and skirt originate from Phuthai. However, the word that both groups use for cotton, kh̄aas, is not Phuthai or another Tai language. Kh̄aas is the name for cotton found in other related Kautic and Khmer languages. This perhaps is an indication that the Katang and Mankhong had knowledge of cotton cultivation prior to their contact with the Phuthai since ancestors of other members of Mon-Khmer language family did during the 13th century CE. In the past before assimilating frame loom technology and weaving cloth for themselves, the Katang may have traded raw cotton in exchange for clothing from the Phuthai, reflecting similar relationships between the Khmu and Tai groups living in northern Laos. Some members of some Khmu subgroups weave on back strap looms, and members of other subgroups do not weave but trade raw cotton, basketry, and foraged forest goods for woven cloth from the Tai Lue.4

KATANG TEXTILES

Gender roles give the responsibility for all stages of textile production to Katang and Mankhong females. Males craft the equipment, but girls and women complete all other tasks related to reeling, spinning, dyeing, and weaving. Katang and Mankhong weavers continue to cultivate indigo and cotton and raise silkworms. Gossypium herbaceum is the most common type of cotton cultivated in the region.5 For the production of cotton thread, girls and women gather the cotton bolls at the beginning of the dry season once the rice has been harvested and allow the raw cotton to dry in the sun. The cotton bolls are passed through a hand-cranked gin to remove the seeds. The ginned cotton is then carded or fluffed with a bow-like devise to even out the texture. After carding, the fibers are rolled into slender, straw-like cylinders that will be spun into thread.

Women are able to sustain sericulture since the villages still maintain mulberry trees in the vicinity of the villages. Mulberry leaves are the primary food source of silkworms so healthy trees are necessary to sustain the production of silk. When carried out, sericulture is a labor-intensive process. The lifecycle of the silkworm or silk caterpillar is approximately 28 days. The moths (Bombyx mori) mate for six days and die after laying eggs. The weavers keep the eggs in round, woven bamboo trays that are covered with a finely woven cloth to deter predators, such as flies and ants. Once the eggs hatch into caterpillars, the female members of the household begin to feed the caterpillars with finely chopped mulberry leaves and clean the trays of excrement several times a day. The caterpillars eat for four or five days before becoming dormant to molt for twenty-four hours. Then, they resume eating and molt another three times before beginning to spin cocoons. As the caterpillars mature, they are fed less often and with less finely chopped leaves. The women

must remove any sick caterpillars and keep the environment clean. The caterpillars that begin to spin their cocoons are placed in another tray that is divided into sections with thin pieces of bamboo or woven bamboo dome-shaped apparatuses. Twenty-five grams of silkworm eggs equals approximately thirty-six thousand worms that eat one ton of mulberry leaves. Thus, the weavers must cultivate and gather the mulberry leaves to sustain sericulture, taking a significant portion of their daily schedules.

A weaver has seven to ten days to reel a continuous thread from some of the cocoons before the pupae metamorphose into moths. The remaining cocoons are undisturbed in order to continue their life cycle. The reeling process requires placing the cocoons in a pot of simmering water, whose temperature is regulated in order to successfully reel the silk filaments off each cocoon. A small pitchfork utensil picks up fibers from several cocoons and inserts them through a small wooden device fastened to the top of the pot. The weaver twists the silk into a thread that is then placed in a flat basket, such as the same type that the caterpillars were housed.

**TECHNIQUES**

Katang and Mankhong weavers employ different techniques to create textile patterns. One technique may be used per textile, or several are combined to create more complex designs. Most of the motifs are made from techniques manipulating the weft threads, but patterns are developed in the warp as well. Informants state that girls begin to weave during early adolescence, usually 11 to 13 years of age. A girl first learns plain- or tabby weave, creating a simple fabric. Once a weaver is comfortable with plain weave technique, she learns others by observing more experienced weavers, including relatives, friends, or neighbors, in her village. She also examines previously woven textiles to learn different motifs and how to combine more than one technique in a weaving.

**Supplementary Weft Techniques**

Katang and Mankhong weavers employ two types of supplementary weft technique, continuous and discontinuous. This technique is the addition of threads woven along with the ground weft of the fabric, and these decorative yarns float on top and below the foundation of a ground warp and weft to form patterns. When the threads are not being used to create a design on the obverse they are woven to float and be visible on the textile’s reverse side. By definition, supplementary yarn is not crucial to the structure of the weaving since a shed of plain weave alternates with a shed of supplementary yarn so that the former becomes the ground fabric, securing the supplementary weft threads into the cloth. Patterning formed with supplementary weft techniques adorn upper and lower garments, bedding and other household textiles, and ceremonial textiles.

Many Katang and Mankhong weavers apply several methods to implement continuous and discontinuous supplementary weft techniques. One method places wooden sticks in the main warp rather than in a secondary vertical heddle apparatus. The sticks assist the weaver in the formation of sheds for each section of a supplementary weft design by helping to lift a particular grouping of warp threads to form one line of a pattern, and a stick is required for each section of the design. If the design is complex, the weaver requires an assistant to move each stick when creating the design. A mirror image or reflection is often created in the design composition. Only a few Katang weavers in Phine District of Savannakhet Province were observed to have transferred the pattern sticks that were inserted in the warp into a supplementary heddle device that the neighboring Phuthai now favor. It is possible that the weavers using the vertical heddle system purchased the apparatus from Phuthai weavers.

**Continuous Supplementary Weft Technique**

Continuous supplementary weft technique is the addition of decorative yarns that float above and below the ground weft from one side to the other or from selvage to selvage. The secondary threads are not cut when not required to create patterns but is “continuous.” The supplementary yarns float on the weaving’s reverse side.
Discontinuous Supplementary Weft Technique
Similar to continuous supplementary weft technique, in order to form discontinuous supplementary weft designs, secondary yarns are inserted into a ground weft to create patterns, but the threads are cut and tied off when a design has been completed when using this technique. This technique allows one or more different colored threads to create supplementary patterning in one row. The different colored threads are not woven from selvage to selvage, but each yarn is confined to one area to create a pattern before tied and cut when the pattern is completed. The weaver inserts a discontinuous supplementary thread where she intends to begin a design. This complex method conserves materials and forms a lightweight fabric since the excess threads are not woven to “float” on the reverse side.

Supplementary Warp Technique
Regarding supplementary warp technique, two warps are set up on the loom, and the second, or supplementary, warp is stretched either above or below the main warp towards the back of the loom at an angle. Katang and Mankhong weavers use an additional heddle for each line of patterning. The supplementary heddles hang behind the primary ones from flexible bamboo planks placed across the top of the loom. Rather than using an iron hook to raise a supplementary heddle, which is utilized by weavers of other ethnic groups, a Katang weaver steps on a separate treadle connected to each additional heddle to lower a particular heddle in order to align the decorative warp threads with the principal warp. The number of treadles utilized to form a particular supplementary warp design equals the sum of number of heddles, both primary and secondary. This setup is similar to weaving twill technique, but the use of twill weave and the presence of twill-woven textiles were not observed in Katang and Mankhong village field sites. Informants also stated that they didn’t use this technique. (The Phuthai method of applying supplementary warp technique only requires two treadles to manipulate the main heddles only, relying on a metal hook to raise the other heddles when required to form a section of the supplementary warp design.) Similar to patterning created with supplementary weft technique, each part of a supplementary warp design is secured in the fabric by alternating supplementary yarns with sheds of ground weft or plain weave.

Weft Ikat Technique
Weft ikat is a resist dye technique where unwoven weft threads are bound tightly with a liquid-resistant material in order to form designs in the dyeing phase. When the threads are dyed, patterns are formed on the threads in the bound areas, thus, created prior to weaving the yarns into fabric. Before applying another color, the threads are allowed to dry after each submersion into a dye bath. If the binding is tight, the dye does not penetrate these sections. The yarns are woven into fabric, and the designs appear on the finished product. Among the Katang and Mankhong, ikat-patterned material is traditionally used only for the midsections of skirts.

In order to form the weft ikat designs, a weaver uses a special frame of two narrow poles on which threads are wrapped around. The width of the frame is adjusted to the desired width of the textile to be woven. Then, she winds a continuous thread onto the frame, creating bundles of thread for each section of patterning. For example, if thirteen sections are required to create the pattern, then thirteen bundles are wound on the frame. The weaver continues to wrap the thread onto the frame until there is a sufficient amount of thread on the frame to weave the fabric often to complete several skirt midsections, depending on the length of the warp that the ikat yarns will be woven into. Each bundle contains numerous threads since the pattern repeats. The weaver must calculate how much material the sum of all the sections will make when woven. In the traditional measuring system, a weaver would have to estimate how many times the pattern is repeated to create two arms length of fabric (generally, 1.6 – 2 meters).

After the winding is complete, the weaver begins to bind sections of the threads with a water resistant material. Once this step is finished, the bundles are secured with string to prevent tangling and transferred to a
dye bath. Depending on the number of desired colors for the design, the threads are returned to the frame, and some of the ties are removed to expose un-dyed areas to subsequent dye baths. In the past, banana leaf was utilized for binding but has been replaced with plastic. More binding may be added in order to protect dyed sections in the next dye bath. After the threads have dried after dyeing, they are carefully wound into bobbins without confusing the order of these. Otherwise, the design composition is lost.

CLOTHING

The traditional attire of the Katang and Mankhong resembles Phuthai dress. The primary factors leading to similarities in the clothing originate from historical interactions between the Katang, Mankhong, and Phuthai, including the acquisition of cloth from the Phuthai via trade, Katang and Mankhong assimilation of weaving skills from the Phuthai, and the political and economical dominance of the Phuthai over the area’s ethnic minorities. In other Tai and non-Tai interactions, the Tai often provided cloth for their Austro-Asiatic neighbors. Prior to the exposure to the Phuthai and other Tai groups, such as the Lao, Katang and Mankhong attire is likely to have included loincloths, sleeveless tunics, and tubular skirts, which are worn by members of similar language groups, including the Katu. The Katang and Mankhong adaptation of Phuthai garments allows members of this group to form an identity distinct from related groups in the Mon-Khmer language family, especially to distance themselves from people who dressed in cloth created on a back strap loom. By appearing similar to the dominant group of Savannakhet Province, members of the two ethnic minority groups can claim that they are becoming more closely associated to the Phuthai. In order to acquire other types of textiles, informants state that even today weavers trade their hand-woven products for foreign goods at the local market.

Women’s Clothing

The traditional clothing of Katang and Mankhong women consists of a long-sleeved blouse and a tubular skirt. The inclusion of a shoulder cloth indicates that the wearer is participating in a special occasion. Their dress today does not include an elaborate head covering, but some women do wrap a multi-purpose cloth in a turban-like manner around their heads. However, the women have replaced the hand-woven fabric once used as this accessory with a terry cloth towel that was purchased in the local market.

Blouses

One type of blouse serves as women’s upper body attire for both daily and ceremonial uses. Primarily composed of indigo-dyed, hand-spun cotton, the long-sleeved shirt may be collarless or have a round collar. The garment opens down the front center, tapering slightly at the waist. The wearer embellishes the indigo blouse fabric with discontinuous supplementary weft designs or embroidery imitating supplementary weft weave. A weaver may place the patterning at the bottom end of the front- and backsides of the blouse. A narrow, pattern piece of material, either woven or embroidered, adorns the neckline and one or both sides of the front opening. In the past silver coins served as buttons and adornment. Recently, plastic ones have replaced the currency. Colorful stitching sometimes adorns the seams and is also applied to accentuate the waist.

Some blouses are lined with un-dyed, hand-spun cotton that is also decorated with embroidery or woven patterning. The adorned section is always found at the backside’s lower end. Some girls and women omit the un-dyed cotton lining for this upper garment so that the blouse’s adornment is visible on its reverse side. Katang and Mankhong women consider the blouse to be an identity marker of their respective ethnicity, and every adolescent girl is expected to complete one for her own use. Women, aged 20 years and older, wear this type of blouse for daily wear. Some younger females wear t-shirts and other factory-made garments for everyday attire, reserving the hand-made upper garments for ceremonial occasions.

---

Shoulder Cloths
Similar to the dress of Phuthai women, Katang females wear a decorated shoulder cloth with their upper garments when participating in rituals or attending ceremonial events. All participants in a ceremony, whether male or female, must drape a folded cloth over one shoulder during the rite. Some wear two textiles so that each shoulder is covered with one fabric and worn so that the textiles’ ends cross each other on the wearer’s torso to form an “x” on both sides of the upper body.

Katang and Mankhong weavers produce a phae daam shoulder cloth, referring to this clothing accessory by the Phuthai name but using their own pronunciation, pha-ae da-aam, elongating the vowels. In this type of textile, medium to large-sized bands of continuous and discontinuous supplementary weft motifs alternate with weft stripes and, sometimes, very narrow rows of continuous supplementary weft designs. The patterning often covers the fabric’s surface with little of the ground surface left visible. A Katang or Mankhong female wears the shoulder cloth with her indigo-cotton blouse and a tubular skirt, such as a sein mii, sein muk, or sein koh. This specific type of dress for the upper body is compulsory for specific religious ceremonies. Informants designate this attire as group identity markers that their ancestors will recognize when the ceremonies’ participants in the natural world attempt to contact their kin living in the supernatural realm.

Some women also produce the Lao-style shoulder cloth, pha-ae bae-aang (phae bing in Phuthai). This textile is sparsely decorated with supplementary weft technique and is woven or traded to coordinate in design and color with a Lao-style skirt. Among some adolescent girls and young adult women, this style of dress is popular to wear at national festivals, such as the Lao Lunar New Year Festival and the That Ing Hang Festival.

Head Coverings or Turbans
During the field research period, both Katang and Mankhong females were not observed covering their heads with an elaborately decorated textile. None of the informants are able to recall wearing an ornate head cloth, decorated with embroidery or weaving techniques. Women over the age of forty years old do wear the multi-purpose, checked cloth (pha-ae taa loo) in a turban-like manner. Presently, a terry cloth towel is utilized rather than the hand-woven fabric for a head covering.

Skirts
The Katang and Mankhong tubular skirt (Katang: sein) is composed of the three main parts and resembles the Phuthai traditional skirt. The three sections consist of the waistband, midsection, and border. The waistband may consist of white (un-dyed) cotton fabric or a piece of striped, red material. Some skirts possess two waistbands formed from both kinds of fabric. Members of both ethnic groups do not consider the waistband a group identity marker; thus, this part’s composition varies and is generally not made from valuable material, such as silk or an elaborately woven cloth. The midsection may be decorated with a variety of techniques, including weft ikat, supplementary warp, and both types of supplementary weft techniques. The border is traditionally decorated with warp-faced patterning. However, the application of continuous and or discontinuous supplementary weft techniques to decorate this skirt section has become more popular among younger weavers (30 years old and less) in order to emulate Lao-style fabrics in recent years. An explanation for wearing these textile types includes being “modern.” It appears that the young adults who had more exposure to society beyond their village locale through education wanted to be more similar to the urban and political elite of Laos.

Katang and Mankhong weavers produce a distinctive skirt decorated with supplementary warp technique called sein muk. The supplementary warp patterning forms large bands in the midsection. Katang and Mankhong weavers generally use brightly colored yarns to form the supplementary warp patterning on an indigo-dyed cotton background. Worn for daily activities, the sein muk generally lacks a decorative border.

Katang and Mankhong weavers restrict use of weft ikat technique (mat mei) to decorate skirt midsections for skirts called sein mei. When weaving a weft ikat-decorated fabric, they pattern the majority of the material’s surface with this technique. Weavers apply weft ikat technique to both silk and cotton threads. Katang and Mankhong use of this technique appears to be less restricted by linear aesthetics, allowing the
creation of imaginative designs. The use of warp ikat technique has not been observed in examples of Katang and Mankhong textiles found in the village sites.

Katang and Mankhong weavers apply discontinuous supplementary weft technique (koh) to decorate two styles of skirts. One style is distinctly Katang, or Mankhong. In local-style sein koh, discontinuous supplementary weft technique is used to cover the majority of the weaving’s surface. The warp is usually a combination of indigo-dyed cotton and stick lac-dyed silk stripes. Indigo-dyed cotton forms the ground weft. Often, two sheds of the ground weft yarns alternate with two sheds of discontinuous supplementary weft formed with thick silk thread. The four threads form one section of a design row. The weaver incorporates the border section into this textile, weaving the midsection and hem in one fabric by changing the patterning on one side of the weaving to designate the border end. Later versions contain synthetic threads in their compositions. Production of the local style of discontinuous supplementary weft-decorated skirts (sein koh) has ceased in the Katang villages of Phine District where the field research initially took place. However, Mankhong weavers in Xepone and Nong Districts continue to make this skirt type; thus, it is possible that the Katang living in remote areas still weave this style of skirt material, but the author did not have the opportunity to observe the production of this skirt type during the field research period.

A few weavers from the younger generations (aged in their 20s and younger) have assimilated a second type, which is considered to be Lao style. In this style, a solid color background is dotted with small discontinuous supplementary weft patterning, thus, distinguishing it from the local one, and it is called sein chok. The skirt’s midsection consists of a sparsely decorated lightweight fabric, often woven in synthetic thread. The motifs formed with discontinuous supplementary weft technique are spaced widely apart on the textile’s surface. The skirt’s border, a separate piece of material, contains denser patterning formed with one or both types of supplementary weft technique, often in the same colors as the midsection in order to match. The skirt borders woven by Katang and Mankhong weavers reflect the transmission of weaving styles, directly from the Phuthai and indirectly from the Lao. Katang and Mankhong weavers also produce Lao-style borders usually to coordinate with Lao-style skirt midsections that they have woven by using the same or similar yarns. They refer to these borders as tein chok (a hem piece decorated with discontinuous supplementary weft technique) and tein kep (a border with continuous supplementary weft patterning).

Some skirt types worn for daily attire sometimes lack a border section, such as the sein muk. The bottom edge of this skirt is absent of any decoration. Katang and Mankhong women’s ceremonial lower garment, or sein koh, does not have a separate border, or a hem piece made from a separate piece of fabric that is attached to the lower end of the midsection. While weaving discontinuous supplementary weft patterned material for this skirt style’s midsection, the weaver changes the designs at one selvage or side of the fabric to designate it as the bottom end. The border is, thus, integrated into the midsection. Thus, distinctive characteristics of Katang and Mankhong lower garments are weaving the border section along with the midsection in one cloth or not having any border in the form of a separate hem piece.

**Men’s Clothing**

Around the beginning of the 20th century, men’s attire was composed of a loincloth and a head covering composed of indigo cotton cloth. One elder over 70 years old remembers when he was a child that his father wore a loincloth instead of pants and a dark indigo textile as a head covering. Katang and Mankhong males are likely to have used loincloths in the past since men’s heritage dress of neighboring minority groups, such as the Katu from the Western sub-branch of the Katsuic ethno-linguistic sub-group, includes this item.

Katang and Mankhong men later adopted Phuthai male attire, such as the form or cut. Simple, tailored garments of a long sleeved, collarless shirt with baggy trousers made from indigo-dyed, hand-spun cotton compose the traditional clothing of men from both groups. The garments are unadorned, lacking patterning or other types of embellishment. Traditionally, fabric ties fasten the shirt opening in the center of the front side, but plastic buttons have now replaced them. None of the informants could recall using or wearing silver coins for this purpose. Western or international style clothing has generally replaced traditional attire.
Shoulder Cloths
For ceremonies, men are required to wear a shoulder cloth, especially since men officiate at both religious and secular rituals. They wear two fabrics, one draped over each shoulder and diagonally crossing the body, while presiding over a rite. Other males emulate this look to display their household’s wealth or prestige. Smaller versions of this textile serve as head cloths. The preferred textile is the *pha-ae da-aam* described above in the women’s clothing section. The traditional beliefs in spirits, especially from the natural environment, and adherence to taboos are perhaps explanations to why Katang and Mankhong men have not abandoned this garment, since the motifs are considered to have talismanic properties. As an identity marker assimilated from the Phuthai repertoire, a Katang or Mankhong woman must provide examples of this ceremonial cloth for her family members.

HOUSEHOLD TEXTILES

The females of a Katang or Mankhong household are also responsible for weaving textiles for domestic purposes. These items include bedding, curtains, room dividers, towels, and hammock-like cribs. The weavers use un-dyed or indigo-dyed, hand-spun cotton to form the household textiles. The checked or plaid patterned *pha-ae taa loo* also functions as a domestic item, used to form bedding and towels, for example. Otherwise, bedding and towels lack patterning.

The Katang and Mankhong utilize a textile called *pha-aa la-euh* as curtains, doorway covers, room dividers, and hammock-like cribs. Different uses of the *pha-aa la-euh* as household accessories have been observed throughout the villages, and they are not used as shawls such as in the Phuthai case. In these circumstances their use is more “domestic” rather than decorative or ritualistic. The woven motifs may possess talismanic properties, whose “protection” is required on an everyday basis rather than stored and brought out for only special occasions. The Katang and Mankhong versions of the *pha-aa la-euh* differ from the Phuthai one since supplementary weft patterning does not cover the majority or the whole surface of the textile.

The Katang or Mankhong type of *pha-aa la-euh* confines the designs to a large band at one of the accessory’s ends. The application of continuous supplementary weft technique or a combination of both continuous and discontinuous supplementary weft techniques creates the patterning in the large band. This item is composed of two pieces of material joined together along one side, requiring the weaver to compose a long textile with patterned ends. The design composition is replicated to create a mirror image on the textile’s length. When the weaving is complete, the fabric is cut in half and joined together along one side in the center, aligning the designs. If the textile is vertically folded in half, the patterning of each half should align to create a reflection. Decorative stitching embellishes the center seam and warp ends that are folded and hemmed to the reverse side.

RELIGIOUS TEXTILES

Due to the restrictive nature of Katang and Mankhong religious beliefs, I was unable to observe any major rituals, such as the annual ancestor veneration rite, since non-community members are forbidden to participate or even enter the village during a period of worship. Also, without the Lao government’s permission to reside in Katang or Mankhong villages for any length of time I did not observe any funeral or wedding ceremonies. A subsequent visit to a Katang village in 2008 allowed me to document an heirloom textile specifically used for funerals. The informants did not reveal details of this ceremonial item’s use, except it served as a shroud or coffin cover.

The informants stated that this textile is generally buried along with the corpse, but, as production of this ceremonial weaving ceased, village members have been kept some as heirlooms to be used at other relatives’ funerals. A family member would remove the weaving from the corpse before the burial. Since many of these textiles are presently appearing on the regional antiquities market for sale. It is possible that their use has been abandoned altogether.
This ceremonial textile is composed of a very long, narrow fabric more than seven meters long and has a red silk and indigo cotton striped warp. One end contains discontinuous supplementary weft patterning woven on a red silk or cotton ground weft. The opposite end is patterned with supplementary warp technique in either white silk or cotton. The supplementary warp designs continue for two-thirds of the fabric, and then the supplementary weft decoration begins. However, before the supplementary weft patterning is woven the white supplementary warp threads are cut since they are no longer used in weaving the cloth. The inclusion of the white threads would not allow the red background at this end to be prominent. The yarns are cut, braided, and allowed to hang on the fabric’s reverse side. The cutting of the warp threads is an unusual characteristic of this material, and this method of cutting unused warp yarns is not found on other textiles decorated with supplementary warp technique among the Katang, Mankhong, related Katuic or Khmer groups, the Phuthai, or other Tai groups in Laos. The nearest known examples of cutting extra warp threads are found in some weavings of various Chin groups living in northwest Burma.

Once the weaving of the textile is complete, the weaver removes it from the loom, folds it in half, and proceeds to sew the textile together along its inner sides. This causes a triangular peak to form at the folded end. If the weaver is highly skilled, each side of the cloth is a mirror reflection of the other. This goal is extremely difficult to achieve since the textile is woven over a long period of time, and the weaver must rely on her memory regarding the spacing, size, and types of motifs found on one end in order to repeat the arrangement on the opposing side. The alignment also depends on how consistent she is in the weaving of the weft into the warp. For example, if her rhythm is light on some days and heavy on others, the density of the threads expands and contracts. While the weaver may accurately count the number of threads and their sequence, any irregularity will create different sized bands of motifs at the opposite ends.

Katang and Mankhong informants state that the pointed end designates the end, which the head would rest upon. Resting on top of the material, the excess material is folded over the feet to cover the topside of the body. The red end would cover the upper body. Since the Katang and Mankhong have assimilated all other textile types from the Phuthai, this textile is a mystery since there is no memory of such production and heirlooms of similar textiles are not present in Phuthai villages. Is it possible it originated from another Tai group? This textile requires further study.

Despite assimilating weaving technology and textile types or styles from neighboring groups, the Katang and Mankhong have developed distinctive cultural markers in the form of textiles. Weavers have also created a unique ceremonial textile. As the Lao government opens eastern Savannakhet especially for regional trade along Hwy 9 the culture heritage of these minority groups is under threat. By encouraging commercial production of hand-woven textiles, members of Katang and Mankhong communities have opportunities to earn income while preserving their culture. An ADB-funded project managed by the country’s tourism authority has taken initial steps to encourage commercial production, providing training on natural dyes and opening markets. Hopefully, other initiatives will follow to preserve Katang and Mankhong textiles.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


LONG TAKE, LONGING AND MARGINALIZATION IN TSAI MING LIANG’S
I DON’T WANT TO SLEEP ALONE

Fauzi Naeim Mohamed
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
korneas@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Tsai Ming-Liang, a renowned Malaysian-born art-house director who has spent the majority of his films based in the city life in Taiwan. I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone, Tsai Ming Liang’s eighth feature film produced in 2006, is his first project that takes its setting in the hubbub of Kuala Lumpur, and his slow attempt to relocate with his amalgamated identity as both native and outsider. This paper analyzes the director’s aesthetics in cinematography, specifically the employment of long take (a cinematic term for lengthy, single uninterrupted shot), in defining the subdued sense of pendatang (Malay word for immigrant) who thrives in the margin, in the borders of urbanity. I indicate how prevailing long take can be, in projecting the quietude, loneliness, and celebrating the culture of everyday objects in his film. I argue that the characters’ longing look as a desire to be somewhere else, that is displaced eventually into comical, chaotic sex.

Keywords: Tsai Ming-liang, Art-House, Kuala Lumpur, Long Take, Aesthetics, Marginalized Society Urbanity

INTRODUCTION

“He would beseech his audience, asking patrons to urge their friends to come see his film. Like the signature Barker in Edward Yang’s animated Web site, Miluku.com, Ah Liang would park himself on the street, calling out ‘Lai kanxi, ah!’ (Come see the show!). At this point, Chen said, Tsai would become emotional and shed tears. An uncertain, embarrassed silence would settle over the audience, as it did over Chen’s because, although Chen smiled, we were unsure how to take this. Was this for real?” (Yueh-yu Yeh & Davis, 2005: 217-218)

There’s this strange story I read of Tsai Ming Liang in Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island (2005), which I have quoted above, byway as a starting point to this essay on the aesthetics of Tsai Ming-liang’s filmmaking. It seems that in parallel of creating provocative cinemas, he too is no stranger of making a curious spectacle of himself. The first time I had seen him face-to-face was way back in 2007, in Central Market, Kuala Lumpur, just right after a retrospective of his films (not all of his oeuvre though). He spoke Chinese, and there was a woman translating his comments to English. The session was moderated by the late Benjamin McKay. Since it was already late at night, I went home early. Even as I write this, I am thinking if I had known of his ‘crying performance’, I might have stayed and watched the display; it is not often seeing a renowned filmmaker openly crying (intentional performance notwithstanding) in front of the audience.

This paper is a trail into Tsai’s film aesthetics, in which I analyze the Tsai’s portrayal of ‘immigrants as marginalized society’ in the urban life in a specific film entitled ‘I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone’ (Hei yan quan, 2006). My analysis will inform on the art of long take, and how by using such technique, the everyday objects as such brings light to the condition of Tsai’s characters, their longing and the loneliness of the atmosphere. Finally, I will offer a reading that such longing is a disguise for the characters not to just be somewhere else other than here but also the urgent needs to have sex; an act which were shown in the film
narrative as comical and chaotic. The usage of long take gives the scenarios an even more tense than usual. Throughout the essay I will be using the words *pendatang* as an alternative form for ‘immigrants’. The words *pendatang*, in Malay, has the root word of *datang* which means in English as ‘come’ or ‘arrive’. To literally translate *pendatang* means the ‘one-who-comes’ or ‘one-who-arrives’. The connotations differ when one uses the words ‘foreigners’ or ‘immigrants’. In Malaysia, the malay words like *pendatang* has more negative connotation and more politically charged usage in the medias. Intrinsically, the words like immigrants can be casually linked with ‘foreigners’, but *pendatang* have been used in the Malayan medias to even depict the Chinese and Indians of Malaysian nationality every time question of original races come into play [1].

The choice of film analyzed - *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone* – is made because the film marked Tsai Ming-liang’s first attempt to shoot his film in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This can be seen as a way of Tsai to re-connect his identity with the country that birthed him. At the same time, it is also a way for Tsai as an artist to show (and introduce) his films to local film fans. Here, the challenge of filmic screening is notorious for the rigidity of Malaysian’s censorship boards. *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone* was one of the many film-projects commissioned by Peter Sellars’ *New Crowned Hope Festival* in Vienna (2006), to honor the 250th anniversary of the birth of that great classical composer, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Having watched most of his prior films, I know for sure that Tsai has to ‘domesticate’ his ‘confrontational’ shots just so that his film can be shown in the Malaysian cinemas [2]. True enough, the Malaysian Censorship Boards *banned* the film, as several counts of scenes shown Malaysia ‘in bad light’, culturally, ethically and racially. The challenge was in showing for local cinema and Tsai then agreed to recuts the scenes to conform to the Censorships. He stated that:

“If I had refused to comply with the five cuts, then there would not have been any dialogue. I would like the dialogue to go further and beyond my film.”[3]

This shows how much Tsai wiling to compromise just to expose his film sensibilities to Malaysian audience. Even the original poster for the film *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone* is not a poster you see everyday in Malaysian scene. With its own Jawi-style of typography, perhaps the producer of the film wants to play out the Islamic/Malay culture found therein in Malaysia, but the images of two male posing in a suspecting situation can really makes one goes ‘Huh?’ (Fig.1). The poster’s compositional figures were quite provocative, no doubt. But having watched five films by Tsai Ming-liang prior, I understand his cheekiness; sure enough as the film plays out, the situation where our posers in the film found themselves in are explained quietly with a most sympathetic and deadpan manner. We can see why Tsai was serious in opening up dialogues with Malaysian authorities, to make them understand the rationale of his aesthetics. Looking from his overall output, it is my belief that this film is his most tame feature to date. However, that doesn’t necessarily imply that *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone* is a lesser film, no; his choices of shots are still as powerful and exhilarating as they have ever been.

But who is Tsai Ming-liang? It is essential I introduce the background of this controversial filmmaker first in this paper. In the realm of Malaysian cinema goers, uttering his name can brings out blank stare. While Ming-liang has won many awards internationally, the local film fans know close to nothing about him. One of the many reasons why the local people know less might be attributed to the approach his cinema takes form, and more so, that he lives in Taiwan even though he was originally born in Kuching, Malaysia. Earlier, he was the son of a farmer who worked a stall in the city center. He graduated his filmic studies from the Drama and Cinema Department of the Chinese Cultural University of Taiwan. While in Kuching, his grandparents often took him to screenings of popular films from China, Taiwan, India, Hong Kong, America, and the Philippines in nearby cinemas. In speaking for his early influence Tsai said that “The main benefit I got from having lived there, in Kuching, for that period was the very slow pace of life, giving me time to develop my interests and enjoy myself.”[4]. He started making his name when his first two films, *Rebels of the Neon God* (*Ch’ing shaonien na cha*, 1992) and *Vive l’amour* (*Aiqing wansui*, 1994) won him international recognition and accolades.
I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone is a story of migrants living in the urban city as Kuala Lumpur. Lee Kang-sheng (As Hsiao Kang), Tsai’s favorite actor from all his previous films, plays two characters: He is that bloodied immigrant laying on the mattress (Fig.2) and also as the comatose patient (Fig.3). Briefly, the story tells of a simple life of Hsiao Kang beaten badly after an encounter with a magician’s mob is nursed back to health by Rawang. After recuperating, he starts to fall with a Coffee shop Waitress, who is also nursing the son of her boss. Rawang, who has somehow fallen over was filled with jealousy, and attempt to recriminate in violently (see Fig,7). The backdrop of the story is architectural ruins, empty spaces and haze. All ends well, for the three, as they (somehow) embrace their differences of sexuality and needs, to harmoniously, live together. The end shot is nothing short of surreal, as the mattress carries them away, blissfully, on water. The manner to develop the story is what people would say as slow which I would explain in the next paragraphs. That Ming-liang continually thrives in international arthouse cinemas show the uniqueness of his vision and cinematic bravery.

**TSAI MING-LIANG’S LONG TAKE AND CINEMA AESTHETICS**

Here, I would like to touch on the characteristics of Tsai’s cinematic aesthetics. By aesthetics, I mean the sense of artistic and philosophical direction that Tsai took in narrating, cinematographing and exhibiting his pictoriality. Tsai is foremost known amongst the circle of serious film critics as a long-take director. The definition of long take equals to ‘an elongated continuous shot without cuts’ (or with minimal cuts). A scene in Tsai’s film can take from 20 seconds to 3 minutes. In the range of current mainstream concepts of shots, 3-minutes duration of a shot can produce tense atmosphere, stillness, quietness or even to the point of boredom for audience who are used to fast-cutting action movies. However, Tsai’s shots duration are not as extreme as Bela Tarr; a Hungarian filmmaker famous for his 7-hour long Satantango (1994). Tsai’s film exhibits a sense of austerity, of minimalism, where shots of figures are shown doing nothing, most of the times looking to other parts of the screen.
Tsai often composed his actors in long-shots. By utilizing this, the condition where his casts found themselves can be made more apparent, looming and oppressive. It gives contextual playground and helps us to see more of the obstacles that the casts have to circulate. Long take heightened the concentration of the audience, as we are made more aware of the details presented; the kind of awareness that will be lost upon us when watching Michael Bay’s Transformers 3. Tsai likes to use non-professional or non-famous actors. Lee Kang-sheng was found by Tsai in an arcade game. Tsai has even further declared that “he would never make another a film without Lee Kang-sheng”[5]. For I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone, Tsai approached a local ‘kuih-seller’, Norman Atun, to be part of his film. Norman was casted as Rawang, a Malay construction worker. Being new, there is that problem of awkwardness especially in close-ups shots where facial acting and consistencies are very important to maintain throughout the film. Tsai’s fellow Taiwanese filmmaker, Hou Hsiao-hsien says, “Amateur actors are often very nervous in close-ups.”[6]. By exhibiting the actors in long-shots, a director can lessen the problems of multiple retakes and awkward acting. Such was the camaraderie between Tsai and Norman that the former invited the later to be part of his latest film, Visage (2009). It looks like Tsai is slowly adding Norman into his own family of casts, which he has built early on in his early stages of filmmaking. Knowing intimately of his actors surely can create a path where he can oversee the developmental, transformational figures of his filmic landscapes. Even Lee Kang-sheng tapped into this ‘family’ when he started shooting his film, The Missing (2003).

Even more, Tsai’s employs the usage of still shot (stationary or fixed camera placement), rather than moving and tracking shots which other long-takes practitioners like Andrei Tarkovsky or Aleksandr Sokurov favors. As such, out of this stillness, and long duration of shot, these techniques free us to gaze the inches of the screen, and absorb the characters’ nuances in our leisurely pace. To borrow words from the film critic Jonathan Romney, Tsai’s filmic approach is that “art of geographically spectacular slowness”[7].

In a broader context, Tsai Ming-liang’s filmmaking can be grouped into that loosely-term called as slow cinema. By slow - even though its might be laced with negative connotations - I don’t imply grueling and sluggish experience, but more on the deliberateness and subdued atmosphere. [8]. To read more on the politics of slow cinema, I quote here Jonathan Romney,

“Slow Cinema’ has been embraced by critics and festivals the world over. [..] The last decade certainly saw an increasing demand among cinephiles for films that are slow, poetic, contemplative - cinema that downplays event in favour of mood, evocativeness and an intensified sense of temporality. Such films highlight the viewing process itself as a real-time experience in which, ideally, you become acutely aware of every minute, every second spent watching.” (Sight & Sound, Feb 2010)

It is very common to find the casts in Tsai’s cinemas dialogue-less; furthering the cause of conversation takes so much energy in Tsai’s little world. As if they are loath to speak out less they are made less than themselves, the wholesome-ness of contemplative, longing creatures. I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone is one of the extreme dialogue-less films Tsai has produced. Slow pacing the film can seem to halt the conventional narrative altogether. This technique is sometimes called as ‘dedramatization’ [9]. Excessive moments like a dramatic, snarling Al Pacino in Scarface are quite unnecessary for this type of film. Though Tsai is not one to fear excess when it serves a certain function; one has to remember the last scene in Vive L’Amour where a lady burst into tears in a drawn out long-take or the out-of-nowhere musical numbers in The Hole.
We can say that Tsai’s long take was his mode of approaching the way people lives their everyday life, in which long takes structure, intensifies the prolonged ambiguity of modern people. At the same time, we can argue too, that his cinema is a by-product of a resistance to Hollywood’s narrative cinemas, as response to post-modern capitalism. In turn, opposition to the visual, special-effects-laden spectacle offers “important factors in making slow movies a ghetto for cinephiles” [10]. The way to enjoy Tsai’s film is to find your own patience in observing not only the composition presented on the screen, but also of your inner self. A schemata of narrativity is helpful in understanding Tsai’s film, and rigorous watching of films (that will set a certain kind of pattern recognition) will definitely boost visual appreciation and identification.

ON MARGINALIZED SOCIETY, PENDATANG

Let us see some statistics: There were about 1.8 million foreign workers in Malaysia until February 2010. More or less 26.1 million foreigners come into Malaysia until 31 Dec 2009. 2.4 million long-term foreigners are living in Malaysia. According to Migration News:

“Malaysia had 1,817,871 registered migrant workers in 2010. […] Malaysia in July 2011 temporarily stopped the arrival of migrant workers while it considered a plan to legalize some of the estimated one to two million unauthorized foreigners in the country. Unauthorized
foreigners with Malaysian jobs are to be given biometric IDs so that employers can legally hire them. Employers say that lack of labor is deterring foreign investment. About 20 percent of all workers in Malaysia, two-thirds of construction workers, and 80 percent of workers on plantations, are foreigners.”[11]

Strange as it may sounds, Malaysia was the first country to employ biometric IDs back in 1998 [12]. There’s even a proposition by Malaysian government to use biometric IDs for the upcoming 2011 election. However, this is not our main concern for this essay. As of this writing (August 2011), there are about 8 million population overall estimated in Klang Valley [13]. Surely this speaks of huge diasporic activities and of potentials, ongoing cultural conflict and dissemination happening in Klang Valley. It is not usual to find common public response of immigrants’ problem as a threat to stability of peace. In short, immigrants, non-national workers or pendatang are viewed as the image of negativity by the locals [14]. We want more crowd control from the government for foreign workers. Not all, of course, pendatang are bad; some comes to the country seeking for the betterment of Malaysian social values, others are tourist that gives us international appreciation and contributes to economic growth. While it is true we need their assistance – cheap and heavy labors or maids to our home - we still look down on pendatang who comes as beggars. They bring bigger potential for crimes and headaches. They are the Others. The ones who lives under the threshold, the ones who are mostly under-appreciated by the other privileged classes.

What is happening in Kuala Lumpur is not an isolated phenomenon; the problems of immigration occur in the major cities in the world like New York, London, Melbourne, Beijing and many others. This is the effects of technology, globalization and economic imbalance in the post-modern world. The prospect of lucrative jobs and political stability lure these pendatang away from their homes to come here. When the differences of cultural background of pendatang meet, they clash and transform each other, and create amalgamation of aesthetics manifestation. A Bangladeshi worker will have to learn Malay language just to speak with customers, if he works in an Indian restaurant. A Myanmar Moslem will have to adapt to Islamic culture practiced in the rituals of Malaysian mosque.

The problems of marginalized people are a topic that looms large in Tsai Ming-liang’s narrative. By marginalized society, it is not just about pendatang; I include also the ‘mentally ills’, patients, homosexuals, prostitutes, inmates and as such. Tsai sees the people living in the margin as commoners without privilege, tropes to be identified and subsequently, celebrated upon. It is like as if this people’s segregation and exclusion from the community fulfills and strengthens the filmmaker personal loneliness and sexual orientation. The marginalized, who is already afflicted with solitary expression, is further placed in a more remote geography in Tsai’s films. I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone find two guys living in a huge, abandoned building. Tsai’s narrative strategy in isolation can also be seen in The Hole, where we observe the two protagonists dwelling in a crumbling building or in Good Bye, Dragon Inn – small numbers of people viewing a classic film in an almost-empty cinemathque. In an interview with David Walsh, Tsai Ming-liang stated that,

“In all of my work I deal with people who are on the fringes of society. My father was a farmer and later he had his own little stall. So I feel very close to the common person. I’m not interested in people who are rich. So whenever I shoot something, whenever I get close to people like those in the film, I feel very good.”[15]
The plethora of racial richness found in *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone* can be described in a Malay word as *majmuk*. When one says of *masyarakat majmuk* in Malaysia, one refers to the phrase ‘plural society’. It is a carnival of complexities of races. One of the myriad instances of *majmuk* can be found in one of the earliest scenes in the film (Fig.4), where we are shown an exhibition of ‘magic’. In the street performance of *panggil duit* (‘Calling forth money’), a ‘bomoh’ (shaman/magician) will ask a small amount of money from the gatherer, so as to multiply the money. However, what I really want to emphasise here is the racial composition that makes up the crowd. The gatherers shown are of different races – Malay, Indian, Chinese, Indonesian and so on - but they are mostly male. One Bangladeshi worker even went and asked the *bomoh* lots of money (Fifty thousand!) so that he can go back to his hometown, buy goats and so forth. I use the word ‘magic’ earlier, but what I mean ‘illegal and fraud’. Yet, people still fall for it. It seems that the belief of superstition is quite high even in the city life that is Kuala Lumpur. The scene is actually, quite normal to be seen in Chow Kit or Petaling Street. When small crowd gathers and form a circle, it is hard for other pedestrians to walk past without wanting to see what is happening.

Tsai, born as Chinese in Malaysia, under the rule of the majority-led Malays, understand deeply the insecurity (and the differences) of being a minority, just as much as he wants his films to move away from racial theme. In all of his films prior, the actors were Chinese, in a Chinese population that was Taiwan. Upon coming to Malaysia, the only way he can capture the spirit of the Malaysian people living in alienated, modernized society is by showing not only the yearnings of its denizens, but also of how *majmuk* Malaysian’s streets can be. Bangladeshi workers, who are numbered many thousands in the main city of Kuala Lumpur, serve as the way marginalized living can be; breathing in groups, existing in squatters, with bare clothes and decorative paraphernalia. Just as much the Malay intimidates politically (look at the number of Malay politicians who seat in current Parliamentary), the Malay also bullies in the streets (Fig.4). They even get away with beating (silent and defenseless) Hsiao Kang - that non-consequential, peripheral *pendatang*. In fact, just before the street mob hits Hsiao Kang, he was asked by the ‘kind of race’ he is, as if racial creds are rooted to the importance of hierarchical extortion. Hsiao Kang is saved *only* by other marginalized individuals - Bangladeshi groups - who then whisked him away on a tattered mattress, back to their home. Who cares about him, but others of his ilk? Only those who dwell in the edge recognize another of its kind, so says the emphatic Tsai Ming-liang. Isolated though Tsai’s characters are, they open a *path* to resistance: It is when a man is in solitude that he can find resource in resisting the ever-forbearing modernization.

**LOCATION, EVERYDAY OBJECTS AND CAMPINESS**

Tsai’s films are, in a way, of *refuge* in itself. First as internally, by having the characters finds solace amongst each other through acknowledgement of mutual suffering and isolation in a bare architecture. The characters gather amidst each other across the connection of loneliness and longing. No doubt there is strength in
numbers. Secondly and externally, in a more personal level, Tsai’s films are for cinephiles taking refuge in contemplation. Aren’t we, the audience, assembling in its together-ness? I am reminded of the words of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, of which I would like reproduce here:

“It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to coordinate their efforts to the sheltering; only when they have gathered together with that end in view do they begin to gather.”[16]

Wouldn’t Tsai’s film brings forth a way to retrospection? Of appreciation to the everyday texture? In confronting Tsai’s cinema, we brought to light our own moods and gather our thinking, and together, they brought comfort and shelter us. Letting ourselves to reflect frees us to see what Tsai wants to share, which is the thinking of his cinema. I postpone here, Heideggerian phenomenological analysis on Tsai Ming-liang’s films as research possibilities for another time.

The enclosure of architecture in I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone is shown as bleak and forlorn. Tsai is transfixed with the image of ‘tattered’ building. Talking about his selection for location, Tsai detailed that:

“We discovered a remarkable location next to the Pudu Jail in Kuala Lumpur. It is a large abandoned building. In the early 90s, as part of its economic development plan, the Malaysian government brought in large numbers of foreign workers to work on its many construction projects. One of these was the Petronas twin towers, then the tallest building in the world. In the late 90s, many of these projects were abandoned because of the Asian economic crisis. The workers found themselves unemployed overnight and many went into hiding, becoming illegal laborers. This building is a remnant from those days. As we entered, we were surprised at how grand it looked inside. It felt almost like a post-modern opera theatre. In the middle of it, we found a deep pool of dark water (probably accumulated from rain and flooding). I was reminded of Mozart’s The Magic Flute. [17]

There is something incredibly mysterious regarding ruins. Like the marginalized people Tsai shots, old and unoccupied building serves to increases the bond of fringe-ness; a way to revel living dangerously in the borderline of society. In Kuala Lumpur, for example, it is easy to drive by its major roads and fail to notice the unfinished buildings, littered somewhere out of the corner of our eyes. It’s as if we are not sure to confront the possible weakness of urban developments. The area around Pudu Jail has its moment in history when it an interest in inmates and dark crimes in its heyday, but now, the place is quite an abandoned building. A place of (dark) history as this, when composed in the camera, with enough lighting to accentuate the dark corners and the rough texture of unpreserved or tattered walls can turn into uncanny images. As Dylan Triggs expressed:

“Architecturally, the uncanny disorientates, pushes us into an ambiguous landscape of shock and convulsion, but simultaneously enforces a sense of aesthetic pleasure at the cost of emotional displacement. The dissident presence of the ‘opposite’ then, is what renders the uncanny either enticing or abhorrent according to ones aesthetic judgment.” [18]

I do not see any abhorrent quality in Tsai’s cinematography of ruins, only fascinated by Tsai’s perspectives for shooting location. Personally, I find ancient remnant of buildings especially enticing. The dripping water from the ceiling from the rain that fills a hole on the wrecked, concrete floor has its own aesthetic sensibilities. Wouldn’t having occupants serve a way to tame an ancient, obsolete beast? Surely as one walks over a path of long untrodden, one brings the light to being? I am reminded somewhere in the film of a moment of merry chase between four of the protagonists - Hsiao Kang, Rawang, Coffee-shop Waitress and Coffee-shop Boss. Each brimmed with curiosities of the other. Each with their own ultimate goal of obtaining the attention of the other. It happens in the dead of the night and it was quite a funny scenario. When the Coffee-shop Boss busily descended a series of stairs, she found she is close to drowning as there
were waters down the rungs. It was a dead end to the chase. This is one of the interesting comedic scenes that I find in all his films. To analyze Tsai Ming-liang, one must understand and appreciate his dark humor. It was also interesting, whereby the circulation of architectural possibilities are transformed over time, as the man-made give way to the design of nature. There’s alteration that we must take note of decay aesthetics. To quote Trigg again:

“The distortion of form means that navigating from one point to the next becomes precarious. Dead ends begin where space has caved in. The ruin is in a constant process of morphing into multiple configurations.” (The Aesthetics of Decay, p.130)

Everyday objects that surround Tsai Ming-liang forms part of the troupe in his filmmaking. They are as important to the story as much as the human casts. According to him:

“The objects I used in my film may not seem attractive but they are certainly inseparable from our life. Things like water pipes, shrubs, convey a feeling of concreteness and reality. Through the camera lens and the outline of light and shadow, these things become similar to and concrete as sculptures, carrying a kind of beauty. They create a sense of realness.” [19]

The pursuit toward long take helps to re-focus the everydayness of things casted in the light of Tsai’s direction. Objects are not glossed over, but – in the course of photographing - remade in their own ordinariness. The everyday object helps to accentuate the director’s characters to exist in their own solitude. According to Professors Chabris and Simons, “We think we should see anything in front of us but in fact we are aware of only a small portion of our visual world at any moment.”[20]. Things that are everyday and banal can even be experienced differently as our eyes are able to linger again and again in a certain spot (without the imposition of cuttings) on the screen, as we try to nurture the connections with the narrative displayed and our own moods. Do not expect explosion or depiction of intense fighting; Tsai’s film are peopled with everyday being in the state of rumination, subjected to daily chores like cleaning clothes, sitting, eating, drinking, sleeping and so on.

At the same time as the story unfolds in I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone, a quirky phenomenon happens – Haze! Having experienced heavy haze before in Kuala Lumpur – as a result from an untended forest fire from neighboring country (or so the news told) – watching the casts don their masks while continuing their everyday mundaneness brought a chuckle to my lips. A scene plays as such: Masked men watching Indian videos in the street (Fig.5). No doubt the blaring Tamil songs and their antics can bring out a spectacle here; one can simply literally stop the pedestrianistic activities just to stare at the videos. This is why Tsai Ming-liang’s film I call as film majmuk. While local filmmakers are busy churning out stereotypical-one-race films, Tsai on the other hand, position the race culture as he sees, and experiences them. We must recall again that Tsai wanted to create dialogue not with just the Malaysian audience but also with the people in power. Just like the plague that affects his previous film, Hole, haze contributes to Tsai’s idea of universal affliction. By slipping in a gas-mask-filter, the event touches the bodily make-ups but still retain the dead-pan mannerisms.
The song (which comes from the radio or TV) that was played in the film recalls the classical, traditional era. Chinese opera music in a modern film, while evoking innocence, always lends to campy atmosphere. I elicit here Tsai Ming-liang’s words, in an interview with David Walsh, on his approach to music:

“On another level, the musical numbers are weapons that I use to confront the environment at the end of the millennium. Because I think that toward the end of the century a lot of qualities--such as passionate desire, naive simplicity--have been suppressed. The musicals contain those qualities. It's something that I use psychologically to confront that world.” (Walsh, 1998)

He was specifically referring to another of his previous project, *The Hole*. The statement can easily be lifted to describe *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone*. Nick Browne writes that there are, “Two fundamental aesthetic poles mark the dominant cultural tendencies enacted across the films of the new period in both Taiwan and Hong Kong – the traditional (nostalgic) and the modern (the cynical, the discontinuous).” (‘Introduction’ to *New Chinese Cinema: Forms Identities Politics*, 1996: p5.)

If we want to position Tsai Ming Liang according to Browne’s, then he sits majestically in the middle between the traditional and the modern. Emille Yueh-yu & Darrell William Davis (2005) are partially right when they discern Tsai’s films as ‘camp aesthetics’ especially of his habit to portray exaggerated sex, strange behaviour and nostalgic music. Campy films are often times associated with kitsch, cheesy and corny. Campy films, with their initial nostalgic forms are also seen in bad lights. Clicking the ever-accessible Wikipedia, ‘camp aesthetics’ are that assembly of “banality, mediocrity, artifice, ostentation, etc. so extreme as to amuse or have a perversely sophisticated appeal.”[21]. Susan Sontag writes camp as artifice, frivolity, naïve middle-class pretentiousness, and ‘shocking’ excess (*Notes on ‘Camp’,* 1964). I see Tsai’s film as somewhat, a rebel to the socio-cultural norms and conventions. However, taking into conjecture the seriousness of the slow pacing, the campiness of the Tsai’s transcends into minimalist-camp, and into the realm of possible sublime. In *Good Bye, Dragon Inn*, for example, there are periods of inflated moments (for example, longest demonstration of pissing I’ve ever seen!), yet there are moments where quietness free itself from its representation and embraces our thinking. Tsai goes beyond than simply ‘bad taste’ into the contemplative mood one often linked to modern filmmakers like Carlos Reygadas, Hirokazu Koreeda or Hou Hsiao-hsien, to name a few.
LONELINESS, LONGING AND SEX

In the earliest, second shot of the film, we are shown our two protagonists - Hsiao Kang and Coffee-shop Waitress (Fig.6) coming upon a meal being cooked, at night. They then, stared into the frying-pan. The still shot takes about two minutes. The facial expressions of both do not change. There is no presentation of smacking one’s own lips to show hunger. There is only impassivity. But we detect here desire; a muted, subdued, forlorn desire for the foods. Or even a kind of transfixed with the activity of the cooks being prepared, as sparks of fire fly without. But is it really nourishments these protagonists want or something else, covered up and concealed in their trappings – unable to fathom or define their true desire? The image of Fig.5 is actually a setup, a prediction for the future, a meeting again between these two that will start a closer (but a hushed-up, nevertheless) relationship.

Figure 6: Longing for the food. I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone (2006).

In the story, Coffee-shop Waitress portrays the desire to break from the relish attention of her boss. She longs for an escape, for ways to be with herself. She yearns for the Paralyzed Man to go away (die) so that she can stop taking bodily care (or performing sexual operation) on him. Along comes Hsiao Kang with his boyish charm. The eventual courtship between Hsiao Kang and Coffee-shop Waitress is even weirder. It happens just as Coffee-shop Waitress wants to serve the customers in a staircase. There ensues a series of drinking by Hsiao Kang from different cups of coffee (or was it teh tarik?) on the tray. Soon, he makes an offering of a gift to the lady. These are lonely people, no doubt. Some part of their soul must have been trapped somewhere in a vertigo. In the book entitled Tsai Ming-liang, Jean- Pierre Rehm even likened the characters of Tsai’s as puppets, marionettes that “have lost the chance of redemption.”[22] His heroes and heroines reveal the inability to speak, and if they do (which they do so sparsely and momentarily) there are not much sense to them. I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone is a study in disjointed-ness. This doesn’t come as surprise to long-fan of Tsai, as societal alienation has always been one of Tsai’s fundamental narratives. He spoke:

“Just like in my other films, I’m talking about people in limbo. We don’t always fit nicely into our environment, and sometimes we’re neither here nor there.”[23].

Hsiao Kang has a problem in fitting with the environment, and out of his loneliness, found a gathering crowd (Fig.4), interrogated and finally beaten upon. Hsiao Kang always finds himself misplaced – in the mosquito net he shared with other mate, the mattress he sleeps in, the home he temporarily lives, even to his notion of sexual relationship. If the cast speak none, then they declare through their bodily gesture. Hands might display roughness, politeness or helplessness. The eyes rove to the objects of their wanting. What does
the Coffee-shop Waitress thinks of, as she lies on the attic? Past lives and past regrets? When Hsio Kang fishes from the pond in the deserted building, what is he really thinking? Are there other places he’d rather be? In the scenario I depicted earlier (Fig.6), Hsiao Kang clearly wants what is cooked in the frying-pan. Surely he is hungry, and has no monetary resources to fulfill his craving. He might be curious even, but what I want to argue further is that the gaze of his longings is eventually displaced, emigrated to sexual needs and sexual tension. It is as if the desire has found a new home in sexual act.

There are many instances of sexual allusion (shirtless Rawang scrubbing the mattress, for instance), but I would like to point out the most fleshly obvious. Observe:

1. When Hsiao Kang helping Rawang to take a leak. Hsiao Kang was weak after being gang-hit. When Rawang helps to unzipped Kang’s jeans, we are shown a part of his ass. Also when Rawang zipping back Kang’s jeans, with Kang’s bottom straddling Rawang’s laps.
2. Soon after, Rawang undress Hsiao Kang on the mattress, enclosed within the kelambu (mosquito nets). He proceeds to clean Hsiao Kang’s body with a wet cloth. The positive energy of tending to another being is good, yet there is that sensual overtone that Tsai glea upon.
3. The paralyzed man jacked off by his mother, right in the middle of a massage. The idea mirrors his mother’s personal preference of sexual release. It is incest. There was even a story of one of the camera assistants approached Tsai, in the midst of shooting the scene, and announced. “Well, Tsai, I will never work with you again”. [24]
4. Also when Coffee-shop Waitress were pressured by her Boss to masturbate the paralyzed man. Clearly, Coffee-shop Waitress didn’t enjoy the task, the man being performed-to couldn’t find satisfaction (or was he?) excepting the Boss who obviously love dominating.
5. When the Coffee Boss meets Hsiao Kang in the dark alley, foreplay turns inexorably to Hsiao Kang pleasing only her. Did she see her son in the face of Hsiao Kang, and thus, beget some sort of twisted sexual anxiety? She used to please her son with her hands and now it is the son’s hand satisfying her back. The scenario is messy.
6. What about the attempt to make love while wearing mask, between Hsiao Kang and Coffee-shop Waitress? In the end, it didn’t work out well for both of them.
7. One of the final scenes involve of the three protagonists sleeping together (with Hsio Kang as the intermediate) in the attic. It looks like resolution has arrived. A promise of future threesome sexual acts.

Every time they perform sensual acts, I sense awkwardness to the brink of chaos. Awkward rhymes well with chaotic, especially when one looks nervous and alienated about it. It speaks well of ‘disorderly action’. Anytime, anything can go wrong. Contemplation, which is so well presented (and augmented as such) in the façades of the actors, lost its sting in the process of intercourse. Personally, watching a local production of showing sexual performance can be quite interesting and enlightening, especially so when I see none whatsoever, in so far as the contents being produced in Malaysia.

If What Time is it There (2001) sports a compulsive-possessive-objectification for a watch (Lee Kang-sheng plays the neurotic watch seller), then I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone has the thematic mattress. The mattress, found by a group of Bangladeshi workers, have been symbolically and physically abused throughout the films. It has: Been carried away; tampered; slept upon; fought for its sleeping properties; to be possessed; washed away; stolen away; basked to the sunlight; vehicle for a wounded man; place for making sex; even sprayed to wash away the lichen or other possible itchy originator. The mattress has its own external history of being used for 30 years. Found in an old hotel, it was deemed very heavy by Tsai. So heavy, that some of its stuffing have to be taken out to make the films protagonists carry it easily [25].
The sign of the mattress itself refers to a real-life Malaysian ambiguity of sexuality and politics. The original Chinese title, *Hei yan quan* actually refers to ‘Black Eye’, the sort of translation that is lost in the English title. Tsai Ming-liang stated the term *Hei yan quan* denotes to the sacking of Malaysian ex-deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who was found with a black eye, after being punched while incarcerated. In the film, Hsiao Kang sports a ‘black eye’ after being hit by the gangsters, in reference to Anwar’s. In the local news, the trial of Anwar has been made very famous after he was tried by the Malaysian Government for the charge of sodomy [26]. This occurs in the era of Mahathir Mohammad, then Malaysian Prime Minister.

Tsai’s mattress is symbolic in that, in the trial of Anwar, a mattress was produced into a courtroom as evidence (allegedly marked with semen) to further damning Anwar. All this political allusions inspired Tsai the filmmaker to play around with his narratives. As much as the plight of marginalized people garnered Tsai’s sympathy, so was the case of Anwar, who Tsai feels strongly connected to. Tsai himself has visualized various kind of sexual experimentation in his films, and pretty much celebrates homosexuality. Ironically enough, in the recent BERSIH (The Coalition for Free and Fair Elections) demonstration, which happened in 9 July 2011 (much to the chagrin of the governing UMNO), it was Anwar’s bodyguard who received the ‘black eye’, after being shot point blank from a gas canister by the police.

**CONCLUSION**

Long take is a powerful technique in film history as ways to capture the realism of time, making us even more conscious of the time passing us by. For Tsai’s cinema, elaborate, methodical pacing is everything. We look to his actors, and the actors look with us, in conjunction with the pace provided by the cinematograph. We share their looks, aware as we are to the context and location that surrounds the protagonists, as they grapple coldly with physical needs. In the sporadic bursts of sexual intimacy (as characters meet and aches clash), the longing for limbo is satiated. But only for awhile. A question then: Does having been sexually fulfilled, means that the longing will stop its gaze? No, they won’t. I have written earlier on the nature of marionettes before in this essay. By marionettes, I imply on the husk, soulless beings- with a disability to express desire - that spread their wanton muted gaze. Tsai has a strong, strict control on his puppets. If his puppets look as such, the sexual appetite (that might not even be there in the first place) must be eventually consumed in awkwardness, in the next sequence of the film. For *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone*, Tsai’s characters have problem in making love or bodily coupling. Like Jen-yi Hsu (2007) voiced, Tsai’s “sexual intercourse seems to be the only way to conquer disconnection, to establish intimacy, and to sooth the trauma of (post) modernity.” [27]. When Rawang wants to end Hsio Kang’s life using milk tin (Fig.7), Kang can only looks desperately. Surely he is communicating of a place, far away, but accessible, that both of them can co-exist better? The sexual activities of both of them (it isn’t shown proper for the stern censorships in Malaysia or for
whatever reason Tsai thins) as such promised in their promiscuity, will have to be delivered somewhere else, to that state of longing and more suffering. Sex has its moments, momentous but only momentarily. As such, the gaze must resume its activities, to continually yearns, masked away in its phenomena to be ‘somewhere-else’, quietly.

*I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone*, for all its prevalent fascinating sign plays and estrangement, at its heart, is a love story. It is a romance is eventually shared by three different people of different background with common underprivileged status. Sex, chuckles Tsai, is an open-ended comfort that crosses the boundary of race and gender. But you must be patient to even grasp its initiation. In solace, one must learn to know and to lookout each other. The Chinese song at the end of the film - as the mattress floats surreally on the dark water, carrying the three occupants - bears repeating for its kitsch romance, and can assist as the end to my essay:

I want to stay in your arms,  
Because you are the only one for me,  
Winter is gone and spring is here,  
Bridges are filled with flowers again  
Can’t you see the pairs of butterflies,  
I want to tell you that I love you,  
You have filled the space in my heart  
Spring in Jiang Nan is lovely in March  
Can you hear the canaries sing of love?

BEGIN NOTES

[1]. I refer here to major medias like *Utusan Malaysia* and *Berita Harian*, which are the main Malay language newspapers controlled by the Barisan Nasional government. Issues of *pendatang asing* (foreign workers) have always been thorny issues in Malaysia.

[2]. *I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone* was screened in Taiwan on 23rd March 2007 and was screened in Malaysia after further edits according to Malaysian censorship on 17th May 2007 in Cathay Cineplex Cineleisure Damansara, Kuala Lumpur.


[8]. Even though, looking from the perspectives of current average audience, who is exposed to MTV-like fast-cuttings (with more than 50 cuts per minute), a 3-minute shot of ‘nothing’ can be a grueling experience that might leads to boredom, especially when there is not much action portrayed in the scene.

[9]. I borrowed the term here from David Bordwell, “Good and Good For You” (July 10 2011) from http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2011/07/10/good-and-good-for-you/

[10]. Ibid.


[12]. Sourced from *Biometric Passport*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometric_passport

[13]. Cited from *World Gazetteer*.


[23]. Allan Koay, “Cutting For Change.” Twitch, (Sept. 16, 2006)


[25]. Ibid.

[26]. The accusation of sodomy, which failed to gain ground in court (he was sentenced to prison 1999-2004 for power corruption) was attempted again by Malaysian Government for the second time, this time with alleged sodomy with his aide, Saiful. Anwar was arrested on July 2008 for the charge, released and is currently in the process of trial (as of August 2011).

[27]. Jen-yi Hsu, "Re-enchanting the Everyday Banal in the Age of Globalization: Alienation, Desire, and Critique of Capitalist Temporality in Tsai Ming-Liang’s The Hole and What Time Is It There?" NTU Studies in Language and Literature, Number 17 (June 2007), 133-157.

REFERENCES


Loh, Joseph. “From Hawker to Actor”. The Star Online (25 March 2007).
Walsh, David. “Tsai Ming-liang’s Vive L’amour: Taipei’s Lonely Souls.”

FILMOGRAPHY

Full features directed by Tsai:
Rebels of the Neon God (Ch’ing shaonien na cha) (1992) Taiwan, 106 min
Vive l’amour (Aiqing wan sui) (1994) Taiwan, 118 min
The River (He liu) (1997) Taiwan, 115 min
The Hole (Dong) (1998) Taiwan/ France 95 min
What Time Is It There? (Ni neibian jidian) (2001) Taiwan/ France, 116 min
Goodbye, Dragon Inn (Bu jian bu san) (2003) Taiwan, 82 min
The Wayward Cloud (Tian bian yi duo yun) (2005) Taiwan/ France, 114 min
I Don’t Want to Sleep Alone (Hēi yǎn quān) (2006) Malaysia/ Taiwan/ France/ China/ Austria, 115 min
Face (Visage) (2009) France/ Taiwan/ Belgium/ Netherlands, 138 min

Short films/ TV directed by Tsai:
All the Corners of the World (TV) (1989) Taiwan, 76 min
Boys (Xiao Hai) (1991) Taiwan, 50 min
The Skywalk is Gone (Tian qiao bu jian le) (2002) Taiwan/ France, 25 min
Wo xin renshi de pengyou (TV) (1995) Taiwan, 56 min
Fish Underground (2001) Taiwan, 30 min
Welcome to São Paulo (Bem-Vindo a São Paulo) [Documentary; segment Aquarium] (2004) Brazil, 100 min
To Each His Own Cinema (Chacun son cinéma ou Ce petit coup au coeur quand la lumière s’éteint et que le film commence) [segment It’s a Dream] (2007) France, 100 min
Madame Butterfly (Hu die fu ren) (2009) France/ Taiwan/ Italy, 36 min
THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION VARIABLES IN INFLUENCING JOB RETENTION OF FILIPINO CALL CENTER AGENTS IN METRO MANILA AND REGION 6

Niel Kenneth Jamandre
Department of Speech Communication and Theater Arts, CAL
University of the Philippines, Philippines
kennethjamandre@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The Philippines is the leading Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) destination in Asia according to the IBM Latest Global Locations Trend Annual Report. Call centers comprise 70% of the BPO offshore services and generated revenues of $5.7 million for 2010. There is an estimated 350,000 Filipino Customer Service Representatives (CSRs) as of the last quarter of 2010. BPO operations are concentrated in the capital city of Manila including Makati, Ortigas, Alabang and Quezon City. As Manila-based call centers experience talent saturation, companies have expanded operations in key cities and provinces.

With an attrition rate of 35% in call centers, this research analyzes communication variables that predict job retention of Filipino CSRs. This research also aims to compare the job retention factors of CSRs in Manila and in two provinces. The study uses the Organizational Assimilation Theory by Fred Jablin as framework.

Total survey respondents is 440. Interview data are analyzed qualitatively and the survey results are analyzed using Logistic Regression Analysis.

Initial findings show that there are significant relationships of attrition and the communication variables on (1) work experience, (2) management programs, (3) salary, (4) shift work, (5) sex, (6) professional growth, (7) job satisfaction, and (8) intention to stay with or leave the company. CSRs in the provinces also have higher probability of staying with the company compared to those who work in Manila.

INTRODUCTION

GLOBAL CONTACT HAS BECOME A MAJOR COMPONENT for businesses in this digital age. Companies expand their market to increase profit by using different modes of technology and engaging in offshore transactions. Telemarketing is a marketing method where an agent contacts a potential customer through a telephone or connection in order to purchase products or services such as insurance, to solicit, and to sell credit card (McDonald 1998).

However, international companies have resorted to outsourcing because of challenges in global economic competition. Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) is an outsourcing of services for a period of four to six years with an ultimate goal of lowering operation costs (Abu and Matias 2003).

The Philippines is a major BPO destination in Asia—there were 125 BPO firms as of 2007 (Amante 2010). An increasing number of international organizations report that the Philippines is the closest competitor of India. The National Outsourcing Association of United Kingdom ranks Manila as the third top global outsourcing city, and Cebu as the best emerging offshoring city (Valmero 2010). The advantages of BPO operations in the Philippines include higher tax incentives, infrastructure, and the quality of human resources particularly the cultural affinity of the Filipinos to the Americans, their neutral accent, and their ability to speak idiomatic American English (Esguerra and Balana 2010).

The BPO is expanding to regional hubs or next wave cities in the Philippines, offering employment opportunities to urban areas outside Metro Manila, such as Laguna, Baguio, Davao, Iloilo, and Bacolod. The cities of Iloilo and Bacolod are part of Region 6 and are among the Top 10 Next Wave Cities 2009 in the
reports of the Business Processing Association of the Philippines (BPAP), Commission on Information and Communications Technology, and the Department of Trade and Industry; Iloilo is considered the most cost-efficient city offering the lowest average wage, rental and power rates and Bacolod is considered having the best business environment (Ho 2009).

The BPO industry is divided into call or contact centers, back office services, like finance and accounting, data processing and management, and human resource development. Call centers comprise 70 percent of BPO operations (Esguerra and Balana 2010). Call or contact centers serve as a model for multipurpose interaction such as selling, servicing, and marketing that serves the needs of various constituents of an organization (e.g., customers, prospects, suppliers, distributors, and employees either in-house or outsourced) (Abu and Matias 2003).

The International Labor Organization (ILO) report entitled “Offshoring and Working Conditions in Remote Work” claims that Filipino BPO employees earn an average basic monthly salary of P16,928 which is 53 percent more than that of their peers in other industries in the Philippines. The profile of the BPO workforce is young, college level or graduates, and composed of mostly female employees. They work for an average of 44.7 hours per week and 42.6 percent of BPO employees (51.7 percent are call center positions) are in graveyard shifts coinciding with the daytime hours of overseas customers, mostly from the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and other English-speaking countries (as cited in Esguerra and Balana 2010).

A call center agent or a customer service representative (CSR) usually undergoes a rigorous recruitment and screening process to ensure that only highly qualified individuals are hired. The common procedures for selection include phone screening, initial interview, examination, final interview, simulation, and assessment. The training program in the call centers initially include importing to the applicants, knowledge of the organization, product, customer, guidelines for procedures, office procedures, customer escalation procedures, hours of operation, quality calls, computer systems, enhancing their communication skills, and monitoring (Jamandre 2008).

Calls handled by CSRs are generally either inbound or outbound. Telemarketing, advisories, sales verification, credit and collection, reaction or reinstatement of accounts, loyalty program benefits, and order entry are covered by outbound calls. On the other hand, inbound calls include inquiries, requests for technical advice or assistance, complaints, customer service, support, transcription, sales, marketing and billing. CSRs answer about seventy to eighty calls per shift thus, CSRs must possess superior listening skills and the ability to deliver information at the customer’s knowledge level in an understandable manner. They must also have basic computer and keyboard skills, excellent communication skills including a confident and courteous tone of voice, the capability to empathize with the customer, and effectively handle irate customers (Amante 2010).

Despite the promise of this sunshine industry, there are two pressing issues that need to be carefully studied: (1) the hiring ratio of only eight (8) of 100 applicants and (2) the high attrition rate of 57 percent among call center agents according to the Contact Center Association of the Philippines (CCAP).

Phillips and Connell (2003) define “retention” as the percentage of employees remaining in the organization and “turnover” as the percentage of employees leaving the organization for whatever reason(s). Sharp (2003) states that 85 percent of CSRs have personal reasons/choices for leaving, while 15 percent are terminated. Among the top reasons why CSRs resign are career change, problem with the manager, negative stereotyping of their competence and nationality, minimal control of their work schedule, and lack of optimism on how their position can foster growth opportunities. To address these, employees need to be attracted, recognized, and rewarded. Sharp (2003) cites the following motivation factors for call center agents: higher wages, ideal working conditions, challenging work, management appreciation, job security, promotion and career path opportunities, involvement in planning, employer loyalty, tactful human resource policies, coaching and training. According to Gina Hechanova (2009), the intention of leaving the company is usually associated with age, career commitment, burnout, dissatisfaction with pay, boss, and responsibilities, and unfair firm management and promotions.

This research aims to identify, compare and analyze the communication variables that influence job retention of call center agents in Metro Manila and Region 6. A communication variable is a characteristic to which numbers can be assigned (Reinard 2001). It is operationalized in this study as a communication
element which can have two or more values that influence the job retention of call center agents (e.g., “#1 I speak well in the English language” and “#48 I have an effective team leader and supervisor relationship”) with values based on a four-point Likert scale of “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” The independent variables are the ninety-two communication items and the respondents’ age, sex, socioeconomic status, actual employment status (employed or resigned), and length of stay in the company while the dependent variable is their intention of either to stay with or leave the company. Hence, this study hypothesizes that (1) the communication variables and demographic information of the call center agents have a significant relationship in influencing the CSR's intention to stay with the company, and that (2) call center agents in Region 6 have the intention to stay longer with the company than their counterparts in Manila.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

How do communication variables influence job retention of call center agents in Metro Manila and Region 6?

OBJECTIVES

1. To identify the communication variables that influence job retention of call center agents in Metro Manila and Region 6;

2. To compare and analyze the communication variables that influence job retention of call center agents in Metro Manila and Region 6.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The local call center industry continues to generate thousands of jobs with an annual growth rate of 15 percent with an estimated 400,000 people currently hired. By 2016, the Philippine BPO is projected to be a $25 billion industry with 1.3 million employees. (Esguerra and Balana 2010). The local call center industry in particular, aims to provide more employment opportunities to Filipinos. This study contributes to a growing number of studies using a communication framework in addressing the issue on attrition in call centers. The results may serve as recruitment criteria to assess the likelihood of an applicant to stay with or leave a company and may also be used in developing job retention programs in training modules (Jamandre 2008). In addition, academic institutions and the private sector may consider the results in developing curricula and promoting the career of graduates.

While there are researches on occupational health risks, employment issues, and how to generally retain BPO employees, only a few are in-depth studies on job retention in the call center industry, let alone a comparison of retention, between Metro Manila and regional sites. Hence, my study aims to contribute to the local studies on the behavior of the Filipino call center agents and its implications on their work. The study fills in certain gaps in human resource management, occupational psychology, and business and communication research.

RELATED LITERATURE

The BPO in the Philippines started in the 1990s when industries patterned the business models of foreign corporations which were adapted in the Philippine setting. Dubbed as the “sunshine industry” of BPO operations, call centers continue to expand and aggressively attract clients and employees. Job fairs and job advertisements in all forms of media are by BPO firms (Amante 2010).

The call center workforce is comprised of young professionals whose average age is 23 years old and about 80 percent of new hires are fresh college graduates (Villafania 2010). High pay and peer influence are the most common reasons cited for working in BPOs. Male employees whose technical positions are related to Computer Science and Engineering, plan to work longer and earn bigger than their female counterparts.
because of their capability to manage burnout (Jamandr 2008). They are entitled to a number of benefits including night differential pay, commissions, study incentives, allowances, bonuses, and office privileges, like food, coffee, sleeping quarters, recreational facilities and other nonmonetary incentives. As a young workforce, the employees intend to work an average of thirty-three months before they transfer to another company or change professions. They cite the following reasons for leaving: better compensation in other companies, offer of higher position, high intensity of stress of the current job based on metric evaluations, unpleasant customer behavior, strict monitoring, holiday work schedule, occupational safety, emotional and health issues, monotony of the work, and lack of professional growth and employee involvement in management decisions (Amante 2010; as cited in Esguerra and Balana 2010). Barrios and Patawaran (2004) explain that CSRs are “present-oriented,” an attribute of a person who values present outcomes rather than the effects of future events.

Since high attrition rate results in additional expenses for recruiting, hiring and training, industry leaders are optimistic that this trend will decrease and stabilize in the next few years as companies continue to research on turnover factors and effective intervention programs. Such studies will affect recruitment strategies as well. There is even a proposal among BPO companies to adopt a Code of Ethics to address the competition among talents and employee transfers (Amante 2010).

According to Wieters (2007), there is a need to develop a Predictive Index to measure the person-job fit among call center agents wherein the compatibility of the behavioral characteristics of an employee and the “characteristics” of the call center job is measured. In addition, the studies of Gray (2009), Nicholson (2009), Chu (2008), and Ramesh (2007) on organizational commitment and job satisfaction of call center employees show that they are motivated to continue working by (1) positive supervisory relationship, (2) knowledge and contribution of individual role to customer service, (3) teamwork, and (4) organization and family embeddedness (i.e., family proximity and relationship of the individual to the organization and community in the context of organizational fit, link, and sacrifice).

The studies mentioned show the dynamic operations of the BPO particularly in call centers. Because CSRs as frontlines, are an important component in the growth of the industry, this study aims to contribute and strengthen the bases of those aforementioned factors that lead to the job retention of CSR.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study uses the Organizational Assimilation Theory (OAT) by Fred Jablin as framework. Jablin (1987, 755) defines assimilation as “those ongoing behavioral and cognitive processes by which individuals join, become integrated into, and exit organizations.” It becomes a dual process based on socialization and individualization. The former refers to the formal and informal situations when the organization encourages the individual to be accustomed, while the latter refers to the attempts of the individual to alter several facets of the organization to suit his or her needs (as cited in Miller 2006). The theory explains the role of the communication process in intervening with the relationship between the individual and the organization, specifically during the stages of organizational entry, assimilation (i.e., consisting of anticipatory socialization stage, encounter stage, and metamorphosis stage), and the exit processing of employees. Organizational assimilation is made up of

a chain of events, activities, message exchanges, interpretations and related processes—essentially ‘links’—in which individuals use what they have learned in the past to understand new organizational situations and contexts, and as appropriate realign, reshape, reorder, overlap, or fabricate new links so they can better adapt to their own and their organizations’ requirements in the present and future. (Jablin 2001, 759)

The process of assimilation starts during the organizational entry. The three parts of anticipatory socialization are “learning about work in general, learning about a particular occupation, and learning about a particular organization” (Jablin 1987, 684). The first refers to an employee’s early experience in life such as during childhood (ibid.). Jablin (2001) cites the following factors which influence vocational anticipatory
socialization of an individual: (1) the family; (2) educational institutions where students learn about standards and competencies, organizing activities, and reducing anxieties; (3) part-time employment which allows the individual to learn relational communication skills; (4) peers and friends, who can be a source of opinions of the occupation; (5) and media which influence perceptions about occupations. Jablin (ibid.) explains that the organizational anticipatory socialization process of an individual is an attempt to apply for a position for which he or she has been trained. In this stage, the job seeker gathers information which could influence expectations from the organization. The main sources of these information are the organizational literature and interpersonal communication with co-applicants, interviewers, teachers, current employees, and persons in his or her social network. This is the stage where the job seeker undergoes the recruitment process, sets organizational expectations, experiences realistic job previews, selection interview, and enters the preentry period.

Encounter is the second stage of assimilation, where the new employee “learns the normal work patterns and thought patterns of the organization” (Jablin 1987, 693). Jablin (1982) explains that the role of the immediate work group and direct initial superior is to provide key information about the organization: thus, the new employee initially realizes and soon enjoys career benefits on a long term basis. Furthermore, this is the phase where the newcomer first experiences and makes sense of the new organizational culture, and learns to change old ways and principles (as cited in Miller 2006).

The employee experiences the following communication-assimilation processes: (1) written and oral orientation programs, when include introduction to the employee’s handbook and topics about organizational history, mission and policies, work rules and related practices and procedures, and employee benefits and services; (2) socialization strategies among members of the unit and the employee or newcomer; (3) training programs; (4) formal mentoring; (5) informal mentoring, which happens based on mutual agreement and occurs naturally between the mentor and the protégé without the formal assignment and with a goal for positive outcomes; (6) information seeking; (7) information giving; (8) development of relationships among peer and supervisors; (9) and role negotiation, where the goal of the seasoned employee is to change the perspective of the newcomer on how a role should be acted out and assessed (Jablin 2001).

During the metamorphosis stage, the employee tries to adapt to the organizational norms by developing new attitudes or by changing existing ones. The employee likewise looks for possibilities on how the organization can accommodate his or her distinct needs and his or her aspiration to influence the organization (as cited in Cragan and Shields 1998).

Organizational exit and disengagement are also significant in understanding assimilation for demographic, economic, and social reasons; the postmodern business trends of mergers, and acquisitions; and the behavior of people who move regularly and change jobs and companies (as cited in Miller 2006). Jablin (2001) adds the following observations about organizational disengagement: (1) it is a process where employees have already predicted when they would be leaving the organization (i.e., this contrary to the notion that the event was unexpected or unplanned; (2) it is a process involving and affecting both the stayers and leavers; (3) it has effects on the families of the leavers; (4) and communication plays an important role during disengagement because it may serve as a sensemaking resource for an unexpected exit, better role adjustment of the leaver outside the organization and a means to discuss topics openly (Jablin 2001).

Motivation theories explain how an individual is attracted to attain goals. In the context of organizations, these theories try to explain the outcome of the attainment of goals based on the employee behavior. It is observed that there are internal and external factors that influence an employee to behave in a certain manner. For instance, Abraham Maslow’s need hierarchy model defines human needs and assumes that the lowest level needs of the pyramid need to be satisfied first before that of the upper level needs i.e., from basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter, to social and emotional needs, to intellectual needs, and finally to self-esteem and self-actualization needs. On the other hand, Frederick Herzberg proposed the two-factor theory of motivation, which posits that intrinsic factors or motivators lead to job satisfaction. Consequently, the “absence extrinsic factors” described as poor hygiene conditions or job context may lead to dissatisfaction. Commenting on Herzberg’s assumptions, critics have noted to equate the process and dynamics of changing hygiene factors with job satisfaction is an oversimplification. Still, Herzberg’s theory provides a detailed set of job factors that foster a motivational atmosphere in the workplace (as cited in
Gibson et al. 2009). Rensis Likert advances the Four Systems of Management human resources theory to explain a series of four management systems based on the changing profile of employer and employee relations—System I or Exploitative Authoritative, System II or Benevolent Authoritative, System III or Consultative, and System IV or Participative. For Likert, the most beneficial system for the highest level of productivity is Participative because there is “genuine participation in decision making and goal setting, free-flowing communication, full use of every worker’s skills and creative energy, and a high level of responsibility and accountability for the goals of the organization” (as cited in Modaff et al. 2008).

While the motivation and humanistic theories offer a perspective on the different factors which influence behavioral change of an employee, Jablin’s concepts on assimilation provide a comprehensive framework of the stages focusing on communication elements which an employee experiences that may lead to job retention. However, Bullis (1999) and Turner (1999) contend that the concept of “assimilation” negatively connotes how an employee is absorbed or integrated in the organization rather than how s/he experiences socialization and individualization (as cited in Modaff et al. 2008). Kramer and Miller (1999) defend the concept of assimilation where there is an active exchange and a mutual influence between the employee and organization in all the stages of assimilation.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

The study uses quantitative and qualitative methods. The survey is designed to measure the possible relationship of the communication variables to the job retention of call center agents, while the focus group discussion validates the survey results.

RESPONDENTS’ PROFILE

The total respondents is 442: Metro Manila (n = 183, 41.4%) and Region 6 (n = 259, 58.6%). Of the 259 Region 6, 117 are from Bacolod and 142 are from Iloilo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metro Manila</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacolod</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iloilo</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are 166 male respondents and 258 female respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Their socioeconomic status of the respondents are as follows: 18 (Class A), 14 (Class B), 137 (Class C), 202 (Class D), 24 (Class E). This is based on the average monthly household income used by the Social Weather Station (SWS).
Table 3. Socioeconomic Status of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average age of the CSRs is 26.30 years old with a minimum age of 19, and maximum age of 51. The average length of stay in a company is 19 months.

Table 4: Intention and Employment status of CSRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention</th>
<th>Actual status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three hundred seventy-three answered that they will stay with the company while forty-two answered that they plan to leave. The employment status of the 442 respondents were checked after three months—302 remained employed, while fourteen resigned, and sixteen were terminated. There were respondents whose statuses were not verified because some survey forms either had incomplete names or no names at all. Finding out who among the respondents resigned or were terminated is significant in order to determine the relationship of the dependent variable of job retention to the respondents’ intention to stay with or leave the company.

It has been noted that there were survey forms with incomplete information such as age, sex, socioeconomic status, length of stay in the company, and intention to stay with or leave the company. There was no pattern as to why some respondents left some survey items blank. However, it can be inferred that this may have been due to the length of the survey and limited time given to answer the survey which was conducting during work hours. Perhaps some chose to conceal their identity and other personal information while others were uncertain of their monthly household income. Others, may even have forgotten the date when they started working in the company.

COMPANY PROFILE

After sending invitations, letters and making follow-up calls to ten companies for two months, only one agreed to participate. Hence, the results of this case study only apply to this particular company. An agreement of confidentiality was made between the researcher and the company in conducting the survey and the focus group discussion within the company.

The company is a foreign corporation which operates in North and Latin America, Australia, United Kingdom, and the Philippines. Its business line includes sales, marketing, and customer relations management. It began its outsourcing component in the United States in the 1980s and expanded its global operations to eighty-five countries in the 2000s. It is one of the industry leaders in the Philippines employing more than 20,000 Filipinos.

RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Questionnaire
A survey questionnaire composed of communication variables was developed from the related literature and the principles of the Organizational Assimilation Theory (i.e., based on the concepts of preentry perceptions,
personal background, family and peer influence, job expectations, prior knowledge about the company, screening, orientation, training program, actual work, immediate work group, socialization strategies, adjustments, mentoring, information-seeking behavior, role negotiation, work environment, and development of new attitudes (Jamandre 2008). The ninety-two items are speaker-related, message-related, channel-related, receiver-related variables and the principles of Anticipatory Socialization, Encounter Stage, and Metamorphosis Stage of the OAT.

The demographic information of age, sex, socioeconomic status, length of stay, actual employment status, the intention to stay with or leave the company and the 92 communication items, were all treated as variables subject to statistical treatment. Factor analysis was used in deriving the common factors present among the 92 communication variables. The communication variables were then measured using a 4-point Likert scale.

The survey questionnaire was endorsed to and distributed by the Human Capital staff of the company. The survey forms from Region 6 were accomplished on December 2010 while those in Manila, on January 2011. The company has sites in Luzon including Pasay City, Quezon City, Taguig, Rizal, Cavite, Pampanga, Batangas and Laguna. Of its regional sites in Cebu, Dumaguete, Iloilo and Bacolod, only those in Iloilo and Bacolod agreed to participate.

Focus Group Discussion
An exploratory guide based on the survey results, OAT and related literature on selecting, hiring, training, and work experiences of call center agents was developed to address the qualitative part of this study. It aims to provide explanations on the specific processes of assimilation experienced by a call center agent, including orientation, training, workload, socialization, and particularities of the work environment.

Two batches composed of six CSRs from Metro Manila and Region 6 participated in two separate Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) on June 2011.

ANALYSIS OF DATA
Statistical Treatment of Data
The 92 survey items were treated as 92 communication variables which were subjected to factor analysis to determine the common factors that influence job retention of call center agents. Factor analysis is a statistical procedure used to reduce the dimensionality of the data. The large set composed of 92 variables was subjected to factor analysis to create a new set of small number of factors, which are functions of the communication variables. This provided new sets of dimensions that may be used for subsequent analyses of the data. In this study, the 92 variables were reduced to twelve factors based on their interrelationship and values. The complete list is in the Findings and Discussion. For example, these ten survey items or communication variables were associated to a factor, called Communication Skills, based on their interrelationship with one another:

Factor 2 – Communication skills
   #1 I speak well in the English language
   #4 I am capable of handling all types of call problems
   #8 I am fully knowledgeable of the products, sales, and services
   #2 I have a good speaking voice
   #14 I know how to achieve customer service satisfaction
   #15 I understand all forms of call protocols
   #9 I fully understand my job description
   #5 I am a persuasive and accommodating call center agent
   #22 I am competitive and confident of my skills to be promoted
   #40 I project a positive image to foreigner clients
After doing factor analysis, t-test was used to compare the average factor scores for two groups of CSRs, while the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was done to compare the average factor scores when there are more than two groups being observed or compared. The factor scores were used in assessing whether there are significant differences in the 12 Communication Factors with respect to the respondent’s (1) intention to stay with or leave the company, (2) sex, (3) socioeconomic status, and (4) actual employment status. These factor scores were also used to determine the significant correlation of the 12 Communication Factors with (5) age of respondent and (6) length of stay in the company.

Qualitative Analysis of Data
The findings of the FGD were encoded and patterns of the communication variables from the survey that influence job retention were analyzed. From the results of the factor analysis, t-test, and ANOVA, the FGD participants were asked to share their ideas and experiences about the communication variables or 12 factors which had significant relationships with their intention of whether they will stay with or leave the company. They were also asked to comment and add insights on the other reasons why they were influenced to stay with the company. Aside from citing their experiences, they also spoke of those who have left the company.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The 92 communication variables in the survey were subjected to factor analysis, and 12 factors were identified:

- Factor 1 - Ability to adapt and socialization skills
- Factor 2 - Communication skills
- Factor 3 - Acculturation to customers
- Factor 4 - Value for work
- Factor 5 - Company pride and work environment
- Factor 6 - Knowledge about company and nature of work
- Factor 7 - Work attitude and problems
- Factor 8 - Customer handling skills
- Factor 9 - Peer relationship and company goals
- Factor 10 - Customer interaction
- Factor 11 - Peer relationship
- Factor 12 - Company innovation

The following results in Tables 5 and 6 were obtained using t-test and ANOVA. The average factor scores between the groups are declared to be statistically different if the p-value of the test is less than the level of significance of 0.1.

Table 5 shows which among the twelve factors exhibit significant differences in the means of factor scores across intention to stay with the company. It can be seen that the average scores for the factors Company Pride and Work Environment, and Customer Handling Skills significantly differ between those who intend to stay with the company and those who intend to leave. In particular, those who intend to stay exhibit higher scores in the factors than those who intend to leave.

| Table 5: Comparison of Average Scores for the Communication Factors across Intention |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Factors                        | Mean            | Remarks         |
|                                | Stay | Leave |                  |
| 1. Ability to adapt and socialization skills | 0.162 | -0.099 | Not significant |
| 2. Communication skills        | 0.001 | 0.082 | Not significant  |
| 3. Acculturation to customers  | 0.009 | -0.254 | Not significant  |
Table 6 shows the results of the ANOVA in comparing the mean factor scores across three different locations - Metro Manila, Iloilo, and Bacolod. It can be seen that significant differences are observed for the factors named Communication Skills, Company Pride and Work Environment, and Peer Relationship. For Factor 2, Bacolod has a higher mean than Metro Manila and all other pairs do not have significantly different mean scores. For Factors 5 and 11, Iloilo and Bacolod have a higher mean than Metro Manila and all other pairs do not have significantly different mean scores.

Comparisons of mean factor scores across sex, socioeconomic status, and actual employment status were also done. However, there are no significant differences of the mean factor scores found across these variables.

Using correlation analysis, it was discovered that the length of stay of an employee in the company has significant correlation with scores in Factor 2 – Communication skills (0.412), Factor 5 – Company pride and work environment (-0.319) and Factor 8 – Customer handling skills (-0.133). This means that call center
agents who have longer tenure with the company tend to have higher scores in Factor 2 and lower scores in Factors 5 and 8.

There is also a significant relationship between the age of employee and the score in Factor 2 (0.122). This is interpreted as older employees tend to have higher scores in Factor 2.

**QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION**

This study sought to answer how communication variables can possibly influence job retention of CSRs in Metro Manila and Region 6. The first aim is to determine which communication and demographic variables have significant relationships with the intention of the call center agent to either stay with or leave the company. Based on the statistical results, the CSRs’ intention to stay with the company is influenced by their perceived high level of communication skills (Factor 2). CSRs believe that they are effective when they are able to provide customer service satisfaction which also motivates them to continue working and to perform better.

As mentioned earlier, applicants undergo an assessment, evaluating their communication skills. According to the FGD participants, hiring in their company is fair regardless of the applicants’ educational background and previous work experiences. They also acknowledge that the orientation and training were effective, particularly in resolving issues to avoid call backs. According to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) (2005), among the top psychological and work stressors in call centers are (1) unrealistic performance quotas, (2) constant electronic performance monitoring, (3) random taping of phone conversations, and (4) highly fragmented, repetitive, and fast paced workload. However, the CSRs’ assessment of their performances based on Quality Assurance scores and statistics were deemed as fair, reasonable, and accurate. CSRs maintain and develop their quality communication skills based on constant monitoring and continuous training. The Human Capital Director explained that there are feedback mechanisms and enhancement surveys to improve the communication skills of the agents. With these programs, CSRs perceive that their level of communication skills are improved as they are being monitored and assessed by their immediate supervisors with quality assurance standards. The FGD participants explained that they are more knowledgeable, capable, and confident of their English-speaking skills and customer interactions. For the respondents however, the “best training happens on the floor.”

CSRs are also convinced to continue working with the company because they have developed a sense of company pride (Factor 5). In effect, they promote the company to others based on their experiences; they speak of their entitlements and healthy work environment. Based on the FGD, the respondents said that they are proud to be working as call center agents because people perceive them to be capable and intelligent English communicators. When people ask them about their work, they confidently and willingly share details of their experiences and dispel the misconceptions regarding their lives as agents.

CSRs value working in the company because of the favorable rules and regulations. A male FGD participant claimed that many CSRs highly value the medical and health benefits, flexible policies, allowances, office amenities, referral programs, rewards and recognition programs, work-life balance, and professional growth. A Human Capital staff explained that employees are entitled to top technological support, dynamic employee communications, and academic advancement. She added that the company offers leadership training to those interested and qualified to “career path mobility” as team leaders, quality analysts, senior or operations manager, among others. As one CSR said, “getting in and staying with the company is a privilege.” These imply that the CSRs are knowledgeable of and satisfied with the company policies and the workplace. In addition, these imply that their motivation to stay with the company is based on their positive experiences of how the company accommodates their needs in developing their skills and being listened to by management. Thus, they promote the company to family and friends.

Another factor that influences CSRs to stay is their improved customer handling skills (Factor 8). Angry and rude clients (Amante 2010; DOLE 2005) are among the top organization stressors in call centers. Although this is difficult and stressful to new hirees, the tenured employees became more patient and confident in dealing with different kinds of customers, especially the irate ones, as they get accustomed to the common concerns and behaviors of callers. The FGD participants added that alongside the challenging phase
of graveyard shift at the start, they eventually master the skills of customer interaction in efficiently resolving customer concerns. They become experts in providing quality customer service given their actual experiences. It appears that the stress of handling difficult customers become manageable over time, thereby motivating the CSRs to perform even better. As a result, they value positive customer feedback when they receive commendations from satisfied clients. Amante (2010) stresses that CSRs must possess strong mental and emotional skills in dealing with diverse and difficult customers who may curse, insult, ramble, or engage in an unintelligible transaction. Working in a call center then becomes easier and manageable for the CSRs. A female FGD participant said that challenging experiences taught her to become a more polite, honest, and considerate customer as well.

Given that there is a significant relationship between Factors 2, 5, and 8 and the length of stay of employees, it is expected that the seasoned CSRs are top performers or experts in their communication and customer handling skills, hence, they consider their work an “easy job” which makes them stay longer. For one female CSR, “self-esteem is just a bonus” in knowing that she performs well and contributes to the success of her work, her team, and the company. The results subscribe to the ideas of Philips and Connell (2003) that employees are motivated if they do challenging work, have autonomy, flexibility, recognition, rewards, growth, compensation, and a supportive and balanced (i.e., positive organizational culture, equitable in decision making and employee welfare) working environment. The CSRs believe that they have stayed and will stay longer in the company as long as they are trained well, have opportunities for promotion, consistently attain customer satisfaction, experience belongingness, and receive competitive compensation.

The fourth factor in convincing CSRs to stay with the company is their positive peer relationship (Factor 11). The CSRs believe that there is an open communication system among superior-subordinate and peer-coworker interactions. The FGD participants described their immediate supervisors or team leaders as accommodating and encouraging. They believe that the role of the team leader is crucial in motivating his or her members to perform well, individually and as group members to meet the target goals. Having an effective leader is significant to job satisfaction (Chu 2008). Amante (2010) claims that the young BPO workforce expects more guidance from their managers. The FGD participants in both Metro Manila and Region 6 unanimously agreed that there is teamwork and a sense of family with their peers in their accounts. As Filipinos are part of a “collectivistic culture” similar to that of India, the concept of “family embeddedness” influences job retention of call center agents (Ramesh 2007). CSRs believe that socialization in a group in the workplace makes them feel “bonded.” In order to succeed as a team, CSRs value their overall group performance for the welfare and benefit of everybody in the team. They believe that they stay in the company because they treat their officemates as family who need the support each other. Hence, their wavemates or peers engage in team building activities and socialize even beyond the confines of the office in order to build relationships.

On the other hand, the FGD participants clarified that the pay is not the main motivator for staying because compared to other call centers, they actually receive a mid-range salary. However, aside from not feeling “overused,” they appreciate the wide range of benefits and the total comprehensive package of benefits given by the company.

For the second aim of this study, which is to compare the job retention factors between Metro Manila and Region 6, it appears that it is the cheaper cost of living in Region 6 which has resulted in its higher mean score compared to that of the Metro Manila. A female FGD participant compared her experience of working in Metro Manila and Cebu. She said that if given the chance, she prefers to work in Cebu because her family is in Cebu and it is more costly to work in Metro Manila than in Cebu. These are the same sentiments of the Region 6 respondents. In addition, the FGD participants also compared their compensation in the call center compared with banks and hospitals and other office-related jobs in Region 6 and still find the call center work more financially rewarding. The FGD participants in Metro Manila echoed the same sentiment: living in Metro Manila is expensive compared to living in the province. On the other hand, a male FGD participant shared that in a training held for a new site, Region 6 employees were more “bonded” and were more predisposed to helping each other compared to their Metro Manila counterparts.

The FGD participants also gave insights on attrition in call centers. They said that their colleagues resigned or were terminated because of their poor relationship with supervisors. Some had better offers in
another company or even transferred to a non-call center industry. Others wanted a change in lifestyle considering the health problems related to their work, frequent customer escalations or call avoidance. There were likewise instances of job mismatch, no long term plans on the part of the agents and lack of commitment which often resulted in poor performance. There were a number of agents who pursued higher studies. To address these, Hechanova (2009) suggests the following: (1) effective rewards system, (2) development of a “fun” atmosphere and well being programs, (3) right fit for the person and the job, (4) job designs (i.e., the process of creating the content and systems of jobs to satisfy the needs of the organization and the employee), (5) continuous growth for the agents, and (6) quality leadership. These suggestions by Hechanova and the results of the study complement each other in giving insights on job retention of CSRs. By looking into the CSRs’ communication skills development, the dynamics of customer interaction, and by instilling a sense of company pride and fostering a positive employee-supervisor relationship, more CSRs may be convinced to stay with the company.

CONCLUSION

The results show that the communication factors that appear to influence job retention of CSRs are their length of stay and the perceived development in their individual and interpersonal relationships with their customers and co-workers. How the organization encourages these developments is likewise important in convincing the CSRs to stay. The CSRs are convinced that staying with the company for a long period means that they have fully adjusted and adapted to the nature of their work and internal and external workplace dynamics.

This study contributes to the knowledge on job retention and organizational communication which BPOs should look into when creating their training and retraining programs which focus on enhancing the call center agents’ interpersonal communication skills to help address the issue of attrition in call centers. Based on the results, it is during the assimilation stage when a CSR is convinced to stay. Factors such as communication skills, company pride, customer handling skills, and peer relationship refer to interpersonal skills developed during the encounter stage of organizational assimilation. While a job seeker sets positive perception and expectation during the recruitment stage, selection interview, and preentry period, it is during the assimilation stage where a CSR fully realizes and values his potential and opportunities to continue working in the company. Respondents who have decided to stay and intend to stay longer in the company are further motivated based on their perceived communication competence, effective training programs, formal and informal mentoring, satisfying customer relations, acceptance and exchange of information seeking behaviors, and the positive development of their relationships as colleagues.

Therefore, the socialization and individualization efforts of the CSR during the encounter stage of assimilation influence job retention. BPO companies, particularly call centers, may then consider these findings for their job retention programs. The employed and potential CSRs could also be given a better understanding of their careers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the potential of communication research together with other disciplines such as Business, Psychology, and Labor Management in the emerging Philippine BPO industry, scholars are encouraged to look into other organizational dynamics of different kinds of local and international call centers and into other BPO industries such as back office services and finance. Future studies may improve on the number of sample respondents and include more regional sites. It is also interesting to compare communication variables with additional demographic information and job retention data across all company rank and positions.
REFERENCES


SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASEAN: ROLE OF EDUCATION IN POVERTY REDUCTION

The Ngu Wah Lwin (Sueni)
Faculty of Economics and Administration
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
ms.sueni@siswa.um.edu.my

ABSTRACT

After the global recession of 2008 which called for a wake of social development worldwide, the matter of poverty reduction has become the most controversial issue. Of those needs to reconsider for social development, the role of education is highlighted as one of the best ways to reduce poverty effectively in long term as education becomes the core of sustainable growth for enhancing human capital and their knowledge infrastructure. Particularly in ASEAN regions, the declaration of ASEAN Vision 2020 put all nations together to step forward by working together in partnership for dynamic development. Subsequently to do so, the diverse response of the governments to education for poverty reduction, however, results into the different levels of sustainable social and capacity development. Therefore, this paper tries to have an analytical look at the impact and role of education in the process of poverty reduction in the important field of social development by comparative studies in Southeast Asia nations. The main purpose of this paper is to compare, contrast and argue the challenges and effectiveness of promoting role of education in poverty reduction by critically looking at the policy, implementation and institutions of the governments regarding to this matter.

Keywords: Social Development, Education, Poverty Reduction, ASEAN Regions

INTRODUCTION

After the global recession of 2008 which called for a wake of social development in worldwide, the matter of poverty reduction has become the most controversial issue. The growing studies on poverty reduction stress to overcome the challenges through lifting economic sectors for the whole particular nations, creating more skills for the people. For instance, the First United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006) was declared in December 1996 after the General Assembly with the theme for the Decade as a whole to be “Eradicating poverty is an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind.” (1) Of those needs to address to erase poverty to a certain extent over a period of time, how to enhance social development by the governments challenges the effective level of the implementation of the certain policies in this regard. Since economic and social development cannot position separately, yet need to be carried out in tandem, to achieve development targets, poverty reduction is part of economic as well as social development. At this point, economic development plays as a means where human and social development is the fundamental goal in the betterment and improvement of people’s lives for long term and large-scale poverty eradication. (2)

As part of social development, the role of education is highlighted as one of the best ways to reduce poverty effectively in long term as education becomes the core of sustainable growth for enhancing human capital and their knowledge infrastructure. Because education plays the main role not only to wealth creation but also in combating poverty, the role of education in poverty reduction cooperate closely with other social sectors. (3) Particularly in ASEAN regions, the declaration of ASEAN Vision 2020 put all nations together to step forward by working together in partnership for dynamic development. By learning the past experience from 1997 financial crisis and its consequences in the region, the crisis itself led the nations to concentrate and pay more attention on micro economic issues, education and human capital development, the patterns of
education policies and the implementation in order to establish a better foundation for the macro policy settings meant to build firmly the growing market economies in the region. (4) One of the significant step forward together of the nations can be seen the declaration of the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) which initiated the series of “road maps” guiding the region’s journey to ASEAN Vision 2020. Some of the work of HPA can be evaluated in forms of strategies for attaining the defined vision, the translating of the planned policies into the appropriate strategies and directions for governance. (5) Along with the implementation of HPA, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009 – 2015) was declared for more effectiveness of the future works of the nations especially after 2008 global financial crisis. Based on ASEAN Vision 2020 to establish an ASEAN Community (“Community of caring societies, living in peace and bonding together in partnership in dynamic development”), the diverse responses of the governments to the social development and particularly to the role of education for poverty reduction have resulted into the different levels of sustainable social and capacity development despite focusing on the social dimension of bridging the development gap among Member States. (6, 7)

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1. To explore the vision or mission of the ASEAN
2. To examine how the ASEAN is trying to focus on the role of education when combating poverty alleviation
3. To recommend the possible solutions to overcome this problem

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the vision or mission of the ASEAN?
2. How is the problem of poverty associated with education?
3. What are the effective changes to enhance the role of education to combat poverty by the governments after global recession in 2008?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study focuses only on the changes or patterns of the implementation of the ASEAN Vision 2020 after global crisis in 2008. Secondly, there are many ways suggested and implemented to combat the poverty and rural development in order to narrow the development gap in the Member States, this paper mainly emphasizes on the role of education in the process of poverty eradication.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

One of the significance of this study is to investigate how ASEAN nations are trying to achieve their ASEAN Vision 2020 even after the global crisis in 2008. As the poverty reduction becomes the urgent case to solve for social development, rural development and to narrow the development gap in the region, this study highlights the essential role of education to address the problem for long-term sustainable benefits of the peoples. And this study covers the nations where the updated data are available.

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Since this paper tries to address the challenges and effectiveness of promoting the role of education in poverty reduction for social development in ASEAN nations after the global recession of 2008, updated data from the secondary sources are not available yet for all nations.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This review of the literature on the concept of human capital would point to two fundamental problems with how this concept is employed. The first thing is how human capital can be built for the long term gain of the people in terms of education and poverty alleviation. The second point to investigate is how the ASEAN nations facilitate to address the problem of poverty and direct causality of education on poverty reduction by setting common vision, policy and implementation especially the global recession of 2008 afterwards.

The research methodology adopted here to investigate the challenges and effectiveness of promoting the role of education in poverty reduction is by analyzing the common policy, implementation and institutions of the nations to address this matter from the secondary data. First of all, this paper discusses the background of the study, the problem statement of this study and the comparative studies of other scholars in this area. The study utilizes the Explanatory Approach – to find out the factors influencing or impeding effectiveness of the implementation of the common vision to achieve in 2020. The data sources and collection process used in this study is quantitative type of data collection method where sources to gather information and data of and related to this study are from extensively from the publication and reports of such as ASEAN Secretariat, UNDP (United Nations Development Program) and WB (World Bank).

LITERATURE REVIEW: THE PROBLEM WITH POVERTY REDUCTION AND ROLE OF EDUCATION

A growing literature and studies on how to deal with poverty reduction stress how crucial role of education to play effectively. This paper argues the challenges and effectiveness of promoting role of education in poverty reduction by critically looking at the policy, implementation and institutions of the Member States while knowing the vital role of education for the people.

Concept of human capital theory deals with the important role of education which creates skills and opportunities to facilitate and grasp higher levels of productivity and quality of life amongst those who possess in comparison with those who do not, as education comes along with the associated benefits despite its cost to invest (8). By taking the assumption that formal education is highly instrumental in improving the production human capacity of a population (9), Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1997) also emphasizes the essential of human capital that (10):

Human resources constitute the ultimate basis of wealth of nations. Capital and natural resources are passive factors of production, human beings are the active agencies who accumulate capital, exploit natural resources, build social, economic and political organization, and carry forward national development. (p.102)

Moreover, some claim education as an economic good which needs to be apportioned regardless of the status of the people in a nation. By acting as both consumer and capital good, education provides utility to a consumer as well as plays in the role of input for better production of other goods and services, subsequently for economic and social transformation through the development of human resource infrastructure. In other words, the development of skills is resulted into an important factor in production stages from the concerning on education as a capital good for long term purpose. It is largely agreed that education generates improved and skilled citizens and assists to enhance the general standard of living in a society in long run from various aspects such as literacy rate, the level of income, by producing the positive social change. The faith that education can create the qualitative citizenry and promote economic growth has led to increasing the heavy investment in education sector in many developed and developing countries. (11)

At this point, the human capital theorist, Balalola (2003) argues the rationality behind investment in human capital by highlighting three points: the new generation are entitled to receive the appropriate parts of the knowledge of the previous generations, the new generation are entitled to develop new products by looking at the existing knowledge, and the people should be given full support to develop entirely new ideas,
products, methods, processes through innovative approaches. (12) Therefore, the level of education is particularly important especially for the poor to assist for their future achievements as well as to break the cycle of poverty. In fact, education is the only social institution which can reach and spread the largest segment of the population through a systematic learning process. In other words, large public expenditure on education should be invested for sustainability in both developed and developing nations. (3, 13)

While human capital theory pays attention to the links between education and its role for poverty reduction, the enrolment to get education, to a certain extent, is likely to relate directly with the effect of macro- and micro-level GNP. (14) Despite knowing the effectiveness of investment in education sector for poverty reduction, the financing and the affordability of education for the poor can hamper unless the support from the government financing to access education. (15) For instance, many poor families bumped by the economic downturn have a high tendency to remove their children from school and push them into work since their early age. Young children who once withdrawal from the school to work are in turn likely to never return the school for their future education since their parents are not able to afford enrolment fees, books or uniforms, even the economic downturn swayed. (16)

At this point, the relationship between education and poverty can be assumed that investment in education can enhance the skills and productivity of the people especially among the poor as education is the best way to combat poverty, in contrast, poverty can hinder the poor from educational achievement both at micro-level (poor countries consequently have lower levels of enrolment) and micro-level (children of the poor receive less education) not only in the developed but also in developing countries. Therefore, the causality between poverty and education relationship has two ways of flowing: poverty acts as a factor hindering people from getting access to education while educated people are regarded to be at less risk of poverty. For example, each year of primary enrolment and schooling is directly related with a 2.5 percent drop in the risk of poverty, and that lower secondary level of schooling has approximately twice this effect in Uganda. (15, 17) According to World Bank (1995) also, education – especially basic (primary and lower-secondary) education – helps eradicate poverty by improving the productivity of the poor, by lessening fertility and enhancing health, and by equipping people with the skills needed for the betterment of society and economy in long run. (18)

However, some scholars argue that the implication of human capital theory does not fully benefit when the proportions of people who have invested many years and huge amount of money in order to get advanced formal educational qualifications grow whilst there is not enough commensurate jobs. Consequently, the problems such as underemployment and unemployment of those educated people can occur in the nations. (19) Despite those counter-productive concerns, in the context of ASEAN nations, the role of education in the process engendering the necessary social capital and knowledge infrastructure develops the civic-minded people with a sense of belonging in the region. By leveraging in the context of micro-economic programs for social development, the adoption of systemic changes to break the poverty cycle for the poor and the children, and to ensure good quality education to obtain is effective to provide long term benefits. Not only the effort of the government but also the contribution of schools, communities, non-government organizations, missionary groups can provide the education of poor children along with education for health care, income generating activities and counseling services. Unlike other national strategies, the impact of education on poverty reduction seems to be less direct. Therefore, the specific planning of educational services is needed to tackle the problem of poverty and ensure the education system for the poor children and for creation of wealth in future. At this point, the conducting of the ‘state’ of the poor (such as family situation, living conditions, reasons for poverty) should be done for the appropriate support to reach them in order to achieve at school, to encourage them by improving their awareness of their rights and responsibilities, abilities, and to increase their skills, self-confidence for their own future lives. (3)

In the context of ASEAN, the spirit of “ASEAN Help- ASEAN” lies as a common ground to address the problem of poverty and rural development in order to narrow the development gap in the region. (20) By promoting ASEAN awareness, gaining advantages, contributing the ASEAN Community building process and providing quality education for the benefits of peoples, the ASEAN countries share a vision of a community of caring societies to position in the globalized world in order to remain important in the modern world. (3, 5)
RESULTS

Due to the unavailable information and data from all nations related to address educational role to reduce poverty which may negatively result and increase due to the global crisis of 2008, only the effort trends of some nations will be analyzed. According to the report of the Development and State of the Art of Adult Learning and Education (ALE) of Thailand, the operation goals for the period of Basic Education 2007 – 2016 targets to get “access of all school-aged children to 12 years of basic education, equal access and opportunities of all Thais to quality education services, increase level of education of the workforce to at least lower secondary education level, provide opportunities of all Thais to enroll in and complete twelve years of education.” Furthermore, the Ministry of Education plans to promote and support the non-formal and informal education by recognizing the significances of concerned parties in terms of their roles and duties. (21)

As the effort of the Philippines according to the report of the Philippine Education for All 2015: Implementation and Challenges, the EFA (Education For All) 2015 National Action Plan themed “Functionally Literate Filipinos, An Educated Nation,” concentrating on the channels of learning through educational opportunities which can become effective conduits of values orientation, consciousness and information useful and relevant to a wide range of social goals; overarching framework for basic education. Moreover, the MTPDP (Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, 2004-2010) is the country’s mechanism for growth and development and for breaking the various cycle of poverty, with the literacy targets to achieve 91.06%, 2015 91.26% between 2010 and 2015 for those who are between 15 and 29 years old. (22)

In Cambodia, the national plan “Education for All” in 2015 and 2009-2013 Education Strategic Plan (ESP) the government set the policy and implemented such as providing breakfast and scholarship programs for poor and gifted students. (23) In Malaysia as well, 10th Malaysia Plan targets to “improve access to and quality of education by providing special consideration to the bottom 40% households for placements in boarding schools, matriculation, universities and scholarship, to benefit all ethnicities, by providing hostels to assist rural children in attending better schools in urban areas. (24) In Singapore, the Education Fund was distributed to advance Education in Singapore according to the report of Financial Year 2008 – 2009 such as helping financially needy students, funding for the publication of cyber-wellness guidebooks. (25)

After examining the implementation of the above-mentioned nations’ education policy, this paper will proceed to the report of the international organizations. First of all, the growth rate of GDP of the ASEAN nations can be seen as shown in Table 4.1 (26). To compare with before and after the global crisis, the growth rate of Singapore fell down significantly from 8.5% to 1.8%. Vietnam also dropped 8.5% to 6.3%. To look at the growth rate difference between 2008 and 2009, Singapore kept falling down until -1.3%, Malaysia from 4.7% to -1.7%, Thailand negatively dropped down from 2.5% to -2.2%. Indonesia, which is the largest population in the ASEAN region, also decreased from 6.3% in 2007, 6.0% in 2008 to 4.5% in 2009. Cambodia fell the rate of growth from 10.2% in 2007, 6.7% in 2008 to -2.0% in 2009. It was estimated to increase GDP growth rate of all nations gradually in the year of 2010. For instance, Singapore is likely to increase the growth rate from -1.3% in 2009 to 14.0% in 2010 and 5.0% in 2011. To look at Malaysia growth rate, it was estimated to improve from -1.7% in 2009 to 6.8% in 2010 and likely to maintain the growth at the rate of 5.0% in 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ADO</td>
<td>Update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Growth Rate of GDP (% per year)
After looking at the annual growth rate of GDP of the ASEAN nations, HDI (Human Development Index) can be seen in Table 4.2 (27). In general, it can be seen that development of all nations remained same in all years from 2008 to 2010; where HDI value 10 is regarded as fully developed and 0 is as least developed indication of HDI. However, Indonesia tended to improve the human development 0.588 in 2008, 0.983 in 2009 to 0.6000 (ranking 108) despite the downturn of global crisis. Vietnam also seemed to increase the index value from 0.560 in 2008 to 0.572 in 2010 (ranking 113). To look at the rank of Human Development Index in 2010, Singapore has the highest rank of HDI among the ASEAN nations. Brunei follows in second place (ranking 37), and Malaysia is in the third highest rank of HDI in 2010. In contrast, Myanmar is the lowest rank of HDI (ranking 132) to compare with other all ASEAN nations. Cambodia falls into the second lowest rank of HDI (ranking 124) in 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Human Development Indicators, 2011
(HDI Value: automatic calculated based on data from UNDESA (2009d), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2010b), World Bank (2010b) and IMF (2010a)

Along with the exploration of the growth rate of GDP and HDI value of all ASEAN nations, HPI (Human Poverty Index) can be seen as shown in Table 4.3 (28); where the higher ranking value of HPI indicates the poorer the country condition. According to the data from Human Development Report, UNDP (2009), Myanmar has 138 ranking with the value of 20.4. In other words, Myanmar is in the highest rank in Human Poverty Index in 2007. Secondly, Cambodia falls in ranking 137 with HPI value of 27.7. Despite having the largest population in the region, Indonesia was ranked only at 111 with the HPI value of 17.0. Singapore can be seen as the least poor nation in ASEAN with the ranking of 23 and HPI value at 3.9 only. Malaysia is the second least poor nation as the ranking was 66 with HPI value at 6.1.
Table 3: Human Poverty Index (HPI – 1), 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>HPI - 1</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Development Report, UNDP, 2009

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

According to the results of the study, there are more future meetings, plans and policies of the ASEAN nations for the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than the acceleration of the effective implementation of the policies for education progress in order to encourage the poverty alleviation for the benefits of the peoples in the nations. However, according to the results of the available data by the time of this study, each nation tries to enhance the living standard of the peoples by encouraging and supporting their education effectively. For instance, Thailand makes sure all children are educated at least of basic education by improving the level of education of the workforce to be at least lower secondary education level. By forcing so, all children at the moment are more likely to go to school for the sake of their future employment. Another example can be seen in the case of the Philippine Education program in Philippine. The EFA (Education for All) shapes the future of the Philippine as an educated nation. Moreover, targeting those who are between 15 and 29 years old to become educated over 90% of those age population, according to the MTPDP indicates that the government has great concerns enhancing the education level of the youngsters or the youth. The effort of the government of Cambodia also states the overall climate and regulations of the national planning for long term. The 10th Malaysia Plan also shows the intended effort of the government for the educational progress within five years of national plan to make sure 40% household who are at the bottom line of the society educated. However, to compare with other national plan to enhance such as economic sectors, the effort on this educational sector concerns is too little. In Singapore, the poverty reduction is likely to be less concerned as the nation is ranked at least HPI list in the ASEAN region.

In term of the data evaluation from the results we discussed earlier, it can be seen that the growth rate of GDP of the nations is directly associated with the global economic downturn or booms. For example, the growth rate of Singapore can be seen a significant drop in Table 4.1; 8.5% of GDP growth rate in 2007 dropped to 1.8% in 2008 and continuously decreased until the following year, -1.3% in 2009. And in the case of Thailand also, it can be seen that the growth rate of GDP fell from 4.9% in 2007, 2.5% in 2008 to -.2.2% in 2009.

From the dimension of Human Development Index (see in Table 4.2), all nations of the ASEAN seem to improve gradually and yearly. For instance, even Myanmar which is in the least HDI among the ASEAN nations, HDI value increased slightly every year; from 0.438 in 2008, 0.444 in 2009 to 0.451 in 2010. Likewise, Singapore which is in the highest rank of HDI value also improved the value of HDI yearly; from 0.839 in 2008, 0.841 in 2009 to 0.846 in 2010 and likely to improve in the following year as well.
According to the Table 4.3, Myanmar is again the highest rank of Human Poverty Index among the ASEAN nations. However, there is no an updated report or data about the nation how to set the policies and implement to encourage the role of the citizens to exist from the poverty.

**SUGGESTED RECOMMENDATIONS**

After analyzing the parts of policy and implementation of the ASEAN governments how each nation promote the role of education in poverty alleviation for long term social development, the following suggested recommendations can be given:

- To enhance the human capacity effectively, the governments should listen to the voice from the public also, just rather than taking the leading role alone.
- Especially those who are poor and marginal are more likely to be affected and suffered from the wave of global crisis, the government should put more emphasize on them with a sense of belongingness in the nations regardless of their ethnicities, level of income and education.
- Even though education progress direction is varied from each other, the governments should have more emphasized on the achievable and targeted outcomes rather than just setting the policies and counting the activities subsequently.

**REFERENCES**

16. Lim GT. What can ASEAN do to address rising poverty levels and social unrest. CPI Writings 2009.
27. International Human Development Indicators, 2011.
THEME TEN

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
THE ŚAILENDRAS REEXAMINED

Anton O. Zakharov
Institute of Oriental Studies
Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
antonzkhrv@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the ancient history of Java, Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, namely the role of the Śailendra dynasty. It analyses the main sources mentioning this clan, i.e. Central Javanese and Indian inscriptions, and contemporary debates on the number of dynasties on Central Java in the eighth – ninth centuries and the relations between the Śailendras and Srivijaya. There are three main questions: What role did the Śailendras play in Central Java; what were their relations with Srivijaya; what was the origin of this dynasty.

The paper argues that the dynasty of Śailendras was of Javanese origin and the first ruler who claimed to be a Śailendra was Panankarana. In fact, there was no difference between so-called ‘Saṅjaya dynasty’ and the Śailendras. During the reign of Panankarana Central Javanese polity subdued Śrivijaya in Southeast Sumatra but we do not know how it occurred. The expansion of Panankarana reached the Malay Peninsula where he left the famous inscription from Chaiya (also known as the Ligor stele). In the ninth century, however, there were other dynasties in Java: that of Pu Kumbhayoni of Walaing and, perhaps, that of Śrī Kahulunan of bhūmi sambhāra “Country of Sambhāra”. The relatives of the Śailendras also held sway over Kedah in Malaysia in the later tenth – early eleventh centuries.

Keywords: Sailendras, Central Java, Sanjaya, Srivijaya

INTRODUCTION

The Śailendras (‘lords of mountains’) is one of the most enigmatic dynasties in the world history. They appear in a handful of sources in various places and times and disappear almost in a moment. The first reference to them can be found in the famous Chaiya inscription (also known as the Ligor Stele) dated from 775 CE and the last is in the Small Leiden Chart of the Chola king Kulottunga dated from 1089–1090 CE. The Chaiya inscription also mentions equally famous polity of Srivijaya and it raises the question of relations between the Śailendras and this realm. This paper will focus on the three main questions: What role did the Śailendras play in Central Java from which majority of their inscriptions comes; what were their relations with Srivijaya; what was the origin of the dynasty.

SOURCES

In Central Java the Śailendras are mentioned in the four inscriptions. The first and, in a certain degree, most informative is the stone of Kalasan dated from 778 CE and found on the plains of Prambanan. It is written in Sanskrit by the script ‘early Nāgarī’. Due to its importance I cite it in its entirety:

Namo bhagavatyai āryatārāyai ||

(1) Yā tārayatamitadukhhabhāvāḍhimagānaṁ lokāṁ vilokya vidhiattrividhairu[2]payaiḥ |
saḥ vaḥ surendranaralokāvibhūtisāraṁ tārā diśātvabhimaṇaṁ jagadekatārā ||
(2) āvarjya mahārājaṁ dyāḥ paṁca[3]paṁca panāṁ panāṁkaraṇaṁ ||
śailendrarājagurubhistārābhavanaṁ hi kāritaṁ śrīmat ||
(3) gurväññayā kṛṭajñaiśtārādevī[4]kṛṭapi tadbhavanaṁ |
vinayamahāñnavidāṁ bhavaṁṛ cāpyāryabhikṣaṇām ||
(4) pangkuratavānattrīra[5]nāmabhārīdaśaśaubhirāñśaḥ |
tārābhavanaṁ kāritaṁmaipā cāpyāryabhikṣaṇām ||
(5) rājye pravarddhamā[6]rne rājñā śailendravānāṁatikasya |
sādhabhiṣākṣābhivaṁ kṛtaṁ kṛtibhiḥ ||
(6) sākanṛpākālātītai[7]vṛśasātaiṁh sātambahīrmahārājaḥ |
akaṇḍgrupājuṁrāṅ ṭaṁ śailendravānāṁ paṇjanmaṁrahaṁ ||
(7) grāmahī kālasanē[8]dattaṁ samghāya sākṣīnaḥ kṛtvā |
pangkuratavānattrīraedesādhyakṣaṁ mahāpuruṣaṁ ||
(8) bhurada[9]ksīnymat atulā dattā saṁghāya rājasīnaṁ |
sālendravānāśabhipair anuparipāyārasantaṁyā ||
(9) [10] sang pangkurādibhiṁhī saṁtvānākādibhiṁ |
sang jiripādibhiṁhī pattibhiṁca sādhubhiḥ || api ca ||
(10) [11] sarvāvēvaṁgaṁnaṁ pāṛthivendraṁ bhūyo bhūyo yācata rājasīnaḥ |
saṁmānvaṁdharmamasturnaṁ[12]rāṉāṁ kāle kāle pālaṇṇaṁ bhavadhūḥ ||
(11) anena punyena vihāraraṁphaṁṛīya jāṁravyaḥbhīṁgaṁ[13]jīnaḥ |
bhavantu sarve tribhavopapannā janā jijnānāmanuṣaṁsanajīnaḥ ||
(12) kāriyāna paṇjanmaṁrahaṁ śrī[14]mānabhiyācate bhāvinṛpān |
bhūyo bhūyo vidhivadvīhāraparipālaṁrāthamiti || (Sarkar 1971:35–6)

This can be translated as follows (Sarkar 1971:37–8, with few corrections given below):

‘Salutation to the divine Āryatārā! (1) May she, who, seeing the world immersed in the sea of existence, duly delivers it through the three means, may she, Tārā, the only guiding-star of the world, grant you (your) pleasure (consisting of) the best part of the wealth of the celestial and the mundane worlds. (2) After persuading the great king dyāḥ Pañcaṇa Paṇjanmaṁrahaṁ, the splendid temple of Tārā was caused to be built by the preceptors of the Śailendra-king. (3) By experts, at the command of the preceptors, were made (the image of) the goddess Tārā and a temple for her; so also was made an abode for the venerable monks who knew the Great Vehicle of Discipline. (4) By the executors of orders (adesāsastrīn)1 of the king named pangkur, tavān, and tīrip, this temple of Tārā as also (the abode) of the venerable monks were caused to be built. (5) As the king of the king who is an ornament of the Śailendra dynasty was flourishing, the Tārā-temple was constructed by the accomplished preceptors of the Śailendra-king. (6) When seven centuries of the era of the śaka king had elapsed, the great king Paṇjanmaṁrahaṁ2 built the Tārā-temple for the worship of (his) preceptors.3

(7) The village named Kālasa was bestowed on the congregation, after calling as witnesses the notable persons such as pangkur, tavān, tīrip and the chiefs of country (desādhyakṣaṁ).4 By the lion of kings was also bestowed on the congregation this incomparable gift in ample measure which is to be protected by kings of the Śailendra-dynasty, by the nobility, (9) by pangkur and his followers, by tavān and his followers, tīrip and his followers, masters (patī)5 and sages (sādhubhiḥ)6. (10) The

1 The compound adesāsastrīn was not translated by Himanshu Bhusan Sarkar but Johannes Gysbertus De Casparis wrote that ‘it literally means “those carrying orders as (though they were) knives”’ (1986:59). The compound consists of the two words adesā ‘order’ and sastrīn ‘having weapons, bearing arms, armed with a sword’ (Monier-Williams 1899:1061; Böhtlingk 1879:171). I suppose the compound may be understood as (who) is an instrument of (executing) an order.
2 I omitted Sarkar’s addition rākryan as the text looks clear.
3 Sarkar’s addition ‘to the deity’ was omitted as unforced.
4 Sarkar translates desādhyakṣaṁ as ‘headmen of villages’ following one of the meanings of the word desā in Old Javanese (Zoetmulder 1982:393) but the inscription is written in Sanskrit, and the meaning here is partially misleading.
5 Sarkar leaves the Sanskrit term patī without translation due to its polysemy. But the meaning ‘master’ is known both in Sanskrit and Old Javanese (Monier-Williams 1899:582; Zoetmulder 1982:1322).
6 Sarkar writes ‘all religious persons (for all ages)’. The word sādhu denotes ‘a holy man, saint, sage’ in Sanskrit and Old Javanese (Monier-Williams 1899:1201; Zoetmulder 1982:1589).
lion of kings again and again makes this request to all the future kings, “this bridge of religion” which is in common property of (all) men should be protected by you at all times. (11) Through the merit accruing from (the construction of) the vihāra may all people who are subject to the three forms of existence and who are proficient in the teachings of the Jīna obtain a (true) insight into the division of things originating from this chain of causation, for good rebirth (jātārtha)7. (12) The illustrious kariyāna Panāṃkaraṇa again and again requests the future kings to maintain the vihāra in a proper way.

The most debatable point in the interpretation of the Kalasan inscription is the number of kings it mentions. Was Panāṃkaraṇa a member of the Śailendra-dynasty, or not? Nikolaas Krom and K.A. Nilakanta Sastri believed he was whereas Jean-Philippe Vogel and Frits Herman Van Naerssen held he was not8. Vogel and Van Naerssen supposed that the text mentions the two kings, one of whom was a Śailendra and suzerain while another was his vassal and was named Panāṃkaraṇa. Such scholars as Georges Cœdès and Roy E. Jordaan share this opinion9. But the hypothesis of two kings seems unfounded: first, why the suzerain is called simply ‘king’ (rājan) while his vassal claims to be ‘great king’ (mahārāja); second, why the name of suzerain does not occur as well as the lineage of his vassal? Using the rule of Ockham, the simplest answer is that there was the only king who was called dyāh Paṅcaṇaṇa Panāṃkaraṇa, ‘ornament of the Śailendra dynasty’ (śailendravanāśatilaka), great king (maharaja), ‘lion of kings’ (rājasinha), and kariyāna (see the text above). I shall return to the Panāṃkaraṇa question later.

The second mention of the Śailendra dynasty occurs in the Sanskrit inscription of 782 CE from Kēlurak in the north of caṇḍī Loro Jongrang of Pramidana10. It is also engraved in the script ‘early Nāgari’. According to the text, the royal preceptor of Gauḍidvīpa named Kumāraghoṣa established an image of Mañjuśrī who embodies Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha (Buddhist community), Brahma, Vishnu and Siva (under the name Maheśvara) in one and the same time. The fifth stanza calls the king an ‘ornament of the dynasty’ (śailendravanāśatilaka) while the twentieth verse gives his name – Śrī Sanggrāmadhanānājyaya. One of the royal epithets is very significant: the forth stanza calls him ‘destroyer of the best heroes of enemies’ (vairiravarīramardana). However, H.B. Sarkar writes that the king’s name was Indra or Dharaṇīdravarma, as F.D.K. Bosch supposed earlier11. This interpretation is based on the phrase dharaṇīdranāmāṇa from the fifth stanza. It may be translated as ‘of the name of Dharaṇīdrā’ or, connecting it with previous words rājā dhṛtā, as ‘the earth is held by the king named Indra’. But as G. Cœdès wrote, ‘as for his name of Dharaṇīdrā, according to a communication by De Casparis, this is the result of an incorrect reading: instead of Dharaṇīdranāmāṇa, the Kelurak inscription should read Dharaṇīdhareṇa, which simply means “king”’12. As I cannot verify new De Casparis’ reading de visu, I cannot judge how it is granted. But I should say that the phrase dharaṇīdranāmāṇa may mean ‘(who is) called the king on the earth’ because the word indra has this meaning13.

For the third time the Śailendra dynasty is mentioned in the Ratu Boko, or Abhayagirivihāra inscription of 792–793 CE. The six fragments of this Sanskrit inscription written in the ‘early Nāgari’ are known to date but there is no complete edition. H.B. Sarkar did not include the last fragment found in his catalogue whereas J.G. De Casparis who published this, discuss the two verses only: XV and XII14. The latter says that the Abhayagiri Vihāra, i.e. a Buddhist community and cloister, was established by the natives from Ceylon (abhāyagirivihāraḥ kāritaḥ śinhalānām)15.

---

7 The phrase was strangely omitted in Sarkar’s translation.
8 Krom 1931, 144; Nilakanta Sastri 1949, 55–56; Vogel 1919, 634; Van Naerssen 1947, 249–253.
9 Cœdès 1968, 89; Jordaan 1999, 40–41.
10 Sarkar 1971, 41.
11 Sarkar 1971, 41, 45, 46, fn. 9; Bosch 1928, 24–25.
12 Cœdès 1959, 48; Cœdès & Damais 1992, 110.
13 Monier-Williams 1899, 166. The beginning of the sixth stanza contains the phrase tenendra which was translated by Sarkar as ‘By him, Indra…’ (Sarkar 1971, 43, 45). It looks very problematic because the instrumental case of the word should be indrena. It seems that the root indra was a part of a compound lost.
The name of the king who issued the Abhayagiri-vihāra inscription is a puzzle. J.G. De Casparis at first suggested Dharmmatūṅga but later preferred Samaratuṅga without substantiation\(^\text{16}\). H.B. Sarkar kept the former while Jeffrey Sundberg has chosen the latter\(^\text{17}\). Unfortunately, I have had no access to the inscription itself and cannot judge what name is true. If the ruler’s name was Samaratuṅga, he appears in the two records (see below), if the name was Dharmmatūṅga, he is mentioned here only.

The fourth and last reference to the Śailendras looks rather doubtful. The stone inscription of Kayumvungan ‘was obtained from the village of Karangtĕngah in the Temanggung division of the residency of Kēdu’\(^\text{18}\). It dates from 824 CE and consists of five fragments. Its first part is written in Sanskrit while the second is in Old Javanese. The end of the ninth line contains the syllable śai- which is filled up by the scholars to form śail(ravanasiṭālaka), i.e. an ‘ornament of the Śailendra dynasty’\(^\text{19}\). The eighth stanza gives the name of the king (ksitindrah) Samaratuṅga whose daughter was called Prāmodavarddhāṇī, according to the tenth stanza\(^\text{20}\). The image of Śrīghananātha (probably, Buddha) and the temple of Buddha were established. But the Old Javanese text mentions neither Samaratuṅga nor Prāmodavarddhāṇī. It refers to the rakarayān of Patapān named Pu Palar who gave away irrigated fields sawah as immunity, and the witnesses of this generous deed. That Pu Palar and Samaratuṅga was one and the same person requires definite proofs. Unfortunately, there is no evidence for this identification.

That is all the data on the Śailendra dynasty from ancient Java. All of them appear in the Buddhist and Sanskrit context. The direct evidence concerns a very narrow historical period from 778 to 793 CE as the reference of the Kayumvungan inscription is problematic.

The term Śailendra occurs in the famous Chaiya, or Ligor stele whose find-place is questionable\(^\text{21}\). The only fact is that it was found in the Thai-Malay Peninsula\(^\text{22}\). It was engraved on the both sides of sandstone. The conventional sides A and B consist of twenty nine and four lines of Sanskrit text respectively. The side A gives the date of the 697\(^\text{th}\) year in the saka era, i.e. 775 CE. The side A mentions the ruler of Srivijaya. The side B refers to the Śailendra dynasty. Ramesh Chandra Majumdar supposed that there are two distinct inscriptions, each on its own side\(^\text{23}\). F.D.K. Bosch offered reading from the side B\(^\text{24}\). G. Cœdes at first thought it is one inscription but later accepted Majumdar’s thesis\(^\text{25}\). He pointed out that the royal titles differ on both sides: the side A calls the ruler ‘king’ (nrpa, nrpati, bhūpati, indrarāja) and, perhaps, ‘king of kings’ (īśvarabhūpati) while the side B signifies the Śailendra ruler as ‘great king’ and ‘king of kings’ (mahārāja, rājādhirāja). But Majumdar’s and Cœdes’ hypothesis does not account for the opening words of both sides\(^\text{26}\).

The side B begins with the term svasti ‘fortune, luck, success, prosperity’\(^\text{27}\) but the side A begins with the gerund visārīṇyā ‘spreading, diffusing; coming forth’ from the root visārin which radically differs from the epigraphic Sanskrit tradition of Southeast Asia. Both sides have identical scripts. It means that Bosch’s assumption is correct and the Chaiya inscription (let it be for the sake of convenience) is one text which should be read from the conventional side B.

The ruler’s name is not mentioned in the Chaiya inscription. The only term which may be a name is viṣṇākhyā ‘Vishnu by name’ from the third line of the side B. Unfortunately, it can be translated as ‘(having an) appearance of Vishnu’ (ayant l’aspect de Viṣṇu)\(^\text{28}\) as the term ākhyā has both meanings\(^\text{29}\). It should be

---

\(^{16}\) De Casparis 1950, 21–22; 1961, 245.

\(^{17}\) Sarkar 1971, 48(iv); Sundberg 2006b, 20, n. 29. Sundberg ‘intent[ed] to publish a complete study, including a full transliteration, of all the extant fragments on another occasion’ (2003, 175, n. 20) but gives no arguments for his reading.

\(^{18}\) Sarkar 1971, 64.

\(^{19}\) De Casparis 1950, 38; Sarkar 1971, 66.


\(^{21}\) Cœdès 1918, 29–30, pl. 1–2.


\(^{23}\) Majumdar 1933, 122.

\(^{24}\) Bosch 1941, 26–38.

\(^{25}\) Cœdès 1918, 2–3; 1959, 42–48; Cœdès & Damais 1992, 103–111.

\(^{26}\) Cœdès (1959, 42–48) strangely omitted this point in his consideration.

\(^{27}\) Monier-Williams 1899, 1283.

\(^{28}\) Monier-Williams 1899, 1001

\(^{29}\) Cœdès 1918, 32; 1959, 47; Cœdès & Damais 1992, 110.

\(^{30}\) Monier-Williams 1899, 129.
noted that the fourth line of the side B gives an example of similar usage: The compound śrīmahārājanāmā may be translated as ‘Śrimahārāja by name’ and ‘who is called illustrious maharaja’.

The side A tells about the construction of brick sanctuaries in honour of Buddha (‘the destroyer of Māra’) and bodhisattvas Padmapañi (kajakara) and Vajrapañi (bajrini)31. Therefore, the Śailendras again appear in Buddhist context.

One of the most important sources on early Indonesian history is the Nālandā copper-plate of Devapāladeva from Bengal32. Devapāladeva belongs to the Pāla dynasty. Unfortunately, this inscription has the only date of the 39th regnal year of Devapāladeva. Conventional chronologies of the Pāla dynasty, however, date his death from 843 or 850 CE33. Therefore, the Nālandā copper-plate belongs to the first half of the ninth century instead of the second one as supposed by J.G. De Casparis34. The inscription says that the ruler of Suvarṇdvīpa (Sumatra or its part, including Srivijaya), ‘great king of kings’ (adhipamahārāja) named Bālaputra founded a Buddhist monastery (vihāra) in Nālandā. Bālaputra was said to be a grandson of a king of Yavabhūmi (Java) who was an ‘ornament of the Śailendra dynasty’ (śailendravaṇāsati lako yavabhūmipālako, line 52). A son of this king Samarāgra-vīra35 married a princess Tārā who was a daughter of a certain ‘great king of the Lunar race’ Dharmasetu (śrīdharmasetu… mangrakṣa bhūmi ri jawa). This prince is also called maharaja and victor (jētā)36. J.G. De Casparis supposed that it is the reference to the battle between Bālaputra and Javanese rulers, namely raka of Pikatan and Lokapāla, resulting in the defeat of Bālaputra and his and the Śailendras eviction from Java to Sumatra37. But the context of the term wālaputra is unclear as the first of preceding two syllables is lost whereas the second -hi- cannot be explained satisfactorily. It is equally possible that wālaputra means here ‘young man, child’ instead of personal name38. If correct, it means that there was no battle on the Ratu Boko plateau.

One point is worthy of notice. The Kēkurak inscription calls the ruler a ‘destroyer of the best heroes of enemies’ (vairiravāvīramardana) (see above). Almost identical epithets occur in the Chaitya inscription and the Nālandā copper-plate: ‘destroying the pride of all his enemies’ (sarvārimadavimathana)39 and ‘illustrious tormentor / destroyer of brave foes’ (śrīvīravāvīramathana)40. This resemblance of epithets enforced to consider them as belonging to one and the same Śailendra ruler. Nilakanta Sastri held that he was

---

31 Cœdès 1918, 29, 31.
32 Shastri 1924, 310–327.
34 De Casparis 1956, 297.
35 The first editor of the Nālandā copper-plate Hirananada Shastri read samarāgradhaira instead of Samarāgra-vīra (1924, 323, n. 4). But Nicolaas Krom improved reading and found a personal name (1931).
36 Shastri 1924, 322–324; Nilakanta Sastri 1949, 126–127; Krom 1926, 139; Damais 1968, 364; Jordaan & Colless 2009, 42.
37 De Casparis 1956, 280–330, esp. 312.
38 Jordaan (ed.) 1996.
39 De Casparis 1956, 312, 318.
40 Wisseman Christie 2001, 30, 52.
41 Sarkar 1971, 278.
42 De Casparis 1956, 311–2.
43 De Casparis 1956, 295–9.
44 Zweitmüler 1952, Part II, 2179; Monier-Williams 1899, 729.
Paṇḍakarana Dharaṇḍrarvarman⁴⁷ but the name Dharaṇḍrarvarman seems inauthentic. Roy Jordaan and Brian Colless think the ruler was Śrī Sangrāmadhananājaya⁴⁸. Jeffrey Sundberg believes that the ‘killer of haughty enemies’ was Paṇḍakarana⁴⁹. The only thing seems evident: These references concern one and same ruler whose name is a point at issue.

Later references to the Śailendras occur outside Java, in India. The Larger Leiden copper-plate inscription of Rājārāja I Chola dated from 1006 CE contains the Sanskrit part which was added by his son Rājendra I about 1019 CE. It tells that the king of Katāha, i.e. Kedah in Malaysia, named Cūḷāmāniyarvarman founded a Buddhist temple in Negapattinam. Cūḷāmāniyarvarman ‘was born in the Śailendra family, was the lord of the Śrīviṣaya (country), and was conducting the rule of Katāha’ (Śailendra-vamśa-sambhūtena Śrīviṣayadhipatinā Katāha-ādhipayam-ātavatai)⁵⁰. TRājārāja I Chola bestowed the temple a village. A son of Cūḷāmāniyarvarman named Māravijayōttungavarman finished his father’s construction. The temple was called Śailendra-Cūḷāmāniyarvarmanahāra. The Smaller Leiden copper-plate inscription of Kulōttunga Chola I confirmed Rājārāja’s endowment⁵¹. The Śrīviṣaya country is identified with Śrīvijaya. Two other inscriptions from Nagapattinam dated from 1014/1015 and 1015 CE make it beyond doubt as they offer different spellings of the name: Śrīviṣaya and Śrīvijaya⁵². Another text from Nagapattinam dated from 1019 mentions an envoy of the king of Kiṭāra, another spelling of Kadāram and Katāha⁵³. These data show that the members of the Śailendra dynasty held sway over Kedah in the end of the tenth – beginning of the eleventh century and also ruled Śrīvijaya⁵⁴.

As the Śailendras and their actions occur in so many contexts of Java, Sumatra, Thai-Malay Peninsula, and India, their history and legacy became very complicated and disputable. Let me turn to some problems in their research.

THE ŚAILENDRAS IN CENTRAL JAVA

The Śailendras in Java occur in the Buddhist context only (see above). Early epigraphy from Java, however, begins with the Śaivite inscription of the king Sañjaya from Canggal dated from 732 CE⁵⁵. It says Sañjaya erected a lingam of Siva. In the early tenth century the king Dakṣa who ruled in 913–919 CE introduced a new calendar – the era of Sañjaya⁵⁶. The famous Mantyasih I inscription of 907 CE issued by the predecessor of Dakṣa, king Balitung, calls Sañjaya the first protector of the kingdom of Matarām: ‘You deified beings of earlier times from Mēdang, from Poḥ pitu the raka of Matarām (such as) king Sañjaya, the illustrious great king (who is) the raka of Panangkaran…’ (kamung rahyang ta rumuhn ri māṅg ri poḥ pitu rakai matarām sang ratu sañjaya śrī mahārāja rakai Panangkaran)⁵⁷. The Sundanese chronicle ‘Carita Parahyangan’ dated from the sixteenth century tells that Sañjaya conquered many lands of Sumatra and Bali, carried war on the Khmers and even China⁵⁸. While this seems an obvious exaggeration⁵⁹, the chronicle shows great significance of Sañjaya in historical memory of the Sundanese and, indirectly, Javanese from whom the former got to know of him. As the kings Sañjaya and Lokapāla as well many other rulers of Central Java in the ninth–early tenth centuries were the devotees of Siva while the Śailendras were Buddhists⁶⁰, many scholars have believed that there were the two dynasties in Java, i.e. the Śailendras and the ‘Sañjaya family’. One of the most

---

⁴⁷ Nilakanta Sastri 1949, 55–6.
⁴⁸ Jordaan & Colless 2009, 43.
⁴⁹ Sundberg 2003, 176.
⁵³ Karashima & Subbarayalu 2009, 278.
⁵⁴ It should be emphasized, however, that the localization of Śrīvijaya of the epoch is debatable (Jordaan & Colless 2009). It may have located in Kedah only, in Kedah and Sumatra, or in Palembang and Jambi in Sumatra. If the Chinese term Sanfoqi is ‘three Vijaya-s’, it may refer to the three polities from the early tenth century onwards bearing this name.
⁵⁷ Sarkar 1972, 68, 75.
⁵⁸ Poerbatjaraka 1920, 403–16; Majumdar 1937, 230; Chatterji 1967, 9.
⁵⁹ Krom 1931, 126; Coedès 1968, 88; Chatterji 1967, 9; cf.: Van der Meulen 1979, 27; but cf. Mahdi 2008, 111–43.
⁶⁰ See the sources in Sarkar 1971–1972; Brandes 1913.
exponents of the theory was J.G. De Casparis. These dynasties rivaled in hegemony, and after postulated defeat of Bālaputra in 856 the Śailendras seems to have been evicted from Java. The great monuments of Borobudur and Prambanan have been interpreted as the rival constructions of the Śailendras and the ‘Sañjaya family’ respectively.

As we have seen earlier, the battle between Bālaputra and Lokapāla looks problematic. There are also the data that there were no distinction between the Śailendras and ‘Sañjaya family’. These data include the Mantyasih I and Wanua Tengah III inscriptions. Both the texts were issued under the king Balitung in 907 and 908 CE respectively. They both give lists of deified rulers as protectors of the kingdom of Matarām while their cognate ties are not mentioned. Roy Jordaan and Brian Colless offer their summary table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mantyasih I (907)</th>
<th>Wanua Tengah III (908)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rakai Mātaram sang Ratu Sañjaya</td>
<td>Rahyangta ri Mdang u Rahyangta i Hāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Panangkaran</td>
<td>Rake Panangkaran (746–784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Panunggale</td>
<td>Rake Panaran (784–803)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Warak</td>
<td>Rake Warak Dyah Manara (803–827)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dyah Gula (827–829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Garung</td>
<td>Rake Garung (829–847)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Pikatan</td>
<td>Rake Pikatan Dyah Saladū (847–855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Kayuwangi</td>
<td>Rake Kayuwangi Dyah Lokapāla (855–885)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dyah Tagwas (885)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rake Panumwangan Dyah Dewendra (885–887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rake Gurungwangi Dyah Bhadra (887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Watuhumalang</td>
<td>Rake Wungkal Humalang Dyah Jēbang (894–898)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Watukura Dyah Balitung</td>
<td>Rake Watukura Dyah Balitung (898–)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jordaan & Colless 2009, 37.

Jan Wiseman Christie points out that the rulers who were claimed the Śailendras could be the members of ‘Sañjaya family’ in one and the same time. The most obvious candidate to such position is the king Paṇaṃkaraṇa from the Kalasan inscription who may be identified with Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Panangkaran. Wiseman Christie notices that Javanese rulers bore names of several components. There are titles (mahārāja, raka, ratu), epithets (dyah, (m)pu, sang, śrī), personal names, and coronation names (abhiṣeka). After their death rulers were referred to by apotheosis name. A monarch could have several coronation names. For example, Balitung is called śrī mahārāja rakai Watukura dyah Balitung śrī Dharmmodāya Mahāśambhu in the Mantyasih I inscription, and Śrī Iswarakeśawotsawatungga in the Wanua Tengah III inscription. As for an apotheosis name, Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Warak Dyah Manara was called Śrī Mahārāja sang lumāḥ i Kelāsa, i.e. ‘who lies dead / whose ashes were interred in Kelāsa’.

The Wanua Tengah III inscription tells that a Buddhist monastery in the area of Pikatan was founded by a certain Rahyangta i Hāra who was called a younger brother of the Rahyangta ri Mdang. As Sañjaya was connected with Mĕdang in the Mantyasih I charter (see above), it is likely that he was this Rahyangta ri Mdang. J. Wiseman Christie points out that the Rahyangta i Hāra could be either his real younger brother or ‘subordinate “brother” ruler of the state known to the Chinese as Heling (Ho-ling), whose capital had been in Hāra, and whose territory had incorporated the Pikatan area until his state was annexed by Sañjaya. She adds:

---

61 De Casparis 1956, 293–7.
66 Wisseman Christie 2001, 34.
‘This Buddhist ruler may have belonged to the Śailendra family. If so, then the two families must have merged in the mid eighth century, when Heling’s annexation and subordination was reinforced by a marriage tie between Sañjaya and a woman related to Heling’s ruler.’

Recognizing her hypothesis of ‘marriage tie’ and annexation of Heling by Sañjaya as a true fact, Wisseman Christie identifies later rulers of Java in the dynastic diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Sañjaya’ family</th>
<th>Śailendra family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rake Panangkaran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dyāh Pañcapantha)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A.D. 746–784)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indra Sanggrāmadhanañjaya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A.D. 782)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rañai Panunggalan / Panaraban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=narendra Sāraṇa) 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A.D. 784–803)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmanottungadeva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A.D. 792–793)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=(? Wisṇu of Ligor, after A.D. 775 r.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rake Warak Dyah Manara (803–827)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarattungga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A.D. 824)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(whose daughter was Prāmodavardhānī)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyah Gula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A.D. 827–828)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? (no abhiṣeka name)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bālaputra = possibly son of the ousted Dyah Gula?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c. A.D. 860)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Wisseman Christie’s theory was criticized by Jeffrey Sundberg. He points out that Heling continued to send embassies to China until 818 CE and it argues against the idea of its annexation by Sañjaya 69. Another problem with Heling is that there was a polity Walaing whose name was transcribed by the Chinese as Heling 70. Sañjaya and his successors never proclaimed to belong to Walaing. Sundberg also emphasizes that the king’s name ‘Indra’ attributed to Panangkaran by Wisseman Christie is out of date (see above). He adds that there is no proof that Sāraṇa is a personal name. Sundberg holds that the Abhayagirivihāra and Kayumvungan inscriptions both mention Samaratuṅga. It means his reign covered both that of Rakai Panunggalan / Panaraban and Rake Warak 71. In any case, Wisseman Christie’s constructions look rather problematic.

Be that as it may, Jeffrey Sundberg shares the same theory of one dynasty in Ancient Java but his interpretation is rather different. He believes the Wanua Tengah III list includes the Śailendras too because it mentions the great king Panamkaraṇa from the Kalasan inscription as Rake Panangkaran and this title also occurs in the Mantyasih I charter (see above) 72. I should note that it is the only clear identification which is doubtless.

One of the most important arguments of Sundberg appears the Buddhist mantra found on the Ratu Boko Plateau. It contains the two lines: oṃ taṭi hiṃ jah svāhā and Panarabwan khanipa 73. According to Sundberg, Panarabwan was identical to Panaraban mentioned in the Wanua Tengah III inscription 74. But the scholar assumes Panaraban was Samaratuṅga and died in 803 CE as the Wanua Tengah III texts states 75. As Samaratuṅga is mentioned in the Kayumvungan inscription of 824 CE, Sundberg declares that he had died

---

67 Wisseman Christie 2001, 34.
68 The phrase narendra Sāraṇa seems to occur in the Mañjuśrī inscription from the temple complex of Candi Sewu. It dates from 792 CE and was deciphered independently of one another by the two Indonesian epigraphists Kusen and Boechari. Kusen translated it into Indonesian. John Miksic, Widya Nayati and Tjahjomo made a provisional translation into English. For more details see Miksic et al. 2001, 319–32; Miksic 2003, 19–42. J.R. Sundberg (2006b, 22, n. 33) noticed that he had prepared a monograph on the Mañjuśrī inscription but, unfortunately, it remains unpublished.
69 Sundberg 2006b, 18
70 Sundberg 2006b, 18; Damais 1964, 93–141.
71 For more details see Sundberg 2006b, 22.
72 Sundberg 2003, 174.
73 Sundberg 2003, 163–188, especially 164–165 n fig. 1.
74 Sundberg 2003, 174.
75 Sundberg 2003, 175.
long before it was issued, and the temple of Buddha was established by his daughter Prāmodavarddhani, not him.76

Sundberg thinks Borobudur was constructed by the Rake Warak Dyah Manara (803–827 CE). The arguments for it are follows. There are place-names near Borobudur reminiscent of the king’s name, including the river-name Kali Warak and the Menoreh Hills. The inscription of Kamalagi dated from 821 CE contains the term waragwarak which may have been a place-name.78 Several undated inscriptions of Borobudur are written in a script resembling that of the Kamalagi inscription.79 The Sundanese chronicle ‘Carita Parahyangan’ calls Rake Warak Dyah Manara – Sang Manarah.80 All these data allow supposition that the domain of Warak lied around Borobudur.

According to Sundberg, the empire of Śailendras was divided by Rake Warak and his hypothetical brother Bālaputra; there is the only argument that Sang Manarah if he was Rake Warak, carried wars against his brother Rahyang Banga. The former obtained Java, the latter held sway over Sumatra.81

Sundberg’s theory contains the two main drawbacks. First, there is no data that Samaratuṅga was dead when the Kayumvugan inscription was issued in 821 CE. Its text gives no such references. In fact, Sundberg dreams here. If the Wanua Tengah III inscription includes the Śailendras and if Samaratuṅga was still alive in 821 CE, he also could the Rake Warak Dyah Manara. I also would like some arguments for the supposition that the Abhayagirivihāra inscription, nevertheless, mentions Samaratuṅga, not Dharmannuṅga.

Second, the hypothesis of division of the Śailendra Empire between Rake Warak and Bālaputra seems ungrounded. At first, one should prove that the Śailendras ever held sway over Sumatra or its southeastern part. The kindred of Bālaputra and the Śailendras does not prove that, first, his father Samarāgravīra was also father of Rake Warak; second, that Samarāgravīra ever ruled in Java because the title of ruler of Yavabhūmi (Java) belonged to grandfather of Bālaputra only. Therefore, Sundberg’s theory seems as much problematic as Wiseman Christie’s.

Theory of many dynasties is advocated now by Roy Jordaan. He holds that there were three dynasties in ancient Java: the Śailendras, the descendants of Sañjaya (probably, self-proclaimed), and the clan of rakarayān of Patapān named Pu Palar mentioned in the Kayumvugan inscription (see above).82 Jordaan identifies the rakarayān of Patapān with a certain dang karayān Part(t)apān from an undated Old Malay inscription of Gondosuli II found in Central Java.83 This inscription mentions a sanctuary of Siva Sang Hyang Wintang, or ‘sacred star’ (de heilige Ster, line 11). The date of the inscription is debatable. J.G. De Casparis dated it from 832 CE but Louis-Charles Damais placed it a bit earlier, around 800 CE.84 Roy Jordaan strangely states it dates from 847 CE without argumentation.85

Jordaan advances several arguments in favour of the Śailendra dynasty. First, he believes the Kalasan inscription of 778 CE mentions the two rulers, one of whom was a Śailendra king. Second, the identifications of the Śailendras with the kings of Wanua Tengah III and Mantyasih I lists are unconvincing. According to him, these lists include the paramount Javanese Śaivite rulers only.86 The Śailendras were supposedly omitted
due to their hypothetical foreign origin. That they would have been of foreign origin is because supposedly no Śailendra ruler bore the Javanese titles of *ruṭu, raka* or *rakarayān*. Jordaan states:

‘The other reason why I think that the Śailendras were of foreign origin and not a separate dynasty from another part of the country, is that the establishment of their rule in Java was accompanied by a number of exogenous changes— the introduction of a new script that in Dutch colonial times was generally known by the name of Pre-Nāgarī (*siddhamātrka*), the earliest issuance of the silver Sandalwood-Flower coins, bearing legends in the same script, the introduction of the *māharāja* title and its subsequent adoption by the Javanese rulers, the transfer of the Javanese capital “to the East” (not necessarily to East Java), and the sudden blossoming of Mahāyāna Buddhist architectural art. In contrast, the departure of the Śailendras from Java was followed by such developments as the fall of Buddhism from royal favour as reflected in the disparaging remarks about Buddhist monks and nuns in the Old Javanese Rāmāyana as well as the halt to Buddhist temple-building activities, the change from Sanskrit to Old Javanese, the shift from silver coinage to an indigenous gold currency.’

Unfortunately, some Jordaan’s observations are far from being well-grounded. First and foremost, the Kalasan inscription of 778 mentions the only great king *mahārāja dyāḥ Paṇḍapaṇa kariyāṇa Paṇḍakarana* who was an ‘ornament of the Śailendra dynasty’ (see above). It means that he belonged to this family and bore Javanese titles *dyāḥ* and *kariyāṇa* as well as the title of *mahārāja*. *Kariyāṇa* seems to be a Sanskritised form of Old Javanese *karayān*. According to the Kalasan inscription, Paṇḍakarana patronized Buddhism. As he appears in the Mantyasih I and Wanua Tengah III lists as Śrī Mahārāja Rakai Panangkaran and Rakendrayan (see above) and the Wanua Tengah III inscription tells that the wet-rice field (*sawah*) was donated to a Buddhist monastery (*bihāra i pikatan*) by this Rake Panangkaran, Jordaan’s statement that these lists include the paramount Śailendra kings should be considered wrong.

Inscriptions written in Old Javanese appeared earlier than the last mentioning of the Śailendras had been made in the Kayumvungan inscription. This text is bilingual and written in both Sanskrit and Old Javanese (see above). The earliest authentic Old Javanese inscription seems to have been the inscribed stone of the Dieng Plateau dated from 809 CE. Buddhism was flourishing in Java in the beginning of the tenth century as attested by the Wanua Tengah III inscription describing the history of a Buddhist monastery in Pikatan (see above). The transfer of the Javanese capital ‘to the East’ known from the Chinese chronicles is extremely obscure information as it covers both terms which are considered as designations of Java and its polities, i.e. Shepo and Heling: ‘The king {of Heling) lives in the city of Shepo; but his ancestor of the (ruling) king, Jiyan, transferred (the capital) to the East, in the city of Poluijiasi’ (Xin Tang shu, book 222, a notice on Heling) and ‘during the epoch of Tianbao (742–755 CE) (the capital) of Shepo was moved to the city of Poluijiasi’ (Ying huan zhe-liu, book 2). If Heling was Walaing, as L.-Ch. Damais supposed, these references have nothing in common with the Śailendras.

Jordaan’s other arguments may be viewed in opposite way. The ‘halt to Buddhist temple-building activities’ could be caused by its own costs: After Borobudur and Śaivite Loro Jonggrang complex in Prambanan were built, there was no other such huge constructions. The change to gold currency could be

87 Jordaan & Colless 2009, 38.
89 Jordaan 2006, 6.
91 Sarkar 1971, 49–52. Recently Jeffrey Sundberg offered new dating of the Munḍana charter – 807 CE but gave no arguments. He also dated the Dieng inscription from 854 CE (Sundberg 2006a, 116, n. 35; 111, n. 9, referring to Damais, 1952). But there are the two or even three inscriptions under this label which come from the Dieng plateau. Himanshu Bhusan Sarkar noticed that the stone of 809 CE tells about the foundation of immunity (*manimā < śīla*) by a certain *panagat* (ruler of an area) named Si Dīma (1971, 49–50). Another inscription from the Dieng plateau is known as Vayuku and dates from 854 CE. It states that the *raku* of Sisaira named pu Virāj marked out wet-rice (*sawah*) fields at Vayuku as immunity for a Buddhist monastery (*bihāra* at Abhayananda (Sarkar, 1971, 127; see a discussion of the inscription’s date in Damais 1951, 29–31; 1952, 30–1). It implies that Buddhism continued flourishing after the supposed eviction of the Sālavṃdra from Java.
92 Pelliot 1904, 225, n. 2.
93 Damais 1964, 93–141.
caused the absence of silver. The Early (or Pre-) Nāgarī script was used for the Buddhist inscriptions only but it does not imply that it was necessarily used by the foreign rulers.

Therefore, no theory of early Javanese history seems to be convincing. One-dynasty thesis is wrong simply because the Gondosuli II and Kayumvungan inscriptions mention a ruler rakarayān of Patapān / ḍang karayān Part(t)apān named Pu Palar. He most likely was not a member of the Śailendra dynasty, and his kinship with the postulated line of Sañjaya is also unfounded. It should be remembered that the ruler of Valaiing Pu Kumbhayoni belonged to another royal family. One of his small Sanskrit records dated from 856 calls him ‘the bull of men’, i.e. king, and the protector of Valaiing (nararṣabha, valaingagoptar)\(^94\). The second inscription which is also dated from 856 claims Pu Kumhayoni a king and the ‘victor of Valaiing’ (nrpatiḥ, valaiṅgaṇetara) and perhaps mentions ‘the land of Sargabhava’\(^95\). J.G. De Casparis refers to the genealogy of Pu Kumbhayoni in one of the undated Ratu Boko inscriptions but gives no true transcription or selected terms which he translates as ‘god-king’ or all other kings – predecessors of Kumbhayoni\(^96\). This ‘god-king’ was his grand grandfather. Pu Kumbhayoni is called a grand grandson (puyut) of Sang Ratu i Halu, i.e. ‘honourable king of Halu’, in the Vukiran inscription dated from 863\(^97\). Pu Kumbhayoni bears the title raka here. Hence, there were other royal or ruling families in Java.

This conclusion is corroborated by other data. One of the most enigmatic persons in ancient Javanese history was Śrī Kahulunan who appears in the two Trui Tepussan (Caṅdi Petung) inscriptions where s/he marked out a sīma, or immunity. Both the texts date from 842 CE. The first of them contains an expression sīma ning kamūlān i bhūmi sambhāra ‘immunity of the Kamūlān in the land/country of Sambhāra’\(^98\). The second inscription lacks the important term bhūmi\(^99\). De Casparis sees here an abbreviated form of the term bhūmisambhārabhūdhara ‘the mountain of accumulation of virtue of the (ten) stages (of the Bodhisattva)’\(^100\). It seems very risky as his idea requires to admit the shorten forms or mistakes by ancient scribes in both texts. I find it unlikely. More or at least equally plausible is a hypothesis that there was another bhūmi comparable with bhūmi ri jawa and bhūmi i mataram\(^101\). It was ruled by Śrī Kahulunan. De Casparis translates this term as ‘Queen Consort’ whereas Boechari, Lokesh Chandra and Andries Teeuw offer ‘Queen Mother’\(^102\). But we do not know to whom she, if she, was a ‘queen mother’.

The only well-established fact concerning the Śailendra dynasty is that its member was mahārāja dyāh Pañcapaṇa kariyāṇā Panǎmkaraṇa from the Kalasan inscription of 778 CE. As he ruled in 746–784 CE, according to the Wanua Tengah III inscription, the two other records date from his reign, i.e. the Kēlurak of 782 CE and the Chiaya, or Ligor, of 775 CE. Therefore, Panǎmkaraṇa very likely was Śrī Sanggrāmadhanaṇjaya. That the authors of these texts used different names and titles, is not a great problem as it should be remembered that, first, the Manyasīh I and Wanua Tengah III inscriptions give two different royal names of Balitung (see above); second, Panǎmkaraṇa, or rakai Panangkaran is not a personal or coronation name but an apanage (watak/watēk) title. More difficult is a relationship of Panǎmkaraṇa and Srivijaya supposed by the Chiaya stele.

THE ŚAILENDRAS AND SRIVIJAYA

\(^{94}\) De Casparis 1956, 270.
\(^{95}\) De Casparis 1956, 274, 276. It is rather strange that Louis-Charles Damais holds that Pu Kumbhayoni was never called a king (Damais 1964, 185). The French scholar interprets the expression valaingagotra (the form of original) as ‘by him who conquered Valaiing’ (par celui qui a vaincu Valaing) and the term valaingagotra ‘by the protector of Valaiing’ in the sense that after conquering country he “protected” it from new, real or imagined enemies (‘dans le sens de celui qui, ayant vaincu un pays, le “protège” contre les nouveaux ennemis, reel ou supposé →’) (Damais 1964, 185).
\(^{96}\) De Casparis 1956, 342.
\(^{98}\) Sarkar 1971, 100.
\(^{99}\) Sarkar 1971, 102.
\(^{100}\) De Casparis 1950, 160–70.
\(^{101}\) Jan Wisseman Christie calls bhūmi, or ‘land’, ‘classical Javanese state’ covering a territory under effective control of royal government situated in kadutun (1985, 12, 19).
The Buddhist kingdom Srivijaya centred in Palembang in South-East Sumatra arose in the second half of the seventh century CE. Its ruler Śrī Jayanāśa left few Old Malay inscriptions dated around 680th CE. His clan affiliation is not known. There are some texts of Srivijaya in Sanskrit.

Jean Philippe Vogel and Nicolaas Krom held that Srivijaya was ruled by the Śailendra dynasty from the very beginning and its capital was transferred to Java in the middle of the eighth century CE. The main arguments were the Buddhist nature of the Kalasan and Kēlurak inscriptions, thriving of Buddhism in Srivijaya according to Chinese pilgrim Yijing, and the punitive expedition of Srivijaya against a ‘land of Java’ (bhūmi Java) mentioned in the Kota Kapur inscription of 686 CE.

On the contrary, Willem Stutterheim thought that the Śailendras who supposedly were of Javanese origin conquered Srivijaya in the middle of the eighth century CE. He referred to the sudden cessation of Srivijaya’s embassies to China in 742 CE and appearances of embassies from other countries: Gelo (Kedah in Malaysia) sent a mission between 742–759 CE, Heling, or ‘Buddhist Java’ sent embassies in 768–818 CE, Shepo, or ‘Hinduist Java’ did the same in 820–873 CE, and Zhanbei (Jambi in Sumatra) dispatched missions in 852 and 871 CE.

But both these theories have serious drawbacks. First, there is no evidence of the Śailendras in Sumatra before Bālaputra in the ninth century but even he could be only a relative of this family like the last Russian emperor Nicholas II was a relative of the German emperor Wilhelm II but belonged to the Romanoff dynasty. Vogel’s and Krom’s theory does not take into consideration the difference of languages used in Srivijaya and in the Javanese monarchy of the Śailendras, Old Malay in first and Sanskrit in second. The supposed punitive expedition against a ‘land of Java’ could be aimed against other place but Java: Boechari pointed at a village Bumijava in south of Sumatra while ‘Java’ could also denote a part of Borneo. Stutterheim’s theory has no data on the Śailendra presence in Sumatra in the eighth century CE. It also confuses Chinese data on Shepo and Heling which were not as opposed as it is usually believed. The theory mixes the question of polity and the question of dynasty.

The most profound examination of the relationship between the Śailendras and Srivijaya belongs to Roy Jordaan and Brian Colless. They state that from the second half of the eighth century CE Srivijaya was an ‘allied kingdom of the Śailendras, who were the true “great kings” (Mahārājas) of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago’ and the relations between Sumatra and Java were a ‘symbiosis’.

The first argument for the alliance between the Śailendras and Srivijaya is royal titles in the Chaiya, or Ligor inscription. According to Stutterheim, Jordaan and Colless, the terms Śrīvījayaendra and Śrīvījayaśvarabhūpati should be translated as ‘King over the lords of Srivijaya’ whereas the title Śrīvījayamrpati was a short form. But G. Coëdès translated the first two terms as ‘king (of the country) of Srivijaya’ and the Sanskrit terms indra-rajā, īśvara, nṛpati, bhūpati, and, certainly, rājan denote kings, but the compound īśvarabhūpati, perhaps, may mean ‘king of kings’ (or the ‘best king’).

A set of data on early insular Southeast Asia can be found in Arabian geographic literature. Medieval Near Eastern scholarship described many countries due to flourishing of international trade by land and by sea. The Arabian geographers Ibn Khurādhbih (c. 850 CE) and Abū Zaid (916 CE) tell about a very fertile island country of Zābag which was identified with Srivijaya or Java, and about the powerful Mahārāja of...
'the islands of the eastern sea'\textsuperscript{118}. Jordaan and Colless believe the second argument for the alliance between the Śailendras and Srivijaya is the description of an island country of Zābag by Ibn Khurdādhbih:

The authority of the Mahārāja [of Zābag] is exercised over these various islands and the island in which he resides is extremely fertile, and patches of habitation succeed each other without interruption. A very trustworthy man affirms that when the cocks crow at daybreak, as in our country, they call out to each other throughout the whole extent of a hundred parasangs [c. 500 kilometres] or more, showing the uninterrupted and regular succession of villages. In effect, there are no uninhabited places in this country and no ruins. He who comes into the country when he is on journey, if he is mounted he may go wherever he pleases; if he is tired or if his mount has difficulty in carrying on, than he may stop wherever he wishes\textsuperscript{119}.

Jordaan and Colless notice that the Mahārāja of isles everyday threw a gold brick in a pond, according to the references of Ibn Khurdādhbih and Abū Zaid, but the ruler of Srivijaya kept his gold in his palace (tēngah rumah) as his Sabokingking, or Telaga Batu II inscription states\textsuperscript{120}. That Zābag was not Srivijaya is confirmed by the fact that Sribuza which was the latter’s name in the Arabian texts, was never called a residence of the Mahārāja of isles\textsuperscript{21}. Therefore, Zābag denoted Java and all the Śailendra Empire. The scholars also refer to the famous story about the founder of the Angkorian Empire, Jayavarman II, who supposedly was in Java before coming to Cambodia, as the Sdok Kak Thom inscription of 1052 CE says\textsuperscript{122}. Jordaan and Colless explain the cessation of Srivijaya = Shilifoshi’s embassies to China by its submission to the Śailendras\textsuperscript{123}.

As a whole, Jordaan’s and Colless’ arguments look convincing. But they have some reticence. First, why the Śailendra ruler in the Chaiya inscription who presumably subdued Srivijaya or was proclaimed as its overlord, was defined as the ‘king of Srivijaya’? Second, it should be proved that in the 775 CE Srivijaya had been in Palembang or somewhere else in Sumatra yet. There is no data of its existence there in the second half of the eighth century. Perhaps, the Śailendra ruler mentioned in the Chaiya inscription took a part of the Thai-Malay Peninsula under his control around 775 CE.

As for the first difficulty, it should be remembered that the full title of Paṇaṃkararana is unknown and kings often included the titles of countries conquered or subordinated in their official titles; the Russian Tsars are good example, for instance Nicholas II who was the Russian Emperor, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland and Tsar of Kazan in one and the same time\textsuperscript{124}. It is also worthy of notice that William the Conqueror was Duke of Normandy and kept this title after he became the king of England, moreover, he did not absorb the kingdom into the Duchy of Normandy and vice versa. It means that the Śailendra ruler could subdue Srivijaya or its part in the Thai-Malay Peninsula and keep the title ‘king of Srivijaya’ in the new subordinate lands.

\textsuperscript{118} Tibbetts 1979, 90; G. Cœdès supposed that earlier reports deal with Java whereas the story by Abū Zaid concerns Sumatra (1968, 93, 130–1).
\textsuperscript{119} Tibbetts 1979, 25–9.
\textsuperscript{120} Tibbetts 1979, 33.
\textsuperscript{121} Tibbetts 1979, 113; Jordaan & Colless 2009, 66.
\textsuperscript{122} De Casparis 1956, 39; Jordaan & Colless 2009, 64.
\textsuperscript{123} Jordaan & Colless 2009, 67–9.
\textsuperscript{124} Nicholas II's full title was ‘We, Nicholas the Second, by the grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russians, of Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, Novgorod, Tsar of Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan, King of Poland, Tsar of Siberia, Tsar of Tauric Chersonesos, Tsar of Georgia ,Lord of Pskov, and Grand Duke of Smolenks, Lithuania. Volhynia, Podolia, and Finland, Prince of Estonia, Livonia, Courland and Semigalia, Samogitia, Belostok, Karelia, of Tver, Yugra, Perm, Vyatka, Bulgaria, and other territories; Lord and Grand Duke of Nizhny Novgorod, Chernigov; Sovereign of Ryazan, Polotsk, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Bolozero, Udora, Oblodoria, Kondiam Vitebsk, Mstislaw, and all the northern territories; and Sovereign of Iveria, Kartalinia, and the Kabardinian lands and Armenian territories; Hereditary Lord and Ruler of the Cherkass and Mountain Princes and others; Lord of Turkestan, Heir of Norway, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, Stormarn, Dithmarschen, Oldenburg, and so forth, and so forth, and so forth’.
Many scholars speak of the two rulers in the Chaiya inscription, i.e. a Śailendra and a king of Srivijaya. The only argument in favour of such supposition is the numerals on the side B of the inscription: eka ‘one’ and dvitīya ‘second’ which may mean ‘the one – the other’ together. But both these numerals do not occur with the term Śrīvijaya appearing on the side A of the Chaiya inscription only. Therefore, the opposition of the two kings looks problematic and unconstrained. The hypothesis of the one king, i.e. the Śailendra ruler who was the king of Srivijaya in one and the same time, is better coordinated with the textual evidence. The mentioning of Vishnu in the Chaiya stele is not surprising due to his appearance as an embodiment of Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī (see above).

Appearance of the Śailendras in the Chaiya stele may have been a result of pilgrim activities, not of warfare. In this case their power did not spread over a part of the Thai-Malay Peninsula. But there are some facts which point to increasing military activities in the Indonesian-Malay archipelago in the second half of the eighth century. First, Shepo (Java) and Kunlun (Malays?) raided the region of Tonkin in Vietnam in 767 CE. Second, inscriptions of Champa tell about invasions of certain barbarians from the sea or even from ‘Java’ in 774 and 787–788 CE. These data may indicate to a politics of expansion of the Javanese rulers. But how the Śailendras became the lords of Srivijaya remains unknown.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ŚAILENDRAS

Wherefrom the Śailendras came Java is a problem which, being unimportant became the point at issue and caused many papers. There are four main theories: of Sumatran, Javanese, Indian, and Funan origin; the first two may name ‘Indonesian’ whereas the last two are ‘foreign’. This distinction partially accounts for their existence: many theories of Indianisation were constructed to view Southeast Asia as a secondary region of the world always dependent on foreign influences from India, China or Western Europe. Nowadays these theories are no longer tenable but the question of the Śailendra origin looks as their echo.

Theory of Sumatran origin was popular in the first half of the twentieth century and advocated by Krom, Cœdès, and Vogel. It became out of date because there is no data on the Śailendra presence in Sumatra earlier than, at best, ninth century and Srivijaya could not subdued Java (see above). But the discovery of the undated Old Malay Sojomerto inscription prolonged popularity of this theory. Boechari who edited the inscription found in Sojomerto on Central Java (sic) supposed that the title dapiṭa Selendra was a Malay form of the term Śailendra. Moreover, he dated the Sojomerto inscription from the beginning of the seventh century CE. As the text praises Siva (namah śīvaya, line 3), Boechari went further and supposed the existence of the Śailendra-Śaivites as opposing to the Śailendras-Buddhists.

But the identification Selendra=Śailendra appears to be problematic. Old Malay has Sanskrit loan-words with sibilants without vocalization as it is attested by Old Malay inscriptions of Srivijaya dated from 682, 684, and 686 CE: there are such terms as Śrīvijaya in the Kedukan Bukit, Kota Kapur and Palas Pasemah texts; śakavarya in the Kedukan Bukit, Kota Kapur and Talang Tuwo records; sūklapakṣa in the Kedukan Bukit source; śrīkṣetra and śrījayanāśa in the Talang Tuwo inscription; and śānti in the Kota Kapur texts. Introductory formula in the ‘oath inscriptions’ of Srivijaya written in an unknown language contains the diphthong ai in the phrase paitumpaan hakairu while the Sojomerto inscription itself contains the Sanskrit word dāiva ‘divine’ with the same diphthong as in the Śailendra. Therefore, the latter’s transition to Selendra

---

125 Majumdar 1933, 122; Cœdès 1959, 47; Mahdi 2008, 128.
126 Monier-Williams 1899, 227.
127 Cœdès 1959, 47.
129 Cœdès 1930, 34, 39, 48.
looks unnecessary. Louis-Charles Damais had some doubts in early dating of the Sojomerto inscription offered by Boechari and placed it before 800 CE\(^{133}\). Hence, the theory of Sumatran origin remains unproved.

Theory of Funan origin was offered by Cœdès in 1934. He referred to resemblance between the Sanskrit titles śailendra, parvatabhūpāla or śailarāja which mean ‘lord of mountains’ with the Old Khmer title kurung bnam with the same meaning which presumably was borne by the kings of ancient kingdom of Funan situated in the Lower Mekong River Delta\(^{134}\). But Claude Jacques proved that this title kurung bnam never existed as there is no its evidence\(^{135}\).

Theory of Indian origin was offered by R.C. Majumdar in the beginning of the thirties of the twentieth century and supported by H.B. Sarkar, Lokesh Chandra and Jordaan\(^{136}\). Their main argument is a spread of foreign influence, above all the Mahāyāna Buddhism under the baton of the Śailendras. This statement is a particular case of general assumption: The adoption of new religion implies dynastic change. But this assumption is fallacious. When Clovis I was converted to Christianity, Merovingian dynasty did not give place to another family. When Vladimir Sviatoslavich the Great baptized all the Kievan Rus’, the Rus’ dynasty kept its position. Therefore, the spread of Buddhism in Java during the second half of the eighth century CE may not have been connected with the change of dynasty. As the first undoubtedly Śailendra ruler of Java was Paṇāṃkaraṇa who succeeded to Sañjaya directly, according to the Wanua Tengah III inscription (see above), more convincing is to suppose the Javanese origin of the Śailendra dynasty.

The theory of Javanese origin has been advocated by Stutterheim, Poerbatjaraka, Boechari, Wiseman Christie\(^{137}\). It has its own problems: why the predecessor of Paṇāṃkaraṇa Sañjaya was not called a Śailendra; why this designation disappeared from Old Javanese sources in the beginning of the ninth century; what relationship existed between the Javanese Śailendras and the rulers of Kedah of the early eleventh century.

As for the first question, it should be remembered that whether Sañjaya was a relative of Paṇāṃkaraṇa or not, is unknown. The family ties of Javanese monarchs are often unknown. Even if Sañjaya and Paṇāṃkaraṇa were relatives it does not mean that they both used the family name of Śailendra. Remember the appearance of royal lists under Balitung. Why his predecessors did not refer to the protectors of their kingdom(s)? Most likely, they did not need such references. Paṇāṃkaraṇa could simply introduce new family name to legitimize his power and/or emphasize his clan status in new religious circumstances. The Mount Meru plays a very important role in Hinduist and Buddhist cosmologies. Calling oneself a ‘lord of mountains’ is to claim to leadership in symbolic universe and increase power. The construction of Borobudur reinforced these claims. But it remains unclear was Paṇāṃkaraṇa its founder.

As noted above, the last reference to the Śailendras in Java dates from 824 CE. Why later rulers did not call themselves Śailendras? First, this family could break: The only child of Samaraturīga – his daughter Prāmodavarddhānī could be the last member of the dynasty and, moreover, could be childless. Second, if the name of Śailendras was introduced by Paṇāṃkaraṇa and was used in Sanskrit texts only, later kings who preferred Old Javanese could reject this Sanskrit title as not having traditional legitimacy (contrary to less ambitious mahārāja). At last, this could be replaced by such synonyms as parwatanātha and girinātha mentioned in ‘Deśawarṇan’ of Mpu Prapāñca (1.1c; 1.5a)\(^{138}\).

The relationship of the Javanese Śailendras and the Śailendras of Kedah was likely cognate but we do not know its relation degree. As a whole, it remains the famous House of Habsburg with its many lines, including Spanish, Austrian, Albertine, and Leopoldine. In any case, it seems better to establish a lack in our knowledge than to fabricate endless ‘wars’, ‘evictions’ or ‘divisions’.

CONCLUSIONS

\(^{133}\) Damais 1970, 44.
\(^{134}\) Cœdès 1934, 67–70; 1968, 36, 88–9.
\(^{135}\) Jacques 1979, 375; Vickery 1998, 36.
\(^{138}\) Robson 1995, 25–26; Pigeaud 1960, 3; Supomo 1972.
The well-established member of the Śailendra dynasty was mahārāja dyāḥ Pañcapaṅa karīvāṇa Pañamkaraṇa from the Kalasan inscription of 778 CE. It was he who left the Chaiya, or Ligor stele of 775 CE, and took control over Srivijaya or its part on the Thai-Malay Peninsula. How he subdued it remains unknown. Perhaps, he introduced the new family name, i.e. the Śailendras. They were of Javanese origin. Their relatives ruled Kedah in the end of the tenth –beginning of the eleventh century.

REFERENCES


Bosch, F.D.K. 1941: ‘De inscriptie van Ligor’, *TBG* 81, 26–38.


Casparis J.G. De 1956: *Selected Inscriptions from the 7th to the 9th Centuries AD*. [Prasasti Indonesia II]. Bandung: Masa Baru.


Damais, L.-Ch. 1964: «Études sino-indonésiennes III: La transcription chinoise Ho-ling comme désignation de Java», *BEFEO* 52/1, 93–141.
Jordaan R.E. 2006: ‘Why the Śailendras were not a Javanese dynasty’, *Indonesia and the Malay World* 34, No. 98, 3–22.


523
THE WESTERN INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
ITS ROLE IN THE HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION IN ASIA

Ahmad Nabil bin Amir  
Department of Al-Qur’an & Al-Hadith, Academy of Islamic Studies  
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur  
nabiller2002@yahoo.co.uk

ABSTRACT

The advance of European colonial power in Southeast Asia has tremendously influenced the cultural and dynamic life of its population. The continuing legacy of western imperialist has significant impact in the fundamental and unprecedented movement of the indigenous people to oust the colonies. This cultural and political encounter has strong influence in the current direction and history of South East Asia undertaking to initiate change and to reclaim its own tradition, history, culture, ethic, economic, and social profile. This work will highlight the central role of western occupation since of 19th century and its political challenge to Islamic welstanchung and the dynamic of economic renaissance and civilization it projected.

Keywords: Imperialism, Southeast Asia, Western Hegemony, Political Reconstruction, Asian History

PENGARUH BARAT DI ASIA TENGGARA: PERANANNYA TERHADAP SEJARAH DAN PERADABAN DI ASIA

ABSTRAK

Kertas ini membincangkan pengaruh yang fundamental dari kesan kolonialisme terhadap rantau Asia dengan pokok perbahasan difokuskan terhadap gugusan Arkipelago. Ia merakamkan sejarah perjuangan bangsa Melayu yang dijajah di bawah kuasa British dan kedudukan dan lokasinya yang strategik sebagai kuasa besar ekonomi, perundangan, politik, tradisi dan falsafah sejak abad ke 16 hingga menjelang awal kurun ke 20. Penjajah British telah memainkan peranan yang signifikan dalam mencorakkan sejarah dan budaya bangsa melayu dan menzahirkan pengaruh yang monumental yang terpahat dalam struktur masyarakat dan tradisi sejarahnya.

Kata Kunci: Imperialisme, Asia Tenggara, Hegemoni Barat, Rekonstruksi Politik, Sejarah Asia

MUKADDIMAH

KESAN PENJAJAHAN YANG POSITIF

Memang tidak dinafikan, pendudukan British di Asia Tenggara memberi banyak kesan langsung dalam kehidupan masyarakat peribumi. Cengkaman militer dan kuasa imperial yang menjarah dan memunggah hasil mahsul dan limpahan khazanah buminya telah memaksa anak bangsa lekas sedar untuk membela dan mempertahankan tanah air dan supaya lekas bangun dan berdikari setelah perjuangan menuntut kemerdekaan dicapai.

Merujuk pada lakaran dan catatan sejarah yang merakamkan bentuk administrasi, dan ikhtiar melahirkan kebudayaan bangsa yang tinggi dan penghasilan infrastruktur dan keupayaan intelek yang menakjubkan, ia memperlihatkan sentuhan British membangunkan Malaya tidak pernah ditandingi sampai sekarang. Ini merupakan antara kesan yang dibawa oleh penjajah dalam merencanakan dasar yang dapat dimanfaatkan oleh seluruh rakyat. Mereka membawa masuk tenaga kerja dari India dan Cina untuk membangunkan infrastruktur termoden di Malaya dan mewujudkan komposisi kaum dan posisi ekonomi yang dapat dibanggakan dan sfalsafah pendidikan dan perundangan yang selaras bagi melicinkan proses pentadbiran.


Kertas ini akan membincangkan kesan-kesan positif yang dilahirkan sepanjang penaklukan Malaya oleh British. Tempoh pendudukan yang panjang sejak awal abad ke 20 dan sehingga British merelakan Malaya mengecap kemerdekaan, telah meninggalkan memoir dan kesan yang terbaik dalam sejarah pemikiran dan intelektual di rantau Malaya ketika itu.

PEMBANGUNAN MATERI

British telah mengorak langkah yang pantas untuk membangunkan sumber materi termasuk membuka peluang ekonomi yang luas kepada penduduk tempatan melalui kegiatan perlombongan, pertanian dan perdagangan. Pihak pemerintah berusaha menggiatkan perusahaan bijih, padi, getah dan sawit, dan membawa program ekonomi yang rancak bagi mempertahankan empatyarnya di Asia. Strategi ekonomi yang ditukangi oleh Inggeris untuk menstrukturkan semula pendapatan dan pengagihan hasil bumi dan meningkatkan sumber materi telah memperlihatkan dampak yang positif dalam upayanya untuk melonjakkan kekuatan ekonomi kolonial. Sistem perladangan, pengairan, perlombongan dan pencarian gas dan petrol yang terkawal telah memangkin kekuatan dan ketangkasan ekonomi yang strategik dan memberikan asas kepada gerakan industrialisasi dan tahap kemajuan yang aggresif di Malaya.

PENINGKATAN INFRASTRUKTUR DAN PRASARANA

British telah melakarkan pembangunan yang bermakna dalam sejarah pembangunan Tanah Melayu. Keupayaan British melonjakkan pengaruh ekonomi kolonial dizahirkan dengan kecanggihan sistem pembangunan, perparitan, penerbangan dan perkapalan yang diperkenalkan dengan upaya yang keras. Struktur arsitektur dan seni bina yang signifikan dan ber dampak jauh, terukir dari kehalusan artifak medieval Eropah yang terlakar pada Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad, Masjid Jamek Kuala Lumpur, Stesen Kereta Api Tanah Melayu, Mahkamah Tinggi Lama, Mahkamah Syariah, Jabatan Penerangan Kuala Lumpur, Mahkamah Pulau Pinang, Muzium Pulau Pinang, Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh, Stesyen Kereta Ipoh dan sebagainya.
UNDANG-UNDANG

British memperkenalkan sistem undang-undang universal yang meraih asas-asas perundangan yang imperatif. Undang-undang yang diperkenalkan adalah warisan dari peradaban Helenistik dan Greek kuno yang mengalir ke Eropah sejak zaman Renaisans. British turut mengiktiraf mandat hukum yang diamalkan dalam kanun Melayu sejak kedatangan Islam ke rantau arkipelago. Undang-undang yang diperkenalkan British menekankan kepentingan mempertahankan negara hukum dan mengamalkan sistem pasaran terbuka dan memastikan keadilan untuk semua.

DEMOKRASI

British turut menempa sejarah penting dari sudut perjuangan menegakkan demokrasi di negara-negara membangun. Kerajaan Inggeris mengiktiraf semangat demokrasi yang meluncurkan asas pentadbiran yang baik dan tatakelola yang telus, prinsip moral yang fundamental dan pemerintahan politik dan pengurusan ekonomi yang adil. Pendiri demokrasi di Barat seperti Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John Adams dan sebagainya telah melahirkan sumberangan yang signifikan dalam mencanangkan pemikiran dan faham demokrasi yang universal dalam tradisi politik dunia. Ia menzahirkan idealisme politik demokrat yang menuntut pengiktirafan terhadap prinsip hukum, mempertahankan kebebasan sivil, sistem pilihannya yang adil, jaminan hak asasi, partisipasi politik, pendidikan liberal dan peluang ekonomi untuk semua bangsa.

SEJARAH


TAMADUN

Tamadun baru yang dilahirkan di Arkipelago telah mencambahkan kebudayaan dan pengaruh Islam yang kuat kesan dari dakyah pembaharuan yang dicetuskan di Mesir khususnya dari jaringan pendokong elitis al-Manar ketika itu. Tamadun Eropah yang melakarkan sejarah penting dalam politik dunia turut mengukir satu citra baru terhadap fenomena kebangkitan dan pengaruh pencerahan di kepulauan melayu. Kesan pemikiran yang tercetus sejak era renaissance di Eropah telah digerakkan dalam sejarah peradaban dunia belahan timur yang bercambah pesat di gugusan arkipelago.

Kedudukan Islam dan peradabannya yang besar menambahkan umat melayu untuk mencari penyesuaian dan memperjuangkan idealisme Islam dalam tamadunnya sendiri. British turut berperanan mengetengahkan pengaruhnya dan mengatur strategi politik yang berkesan yang menzahirkan ketinggian peradaban dan sejarahnya, dan berhasil mempengaruhi dan memberikan dampak yang besar terhadap ciri budaya, tamadun dan pemikiran bangsa melayu. Dengan ideologi dan falsafah renaissance, British membawa mandat universal untuk melonjakkan pengaruhnya dalam jalur pemikiran dan politik melayu. Pentadbiran ala-British diamalkan
secara konsisten yang membawa agenda ekonomi, politik, dan demokrasi barat dalam peradaban umat melayu.

FALSAFAH


PERKEMBANGAN TANAH MELAYU SETELAH ZAMAN PENJAJAHAN


RUJUKAN


PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL ANTECEDENTS: TWO NARRATIVES IMPACTING CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR POLITICS

Anthony Ware
School of International and Political Studies
Deakin University, Australia
anthony.ware@deakin.edu.au

ABSTRACT

This paper offers a critical analysis of the antecedents to the contemporary socio-political complexity which characterises Myanmar, by examining two significant historical narratives which help shape it. State fragility in Myanmar, and the contested nature of domestic politics, highlights deep strain in the state-society contract, a compact historically-formed over a long timeframe. It is therefore essential that contextual histories of the state-formation process inform contemporary understanding; analysis that does not take adequate account of the history of how the state came to its current condition is simplistic, if not irrelevant.

The pre-colonial and colonial periods were not one long, unchanging history, however some significant aspects of continuity have persisted since the early Bagan-era, modified by the colonial experience, and continue to resonate within the values of the current political elite. This paper argues that the modern state, as re-established by the military regime from the mid-1980s, was built in a new guise on the foundations of a combination of its monarchical and colonial predecessors. The paper, therefore, discusses each of these two narratives in turn. The first of these narratives explores traditional perceptions of power, rulership and political legitimacy, and how these perceptions of power and rulership continue to resonate within contemporary political values, presenting these as seven perceptions about power and rulership, and discussing the Buddhist basis of these thought patterns. The second narrative explores the way these values were re-shaped by the colonial experience and the history of interaction with the West, and the new values and security concerns this experience evokes.

Trying to understand the regime’s peculiar worldview is not the same as sharing or justifying it, just as taking as serious understanding of their perspective into account when formulating policies does not mean condoning any brutal behaviour. It does, however, offer significantly sharper of the contemporary context and possible futures.

Keywords: Myanmar, Political Values, History, Post-Colonialism

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORICAL POLITICAL VALUES

It would be [as much] an error to dismiss the Burmese past as irrelevant to the present or the future, as is often done in policy circles, as it would be to ignore contemporary realities and solely concentrate on history.
(Steinberg 2006:37)

Culture and political values are never static, however some significant aspects of continuity can be seen in Burmese politics since the classical Bagan empire (1057 to 1287 AD). While modified by colonial rule and the early modern period, echoes of these values continue to resonate within contemporary Burmese politics (Taylor 2009:15-16). Steinberg (2010) calls these ‘residues’ from the past, and both Taylor and Steinberg
argue that these continuities particularly reside within notions of kingship and statecraft, and the relationship between these and Buddhist concepts. “Traditional patterns of power and authority have continued to the present” (Steinberg 2006:27,37). Understanding these continuities contributes significant insight into contemporary politics.

It has been argued, for example, that Ne Win's regime (1962-1987) adopted many of the attributes and values of the various forms of government preceding it. Their,

... direct seizure of power, elimination of rivals, and separation of government from the people were all consistent with the precolonial style of government. From the colonial period came their emphasis on law and order, centralism, and efficiency; from the nationalist movement came the elements of a socialist ideology, a small governing elite, and a single party. (Silverstein 1977:32)

The modern state, as re-established by military regimes since the mid-1980s, has been built “in a new guise on the foundations of its monarchical and colonial predecessors” (Taylor 2009:375). This paper, therefore, discusses each of these two narratives in turn: traditional perceptions about power and rulership, derived from almost a millennium of Burmese monarchy prior to colonialism; and the way these values were re-shaped by the colonialism and the history of interaction with the West.

FIRST NARRATIVE: HISTORICAL BURMESE-BUDDHIST IDEOLOGY

The Tradition of Ancient Kings
It has been argued that the “guiding framework” of the modern Burmese state was laid at Bagan, the first Burmese empire, traditionally dated 1057-1287AD (Aung-Thwin 1985:199). Any understanding of contemporary Burmese society is therefore incomplete without study of the political values of these pre-colonial Burmese empires. Thus while the colonial era brought extensive change and it would be overly simplistic to suggest that the contemporary state has completely returned in character to that of the pre-colonial state, areas of continuity do persist (Taylor 2009:13). British rule did not change, for example,

the more fundamental attitudes toward power, authority, hierarchy, and governance that still profoundly influence how power is perceived and executed ... the colonial era [rather,] reinforced traditional patterns of control, and emphasis on Buddhism as a reaction against rule that was widely interpreted, at least by Burmans, as illegitimate. (Steinberg 2006:29)

All post-independence regimes have directly appealed to pre-colonial images of rulership to reinforce their own legitimacy (Matthews 1998:11).

The cultural frame in which the military as well as the civilian political leadership of Burma have defined and claimed legitimacy has been the traditional culture with its age-old symbolic images. (Maung 1991)

While little is known with certainty of the thought processes of recentmilitary governments, there is good evidence that each of the Senior Generals guiding the state since 1962 have seen themselves as continuing the tradition of the great Burman kings (Steinberg 2010:15; Haacke 2006:21). Selth (2010:21) argues that lacking democratic legitimacy to rule, the Burmese generals have “behaved as if they were continuing in a royal tradition”, emphasising those things which conferred traditional legitimacy on rulers, namely achieving unity and stability, retaining independence, and overt Buddhist patronage. This view is widely held, with abundant illustrations from the rulership of Senior Generals Ne Win (1962-1988), Saw Maung (1988-1992), and Than Shwe (1992-2011). Examples include: adopting classical royal regalia (McCarthy 2008; Steinberg 2010:83); refurbishing and constructing pagodas (Jordt 2003:69); collecting white
elephants (Skidmore 2004:88); and moving of the capital city—an action traditionally signalling the beginning of a new dynasty (Myoe 2006; Seekins 2009; Steinberg 2010:133; Rozenberg 2009:24-25). Official invitations to the stake-driving ceremony for the new pagoda in Naypyidaw, for example, opened with the phrase, “Rajahtani Naypyidaw”, literally, “the royal capital where the king resides” (Myoe 2006:14).

Authoritarianism and Traditional Values
These traditional sources of political legitimacy are enduring Burmese values. Even during the democratic period prior to the 1962 military coup, Gyi expressed concern that political power was being arrogated by authoritarian leadership, through appeal to pre-colonial monarchical socio-political values, beliefs and attitudes—and that these values were broadly held by the entire population, not just the political elite (Gyi 1983:7-13).

Steinberg similarly argues that popular uprisings in Burma, from classical times until at least the 1988 demonstrations, were not designed to change the system as much as to substitute who was in command (Steinberg 2006:22). Collignon (2001) substantiates this argument by correlating mass demonstrations with serious deterioration in economic circumstances, rather than inherently political trigger events, concluding that:

_The totalitarian power of the SLORC-SPDC generals has found more legitimacy in the traditional views of Burmese culture than the modern concept of human rights ... the root of Burma's problems may not just be the SLORC-SPDC—it may be Burma itself ... it simply never occurs to the majority of ordinary people that they are responsible ... [People] believe that their problem is the bad ruler (as opposed to bad type of government) ... A military regime ... can lay claim to legitimacy in the framework of the traditional cognitive model of Burmese society_ (Collignon 2001:79-80,83)

Gyi’s suggests that colonialism had a minimal impact on traditional values, arguing that the British “never seriously attempted to win the imagination of the people ... to their ideals,” and since they “were never in close touch with the people ... the medieval Burmese mind underwent no essential change” (Gyi 1983:8-13). He concludes that colonial rule actually reinforced more than challenged authoritarian ideas about power and rulership, while the nationalists, in their struggle for independence, attracted people to their cause by fanning into folklore stories of the splendour and order under Burman Buddhist monarchs. By the time of the Japanese invaded Burma during WWII, just 56 years after the British conquered Mandalay, most Burmans looked forward nostalgically to the establishment of a new version of that vision (Taylor 1987:218).

Buddhist-Basis of Traditional Legitimacy
Buddhism is the cornerstone of Burmese culture (Rozenberg 2009:13), and “Burmese polities have defined themselves in terms of Buddhist sources of legitimacy for more than a millennium” (Schober 2011). Philp (2004:4-5) argues that all post-independence governments have incorporated Burmese Buddhist elements into their political ideology, and sought to establish a sense of historical continuity with Burmese monarchical traditions for legitimacy and nation-building purposes. Whenever Burmese rulers, from King Anawrahta (1044-1077AD) to Than Shwe, have faced an erosion of political legitimacy they have returned to Buddhism to rebuild their position (Houtman 1999:160).

The most comprehensive ethnographic study of Theravada Buddhism in Burma was conducted by Spiro (1982), who completed his fieldwork during the 1950s, during the democratic era. According to Spiro (1982:59-70), while the radical soteriology of attaining nibbana may be the goal of many monks, this is not practical or desirable for a majority of Burmese Buddhist laypeople. Paying lip-service to doctrines of dukka (suffering) and tanha (desire), he suggests laypeople aspire to a future in which their desires are instead satisfied through the accumulation of kamma. For most Burmese, Spiro argues, this means aspiring to a better rebirth, with the outcome being an emphasis on merit-making and amassing kamma. Spiro found that even in the 1950s laypeople in poor rural villages in Upper Burma invested between 30-40% of their net disposable income on merit-making (1982:459).
Inscriptions as early as Anawrahta show many Burmese kings even viewed the accumulation of kamma as a direct means of attaining nibbana, bypassing the need for ascetic meditation (Aung-Thwin 1985:41-43; Koenig 1990:34). Those with large stores of kamma, those with hpoun (merit, glory), were highly respected. Since social position is the most clear, outward indicator of hpoun, and because social position brings additional ability for further merit-making, advancement in social position was a major ambition for most lay-Buddhists. Several scholars suggest that in practice most Burmese laypeople make accumulation of hpoun a central pursuit(Koenig 1990:42); "when applied to the laity at least, merit, wealth, and power thus became conceptually interchangeable" (Aung-Thwin 1985:46).

This tradition continues today. Burmese military rulers from Ne Win to Than Shwe have exhibited a “deep and unfeigned reverence for Buddhism, and there is no room for such claims to moral legitimacy in regularly corrupt, nepotistic, late capitalistic dictatorships” (Skidmore 2004:60). Rather, such “obsessive compulsion” towards merit-making(Jordt 2001:311)is far more complex and sincere. Tambiah is convinced that through this Ne Win, for example, was

... carefully laying claim to what is known in Theravada countries as the role of cakkavartior World Conqueror on the earthly plane, a leadership usually reserved for monarchs who establish order in the world so that Buddhist monks can get on with the process of showing, through example, the path to Enlightenment.

(Tambiah 1976)

Kamma and hpoun, and their corollary for political leadership, the ideals of dhammaraja and cakkavatti, form the basis for traditional perceptions of power and rulership. Historically, both have been perceived as ideals of rulership, and elements of these ideas reverberate in today’s Burmese political ideology. Aung San Suu Kyi, for example, even appealed to the duties and character expected of a dhammaraja in challenging the military regime, and elaborating her political ethos (Suu Kyi 1995:110).

The dhammaraja is an ideal ruler who uses their great kamma to restore political, moral and religious order—an almost messianic role (Aung-Thwin 1983; 1985:56-60). Cakkavattis similar, in Burmese thought being a universal monarch who delays their own entrance into nibbana to conquerthepro world and implement dhamma, not out of personal ambition but concern for the welfare of people beyond his realm (Taylor 2009:57). The concept is thus likewise messianic, essentially similar to the bodhisatta in the Mahayana tradition, the difference being that acakkavattiaccepts the wearisome task of political rulership and military conquest as the means to help others find the path (Aung-Thwin 1983:56-57; Tambiah 1976:46-47).

Kammaraja is a recent analytical term, coined to describe such a ruler with the most abundant store of merit among the laypeople. It therefore describes the moral, kammic legitimisation of kingship (Aung-Thwin 1985:62-64). A kammaraja is morally superior to his subjects by definition of possessing more hpoun. By virtue of being the ruler, a king is proven to be the most worthy person for the position. This is a circular argument: the right to rule is inherently demonstrated by being in the position to rule. And, because of this superior hpoun, Burmese kings were considered future Buddhas: for example the name Alaungpaya (1752-1760) is an appellation meaning, “Buddha to be” (Aung 1967:168-169), and on deathmost kings were assumed to have directly entered nibbana(Steinberg 2006:35; Aung-Thwin 1985:62-64).

Burmese chronicles record the mythical Buddhist origins of political rulership, suggesting kingship only came into existence after eons of moral decay under more democratic social structures, and that decay led to a need for people with superior moral qualities (greater hpoun) to sacrificially accept a role to lead the people, “to prevent society from lapsing into anarchy” (Koenig 1990:65-68). The ruler’s role is thus not to serve the people per se, but to serve dhamma (teaching) and bring order from chaos (also Aung-Thwin 1985:56-57). It should be noted that this ancient conceptwas explicitly repeated as recently as 1829 in The Glass Palace Chronicle, to bolster the legitimacy of King Bagyidawafter the loss of the First Anglo-Burmese War (transl. Tin & Luce 1923).

The weakness of this belief is that, while kamma conveys legitimacy on a ruler, “it confers legitimacy on any political regime—not only on the regime in authority, but on the regime that usurps its authority” (Spiro 1982:443).
The belief in karma plays a curiously paradoxical role. Conferring legitimacy on the regime in power, and at the same time providing an incentive for the overthrow of that regime, this doctrine has played an important part in the political instability that has persistently plagued Burmese history ... (it provides) powerful incentives for the usurpation of power ... (as a result Burma) has known an extraordinary incidence of usurpation of royal power. (Spiro 1982:440-442)

Seven Perceptions of Authority and Rulership
Based on the preceding analysis, Steinberg's “important residues” of ancient Burmese political ideology reverberating within contemporary politics (2010:15) can be summarised in terms of the perceptions by rulers, those under the authority, and of competing power, the application of each being identifiable in contemporary politics.

Perceptions by Rulers

#1 Legitimacy – Merit, Order & Control
Kamma provides a powerful moral authority to the social order, and kings, the pinnacle of the social order, represent “the culmination of an incredible storehouse of merit” (Spiro 1982:139-140). “No matter how morally unfit a ruler may appear to be, as long as he is able to cling to power he can claim that this hpoun (glory) is still flourishing” (Zin 2001).

In theory, Burmese kings had absolute authority. The strongest kings were charismatic figures claiming a monopoly on power, however most were caught in a web of internal and external threats, where power was limited by the need to manage rivals, the monkhood, enemies and the natural environment (Silverstein 1977:6; Steinberg 2006:31; Taylor 2009:16). Demonstrating they possessed sufficient hpoun allowed a ruler to lead with “an overwhelming reverence and awe” and loyal following by the people (Spiro 1982:139-140). The legitimacy of rulers was, thus, determined by how much of the theoretically absolute control they could demonstrate, and how well they could ensure state-controlled distribution of basic needs (Taylor 2009:56). Security and prosperity conferred legitimacy. To legitimise their right to rule, successful Burmese kings therefore had to show themselves strong militarily, politically, economically and spiritually. For example, effective kings had strong militaries (Gyi 1983; Matthews 1998; Taylor 2009:48), managed or removed rivals, placed a major emphasis on establishing unity between factions and conquered states, under ultimate loyalty to themselves (Taylor 1987:7), controlled business and trade (Taylor 1987:39), managed a “redistributive” economy with royal monopolies in key industries, and demonstrated their authority and control over the monkhood while being their chief patron (Aung-Than 1979; 1985:26-30; Lieberman 1980).

#2 Moral Responsibility – Order, Reformation & Merit
Kammaraja legitimacy comes with moral responsibility, to use the enlightened understanding to establish political and moral order, and work for the welfare and salvation of the people. Given the Burmese mythology that kingship arose out of more democratic social structures into the personalised leadership of one with greater hpoun (Koenig 1990:65-68), the responsibility of rulers is not to serve the people by providing freedom, law and order, peace, opportunity, or prosperity, but to build an ordered state around themselves, in which natural authority flowed from the top down, unity is maintained, morality is upheld, and merit-making is undertaken.

#3 Authority – Personalised, Centralised & Hierarchical
Power within this traditional ideology is finite and personalised (Steinberg 2006:37-38). It is common for power to be seen in zero-sum terms in traditional societies; in Burmاثis is related to a belief that leadership legitimacy derives from finite and personal hpoun. As a result, loyalty must be to an individual not an institution, and delegating authority (whether institutionally or personally) is both illogical and destructive unless conditions retain ultimate control (Steinberg 2010:149-157). This is the basis of Burmese patron-client
hierarchy, of factionalism and entourage systems, and historical appanage rather than feudal systems of nobility. Loyalty becomes more important than competence, because it is responsibility not power which is delegated, and competing power must be viewed as not in the national interest (Steinberg 2010:149-157).

Perceptions by the Ruled

#4 Responsibility if Strong – Comply
Not surprisingly, many of the most successful Burmese kings were not popular during their reign. Proverbs viewed kings as similar to natural calamities: something to avoid whenever possible, as one of the five evils people must endure (Koenig 1990:92; Silverstein 1977:9). On the other hand, the central role the ruler plays in creating merit-based wellbeing for the people makes compliance a moral good: “a quasi-religious duty” (Silverstein 1996:213). Theoretically, conscription of labour or confiscation of goods for merit-making creates merit for the whole population. The average peasant “did not expect the state to do anything to improve his life [showing] stoic acceptance of misfortune and the government's excessive demands and victimisation” (Silverstein 1977:10). When a Burmese ruler was in a strong position, the common response was to try to avoid interaction with authorities as much as possible (Tun 1983), and comply whenever they did come into direct contact.

#5 Responsibility if Weak – Challenge
Coercion, always inherent in the exercise of secular authority, diminishes merit, thus Burmese kings engaged extensively in merit-making activities (Koenig 1990:70). However, overly authoritarian rule can rapidly diminish ṭpoun, legitimising revolt. Throughout Burmese history, whenever the kingdom appeared weak or disunited, whenever the response of rulers to natural disasters was inadequate, and in times of transition, rivals almost invariably rebelled (Aung-Thwin 1985:63). Revolt and regicide were extremely common in Burmese history, and easily justified. Overthrow of a monarch immediately robbed that monarch of their former legitimacy, transferring that same legitimacy to the usurper.

Perceptions about Competing Power

#6 Response to Internal Rivals – Control
In this political landscape, permitting the continued existence of rival political power shows weakness, whether that is a rival leader or institution (Steinberg 2006:30-40; Silverstein 1977:7). As leaders earn legitimacy by not having rivals, either through pledges of loyalty or eliminating them in one fashion or another, historically princes and possible heirs were closely watched and often massacred, while nobles were prevented from emerging as a class with rights independent of royal authority. “The violence and cruelty of the Burmese kings is legendary”, particularly against potential rivals (Pye 1962:67). Modern ideas, such as an autonomous legislature, independent judiciary, loyal opposition, free press, civil society and even a middle or business class with a measure of independent security in private wealth are all alternative centres of power which challenge such traditional ideas, and therefore need to be controlled.

#7 Response to External Powers – Non-Dependence
Since eighteenth century British trade and diplomatic contact with Burma, successive rulers have been labelled isolationist, intransigent and xenophobic (e.g. Donnison 1970:55; Hall 1956:66). The response of many Burmese kings to contact by external rival powers was to belittle envoys, delay for considerable periods, engage in grandiose ceremony, and take uncompromising, belligerent positions (e.g. Donnison 1970:58-60; Harvey 1925:285-288).

The Burmese response was to demonstrate political and economic non-dependence, and “a desire to find solutions to local problems from within the Burmese tradition” (Silverstein 1977:4). It would seem, however, that labels of isolationism and xenophobia are a slight overstatement, and that rulers have been more concerned about not being dependent or subject to the power of other states more than being inherently xenophobic. A more appropriate term would be autarky, economic (and political) self-sufficiency (Taylor 2001:5). Burma's consistent political neutrality and non-alignment stands out. Akammaraja maintained legitimacy by ruling, not being subject or dependent upon others; dependency undermines legitimacy.
These, then, are some of the residues of pre-colonial Burmese political ideology reverberating within contemporary politics. While these perceptions of power and rulership are most readily observable in the behaviour of recent military juntas, they also pervade the whole contemporary social structure including opposition groups, local governments, ethnic minority leadership, non-government organisations, business, even academic intuitions, religious institutions and families (Steinberg 2010:157).

SECOND NARRATIVE: INTERACTION WITH THE WEST / COLONIAL EXPERIENCE

Some authorities, like Callahan (2004), are quite dismissive of the idea that traditional concepts such as cakkavatti and hpoun explain the behaviour of the post-independence military rulers and the persistence of authoritarian rule. Rather, she sees the pre-eminence of the military and the authoritarian nature of the Burmese state as derived from things like British use of warfare as the means of state-building during the colonial era (Callahan 2004:8-20). However, most scholars accept both influences as significant. A number of interconnected pathways appear to lead to Myanmar's current condition; traditional ideology being one, and another being derived from colonial and the history of interaction with the West (Taylor 2005).

Early Impressions

For many amongst the Myanmar elite, the history of interaction with the West has been overwhelmingly negative. The first recorded European visitor to Burma was in 1435, and most Europeans who arrived in Burma over the following two centuries were Portuguese merchants, missionaries and adventurers (Donnison 1970:57). The Burman kings, being slow to incorporating mercenaries into their armed forces, faced a considerable number of these adventurers serving in forces aligned against them.

In 1600, Portuguese adventurer, Filipe de Brito, converted rebel Mon groups to Catholicism and he set up his own kingdom in Syriam. Using ships to control sea trade and levy import duties, he raided Buddhist pagodas for precious stones and gold, accumulating massive wealth before the Burmese eventually defeated him, at a cost of 30,000 lives (Donnison 1970:57-59; Hall 1956:63-65; Harvey 1925:185-187; Aung 1967:135-137). This experience left deep suspicion of Europeans, and its impact should not be underestimated (Donnison 1970:59). Burman interest in trade was dampened such that in 1635, when silting in the Pegu River and peace with Siam suggested relocating the capital, the Burmans moved their capital inland, to Ava (Hall 1956:65).

As the Dutch, French then English intermittently arrived over the following years, to open trading posts and shipyards along the Burmese coast, Burmese rulers, variously showed little interest, obstructed their activities, or attempted to create their own trade monopolies.

It is not without significance that Siam, which, when forced in the next century to evacuate its capital built one at a seaport rather than further inland, managed to survive as an independent state, while Burma succumbed to foreign conquest. The chief ingredient in the failure of the Burmese kingdom was supplied not by ‘Western Imperialism’, but by the intransigence and xenophobia which radiated from the Court of Ava.
(Hall 1956:66)

In 1742, during the bitter rivalries between the Mon and Burman that eventually brought down the Second Burmese Empire, Burman forces sacked the foreign settlements at Syriam (Hall 1956:76). This incident greatly coloured European perceptions of the Burmese. A decade later the British invaded Negrais to pre-empt a predicted French incursion. King Alaungpaya wrote to King George II offering recognition in exchange for trade and arms, but a lack of reply then a British withdrawal was seen to confirm Burman suspicions, culminating in another massacre of foreigners in 1759 (Hall 1956:80). The French tried one more time, obtaining permission for a shipyard in Rangoon, however their support for a failed Mon rebellion in 1768 led to a further massacre. The Burmans became convinced that both the French and English were arming and supporting rebels to overthrow their rule.

There can be little doubt that these incidents coloured views on both sides, resulting in deep distrust which has not been overcome to this day. By the time the British sent their first genuinely political envoy,
Captain Michael Symes, on in 1795, “The British encountered little but hostility and deliberately imposed humiliation” (Donnison 1970:58; see also Harvey 1925:283-285). The Burmese, for their part, felt insulted at being sent envoys from British viceroy’s rather than the king (Harvey 1925:286). British delegations were accompanied by escorts designed to intimidate, and pressed for a treaty of “subsidiary alliance” (Hall 1956:99-100), something impossible for a Burmese king without robbing him of political legitimacy.

Three Anglo-Burmese Wars
Burma was colonised through three brutal wars. The first war (1824-1826) has been called the “worst-managed war in British military history” (Hall 1956:103-105). Despite the British eventual victory, forty-five percent of the 40,000 British troops, including most of the Europeans, died when troops were cut-off from supplies. While the Arakan and Tenasserim were lost, the war gave hope to the Burmese that the British lacked real military might.

A blockade of Rangoon less than thirty years later triggered a second war (1852-1853). The British annexed Lower Burma quickly and decisively, leaving the Burmese shocked and overwhelmed (Hall 1956:107-115). When the British did not withdraw as anticipated, after a brief show of force, the Burmese feared a full takeover. The annexed territory responded with a grass-roots rebellion that required 10,000 additional troops three years to pacify. The British were surprised that even after defeat the Burmese were neither submissive nor inclined to conduct trade negotiations. Envoys “had to encounter all the arts of subterfuge, evasion and studied rudeness, with which earlier envoys had had to contend” (Hall 1956:115). A tense, three-decade standoff resulted, culminating in a third war (1885-1886). It has been argued that the decision to invade Upper Burma was ultimately dictated by powerful British capitalists eager to defend their personal financial interests (Webster 2000:1025), the trigger being a trade dispute over the amount of teak logged in Burmese territory.

Defeating the main Burmese army in just months, the British anticipated they would be welcomed as liberators from the despotic king Thibaw. Having boasted that they could take Mandalay with as few as 500 men, they were unprepared for the resulting rebellion that required an additional 40,500 troops and five years to quell (Hall 1956:143; Taylor 2009).Colonial literature speaks of armed gangs of robbers roaming the country, but today many scholars recognise this as a rapidly-organising grass-roots rebellion targeted against the British (e.g. Aung & Aung-Thwin 2008).

The brutal pacification of this popular rebellion contributed seriously to the Burmese experience of colonialism. The Burmese were “stunned and terror-stricken” by the British “subjection by terror” and “promiscuous shooting” of locals (Geary 1886:236,45,248). A key rational for the war had been the supposed brutality of king Thibaw. Ordinary Burmese expressed horror at the British cruelty:

*The British adopted a “strategic-hamlet” strategy: villages were burned, and families who had supplied rebels, and villages with their headmen were uprooted from their homes and sent away to Lower Burma.*

(Aung & Aung-Thwin 2008)

Such reports echo the infamous four-cuts strategy of Ne Win against ethnic insurgents.

The Colonial Experience
The subsequent Burmese experience of colonialism substantially differed from that of the rest of British India. Central to Burma’s particularly negative experiences were: direct rule rather than rule through local hierarchies; integration of Burma into British India despite little shared culture or history, and; importation of large numbers of Indians for the administration and economic development of Burma. Many Burmese view direct rule as the result of Burmese non- acquiescence to Britain’s commercial and strategic desires (Thant Myint-U 2001:198). Because of its harshness and lack of consideration of Burmese culture, history and identity, “The Burmese regarded British government as an even greater evil than Burmese monarchy had been, with most of its vices but few of its virtues” (Taylor 2009:117).
Indian Migration

Seeing the Burmese as unmotivated workers, the colonial administration relied heavily on Indian migration. Subsidising travel costs (Taylor 2009:107), Rangoon soon had the world's highest rate of migration, outstripping even New York (Charney 2009:18). By 1921 some 55% of Rangoon was Indian (Charney 2009:22), and 480,000 new Indian migrants arrived in 1927 alone (Hall 1956:143). Indians had a disproportionate influence in government and trade, were the largest landowners in Lower Burma, provided most of the finance for agricultural development, and had “a virtual monopoly” in key areas of the civil service (Donnison 1970:91; Taylor 2009:135-136). Most Indians stayed only 2-4 years, taking their earnings with them when they returned home (Taylor 2009:147). By the 1930s, the majority of Burmese in Lower Burma were landless labourers occupying the lowest rung of the social hierarchy in their own country (Hall 1956:160), while the economy was built on migrant workers who lacked social bonding to Burma, did not intend on settling in the country, and felt no motivation for self-sacrifice for the good of the community (Taylor 2009:78).

Imported Indian labour “erected a barrier between Burmans and the modern world that has never been broken down” (Taylor 1995:52 quoting Furnivall 1941:46). Europeans wanting to work in the Indian Civil Service in Burma had to pass exams in Hindustani, not Burmese (Charney 2009:2,28). Few British spoke more than marketplace Burmese, and a majority of Burmese spoke no English at all (Donnison 1970:93-97). British colonial presence in Burma was thus “much more superficial, at least as far as political culture is concerned” than that of the rest of the sub-continent (Perry 2007:21). The Burmese, an ethnic minority in the major cities of their own country, gained little or none of the benefits of the booming economy (Donnison 1970:89; Charney 2009:30,44). These dynamics exacerbated, not ameliorated, pre-existing Burmese concerns.

Ethnic Policies

The British classified the ethnic Burman majority as a ‘martial race’, a threat to order and stability, and concluded that the ethnic minorities needed protection from them. Thus two Burmas were created: ‘Ministerial Burma’, in areas dominated by the Burman majority, was under direct rule and subject to British legal, administrative and educational oversight; while ‘Frontier Areas’, in areas populated by ethnic minorities, were left under the control of traditional rulers and chiefs, and saw little investment or infrastructure development (Smith 1994:22; Thant Myint-U 2001:15-16; Taylor 2005:12). Both sides had grievance against the other over this arrangement. Karen, Kachin and Chin minorities were actively recruited into the army and police to control Ministerial Burma, alongside Indian forces. Burmans were not admitted until WWI (Smith 1994:22; Taylor 2005:100). Even by 1940, just 12% of the Burmese army were Burman (despite constituting 2/3 of the population), while Karen, Chin and Kachin (10% of the population) made up over 75% of the army (Steinberg 1982:60).

Any chance of progress in ethnic relations was shattered by WWII, when Aung San's national liberation army fought with the Japanese against many minority regiments who stayed loyal to the British (Smith 1994:22-23). Tens of thousands died in subsequent bloody clashes and retaliatory killings. Ethnic minority leaders have frequently said these war massacres led to their resolve to take up arms after independence, if their political demands were not met. Much of the ethnic hostility which erupted in Burma at independence has thus been attributed to the events of the war, exacerbated by the disparity in colonial treatment.

Some scholars argue that race was not a significant issue in Burma prior to colonialism; that wars before that time had been about political and personal power politics rather than racially motivated (e.g. Houtman 1999:68; Steinberg 2006:25). “The colonial authorities' insistence upon racial distinctiveness gave ethnicity a greater centrality in political thought than it had previously had” (Taylor 2009:150). Ethnic divisions today “have become the major political factor facing the society” (Steinberg 2006:25).

Colonial Administration

British administration in Burma was thus,
incomparably more authoritative and effective than any other that Burma has ever known ... It was a highly centralized and paternalistic system, not at all unlike that imposed by the Burmese kings—except that it was vastly more effective (and to that extent more burdensome) and of course, that it was imposed by foreigners (Donnison 1970:77,83)

Rather than re-constructing Burmese political values, the case could be made that the colonial administration actually overwhelmingly reinforced traditional ideas about political power being legitimised through centralised control, while demonstrating a far more efficient means to exert that control down to the village level (Steinberg 2006:29). While local representation was introduced shortly before independence, the very short and limited experience of democracy under colonialism give little time for new European values to take root. For most of the colonial period, the British ruled by decree and maintained control by retaining the right to arbitrarily suspend the law and declare a state of exception (Silverstein 1977:23). They maintained control, as Duffield expresses it, “by holding self-reliant populations on the threshold of emergency” and keeping them independent of the state in terms of their welfare and social survival (Duffield 2008). It could be argued that recent Burmese military regimes largely just perpetuate patterns demonstrated by the British.

**The YMBA & the Hsaya San Rebellion**

Burmese nationalism and opposition to British rule simmered continually. The Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) was formed in 1906 amongst newly educated young urban Burmese, initially to promote Buddhism and Burmese culture in education and literature. By 1917, less than thirty years after the end of the third war, they had taken on the function of a political party and were advocating self-rule—then led mass strikes and street protests against the British in 1920, enlisting large numbers of monks in scenes very reminiscent of the mass demonstrations of 1962, 1988 and 2007. Gyi's opinion is that, had Burma been given independence at this point in time, a complete reversion to a monarchical system would have been not unlikely (Gyi 1983:87).

When an earthquake nearly destroyed Pegu in 1930, the astrologer-monk, Hsaya San, became convinced that this disaster reflected the diminished hpoun of the British, and hence was an omen of the end of colonial rule. Raising a following amongst exceptionally poor villagers, Saya San, was declared king and launched a 2-year rebellion. One cause of this rebellion was the severe crash in rice prices during the Great Depression; the other was simmering anti-British sentiment. The untrained rebels had very few weapons, mostly just amulets and charms meant to keep British weapons from harming them; however, the British response was harsh and authoritarian. By 1932 some 10,000 had been killed and 9,000 captured, with mass executions and burning of villages. Photos of decapitated heads were posted at police stations across the country as a deterrent, inadvertently fanning nationalist sentiment. The British marvelled at their superstition without recognising the alienation and depth of feeling the peasants had against foreign rule (Aung 1967:290-292; Charney 2009:13-17).

One of the most significant concerns held by Burmese nationalists was that colonialism forced secularism onto the deeply religious people (Schober 2011), thus one key aspect of Burmese post-colonialism has thus an attempt to reclaim many traditional Burmese Buddhist values and practice felt.

**RELEVANCE OF THESE NARRATIVES**

There can be no doubt that other narratives have also contributed to the formation of the contemporary Myanmar socio-political context. It has already been noted that Taylor (2005) proposes a multiplicity of pathways to the present. The Burma Independence Army (BIA), for example, which emerged after Independence as the premier national institution (Haacke 2006:13; Callahan 2004), was an almost exclusively Burman army formed to drive the British out of Burma. With a majority of the colonial soldiers and civil servants being from ethnic minorities, the BIA was birthed with political motivations and steeped in ethnic tension (Taylor 2009:234-236).
Aligned Movement during the Cold War, multiple foreign support for a wide variety of ethnic insurgencies, late inclusion into ASEAN (well after the spectacular growth of the Asian Tiger economies), and the recent rise of China, are each also significant narratives impacting current politics. Nonetheless, the two narratives highlighted in this paper are among the most profound in the depth and duration of their influence on fundamental Burmese political values, particularly understandings of power and rulership, and thus significantly illuminate recent history and the contemporary socio-political context.

It is not difficult to see the imprint of these historical ‘residues’ reverberating in the political machinations after Independence. For example, Burma's complete departure from the British Commonwealth at Independence stemmed from the nationalist belief that Burma would never truly be free of foreign control while she remained within the Commonwealth (Steinberg 2001:44). The dream for a unified Burmese state had been held together by Aung San, who had persuaded most ethnic minorities to put aside their concerns and join the union. The assassination of Aung San and most of his cabinet just before Independence allowed a resurgence of ethnic antagonism, and plunged the country into a plethora of disunited armed rebellions. This period demonstrates the continuation of traditional ideas about power and rulership, and concerns over foreign domination.

On independence, Prime Minister U Nu sought to fortify his political legitimacy by turning to devout, public Buddhist patronage (Schober 2011:78-82). While the success of such traditional legitimacy was less than in previous times (Taylor 2009:290-292), it worked to a certain extent: some certainly saw U Nu as a new, benevolent and righteous dhammaraja ruler, demonstrating a measure of legitimacy in the traditional values. Likewise, Ne Win drew on traditional values when he legitimised his 1962 coup as being to maintain national unity by preventing ethnic splintering, eradicating insurgency, protecting state sovereignty against outside control and defending Buddhism (Steinberg 2001:52,61). The subsequent isolationism, autarky, socialism, and military-bureaucratic rule all resonate with the impact of these two narratives.

The military elite led the Burmese masses back into their old familiar ground of pre-democratic life style and values ... Despite its facade of constitutional apparatus and formal rules, Burma is ruled by Ne Win in the role of absolute monarch.
(Gyi 1983:125,192,225)

Two and a half decades later, in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed control during a time of similar economic and civil unrest. In their own eyes, SLORC stepped in to save the country from chaos, disintegration, and foreign subjugation.

At a time when the mother land Union was on the brink of being burnt down to ashes by hellfires in the 1988 disturbances, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Tatmadaw) saved it in the nick of time. It then endeavoured to avert the terrible fate in store for the nation and build it up into a mountain of gold.
(in Skidmore 2004:79)

While many civilians protested, “Many officers remain convinced that only the armed forces can keep Burma united, and that a democratic government would be harmful for the country” (Pedersen 2008:25-27). SLORC justified the coup through its Three Main National Causes, stating the regime's priorities were to ensure “non–disintegration of the union”, “non–disintegration of solidarity”, and “perpetuation of national sovereignty” (Kaungbon 1994). Subsequent State Protection and Development Council (SPDC) and Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) governments have maintained these priorities, and the same narratives continue to inform the current slow political evolution. These priorities resound with fears derived from the colonial narrative. It is noteworthy that SLORC/SPDC articulated the goal of national unity in terms of “reconsolidation” under a single, centralised rule, not through reconciliation. This very paternalistic outlook sees need for the state to oversee the economy, morals, culture and patriotism, and to protect a gullible public from foreign domination and control, in very traditional power terms. Many aspects of traditional ideology persist within this thinking.
As we weigh up whether or not we are currently experiencing the beginnings of significant political change in Myanmar, an appreciation of the historical formation of political values and the dominant long-term political narratives informing current politics is highly relevant. Recent OECD (2007:23) research advises that where there is a long history of state fragility, it is essential contextual histories of the state-formation process, such as this one, inform of understanding of the socio-political context.

This paper contends that analysis which does not take adequate account of the history of how the state came to its current condition is simplistic, if not irrelevant (Steinberg 2010:149), and offers two major historical narratives contributing significantly to current Burmese political values about power and rulership.

REFERENCE LIST


Tun, Than. 1983. ‘Social Life in Burma in the 16th Century.’ *Southeast Asian Studies*, 21 (3).


DUMAI, RIAU INDONESIA: FROM A FISHING VILLAGE TO THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

Anastasia Wiwik Swastiwi
Balai Pelestarian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Tanjungpinang Indonesia
wiwik_tpi@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

This paper offers a critical analysis of the antecedents to the contemporary socio-political complexity which characterises Myanmar, by examining two significant historical narratives which help shape it. State fragility in Myanmar, and the contested nature of domestic politics, highlights deep strain in the state-society contract, a compact historically-formed over a long timeframe. It is therefore essential that contextual histories of the state-formation process inform contemporary understanding; analysis that does not take adequate account of the history of how the state came to its current condition is simplistic, if not irrelevant.

The pre-colonial and colonial periods were not one long, unchanging history, however some significant aspects of continuity have persisted since the early Bagan-era, modified by the colonial experience, and continue to resonate within the values of the current political elite. This paper argues that the modern state, as re-established by the military regime from the mid-1980s, was built in a new guise on the foundations of a combination of its monarchical and colonial predecessors. The paper, therefore, discusses each of these two narratives in turn. The first of these narratives explores traditional perceptions of power, rulership and political legitimacy, and how these perceptions of power and rulership continue to resonate within contemporary political values, presenting these as seven perceptions about power and rulership, and discussing the Buddhist basis of these thought patterns. The second narrative explores the way these values were re-shaped by the colonial experience and the history of interaction with the West, and the new values and security concerns this experience evokes.

Trying to understand the regime’s peculiar worldview is not the same as sharing or justifying it, just as taking as serious understanding of their perspective into account when formulating policies does not mean condoning any brutal behaviour. It does, however, offer significantly sharper of the contemporary context and possible futures.

Keywords: Myanmar, Political Values, History, Post-Colonialism

DUMAI, RIAU INDONESIA: DARI KAMPUNG NELAYAN KE KOTA INDUSTRI

ABSTRAK

Pada umumnya di Asia Tenggara, perkembangan kota-kota modern banyak dibentuk berdasarkan warisan sejarah masa sebelumnya.Dalam dinamika sejarahnya, banyak kota-kota itu terlahir sebagai akibat pusat-pusat politik tradisional seperti pusat-pusat istana kerajaan, pusat-pusat perkembangan perdagangan seperti di pelabuhan atau wilayah pesisir pantai.

Kota Dumai merupakan salah satu wilayah di Riau yang berbatasan dengan wilayah negara lain yaitu Malaysia. Pada awalnya, Dumai hanyalah sebuah kampung nelayan yang sepi, berada di pesisir Timur Riau, Indonesia.Dumai kemudian menjadi salah satu puing masuk bagi daerah Riau Daratan. Kota ini telah berubah dan berkembang menjadi sebuah Kota Industri. Kertas ini akan mengupas tentang perkembangan Kota Dumai sejak awal
pertumbuhannya dari sebuah kampung nelayan menjadi sebuah kota industri dan dinamika masyarakatnya.

**Kata Kunci:** Kampung Nelayan, Kota Industri, Dinamika Masyarakat

**PENGENALAN**


Pada awalnya, Dumai hanyalah sebuah dusun nelayan yang sepi, berada di pesisir Timur Propinsi Riau, Indonesia. Kini, Dumai yang kaya dengan minyak bumi itu, menjelma menjadi kota pelabuhan minyak yang sangat ramai sejak tahun 1999. Kilang-kilang minyak tumbuh menjamur di sekitar pelabuhan. Dumai kemudian menjadi salah satu pintu gerbang utama bagi daerah Riau Daratan. Kota ini telah berubah dan berkembang menjadi sebuah Kota Industri dan Kota Pelabuhan Minyak yang dilengkapi dengan tangk-tangki penyimpanan minyak dan instalasi lainnya. Dumai juga memiliki potensi ekonomi lainnya yaitu memiliki industri pemrosesan Crude Palm Oil (CPO); pengembangan industri garmen, tekstil, listrik dan kimia; pelabuhan kontainer yang mendukung ekspor gas alam; industri minyak yang mengolah 170 ribu barrel/hari; jalur kereta api di Lubuk Gaung dan Pelintung; transportasi kapal tanker untuk ekspor minyak; industri real estate seluas 130 ha di Pelintung dan industri perikanan seluas 500 ha.

Melihat perkembangan Kota Dumai yang semula hanyalah sebuah dusun nelayan yang sepi kemudian berkembang menjadi kota industri dan kota pelabuhan minyak tentulah memiliki dinamika sejarahnya yang berbeda dengan dinamika sejarah perkembangan kota-kota lain di Indonesia.

**TERBENTUKNYA KAMPUNG DUMAI**

Banyak versi yang menyatakan tentang sejak kapan Dumai itu dibangun. Kapan Dumai dibangun, secara konkrit belum dapat dipastikan (Muchtar Lutfi; 1998), tetapi menurut perkiraan Dumai telah berdiri sekitar abad 18. Perkiraan Dumai telah berdiri sekitar abad 18 yang dibuat oleh Tim Penyusunan dan Penulisan

---

3. Tiga kabupaten di Provinsi Riau yang berbatasan dengan wilayah negara Malaysia yaitu Kabupaten Rokan Hilir, Kabupaten Bengkalis dan Kota Dumai.
4. Lihat Biro Pusat Statistik 2005

Dari hasil wawancara dengan tokoh tua Kota Dumai Nazaruddin (70 tahun), menyatakan bahwa:

“Dumai pada masa lalu menjadi tempat berladangnya orang-orang yang berasal dari Pulau Rupat. Daerah pertama yang didiami adalah sekitar Pangkalan Sesai daerah hulu Sungai Dumai sekarang.”

Sebagai bukti ditemui sungai bernama Sungai mesjid dan benteng dari Tanah yang dikenal dengan Benteng Aceh.

**DUMAI : KAMPUNG NELAYAN**

Secara tertulis nama Dumai sudah ada pada tahun 1927 yang dapat dilihat dari beberapa peninggalan sejarah yang ditemui, dan dari dokumen sejarah yang ada. Dumai telah disebut masa sejak masa Pemerintahan Siak dan pemerintahan penjajahan Belanda dengan sebutan *Underdistrik van of Dumai* (Bahasa Belanda yang di dalam bahasa Indonesia setara dengan daerah kelurahan/desa atau kampung saat ini) yang beribukotakan di Batu Panjang sebagai daerah di bawah atau kampung atau kecamatan adalah Bukit Batu (Kabupaten Bengkalis). Dari dokumen itu dapat diinterpretasikan bahwa pada era 1930-an Dumai merupakan dusun nelayan kecil, penduduknya hanya beberapa keluarga saja yang berada di pinggiran pantai.


Menemukan eksplorasi minyak yang berhasil di wilayah Mandau oleh tim penelitian dari amerika SCOAL pada tahun 1924, kemudian kekalahan tentara Jepang dan perjuangan rakyat merebut kembali Indonesia dari tangan Belanda dan pemerintahan Indonesia dapat berjalan dengan baik turut menghantar perkembangan terbentuknya Kepenghuluan Dumai.


Kepenghuluan Dumai tidak terlalu lama, guna mempercepat pertumbuhan dan jalan pemerintahan apalagi ketika itu Dumai menjadi salah satu kawasan pelabuhan. Pemerintah segera mempersiapkan Dumai menjadi kecamatan karena Dumai merupakan daerah yang strategis untuk pelabuhan bagi mendukung perkembangan Dumai.

Pada tahun 1962, Dumai menjadi kecamatan dipimpin pejabat sementara kecamatan yaitu Tengku Harun dan kemudian baru mulai dianugerahkan kecamatan oleh Pemerintah dengan jalan pertama Tengku Masدلhak menjadi camat pertama Dumai dan menempatkan kantor administrasi di jalan Pertamina.

Pada tahun 1979, Dumai kembali dimekarkan menjadi Kota administrasi dengan memiliki tiga daerah kecamatan, Kecamatan Dumai Timur, Dumai Barat, Bukit Kapur dengan walikota pertama Wan Dahlan


Perkembangan Dumai sebagai kecamatan yang berada di bawah Kabupaten Bengkalis berbanding terbalik dengan keadaan Dumai sebagai kota pelabuhan. Letak Dumai yang strategis terutama sebagian besar pantainya yang dilindungi Pulau Rupat sehingga terlindung dari keganasan ombak Selat Melaka, dan letaknya yang sangat dekat dengan negara tetangga seperti Malaysia dan Singapura menyebabkan pemerintah pusat mengambil kebijakan mengembangkan Dumai sebagai kawasan pelabuhan dan kawasan industri, khususnya minyak.

Ketika itu, status pelabuhan Dumai merupakan kantor wilayah yang membawahi tiga provinsi yaitu Riau, Sumatera Barat, dan Jambi. PN Pertamina menempatkan Dumai sebagai salah satu unit dari beberapa unit yang ada, yaitu Unit VI. Keberadaan industri strategis dan vital di Dumai serta letaknya yang tidak jauh dari perbatasan internasional menyebabkan pihak ABRI dan Polri memindahkan Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim) 0203 dari ibu kotakabupaten ke Dumai.


Dumai Barat yang ibu kotanya Purnama sesuai dengan PP Nomor 8 Tahun 1979, ibukotanya sesuai dengan PP Nomor 8 Tahun 1979, ibu kota Kecamatan Dumai Timur tetap berada di wilayah Kelurahan Teluk Binjai, bukan di Kelurahan Tanjung Palas.

**DUMAI : KOTA INDUSTRI**

Perubahan status Dumai yang sebelumnya dibawah Kabupaten Bengkalis menjadi Kota Dumai sesuai dengan UU no. 16 Tahun 1999 sangat memberikan warna perkembangan baru tersendiri terhadap Kota Dumai itu sendiri.7 Sesuai dengan letak wilayah yang sangat strategis, Kota Dumai sudah sejak lama dikenal dengan kota pelabuhan dan daerah pengolahan minyak. Hal yang terpenting semuanya adalah diberlakukannya Undang-Undang No. 32 Tahun 2001 sangat memberikan angin segar terhadap pembangunan di Provinsi Riau khususnya Kota Dumai.

Perkembangan Kota Dumai sejak diberlakukannya Otonomi daerah dan perubahan status menjadi Kota Dumai mengalami perkembangan yang signifikan. Beberapa proyek investasi tumbuh di Kota Dumai. Dumai bahkan lebih dikenal sebagai kota industri. Untuk lebih dapat memahami Dumai sebagai sebuah kota industri, tentunya haruslah mengacu pada sebuah konsep mengenai kota itu sendiri.

**DEFINISI KOTA**


Mengacu pada definisi yang dipaparkan diatas mempunyai diantara setidaknya dapat diambil kesimpulan bahwa sebenarnya pola penerapan penataan kota, ruang dan wilayah di suatu daerah bertujuan untuk memajukan tingkat kehidupan masyarakat menjadi lebih baik atau masyarakat menjadi lebih sejahtera. Tata ruang dapat memberikan kesejahteraan bagi para penduduknya ialah dengan memenuhi aspek kegiatan sosial, kegiatan, ekonomi, dan kegiatan lingkungan hidup yang ada di daerah sekitar kawasan tersebut.8

---

7 Sejak Batam lepas dari Provinsi Riau dan tergabung dalam Provinsi Kepulauan Riau, Kota Dumai merupakan salah satu andalan Pemerintah Kota Provinsi Riau sebagai daerah pengganti Batam.

8 Untuk menjaga situasi ekologi di perkotaan Menteri Dalam Negeri pada tahun 1988 mengeluarkan instruksi MENDAGRI No 14 / 1988 dimana di salah satu poinnya adalah setiap kota harus menyediakan ruang terbuka hijau hingga 40 sampai 60 persen.
POTENSI KOTA DUMAI

Kota Dumai memiliki beberapa keunggulan yang menjadi kekuatan utama, mengapa Kota Dumai menjadi daerah utama tujuan pembangunan Provinsi Riau, bahkan kawasan pantai timur Sumatera. Keunggulan-keunggulan tersebut meliputi:

Memiliki letak geografis yang strategis. Dilihat dari sisi geografis, maka Kota Dumai memiliki keunggulan yang paling menonjol apabila dibandingkan dengan daerah lainnya berupa keunggulan internal dan eksternal.

Lingkungan internal
1. Kota Dumai berhadapan langsung dengan Selat Rupat dan Selat Malaka sehingga Kota Dumai menjadi salah satu Pelabuhan Samudera yang paling potensial di jalur perhubungan laut di kawasan Selat Malaka yang merupakan salah satu jalur perhubungan laut terpadat di dunia, sehingga Pelabuhan Dumai menjadi pelabuhan laut yang paling strategis bagi kegiatan ekspor dan impor, terutama hasil minyak bumi, kelapa sawit, CPO dan produk non migas lainnya serta hasil produksi rakyat.
2. Terletak di tengah-tengah intensitas jalur perhubungan darat dan laut dan berdekan dengan negara tetangga Malaysia khususnya Malaka dan Negeri Sembila serta Singapura serta daerah tingkat II yang kaya, maka Kota Dumai sangat layat menjadi pusat perdagangan.
3. Merupakan pusat pengolahan (Center of prosessing oil) hasil tambak minyak di Provinsi Riau berupa kilang hydrocreaker Puteri Tujuh, kilang pengolahan CPO dan pusat distribusi arus barang ekspor, impor dan jasa.
4. Mempunyai keunggulan menjadi sentral kawasan industri di Provinsi Riau.
5. Terletak dan dikelilingi oleh kawasan hinterland yang kaya di Propinsi Riau yang memerlukan produk jasa yang dimiliki oleh Kota Dumai.
6. Merupakan puncat gerbang masuknya masuknya wisatawan domestik dan manca negara untuk kawasan pantai timur Sumatera.
7. Merupakan kawasan yang potensial dikembangkan sebagai kawasan wisata buatan dan pantai serta wisata sejarah.
9. Memiliki potensi budidaya perikanan laut, karena ditunjang oleh kondisi laut yang masih alami dan bersih.
10. Memiliki tingkat stabilitas keamanan yang tinggi yang ditunjang oleh nilai budaya masyarakat bagi mendukung kelancaran aktivitas pembangunan.

Lingkungan eksternal
Selain memiliki keunggulan internal tersebut, Kota Dumai memiliki keunggulan lingkungan eksternal berupa:

1. Sebagai daerah pemasok kebutuhan, karena berhampiran dengan kawasan hinterland yang sangat berkembang pesat yaitu Batam, Bintan, Singapura dan Malaysia.
3. Dapat dijadikan pusat perhubungan udara Provinsi Riau bagian utara.

Perkembangan dan kemajuan pembangunan Kota Dumai bahkan jauh melebihi ibukota Kabupaten Bengkalis sebagai kabupaten induk yang merupakan pusat pemerintahan yang telah berlangsung cukup lama, padahal pada waktu itu, Kota Dumai masih merupakan salah satu kecamatan yang berdekan sangat dengan yang lain yaitu kecamatan Dumai dan kecamatan Bukit Kapur yang masih sepi. Kemudian kecamatan tersebut terus berkembang dan kemajuan yang lebih pesat terjadi tatkala Kota Dumai ditingkatkan tarafnya menjadi sebuah Kota Administratif. Kota administratif ini terus berkembang dan kemajuannya lebih tersebarlah tatkala...
impian dan keinginan seluruh komponen masyarakat Kota Dumai yang telah berjuang sekuat tenaga selama lebih dari 20 tahun terwujud. Kota Dumai resmi menjadi Kotamadya dengan ibukotanya Dumai.

Saat ini setelah satu dasawarsa peningkatan taraf tersebut, Kota Dumai telah berkembang maju dan wilayah pemerintahannya saat ini terdiri dari lima kecamatan dengan 32 kelurahan serta dengan luas wilayah keseluruhan lebih kurang 1.727,385 km2.

ANALISA

Terdapat beberapa pandangan yang berkaitan dengan perubahan suatu kawasan dan sekitarnya sebagai bagian dari suatu kawasan perkotaan yang lebih luas, menurut Gallion dalam The Urban Pattern9 disebutkan bahwa perubahan suatu kawasan dan sebagian kota dipengaruhi letak geografis suatu kota. Hal ini sangat berpengaruh terhadap perubahan akiat pertumbuhan daerah di kota tersebut, apabila terletak di daerah pantai yang landai, pada jaringan transportasi dan jaringan hubungan antar kota, maka kota akan cepat tumbuh sehingga beberapa elemen kawasan kota akan cepat berubah.

Berdasarkan uraian di atas, perkembangan Kota Dumai memiliki karakteristik yang melalui beberapa tahap mengikuti tahap perkembangan kota yang pernah dilakukan oleh J. M. Houston (2002). J.M. Houston berpendapat bahwa karakteristik perkembangan kota melalui tiga tahap berikut:


PENUTUP

Kota Dumai merupakan pelabuhan samudera yang besar dipersepsi timur pulau Sumatera, sekaligus merupakan pelabuhan ekspor dan impor yang menghasilkan jutaan dollar setiap tahunnya. Setelah pemekaran Propinsi Riau menjadi dua propinsi yaitu Propinsi Riau dan Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, lalu disusul pemekaran Kabupaten Bengkalis menjadi empat daerah tingkat II, maka perhatian mulai tertuju ke Kota Dumai, sebagai sebuah kota yang terletak dipersepsi timur pulau Sumatera atau lebih tepatnya bahagian utara Propinsi Riau, yang merupakan alternative untuk dijadikan potensi pembangunan Propinsi Riau. Berdasarkan teori morfologi kota dan potensi geografisnya, Kota Dumai menjanjikan prospek ke depan yang dapat mempercepat proses pembangunan di Provinsi Riau pasca terbentuknya Provinsi Riau Kepulauan.

Sebagai sebuah kota besar dalam sistem pemerintahan Indonesia yang baru hasil pemekaran Kabupaten Bengkalis, maka sudah barang tentu Kota Dumai mempunyai otonomi sendiri, tetapi sebagai sebuah kota yang baru pula, sudah pasti akan masih banyak ditemukan kekurangan-kekurangan dalam berbagai segi, walaupun data-data serta informasi yang rinci mengenai kondisi dan potensi berkembang yang diperlukan telah cukup tersedia di Dumai, melalui dinas dan instansi terkait Kota Dumai, namun dari sisi kebijakan dan bisnis, data-data dan informasi tersebut belum menyakinkan untuk ditindak-lanjuti, sehingga sampai hari ini pembangunan masih belum optimal.

9 Gallion. The Urban Pattern City Planning and Design. London. 1963


BIBLIOGRAFI

Gallion. The Urban Pattern City Planning and Design. London. 1963
http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kota
http://www.brainyquote.com/words/ci/city144378.html
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/city
http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kota
http://www.brainyquote.com/words/ci/city144378.html
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/city
EDUCATIONAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION BASED ON POTENTIAL REGIONAL SOURCES

Robert Tua Siregar
Simalungun University, Indonesia
tuasir@gmail.com / tuasir@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The centralized system of government that runs for 32 (thirty two) years is considered as a government that is not conducive to regional development. Development policies of the central government has created a uniform pattern of development that do not meet local demands are very varied. In addition, development policy as long as it has created a dependency of local government and its officials on the pattern of "please-and the instructions to await instructions from the center". In turn, local governments do not have sufficient capacity to create development policies that they could sponge local needs. Handler will be done with this education contribute to the allocation of funding and knowledge transfer to the school age, especially the middle level. For that Simalungun District that has had a policy of agricultural potential.

The existence of local government on regional autonomy, according to its function separately manage national resources are available diwilayahnya, which includes: natural resources, man-made resources, and human resources available in the area and is responsible for maintaining environmental sustainability in accordance with the legislation. By that one of them is in the field of education that can give service to the community. Implementation is of course to increase public welfare. For the out put of education is expected to influence significantly to the region and the individual. This can be done if governments give attention to the source potential, so that the achievements adjusted to source potential. By giving attention to this, the expected output can be used on the area of education is appropriate to local needs.

By using a combination of qualitative of quantitative methods of the obtained results followed by penenzooningan territory. Conduct zoning location needs, namely: Region Simalungun upstream / above a concentration of vocational education in agriculture horticulture, animal husbandry, fisheries, tourism and production management technology. Middle Simalungun region will give the concentration of the SMK in the field of management of the potential of agricultural products coffee, chocolate, food, livestock, fisheries, technology management and Tourism. Simalungun region downstream / down will give the concentration field of vocational education in the management of crop production potential of plantations, commodity cassava, cocoa, livestock, fisheries, pengelohan and automotive technology.

Keywords: Policy Implementation, Regional Sources
IMPLEMENTASI KEBIJAKAN PENDIDIKAN BERBASIS SUMBER POTENSI DAERAH

ABSTRAK

Sistem pemerintahan yang sentralisitik yang berjalan selama 32 tahun dianggap sebagai pemerintahan yang tidak kondusif bagi pembangunan regional. Kebijakan pembangunan pemerintah pusat telah menciptakan pola pembangunan yang seragam yang tidak memenuhi tuntutan lokal yang sangat bervariasi. Selain itu, kebijakan pembangunan selama itu telah menciptakan ketergantungan pemerintah daerah dan pejabatnya pada pola “mohon petunjuk ke- dan menunggu instruksi dari pusat”. Pada gilirannya, pemerintah daerah tidak memiliki kapasitas yang memadai untuk menciptakan kebijakan-kebijakan pembangunan yang mampu mere spon kebutuhan lokal. Penanganan pendidikan ini akan dilakukan dengan memberi kontribusi alokasi pembiayaan dan transfer knowledge kepada usia sekolah khususnya tingkat menengah. Untuk itu Kabupaten Simalungun yang memiliki potensi pertanian mempunyai kebijakan.

Keberadaan pemerintah daerah pada era otonomi daerah ini sesuai fungsinya utnuk mengelola sumberdaya nasional yang tersedia diwilayahnya, yang meliputi: sumber daya alam, sumber daya buatan, dan sumber daya manusia yang tersedia di daerah dan bertanggungjawab memelihara kelestarian lingkungan sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan. Oleh itu salah satunya adalah dalam bidang pendidikan yang dapat memberi pelayanan kepada masyarakatnya. Implementasinya tentu untuk peningkatan kesejahteraan masyarakat. Untuk itu out put pendidikan ini diharapkan dapat memberi pengaruh secara signifikan terhadap wilayah dan individunya. Di lain daerah ini dilakukan jika pemerintah daerah memberi perhatian kepada sumber potensi yang dimiliki, sehingga capaiannya disesuaikan dengan sumber potensi tersebut. Dengan memberi perhatian terhadap hal tersebut, diharapkan out put pendidikan dapat digunakan pada daerah secara tepat guna untuk kebutuhan daerah.


Kata Kunci: Implementasi Kebijakanberbasis Potensi

PENDAHULUAN

Sistem pemerintahan yang sentralisitik yang berjalan selama 32 tahun dianggap sebagai pemerintahan yang tidak kondusif bagi pembangunan regional. Kebijakan pembangunan pemerintah pusat telah menciptakan pola pembangunan yang seragam yang tidak memenuhi tuntutan lokal yang sangat bervariasi. Selain itu, kebijakan pembangunan selama itu telah menciptakan ketergantungan pemerintah daerah dan pejabatnya pada pola “mohon petunjuk ke- dan menunggu instruksi dari pusat”. Pada gilirannya, pemerintah daerah tidak memiliki kapasitas yang memadai untuk menciptakan kebijakan-kebijakan pembangunan yang mampu mere spon kebutuhan lokal.

Pemberlakuan otonomi daerah yang dimulai sejak tahun 1999 nampaknya mendapatkan reaksi berbeda-beda dari satu daerah dengan daerah lainnya. Sayangnya, banyak orang hanya melihat sisi negatif dari pemberian otonomi daerah. Pertama, otonomi dianggap melahirkan raja-raja kecil di daerah yang
cenderung menyalahgunakan kewenangan yang dimiliki. Kewenangan yang diberikan oleh pemerintah pusat tidak berhasil diturunkan sampai ke masyarakat pada tingkat bawah (grassroot level) melainkan telah dibajak oleh elit-lokal (elite capture). Kedua, otonomi daerah dianggap telah membiakkan benih baru yang kemudian menghasilkan pelaku pelaku korupsi baru.


Berbicara mengenai kualitas sumber daya manusia, pendidikan memegang peran yang sangat penting dalam proses peningkatan kualitas sumberdaya manusia. Peningkatan kualitas pendidikan merupakan suatu proses yang terintegrasi dengan proses peningkatan kualitas sumber daya manusia itu sendiri. Menyadari pentingnya proses peningkatan kualitas sumber daya manusia, maka pemerintah bersama kalangan swasta sama-sama telah dan terus berupaya mewujudkan amanat tersebut melalui berbagai usaha pembangunan pendidikan yang lebih berkualitas antara lain melalui pengembangan dan perbaikan kurikulum dan sistem evaluasi, perbaikan sarana pendidikan, pengembangan dan pengadaan materi ajar, serta pelatihan bagi guru dan tenaga kependidikan lainnya.

Selama masa pelaksanaan otonomi daerah banyak kasus korupsi yang melibatkan pejabat baik eksekutif maupun legislatif daerah. Ketiga, otonomi daerah dianggap telah menghidupkan kembali semangat primordialisme antar daerah. Dalam kenyataan, memang, beberapa daerah mempraktikkan seleksi pegawai atau promosi jabatan atas dasar ikatan kedaerahan.

**OTONOMI DAERAH DAN PEMBANGUNAN LOKAL**


Melalui desentralisasi, pemerintah daerah tidak hanya mampu merespon kebutuhan—kebutuhan warga, tetapi juga mampu mendorong warga untuk memiliki kemauan untuk membayar (willingness to pay for services) pelayanan publik yang sesuai dengan keinginan mereka; serta mendorong warga agar memiliki kemauan untuk mempertahankan pelayanan publik yang telah diberikan (maintain services that match their demand) utamanya jika mereka telah dilibatkan dalam proses pengambilan keputusan untuk penyediaan pelayanan publik tersebut.

Selain itu, desentralisasi memungkinkan bagi para pejabat lokal lebih efektif melakukan monitoring dibandingkan pejabat pemerintah pusat. Pejabat lokal lebih mudah memperoleh informasi, sementara itu pejabat pemerintah pusat perlu menyediakan investasi lebih besar untuk memperoleh informasi yang sama. Karena itu, dari sisi efektivitas pembangunan, desentralisasi memberikan peluang yang besar agar program-program yang disusun benar-benar lebih mencerminkan aspirasi masyarakat. Selanjutnya, program yang telah disusun tersebut juga akan dengan mudah dimonitor oleh pejabat daerah yang memiliki kedekatan jarak sehingga bisa mengontrol day-to-day activities.

Prinsip-prinsip efisiensi ekonomi dalam pelayanan publik akan dicapai melalui desentralisasi kewenangan apabila memenuhi beberapa syarat berikut ini:

1. Tuntutan lokal akan pelayanan berbeda antar wilayah.
2. Tidak ada kaitan signifikan antara pelayanan yang diberikan dan skala ekonomi untuk memproduksi pelayanan publik yang disediakan.
3. Tidak ada spillovers of costs and benefits dari pelayanan publik yang diberikan oleh suatu wilayah.
4. Pelayanan publik yang diberikan akan disediakan melalui sebagian dari pajak atau retribusi daerah tersebut.
5. Pemerintah daerah memiliki kapasitas yang memadai untuk memberikan (deliver) pelayanan publik yang disediakan.
6. Pelayanan publik tersebut dimaksudkan untuk redistribusi pendapatan.

Desentralisasi kewenangan yang diberikan oleh pemerintah pusat telah merubah paradigma yang selama ini berjalan dengan kewenangan yang dimiliki daerah.

SUMBER DAYA MANUSIA SEBAGAI UNSUR PENGEMBANGAN WILAYAH


Dalam hal ini, wilayah dibagi berdasarkan daerah produktif dan daerah non produktif. Pada dasarnya wilayah merupakan kumpulan berbagai daerah sehingga tingkat keluasannya lebih luas. Pembahasan mengenai pengembangan wilayah tidak dapat dilepaskan dari unsur wilayah itu sendiri, wilayah secara umum diartikan sebagai area, daerah tertentu dengan batasan-batasan yang jelas. Subroto dalam Alkadrie (2001) memberikan pengertian dari wilayah adalah suatu sistem dan merupakan tempat manusia bermukim serta mempertahankan hidupnya. Dalam penataan ruang yang paling utama diwujudkan adalah meningkatkan kinerja dan kualitas wilayah untuk penyediaan produksi dan jasa yang cukup, pemukiman yang sehat, dan kelestarian lingkungan hidup. Oleh karena itu, hal mendasar di dalam penatuan ruang melalui pendekatan wilayah adalah memadukan unsur-unsur pembentuk wilayah agar kinerja wilayah meningkat dalam lingkungan yang tetap lestari dan kondusif terhadap pengembangan kesejahteraan masyarakat yang berkelanjutan.

Subroto dalam Alkadrie (2001) menyatakan bahwa tujuan pengembangan wilayah adalah untuk meningkatkan daya guna dan hasil guna sumber daya yang tersebar di wilayah Indonesia guna mewujudkan tujuan pembangunan nasional. Untuk itu, arah dan kebijaksanaan pengembangan wilayah adalah:

1) pembangunan diarahkan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan masyarakat dengan tetap memperkukuh kesatuan dan ketahanan nasional serta mewujudkan Wawasan Nusantara;
2) pembangunan sektoral dilakukan dengan cara saling memperkuat untuk meningkatkan pertumbuhan, pemerataan, dan kesatuan wilayah nasional serta pembangunan yang berkelanjutan;
3) perkembangan wilayah diupayakan saling terkait dan menguatkan sesuai dengan potensi wilayah.

peningkatan pendapatan, kesejahteraan masyarakat serta pembangunan yang dilakukan pada wilayah tersebut.


Nachrowi dalam Alkadrie (2001) juga menyatakan bahwa pengembangan wilayah merupakan interaksi antara tiga pilar pengembangan wilayah. Suatu wilayah yang mempunyai sumber daya alam yang cukup kaya dan sumber daya manusia yang mampu memanfaatkan dan mengembangkan teknologi, akan lebih cepat berkembang dibandingkan dengan wilayah yang tidak mempunyai sumber daya alam yang cukup dan sumber daya manusia yang unggul.

Sebaliknya, hanya sedikit orang yang menyoroti aspek-aspek positif yang muncul bersamaan dengan pelaksanaan otonomi daerah itu sendiri. Beberapa daerah dengan kewenangan yang ada telah melakukan banyak inovasi dengan menciptakan peraturan-peraturan daerah yang diharapkan bisa memperbaiki pelayanan publik. Karena itu, makalah ini akan menyoroti beberapa aspek positif dari pemberlakuan otonomi daerah, terutama dari sisi peningkatan inovasi oleh pemerintah daerah dalam memberikan implementasi kebijakan pendidikan yang berbasis sumber potensi daerah.

HUBUNGAN PENDIDIKAN TERHADAP PERTUMBUHAN EKONOMI

Pendidikan merupakan salah satu komponen yang paling vital dari pertumbuhan dan pembangunan ekonomi yang mana juga merupakan sumber input bagi total fungsi produksi/ the aggregate production function (Todaro and Smith dalam Hajizi, 2004). Menurut mereka, pendidikan selain merupakan tujuan pembangunan juga merupakan prasyarat untuk meningkatkan produktivitas. Selain itu kemampuan untuk menyerap teknologi modern juga disebabkan oleh tingginya kemampuan sumber daya manusia sehingga mampu untuk semakin meningkatkan mesin-mesin ekonomi dalam menggerakkan pertumbuhan ekonomi. McConnell dalam Hajizi (2004) mengatakan seseorang memiliki pendidikan yang semakin tinggi akan mendapatkan pendapatan yang semakin tinggi di masa yang akan datang. Asumsi dasar teori human capital adalah bahwa seseorang dapat meningkatkan penghasilan melalui pendidikan. Setiap tambahan satu tahun sekolah berarti di satu pihak meningkatkan kemampuan kerja dan tingkat penghasilan seseorang akan tetapi di pihak lain menunda penerimaan penghasilan selama satu tahun dalam mengikuti sekolah tersebut. Di samping penundaan menerima penghasilan tersebut, orang yang melanjutkan sekolah harus membayar secara langsung seperti uang sekolah, pembelian buku-buku dan lainnya.

PENDIDIKAN BERBASIS SUMBER POTENSI DAERAH

Kebijakan pembangunan pendidikan yang dilakukan didasarkan pada UU No 20 Tahun 2003 diselenggarakan dengan memberdayakan semua komponen masyarakat melalui peran serta dalam penyelenggaraan dan pengendalian mutu. Hal ini juga memberi penekanan pada peningkatan kualitas dan penggunaan out put pendidikan dimaksud pengembangan kurikulum dilakukan dengan mengacu pada standar nasional pendidikan untuk mewujudkan tujuan pendidikan nasional. Kurikulum pada semua jenjang dan jenis pendidikan dikembangkan dengan prinsip diversifikasi sesuai dengan satuan pendidikan, potensi daerah, dan peserta didik.

Dengan demikian pemerintah daerah mempunyai peluang mengimplementasikan kebijakan pendidikan dengan memperhatikan sumber potensinya. Misalnya sebuah daerah memiliki sumber potensi pertanian, maka diharapkan arahan kebijakan pendidikan lebih konsentrasi kepada pertanian dengan mengacu kepada standar nasional. Untuk itu upaya yang perlu dilakukan adalah:
1. Identifikasi dan analisis terhadap potensi fisik daerah
2. Melakukan analisis keruangan untuk mengkompilasikan kawasan potensi daerah
3. Arahan kebijakan sekolah menengah kejuruan dengan esensi untuk mempersiapkan peserta didik dengan skill dan kompetensi yang sesuai dengan potensi lokal.
4. Mengenalkan secara dini sumber potensi daerah kepada siswa dengan memberi muatan lokal mulai dari tingkat dasar
5. Pendidikan Berbasis Keunggulan Lokal (PBKL) di tingkat menengah atas hingga perguruan tinggi disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan daerah, dengan memanfaatkan berbagai sumber daya alam, sumber daya manusia, geografis, budaya, historis dan potensi daerah lainnya yang bermanfaat dalam proses pengembangan kompetensi sesuai dengan potensi, bakat dan minat peserta didik.

Implementasi kebijakan ini diharapkan akan dapat mendorong iklim berinvestasi lebih baik dan out put pendidikan diharapkan dapat lebih tepat guna sesuai kebutuhan daerah. Hal lain yang perlu kita pahami adalah kenyataan yang ada pada kalangan siswa yang didasari oleh kebiasaan yang dilakukan dan dilihat dalam kesehariannya, misalnya jika kehidupan lingkungannya petani maka dia lebih cenderung memiliki niat dan bakat pada bidang tersebut.

Dengan otonomi daerah diharapkan pemerintah daerah dapat melakukan aspek-aspek positif yang muncul bersamaan dengan pelaksanaan otonomi daerah itu sendiri. Beberapa daerah dengan kewenangan yang ada telah melakukan banyak inovasi dengan memunculkan terobosan, salah satunya adalah bidang pendidikan yang disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan daerah.

BENTUK PENDIDIKAN BERBASIS SUMBER POTENSI

Dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional pada pasal 55 ayat 1 menyatakan bahwa “Masyarakat berhak menyelenggarakan pendidikan berbasis masyarakat pada pendidikan formal dan nonformal sesuai dengan kekhasan agama, lingkungan sosial, dan budaya untuk kepentingan masyarakat. Untuk itu pemerintah melakukan konsentrasi implementasi sesuai dengan kebutuhan daerah, tentu dengan mengelola bidang pendidikan yang memiliki nilai out put kebutuhan daerah.


United States Congress dalam Wardiman (1999) mengatakan bahwa pendidikan kejuruan adalah program pendidikan yang secara langsung dikaftakan dengan penyiapan seseorang untuk pekerjaan tertentu atau untuk persiapan tambahan karir seseorang. Dalam hal ini terlihat bahwa pendidikan kejuruan adalah pendidikan untuk memasuki lapangan kerja dan diperuntukkan bagi siapa saja yang menginginkannya, yang membutuhkannya dan yang dapat untung darinya.

Sehingga sesuai Renstra Departemen Pendidikan Nasional Tahun 2005 dan 2009 menyatakan bahwa visi, misi dan tujuan dari pembangunan Pendidikan Menengah Kejuruan (Dikmenjur) Nasional adalah sebagai berikut:

1) Visi Dikmenjur adalah: Terwujudnya lembaga pendidikan kejuruan yang menghasilkan sumber daya manusia berkelas dunia serta perluasan layanan pendidikan berbasis keunggulan lokal.
2) Misi Dikmenjur sebagai berikut:
(a) Meningkatkan Profesionalisme dan Akuntabilitas Lembaga Pendidikan Kejuruan sebagai Pusat Pembudayaan Kompetensi Berstandar Internasional;
(b) Melaksanakan sistem pendidikan kejuruan yang permeable dan flexible secara terintegrasi antar jalur dan jenjang pendidikan;
(c) Mengupayakan perluasan dan pemerataan layanan pendidikan kejuruan yang bermutu dan berbasis keunggulan lokal;
(d) Meningkatkan peran serta masyarakat dalam penyelenggaraan pendidikan kejuruan;
(e) Meningkatkan Capacity Building penyelenggaraan pendidikan kejuruan melalui sinkronisasi dan koordinasi.

3) Tujuan Dikmenjur sebagai berikut :
(a) Mewujudkan Lembaga Pendidikan Kejuruan yang Akuntabel sebagai Pusat Pembudayaan Kompetensi Berstandar Internasional;
(b) Mendidik Sumber Daya Manusia yang mempunyai etos kerja dan kompetensi berstandar Internasional;
(c) Memberikan berbagai Layanan Pendidikan Kejuruan yang Permeable dan Flexible secara terintegrasi antar jalur dan jenjang Pendidikan;
(d) Memperluas layanan dan pemerataan mutu pendidikan kejuruan.

PENUTUP
Keberadaan pemerintah daerah pada era otonomi daerah ini sesuai fungsinya utnuk mengelola sumberdaya nasional yang tersedia diwilayahnya, yang meliputi: sumber daya alam, sumber daya buatan, dan sumber daya manusia yang tersedia di daerah dan bertanggungjawab memelihara kelestarian lingkungan sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan. Oleh itu salah satunya adalah dalam bidang pendidikan yang dapat memberi pelayanan kepada masyarakatnya. Implementasinya tentu untuk peningkatan kesejahteraan masyarakat. Untuk itu out put pendidikan ini diharapkan dapat memberi pengaruh secara signifikan terhadap wilayah dan individunya.

Hal ini dapat dilakukan jika pemerintah daerah memberi perhatian kepada sumber potensi yang dimiliki, sehingga capaiannya disesuaikan dengan sumber potensi tersebut. Dengan memberI perhatian terhadap hal tersebut, diharapkan out put pendidikan dapat digunakan pada daerah secara tepat guna untuk kebutuhan daerah.

REFERENSI
Undang-undang No. 20 tahun 2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional
THEME ELEVEN

MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF A TRAFFIC LIMITATION SCHEME IN STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: A STUDY OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS)
University of Wollongong, Australia
mhbmr027@uowmail.edu.au

ABSTRACT

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the most significant international chokepoints with navigational traffic of almost 80,000 vessels annually. The Sunda and the Lombok-Makassar Straits are viable alternatives but not as heavily navigated. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea prescribes that vessels and aircraft of all flags may exercise the unimpeded right of transit passage while navigating through straits used for international navigation. The conferment of this right to ships of all flags creates a difficult situation for States bordering busy waterways, particularly in protecting the marine environment of those straits from vessel-source marine pollution. Australia has been successful in designating the Torres Strait as a ‘Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (PSSA) in 2005, with compulsory pilotage as the applicable ‘Associated Protective Measure’ (APM), which has assisted in minimising the risks of maritime casualties in the said waterway. To date, the Torres Strait is the only strait used for international navigation in the world that enjoys such a designation. Assuming that the PSSA designation is also extended to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the potential implementation of the most suitable APM would probably materialise through the introduction of a ‘traffic limitation scheme’, given the nature of the Straits. Indeed, in 2008, Malaysia has announced that it may seek to cap the number of shipping traffic plying the Straits. Hence, this paper aims to discuss the question of the viability and practicability of the application of this traffic limitation scheme if such a scheme is introduced in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the potential legal and political implications arising out of such an implementation.

Keywords: Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Law of the Sea, Particularly Sensitive Sea Area

INTRODUCTION

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the most important shipping lanes in the world that facilitates international trade (George, 2008). These waterways were traversed by more than 70,000 vessels in 2007 (Mandryk, 2008). With the emerging economies of East Asian giants namely China, Japan and South Korea, both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will continue to increase in their significance as tanker pipelines connecting the oil producers in the Middle East with their East Asian consumers (Sien, 1998). If the current trend continues, it is predicted that by 2020, the Straits would be navigated by approximately 150,000 vessels yearly, a double of what they are burdened with now (Beckman, 2009). Another report by the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) revealed that by the year 2024, the navigational traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would be around 122,640 transits annually (H. Ibrahim & Sh, 2009). The other convenient alternative routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would be through the longer Sunda and Lombok-Makassar Straits passageways within the Indonesian archipelagic waters (Rusli, 2010a). There have also been proposals to construct the Thai Canal through the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand (Thapa, Kusanagi, Kitazumi, &
Murayama, 2007)¹, and to erect oil pipelines from one side of the Peninsula Malaysia to the other under the project named Trans-Peninsula Pipeline Project (TPP), linking the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea, so that vessels could escape the busy and constricted Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Azman, 2007)².

NAVIGATIONAL HAZARDS IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not entirely safe for navigation. The waters of the Straits are rather shallow, and the water level varies with the changing of the tides (H. M. Ibrahim, Husin, & Sivaguru, 2008). More often than not, the seabed also shifts, creating serious risks of groundings (Dyke, 2009). The Straits narrow at different points along their length with the narrowest point in the Strait of Singapore being only 3.2 kilometres in breadth hence making navigation in the Straits more intricate (George, 2008). Accidents and maritime collisions in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are also influenced by other factors such as the heavy density of traffic, poor visibility during squalls, numerous shoals and banks that often change in location along the waterways, confusing crossing patterns by small domestic craft and several wrecks in certain localities along the Straits.

THE EFFECTS OF VESSEL-SOURCE OF MARINE POLLUTION IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

Oil spill are typical with shipping activities, be it through operational or accidental discharges (Basiron, 2010). Due to heavy shipping activities, it was recorded that coral reef development in the Strait of Malacca is amongst the lowest in this region (Emran, 2007). Mangrove ecosystem along the Strait of Malacca, especially in the south-western corner of the Malaysian State of Johor is being threatened by constant soil erosion as a result of high navigational density plying the waterway (Basiron, 2008). Besides oil spill, shipping activities discharge other types of harmful and unwarranted wastes through expulsion of marine debris, disposal of sewage, spills of hazardous and noxious chemicals and substances, noise emissions and air pollution. This condition is further aggravated by the fact that the littoral States’ powers to impose environmental protection measures in these waterways are limited by application of accepted international regulations (Beckman, 2004). Their hands and legs are bonded based on the fact that they cannot act unilaterally on matters pertaining to maritime traffic regulation and protection of the marine environment of the Straits,³ as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are considered as straits where the unimpeded right of transit passage applies.⁴

CO-OPERATIVE MECHANISM IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

Currently, there is an ongoing co-operative mechanism scheme between the littoral States and the User States in managing the issues on safety of navigation and the control of vessel-source pollution in the Straits (Ho, 2009). Nevertheless, these developments have been moving rather slowly and have not kept pace with the increasing number of ships that transit the Straits of Malacca and Singapore each year. To date, Japan is the

¹ The Indian Ocean is separated from the China Seas by the Malay Peninsula, a strip of land that projects south from mainland Asia. Thus, ships have to ply through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in order to travel between these two parts of the world. Therefore, there have been plans contemplated to construct a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, a narrow stretch of land on the Malay Peninsula so that vessels could escape the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, cutting 1,100 km of the normal voyage time from the Indian to the Pacific Oceans. This project has been scrapped off and revived again for several times, and the Thai government in 2007 has decided to move on with the project. See (“Thai Canal Frequently Asked Questions,”).

² In 2008, Malaysia has announced the TPP project, a project to erect oil pipelines from Yan, Kedah which is situated in the west coast of Peninsula Malaysia to Bachok, Kelantan, located on the shores facing the South China Sea. This project, once completed, may allow oil companies to transport oil through these pipelines, hence saving up to three days to the normal voyage around the Peninsula. See (Khalid, 2009).

³ The littoral States can take appropriate enforcement measures against recalcitrant vessels that have violated regulations formulated under Article 42(1) (a) & 42 (1) (b) and this violation has caused or threatening to cause major damage towards the marine environment of the straits. This is further reiterated in Article 233 (Part XII) of the LOSC where it puts a requirement that States bordering straits shall have no power to stop the passage of a polluting vessel unless it has committed major damage to the marine environment of the straits.

⁴ Article 38 of the LOSC provides that ‘...all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded...’. Article 37 of the LOSC complements Article 38 by reiterating that transit passage can be exercised by all vessels and aircraft through straits used for international navigation that links one part of the high seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to another part of high seas or an EEZ.
only User State that has consistently assisted the littoral States; the Nippon Foundation of Japan took the initiative to donate (in American dollar [USD]) USD2.5 million in 2009 to the Aids to Navigation Fund (the Fund), which was set up in 2008 to deal with the Straits maintenance (Tharp, 2010). The 2009 budget for the Fund was USD8 million but it has managed to raise only around USD5 million, with USD2.5 million coming from the Nippon Foundation (Bateman, 2009b), (Ahmad, 2010).

Given that the Straits are projected to accommodate constant increase of shipping traffic in the future, the current available environmental protection regime including the co-operative mechanism scheme may not be entirely sufficient to protect the marine environment of these shipping lanes. Besides, with more vessels plying the Straits, the question of safety and environmental concerns will become more acute for the littoral States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Hamzah, 2008). If this situation continues, it may be difficult in the future to promote environmental sustainability in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. As such, suggestions have been made to designate the Straits as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA) to further protect and preserve the marine environment of the Straits (Dyke, 2009), (Unlu, 2006).

The provisions of the transit passage regime were negotiated when principles of international environmental law were just beginning to emerge. The framework for protection and preservation of the marine environment in the LOSC has been considerably amplified by modern conservation principles and norms such as the precautionary principle, conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use and the polluter pays principle since the LOSC was negotiated. Therefore does the right of transit passage remain unqualified? Bateman asserts:

“The right of transit passage may be increasingly qualified in the future by the growing trend among coastal States to introduce measures for the protection of the marine environment which impact upon navigation” (Bateman, 2009a).

Australia has pioneered a new development in State practice on the governance of straits used for international navigation through its introduction of a compulsory pilotage regime in the waters of the Torres Strait. This State practice may be an early sign that the assumption that transit passage is an unqualified navigational right for all vessels and aircrafts exercising transit in straits used for international navigation has been modified to take into accounts the environmental responsibilities of both the littoral States and the user States.

STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE PSSA OR A STRAIT OF MALACCA PSSA: LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the only international body responsible for PSSA designation. To date, there are 11 PSSAs in the world with the Torres Strait being the only strait used for international navigation that has been designated as a PSSA. A PSSA is an area that needs special protection through action by IMO because of its significance for recognised ecological or socio-economic or scientific reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities ("Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas," 2002). An application to IMO for designation of a PSSA and the adoption of APMs, or any amendment(s) to them, may be submitted only by a Member Government ("Revised Guidelines For the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas," 2006). A co-ordinated proposal should be formulated where two or more Governments have a common interest in that particular area.

The interested State or States wishing to have the IMO to designate a PSSA should submit an application to the MEPC based on certain criterias, inter alia ecological criteria, social, cultural and economic criterias as well as scientific and educational criterias. Consideration would be given on these factors:

(a) Vessel traffic characteristics which include vessel operational factors, vessel types, traffic characteristics and the harmful substances that the vessels are transporting;
(b) Natural factors which consist of hydrographical, meteorological and oceanographic factors.
In order for the proposal or proposals to be seriously considered, the proposing State or States should provide evidence to show the vulnerability of the area to international shipping and to propose any APMs that would be effective in averting future environmental damage and in helping the protection and preservation of the marine environment of that specified area. Resolution A.982 (24) or its full name, Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of PSSAs, states that:

An application for PSSA designation should contain a proposal for an APM or measures aimed at preventing, reducing or eliminating the threat or identified vulnerability. APMs for PSSAs are limited to actions that are to be, or have been, approved and adopted by IMO, for example, a routeing system such as an area to be avoided. (emphasis added)

Views have been expressed that the Strait of Malacca as a whole would not qualify for designation as a PSSA, but only a specifically defined area of the waterway which is in need of special protection (Beckman, 2004). Based on the criteria which need to be fulfilled for a PSSA designation, it would not be impossible for both straits to qualify as a PSSA as they both have significant ecological or socio-economic or scientific value which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities such as shipping movements and discharges of harmful substances. As stated by Van Dyke:

“The Malacca Strait might be a logical candidate to be designated by the IMO as a particularly sensitive sea area because of the human and economic dependency on this Strait. Its economic importance as a transport channel is unquestioned and the closure of the Strait because of an accident...would be disastrous to the region and the world, and would cause severe harm to other economic activities in the region including offshore fishing, tourism and mangrove harvesting” (Dyke, 2009).

Assuming that the both Straits of Malacca and Singapore are to be designated as a PSSA, there are a few APMs that might be potentially suitable to be imposed in these crucial waterways.

THE PROPOSED TRAFFIC LIMITATION SCHEME ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

A potential APM which might be imposed in a proposed Straits of Malacca and Singapore PSSA is a limitation on shipping traffic. Such a plan to cap shipping movement in the Straits was suggested by the Malaysian government in 2008 (Hock, 2008). As reported in Hock (2008), the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak contended that:

Malaysia believes there is an ultimate ‘tipping point’ for maritime traffic in the strait beyond which further increases will become not only risky but also too dangerous and costly. At such point, the cost to ensure safety of navigation will also increase exponentially.’

An argument against this APM would be that it is inconsistent with Part III of the LOSC which provides for all ships to exercise the unimpeded right of transit passage in straits used for international navigation. Under customary and conventional international law, straits have always been deemed to be opened to maritime traffic. Even before the LOSC came into force, conventions and treatises regarding straits contained provisions that ensured freedom of navigation for vessels sailing through straits:

5 The Straits of Malacca and Singapore possess socio-economic importance, as they are significant in generating the sources of livelihood for coastal populations of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia through economic activities such as fishing and marine tourism, see (Hooi, 2008) and (Ishak & Hooi, 2008).
(a) Article 2 of Section 1 of the Montreux Convention 1936 (Montreux Convention) that governs navigation in the Turkish Straits states that in times of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits regardless of their flags and the cargoes they are carrying (Unlu, 2002);

(b) Article 7 of the Torres Strait Treaty ensures freedom of navigation and overflight over the Torres Strait ("Treaty Between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Two Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters," 1985);

(c) Article V of the 1881 Boundary Treaty between Argentina and Chile confers freedom of navigation for vessels of all flags to sail through the Strait of Magellan (Morris, 1989).

The Montreux Convention 1936 (Montreux Convention) which governs navigation in the Turkish Straits, comprising the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, has different provisions from other treaties and conventions regarding straits. It guarantees freedom of navigation to all ships to ply the Turkish Straits, however, it imposes some limitations and conditions on both merchant and naval vessels transiting the Straits, depending on the prevailing political situation. Article 6 of the Montreux Convention provides:

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of Article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except that vessels must enter the Straits by day and their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each case be indicated by the Turkish authorities. (own emphasis)

The Montreux Convention also imposes limitations on the aggregate tonnage of naval vessels while transiting or being present in the Turkish Straits. Article 14 of the Montreux Convention provides:

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tonnes…

Article 18(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Montreux Convention place limitations on the aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have while being present in the Turkish Straits:

**Article 18**

(1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows:

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed 30 000 tonnes;

(b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10 000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of 45 000 tons…;

(c) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

Although customary international law and the LOSC dictate that straits shall always be open for navigation, the State practice disclosed in the Montreux Convention is a historical exception to this general rule, however, the limitations prescribed by the Montreux Convention upon merchant vessels in Turkish Straits are only applicable in war and the limitations on average aggregate tonnage only apply to naval ships. This instance of divergent State practice shows that putting limitations or conditions on vessels transiting straits is not entirely unprecedented.
Even though the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not governed by a long standing international convention like the Turkish Straits, this may not preclude littoral States from placing some limitations on ships transiting the Straits for environmental protection purposes by other means. A potential justification for such limitations, which could be argued in a submission to the IMO, is that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have only certain carrying capacity for shipping traffic. If shipping traffic goes beyond certain limits, it may adversely impact the well being of the marine environment to the extent of causing irreparable damage. As H.M. Ibrahim argues:

There may well be a tipping point, beyond which any further increase would be too costly and hazardous...there is a limit to the carrying capacity of the straits (H. M. Ibrahim, 2008).

The reasons why the Montreux Convention imposed limitations on shipping traffic in the Turkish Straits (depending on the prevailing political situation) was associated with Turkey’s security. Therefore, the reasons for imposing such limitations in the case of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would be so as to enable the littoral States protect and preserve the integrity of the marine environment of the Straits from being degraded by heavy shipping activities. The IMO PSSA Guidelines provide that the APMs for PSSAs must be those that ‘are to be’ or ‘have been’ approved by the IMO such as routeing systems. A traffic limitation scheme could be characterised as a routeing system in that it helps to regulate traffic especially in the narrow, busy and constricted waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Undoubtedly if traffic limitations were proposed as an APM in a submission made to the IMO on designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a PSSA, member States would question the import and content of this measure as well as its legality. Would it involve only certain types of vessels like giant mega tankers or otherwise? What would be the maximum limit on shipping movements through the Straits daily, monthly or even yearly? Who would have the authority to decide on the maximum volume of shipping traffic that can traverse the Straits? Does the limitation relate to the maximum gross tonnage of vessels? If so what is the maximum gross tonnage per ship per day allowed to traverse the Straits? Would a vessel be penalised if it violated the limitation regulations?

Maritime States are likely to argue that such a measure would be inconsistent with the LOSC, particularly Articles 38(1) and 44. They may also contend that this proposed APM would create an undesired precedent to be followed by other States bordering straits on other parts of the world. Moreover, this proposed APM would cause undue delays in maritime shipments and unwarrantedly disrupts the free flow of international trade, as there will be quotas as to the amount of shipping traffic that could sail the Straits at a time. Shipping costs would also increase as ships are compelled to navigate through longer alternatives like the Sunda or Lombok-Makassar Straits routes via the Indonesian archipelagic waters (Ho, 2009). A study has estimated that the cost of rerouting tankers to Japan away from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route will increase the cost of doing business by US$88 million (Ho, 2009). Certainly, this would not be to the delight of major maritime States that depend on the Straits for the survival of their economies.

Putting these oppositions aside, in relation to implementation of such a measure, discussions could be convened between the littoral States, user States, private stakeholders and the IMO in order to determine the best method of limiting shipping traffic so as to protect the marine environment of the Straits without substantial disruption to global trade. Further research would also be needed into the sustainable traffic carrying capacity of the Straits, taking into consideration the biodiversity, socio-economic and scientific importance of the Straits. A preliminary study conducted by Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) released in November 2009 revealed that the Strait of Malacca can sustain traffic up to five times the current level ("Working Paper For "Carriage Capacity of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore"," 2009), and noted that the Strait of Singapore could safely accommodate a doubling or more of vessel traffic in the future (Ho, 2009).

The study pointed out that in 2007, there were 257,000 vessel movements in the Strait of Singapore based on actual vessel reports to the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) in Singapore. Furthermore, the study indicated that the number of accidents and collisions in the Strait of Singapore has, over the period of three
years since 2006, remained constant despite the steady increase of shipping traffic, manifesting that the increase in traffic volume may not directly affect the safety of navigation of shipping activities in the Strait of Singapore. However the data used in this analysis was dated and lacks precision. The second phase of this study by MPA will venture into possible traffic management measures to ensure smooth and safe navigation in the Strait of Singapore is guaranteed.

In contrast, the study conducted by Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) claimed that the maximum carrying capacity of the Strait of Malacca is 122,640 vessels which is predicted to happen soon in 2024 (H. Ibrahim & Sh, 2009). This study by MIMA applied queuing theory as a methodology and projected carrying capacity based on traffic data generated by the STRAITREP system. Similarly, a study in 2007 conducted by the Japan Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in conjunction with the Nippon Foundation projected the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will accommodate more shipping traffic in the future, with a projected volume of 141,000 vessel transits annually (Ho, 2009). Although these three separate studies differ in their methodologies and conclusions as to the precise carrying capacity of the Straits, the general agreement derived from these studies is that, with the steady increase of shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore each year, the problems of congestion in the Straits would be inevitable.

In advancing their submission in the IMO, the littoral States may contend that the proposed traffic limitation is critical to enhancing navigational safety by ensuring that the traffic in the Straits does not escalate to such a degree that it causes danger to mariners (Rusli, 2011). They may also contend that this protective measure does not contravene the LOSC as it provides that States have an overarching obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. If shipping traffic is not capped and it goes beyond the carrying capacity of the Straits, the marine environment of these waterways will ultimately suffer from undesirable consequences (H. Ibrahim & Shahryari, 2008).

The Potential Legal and Political Effects of the Implementation of the Proposed Traffic Limitation Scheme

In view of the critical nature of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the volume of shipping traffic passing through them, there is likely to be considerable controversy over the proposed plan to limit shipping traffic in the Straits (Rusli, 2010b). Firstly, nations that are against such a plan would contend that Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have breached the provisions of the LOSC which allows for the unimpeded navigational regime of transit passage in straits used for international navigation. Opposing States may argue that the littoral States have violated Articles 38(1) and 44 of the LOSC that prohibit States bordering straits from hampering transit passage. Secondly, they would assert that since the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are indispensable in regulating global trade, the imposition of the proposed traffic limitation scheme would not only impede passage, but it would also unreasonably increase shipping costs, as vessels and ships would have to sail through the longer Sunda, and Lombok-Makassar Straits via the Indonesian archipelago.

Although a proper study has yet to be conducted to determine the impacts of the introduction of the traffic limitation scheme in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore on freight rates, data from Table 2 shows that such an application would incur more expenses on the average operating costs of a VLCC and this would ultimately affect the global international trade that moves via the Straits.

Thirdly, opposing States could also contend that the co-operative mechanisms in both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are doing well with more States besides Japan agreeing to share the burden of protecting and preserving the marine environment of both Straits. When the Kuala Lumpur Meeting was convened, China and the US, to name a few, have expressed interest in participating in projects related to environmental protection and safety of navigation matters in the Straits. At the Singapore Meeting, Korea and the UAE announced that they would contribute to the fund. Germany also revealed its intention to find ways to contribute to the management of the marine environment of the Straits (Beckman, 2009). These developments show that as far as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are concerned, this proposed traffic limitation scheme is likely to face political opposition and may not be the ultimate solution to the littoral States’ environmental protection dilemma.

---

6 Article 192 of the LOSC reads “States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment”.
Possible Rebuttals by the Littoral States
The littoral States are, however, not lacking in arguments to rebut these potential criticisms and oppositions to the traffic limitation scheme plan (Rusli, 2010b). On the first issue, both States may assert that the imposition of the traffic limitation scheme in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would not impede transit passage, but on the other hand would facilitate safe and environmentally responsible passage of the Straits. For narrow parts of the Straits that are burdened with high navigational traffic, over-flowing shipping traffic might pose danger to mariners and the marine environment of the Straits themselves. Like the compulsory pilotage regime in the Torres Strait, this proposed traffic limitation scheme may also be considered as a ‘routeing system’ that ensures safe navigation for ships transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

It is a true assertion that cooperative mechanisms between the littoral States and the Users have gone through positive developments in recent years. Nevertheless, these developments have been moving rather slowly and have not kept pace with the increasing number of ships that transit the Straits of Malacca and Singapore each year. To date, Japan is the only User State that has consistently assisted the littoral States; the Nippon Foundation of Japan took the initiative to donate US$2.5 million in 2008 and 2009 to the Aids to Navigation Fund (the Fund), which was set up in 2008 to deal with the Straits maintenance (Tharp, 2010). Based on details in Table 1, the 2009 budget for the Fund was US$8 million but it has managed to raise only around US$5.4 million, with US$2.5 million coming from the Nippon Foundation (Bateman, 2009b). During the Symposium on the Enhancement of Safety of Navigation and the Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in 2007, the problem of lack of participation from users of the Straits other than Japan has been a matter of discussion (Basiron, 2007). This issue has been consistently raised resulting in a proposal that the littoral States consider lodging a complaint to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea citing the Users for violating Article 300 of LOSC on good faith and abuse of rights (Basiron, 2007). As there has been little response from the users of the Straits, the Cooperative Mechanism cannot entirely be relied upon and consequently, the traffic limitation scheme may be seen by the littoral States particularly as a potential solution to further preserve and protect the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

CONCLUSION
It is beyond doubt that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are important waterways particularly for shipping activities. The continuing increase of shipping traffic each year has compromised the well-being of the marine environment of the Straits. Part III and Part XII of the LOSC have put the littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in a disadvantaged position, where it favours shipping over protection of the marine environment of Straits. Given the gradual but ongoing increase of shipping traffic through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in the future, it is submitted that the traffic limitation scheme under the proposed PSSA regime, should it be extended to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, would be the best to govern the current and future traffic situations in the Straits. The littoral States may have to undertake in-depth researches on this matter as this measure may possibly impede the right of free transit of foreign vessels in the Straits.

It is likely that such a proposal for the introduction of a traffic limitation scheme in the Straits would be highly contentious given the strategic and economic importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Before such a scheme is introduced, it may be desirable for the littoral States and the maritime community to consider coming up with more viable alternatives to the Straits, namely through the realisations of the Thai Canal Project or the TPP Project as mentioned earlier. Once these projects are up and ready, the shipping scenario in the Straits would inevitably change; ships would still continue to sail the Straits but the number is expected not to be as high as what it is now. The traffic limitation scheme proposed under the proposed PSSA regime could then be more doable to realise if these alternatives are available. Until then, this proposed scheme may likely to remain highly contentious.

7 Article 300 states that “State Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the right, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.
TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Donation Made to the Fund in 2009
(Source: Maritime Institute of Malaysia [MIMA])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country/ Organisation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates (UAE)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>83,532.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>774,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Nippon Foundation</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Middle East Navigation Aids Service (MENAS)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Malacca Strait Council (MSC)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization (IMO)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,007,532.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. VLCC Operating Costs based on a vessel with a capital cost of US$68 million and a life of 25 years. 
(Source: (Marlow & Gardner, 2006))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Running Cost (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manning, including victualling</td>
<td>892,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubes and stores</td>
<td>386,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spares, R &amp; M</td>
<td>263,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drydockging (annualised cost)</td>
<td>688,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>582,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>110,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>65,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,986,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Running costs per annum = US$2,986,000.00
Capital costs per annum = US$4,825,000.00 (Calculated on a 5% rate of return over 25 years on an initial cost of US$68 million)

Total operating cost per annum = US$7,811,000.00

REFERENCES


BUTUAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARITIME TRADE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, AD.10TH-13TH CENTURIES

Mary Jane Louise A. Bolunia
Archaeology Division, National Museum
Manila, Philippines
mjlabolunia@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Ancient maritime trade in Southeast Asia still needs to be fully understood. This present paper is based on the archaeological investigation conducted in Butuan, an ancient community in northeastern Mindanao, Philippines. Based on the archaeological materials recovered, Butuan was active in the regional maritime trade of Southeast Asia between the 10th-13th centuries. These are based on two major artifacts: the shell-first constructed wooden boats and the Sung Dynasty ceramics. Nine plank-built, edge-pegged boats have been identified, and three have been excavated by the National Museum archaeologists while thousands of tradeware ceramics from China, southern Thailand and other places have been recovered. This is contrary to the belief of some scholars that the Philippines did not participate much in the trade because of its easternmost location on the edge of the maritime lake.

Based on archaeological evidence, they indicate that Butuan was an active player in the regional trade of Southeast Asia. To amass the imported ceramics, Butuan traded its forest and marine products. It was a hub for distributing the imported ceramics to the hinterlands because of the presence of Agusan River, one of the two major rivers of Mindanao. Likewise, Butuan sent trade missions to China to get preferential treatment from the Emperor, bypassing Champa. Shell-first constructed boats were also found in Indonesia, Malaysia and South China, pointing to a shared maritime tradition and an active interaction in island Southeast Asia.

Keywords: Maritime Trade, Boats, Shell-First Construction, Tradeware Ceramics, Trade Missions

INTRODUCTION

Maritime activities involving countries in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines had been established through historical accounts and actual evidences of material remains through the years (Dizon 2004; Peralta 2000; Agoncillo 1990; Reid 1988; Scott 1984, 1981). The vibrant trade and cultural encounters that existed among these countries before the advent of western colonization has been the subject of many studies both by foreign and local scholars alike. The Philippines, although part of this maritime network, carried its role on a different scale because of its geographical location which, some would say, is peripheral to the main trade routes. But being an archipelago and being on the so called “periphery” did not deter the country from participating in the regional activities. Proof of this participation can be gleaned from the many archaeological sites that have yielded hundreds and even thousands of material evidences coming from various parts of Southeast Asia and China.

Butuan during the 10th-century was said to have been actively involved in the trade with China based on the tradeware ceramics recovered from the different archaeological sites. Majority of these tradeware ceramics belonged to the Song Dynasty (10th-13th century A.D.), although there were also ceramics belonging
to the Tang Dynasty (7th-10th century A.D.) and Five Dynasty Period (10th century A.D.). These led earlier researchers to believe that Butuan was once a major trading center of the archipelago.

My study looks into the involvement of Butuan within the context of the maritime trade network of Southeast Asia from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries (A.D. 10th-13th). Specifically, the study focuses on the physical landscape of Butuan during the period covered, the interactions carried out by the different groups of people that resided in Butuan, and, the material remains that were recovered from the sites.

This study relies primarily on archaeological and geological evidences to support the claim. Primary sources of data come from the excavated artifacts, ecofacts and features as well as the geomorphological studies conducted in Butuan in 1986 and 2001 (ASEAN 1986; Javelosa et al 2002). Field and site reports written by National Museum researchers about Butuan were used together with the inventory records, maps and illustrations that the previous studies have generated. Seven sites are included in this study, all found in one area called Barangay Libertad. These are Burdeos, Fortun, Luna, Plaza, Toro-toro, Torralba, Sanchez-Buque.

My initial survey and excavations in Butuan started in 2001, 25 years after the first archaeological excavations. This led to the discovery of new sites and the recovery of more artifacts and ecofacts that are now deposited at the National Museum together with the earlier recovered cultural material remains. More than twenty thousand artifacts and ecofacts have been analyzed for this study showing that this one big archaeological site was quite important.

Aside from archaeological surveys and excavations, ethnohistorical sources were also used to corroborate and support the results. Interviews with different Manobo boat-builders from three different communities within the Agusan area were also carried out as well as with the Sama and Bajau boat builders from Tawi-Tawi who were building a boat in Manila in 2010.

Butuan is located in northeastern Mindanao, Southern Philippines. It is within the Agusan alluvial floodplain which is also the delta formed through the actions of the Agusan River, a fast-flowing river. Agusan River is only one of two major river systems in the island of Mindanao. Through the annual flooding of Agusan River, Butuan’s soil is continually fertilized. The Agusan Valley where Butuan is located was said to have been populated through the mouth of the river (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967).

Butuan as well as the rest of Mindanao is outside the typhoon belt. It has practically no dry season but has a well pronounced rainy season that prevails throughout the year. The highest level of rainfall occurs during the months of December until March and the least rainfall occurs during the months of July until September. As a result, the whole city still suffers from seasonal flooding after heavy rains. Being located on the northern part of Agusan del Norte, Butuan has access to Mindanao Sea and the Surigao Strait which are rich fishing grounds. This is further supported by the extensive mangroves found along the river and its tributaries.

Two major faultlines pass through Butuan and the rest of Agusan del Norte on a north-south and east-west direction creating a continued geologic change for Butuan and the rest of the Agusan provinces. Also, because of these faultlines, it has affected the direction of the Agusan River. Based on the geomorphologic studies conducted in Butuan, Agusan River has changed its course three times by swerving eastward (Aguilera 1988; Javelosa 2002). (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967)

These continued geologic movements had created major changes on the landscape of Butuan. Islands and islets were lost and found, rivers were choked and formed, soils were buried and exposed giving Butuan several make-overs in the span of 2 million years with the most turbulent and chaotic in the last 40,000 years (ASEAN 1986; Aguilera 1988; Javelosa et al 2002). In the course of these physical changes were the corresponding adaptive activities carried out by the people to continue inhabiting Butuan. The archaeological sites discovered best describe Butuan as a favorable area for human habitation and other related activities.

Wernstedt and Spencer (1967) described that Butuan’s population was concentrated more on the coast and within the city limits because of the poor drainage basin inundating the rest of Butuan. Much of the southern section of the province is either seasonally flooded to a depth of one or two meters or is permanently swampy which can be attributed to its estuarine environment. Butuan’s soil type is predominantly alluvium. The zone
of flooding involves an area of about 1295-2072 square kilometers and can also be gleaned from the associated vegetation which is more of the mangrove and nipa palms.

Butuan was one of those places involved in the maritime trade network in the 10th century. One of its advantages was the presence of a port. According to Ray (1996), the Greeks used several terms to describe the halting stations along the maritime route. Port or limen, hormos or harbor and emporion for emporium or market are some of these labels to describe these areas. Ray (1996) further adds that a port is an economic concept that represents a complex interplay of the physical, geographical and socioeconomic phenomena culled from the colonial period. Aside from the port, there were also places along the trade route that offered facilities for buying and selling products which also contributed to the complexity of the area. Furthermore, “ports were located not on the coast, but at the mouths of rivers which also provided convenient fording points and access to the routes of the interior. What was best required were ghats or landing places close to the mouths of the rivers, where goods could be off-loaded and transported” (Ray 1996:424).

Butuan was already a known center or port of call for vessels from Borneo and Luzon even before the coming of western colonizers. Several ships were said to have been seen in Butuan Bay by members of Spanish conquistador Legazpi’s expedition in 1565. Economic exchange or trade of gold, wax, cinnamon and slaves was being carried out by the locals with those from Borneo and Luzon (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967). The presence of Agusan River in the Libertad area in the 10th-13th century augured well for Butuan since this is the only route to go to the mountainous part of Agusan and nearby areas. Libertad during this time too was at the mouth of Agusan River occupying a strategic area that had control over those who would use the river. The soil of Butuan is very fertile that it produces much of what it needs. The flora and fauna is rich and diversified. Until the 1970s, deer (Cervus sp.), wild pig (Sus barbatus) and macaques (Macaca sp.) can still be seen within the city proper. Nowadays, these same animals are seen only in the hinterlands as they have been pushed into the interior by human expansion. Aside from these animals, there are also other important animals found like the civet cat (Paradoxurus hermaphroditus) monitor lizard (Varanus cumingi), bats and even a flying lemur. In the waters of Butuan are found different kinds of fish, shells and other marine animals. In much earlier times, Butuan waters had crocodiles, turtles, sharks, and the like.

The plant resources are likewise rich. There are many endemic plants fit for human and animal consumption. Sago palm (Metroxylon sago Rottb.) is one. Sago is known by its local name, lumbia, lumbai or sagu. Its habitat is the freshwater swamps at low altitude. It is a source of starch that can be made into flour to prepare different kinds of food including as a rice substitute.

Another important plant of Butuan is kaong (Arenga pinnata Wurmb). Kaong’s fiber is made into ropes called cabo negro. Its local name is onau, unau. The sugar palm that is endemic is the ebiok or ibiok, habiok, hibiok. The fruits yield sugar, starch, alcohol and local wine. Kaong is commonly tapped at present for its sweet sap and is used to make sugar by boiling its sweet unfermented sap. Archaeologically, cabo negro fibers that come from Kaong were recovered from the boat excavated by archaeologists in 1977. These were used to lash the planks of the prehistoric boats excavated in Libertad. Also important is the Areca caliso (Becc) which the Manobo use as a substitute for the betel nut. Betel nut chewing is an important social activity among the Manobos. Lastly, Butuan is home to dipterocarp forests. It is planted with hardwood trees good for various purposes including boat-building. These trees have been selected by various boat builders to make the dug-out canoes or the planks of the Butuan boat. (ASEAN 1986).

There are other plants with medicinal and edible qualities found in the forests of Butuan. These include cinnamon (Cinnamomum Sp.), which can be used for cooking, preservative as well as for healing and rituals. This plant is found in the hinterlands of Butuan or at the foothills of Mt. Hilong-hilong. It has been claimed that cinnamon was one of the spices traded during the Manila Galleon Trade. Rootcrops are also abundant in Butuan and this includes several species of yam, sweet potato and taro. Rice is a staple of the Butuanon. For the Manobo, this is used more as a ritual food rather than an everyday cereal.

Another resource of Butuan is gold. Gold nuggets, ornaments and jewelries have been recovered from Butuan. Tiny gold nuggets have been panned from areas located on the eastern side, although after a rainfall, people can pick up these gold nuggets in other places. Ornaments and jewelries made of gold recovered from burials included gold headbands, gold masks, gold earrings and beads.
The largest concentration of archeological sites that had been excavated is found in Barangay Libertad, an area that is already approximately some 6 kilometers inland at present. Its present landscape shows that nipa palms and mangrove grow abundantly in the area and adjoining places.

In the 1970s, Mindanao gained prominence when the summer archaeological field school organized by Xavier University excavated parts of Butuan and yielded a rich burial site dating to the Ming Dynasty (Burton 1976). Wooden coffins containing human bones and funerary offerings were recovered from the site. Pothunters also found burials containing human skeletons with their funerary offerings or pabaon. These funerary offerings included tradeware ceramics and gold ornaments which was a major concern of the pothunters. It was in another pothunting activity that pothunters looking for burials with gold and ceramics accidentally hit long wooden boards which turned out to be fragments from the planks of a wooden boat. This was the first time that a wooden boat was found in the archaeological record in the Philippines (Salcedo 1976).

From 1976 to the present, archaeological surveys and excavations in Butuan had been conducted by National Museum personnel. Through more than three decades of archaeological work, much had been recovered from the archaeological sites but have not been fully studied. A large percentage of the artifacts recovered are ceramics of various types and origins. To create some order in the ceramics recovered, I created a classification system based primarily on the type of clay used to create the vessels, its origin and function. The firing temperature was also considered to determine whether the remains should be classified as earthenware or stoneware or porcelain.

It would show that majority of the porcelain sherds were concentrated in two sites where the earthenware sherds were least found and vice-versa. There were also earthenware sherds that had white clay but were not locally produced because the Philippines at that time did not have clay. Also, the design was not seen among the local pottery.

Earthenware sherds did not only include cooking pots but also pans with handles and cooking stoves. Another type of earthenware found from the site was the crucible which was used for metallurgy. Two types of crucibles were found at the site. The first type was a big deep vessel made of clay while the second type was small compared to the first. The first type was donated to the National Museum while the 2nd type was collected during the National Museum excavation.

On the otherhand, the imported ceramics were further classified based on their perceived function and the possible age based on the Chinese Dynasty ruling at the time of manufacture. It was found out that there were tradeware ceramics belonging to the Tang and Yueh period dating from the the 7th to 10th centuries A.D. although most of the artifacts were Song ceramics belonging to the Northern and Southern Song (ca. 9th-12th century). These were classified into bowls, dish, plates and cups with some figurines.

While gold was abundant in Butuan, the National Museum staff did not find many. Instead, the treasure hunters found more due to their unsystematic and chaotic way of digging. They found gold beads, head adornments, rings and armbands. These were the most coveted artifacts together with the porcelain pieces.

Aside from the gold beads there were also glass, stone and coral beads. There were also rhinoceros horn, bronze objects and wooden images and toys. Three artifacts that are unique based on the material used, design and intrinsic characteristics were also found in Libertad. One is an ivory seal containing the name Butuan (spelled Pu-tuan or Butwan), two is the metal strip containing an old Java script, and three is the gold image of Tara, an Indic god.

Another very important artifact found in Libertad was the wooden boats. To date, 9 have been identified buried on swampy grounds. In 1976, the first boat was recovered through salvage archaeology while in 1977, the second boat was excavated systematically by the National Museum. In 1986, through ASEAN initiative, another boat was excavated by foreign archaeologists who joined the excavation. The importance of these boats cannot be discounted because its method of construction is no longer seen much around the country but is widely practiced in Southeast Asia.

To build the boats, planks were added on both sides of the keel using dowels which were spaced approximately 16-18cm. for Boat I and 12 cm. for Boat II and also 12 cm. for Boat V. Lugs were carved
within the planks and spaced equidistantly. These lugs are then bored with holes where the *cabó negro* (Arenga pinnata) cord is inserted for lashing. This helps the dowels secure the planks together to the frame or ribs which are attached after the boat has been completed. The boats have rounded bottoms for balance as there was no provision for outriggers found (Personal Communication Santiago 2009). A quarter rudder was recovered from Boat I. Caulking, using *almáciga*, a natural resin, on the planks of the boats was made to seal possible holes and sippage in between the planks.

Based on the study conducted by Green et. al (1993), the boat is capable of taking in twenty people with an average weight of 60 kilos. The nearest similar boats built by local boat-builders would come from Batanes. Even today, the Ivatan boat builders and the Sama-Bajau boat builders build boats following the edge-peg, plank-built method or the shell first construction technique.

Similar boats were also excavated in Indonesia, Malaysia and South China (ASEAN COCI 2007). The wooden boats from all these countries bring the image of interaction between and among the different groups of people whose geographic predicament are similar. Extant boats using the shell-first technique were also observed still being used and made in Batanes (Bolunia 1995) and in Tawi-tawi by the Sama-Bajau boat-builders. In Batanes, these boats are either called *tataya* or *faluca* depending on the size.

Boats allowed people to move around, exchange technological know-how, ideas and religion (Solheim n.d.). Social interaction was carried out indirectly through the exchange of both products and ideas. The National Museum has identified nine boats and three have been excavated already. The identity of the boat builders had not been established since its discovery. The Manobo who are considered as the original settlers of Butuan do not claim that their ancestors made the boats (Garvan 1931; Bolunia 2001, 2003, 2008). According to the Manobo boat-builders that we interviewed, they do not have a tradition for making large boats because there is no need for these boats in the river. But they were quick to counter that they were good in making dugout canoes. They were also adept in navigating the Agusan River or its tributaries. Scholars like Peralta (1980) believe that the boats were for riverine and coastal use only. Further interview with the Manobo boat-builders only made them more adamant that their ancestors did not build the boats found in Libertad. They also said that they do not have words to describe or label the boats.

One group of people that are known up to the present to be boat-builders are the Sama-Bajau of the Tawi-tawi Archipelago. The Sama-Bajau boat-builders know how to build large boats without the use of blueprints or complex tools. One such boat that they built recently were the boats that the *Kaya ng Pinoy* group used to sail around Central Visayas and Mindanao all the way to the tip of South Vietnam. They were able to prove that the boats were capable of sailing long voyages. It was also not difficult for them to visualize the construction of the big boats when they were first informed of the work they were to do. The boat-builders immediately explained how they were going to construct the boat including the wood they will use for the keel and the planks. Listening to them explain the steps they will involve gave a picture of ease and facility of the project at hand.

It would be recalled that Butuan was already trading with Champa before the 11th century. It was already bringing its products to Champa as part of the goods that will in turn be sent to China. During the 11th century, Butuan decided to bypass Champa which created problems for China as Champa raised the issue. From 1001 until 1007 or 1011, Butuan sent tribute mission directly to China. These tribute missions did not prosper beyond the early part of 11th century. This can maybe be attributed to difficulties in collecting enough products for China or difficulty in navigating the rest of the South China Sea all the way to China.

Beaujard (2005) describes that a close relationship exists between the coastal communities and the hinterlands for maritime trade to flourish. He further avers that while the “mouths of larger rivers have always served as points in the development of commerce and trade, it needs the waterways to sustain its involvement (2005:415). Salemink (Boomgard and Nordholt (2008:9) describes how the “isolated” upland areas, with their tribal inhabitants, have formed trade networks with the lowlands for centuries. Certain products, such as elephant tusks, rhinoceros horn, beeswax and eaglewood, all of them commodities in the long distance trade that were shipped from lowland port-of-trade- could only be acquired in the upland areas. At the same time, the availability of resources and labor naturally played a role in the construction a system of symbiotic relationship.
Although the perishable items like the organic products that were used to trade for Chinese ceramics and silk no longer exist, traces of other goods like the coconut shells, the bark, deer and pig bones, fish and other marine animals including the 9 boats are still around in the archaeological record to show that indeed people were present in Libertad during that time. Instead of finding Chinese silk, Chinese tradeware ceramics and Chinese coins were found both in the midden and in burials. One type of ceramics, the earthenware ceramics, also prove to the presence of trade or exchange because these are not locally produced but have already been identified as coming from southern Thailand. Figurines associated with Hindu influence were also recovered from the sites.

The claim by many Butuanon nowadays that Butuan became a center of trade during the 10th-13th centuries A.D. because of its geographical location which is favorable to trade and exchange cannot be discounted based on the material evidences recovered from the various sites.

REFERENCES


Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Southeast Asia

Maritime Southeast Asia

NEW ASEAN MARITIME CORE: MALAYSIA-THAILAND-VIETNAM MARITIME COOPERATION

Mohd Azhari Abdul Karim
Centre for Policy Research and International Studies (CenPRIS)
Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang
azhari_k@usm.my

ABSTRACT

The initial main theme of CenPRIS’s ocean research cluster is “connecting oceans” - an allusion to CenPRIS’s eventual focus on the Straits of Malacca as a body of water or maritime space that connects its littoral states - Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore - with the larger ocean space, the Indian Ocean. Focusing on the maritime potential of nations represents the other principal component of CenPRIS’s ocean research cluster. The development of the “CenPRIS Ocean Index” will measure the level of utilisation of a nation’s maritime resources and act as a policy planning instrument within Malaysia’s new Ocean Policy. Another research project under the cluster will examine the development of Penang as a knowledge hub in the Straits of Malacca region. A third project that will build upon the two research frameworks is on the governance of ethnic and bio-diversity along the Straits of Malacca, examining in greater detail the importance of sea passageways. For the governance of diversity, the participation of the natural sciences - marine biologists, oceanographers and other scientists - will bring more depth to a complex field that demands an interdisciplinary approach.

Keywords: Oceans Law and Policy, Straits of Malacca, Oceans Research

MARITIME STUDIES AND OCEAN POLICY

Social science research into maritime-related subjects can be seen as one of the key areas of academic research that is often overlooked in a relatively broad discipline that is dominated almost entirely by scholars of the life sciences. The near monopoly of the natural sciences on ocean and maritime research comes at the expense of developing a social science paradigm in approaching the vast field of maritime and ocean studies.

Ocean and maritime research has come into its own in the competitive and increasingly overcrowded field of academic research. Previously considered as peripheral areas and confined to the fringes of academia, these areas now mark the new borders that are steadily expanding and studied in their own right to the extent that it has become necessary to even adopt a distinctly maritime perspective in examining the vast watery spaces. Research into these new frontier regions have all but acquired a new and glamorous sheen in the academic world, attracting a broad range of scholars both from the areas of natural and social sciences. An emerging but unmistakable trend in this line of scholarly research has seen the emergence - in the past ten years or so in many parts of the globe but interestingly in the developing world - of research institutes devoted solely to maritime-related disciplines.

MARITIME SPACES DO MATTER

The prevalence of territorial disputes revolving around contested maritime space is also a key feature in a number of bilateral and multilateral conflicts. Furthermore, the demand by emerging economic powerhouses such as China, Vietnam or India of raw material and strategic minerals to boost production capacity has also alerted nations with vast ocean and maritime spaces to the possibility of territorial
expansion. Various means are increasingly resorted to such as land reclamation, joint development of disputed border territories and a range of other actions to advertise and promote their purported ownership of disputed areas, a number of which are unmistakably aggressive. Such trends do seem to suggest that governments are taking the administration of their maritime spaces more seriously than ever before.

Some three quarters of the Earth’s surface is covered in water, and yet the oceans as a whole is still under researched, in spite of the obvious signs of scholarly interest. On the whole, academic research on oceans still favours a predominantly land-based perspective. Not only does most research work undertaken revolve around land-based subjects, this inordinate bias towards the land mass has resulted in the ocean and maritime spaces being largely neglected until recently. The consequence is that the importance of maritime space seems to resonate less with policymakers and governments than their terrestrial possessions. However, the resurgent interest in research on maritime-related subjects suggests that this pattern is exhibiting significant symptoms of change that will probably lead to broadening the frontiers of the discipline.

The raised awareness that bodies of water such as the seas, oceans, and waterways constitute an invaluable asset have also accompanied increasing scholarship on various aspects of maritime studies, such as maritime security and strategic issues, international relations, sociology, anthropology, geology and oceanography. An itemised survey of the Institute for Science Information (ISI) Web of Science database for journal entries in the last five years or so, using the terms “ocean OR maritime” yields 48,727 results, of which material categorised under social science numbered only 6,184 while those on arts and humanities 882. The rest of the material on ocean or maritime studies were taken up by geology with 19,887 items, environmental science and ecology with 11,781 items, oceanography with 10,405 items, and marine and freshwater biology with 10,171 items. In the social science category, only about 4,098 items were listed on geography, business and economics 513 items, international relations 317 items, sociology 138 items and anthropology 84 items. Though these figures insinuate that a considerable number of publications have resulted from maritime social science research, a closer look reveals that in many of these research papers the topic of ocean or maritime subjects are only touched upon, being a sideline rather than a focus of research.

A quick glance at the existing scholarship within the field of ocean sciences and maritime studies reveals a startling discovery - that much of the scholarship and research in this area is contributed by the natural sciences, with a disproportionately low contribution from the field of social sciences or humanities. The woeful state of social science scholarship on the ocean and maritime spaces highlights...
the need for a more comprehensive and serious attempt at addressing this imbalance through a more intensive study of the earth’s maritime regions from a social science vantage point.

This disparity in between the life and social sciences in maritime research would lead to a pertinent question in the next paragraph - why does the ocean matter so much from the social science viewpoint?

MARITIME SPACES AS RESOURCE: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE

All nations, no matter how impoverished or wealthy, are usually endowed with a range of resources such as strategic minerals, arable land, to even ethnic diversity and knowledge assets. Often overlooked and under-rated as a resource are the geophysical features of a nation - in this case, the length of coastline a nation possesses and its proximity or access to oceans. Viewed as a natural resource in its own right, a nation’s coastlines will prove to be extremely useful in terms of physical territorial expansion and as a source of valuable commodities such as oil and gas.

Looking at the vast expanse of the oceans and maritime space as a nation’s tangible resource represents one of the core thrusts in the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies’s (CenPRIS) ocean and maritime research programme. Scholars from the Centre for Development Studies (ZEF), Bonn University, working with CenPRIS at Universiti Sains Malaysia, have discovered that among a nation’s natural endowments that are less frequently studied are its coastal areas and its access to the world’s oceans. Such a perspective will necessitate research methodologies and frameworks that are principally grounded in the social sciences.

From this angle, one observes that a nation with a long coastline will naturally have an advantage over those with shorter ones or even landlocked nations, for that matter, whereby the ones with long coastlines are in a better position to make use of these maritime assets in a variety of ways. A long coastline makes it possible for nations to engage in maritime industries such as ship building, fisheries, maritime logistics, and offshore exploration for oil and gas. These nations’ harbours will facilitate international shipping, labour migration, and the transfer of goods and knowledge. These assets have enabled the United Kingdom - an island nation with access to the Atlantic and the North Sea, among others - to emerge as a maritime nation with a global presence at the height of its colonial glory. Its ports such as Cardiff, Southampton, Glasgow and Liverpool were shipping hubs that were multicultural and cosmopolitan in character, acting as catalysts for a variety of industries that saw the expansion of these former harbour towns into principal urban centres, attracting migrant populations from all over the globe.

Location along the world’s oceans and access to blue water frequently leads to a higher level of maritime ecology and biodiversity. These are increasingly viewed as natural resources that are naturally sustainable and not easily depleted, as opposed to minerals like oil, zinc, coal or gold.

These maritime spaces that double up as a country’s natural resources naturally require a system of governance with which to administer it, as much as a system is needed to govern the landed territories of nations. A study of governance of diversity in these areas is therefore imperative and will yield a potential harvest of findings that could lead to a formulation and evolution of a more effective management regime to govern these resources. Small maritime passageways that connect or give access to the principal oceans, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca - both of which provide access to the Indian Ocean - become important units of study in the governance aspect of maritime and ocean spaces.

A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE OF OCEANS

Using maritime space as a conceptual framework with which to engage in issues of governance, a slightly different perspective emerges. Without setting aside the importance of the contribution of the ocean and marine sciences towards a more encompassing scholastic view of the ocean, the social science perspective aims only to enhance and broaden the field of ocean and maritime studies. There is a discernible trend for many of these newly-found institutes to adopt an inter-disciplinary discursive framework that integrates both the social and natural sciences perspective into studies related to the maritime space.
The deficiency of a research programme that is coloured by a land-based and natural science perspective has been highlighted earlier, along with an unbalanced scholarship that favours the latter. This deficiency is being addressed, slowly but steadily, through the establishment of a number of private and public research institutes on ocean and maritime studies employing a social science paradigm.

Adopting a social science and policy-oriented research agenda as the thrust is not something entirely new. In fact, the utility of social science policy-oriented ocean research has been explicitly acknowledged by academicians and policy practitioners. However, the level of awareness among strategic groups that the maritime space constitutes a valuable resource is not as great as it ought to be. Most nations still view issues of territorial expansion, jurisdiction and governance through a land-based paradigm, which although firmly established, is inadequate to address increasingly complex bilateral and multilateral concerns in the context of a contested maritime space.

That a social science perspective acquires a greater degree of salience as a means of conceptualising problems and offering policy options to decision makers is also recognised. This is because maritime spaces, such as oceans and sea passages, are increasingly seen as a principal resource for economic development and a main factor in economic and geopolitical competition, where previously it was only a means for transportation.

The reliance of nations on offshore economic activities such as oil drilling, deep sea mining and fisheries has also placed renewed importance on undertaking social science-based research on the ocean and maritime space. Increasingly resonant is the issue of governance of maritime territory beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as territorial and border disputes are occurring with alarming regularity. The overlapping and unresolved maritime claims in the South China Sea represent one example where geopolitical competition over a limited space may heighten tension in a region. Non-conventional threats such as piracy, militancy, terrorism, environmental degradation, coastline change and mass population movement across borders, are only some of the concerns which continue to plague decision makers on both sides of the Straits of Malacca for a long time, leading to the occasional tense moment in bilateral relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, for example.

Being a policy-oriented research centre, the ocean research cluster at CenPRIS seeks to extend its current trajectory into policy research that is solution-oriented and offers immediate impact. The ocean research cluster at CenPRIS attempts to break away from the predominance of a land-based perspective in favour of embracing a broader outlook in which the oceans and the seas should be studied in their own right.

From the brief survey of the research typology of ocean and maritime studies, it would appear that adopting a social science perspective to maritime research is not an entirely novel approach. Some work has actually been carried out whose thrust was primarily based on maritime anthropology, sociology, international relations and strategic studies. For example, extensive research on ethnic groups inhabiting the region’s ocean spaces such as the Orang Laut or the Sea Gypsies of Malaysia and Indonesia, which had been carried out under the umbrella of maritime anthropology. Maritime sociology has also gained some traction as a sub-genre of maritime research, with research carried out on socio-economic conditions of principal ports particularly in Europe and around the Indian Ocean.
THE CENPRIS OCEAN RESEARCH CLUSTER

CenPRIS’s ocean research cluster is but a small step compared to the highly specialised maritime research institutes throughout the world. For CenPRIS, there is room to develop a more policy-oriented research that attempts to integrate the natural and social sciences for a more informed analyses of development issues relating to the use of ocean resources that would provide building blocks or policy inputs for the government to craft a more integrated and balanced maritime policy.

The initial main theme of CenPRIS’s ocean research cluster is “connecting oceans” - an allusion to CenPRIS’s eventual focus on the Straits of Malacca as a body of water or maritime space that connects its littoral states - Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore - with the larger ocean space, the Indian Ocean. Maritime passageways such as the Straits of Malacca have assumed a pivotal role as a conduit through which the movement and transaction of people, ideas, culture, goods and services has transformed strategic points along the straits into hubs for knowledge production, innovation and commercially driven activities. As the Straits of Malacca shares overlapping territorial boundaries, the governance aspect assumes an overarching significance in its study. As one of the world’s vital sea lanes of communication, the Straits of Malacca itself is a resource whose governance becomes the responsibility of not only the littoral states but also the international community.

Developing the maritime potential of states represents the other principal component of CenPRIS’s ocean research cluster, represented by two research projects that will form the core of CenPRIS’s maritime research cluster. The development of the Ocean Index to act as a policy planning instrument to show the level of utilisation of a nation’s maritime resources is but a small step in highlighting the economic potential of having a culturally and biologically diverse coastline. Another research project under the cluster will examine the potential development of Penang and the north-western states of Peninsular Malaysia as a knowledge hub.

A third project that will build upon the two research frameworks and integrate their findings is on the governance of diversity along the Straits of Malacca, in trying to examine in greater detail the importance of sea passageways such as the straits in linking economic and knowledge hubs with the world’s oceans. For the governance of diversity, the participation of the natural sciences - marine biologists, zoologists and scientists - will bring more depth to a study that will otherwise only represent a limited perspective from the social science point of view.
A maritime area like the Straits of Malacca, the Sulu Sea or the South China Sea might qualify to be categorised as large marine ecosystems (LMEs). LMEs are distinct ecological regions that extend from the coast to the edge of the continental shelf. LMEs are economically important, producing goods and services—including 95 percent of the world’s fish yields—worth billions of dollars a year. Because LME coastlines are heavily populated, these ecosystems are often among the most polluted and degraded on Earth. The economic value of LMEs demands that their resources and habitats are protected and managed sustainably for both present and future generations. Often this requires international cooperation, since most LMEs span the maritime jurisdictions of more than one country.

The proposed research programme on the governance of cultural and biological diversity in the Straits of Malacca is actually an extension of an existing collaborative project between ZEF and CenPRIS on the economic and strategic significance of the Straits of Malacca. It is but one dimension of the working partnership that came about from the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between USM and Bonn University in April 2010. The initial result of this collaborative study by Professors Solvay Gerke and Hans-Dieter Evers has been published in the CenPRIS Working Paper Series (Gerke and Evers 2009) and elsewhere in a volume entitled “The Straits of Malacca: Knowledge and Diversity” (Gerke, Evers, Hornidge 2008).

THE CENPRIS OCEAN INDEX

One significant first result of ocean research at CenPRIS has been the “Ocean Index”. This index measures the geographical maritime potential of states and nations and shows how far this potential has been used in developing a maritime economy. Technical details of the first phase of this index are available in a handbook and in a CenPRIS Working Paper (Evers 2010). The index has been applied in showing differences of ASEAN states Index (Evers 2010; Evers and Azhari 2011a,b) and between the states of Malaysia (Evers and Zesali 2011). The index will be continuously updated and improved.
CONCLUSION

The CenPRIS ocean research cluster seeks to complement the valuable research work done by similar institutes worldwide by initiating an inter-disciplinary research agenda that will hopefully lead to a positive collaboration between natural and social scientists. Natural science represents an integral part of the cluster without which it would be difficult to examine the policy dimension of the development of maritime resources and potential of a nation like Malaysia, whose states are all endowed with a coastline. A more wide-ranging study on the implications of nation’s maritime and ocean policy will naturally lead to value-added and credible policy options. It is only through sound feedback and scholarship based on an inter-disciplinary research framework that the full extent of Malaysia’s maritime potential could be harnessed in preparation for Malaysia’s eventual emergence as a formidable maritime nation. It is too early to reap the harvest but the establishment and development of the CenPRIS ocean research cluster will hopefully prove to be useful in promoting the study of the oceans from a social science, or more specifically development policy, perspective.

REFERENCES


ABSTRACTS
(PRESENTERS WHO DID NOT SUBMIT THEIR PAPERS)

ISLAM AND STATE IN INDONESIA; A SUBSTANTIVISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Mohamad Latief
Department of Islamic Political Science, University of Malaya

This paper concerns with current dynamics within Indonesian politics and deals with its relentless attempt to construct a harmonious relationship between religion (Islam) and politic (state). The paper concluded that, in the context of Indonesian politics, secularism has grown so rapidly and influenced gradually the political paradigm and attitude of its society. And this influence could be viewed through an examination onto political discourse which the substantivistic paradigm brought about. Included in these are, for example, rejection to the establishment of Islamic State, Islamic political party and implementation of Shariah etc. As of now, this substantivistic notion has so incredibly shaped political paradigm of many Islamic political parties, especially Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN); each of which represents the two largest Islamic mass organizations of the country; Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The paper will therefore describe and critically examine this substantivistic paradigm on the basis of its convergence with the so-called secularization of politic. It is this measure of secularism which we are entitled to wisely anticipate and mutually overcome.

Keywords: Secularism, Formalistic, Substantivistic, Pancasila, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Partai Amanat Nasional

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SAMPIT 2004: POLITICS OF RECOGNITION IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY
Suharno and Samodra Wibawa
Faculty of Social Science and Economy, Yogyakarta State University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University

Indonesia, as a multicultural country, necessitates the space of co-existence which gives recognition to the various identities forming the multiculturality. In fact, through many government policies, since the colonial administration up to the New Order era, the monocultural politics was prominent, solely for the sake of stability and social integration — in the form of centralism and authoritarianism. These brought conflicts between ethnics in several places in Indonesia since the end of 1990s.

This article discusses the resolution of ethnical conflict between Dayak and Madurese in Sampit, Borneo in 2000s. This paper will address several questions: How did the local government solve the problem? How did politics of recognition overcome the inter-ethnic conflict? Does it prevent incoming latent conflict? How was the policy of recognition formulated and implemented? What differences between Sampit case and those of Sambas and Poso?

This article is based on a qualitative study in the location. The first author has conducted observation, in-depth interview, and focused group discussion to generate data.

Keywords: Multicultural, Conflict, Politics of Recognition, Public Policy, Sampit, Dayak, Madurese
DONORS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASES OF INDONESIA, PHILIPPINE, AND MYANMAR
Asra Virgianita
Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia

Democratization is recognized by some scholars as having two faces: one internal and one for the international community. The emergence of democracy movement by local organizations in one country, as an impact of the globalization of democracy, encouraged the same in other countries. On the other hand, the international community keeps trying to facilitate democratic movements both by providing funds and technical assistance. Since the 1990s, democratization has become a new area for the international community, especially donor countries, in giving assistance. Traditionally, technical assistance has been provided in the context of economics and development, with main emphasis on building and strengthening physical infrastructure. This study argues that in explaining democratic movement in Southeast Asia, the international factors, or the role of donors should not be excluded. Considering these, this paper will analyze the role of international donors in supporting democratization in the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Philippine and Myanmar by addressing two questions. First, how have international donors played a role in promoting democracy and involved in the democratization in those countries. Second, how have the international donors formulated their approach to promote democracy and supporting democratization in those countries? Overall, this study purpose to analyze how international donors can have a positive role in supporting democratization in Southeast Asian countries.

Keywords: Democratization, Democracy Assistance, International Donors

CHANGES IN STRATIFICATION, INSTITUTIONS AND LIFESTYLE: OIL PALM PLANTATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN A RURAL COMMUNITY IN WEST PASAMAN, INDONESIA
Elfitra, Jendrius
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Andalas University

This paper will discuss about social changes in a rural community in West Pasaman Regency, Indonesia related to penetration of smallholder’s oil palm plantation that have been developed intensively and massively in last two decades. The changes in stratification have been indicated by complexity of stratification forms those based on land tenure and the emergence of rich groups and laborers. In terms of social institutions, extended families have been transformed to nuclear families, socialization which is based on family and kinship have been shifted to formal education. Moreover, surau as socialization and educational institution for adolescence is not functional anymore.

Keywords: Social Change, Social Stratification, Social Institution, Rural Society
DOES PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND THE PRACTICE OF EGAT’S CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL IN THAILAND ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN CROSS BORDER INVESTMENTS?: A CASE STUDY OF THE PROPOSED HAT GYI HYDROPOWER PROJECT ON SALWEEN RIVER, MYANMAR/ BURMA

Nang Shining
Faculty of Political Sciences, Chulalongkorn University

This paper has three main purposes: to examine the participatory governance applicable to the community inside Thailand; to find out the EGAT’s Corporate Social Responsibility both according to the standard themselves and their implementation in practice according to the experiences of the stakeholders involved; and to evaluate the gap of the participatory governance model and CSR standard utilization impact to environmental justice in the process of Hat Gyi dam project.

Qualitative research methods have been applied in this study through a combination of in-depth interviews with key informants and secondary database research. This research will only be emphasized to the communities inside Thailand living along the Salween River, in particular, Mae Sam Laep village, Tha Ta Fang village, and Sop Moei village, The dam project is located inside Myanmar, 47 Km away from the Thailand-Myanmar border, and its complicated political context is widely known.

During the preparation of the feasibility study, potentially affected communities were not consulted, nor invited to participate in the decision-making process. Furthermore, information about the project and Environmental Impact Assessment report has not been fully released to a wide range of stakeholders. A resettlement and compensation plan for the affected communities is even existent. The paper argues that the inadequate implementation of the principles of participatory governance toward the communities and the inadequate enforcement of EGAT’s CSR standard has resulted in a failure to ensure adequate consideration of the principles of environmental justice in the case of the proposed Hat Gyi dam in Karen State, Myanmar/Burma.

Keywords: Hat Gyi Hydropower Project, Myanmar, Participatory Governance, Environmental Justice, Corporate Social Responsibility

FROM NAGARI TO DESA AND BACK TO NAGARI: HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF NAGARI GOVERNANCE IN WEST SUMATRA

Jendrius
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Andalas University

Nagari as a prototype of local governance of Minangkabau Society in West Sumatra has a long history and influenced by several external forces. Islam, the colonial governments and the central governments are the external influences of Nagari. Although the Nagari government system was replaced by the “desa governmental system” (Javanese model of village and became standard throughout Indonesia) during the "Orde Baru" era, but the spirit to maintain the existance of Nagari as the lowest unit of local government still exists. The return to the nagari had been realized along with the decentralization process in Indonesia. This paper traces the historical context of the development of nagari governance and describes and analyzes the forms and structures of nagari governance and impacts of the changes on local communities.

Keywords: Nagari, Desa, Local Governance, Minangkabau, Decentralization
STUDENT MOVEMENTS AS CREATIVE MINORITY
Aryo dwiharprayudi
Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Globalization makes the flow of information faster. This process affects all aspects of a student’s life – and among those affected are student movements. This paper will discuss student movements among the universities in Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) countries, in relations to this globalized world. ASEAN is one of the regional organizations affected significantly by globalization. Students have strategic roles in this era, which are as agents of change, social control and iron stock for the future. With these strategic roles, students must provide a solution to existing problems, because students are known as a creative minority. The student movements in ASEAN should establish and strengthen communication networks in order to stand at the international level and speak out to the world for truth and justice. Student movement can contribute significantly to affecting international policy and give an alternative for the policy. There are already some activities that unify the student movements in ASEAN, such as Student Visit, International Conference of the ASEAN Young Leaders and the ASEAN University student leader forums, even had initiated to make the Student Government of ASEAN and the ASEAN Community in 2015. The problems encountered in these activities are the unsustainable result which could not be published. As the solution for the problems, writers would like to recommend that we should conduct an annual meeting between student representatives, and the meeting should construct a recommendation to solve regional and international problems.

Keywords: Student Movements, Creative Minority, ASEAN, Globalization, Policy

ENGINEERING CULTURAL STUDIES AS SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR STRENGTHEN ASEAN COMMUNITY
Abdullah Sumrahadi
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Sunan Kaliijaga State Islamic University

Since the initial establishment of ASEAN aspires to realize the unity of Southeast Asia, and ASEAN membership expanded. At the same time, ASEAN faces new problems with the expansion of membership is due to the increased responsibilities that the greater and the potential for internal disputes such as border issues, illegal labor, and environmental problems. ASEAN leaders agreed to have the commitment creates One Caring and Sharing Community in 2015, five years earlier than planned in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, and to disseminate to the people of ASEAN to have the “we feeling.” ASEAN Community will be colored achievement of cooperation, solidarity, together against poverty, and enjoy a sense of security, including human security. ASEAN culturally fragmented and has no proximity to one another, unless the influence of Malay-Islamic civilization in the South, India, Buddha in the center and south. One thing that might be the historical ties that the nations in this region has made contact trading, cultural exchange and political contacts between them and with the countries of South Asia, Middle East, Africa, North East Asia, long before Europeans enter and colonize the region. Through this study will be seen how the cultural linkages become a social capital. In which social capital is derived from cultural values that traced from the respective involved members will be a new power. This study using post-positivist approach, where the tension of qualitative narrative as the mainstream and assisted by postcolonial theory as a critical reading for the context to find early conclusions.

Keywords: Cultural Form, Critical Discourse, Social Capital, Beyond Societies, Post-National
DRAMATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE RECENT TIME: ISSUES, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Adekunie Daoud Balogun
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Political affairs in the Southeast Asian region have in the last 21st century become a powerful, decisive instrument of producing active leaderships. But strategic plans to make opposition become virtually redundant are being observed in a number of Southeast Asian nations’ political practices. This development may arouse supportive sympathy for the opposition by the government loyalists in order to prevent a one party system syndrome. Therefore, some undemocratic plans are capable of derailing the democratic traditions which encouraged political participation. Therefore, meaningful business of governance focusing on people-demands and people-needs oriented programmes can successfully take the leadership through many decades of political progress in governance. Alternatively, regional problems, inflation, unemployment, poverty, pollution narcotic problems, goods smuggling, cyber crime, security, social problems and immigration are crucial issues that needed government regular attention. The paper aims to limit its study on five of the Southeast Asian countries in the capacity of Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Singapore. The objectives of the study are to seek means for the authorities to keep stronghold of their power at the local level and also maintain its leadership position in the regional and global intergovernmental organizations for promoting political, economic and cultural sustainability for the benefit of the future generation. The study will use primary and secondary sources and the available literatures while theoretical approach will explore the realists and neo-liberals’ perspectives to analyze its envisioning standpoints.

Keywords: Political Transition, Southeast Asian Politics

DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI: A TRIPARTITE COMPARISON
Rohaizan Baharuddin
Centre for Languages and Compulsory Subjects, Taylor's University

The purpose of this study is to examine and compare the practices of democracy in three Muslim countries in the Southeast Asia region – Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Specifically, the paper presents the comparative study on Indonesia, Malaysian and Brunei important democratic elements such as political systems, political institutions and public political participation. Based on the quantitative and qualitative data primarily collected from Freedom House and other secondary sources, this study demonstrates the findings that though sharing lots of similarities in terms of geographical location, race, language, culture, religion and to some extent history, these three selected countries appeared so differently when it comes to democratic performance and practices where Indonesia was ranked as ‘Free’ country, ‘Partially Free’ country for Malaysia and ‘Not Free’ country for Brunei. Besides they also practiced totally different political systems which Indonesia and Malaysia belong to Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies respectively, while Brunei maintain an Absolute Monarchy System. These reflect the public participation in politics which is active is Indonesia, moderate in Malaysia and passive in Brunei.

Keywords: Democracy, Southeast Asia Politics, Political Systems, Political Institutions, Political Participation, Muslim Democracy
EXPLORING REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: PERSPECTIVES FROM AN INTEGRATED AND MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH
Ederson Delos Trino Tápia
College of Governance and Public Policy, University of Makati

As with most concepts in the Social Sciences, governance has had to contend with a plethora of challenges, not the least of which covers questions regarding its meaning. This matter is made even more complicated with the fact that by its very nature, the term is, and indeed may be approached from the perspective of various academic disciplines. Not a single discipline can claim a monopoly on its use. However, a great number of the academic and even practical work on the issue has been made using the lenses of Public Administration (PA). In the Philippines, this is best exemplified by the name it has given to its premier PA academic institution – the National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG). Yet, the fact remains that other disciplines and areas of interest such as Political Science, International Political Economy, Management, Business Administration, and others make use of the term routinely and has in fact arrogated it to form part of their respective lexicons. While this may be due to PA’s long enduring relationship with these fields, as they do in fact share some common interest, it may also be due to the multi-dimensional character of the term itself – immediately conjuring up images that pertain to governments, bureaucracies, institutions and a host of other issues. The discourse however has largely centred on national and sub-national contexts. As globalisation dramatically impacts on almost all facets of human interaction, the governance literature has also articulated frameworks that transcend national boundaries.

Academic interest on Southeast Asia is similarly situated. Universities which have taken a keen interest on the matter have done so under the heading of Area Studies consciously making use of an interdisciplinary approach. Scholars who claim expertise on this subject are of varied academic background and training. It is therefore a necessary proposition that a proper understanding of the complexities of Southeast Asia require an interdisciplinary approach.

This paper seeks to problematise governance and Southeast Asia through the somewhat unifying framework of regional governance, used in this paper both as a framework of analysis and as a normative goal. It argues that as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) makes a transition from a norms-based organisation to one ruled by more formal mechanisms, a corollary framework that meets the concomitant challenges brought forth by the complexities of region-building must be in place and must be strengthened. The paper’s objectives include examining how the issues, challenges and prospects impact on ASEAN regional integration and the governance dimension it necessarily touches. The discussion on regional governance is enriched by considering it hand-in-hand with an integrated approach to multi-level governance. It is divided into four parts. The paper begins with an overview of Southeast Asia as a region and a brief historical account of the development of ASEAN. The second part presents a theoretical treatise on governance and regional governance and looks at the issue from a ‘multi-level’ perspective and an ‘integrated’ approach. The third part details ASEAN initiatives as they impinge on the strengthening of regional governance mechanisms. Finally, the paper looks at the challenges that a regional governance framework in Southeast Asia has to contend with.

Keywords: Governance, regional governance, Southeast Asia
CHALLENGES FACED BY NATURE-BASED TOURISM RESOURCES IN SELANGOR
Rosiilawati Zainol, Syra Lawrence Maidin, Goh Hong Ching, Norzailawati Mohd Noor, Nikmatul Adha Nordin, Tan Wan Hin, Wan Suzita Wan Ibrahim and Muhamad Nur Akramin Sulaiman
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya
Urban and Regional Planning Department, International Islamic University

Nature-based tourism resources often fall victim to urban development. Correct measures are needed to conserve these resources not only for their economic value but also for their environmental contributions in stabilizing the local climate and as natural landscapes. Referring to the case of Selangor, this paper intends to reveal the issues in conserving nature-based tourism resources in light of the greater interest in prospering urbanization. Both nature-based tourism resources and urbanization are important to Selangor with the former being the center of attractions and source of income to the state and the latter being the direction of a developed state. However, the current trend shows that the nature-based tourism resources are often being sacrificed in order to give way to urbanization. Therefore, the objectives of the study are to identify the challenges faced in conserving nature-based tourism resources in Selangor and subsequently to suggest a list of corrective measures which not only could be used by the case study itself but to other examples in the ASEAN which are facing similar threats. To achieve these objectives, field work observations and evaluations on nature-based tourism resources in Selangor are used to obtain the current condition of these resources. In addition, articles written on corrective measures taken in preserving tourism resources in other ASEAN countries are also analyzed. Spatial analysis is used to extract the danger faced by tourism resources in Selangor and content analysis are used to outline corrective measures taken to preserve these resources. Findings show that tourism resources in Selangor are under threat of urban encroachments due to development demands and are poorly maintained although they are popular attractions. In addition, findings also show that, in other ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, tourism resources are preserved and well maintained. Therefore, correct measures need to be outlined and implemented to reduce urban encroachments towards nature-based tourism resources and to maintain these resources for future generation and even more for climate stability.

Keywords: Nature-Based Tourism Resources, Correct Measures, Spatial Analysis, Urban Encroachments, Urbanization

TOURISM IN THAILAND AND THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
John Walsh
Shinawatra University

Tourism is one of Thailand’s most important industries and earns a great deal of revenue for the country. However, tourism is problematic in terms of planned economic development owing to innate volatility resulting from shocks in the external environment and because most tourist industry jobs are low wage and low-skilled service sector jobs. During the authoritarian age, Thai economic development was largely the result of the low-cost import-substituting, export-oriented manufacturing paradigm (also known as the East Asian Economic Model) that is most successful in economic terms when the use of force supplements persuasion and the use of market-based incentives in inspiring people and organisations to take the actions that are wanted to further planned developmental goals. While this has been successful in the past to the extent that Thailand has risen to middle income status, the Middle Income Trap dictates that the means of moving from low income to middle income status are not the same means by which a country can move from middle income to high income status. Instead, it appears to be necessary to move into a post-authoritarian development paradigm and this potential change has been an important (but largely unacknowledged) factor in recent political conflicts in the Kingdom. The post-authoritarian paradigm will feature, as it has elsewhere,
enhanced use of the creative industries and their ability to foster value adding activities and clusters of different and complementary economic activities. One industry that can coordinate and leverage different and diverse elements of the creative industries is tourism. There is considerable potential for Thai tourism managers to package together various elements of the creative industries in value-maximising experiences. This paper evaluates the existing state of the Thai tourism industry and the efforts to date to make use of the creative industries. Conclusions are drawn from this and recommendations made.

**Keywords:** Thailand, Tourism, Labour Market, Creative Industry, Competitiveness

**SECURING URBAN FARMING THROUGH MULTIPLE AND DIVERSIFIED FOOD PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES**

Pham Tran Thang Long
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University

This paper provides an analysis of farm livelihoods operating within the global phenomena of intensive urban expansion and market engagement. Ethnographic field research with 11 case studies was carried out during the period 2008 to 2010. By demonstrating the practice of urban farming in the specific context of urbanizing Đông Mỹ commune in Hanoi, Vietnam, the paper argues that urban farming in the form of food production has necessarily been sustained and developed through multiple and diversified strategies. In this mixed system, differentiated actors operate their multi-size farms in various manners, so that they can utilize all of their land, labor and capital towards not only one target in the urban market - even if it is the main target - but also self-consumption and petty trade at the local market. The existence of this arrangement depends on the existence of a local market, a certain level of political intervention, market arrangements, the level of self-management among the local producers, and the degree to which the local producers can move back and forth between their location and the urban areas, not only for off-farm employment, but also to gather information and evaluate other modes of production. The specific practice of urban farming in Đông Mỹ accordingly asserts dynamic and heterogeneous nature of farm producers in the context of a Southeast Asian country, and by so doing, contributes to a different way of defining the practice of “urban farming”.

**Keywords:** Agrarian Restructuring, Urban Agriculture, Diversified Livelihoods, Multiple Production System, Vietnam

**FROM IRREGULAR MIGRANT WORKERS TO ENTREPRENEURS: TOM YUM RESTAURANT BUSINESSES AMONG PATANI MALAY ENTREPRENEURS IN MALAYSIA**

Suttiporn Bunmak
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Thaksin University

Significant Patani Malay ethnic Tom Yum restaurant business growth has occurred in Malaysia. The emergence of Tom Yum restaurant businesses has been a part of the social landscape in cities of Malaysia in third decades. These businesses are owned and operated by migrant entrepreneurs from the lower southern Thailand -- Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Songkhla provinces who were mostly irregular migrant workers in their early phase of migration process. The self-employment pattern of Patani Malay business, particularly the success of Tom Yum restaurant business, is current explained by the social resources explanation as a labour source within their co-ethnic migrant workers for cheap cost and their national identities. Drawing up examples based on six months between 2008, November to 2009, April of qualitative approach fieldwork, participant observation and in-depth interviews of Patani Malay migrant workers and Patani Malay business owners from the lower southern provinces of Thailand employed at Tom Yum restaurants in Kuala Lumpur by use of snowballing technique. The paper has sought to reveal how irregular migrant workers reposition themselves from the workers to entrepreneurs in the ethnic restaurant business, Malaysia. This paper is
important in better understanding the connections between the eating-out demands of the ethnic restaurant business in Malaysia and the need of migrant workers to be self-employment pattern of the success of Tom Yum restaurant business in Malaysia.

**Keywords:** Immigrant Entrepreneur, Ethnic Restaurant, Self-Employment, Migrant Workers, Malaysia

**COMMUNICATING WITH THE WORLD: USES AND GRATIFICATION RESEARCH ON ETHNIC TOURISM**

Tracy Peter Samat, Mus Chairil Samani, Dayang Aizza Abang Ahmad and Jamilah Maliki

Universiti Malaysia Sarawak

Ethnic tourism has become a mushrooming tourism product in Sarawak, continuously providing growth to the state and local community particularly at the rural area. The exotic cultural elements that include cultural events, arts, and environment that ethnic tourism offers were discovered to be amongst the motivating factor of tourists’ arrivals to Sarawak, in the recent years. This is proven from a case study conducted among the Bidayuh community at Annah Rais village that projects the integration between the ethnic tourism industry with the local community development. Among the factor that creates the attention and desire for the tourists’ visit is based on the knowledge obtained from various sources. This research draws on the uses and gratifications perspective in mass communication to examine the audience experience associated in their information seeking process. The method utilize for this study is based on a survey among the various tourists staying at the homestay in Annah Rais. A total of 50 respondents were purposively sampled amongst those who stayed at the two selected homestays: Edward’s Homestay and Macharee’s Homestay. The findings indicate that most of the tourists, found information about places of interests and available facilities from the Internet. The information provided in the website serves as entertainment, information, personal identity, and social utility function to the tourists.

**Keywords:** Ethnic Tourism, Bidayuh Community, Homestay, Uses and Gratification, Internet

**REVISITING THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN MALAYSIA**

Jikon Lai

College of Asia & the Pacific Australian National University

The state-led developmental model, long associated with the rise of the East Asian Tiger economies, has seen its fortune ebb and flow in the last two decades. While there was cautious celebration of its approach to economic development with the publication of the World Bank’s ‘East Asian Miracle’ report in 1993, many claimed that the model had been discredited with the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8. This however did not stop East Asian economies from continuing to intervene in their economies, for both political and developmental ends. The novelty of recent government interventions can be found in the shift in focus from the manufacturing sector to the services sector, in particular financial services. In this paper, I analyse the evolution of developmental policies focusing on the emergence of Islamic finance in Malaysia. The paper seeks to understand how the Malaysian Government has influenced, shaped and driven the impressive growth of the Islamic finance sub-sector. As the debate about the ‘East Asian state’ has traditionally focused on the manufacturing sector, this paper expands on this literature by identifying and analysing the differences in developmental policies as applied between the services sector and the ‘real’ sector. In the conclusion, I offer some preliminary observations on the ‘room’ that governments today have to manoeuvre in adopting developmental policies in the services sector, given the various proscriptions, in international rules and norms, against
active state intervention.

**Keywords:** Economic Development, Developmental State, Financial Sector, Islamic Finance, Economic Policy

---

**CAN MALAYSIAN FIRMS INNOVATE? BENCHMARKING AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LEADERS**

Rajah Rasiah and Yap Xiao Shan  
Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya

The significance of technology cannot be overestimated by countries like Malaysia that want to advance from being middle- to high-income. Failure to upgrade technology will cause the country to lose its competitiveness in the globalized world. This paper examines the Malaysian case by benchmarking the technological attainment of local technological companies against global companies. Silterra, a Malaysia front-end semiconductor manufacturer that operates a highly automated fabrication facility with state-of-the-art fabrication tools and systems will be compared against MNCs like Intel, TSMC, and Texas Instruments. The areas of comparison are the companies’ financial performance, R&D expenditures, patents, human resource and corporate strategic plans.

This paper also aims to examine the technological innovations of these companies in their product structures and the speed of these advancements. Comparisons of these firms will reflect the relative position of Malaysia firms against the global competition in terms of technology. It also discusses how effective Malaysian firms have been in catching up with current technology given the country’s 40 years’ history of foreign direct investment, and given that Malaysia is currently still one of the world’s most popular sites for semiconductor manufacturing, assembly, testing and packaging. Multinational corporate that have established a presence here for some time include such well-known brands as AMD, Toshiba, Intel, NEC and STMicroelectronics. This paper will argue that the Malaysian semiconductor industry still has a long way before it is technologically competitive in the global markets.

**Keywords:** Malaysia, Technology, Integrated Circuits, Semiconductor, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)

---

**RETHINKING OF TOURISM MANAGEMENT IN CHERATING, PAHANG**

Noni Lela Hayati Ayob, Wan Suzita Wan Ibrahim and Rosilawati Zainol  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Cherating is rich in tourism resources which consist of local handicrafts, food and beautiful beaches. However, its sustainability currently relies heavily on weekend visitors and package tour and most of them are locals. Therefore, this paper presents the issues of tourism development in Cherating. Developments especially along Cherating beach are haphazard. This could be due to the privately owned land areas along the beach. In addition, other issues identified are competitiveness among tourist destinations which are more attractive compared to Cherating and poor level of services given to the tourists. With this in mind, this study intends to identify the location of tourists’ attractions in Cherating, to examine the current status of these attractions and to compare the current situations with tourism resources in other ASEAN countries. Field work observation and interview are the main methods used in data collection. In addition, articles related to best practices in sustaining tourism resources are also used as secondary data. Subsequently, GIS application is used to identify tourism resources spatially and contents analysis on the articles. Findings show that actions need to be taken to preserve the natural beauty of Cherating. Among the actions include redevelopment of lodging houses along the beach resort with homestay concept, batik industry retention, water sports activities
and promotion of the tour packages that include small and medium sized industries around the Cherating Beach. Furthermore state government involvement is also required in rejuvenating Cherating.

**Keywords:** Tourism Resources, Beaches, GIS Application, Handicrafts, Local Food

---

**COASTAL COMMUNITY ECONOMIES IN THE NORTHERN EAST COAST OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIA**

Nor Shahida, A. and Khairulmaini, O.S
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Coastal communities refer to people living in the coastal zone. This group is exposed to physical factors and processes of coastal changes such as the wind, waves, currents, erosion and deposition processes. In terms of economic activity, the coastal communities are usually dependent on marine resources such as fishing, small-scale entrepreneurs and traders. Coastal tourism activities are mostly community-based eco-tourism. For this paper, the community referred to are the coastal communities in the northern east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, Kelantan. The main objective is to examine changes in the coastal community of economic activity impact of the changes that occur at the edge of the sea. Secondly is to examine the level of community vulnerability and adaptation effects of the changes that has occurred. Some coastal areas at Kelantan are experiencing serious changes have been selected through an analysis of Geographic Information System (GIS), then the economic aspects of coastal communities studied in detail to see the impact faced by the community. In regards, analysis of the study revealed that the level of vulnerability impact of changes in economic activity and adaptation to coastal communities continue to live in the coastal zone of the study area.

**Keywords:** Coastal Community, Coastal Changes, Vulnerability, Adaptation

---

**VEHICLE THEFT RATE IN KUALA LUMPUR: A SPATIAL ANALYSIS USING GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (GIS)**

Sharif Shofirun Sharif Ali, Rosmadi Fauzi and Jamilah Mohamad
Department of Geography, University of Malaya

Crime has been regarded as one of the most worrying state of problem for every nation in the world. Criminal offences that attested actions against the public and state not only caused losses but also traumatic experiences to the victims. Hence, numerous studies had been done by researchers to understand the occurrences, the trends and the patterns of crime. Criminology or the study of crime is not only a field venture just by the sociologist but also has gained attention from geographers too. Geographers believe that crime is influenced by numerous factors such as spatial factor and non-spatial factors for example age, race, income, and etc. Rapid urban development and growth are often associated with the increase of criminal rate in certain area. It is arguably proven that crime in urban areas has increased in parallel with the urban growth especially in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. This has caused negative impact on quality of life for its residents and raised concern on residents’ safety. There are many factors that have contributed to the increase in crime rate. The problem has becomes more complicated when there is an influx arrival of foreign labours, drug addicts and weaknesses of law enforcements. Positive impact of analysing crime rate using technology will facilitate local authorities to enforce law more efficiently. The use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in crime analysis has helped the authorities in decision making processes in Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. The ability of GIS in analyzing spatial data would enable swift actions to prevent crime rate especially, vehicle theft. This study aims to provide useful information to reduce crime rates and intend to assist the respective in curbing crime rates Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
Keywords: Crime, Vehicle Theft, Spatial Analysis, GIS

ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, DENATIONALIZATION AND THE RELOCATION OF VIOLENCE
Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn
College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University

Southeast Asia has become a site of interests for foreign investment, in view of its geographical linkages to rising China and India. It is also one of the fastest growing regional economies in the world. ASEAN as a regional bloc, fully aware of its own economic and strategic interests in the eyes of the western powers, is eager to advance its degree of integration with the global economy through a series of free trade agreements and internal deregulation. While there is an obvious shift of capital accumulation on the global scale towards Southeast Asia, this change brings in pressure and expectation, and in turn accelerates the neoliberal process of globalization. As David Harvey (2004) has pointed out, while the promise of poverty reduction as a result of ‘neoliberal’ policies and practices of globalization is never materialized, social dislocation and environmental degradation has been also unevenly distributed. This paper will show the ways in which ASEAN’s plan of community building through economic integration, as a response to such global pressure and expectation, results in the uneven distribution of both benefits and costs across the region. Furthermore, this paper argues that this transformation poses a threat to certain groups of people in specific areas as it relocates exploitation and violence towards less democratic societies. These groups of people are those who live at the ‘borders’ of the New Geography of Power (Sassen, 1996), meaning either immigrants moving across literarily borders of the nation-states or workers in and communities around ‘special economic zones’ created by the extraterritoriality of the economic globalization.

ORGANIZATIONAL FACILITATION OF REGIONAL GOOD GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDY ON FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE IN ASEAN (1990, 2000, 2010)
Hsia-Ping Lan
Department of Public Administration, National Chengchi University

There is a critical question that “Is institution declining?” under the impacts of regional governance, and this paper is going to explore the answer from an organizational aspect. The main assumption of this research is that there is still a strong demand of organizational facilitation for regional governance. This research is going to offer empirical evidence in the ASEAN food safety governance through the international political economic analysis. Considering the issue of food is the most important issue in developing countries such as the members of ASEAN, this research focuses on the topic of food safety governance. The international political economic analysis of ASEAN food safety governance focuses on the relationship of the assessment of the good governance of food safety organization in ASEAN, and the economic growth of ASEAN members as well as the political stability of ASEAN members in 1990 (before the establishment of AMAF), 2000 (after the establishment of AMAF), and 2010 (the latest situation) through the qualitative research method and SEM causal analysis.
In recent years, ASEAN leaders have made noticeable efforts toward ASEAN community-building. The new direction towards which ASEAN is heading has been phrased as “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”. The ASEAN Charter has made the relevant shift by such commitments as enhancing participation of civil societies, promoting greater people-to-people interaction, and fostering cultural awareness of the region. The organization is in the stage of important reinventing its structure and character.

In terms of external relations, ASEAN is facing a challenge to stay relevant in both intra-regional and extra-regional processes. With multiple, often overlapping and mutually competitive regional initiatives in Asia-Pacific, ASEAN is facing a challenge to remain its central position in this new architecture. In similar token, current conditions have made ASEAN struggle to sustain its priority position in extra-regional relations. Particularly the relationship with Europe has been overshadowed by China’s increasing density of bilateral networks with European partners. With the longest experience of inter-regional dialogue with Europe in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework, where ASEAN can not only interact with the EU partners, but also with other Asian counterparts; it is an important platform for reinvigorating its position. In fact, since its establishment, ASEM was expected to play an important role in strengthening the ASEAN’s voice in the international community.

One factor that distinguishes ASEM from other regional and transregional fora is it has a substantive socio-cultural cooperation pillar (third pillar). Although the relative low-profile in comparison to other two: political and economic, the third pillar has been the most successful.

All states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN Secretariat are the members of Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is re-structuring itself to remain a relevant driving force in the region, it needs to simultaneously pay attention to its internal community-building, as well as to reaching out the global community. This study embarks on examining the unexplored value of cultural cooperation and its contribution to ASEAN’s internal growth in terms of implication for ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, and also as a mean for ASEAN to enhance external relations. This paper shall explain the role of culture in Asia-Europe inter-regionalism; in particular it focuses on the ASEAN’s participation in the processes third pillar programs. It seeks for a linkage between people-to-people partnership in Asia-Europe framework and the transformation of ASEAN into a “People-oriented organization”. This study argues that socio-cultural aspects of cooperation contribute to maintaining relevance, comprehensiveness, and sustainability of the dialogue; and as a consequence helps ASEAN to maintain its significant position in internal intra- and extra-regional matters.

**Keywords:** ASEAN, ASEM, Socio-Cultural Inter-Regionalism, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, Social Interaction, Cultural Democracy
PROMOTING THE ASEAN COMMUNITY THROUGH STUDENT MOVEMENTS: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ASEAN STUDENT UNION

Ridwansyah Yusuf Achmad
School of Architecture, Planning, and Policy Development in Institut Teknologi Bandung

ASEAN today is empowering itself to be a strategic multi-nation community that could balance the socio-economic power which has been dominated by the “west” in the last centuries. It cannot be denied that to promote the ASEAN Community will need a comprehensive cooperation among all stakeholders in ASEAN. One of the potential powers that could stimulate the ASEAN Community is the university Student Union. It is a group of young intellectuals with strong a sense of idealism, bright vision about the future and passionate to build an international network.

This paper will describe the possibilities and challenges to optimize the potential of student unions in all ASEAN countries in order to establish the ASEAN Student Union. It will also compare the activity patterns, peculiarities, and influences among other student unions in world class universities and student unions in ASEAN countries. The analytical procedure will be through a series of qualitative approach research, and also through critical evaluation using related literature and desk study. From the research, it is known that, even though the student union in ASEAN countries face many challenges and difficulties in developing the network, they are optimistic enthusiastic in establishing the ASEAN Student Union in order to realize the ASEAN Community.

Keywords: ASEAN, Student Union, ASEAN Community, Collaboration, Movement

CHINA AND JAPAN EAST ASIA REGIONALISM: INTEREST AND COMPETITION

Mohamed Aslam
Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya

Prior to ASEAN Plus Three (APT), China, Japan, and South Korea which are amongst the world's largest traders had not participated in any regional agreements. However, those countries are members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that was created in 1989. Ahead of the establishment of APT, Japan and South Korea put great emphasis on APEC for trade and investment liberalisation. Until now APEC has failed to materialise in establishing potential economic cooperation among members. On the other hand, the Association of Southeast Asia Nation (ASEAN) which was formed in 1967 is an active regional group. With its sub-regional economic co-operation, i.e ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was the only free trade area in East Asia before the APT and now the members are looking forward to the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community. ASEAN was the main mover in forming economic cooperation in the region, i.e it brought other countries in the region including China, Japan and South Korea to the negotiation table and finally ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was formed in 1998. China and Japan, have their own motives for participating in the regional group. Apart from APT, both countries have their own reasons in negotiating and signing bilateral FTA agreements with non-ASEAN members. The move by China and Japan implicitly, has “eroded” the main intention of APT in developing a single and solid free trade area in East Asia. The Japanese proposal on establishing an East Asian Community (EAC) is at stake of failing if there is no full attention by members of APT in looking forward to the possibility of forming the EAC. The main intention for the development of East Asia Summit (EAS) was to bring members of ASEAN and East Asian countries to the discussion table. However by including non-East Asian such as Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia and other countries certainly it has expunged the significance of EAS objectives. Development and the issues of the APT and EAS up to date show China’s and Japan’s are maneuvering and influencing the direction of APT particularly. It seems that there is competition between the two countries in engaging the APT and EAS. Not only are economic matters looked upon by the countries but also political motives have moved them into
regional economic cooperation in the region. The acts of China and Japan likely may not provide a clear signal that the APT is moving into a single FTA.

**Keywords:** Regional Economic Integration, International Relations, ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit

---

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND NGOS IN STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA**

Zubaidi

The bilateral relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia can be considered good despite all the obstacles and challenges that they have been facing from time to time. Thanks to the political mechanism set up by ASEAN countries to solve problems ranging from political, social, or economic issues. The bilateral relationship between both countries had been tied with other factors especially the social and religious factors which have played an important role in strengthening their relationship. This assumption can be proven by looking at the long history shared by both countries as well as the roles of the Muslim leaders of both countries and various religious organisations in maintaining the good relationship between them. These non-political factors are believed to be another factor which play an important role that strengthen the relationship of both countries.

This research will study the importance of the religious factor in maintaining the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia and the role of various religious organisations in strengthening their bilateral relationship.

The research is to be based on both library and field research. The library research will focus on the history and the religious elements which are shared by the people of these countries whilst the field research will focus more on the roles of religious leaders and Islamic organisations in both countries in maintaining the relationship.

The research will discuss firstly about the brief history of this bilateral relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia and the important elements of this relationship. It will be followed by studying the religious factors and practises which are shared by the people in both countries. Apart of this religious factor, the role of various Islamic organisations and institutions in strengthening this relationship will be discussed as well. In conclusion, this paper will provide, the opinions and suggestions on the importance of the religious factor and offer some ways of improving the relationship.

---

**MALAYSIA AND MYANMAR RELATIONS: SHOULD MALAYSIA TAKE SOME EXTRA MILES IN ENGAGING MYANMAR?**

Azman Ayob

1.0 Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA

2.0 Malaysia established diplomatic relationship with Myanmar in 1959. Since then, the relationship between the two countries has developed. Malaysia and Myanmar relations improved significantly after the end of confrontation with Indonesia in 1965. This bilateral relationship first centered upon security, and economic and trade cooperation. However, following the massive August 1988 pro-democracy demonstration in Myanmar where the new armed forces dictatorship led by General Saw Maung suppressed the people, leaving hundreds of deaths, the world had taken a more negative attitude toward Myanmar, including Malaysia. Although ASEAN countries had taken the non-interference approach in Myanmar’s domestic affairs, the signal of dissatisfaction over the incident had been conveyed to Myanmar. Malaysia also expressed a similar signal to Myanmar in accordance with the ASEAN stance. However, Myanmar seemed to look at Malaysia under the premiership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad to be its trusted international friend. Although economic and
Trade relations between Malaysia and Myanmar are relatively good. Malaysia has shown some dissatisfaction and frustration over the political situation and business environment in Myanmar. Malaysian companies have incurred losses due to Myanmar’s corruption and non-transparent policymaking process. Malaysia also is still frustrated with Myanmar’s slow and stagnant effort in democratizing its political systems, as well as Rohingya refugees that have flocked into Malaysia since 1978, not to mention other illegal immigrants from Myanmar, drugs and human trafficking issues.

This paper highlights the Malaysia and Myanmar relations in areas of security, economic, and trade cooperation as well as Myanmar’s domestic issues that have impacted Malaysia. This paper also focuses on some debatable arguments of the need for Malaysia to further engage Myanmar in bringing the country into international mainstream.

**Keywords:** Malaysia-Myanmar relations, ASEAN, Military Junta, Democracy, Foreign Policy

---

**MUSLIM FAITH IN BUDDHIST STATE: BURMESE MUSLIM NATIONALISTS’ CONTRIBUTIONS IN MYANMAR POLITICS 1920 – 1988**
Mohd Mohiyuddin Bin Mohd Sulaiman
Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA

Myanmar, a home for more than 135 different ethnic groups, is also a home for significant minorities that practice Islam, Hinduism, Christianity and animism. Most Myanmar studies, both pre-independence or post-independence, have been heavily centred on politics, even so on military rules. There is sparse literature about the Burmese Muslim nationalists who had tirelessly struggled hand in hand with their Buddhist counterparts such as Aung San and U Nu for the independence of Myanmar (then Burma) from the British. The first President of Rangoon University Student Union who called for massive demonstration against the British colonials was a Muslim. U Ba Chit, another Muslim, who was later appointed as the first Ambassador to Malaysia by U Nu, the Premier of Myanmar, was instrumental in convincing Aung San to sign the Pin Lon Treaty on 12 February 1947 that subsequently became a foundation of Myanmar independence. U Razak, whose name unequivocally manifests his faith, was serving as a Minister of Education when he was gunned down, along with Aung San, in an unfortunate massacre on 19 July 1947. Razak, a professor in Pali was very much liked by Aung San and his comrades who were mostly Buddhists. M.A. Rashid was a loyal disciple of Aung San and later served as Minister of Trade and Minister of Labor in the U Nu cabinet in post independence Myanmar. U Khin Maung Latt was another Muslim who served as Minister of Justice. This paper outlines contributions and roles rendered by Burmese Muslims in the fight to free Myanmar in reply to Myanmar literature.

---

**SPATIAL FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR ANALYSING CRIME RELATED ASSAULT IN KUALA LUMPUR**
Muharrir Kamaruddin, Rosmadi Fauzi and Jamilah Mohammad
Faculty of Arts & Social Science University of Malaya

This study analyzed the spatial factors that have tendency towards the occurrences of crime related assault in Kuala Lumpur. It is vital to identify what are the spatial factors that closely associated with crime related assault. Therefore, the appropriate method for addressing the above problem is factor analysis. Data were collected from 442 samples of census tract data in Kuala Lumpur. The data were converted into spatial data or spatial factors using Geography Information Systems (GIS) applications and grouping into 3 category groups of spatial factors which include (i) socio-demography, (ii) land use, and (iii) geographical features. A principle component analysis was conducted on 28 items. The Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) validated the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=.80. There are 7 components that have eigen values more than 1 and in combination explained 78.66 percent of the variance. Values in Rotated Component Matrix indicated
that factor 1 have 14 items (socio-demography features) while factor 2 have 11 items (land use and geographical features). Besides, the Component Transformation Matrix shows correlations between factors are low which is below .20(.16). This indicated that these 2 factors are independent and constructs independently. Based on the results, 25 items from 2 major components can be used as a factor for predicting crime related assault.

**Keywords:** Crime Related Assault, Spatial Factors, Factor Analysis

---

**BUILDING PEACE BEYOND THE BORDER IN SOUTH EAST ASIA NATIONS**

Suryo Wibisono
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, National Development University Yogyakarta

Relations between the countries in Southeast Asia in recent years have been marked by many conflicts. Overlapping claims and boundaries are often the cause of conflict. The author notes there are several border conflicts in the region, and some have even the tendency to be violent.

There is conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia over the issue of Ambalat; between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vhear, among Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, and China in the Spratly Islands, and several incidents in the border conflict that often happens.

Consciousness as a "brother" who is in the region of Southeast Asia and sheltered by the "family" ASEAN should be able to minimize the conflict. Diplomacy approach could be an option compared with the security approach. In this paper later, a solution to the number of border conflicts that occur will be discussed in detail, and the anatomy of some existing conflicts will be analyzed comprehensively.

**Keywords:** Borders, Conflict, Conflict Resolution

---

**ENERGY ISSUE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Apriwan
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Andalas University

The paper examines how energy issues have been securitizing in Southeast Asia. It takes five main issues which quite urgent for resolving in the region, that are energy crisis in Mekong River Basin, Ambalat issue, Thailand Gulf and South China Sea crisis. The issues could be potential conflict that will impact regional instability. In the Mekong, the problem of energy regards to utilize the river for building the hydropower along Mekong River Basin, it does not only involve the riparian states but also China which has the upstream area. Ambalat Issue (Indonesia) or ND6-ND7 (Malaysia) does not only the territorial problem, it also related to the energy resources. The tension among the two states was beginning when some companies which have signed a contract with Indonesia and Malaysia for exploring the same area (Ambalat/ND6-ND7). The same cases also happened in Thailand Gulf and South China Sea, some states got tension in exploring the area, each of them has territorial claiming over the region. Furthermore, to examine the securitization of the issues, it uses constructivism approach and securitization concept. This approach and the concept explain about the interaction among the states related to those issues. The interaction has two possibilities, conflict or cooperation. Hence, the issue of energy will bring the states to politize or even securitize their energy capacity through discovering and claiming the new resources as theirs. The paper explains how the issue has been part of security agenda within the region.
ASEAN IN EAST ASIA SUMMIT
Kim Hyung Jong
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

East Asia Summit was inaugurated at Kuala Lumpur in 2005 as a forum comprising so called ‘ASEAN+6’ states that are ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Its inception indicates the complexity of East Asian regionalism as it added an institution not replaced extant regional cooperation mechanisms in the region such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Indeed, the formation of EAS reflects the process of compromise among the related parties over power-relations in the region. It also relates to the emergence of new region. The inclusion of East Asia in its name would contribute to the recognition of East Asia as a region. However, it so happened not without confusion and contention with existing regional institutions in particular with APT. The fate of EAS is seemly judged by its relative merits. The ambiguity of its goal and overlapped area of cooperation with others denounce it as undesigned regionalism. The recent development of EAS to open its membership embracing the US and Russia denotes new aspects of East Asia regionalism as it is expected to have greater scope of membership and issues. While drawing on the evolution of EAS, this article investigates its challenges in the context of the ASEAN’s regional role in East Asian regionalism. It is divided into three parts. It analyses major factors for the formation of EAS followed by evaluating its functional cooperation. Finally, it draws its prospects for ASEAN from the recent development.

Keywords: ASEAN, East Asian Summit, East Asian Regionalism, ASEAN Plus Three, China, the US

SOCIAL DISTANCE MOBILITY IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES AROUND ANDALAS UNIVERSITY CAMPUS
Azwar
Department of Sociology Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Andalas University

Existence and development Andalas University campus get more accessibility for society who lives around the campus to get alternative jobs, although to get the access they require certain requirements. In this context the development of Andalas University campus had been triggered social and economic transformation. In the same time the conditions brought the local communities have integrated to wider communities. The growth of the new settlements those inhabited by lecturers and staffs university, boarding houses for students in local residential and construction of roads around the settlement and the roads that connected to outer area. When accessibilities greater, it means more easily for local communities to get better life standard. The condition will determine social mobility for local communities. Mobility process has been assumed will be done as vertical or horizontal (upward or horizontal mobility) then, the mobility have been a parameter for changes of social and economic status of the communities

Keywords: Social Distance Mobility, Social Change, Development

HOMOSEXUAL MEN’S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN ONLINE AND FACE TO FACE INTERACTIONS: FOCUS ON MALAYSIA
Francisco PerlasDumanig, Maya Khemlani David and Ahmed HilmiMhd. Noor
University of Malaya

Homosexuality is still a taboo in Malaysia since it is not allowed particularly in Islam. Malaysia as an Islamic country does not permit sexual relationships between those of the same gender. Despite such constraints, it is evident that male homosexual Malaysian Muslims exist. Although they try to hide their homosexual identities
in public they do explore and flaunt their homosexual identities online through an online social network. Such issues are explored in this paper by examining how homosexual men construct their identities in online and face-to-face interactions. To fully understand the construction of male homosexual identities, social constructionist and essentialist theories are unified and used as the theoretical framework. The study will be conducted in three phases of data gathering: chatting online, face-to-face interactions, and interviews. Interviews, observations and actual interactions with 20 homosexual men will be conducted in Kuala Lumpur. A qualitative approach will be used in the analysis. The analysis will focus on the identities constructed by homosexual Malaysian men in online and face-to-face interactions.

**Keywords:** Homosexuality, Identity, Online Chatting, Face-to-Face Interaction, Malaysia

---

**WHO ARE THEY? YOUTH IDENTITY IN SABAH IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION**

Andreas Totu, Dayu Sansalu, Romzi Ationg, Henry Bating
Centre for the Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning, Universiti Malaysia Sabah

The effects of globalization on people’s lives have been acknowledged and discussed thoroughly by academicians and researchers. The process of globalization brings about social changes, especially in the realm of personal as well as cultural identity. The spread of ‘foreign’ cultures and lifestyles into local environments has altered how people think about themselves, particularly among youths who were presumed to be naïve and vulnerable to new cultural influences. Therefore, this paper examines whether the identity of youths in Sabah was affected by the spread of foreign cultural elements. There were three types of identities to identify the current identity of youths in Sabah, namely traditional, transitional (crisis) and postmodern. The outcome of this study seemed to suggest that majority of the 800 respondents are in the identity crisis stage or even confused stage. Analyses through the Multiple Linear Regression produced interesting results. The main factors that contribute significantly to identity changes include media and globalization, local norms, and religion and beliefs. Peer group appeared to have a moderate impact on identity changes among respondents.

**Keywords:** Youth, Identity, Globalization, Media, Culture

---

**HUMAN ORDERING IN QURANIC RECITATION: THE INVENTION AND STANDARDIZATION OF MURATTAL AL-QUR’AN IN WEST SUMATERA**

Tulus Handra Kadir
Faculty Arts and Languages, State University of Padang

This paper presents a discourse on the ‘beautifying of murattal Al-Qur’an’ as a part of the human ordering aspect in Quranic recitation. It was derived from an exploratory study of the activity of murattal recitation as “actually sound” by the Minangkabau community in West Sumatera. This study was based on a case of the emergence of a dominant new style of murattal which impressed the homogeneity in the style of rhythmic recitation, but differs from murattal recitation that is performed by Arabian Syeikhs, which was used as reference, particularly in the prosody and musical communication aspects.

Research on the invention and standardization of murattal Al-Qur’an in West Sumatera depicts the reality of Quranic recitation as human ordering in Southeast Asia.

The beautifying of the Quranic recitation plays an important role in establishing the ‘impression’ of the Quranic recitation, specially the murattal Al-Qur’an. ‘Beautifying’ as a part of human ordering unveils the fact that there are different categories of murattal based on performance, constructing the meaning of recitation, determining the impression of recitation, and it shapes regional identity.
THE NEON LIGHTS OUTSIDE ONE’S SLIDING DOOR: DISPLACEMENT AND URBAN LIVING IN ISABELITA ORLINA REYES’S STORIES FROM THE CITY
Oscar Tantoco Serquina, Jr
Department of Speech Communication and Theatre Arts, University of the Philippines

This paper analyzes Isabelita Orlina Reyes’s first poetry book, Stories from the City (UP Press, 1998). Guided by John Rennie Short’s Urban Theory and Karen Caplan’s concept of deterritorialization, it aims to: 1) determine how Reyes tackles displacement, rootedness, the concept of home, and identity in her poetry; 2) identify the kind of dislocated consciousness operating in her poems; and 3) determine how Reyes approaches the subject of alienation in contemporary urban living.

Based on the analysis, this paper forwards that Reyes articulates the situation of individuals who grew up in a culture and society considered not theirs. As hybrids of Filipino and American values, customs, and beliefs, the various personae in Reyes’s collection experience the conflicts, tensions, and ambivalences that displaced individuals feel towards themselves and the people with whom they interact. Furthermore, they are so-called “transitional-beings” caught in the middle of here and there, East and West, the city where they grew up and the city which their bodies fit in.

In the end, Reyes’s personae have opted to look inward, shunning or severing themselves from the history, culture, and other material forces that constitute the urban space in which they are implicated. Ultimately, this paper proposes that Reyes’s poetry must interrogate the prevailing ideologies that control the city’s structure as well as the psychic patterns of everyday life, if only to be free from the shackles and complications of deterritorialization which one experiences and encounters in the city or elsewhere.

**Keywords:** Philippine Poetry, Deterritorialization, Urban Living, Home, Identity

‘UNYIL’ AND ‘UPIN – IPIN’: FROM CHILDREN’S STORY TO NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURAL
Ariani Ratna Budiati
Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies, University of Gadjah Mada

Children's stories are designed to meet the wishes of children's knowledge in his world, as well as introduction effort against the outside world. The use of dolls is an effective way for entertainment and education of children. Technological developments led to the children’s film series.

This paper discusses the series of films for children as one existing child entertainment media identity and multicultural education. This is where the children’s imagination on identity and diversity begins to form. To understand this issue, this paper will examine two series of kids 'Unyil' (Indonesia) and 'Upin- Ipin' (Malaysia). Two children have unique serial respectively, but there are similarities between the story that every element of national identity and multicultural development. Actually, two problems are not the kids 'area', but narrated in the story. The strength of these two films in the form of stories and visuals.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how movies helped shape the image of children and multicultural identity. This research proves that children become media film of national identity and multicultural education is very important in social life.

**Keywords:** Children’s Film Series, Imagination, Education, National Identity, Multicultural
THE DEVELOPMENTS OF BATIK IN FASHION DESIGNING IN KLANG VALLEY FROM YEAR 2003 TILL PRESENT
Pegah Jahangiri, Mina Hedayat and Dr Sabzali Musa Kahn
Cultural Centre, University of Malaya

The study of Malaysian batik offers a unique opportunity for others to begin to understand the traditional heritage of Malaysia. The art of batik has developed significantly in recent times as an expression of regional identity. Batik is made in many countries all over the world but it is in Malaysia that has become an expression of local pride and essential symbol of the nation. The batik being produced in Malaysia today is an interesting combination of old and new. Batik is commonly used as formal wear at official public functions but it should not be restricted to that. Malaysia could go far beyond that. This article identifies the developments of batik in fashion designing in Klang Valley from year 2003 till present. The latest Batik news is its adaptability to various different materials that make it a wonderful tool for creativity. The products made out of these innovations are also varied and not just restricted to apparel. Batik moves out of the traditional printing methods to experiment on various surfaces such as silk, cotton, wool, leather, paper and even wood. This study used qualitative research methods. Instruments used for collecting data are as follow: Interview, observation and documentation. This study is a qualitative research which fills the gap in knowledge in the development of batik in fashion industry from year 2003 till present focusing on Klang Valley.

Keywords: Batik Design, Fashion Design, Textile, Art, Malaysian Heritage

THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDEAL WOMEN IN INDONESIAN WOMEN-MADE FILMS
Elan Lazuardi
Faculty of Cultural Science, Gadjah Mada University

The development of Indonesian films recently is marked by the growing number of national films productions since the year 2000. Along with the rise and fall of national film production, one of the most interesting observable issues is women’s role. In the past, most female participants in Indonesian film industry as visual objects in movies which were mostly directed by men filmmakers. There was only a few number of women filmmakers. Now, more female figures emerge in our film industry in a more prominent role as filmmaker, both as producer and also director. Some attempt to produce films with women as the subject.

This paper discusses the narrative and visualization of young women captured by Indonesian female film-makers. Films produced and screened after 2000 were selected on a basis of the film subjects. Data for this paper was gained by analyzing a number of women-made film texts, and enriched by studying relevant literatures and documents, especially those about women’s representation in previous Indonesian films. Question raised in this paper is how women represent women on screen.

Findings suggest that contrary to previous films which often depicted women either as good housewives who ended happy or success career woman but ended miserably, the studied films have shown different portrait of Indonesian young women. However, these current films are still engaged in competing values of old and modern related with gender issues; wanting gender equality to be realized in real lives, but somehow still agreeing dominant discourse in patriarchal culture.

Keywords: Women, Film, Indonesia, Representation, Ideal
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MINANGKABAU DANCE THROUGH THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL POLITICS IN WEST SUMATERA
Indrayuda And Tulus Handra Kadir
Faculty Arts and Languages (FBS), State University of Padang

Social and political influence in West Sumatera, beginning with the transfer of government land to the village, gave a cultural impact to Minangkabau dance, so its growth slowed down and was adversely affected. Therefore, the development of inheritance, functions, uses and quantities have also changed. Accordingly, the traditional elements as a part of matrilineal system could not control and manage the development of Minangkabau culture of dance. So far the art educational institutions took control over the development of dance culture of Minangkabau in West Sumatera. Now, after returning to the state government, the government tried to push back the indigenous cultural development in the state of Minangkabau dance. Consistent with this, inheritance, functions and purposes of reviving the Minangkabau dance by the government and the local customs to its originality. So far, the dominant art institutions are operating on the development of dance culture of the Minangkabau. Therefore, further functional changes; have made the Minangkabau dance the commodity of art entertainment and tourism industry in West Sumatera.

Keywords: Cultural Development, Minangkabau Dance, Effects of Social Politics, Change of Government System, Nagari Society.

SUMBA IKAT: NEW TRENDS
Marie Tseng
Museum Volunteers Malaysia

Southeast Asia produces some of the most exquisite textiles in the world, among which are ikats. Ikat means to tie or knot in Malay and Indonesian. The quality of the “ikat” produced in this region is so great that the word ikat is now used worldwide to describe all textiles made using this technique of tie-dying the warp or weft threads (and sometimes both) before weaving the cloth. Young weavers in Sumba are perpetuating the art of ikat weaving, preserving traditions, and adapting to modernity. The traditional motifs are evolving and new ones are being created. Jill Forshee (1999: 36) points out that: “While modern, international influences have had the effect of diminishing the quality and local meaning of [Sumba] textiles in many cases, these same external forces have also stimulated tremendous creativity on the part of East Sumba’s designers, weavers, and traders—producing a revival in cloth production and various transformations in people’s lives.” In this paper I will look at the effect of globalization on the production of ikat, and how the people in Sumba are responding to these new challenges. The paper will also examine the future for the ikats of Sumba: How ikat have found their ways to the catwalks of London, Paris, or New York and how young Indonesian designers are also working at preserving the weaving traditions of Sumba.

Keywords: Sumba, Textiles, Cultural Identity, Preservation, Development

LANGKASUKA CLOTHS: LIMAR, TELEPUK, SONGKET AND TENUN
Zulkifli Mohamad
UC Riverside Dance Department, UCLA Southeast Asian Department

Little is known about the textiles of the former Malay kingdom of Langkasuka although the subject has been discussed at the Malaysian Textile Museum and Fowler Museum of the University of California. This presentation will first give a background to Langkasuka, the first Malay kingdom in Malay Peninsula, by examining theoretical dates of its founding and interactions with neighboring kingdoms such as Angkor of
Abstracts

present-day Cambodia, Sri Wijaya and Majapahit of present-day Indonesia, and Champa of present-day Vietnam. The different types of textiles, such as limar, telepuk, songket, and tenun, and the influences from the contemporaneous kingdoms will be explored. Hand-woven textile production continues in the Malaysian states of Kelantan and Terengganu, dating back to the 14th century CE. Weavers in Kelantan believe that the limar was introduced by the Khmer of present-day Cambodia indirectly through trade with the Siamese and also directly by association of the kingdom of Langkasuka of northern Malaysia. However, the weavers of Terengganu disagree and state that the tradition originated from India through trade with Sumatran (Sumatra of Indonesia) kingdoms. Weaving of songket continues in Terengganu but has ceased in Kelantan. Efforts to revitalize the traditional textiles are still possible in order to preserve and recall the region's heritage. Adaptations of the textiles to meet the needs of the local and international market will enable the conditions to continue. The talk will unfold itself through the reading of Stewart Wavel's The Daga King's Daughter.

Keywords: Malay, Langkasuka, Textiles, Cultural Preservation, Heritage

CULTURE AND INNOVATION: A SURVEY OF THE MALAYSIAN MUSIC INDUSTRY
Hasmah Zanudin and Ari Fzain Yusof Ali
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

The Malaysian music industry comprises a mixture of various creative elements each with their own traditions and conventions. The industry can be divided roughly into three eras, the musical era before the onset of the Internet, the musical era after onset of the Internet and the era of music which survived changes during these two eras and constitutes a niche area on its own. Each comprises a unique following not specific to any group though overlap does occur. This survey examines the elements pertinent in defining the music industry of Malaysia and highlights educational, social and business concerns. Far from being merely a genre specific attempt at analysis, this paper focuses on an industry undergoing change that sees each era as transitional. The scope of analysis includes the manufacture of music as well as its performance and each is treated accordingly as divergent areas of emphasis emerge. The governmental processes at work in establishing a rich and diverse culture of innovation, supportive of a musical environment that functions as the backbone of many overlapping industries such as television, film and theatre will be examined in a final analysis that questions Malaysia’s role as a content producing nation in the region.

Keywords: Arts, Funding, Music, Culture, Transitional, Creativity, Music Industry, Internet, Content Producer, Education, Business, Definition

IGAL KATA-KATA (NARRATIVE IGAL): EXAMINING APPROACHES TO THE INTERPRETATION OF FOLK TALES IN SAMA TRADITIONAL DANCE CHOREOGRAPHY
Hanafi Bin Hussin and MCM Santamaria
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya
Asian Centre, University of Philippines

This paper examines igal kata-kata (narrative igal) in the context of contemporary choreography. Igal is the traditional dance genre of the Sama peoples of maritime Southeast Asia. In particular, the paper examines three theatrical choreographic pieces presented in the Pesta Igal Festival held in the Philippines in 2010. Analysis of the data from the three cases appears to indicate that the reception of the concept of “folk tale” or “narrative” varies as much as notions of “choreography.” It also appears to indicate that the idea of “theatre” and “ritual” is not fully individuated. The first part of this paper reviews earlier works that have noted the existence of narrative igal or fragments of such in their field observations. The second part discusses the Pesta Igal event of 2010 as the creative context for this study in dance, as well as the rules of commission of
choreographic pieces that the participants were asked to follow. The third part describes the three dance pieces created by artists from the communities of Tabawan Island and Sitangkai Island, Tawi-Tawi Province, Philippines and Semporna, Sabah, Malaysia. Finally, the fourth part, presents a comparative template based on approaches to the interpretation of chosen narratives; engagement of the dance vocabulary; employment of music and other theatrical elements; and, several major aspects of the choreographic process.

**Keywords:** Maritime Southeast Asia, Sama People, Igal Dance, Traditional Dance Choreography, Folk Tale

---

**FESTIVAL PULAU MAKASSAR: Dari Ritual Ke Pariwisata**

Ruslan Ramlan
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara

Festivial perairan pulau Makassar merupakan salah satu even festival terbesar di Sulawesi Tenggara. Pada tahun 2011 ini merupakan penyelenggaraan festival yang ke Lima kalinya dan oleh Kementrian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata telah memasukan acara ini kedalam kelender festival nasional.

Festival ini dilaksanakan oleh Pemerintah Kota Baubau dalam hal ini Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Kota Bau-bau sesungguhnya berawal pada acara ritual tahunan masyarakat. Ritual tersebut adalah: Pakande Tanah (sedekah Bumi), Pakande Tawo ( sedekah Laut) dan Mata’a (Pesta Panen). Ketiga proses ritual ini kemudian diselingi dengan kegiatan olehraga air (Voli pantai, renang, lomba dayung perahu naga dan perahu tradisional) dan kegiatan kesenian tradisional (tari dan Musik).

Pelaksanan festival yang oleh pemerintah setempat dinilai sukses dari sisi pelaksanaan karena mampu mendatangkan pelancong local yang cukup banyak dan mendorong peningkatan perekonomian masyarakat. Namun demikian ada hal yang perlu mendapat perhatian yakni kegiatan ritual yang awalnya dianggap sacral oleh masyarakatnya secara perlahan namun pasti telah berubah menjadi sesuatu yang profane.

**Kata Kunci:** Festival, Ritual, Pariwisata

---

**FILIPINO ILOCUTION: GRAVITY, FREQUENCY AND ARCHITECTURAL COMPLEXITY**

Peter Jon L. Mendoza
Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology

This paper seeks to investigate the maturity of the Philippine language users’ use of their first language (L1) and the second language (L2). The aspects of communicative competence of Swain and Canale (developed by Dell Hymes and later refined by Chomsky) will be the epicenter of the theories employed in this study. Specifically, this paper will attempt to rationalize, quantify and qualify the instances of discourse competence (cohesiveness of ideas, and cohesion), sociolinguistic competence (register, context, language repertoire, style and cultural load) and strategic competence (repair of linguistic error, avoidance, and verbal to non-verbal transcoding) of the interlocutors as employed in the context and in unstructured conversations/social setting. The theory of acculturation (Schumann,1978) will also be used as to social distance (social dominance, integration pattern, enclosure, cohesiveness, size, cultural congruence, extended length of the residence) and psychological distance (motivation, attitude), and finally the types of communication strategies (Message abandonment, topic avoidance, circumlocution, approximation, use of all-purpose words, word coinage, restructuring, code switching, mime) by Piyasuda Wongsawang.
THE USE OF SARAWAK MALAY DIALECT AMONG URBAN DAYAK BIDAYUH IN KUCHING
Caesar Dealwis
Universiti Teknologi MARA Samarahan

Sarawak Malay is the lingua franca among urban Sarawakians in inter-ethnic communication. However, it is also used by the urban Bidayuhs across dialect group interactions. The sociolinguistic norms of the younger generation of Bidayuhs today are also influenced by Bahasa Malaysia, English and their own heritage dialects. Using Fishman (1968, 1972) as the main framework, the objectives of this paper are to determine the extent of the use of Sarawak Malay and other codes across dialect group interactions and to investigate the reasons for their code/s selection. The data was collected through audio recordings and transcriptions of 32 casual conversations and face-to-face interviews. Myers-Scotton’s (1993c) Matrix Language Frame Model was used as a point of reference to analyze the transcriptions based on different categories of language used and these will be supported by face to face interviews to explain language choices.

Keywords: Sarawak Malay, Urban, Bidayuh

THE SPREAD OF LOVE: A CASE STUDY OF CHARITABLE ACTIVITY OF TZU CHI FOUNDATION IN KALI ANGKE, JAKARTA
Wong, Lee Lan
Institute of Anthropology, National Tsing Hua University

This paper focuses on the collaboration between Tzu Chi Foundation and the government in Jakarta regarding the project of relocating residents on the Kali Angke riverbanks who have suffered because of the flood and the rubbish. Residents are mainly Muslims in the area were moved into housing and apartments built by the Tzu Chi Foundation, originally from Taiwan, which was launched in 2003 and 2005. The first question I observed are the collaboration among a Buddhist originated charitable organization, the Tzu Chi Foundation and the people from the government of Jakarta. Projects such as relocating residents and dredging the Angke River were launched after the big flood in 2002. There were numerous slums along the riverbanks and refuse piled up in the river which caused severe floods during heavy rain. Secondly, arguments made from the responses of the residents, mainly Muslims, living in the apartments for their perception about Buddha and Tzu Chi. Interethnic relation also become the main observation point as most volunteers from Tzu Chi are mainly Buddhis Taiwanese or Chinese in Jakarta while residents consisted mainly of Muslims. It argues a proximity good case study regarding religious and environment presented by the Tzu Chi in Jakarta.

Keywords: Tzu Chi Foundation, NGO, Angke River Restoration Project, Humanitarian Aid, Transnational, Globalization

Yambao, Clod Marlan Krister V
University of the Philippines

Coincidentally, in 2010, the replica of the pre-colonial “balangay” and the Spanish colonial Galleon Andalucia voyaged the sea to trace the “old route of globalization.” The former is a boat (sponsored by the Philippines) believed to be used in the pre-colonial migration and exchanges of the “Filipino ancestors” around the Southeast Asian neighbors and the latter (sponsored by Spain) used for the colonial Eurocentric exchange trading system. The events signify the context and representation of the Philippines within the...
contemporary global conditions and the proceeding of the “stranded” colonial historical memories that struggles to float within the Filipino consciousness.

In this paper, I will dissect the dominant paradigm that fuels the (re)voyaging of these antiquities in order to resurface the critical gravity of the pre-colonial and colonial inheritance as counter-memory. This paper therefore asks, what does it mean to retrace and re-narrate the route and re-docking of the ships within the climate of the neocolony and postcolony? In order to intimate this question, the paper looks at the production of meanings and memories as critical tropes of identity (re/de)construction and the historical and contemporary global conditions of the Filipino transnational maritime labor. This paper shall argue that the politics of repetition of these maritime events present both as a global spectacle/enchantment of memory and that it represents the struggle to keep the memories of (pre) colonial (counter)memories buoyant in the political sea of Filipino (and Southeast Asian) consciousness or identity construction against the current and currency of globality.

**Keywords:** Cultural Studies, Historical Memory, Maritime, Globalization, Cultural Representations, Identities

---

**HUBUNGAN VIETNAM DAN ASEAN 1967-1995**

Ahmad Zainudin Bin Husin  
Fakulti Sains Kemanusiaan, Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris


*Kata Kunci:* ASEAN, Vietnam, Perang Vietnam
**THE MAKING OF A ‘CLASSIC’ IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES: ANOTHER LOOK AT KAHIN, AGONCILLO AND THEIR BOOKS ON REVOLUTIONS**

Rommel A. Curaming  
Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Universiti Brunei Darussalam

This paper seeks to address the question, what makes a ‘classic’ in Southeast Asian Studies. It compares and contrasts features of two books, George Kahin’s *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* and Teodoro Agoncillo’s *Revolt of the Masses*, the subject-position of the authors, and the politico-academic contexts in which they were written, assessed and consumed. Specifically, it will try to answer the following questions: (1) To what extent did scholarly merit define a ‘classic’? (2) What features internal to particular country studies stimulated or impeded the making of a potential classic? (3) What sort of political and academic architectures were conducive or unreceptive to potential candidates? (4) In what ways, and to what extent, have the ‘rules of the game’ changed sixty years later?

**Keywords:** Indonesia, Philippines, Kahin, Agoncillo, Revolution, Nationalism, Classics

**RECONSTRUCTING MARITIME BOUNDARIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Shiskha Prabawanintygas  
Department of International Relations, Universitas Paramadina

Concepts of state border and territorial sovereignty in contemporary Southeast Asia are basically colonial constructs of which application had frequently triggered border conflicts between neighboring countries. The concepts also fail to accommodate the interests of communities living along state border lines. At the same time, processes of globalization have pushed forward the eradication of state political borders. All of these have in effect made state borders obsolete. Consequently, border conflicts have not been resolved properly...
which has spilled over into other realms beyond simply border sovereignty, such as economic competition, social cultures and international affairs.

This paper will examine the complex problems existing in maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia. It will examine both problems of trans-border activities and methods and approaches applied by neighboring states in seeking solutions. It will also analyze border narratives of the locals including its application within daily life. The methods and approaches of international bodies in handling border conflicts will also be discussed.

Keywords: Maritime Boundaries, Southeast Asia, State Border, Territorial Sovereignty

TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE AND SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION OF SHARED FISH STOCKS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Mohammad Zaki Ahmad
College of Law, Government and International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia

Cooperative management approach in fisheries conservation and management, either directly with other States or through regional fisheries management organization (RFMO), represents one of the core elements of responsible fisheries management as embodied in various international treaty and non-binding instruments adopted over the last three decades. With the present status of marine fisheries stocks worldwide indicates an alarming trend of serious depletion and over-exploitation arising largely from the failure of individual States to adopt effective management regime, there is urgent need to address this problem through an increased cooperation among States and RFMOs. This is especially the case with respect to the management and conservation of commercially important shared fish stocks in the South China Sea. Because the transboundary nature of these fish stocks spreads across different maritime jurisdictional zones such as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in this semi-enclosed sea, it is imperative for the management measures to be coherence and consistent throughout the stocks’ entire migratory range. Indeed, it is impossible for the relevant coastal State to act alone in managing those shared fish stocks within its own EEZ if it intends to achieve effective management and ensure rational utilization of the stocks. Consequently, coastal States need to engage in cooperative arrangement with other States that shared the same stocks. This paper examines the existing institutional framework that facilitates and promotes cooperation pertinent to the management and conservation of shared fish stocks in the South China Sea involving three ASEAN countries- Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. It also highlights international legal and policy frameworks that have embraced the principle of cooperative management in fisheries, as well as identifies the challenges confronting the region’s littoral States and fisheries organizations in applying this principle and proposes recommendations to address such challenges.

Keywords: Responsible Fisheries, Shared Fish Stocks, South China Sea, Institutional Framework, Cooperation

STRAITS PORT OF PENANG: GATEWAY TO INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Loh Wei Leng and Chi Seck Choo
Institute of Ocean and Earth Sciences, University of Malaya

From the earliest centuries, there is evidence of the participation of various communities in the Southeast Asian region in global trade between Europe, India and China. One of its components was between China and Maritime Southeast Asia which focused on trade in the South China Sea and the Straits of Melaka. Maritime Southeast Asia developed, first as suppliers of regional goods and services, next as the transit foci of routes
extending to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The region also attracted new migrant communities as sojourners, settlers and colonists vying for the control of the flow of goods and services, giving rise to an intricate pattern of complex local, regional and global trade networks.

As new types of products, routes and markets emerged in dynamic and ever changing patterns, some of the communities were wiped away, while others re-grouped to form new social and economic alliances, including “trading empires”. New political, social and economic liaisons and mobility resulted in the formation of acculturated minority communities.

This paper is part of a wider study of the contribution of one such minority sub-community, i.e., the Peranakan Chinese in maritime Southeast Asia in the when the China-Southeast Asia component of the East-West trade had its greatest impact on the social and economic development of the region, that is, the 18th to the 19th centuries.

**Keywords:** Trading Communities, Regional Commerce, Maritime Southeast Asia, Peranakan Chinese

---

**BAGAN SIAPI-API AND FISHERY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 1999-2011**

Nordin Hussin and Azmi Fitrisia

Faculty Social and Political Science in the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

Bagan Siapi-API on the east coast of Sumatra, part of the Malacca Strait waters rose to prominence again in the field of fisheries. It was once the second largest fish producer in the world during the Dutch colonial period although it went through a phase of decline. Infrastructure established to improve fishery Bagan Siapi-API. In 2006 has been carried out in cooperation with PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia I in the business coaching jetty, pontoon and passenger terminals. Then Port Bagan Siapi-API opened state voyage to Port Dickson, Malaysia. In another portion of the shipyard dock-year-old continues to be empowered hundreds of production. Shipyard continues to produce traditional fishing boats and modern. It is possible because Bengkalis regency administration has been divided and Bagan Siapi-API is currently in district administration Rokan Hilir.

This paper wants to elaborate effort Rokan Hilir district administration in the development of fisheries Bagan Siapi-API. It also explains the impact of fisheries Bagan Siapi-API and the growth of Southeast Asian fisheries in the same period. This paper is fostered within the framework of economic history, so that the economic approach guiding this paper.

---

**TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE MARITIME INDUSTRY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

Nazery Khalid and Nathalie Fau

Maritime Institute of Malaysia

The maritime industry facilitates much of the world’s trade. A host of activities is undertaken within the industry, including port operations, shipping, shipbuilding, cargo handling, offshore oil and gas exploration and production (E&P), tourism and fishery. The maritime industry is subject to many factors that affect its development, growth and direction. Trends and developments in international relations, regulatory framework, trade, technology, investment, production, consumption, distribution and supply chain management, among many others, directly or indirectly affect the activities in the maritime industry. For a region like Southeast Asia which is surrounded by seas and depends largely on the oceans to generate economic growth, it is important for the stakeholders in the maritime industry to have a good grasp of these trends and developments to enable regulators and industry players alike to adjust to the demands of this dynamic industry and the competitive environment. This is important if Southeast Asia is to retain and enhance its competitiveness and attractiveness as a maritime region, a growth area for trade and an investment
destination. This paper outlines the key trends and developments affecting the region’s maritime industry and highlight how they are changing the industry. It recommends a set of response on how the regional stakeholders in the maritime industry should respond to these trends and developments, arguing along the way that they may risk losing their competitiveness if they do not adapt and adjust to the demands and changes of a world in flux. The paper stresses that although Southeast Asia enjoys strategic advantage for its location along busy shipping lanes and its riches of marine resources, there are huge challenges ahead for the region to overcome in order to attract investment and to provide human capital in the maritime industry to develop it, and to remain competitive in areas such as ports, shipping, shipbuilding and offshore energy E&P.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, Maritime Industry, Competitiveness

THE POTENTIAL OF SYNERGY IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY: CASE PEKANBARU AND KAMPAR REGENCIES

Sri Endang Kornita
Faculty of Economics, University of Riau, Pekanbaru

This paper identified the potential of synergy in development policy at two local governments in Riau Province, Indonesia. Since its implementation in 2000, the regional government has more authority with respect to regional development policy. The opportunity for synergy in development policy between regions could be an alternative for faster regional development. The basic sectors which have synergy potential, in terms of policy, program, and institution in the region, need to be identified and analysed using SWOT analysis to find the development strategy to create synergy in regional development.

Based on the results of research, it was shown that synergy in development between the regencies (Kampar and Pekanbaru) has potential in the agricultural sector for Kampar and trading for Pekanbaru. To improve people economics welfare at both regencies by strategy of build the public organization for the synergy in professional and dynamic activity. The conclusion is collective stakeholder involvement of government, private sectors, including third party vendors, and citizens as ‘strategic’ partners is essential in the creation of synergy in development.

Keywords: Synergy, Development, Policy, Potential, Economy

THE VIRTUAL HAKKA COMMUNITY: A NEW DOMAIN OF REVITALIZATION

Siripen Ungsitipoonporn
Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia, Mahidol University

Hakka language is one variety of Chinese language, Sino-Tibetan family. Hakka themselves have many sub-dialects which mean they come from several areas in China such as Guangdong, Southern Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Hunan, and Sichuan provinces. Now the Hakka descendants in Thailand are scattered throughout every province. However, there are only a few older Hakka speakers who can speak Hakka language well. How do they preserve language and culture before the end of 21st century?

The purpose of this paper is to present a new domain of Hakka revitalization via Hakka online community. This website just has created more than three years by the webmaster who would like to preserve his ancestor language and culture. Although he cannot speak Hakka so much, he wants Hakka speakers who know Hakka language well used this website to communicate or transfers Hakka language to the next generation using Thai language. So far, this website is quite well known among Hakka descendants who are interested in Hakka language and culture. There are some new members join the website every day. They exchange opinions and knowledge on many aspects of Hakka language and culture. It seems to be they live in a community although
they stay in their homes scattered in many parts of the world. The most important thing is that there are members in every age group. This phenomenon reflects the positive way and hope for preserving Hakka ethnicity because the Hakka themselves have realized the need for language and culture revitalization

**Keywords:** Hakka, Community Online, Language Revitalization, Sociolinguistics, Hakka in Thailand

**DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Padma Indranila  
Centre for Southeast Asia Social Studies in Gadjah Mada University

Southeast Asia has a large number of ethnic groups. There are 878 ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. Media has shown cases of discrimination experiences by ethnic minority groups in Southeast Asia. This prompted a Human Rights Violations research in 2010, carried out through media watch. The study findings show that there are many conflicts among various ethnic groups related to human violence. This paper addresses various cases of ethnic discrimination in several countries in Southeast Asia.

This condition occurred when the minorities of ethnic groups were discriminated by the majorities. In Indonesia, conflicts between ethnic groups are usually triggered by religious conflicts. This situation also happened in other countries in Southeast Asia such as Myanmar, Thailand, Filipina, Vietnam, and Laos. However, in Malaysia and Singapore, conflicts between ethnic groups occurred because of racial issues. It can be seen that a large number of ethnic groups in a country could be linked to a number of conflicts and human violence happened between the ethnic groups. This lesson teaches us the importance of unity in diversity.

**Keywords:** Discrimination, Ethnic, Minorities, Southeast Asia

**ISLAM, INDONESIA AND EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES: CONTRIBUTION TO THE MALAY MUSLIMS DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHERN THAILAND**

Lili Yulyadi  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Southern Thailand conflict which involved Malay Muslims and the kingdom of Thailand has been considered as both an ethnic and a religious conflict. It was widely believed that the root of conflict has been colonial in nature. However the long lasting conflict in this region remains perceived by Muslim countries as internal domestic affairs and none of the international organizations have paid attention on this minority community.

Various attempts have been carried out to settle the problem amongst the parties involved. On the other hand, Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world does not also consider the conflict as an international issue. As such, there has been no real attempt to assist the Muslim minority in Southern Thailand. However, there are some hidden attempts from the Islamic institutions in Indonesia where they provide an opportunity for Malay Muslims at the Southern Thailand to pursue their higher education. This paper attempts to highlight the role of Indonesian Islamic institutions in granting education opportunities for the Malay Muslims in the southern Thailand.

**Keywords:** Southern Thailand, Educational Opportunities, Malay Muslims, Colonial Conflict
THREATS TO EDUCATION IN SOUTHERN THAILAND
Bordin Waelateh
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince of Songkla University

The raid of the Thai military camp in Narathiwat province on 4 January 2004 triggered an “official kick off” of several forms of violence and troubles in the area of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat known as the southern border provinces of Thailand which has endured to the present days. Whatever the reasons behind the violence are, the residents who live in the area, mostly Muslims and of Malay ethnicity, are encountering hardships in spending their daily life. The distrust among the different groups of people involved, especially among Muslims and non-Muslims is widely seen. This situation has also compromised the quality of education in the area. Recently, the Office of National Educational Quality Assurance (ONEQA) revealed that Pattani is ranked the lowest in terms of national educational standard. It is ranked number 73 out of 73 provinces in Thailand, while its neighbors, Narathiwat and Yala are ranked 72 and 71, respectively.

This article provides an insightful argument of the educational system in the deep south of Thailand through various cases that the researcher has witnessed as he is a native of Pattani. The article also explains the possible reasons why education in the deep south is under threat. The educational system is obviously different from the mainstream Thai educational system. 50% of school time is devoted to religious studies and the other half is for general education, while the mainstream education is totally focused on general education. After the violence erupted seven years ago, many Buddhist teachers moved out from the area. Some schools were burned down and schools were closed for a period of time.

Keywords: South Thailand, Educational System, Islamic Education

“MALAYSIAN SOLUTION” DOES NOT DETER ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES SAIL TO AUSTRALIA: A STUDY FROM HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
Andika Bin Ab Wahab
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Australian and Malaysian governments had jointly announced the proposed agreement to send back the first 800 asylum seekers those will reach Australia illegally back to Malaysia. This initiative was proposed in effort of the both governments to combat and break human trafficking and smuggling’s business model in Southeast Asian region. However, this initiative was tremendously condemned by various quarters, in particular, the Office of High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) as well as both Australian and Malaysian human rights organizations taken into consideration of appalled human rights record of Malaysian government in treating hundred thousands of refugees and asylum seekers in its country. At the same time, initial study finds that asylum seekers are not afraid to take a boat and sail to Australia although have to face risk of being sent back to Malaysia. This study aims to investigate how this proposed agreement can be implemented as an effective deterrence to combat human trafficking and smuggling whereby asylum-seekers and refugees still want to take boat to Australia. Australian media report in Malaysia also found that this initiative is not disturbing the regular transaction of the agents (service provider) as long as the demands are still rising up. In doing so, the study will investigate the current refugee protection and the survival of refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia from human security perspectives in order to explain why this proposed agreement is ineffective to combat human trafficking and smuggling’s business model. This study is of the view that any effort to grasp the national security should not sideline the element of human security. In fact, it should be done simultaneously.
MUSLIM WOMEN ACTIVIST ORGANISATIONS IN THE CONFLICT REGION OF SOUTH THAILAND
Mala Rajo Sathian and Rosnun Che Yusof
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

This paper will examine civil society organisations in the south of Thailand that have mushroomed since the escalation of violence in the southern provinces since 2004. Unlike most religious and civil organisations that are led by men, this study focuses on organisations led by women that aims primarily to seek redress for the loss of their Muslim brethren especially their own fathers, husbands and sons in the violent clashes in the south. How do these women who are not accustomed to bargaining and speaking to higher agencies seek redress or even get a chance at filing papers for the release of their sons, husbands or fathers. Some spend long desperate months outside courtrooms, police and army lock ups in the hope of getting some remote information on their loved ones but are often turned away. In solidarity, these women have grouped together to form organisations to fight for their cause. Examples of these Muslim women organisations are the klum yaew ya or Hearty Heart Foundation led by sisters Pattama Haemima and Anchana Semmina and the Faliheen group which focuses on the welfare of orphaned children and widowed women. This paper will look into the workings of these groups, their source of support and funding as well as their mechanisms for seeking redress and justice from the state.

UNDERSTANDING HIEP HOI CHAM: HOI GIAO VIETNAM (THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM CHAM IN VIETNAM)
Rie Nakamura
College of Law, Government and International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia

The paper aims to understand the Association of Muslim Cham in Vietnam and their activities. It was the government-recognized organization of the Cham ethnic minority group in the 1960s. This association was needed to assist the Cham people who had migrated into Saigon, seeking employment and escaping from the war. They also needed to have an organization to identify them as Cham ethnic minority to prevent them from being conscribed. Upon establishment of the Association, it carried out various activities to assert their ethnic identity as Cham based on the religion of Islam. Since the Association was recognized by the former Saigon government, current Vietnamese scholars see it as a product of the US puppet regime. There are only limited number of research carried out and those studies are quite sketchy and some facts are unclear. The paper is based on the interview accounts of former officials of the association and some archive records to re-evaluate the meaning of the Association. It argues that the Association of Muslim Cham in Vietnam can be understood as the earliest attempt to unify the Cham ethnic minority scattered in the southern part of Vietnam through the religion of Islam and to build a Pan-Cham ethnic identity. The paper also discusses the Cham Muslim community’s relationship to to International Muslim communities especially the Malay communities in Malaysia. Relating to this issue, the paper examines the process of introduction of the new sect of Islam called “Muda” (young group) from Malaysia.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Cham, Islam, Vietnam, Minority Policies
THE CHAM DIASPORA IN MALAYSIA. AN ‘INVISIBLE’ COMMUNITY?
Nicolas Weber
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya

Among the new migrant communities in Malaysia, the Chams hold a particular position. The Chams have interacted with the Malays for centuries although the migration to Malaysia occurred mainly after the early 1980’s. The study of the Cham community in Malaysia is quite challenging as the Chams and the Malays share many linguistic, cultural and religious characteristics. This paper considers first the origins of the Chams of Malaysia and the history of their migrations to this country. It will then consider the nature of Cham social and economical practices.

Keywords: Cham, Migrants, Southeast Asia, Malaysia